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+"Wicked Rose" and the NCPH Hacking Group
+by Ken Dunham & Jim Melnick
+Zero-day attacks, where an attack occurs before public knowledge of a vulnerability is known, is
+a growing cause of concern for security professionals in the 21st century. An unprecedented
+number of zero-day attacks took place in 2006, largely involving Microsoft Office Files. Ken
+Dunham, Director of the Rapid Response Team, and Jim Melnick, Director of Threat Operations,
+led the VeriSign iDefense intelligence team to track down Chinese hackers for hire out of China,
+responsible for many of the attacks in 2006. Wicked Rose is the ring-leader of the NCPH
+hacking group and this is the story of their maturation into significant global threat by 2006.
+Introduction to N.C.P.H.
+N.C.P.H. (Network Crack Program Hacker) has about ten members or associates. Four core
+members exist as of 2006:
+(Wicked) Rose
+KuNgBiM
+Rodag
+Charles
+There are also some six other associates within NCPH and two other positions (possibly unfilled
+positions) whose purpose is unclear. However, 
+Rose
+ or 
+Wicked Rose
+ seems to be the
+primary leader. Membership rules, recruiting goals and standards are unknown. However, some
+members appear to be current or former students of Sichuan University of Science and
+Engineering.1
+The group is responsible for development and deployment of exploit codes related vulnerabilities
+in Microsoft Word Malformed OLE Structure Code Execution and Microsoft Excel Malformed
+BIFF Structure Code Execution.
+Public Knowledge of a Zero-Day Word Exploit
+The story of NCPH zero-day attacks begins publicly on May 18, 2006. On this day the Internet
+Storm Center reports a new possible zero-day attack. iDefense worked closely with SANS and
+other organizations to analyze the threat landscape as it related to exploitation of this
+vulnerability. Within the next 36 hours, iDefense gained access to multiple codes and extracted a
+new rootkit called GinWui. Independent research proved the following:
+Exploitation targeted a new vulnerability that allowed attackers to successfully exploit
+computers running fully patched versions of Microsoft Word 2002 and others.
+Exploitation dated to May 12, 2006 and involved at least six unique hostile exploit files.
+iDefense confirmed that attacks targeted two organizations, one in the United States and
+one in Japan.
+Chinese-authored rootkits GinWui.A and GinWui.B exist in several attacks. iDefense
+identified the rootkits' source and authors as Chinese actor "Wicked Rose" and others
+profiled later in this report.
+www.suse.edu.cn & http://www.study-in-china.org/school/Sichuan/suse/
+Successful installation of the rootkit requires Administrator or Debugger rights. Initial
+exploitation, however, does not require Administrator rights.
+iDefense identified unique malicious code attacks pointing to nease.net and authored
+several Snort signatures for this traffic. iDefense continues to monitor other domains
+related to the attack.
+The original attack upon a large DoD entity within the USA began on May 12, 2006. Targets of
+the attacker were apparently "Googled" by the attacker. Three variations of a Microsoft Word
+zero-day attack are involved in the attack. A few dozen attack files are first distributed to less
+than a dozen targets to identify which version works within the organization.
+Once attackers identify the vulnerable version of Microsoft Word used within the organization
+close to 200 messages sent out to multiple targets within the organization within 24 hours. This
+second wave of attack is distributed as "Planning document 5-16-2006.doc". This code is
+improved beyond the first variant sent out earlier to identify the vulnerable version of Word
+within the targeted network.
+A third attack commences on May 17, 2006. During this period, the Internet Storm Center and
+others get involved and the case becomes public. In the end, iDefense identified six unique
+samples, of which three are more prevalent than other variants.
+The GinWui Backdoor Rootkit Payload
+Zero day attacks commenced in May 2006 attempted to install a GinWui backdoor Trojan horse
+and Windows rootkit. A DLL file called winguis.dll and several SYS files install themselves
+when a computer is successfully attacked through an exploit. Two versions of the GinWui
+rootkit are installed during several attacks in May and June 2006.
+NCHP 5.0 Screenshot (GinWui Rootkit)
+Wicked Rose is the author of the GinWui malicious code. His code and support posts related to
+GinWui distributions exist on the Chinese NCPH and Evil Octal forums. Wicked Rose
+associates with WHG and others on this form. WHT hosted version "3.0beta.3" of the "NCPH
+remote control" rootkit code on May 2, 2006. This distribution of GinWui was largely unknown
+and undetected by anti-virus companies at the time of release.
+Versions of GinWui used in targeted attacks of May and June 2006 are private versions, not
+released to the public. This proves that Wicked Rose either constructed the zero day attacks or
+sold private code to users that performed the attack.
+Wicked Rose later documents additional updates to his rootkit code, version .50, at
+http://rodag.blogbus.com/index.html. By this time Wicked Rose was performing full-time
+development of this malicious code as a hacker for hire.
+June 21, 2007 
+ Continued US Targeted Attacks
+Just over a month later, following initial GinWui based targeted attacks, another Microsoft Word
+exploit occurs on June 21, 2006. A spoofed e-mail is sent to a target containing a hostile
+Microsoft Word document. Analysis of the attack reveals that it's likely a test file used to
+identify what version of Word may be running within the targeted organization, rather than a
+refined targeted attack upon a known version of Microsoft Word. Chinese text within the Word
+document reveal Chinese characters discussing a systematic evaluation of offsets for Microsoft
+Word exploitation:
+RipGof attacks reveal a Chinese string related to systematic testing of offsets for exploitation.
+Backtracking Targeted Attacks: RipGof
+In June 2006 another targeted attack emerges, but it's not GinWui this time but a new code,
+RipGof.B. The attack attempts to exploit MS06-027 to install RipGof.B, a Trojan horse. This is
+the same exploit code used in the former Zero-Day attacks linked to Wicked Rose and the NCPH
+hacking group. The exploit code is still private at this time, proving that the author of both
+GinWui and RipGof attacks are the same individual or group or affiliated through underground
+criminal operations.
+RipGof.B is an improvement of the former exploit used in GinWui attacks. RipGof.B attacks
+included improvements to shellcode that attempts to fork to different locations based upon the
+address value of the stack to exploit multiple versions of Microsoft Word. Once installed,
+RipGof.B attempts to connect to enjoy.irdet.com and enjoy.bmwsee.com over TCP port 80. It
+runs as a rootkit and backdoor Trojan horse and phones home to a Chinese server with stolen
+data.
+RipGof malicious code does not exist as a distribution in the underground, leading investigators
+to look into the original RipGof.A malicious code. Over a year prior to the 2006 targeted attacks
+RipGof.A emerges in the wild. RipGof.A attempted to exploit the Jet Engine Database exploit in
+March 2005. This proves attempted exploitation and installation of code through RipGof for a
+year prior to more sophisticated codes and attacks.
+In summary, RipGof and GinWui attacks both use the same private exploit code against
+Microsoft Word and both install rootkit based codes to steal and send information back to
+Chinese sources. This circumstantial evidence reveals that Wicked Rose and the NCPH group
+likely began their exploitation efforts at least a year and a half to two years prior to sophisticated
+attacks that commenced in 2006. Once the group found a vulnerability within Microsoft Word
+they were able to improve upon it and their targeted attack techniques to distribute multiple
+targeted attacks and malicious codes for criminal gain as hackers for hire.
+Timeline of Events
+Wicked Rose and the NCPH hacking group are implicated in multiple Office based attacks over
+a two year period. An attack in 2006 used RipGof.B in the attack. RipGof.A first emerged a
+year earlier using an exploit that is relatively unsophisticated. Over the next year the Evil
+Security Team, also out of China, creates the Dasher worm and uses the PcShares Trojan in an
+attack. Wicked Rose gives a recommendation on the Trojan the day it is updated in the spring of
+2006, showing a close affiliation between Wicked Rose and the Evil Security Team actors.
+Multiple attacks that take place in May and June and later 2006 are related to privately held
+exploit code for both Microsoft Word and Excel, proven to be developed by Wicked Rose. A
+timeline of proven associated events related to Wicked Rose attacks is below:
+April 22, 2005 - RipGof.A JetEngine DB Attack
+Dec. 19, 2005 
+ Dasher worm and PcShare Trojan attack by Evil Security Team
+April 27, 2006 Update to windowsupdates.net attack site
+April 30, 2006 - Wicked Rose Drops out of School
+May 2, 2006 
+ 3.0beta3 NCPH remote control (GinWui) public release
+May 12, 2006 - Initial probing and GinWui.A exploitation attempts against US target
+May 15, 2006 - PcShare Trojan update recommended by Wicked Rose on day of new release
+May 16, 2006 - Update to windowsupdates.net attack site
+May 16, 2006 - Multiple GinWui.A attacks against US target
+May 18, 2006 - SANS reports zero-day attack
+May 19, 2006 Update to windowsupdates.net attack site
+May 20, 2006 - GinWui.B Attack
+May 20, 2006 - WZT Kicked out of NCPH
+May 29, 2006 - GinWui.C Attack
+June 1, 2006 Update to windowsupdates.net attack site
+June 9, 2006 
+ Mdropper.F Attack
+June 14, 2006 
+ Daserf.A Attack
+June 15, 2006 
+ Mdropper.G Attack
+June 15, 2006 
+ Booli.A Trojan Attack
+June 16, 2006 - Flux.E Attack
+June 18, 2006 - RipGof.B Attack
+June 23, 2006 
+ PPDropper.A
+June 23, 2006 
+ Booli.B Trojan attack
+June 25, 2006 - GinWui.D Attack
+June 26, 2006 - GinWui.E Attack
+Sept. 27, 2006 
+ PPDropper.F Attack
+Sept. 30, 2006 
+ GinWui.G Attack
+Oct. 9, 2006 
+ Wicked Rose reports pay increase; likely in September
+A Pictorial Introduction to Wicked Rose and NCPH
+Just who are Wicked Rose and the NCPH hacker group? As it turns out, a collection of college
+students in China who likely room with one another and regularly support their hacking interests.
+In-depth research implicates Wicked Rose as the ring-leader of the group, responsible for
+managing hacker for hire relationships and paying group members for their work as hackers.
+During the time of targeted attacks in 2006 their income increased significantly, to full-time
+wages for part time hacking. Wicked Rose, leader of the group, is pictured below:
+ (MeiGui HeiKe) 
+Rose Hacker
+QQ number is 5372453 www.mghacker.com
+Wicked Rose maintains a personal site at www.mghacker.com.
+Wicked Rose's Website: www.mghacker.com
+Rose is an approximate 20-year-old (2006) student at the Sichuan University of Science &
+Engineering. In the spring of 2006 Wicked Rose claims to have dropped out of school for full
+time hacking opportunities. Specifically, on April 30, 2006 his blog entry claims he did not
+register for his university exam. He performed significant updates to his rootkit code from
+March through June 2006. He later returned to school by September 2006.
+Wicked Rose claims responsibility on his blog for targeted e-mail based attacks containing
+Microsoft Word and CHM exploits from the spring of 2006.
+Other NCPH-member websites include: http://rodag.blogbus.com,
+http://www.cppblog.com/charles and http://kungbim.blogbus.com. The main NCPH website is
+www.ncph.net:
+NCPH Studio website www.ncph.net
+Registration information for ncph.net reveals a Chinese registrant:
+Registrant Contact: ncph studio (ncph2005@126.com) si chuan li gong xue yuan
+zigong, Sichuan, cn 643000 P: +86.13154663992 F: +86.13154663992
+The main location of the NCPH group is in Zigong, Sichuan Province, in south-central China.
+Zigong, Sichuan Province, in south-central China
+The NCPH group (NCPH Studio) in Zigong, China, is shown here:
+NCPH hackers at work in the 
+ncph studio
+Left to right: 
+Wicked Rose,
+ KuNgBiM, Charles and Rodag
+Additional photos featuring Wicked Rose and NCPH hackers are below, captured from their
+various websites and blog entries in 2006. Chinese translation for each photo are below:
+"Wicked Rose"
+From an ancient Chinese poem,
+expressing the devotion of his heart for
+hacking.
+"After you choose the technology you
+love, you have to research every system
+and code everyday!"
+Charles: "Silence belongs to our
+world..."
+Charles
+"Charles always laughs so brightly when
+searching for program problems!"
+KuNgBiM
+"Only we can feel this kind of happy..."
+Ronag
+"Behind every successful design, he
+always has a slight smile
+Wicked Rose and NCPH hacking photos
+WHG (
+WHG is not a core member of NCPH but a close affiliate of Wicked Rose. WHG appears to be
+central to development of the NCPH rootkit, aka GinWui. WHG is credited by Wicked Rose as
+one of the authors of this malicious code. WHG is an experienced malicious code author with
+the following contact information:
+E-mail address:
+QQ Number:
+Website:
+Real Name:
+Location:
+whg@163.com
+312016
+http://cnasm.com
+May be "Zhao Jibing",
+Believed to be employed in the Sichuan province of China.
+WZT is a former member of the NCPH group who was kicked out during the time of zero-day
+attacks in May 2006. WZT was removed on May 20, 2006. During this time period the zeroday attacks became publicly disclosed, increasing pressure upon the hacking group. It is feasible
+that WZT may have offended the group in some way related to zero-day attack techniques, strife
+over hacker for hire deals, or competition for hacker for hire deals.
+WZT is a former coding expert within the NCPH group and many years experience in hacking.
+He is responsible for creating multiple tools and regularly giving credit to the infamous Li0n
+Chinese hacker (founder of Honker Union (HUC) Chinese group. WZT maintains a website at
+tthacker.cublog.cn.
+The Jiangsu Connection?
+WHOIS registrant data for related domains used within attacks and hacker sites reveals a
+connection with the Jiangsu province of China. One domain, windowsupdates.net, is used in
+attacks and revolves to an IP address in the Sichuan province. Meanwhile, the registrant
+"zhaofeng network" is reportedly based out of Jiangsu, not Sichuan. Some of the WHOIS
+information clearly contains fraudulent information to presumably direct researchers away from
+the true identity and location of the attacker responsible for registering the hostile domain. The
+connection to the Jiangsu and Sichuan provinces remains unclear.
+Concluding Comments
+Prior to Wicked Rose and NCPH hacker for hire attacks in 2006, Chinese hackers are only
+known for their patriotic hacking. This disturbing development reveals two critical threats: 1)
+motives of Chinese hackers are changing 2) Chinese hackers are regularly associated with
+sophisticated attacks as of 2006.
+Wicked Rose implicates himself in his early blog entries and website posts in 2006 and prior.
+An unknown company or entity reportedly paid Wicked Rose for hacking at the rate of 2,000
+RMB a month, about $250 USD. At this time Wicked Rose gave 200 RMB to NCPH hackers
+and kept the rest for himself. Once targeted attacks took place the payment increased five-fold to
+5,000 RMB monthly with $1,000 a month going to NCPH hackers. This is a significant amount
+of money in China, effectively paying hackers a full-time wage for part-time hacking.
+Throughout the summer of 2006, while Wicked Rose was not in school, over 35 zero-day
+attacks, proof-of-concept codes, and attacks against un-patched Microsoft Office vulnerabilities
+are discovered in the wild. With Wicked Rose claiming responsibility for early attacks and the
+lead author of both GinWui and the NCPH hacking group, there is little doubt left as to his
+involvement in attacks to date.
+By the end of 2006 attacks become increasingly sophisticated. In one instance a popular
+PowerPoint file distributed during the Christmas holiday season for the last two years prior is
+used within a socially engineered attack upon one individual within an energy sector US based
+company. The PowerPoint file is modified to include an exploit that silently installs malicious
+code. This same individual receives another e-mail containing a Microsoft Word exploit. In this
+case only one individual within the company is targeted, and with just two messages socially
+engineered for maximum success. This is a much more targeted and stealthy approach for
+attacks compared to the earlier attacks performed by the group in the late spring of 2006.
+NCPH continues to be a significant threat going forth for several reasons.
+1. Attacks continue to take place in the wild and are very difficult to identify on a targeted
+basis. Only the most sophisticated networks and system administrators are able to
+properly protect and capture hostile targeted attack files before an attack takes place.
+2. NCPH is a serious dedicated hacking group that is methodical and disciplined in their
+development of new exploits and attacks.
+3. NCPH is motivated by both the thrill and challenge of hacking and money as a motive.
+4. Attacks by the group are highly targeted and stealthy, very difficult to detect and remove.