text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has created scheduled tasks to maintain Machete's persistence.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus achieved persistence by placing a malicious executable in the startup directory and has added the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key to the Registry.[185] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has enumerated programs installed on an infected machine.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has used encrypted strings and configuration files.[273][274][275][276][277][278][279] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can store a file named mpsvc.dll, which opens a malicious mpsvc.mui file, in the same folder as the legitimate Microsoft executable MsMpEng.exe to gain execution.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax has set an execution trigger date and time, stored as an ASCII Unix/Epoch time value.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1636.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMS Messages
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather SMS messages. On Android, this can be accomplished using the SMS Content Provider. iOS provides no standard API to access SMS messages. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing. [21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot's second stage DLL has set a timer using "timeSetEvent" to schedule its next execution.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Trust Dies in Darkness: Shedding Light on Samsung's TrustZone Keymaster Design
ARM-based Android smartphones rely on the TrustZone hardware support for a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to implement security-sensitive functions. The TEE runs a separate, isolated, TrustZone Operating System (TZOS... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can inject code into system processes including notepad.exe, svchost.exe, and vbc.exe.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can detect and block sensitive data being sent over unencrypted protocols. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae can achieve persistence through a Registry Run key.[174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has placed malware on file shares and given it the same name as legitimate documents on the share.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can spawn processes with alternate PPIDs.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can decode its encoded PE file prior to execution.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
VNC defaults to TCP ports 5900 for the server, 5800 for browser access, and 5500 for a viewer in listening mode. Filtering or blocking these ports will inhibit VNC traffic utilizing default ports. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has created scheduled tasks using name variants such as "Windows Update Security", "Windows Update Security Patches", and "Google Chrome Security Update", to launch Maze at a specific time.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used tracert to check internet connectivity.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0160
ATT&CK Technique Name:certutil
certutil has been used to decode binaries hidden inside certificate files as Base64 information.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used exploits to increase their levels of rights and privileges.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can deobfuscate its payload prior to execution.[53][54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS has a command to download an .exe and use process hollowing to inject it into a new process.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit user access to system utilities such as systemctl to only users who have a legitimate need. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. has C2 commands to add an infected device to a DDoS pool.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton is able to read, write and execute code in memory on the safety controller at an arbitrary address within the devices firmware region. This allows the malware to make changes to the running firmware in memory and modify how the device operates. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Device Authentication
Adversaries may use Patch System Image to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Device Authentication
Adversaries may use Patch System Image to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 A New Trend for the Blue Team - Using a Practical Symbolic Engine to Detect Evasive Forms of Malware/Ransomware
Blue Teams and anyone on the defensive side face various challenges when it comes to reverse engineering suspected malware or ransomware binaries, especially ones with obfuscation techniq... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak logs key strokes for configured processes and sends them back to the C2 server.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0419
ATT&CK Technique Name:SimBad
SimBad registers for the BOOT_COMPLETED and USER_PRESENT broadcast intents, which allows the software to perform actions after the device is booted and when the user is using the device, respectively.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has the ability to delete files on the compromised host.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0163
ATT&CK Technique Name:Janicab
Janicab captured audio and sent it out to a C2 server.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors use NBTscan to discover vulnerable systems.[230] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has obtained valid accounts to gain initial access.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cleaver
Cleaver has created fake LinkedIn profiles that included profile photos, details, and connections.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Are You Trading Stocks Securely? Exposing Security Flaws in Trading Technologies
With the advent of electronic trading platforms and networks, the exchange of financial securities now is easier and faster than ever; but this comes with inherent risks. Nowadays, not only rich people can invest in the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place.Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Periodically review user accounts and remove those that are inactive or unnecessary. Limit the ability for user accounts to create additional accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used PsExec to deploy beacons on compromised systems.[15] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Keynote - Preparing the Long Journey for Data Security
Data has been regarded as the fifth factor of production, and data security is ranked a high priority by governments across the world. In China, data security-related legislation such as the "Data Security Law" and "Personal Information Prote... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to critical systems and domain controllers. Most cloud environments support separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances that enable further segmentation of cloud systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a batch file that modified the COMSysApp service to load a malicious ipnet.dll payload and to load a DLL into the svchost.exe process.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla can query the Registry for its configuration information.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used a custom build of open-source command-line dbxcli to exfiltrate stolen data to Dropbox.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark can collect the GUID of a targeted machine.[229][230] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell can issue commands via HTTP POST.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has compromised personal email accounts through the use of legitimate credentials and gathered additional victim information.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has the ability to overwrite scripts and delete itself if a sandbox environment is detected.[178] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Pwning Cloud Vendors with Untraditional PostgreSQL Vulnerabilities
Cloud service providers often provide popular and beloved open-source solutions as multi-tenant managed services. This is a significant power of the cloud - to offer anything as a scalable, managed service. However, these projects w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to use the command shell to execute commands on a compromised host.[295] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has hosted open-source remote access Trojans used in its operations in GitHub.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing was run through a deployed Ubuntu container.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Poseidon Group
Poseidon Group searches for administrator accounts on both the local victim machine and the network.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0298
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbot
Xbot can encrypt the victim's files in external storage (e.g., SD card) and then request a PayPal cash card as ransom.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:IndigoZebra
IndigoZebra sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments that urged recipients to review modifications in the file which would trigger the attack.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1608.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Link Target
Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in Malicious Link. Li... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Controller Authentication
Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has edited the Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost.exe.config file to load a malicious DLL into the AD FS process, thereby enabling persistent access to any service federated with AD FS for a user with a specified User Principal Name.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1608.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Upload Malware
Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1398
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts are part of the underlying operating system and are not accessible to the user unless the device has been rooted ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser's installer contains a malicious file named navlu.dll to decrypt and run the RAT. navlu.dll is also the name of a legitimate Symantec DLL.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet used WMI with an explorer.exe token to execute on a remote share.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda's custom ORat tool uses a WMI event consumer to maintain persistence.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use PsExec to execute a payload on a remote host. It can also use Service Control Manager to start new services.[17][18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy has used Systeminfo to gather the OS version, as well as information on the system configuration, BIOS, the motherboard, and the processor.[60][61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:MiniDuke
MiniDuke can gather the hostname on a compromised machine.[131] | secon |
title:botconf2013 Spatial Statistics as a Metric for Detecting Botnet C2 Servers
Botnets consist of thousands of hosts infected with malware. As these hosts are widely dispersed and usually not physically accessible to botnet owners, a means to communicate with these hosts is needed. Using Command and Control (C2) serv... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weakne... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can log keystrokes on the victim’s machine.[5][6][7][8][9] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 ExplosION: The Hidden Mines in the Android ION Driver
The ION driver is an essential component introduced by Google into the Android kernel to facilitate allocations of device-accessible memory. It has been widely used by vendors for almost 10 years. In addition, almost all untrusted apps can acce... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has conducted watering-hole attacks through media and magazine websites.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used the Windows API ObtainUserAgentString to obtain the User-Agent from a compromised host to connect to a C2 server.[106] Lazarus Group has also used various, often lesser known, functions to perform various types of Discovery and Process Injection... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can make tokens from known credentials.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla RPC backdoors can impersonate or steal process tokens before executing commands.[13] | secon |
title:botconf2019 An Android Botnet Analysis – Shaoye Botnet
The action of Shaoye botnet started from June 2017. The peak of attacks was seen in January 2018. TWNCERT (Taiwan National Computer Emergency Response Team) received the intelligence about a DNS hijack from Japan NICT (National Institute of Information and Co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE can establish persistence by installing itself in the startup folder, whereas the GO variant has created a HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookM registry key.[251][252] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0343
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Windows
The Exaramel for Windows dropper creates and starts a Windows service named wsmprovav with the description "Windows Check AV" in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate service.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke searches for Microsoft Outlook data files with extensions .pst and .ost for collection and exfiltration.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used scheduled tasks to automatically log out of created accounts every 8 hours as well as to execute malicious files.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has used Tor nodes for C2 traffic.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 added credentials to OAuth Applications and Service Principals.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1027.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Steganography
Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi gathers and exfiltrates keystrokes from the machine.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle queries the device for metadata such as make, model, and power levels.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can use System.DirectoryServices namespace to retrieve domain group information.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT overwrites and deletes the Master Boot Record (MBR) on the victim's machine and has possessed MBR wiper malware since at least 2009.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth has used an XOR-based algorithm to encrypt payloads twice with different keys.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can remount the system partition as read/write to install attacker-specified certificates.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 When TLS Hacks You
Lots of people try to attack the security of TLS. But, what if we use TLS to attack other things? It's a huge standard, and it turns out that features intended to make TLS fast have also made it useful as an attack vector.Among other things, these features provide a lot of flexibi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has leveraged the BatchEncryption tool to perform advanced batch script obfuscation and encoding techniques.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1584.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Serverless
Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys associated with COR_PROFILER. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0357
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impacket
Impacket modules like ntlmrelayx and smbrelayx can be used in conjunction with Network Sniffing and LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay to gather NetNTLM credentials for Brute Force or relay attacks that can gain code execution.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for logon scripts that may lead to persistence. | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.