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ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has loaded a plist file using the launchctl command.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team added a login to a SQL Server with sp_addlinkedsrvlogin.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used regsvr32 to execute malware.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1027.011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fileless Storage
Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage include the Windows Registry, event logs, or ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke hides many of its backdoor payloads in an alternate data stream (ADS).[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0551
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle has retrieved .doc, .txt, .gif, .apk, .jpg, .png, .mp3, and .db files from external storage.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has used spearphishing attachments to infect victims.[186] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has used strategic web compromises, particularly of South Korean websites, to distribute malware. The group has also used torrent file-sharing sites to more indiscriminately disseminate malware to victims. As part of their compromises, the group has used a Javascript ba... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the per... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot has modified the Registry to install a second-stage script in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\sibot.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can look for files carrying specific extensions such as: .rtf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .pps, .ppsx, .txt, .gpg, .pkr, .kdbx, .key, and .jpb.[190] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel can RC4-encrypt credentials before sending to the C2.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare has used an invalid certificate in attempt to appear legitimate.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used compromised credentials to log on to other systems and escalate privileges.[56] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Battle of Windows Service: A Silver Bullet to Discover File Privilege Escalation Bugs Automatically
System services have always been an important component of Windows 10. In recent years, there have been quite a few privilege escalation vulnerabilities in them.At present, we can effectively automat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0052
ATT&CK Technique Name:OnionDuke
OnionDuke has the capability to use a Denial of Service module.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has used an IRC channel for C2 communications.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0424
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triada
Triada utilized HTTP to exfiltrate data through POST requests to the command and control server.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used zwShell to establish full remote control of the connected machine and manipulate the Registry.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can determine if a user is logged in by checking to see if explorer.exe is running.[241] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT has the ability to download additional payloads onto an infected machine.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit the number of high-privileged domain and cloud accounts, and ensure that these are not used for day-to-day operations. Ensure that on-premises accounts do not have privileged cloud permissions and that isolated, cloud-only accounts are used for m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff can intercept two-factor authentication codes transmitted via SMS.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
InnaputRAT variants have attempted to appear legitimate by adding a new service named OfficeUpdateService.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kasidet
Kasidet creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[128][129] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 A Deep Dive into Privacy Dashboard of Top Android Vendors
Most android vendors designed privacy dashboards before Android 12 to allow users to monitor sensitive behaviors of their installed apps, such as clipboard access, location collection, file operation, etc. However, we conducted comprehensive... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's kerberos module can create silver tickets.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch can persist via DLL search order hijacking on Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, or Microsoft OneDrive.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy gathers the current time zone and date information from the system.[82][83] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Detecting Fake 4G Base Stations in Real Time
4G/LTE IMSI-catchers (such as the Hailstorm) are becoming more popular with governments and law enforcement around the world, as well as spies, and even criminals. Until now, IMSI-catcher detection has focused on 2G IMSI-catchers (such as the Stingray), ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has created new virtual machines within the target's cloud environment after leveraging credential access to cloud assets.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0521
ATT&CK Technique Name:BloodHound
BloodHound can collect password policy information on the target environment.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used public sites such as github.com and sendspace.com to upload files and then download them to victim computers.[114][1] The group's JavaScript backdoor is also capable of downloading files.[115] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Sandbox detection for the masses: leak, abuse, test
Manual processing of malware samples became impossible years ago. Sandboxes are used to automate the analysis of malware samples to gather information about the dynamic behaviour of the malware, both at AV companies and at enterprises. Some malware s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used brute force techniques to obtain credentials.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has encrypted files stolen from connected USB drives into a RAR file before exfiltration.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has staged data on remote MSP systems or other victim networks prior to exfiltration.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used the WMIEXEC utility to execute whoami commands on remote machines.[17] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Disinformation At Scale: Using GPT-3 Maliciously for Information Operations
Last year, OpenAI developed GPT-3—currently the largest and most powerful natural language model in the world. The select groups that were granted first access quickly demonstrated that it can write realistic text from almos... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can use Native API for defense evasion, discovery, and collection.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has used PowerShell to execute malicious commands and payloads.[118][119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet uses encrypted configuration blocks and writes encrypted files to disk.[315] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Hardware Installation
Limit the use of USB devices and removable media within a network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that low-privileged user accounts do not have permission to add access keys to accounts. In AWS environments, prohibit users from calling the sts:GetFederationToken API unless explicitly required.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.015
ATT&CK Technique Name:ListPlanting
Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
In one version of KeyBoy, string obfuscation routines were used to hide many of the critical values referenced in the malware.[182] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Automation Techniques in C++ Reverse Engineering
This presentation will discuss several generic, automated dynamic analysis techniques based on DLL injection for type analysis while reverse engineering C++ code. We focus on discovering the locations where structures are used within a C++ program thr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors staged malware and malicious files in legitimate hosting services such as OneDrive or MediaFire.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[112] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Government-Mandated Front Doors?: A Global Assessment of Legalized Government Access to Data
Who needs a backdoor when front door access is required? From Tesla to the U.S. tech giants, there has been a growing focus on whether private sector companies are obliged to turn over data to a foreign gove... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic searches for anti-malware services running on the victim’s machine and terminates itself if it finds them.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1592.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 9 and above restricts access to microphone, camera, and other sensors from background applications.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group delivered RATANKBA and other malicious code to victims via a compromised legitimate website.[31][32] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 AEPIC Leak: Architecturally Leaking Uninitialized Data from the Microarchitecture
CPU vulnerabilities undermine the security guarantees provided by software- and hardware-security improvements. While the discovery of transient-execution attacks increased the interest in CPU vulnerabilities on a micr... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Integration of Cyber Insurance Into A Risk Management Program
This session will provide information on the current data breach landscape and then discuss how Cyber Insurance is being integrated into a risk management plan. Information Security professionals and incident responders are in many cases ... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Dirty Bin Cache: A New Code Injection Poisoning Binary Translation Cache
In recent years, Arm processors have become popular on laptops, not limited to embedded devices. For example, Apple announced the Mac transition from Intel to Arm-based Apple Silicon in 2020, which made a big splash. Apple S... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors used AnyDesk to transfer tools between systems.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can downloaded payloads from C2 to the compromised host.[314][315] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1005
ATT&CK Technique Name:POLONIUM
POLONIUM has used compromised credentials from an IT company to target downstream customers including a law firm and aviation company.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain has deleted collected items after uploading the content to its C2 server.[145][146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has been delivered via spearphishing emails which contained malicious links.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear has used a custom RC4 and XOR encrypted protocol over port 443 for C2.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1001.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Protocol Impersonation
Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic ble... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Adversaries can instruct Duqu to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on rem... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Sakula contains UAC bypass code for both 32- and 64-bit systems.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth creates a startup item for persistence. [31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST was digitally signed by SolarWinds from March - May 2020.[64] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Fantastic Red-Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Red team testing in organizations over the last year has shown a dramatic increase in detections mapped to MITRE ATT&CK™ across Windows, Linux and macOS. However, many organizations continue to miss several key techniques that, unsurprisingly, often bl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has modified files based on the open-source project cryptcat in an apparent attempt to decrease AV detection rates.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowGoop
PowGoop can side-load Goopdate.dll into GoogleUpdate.exe.[43][54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX adds Run key entries in the Registry to establish persistence.[194][56][195] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy has a command to delete files and directories.[258][259][260] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can use PowerShell for payload execution and C2 communication.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
A TYPEFRAME variant can force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can implement the kernel32.dll Sleep function to delay execution for up to 300 seconds before implementing persistence or processing an addon package.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can search for debugging tools on a compromised host.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 How can Someone with Autism Specifically Enhance the Cyber Security Workforce?
This session outlines how someone with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) offers a unique skillset that can be very helpful in the cybersecurity field.A higher percentage of hackers show signs or are already diagnosed ASD tha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.[5][6] These audits should also include if default ac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0133
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nomadic Octopus
Nomadic Octopus executed PowerShell in a hidden window.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used RAR to compress collected data before exfiltration.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE has been obfuscated with hex-encoded strings.[310] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Attacking Hardware Systems Using Resonance and the Laws of Physics
Everything has a resonant frequency. By finding the resonant frequency of certain electronic sensors, programmable logic, and other devices, it is possible to subvert certain systems that are supposedly secured by the electronic comp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict write access to XDG autostart entries to only select privileged users. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Administrators should audit all cloud and container accounts to ensure that they are necessary and that the permissions granted to them are appropriate. Additionally, administrators should perform an audit of all OAuth applications and the permissions they have been granted ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 A New Trend for the Blue Team - Using a Practical Symbolic Engine to Detect Evasive Forms of Malware/Ransomware
Blue Teams and anyone on the defensive side face various challenges when it comes to reverse engineering suspected malware or ransomware binaries, especially ones with obfuscation techniqu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.[98][99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used batch scripts to download tools and executing cryptocurrency miners.[327] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation can often detect rooted devices. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Dive Into Apple IO80211Family Vol. 2
At the Black Hat USA 2020 I presented a topic [1] related to the Apple IO80211Family, which discussed the architecture, attack surfaces, and numerous cases of kernel vulnerabilities for the Apple 80211 Wi-Fi kernel extensions. One and a half years have passed, an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has executed DLL search order hijacking.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0454
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cadelspy
Cadelspy has the ability to identify open windows on the compromised host.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 2021: A Titan M Odyssey
In the past years, most of the Android devices were relying on ARM Trustzone for critical security features.In 2018, with the release of the Pixel 3, Google introduced the Titan M chip, a hardware security module used to enhance the device security by reducing its attack surf... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader searches for credentials stored from web browsers.[82] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.