data/paths.jsonl

{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 234, "evidence_json": "{\"socket\": {\"connect\": \"REFUSED: Permission denied\", \"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o660\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/run/containerd/containerd.sock\", \"readable_by_agent\": false, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}}", "evidence_keys": ["socket"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "container_runtimes:containerd_socket", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "containerd runs as uid 0; reaching its socket is equivalent to reaching the docker socket", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "container_runtimes"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": "{\"acl_measured\": [\"user::rw-\", \"group::rw-\", \"other::---\"], \"boundary_explanation\": \"No kernel boundary is defeated. The kernel's DAC check on connect(2) to a mode-0o660 socket owned by uid 0 gid 969 *passes*, because gid 969 is in the agent's credential [10, 969, 1000]. Authority is granted at the socket and then exercised by a daemon already running as uid 0 -- so there is no exploit to detect, no boundary to harden, and nothing for a sandbox, capability drop or seccomp filter to stop. That is precisely why it is root-equivalent: the only remedy is to stop granting it.\", \"carrier\": \"AF_UNIX stream socket /var/run/docker.sock (mode 0o660, 0:969) speaking the Docker Engine API\", \"classification\": \"ROOT_EQUIVALENT\", \"classification_basis\": \"measurement, not convention: a container started through this socket wrote to the host filesystem and the resulting file was owned by uid 4242, which the agent cannot produce by any other measured route\", \"evidence_provenance\": \"ROOT_EQUIVALENCE_REGISTRY.json and attack_results.json, both produced by the sanctioned V3 attack suite. No new escalation was attempted by this pass.\", \"kernel_enforced_boundary_crossed\": \"NONE\", \"measured_evidence\": {\"agent_credential_gids\": [10, 969, 1000], \"attack_H_changed_canonical\": null, \"attack_H_verdict\": null, \"container_uid_map\": [\"         0          0 4294967295\"], \"host_file_uid_after_write\": 4242, \"rootless_daemon\": false, \"selinux_note\": \"SELinux denies the bind-mount write by default; --security-opt label=disable removes it. A flag is not a boundary when the attacker chooses the flags.\", \"socket\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o660\", \"owner_gid\": 969, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/var/run/docker.sock\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": true}, \"socket_group_in_credential\": true, \"targets_reached\": {\"A_arbitrary_host_write\": true, \"B_arbitrary_host_chown\": true, \"C_uid_0\": true, \"E_capabilities\": true, \"F_mount_defeats_dac\": true}}, \"mechanism_detail\": \"connect(2) succeeds under DAC, then `POST /containers/create` with a host bind mount and `--security-opt label=disable`, then `POST /containers/{id}/start`. The container's first process runs with the host's real uid 0 (`container_uid_map` = ['         0          0 4294967295']), so writes through the bind mount land on the host as root.\", \"removal\": \"remove the agent from group 'docker' (or drop the ACL entry); the daemon itself needs no change\"}", "classification": "ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 416, "evidence_json": "{\"corroborating_measurement\": \"ROOT_EQUIVALENT_REGISTRY.json: a container started through this socket reported uid_map 0 0 4294967295 and chowned a host file to uid 4242\", \"docker_info_rc\": 0, \"rootless\": false, \"socket\": {\"connect\": \"ACCEPTED\", \"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o660\", \"owner_gid\": 969, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/var/run/docker.sock\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": true}}", "evidence_keys": ["corroborating_measurement", "docker_info_rc", "rootless", "socket"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "container_runtimes:docker_rootful_socket", "prior_classification": "ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "the daemon runs as uid 0 and executes container specifications chosen by whoever reaches the socket, including bind mounts of / with label=disable", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "container_runtimes"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the readable half of the policy is measured below; the deciding half, /etc/polkit-1/rules.d, is 0700 root and can return polkit.Result.YES (no password) for this action", "evidence_bytes": 1169, "evidence_json": "{\"action_id\": \"org.libvirt.unix.manage\", \"admin_identities_from_50_default\": [], \"agent_groups\": [\"wheel\", \"docker\", \"martin\"], \"agent_is_admin_identity\": false, \"implicit\": {\"implicit active\": \"auth_admin_keep\", \"implicit any\": \"auth_admin_keep\", \"implicit inactive\": \"auth_admin_keep\"}, \"libvirt_rules\": {\"content\": \"// Allow any user in the 'libvirt' group to connect to system libvirtd\\n// without entering a password.\\n\\npolkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {\\n    if (action.id == \\\"org.libvirt.unix.manage\\\" &&\\n        subject.isInGroup(\\\"libvirt\\\")) {\\n        return polkit.Result.YES;\\n    }\\n});\\n\", \"path\": \"/usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/50-libvirt.rules\", \"readable_by_agent\": true}, \"libvirtd_conf\": {\"exists\": false, \"parent_searchable\": false, \"path\": \"/etc/libvirt/libvirtd.conf\", \"state\": \"UNDETERMINED\", \"why\": \"/etc/libvirt is not searchable by the agent\"}, \"overlap\": [], \"polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent\": false, \"socket_from_before\": {\"connect\": \"ACCEPTED\", \"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o666\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock-ro\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": true}}", "evidence_keys": ["action_id", "admin_identities_from_50_default", "agent_groups", "agent_is_admin_identity", "implicit", "libvirt_rules", "libvirtd_conf", "overlap", "polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent", "socket_from_before"], "operator_action": "operator reads /etc/libvirt/libvirtd.conf (auth_unix_rw, unix_sock_group) and confirms this identity is in no group the libvirt polkit rules grant", "path_id": "container_runtimes:libvirt_ro_socket", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "an authorised libvirt session can attach host block devices to a guest, which is root-equivalent; the socket is world-connectable by design and decides nothing", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "container_runtimes"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the readable half of the policy is measured below; the deciding half, /etc/polkit-1/rules.d, is 0700 root and can return polkit.Result.YES (no password) for this action", "evidence_bytes": 1166, "evidence_json": "{\"action_id\": \"org.libvirt.unix.manage\", \"admin_identities_from_50_default\": [], \"agent_groups\": [\"wheel\", \"docker\", \"martin\"], \"agent_is_admin_identity\": false, \"implicit\": {\"implicit active\": \"auth_admin_keep\", \"implicit any\": \"auth_admin_keep\", \"implicit inactive\": \"auth_admin_keep\"}, \"libvirt_rules\": {\"content\": \"// Allow any user in the 'libvirt' group to connect to system libvirtd\\n// without entering a password.\\n\\npolkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {\\n    if (action.id == \\\"org.libvirt.unix.manage\\\" &&\\n        subject.isInGroup(\\\"libvirt\\\")) {\\n        return polkit.Result.YES;\\n    }\\n});\\n\", \"path\": \"/usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/50-libvirt.rules\", \"readable_by_agent\": true}, \"libvirtd_conf\": {\"exists\": false, \"parent_searchable\": false, \"path\": \"/etc/libvirt/libvirtd.conf\", \"state\": \"UNDETERMINED\", \"why\": \"/etc/libvirt is not searchable by the agent\"}, \"overlap\": [], \"polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent\": false, \"socket_from_before\": {\"connect\": \"ACCEPTED\", \"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o666\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": true}}", "evidence_keys": ["action_id", "admin_identities_from_50_default", "agent_groups", "agent_is_admin_identity", "implicit", "libvirt_rules", "libvirtd_conf", "overlap", "polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent", "socket_from_before"], "operator_action": "operator reads /etc/libvirt/libvirtd.conf (auth_unix_rw, unix_sock_group) and confirms this identity is in no group the libvirt polkit rules grant", "path_id": "container_runtimes:libvirt_socket", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "an authorised libvirt session can attach host block devices to a guest, which is root-equivalent; the socket is world-connectable by design and decides nothing", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "container_runtimes"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 364, "evidence_json": "{\"agent_cap_inheritable\": \"0000000800000000\", \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_net_raw\"], \"effective\": false, \"flags\": \"p\", \"inheritable_only\": false, \"permitted\": true, \"raw\": \"cap_net_raw=p\"}, \"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/arping\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["agent_cap_inheritable", "capabilities", "exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/bin/arping", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "every capability on this file is bounded to networking or scheduling (['cap_net_raw']); none confers authority over another principal's files, processes or credentials", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 367, "evidence_json": "{\"agent_cap_inheritable\": \"0000000800000000\", \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_net_raw\"], \"effective\": false, \"flags\": \"p\", \"inheritable_only\": false, \"permitted\": true, \"raw\": \"cap_net_raw=p\"}, \"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/clockdiff\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["agent_cap_inheritable", "capabilities", "exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/bin/clockdiff", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "every capability on this file is bounded to networking or scheduling (['cap_net_raw']); none confers authority over another principal's files, processes or credentials", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 369, "evidence_json": "{\"agent_cap_inheritable\": \"0000000800000000\", \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_net_raw\"], \"effective\": true, \"flags\": \"ep\", \"inheritable_only\": false, \"permitted\": true, \"raw\": \"cap_net_raw=ep\"}, \"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/mtr-packet\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["agent_cap_inheritable", "capabilities", "exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/bin/mtr-packet", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "every capability on this file is bounded to networking or scheduling (['cap_net_raw']); none confers authority over another principal's files, processes or credentials", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 366, "evidence_json": "{\"agent_cap_inheritable\": \"0000000800000000\", \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_setgid\"], \"effective\": true, \"flags\": \"ep\", \"inheritable_only\": false, \"permitted\": true, \"raw\": \"cap_setgid=ep\"}, \"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/newgidmap\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["agent_cap_inheritable", "capabilities", "exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/bin/newgidmap", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "bounded by /etc/subgid", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 366, "evidence_json": "{\"agent_cap_inheritable\": \"0000000800000000\", \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_setuid\"], \"effective\": true, \"flags\": \"ep\", \"inheritable_only\": false, \"permitted\": true, \"raw\": \"cap_setuid=ep\"}, \"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/newuidmap\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["agent_cap_inheritable", "capabilities", "exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/bin/newuidmap", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "bounded by /etc/subuid; V3 measured it refusing uid 940", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "the agent cannot execute this file: mode 0o510, owner 0:48, and os.access(X_OK) is False for credential [10, 969, 1000]. A capability on a file the caller may not exec is not a path for that caller", "evidence_bytes": 488, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": null, \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_setgid\", \"cap_setuid\"], \"effective\": true, \"flags\": \"ep\", \"inheritable_only\": false, \"permitted\": true, \"raw\": \"cap_setgid,cap_setuid=ep\"}, \"executable_by_agent\": false, \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o510\", \"owner_gid\": 48, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/suexec\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"package_owner\": \"httpd-core-2.4.68-1.fc44.x86_64\"}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "executable_by_agent", "file", "integrity", "package_owner"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/bin/suexec", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "would confer ['cap_setgid', 'cap_setuid'] on exec", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "the capabilities are inheritable-only (flags 'ei', no 'p'), so exec grants only what the caller's own inheritable set contains. The agent's CapInh is 0000000800000000, whose intersection with ['cap_dac_read_search', 'cap_net_admin', 'cap_net_bind_service', 'cap_net_raw', 'cap_setgid', 'cap_setuid', 'cap_sys_ptrace'] is empty -- computed bit by bit, not assumed", "evidence_bytes": 814, "evidence_json": "{\"agent_cap_inheritable\": \"0000000800000000\", \"binary_hash\": \"891a347dc54d8b884b9177de1d1a695e1cae8910d328382fefa1447fff1ccda1\", \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_dac_read_search\", \"cap_net_admin\", \"cap_net_bind_service\", \"cap_net_raw\", \"cap_setgid\", \"cap_setuid\", \"cap_sys_ptrace\"], \"effective\": true, \"flags\": \"ei\", \"inheritable_only\": true, \"permitted\": false, \"raw\": \"cap_dac_read_search,cap_setgid,cap_setuid,cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw,cap_sys_ptrace=ei\"}, \"capabilities_the_agent_could_activate\": [], \"executable_by_agent\": true, \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/warp-svc\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"NOT_PACKAGED\", \"package_owner\": \"cloudflare-warp-2026.4.1390.0-1.x86_64\"}", "evidence_keys": ["agent_cap_inheritable", "binary_hash", "capabilities", "capabilities_the_agent_could_activate", "executable_by_agent", "file", "integrity", "package_owner"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/bin/warp-svc", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "would confer ['cap_dac_read_search', 'cap_net_admin', 'cap_net_bind_service', 'cap_net_raw', 'cap_setgid', 'cap_setuid', 'cap_sys_ptrace'] to a caller that already holds them", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 469, "evidence_json": "{\"agent_cap_inheritable\": \"0000000800000000\", \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_net_admin\", \"cap_net_bind_service\", \"cap_sys_nice\"], \"effective\": true, \"flags\": \"ep\", \"inheritable_only\": false, \"permitted\": true, \"raw\": \"cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice=ep\"}, \"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/libexec/gstreamer-1.0/gst-ptp-helper\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["agent_cap_inheritable", "capabilities", "exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/libexec/gstreamer-1.0/gst-ptp-helper", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "every capability on this file is bounded to networking or scheduling (['cap_net_admin', 'cap_net_bind_service', 'cap_sys_nice']); none confers authority over another principal's files, processes or credentials", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "the agent cannot execute this file: mode 0o750, owner 0:980, and os.access(X_OK) is False for credential [10, 969, 1000]. A capability on a file the caller may not exec is not a path for that caller", "evidence_bytes": 550, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": null, \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_dac_read_search\", \"cap_setgid\", \"cap_setuid\"], \"effective\": false, \"flags\": \"p\", \"inheritable_only\": false, \"permitted\": true, \"raw\": \"cap_dac_read_search,cap_setgid,cap_setuid=p\"}, \"executable_by_agent\": false, \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o750\", \"owner_gid\": 980, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/libexec/sssd/krb5_child\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"package_owner\": \"sssd-krb5-common-2.13.1-2.fc44.x86_64\"}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "executable_by_agent", "file", "integrity", "package_owner"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/libexec/sssd/krb5_child", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "would confer ['cap_dac_read_search', 'cap_setgid', 'cap_setuid'] on exec", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "the agent cannot execute this file: mode 0o750, owner 0:980, and os.access(X_OK) is False for credential [10, 969, 1000]. A capability on a file the caller may not exec is not a path for that caller", "evidence_bytes": 500, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": null, \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_dac_read_search\"], \"effective\": false, \"flags\": \"p\", \"inheritable_only\": false, \"permitted\": true, \"raw\": \"cap_dac_read_search=p\"}, \"executable_by_agent\": false, \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o750\", \"owner_gid\": 980, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/libexec/sssd/ldap_child\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"package_owner\": \"sssd-krb5-common-2.13.1-2.fc44.x86_64\"}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "executable_by_agent", "file", "integrity", "package_owner"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/libexec/sssd/ldap_child", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "would confer ['cap_dac_read_search'] on exec", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "the agent cannot execute this file: mode 0o750, owner 0:980, and os.access(X_OK) is False for credential [10, 969, 1000]. A capability on a file the caller may not exec is not a path for that caller", "evidence_bytes": 493, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": null, \"capabilities\": {\"capabilities\": [\"cap_dac_read_search\"], \"effective\": false, \"flags\": \"p\", \"inheritable_only\": false, \"permitted\": true, \"raw\": \"cap_dac_read_search=p\"}, \"executable_by_agent\": false, \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o750\", \"owner_gid\": 980, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/libexec/sssd/sssd_pam\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"package_owner\": \"sssd-common-2.13.1-2.fc44.x86_64\"}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "executable_by_agent", "file", "integrity", "package_owner"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "filecaps:/usr/libexec/sssd/sssd_pam", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "would confer ['cap_dac_read_search'] on exec", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "filecaps"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": "{\"boundary_explanation\": \"No kernel boundary is defeated. The kernel's DAC check on connect(2) to a mode-0o660 socket owned by uid 0 gid 969 *passes*, because gid 969 is in the agent's credential [10, 969, 1000]. Authority is granted at the socket and then exercised by a daemon already running as uid 0 -- so there is no exploit to detect, no boundary to harden, and nothing for a sandbox, capability drop or seccomp filter to stop. That is precisely why it is root-equivalent: the only remedy is to stop granting it.\", \"carrier\": \"supplementary group membership: gid 969 (docker) present in the process credential\", \"classification\": \"ROOT_EQUIVALENT\", \"classification_basis\": \"measurement, not convention: a container started through this socket wrote to the host filesystem and the resulting file was owned by uid 4242, which the agent cannot produce by any other measured route\", \"evidence_provenance\": \"ROOT_EQUIVALENCE_REGISTRY.json and attack_results.json, both produced by the sanctioned V3 attack suite. No new escalation was attempted by this pass.\", \"kernel_enforced_boundary_crossed\": \"NONE\", \"measured_evidence\": {\"agent_credential_gids\": [10, 969, 1000], \"attack_H_changed_canonical\": null, \"attack_H_verdict\": null, \"container_uid_map\": [\"         0          0 4294967295\"], \"host_file_uid_after_write\": 4242, \"rootless_daemon\": false, \"selinux_note\": \"SELinux denies the bind-mount write by default; --security-opt label=disable removes it. A flag is not a boundary when the attacker chooses the flags.\", \"socket\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o660\", \"owner_gid\": 969, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/var/run/docker.sock\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": true}, \"socket_group_in_credential\": true, \"targets_reached\": {\"A_arbitrary_host_write\": true, \"B_arbitrary_host_chown\": true, \"C_uid_0\": true, \"E_capabilities\": true, \"F_mount_defeats_dac\": true}}, \"mechanism_detail\": \"The credential is the carrier. `getgroups(2)` returns [10, 969, 1000]; group `docker` is gid 969. Membership is what makes the DAC check on the socket succeed, so this path and the socket path are one mechanism observed at two layers -- both are listed because removing either one alone does not necessarily remove the other (an ACL entry can replace the group).\", \"removal\": \"remove the agent from group 'docker' (or drop the ACL entry); the daemon itself needs no change\", \"routes_measured\": [\"group membership: agent is in group 'docker'\"]}", "classification": "ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 33, "evidence_json": "{\"group\": \"docker\", \"held\": true}", "evidence_keys": ["group", "held"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "groups:membership_docker", "prior_classification": "ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "member of 'docker': controls a rootful container daemon", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "groups"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the readable half of the policy is measured below; the deciding half, /etc/polkit-1/rules.d, is 0700 root and can return polkit.Result.YES (no password) for this action", "evidence_bytes": 364, "evidence_json": "{\"action_id\": \"org.freedesktop.policykit.exec\", \"admin_identities_from_50_default\": [], \"agent_groups\": [\"wheel\", \"docker\", \"martin\"], \"agent_is_admin_identity\": false, \"group_roster\": null, \"implicit\": {\"implicit active\": \"auth_admin\", \"implicit any\": \"auth_admin\", \"implicit inactive\": \"auth_admin\"}, \"overlap\": [], \"polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["action_id", "admin_identities_from_50_default", "agent_groups", "agent_is_admin_identity", "group_roster", "implicit", "overlap", "polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent"], "operator_action": "operator removes this identity from `wheel` (`gpasswd -d martin wheel`) after confirming no other admin identity depends on it", "path_id": "groups:membership_wheel", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "membership of the polkit administrator group and, on RPM-family hosts, the conventional sudoers group: it is the identity that authenticates privileged actions, not a mechanism of its own", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "groups"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the readable half of the policy is measured below; the deciding half, /etc/polkit-1/rules.d, is 0700 root and can return polkit.Result.YES (no password) for this action", "evidence_bytes": 354, "evidence_json": "{\"action_id\": \"org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units\", \"admin_identities_from_50_default\": [], \"agent_groups\": [\"wheel\", \"docker\", \"martin\"], \"agent_is_admin_identity\": false, \"implicit\": {\"implicit active\": \"auth_admin_keep\", \"implicit any\": \"auth_admin\", \"implicit inactive\": \"auth_admin\"}, \"overlap\": [], \"polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["action_id", "admin_identities_from_50_default", "agent_groups", "agent_is_admin_identity", "implicit", "overlap", "polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent"], "operator_action": "operator enumerates the local polkit rules and confirms no rule grants this identity a privileged system-bus action without authentication", "path_id": "polkit:dbus_system_bus", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "the system bus carries privileged RPCs (StartTransientUnit among them); reachability is by design and authority is decided per RPC by polkit", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "polkit"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the readable half of the policy is measured below; the deciding half, /etc/polkit-1/rules.d, is 0700 root and can return polkit.Result.YES (no password) for this action", "evidence_bytes": 342, "evidence_json": "{\"action_id\": \"org.freedesktop.policykit.exec\", \"admin_identities_from_50_default\": [], \"agent_groups\": [\"wheel\", \"docker\", \"martin\"], \"agent_is_admin_identity\": false, \"implicit\": {\"implicit active\": \"auth_admin\", \"implicit any\": \"auth_admin\", \"implicit inactive\": \"auth_admin\"}, \"overlap\": [], \"polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["action_id", "admin_identities_from_50_default", "agent_groups", "agent_is_admin_identity", "implicit", "overlap", "polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent"], "operator_action": "operator reads /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/* for a rule returning YES on this action, and removes this identity from the admin group", "path_id": "polkit:pkexec", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "runs an arbitrary program as another user, including root", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "polkit"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the bytes match the package but the package declares mode 100755 while the disk carries setuid: the privilege was granted after packaging and no vendor statement bounds it", "evidence_bytes": 793, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"2015304df43beff0b74409cdc4d858107efcde650d9bc8afb1288041d62cec4b\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"887875dc21801dd0685b3f46ea5d5c24\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/opt/1Password/chrome-sandbox\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"1password-8.12.30-1.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound_if_provenance_held\": \"bounded by the SUID sandbox protocol: the helper refuses to run unless invoked as the sandbox host of its own process tree\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"md5\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": false, \"package_owner\": \"1password-8.12.30-1.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": false, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator determines who set the setuid bit and whether the vendor intends this binary to run as root; if not, `chmod u-s` it", "path_id": "setuid:/opt/1Password/chrome-sandbox", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "creates a user/PID namespace for a browser renderer and execs only the target passed by its own zygote; it does not take a caller-chosen command", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 856, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"18391bf9d217ddbde9956347cbb1346d2808a73ade4baa3f88a610447cf946b4\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"18391bf9d217ddbde9956347cbb1346d2808a73ade4baa3f88a610447cf946b4\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/opt/google/chrome-unstable/chrome-sandbox\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"google-chrome-unstable-152.0.7939.5-1.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded by the SUID sandbox protocol: the helper refuses to run unless invoked as the sandbox host of its own process tree\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"google-chrome-unstable-152.0.7939.5-1.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/opt/google/chrome-unstable/chrome-sandbox", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "creates a user/PID namespace for a browser renderer and execs only the target passed by its own zygote; it does not take a caller-chosen command", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 847, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"34da15f461b6236f4fed24138c133153d7a10e7e2c9216fd80b4874eb23b5a74\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"34da15f461b6236f4fed24138c133153d7a10e7e2c9216fd80b4874eb23b5a74\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"google-chrome-stable-150.0.7871.128-1.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded by the SUID sandbox protocol: the helper refuses to run unless invoked as the sandbox host of its own process tree\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"google-chrome-stable-150.0.7871.128-1.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "creates a user/PID namespace for a browser renderer and execs only the target passed by its own zygote; it does not take a caller-chosen command", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 1104, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"142b02216e3901c0ff20ddbee4cc90b86675d7d47af3bf1952eff7d6452860b5\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"142b02216e3901c0ff20ddbee4cc90b86675d7d47af3bf1952eff7d6452860b5\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/at\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"at-3.2.5-21.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"allow_file\": {\"exists\": false, \"path\": \"/etc/at.allow\"}, \"bound\": {\"bound\": \"bounded: a submitted job executes under the caller's own uid, so it confers no authority the caller does not already hold\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"at-3.2.5-21.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}, \"deny_file\": {\"content\": \"\", \"exists\": true, \"path\": \"/etc/at.deny\"}, \"note\": \"the allow/deny files decide *who may submit*, not *as whom the job runs*; they are recorded because they bound the blast radius, not because they change the classification\"}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/at", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "writes into the job spool directory as root, then the daemon runs the job as the *submitting* user", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 815, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"9112c96dc2285596bf3bfd13a8d19f22e21e1607edea101d12fca50cb10f0156\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"9112c96dc2285596bf3bfd13a8d19f22e21e1607edea101d12fca50cb10f0156\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/chage\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"shadow-utils-4.19.0-7.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded to the caller's own row in /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow or the PAM timestamp; it cannot grant a group or a uid the caller lacks\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"shadow-utils-4.19.0-7.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/chage", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "edits the invoking user's own account record after PAM authentication; it takes no caller-chosen command and writes no caller-chosen path", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "no verified provenance for these bytes (integrity=FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT), so the design bound cannot be attributed to the binary actually on disk", "evidence_bytes": 805, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": null, \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"18a46f289e2437330a839ef71e9e1b5e57811c607d889702353a38077cbb1f47\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4711\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/chfn\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"package_owner\": \"util-linux-2.41.5-1.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound_if_provenance_held\": \"bounded to the caller's own row in /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow or the PAM timestamp; it cannot grant a group or a uid the caller lacks\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"util-linux-2.41.5-1.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator establishes provenance for this binary (vendor manifest, checksum, or a package whose digest the agent can read) or removes the setuid bit", "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/chfn", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "edits the invoking user's own account record after PAM authentication; it takes no caller-chosen command and writes no caller-chosen path", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "no verified provenance for these bytes (integrity=FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT), so the design bound cannot be attributed to the binary actually on disk", "evidence_bytes": 805, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": null, \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"b2b33675e042afaedc38873d85959ef733e9cc2248f16356bf4665b84bcb905f\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4711\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/chsh\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"package_owner\": \"util-linux-2.41.5-1.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound_if_provenance_held\": \"bounded to the caller's own row in /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow or the PAM timestamp; it cannot grant a group or a uid the caller lacks\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"util-linux-2.41.5-1.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator establishes provenance for this binary (vendor manifest, checksum, or a package whose digest the agent can read) or removes the setuid bit", "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/chsh", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "edits the invoking user's own account record after PAM authentication; it takes no caller-chosen command and writes no caller-chosen path", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 1121, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"d4671b407d990826dcf0f83d167f40c5a4991d5dbf363c5f16fc2fa31c2c7d24\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"d4671b407d990826dcf0f83d167f40c5a4991d5dbf363c5f16fc2fa31c2c7d24\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/crontab\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"cronie-1.7.2-16.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"allow_file\": {\"exists\": false, \"path\": \"/etc/cron.allow\"}, \"bound\": {\"bound\": \"bounded: a submitted job executes under the caller's own uid, so it confers no authority the caller does not already hold\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"cronie-1.7.2-16.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}, \"deny_file\": {\"content\": \"\", \"exists\": true, \"path\": \"/etc/cron.deny\"}, \"note\": \"the allow/deny files decide *who may submit*, not *as whom the job runs*; they are recorded because they bound the blast radius, not because they change the classification\"}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/crontab", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "writes into the job spool directory as root, then the daemon runs the job as the *submitting* user", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 168, "evidence_json": "{\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/fusermount\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/fusermount", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "bounded to the caller's own FUSE mounts", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares; and /etc/fstab contains no `user`/`users` entry (0 matches)", "evidence_bytes": 870, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"9b6434262614e97268bbd57afe21b3584696cf759ba17009ffaf059041ffb19a\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"9b6434262614e97268bbd57afe21b3584696cf759ba17009ffaf059041ffb19a\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/fusermount-glusterfs\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"glusterfs-fuse-11.2-8.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": {\"bound\": \"bounded: with no `user`/`users` entry in fstab the helper refuses an unprivileged caller, and it accepts no caller-chosen mount source\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"glusterfs-fuse-11.2-8.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}, \"fstab_user_entries\": []}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/fusermount-glusterfs", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "mounts a filesystem as root", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 169, "evidence_json": "{\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/fusermount3\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/fusermount3", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "bounded to the caller's own FUSE mounts", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the administrator list lives in /etc/gshadow, which is 0000 root and unreadable by the agent", "evidence_bytes": 493, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"5d7eea7f619c5b7a2b7129d52023e78f8619c206e46c9a3189563e1f95cf5f4e\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"5d7eea7f619c5b7a2b7129d52023e78f8619c206e46c9a3189563e1f95cf5f4e\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/gpasswd\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"shadow-utils-4.19.0-7.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"gshadow_mode\": \"0o0\", \"gshadow_readable\": false}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator reads /etc/gshadow and confirms this identity administers no group (an empty admin field on every privileged group)", "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/gpasswd", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "administers group membership; root-equivalent exactly when the agent administers a privileged group, because adding itself to `docker` or `wheel` re-opens a closed path", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 176, "evidence_json": "{\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/grub2-set-bootflag\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/grub2-set-bootflag", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "writes one bootflag byte", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 163, "evidence_json": "{\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/mount\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/mount", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "bounded by fstab 'user' entries", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares; and /etc/fstab contains no `user`/`users` entry (0 matches)", "evidence_bytes": 865, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"da5be99dccfdca306d066e4e5c005cac71c4605949080c62c072592f80c5e8f7\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"da5be99dccfdca306d066e4e5c005cac71c4605949080c62c072592f80c5e8f7\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/mount.nfs\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"nfs-common-utils-2.8.7-6.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": {\"bound\": \"bounded: with no `user`/`users` entry in fstab the helper refuses an unprivileged caller, and it accepts no caller-chosen mount source\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"nfs-common-utils-2.8.7-6.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}, \"fstab_user_entries\": []}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/mount.nfs", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "mounts a filesystem as root", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 816, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"9e4c6ed4000e631dac868fefa1247e99e58e546c3741632903999738537d23a7\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"9e4c6ed4000e631dac868fefa1247e99e58e546c3741632903999738537d23a7\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/newgrp\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"shadow-utils-4.19.0-7.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded to the caller's own row in /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow or the PAM timestamp; it cannot grant a group or a uid the caller lacks\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"shadow-utils-4.19.0-7.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/newgrp", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "edits the invoking user's own account record after PAM authentication; it takes no caller-chosen command and writes no caller-chosen path", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 177, "evidence_json": "{\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/pam_timestamp_check\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/pam_timestamp_check", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "timestamp file only", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 816, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"193f9b0002108bf4b1b4c11d342f15bbf9e66ad729cb37697d746cf517afb968\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"193f9b0002108bf4b1b4c11d342f15bbf9e66ad729cb37697d746cf517afb968\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/passwd\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"shadow-utils-4.19.0-7.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded to the caller's own row in /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow or the PAM timestamp; it cannot grant a group or a uid the caller lacks\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"shadow-utils-4.19.0-7.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/passwd", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "edits the invoking user's own account record after PAM authentication; it takes no caller-chosen command and writes no caller-chosen path", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the gate is the authorisation policy, which is unreadable by the agent (/etc/sudoers is 0440 root, /etc/polkit-1/rules.d is 0700 root)", "evidence_bytes": 535, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"926bdb901a39b1cc0fb051dea2c789d95f53e1ef13794e923d7469cd6d579d9a\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"926bdb901a39b1cc0fb051dea2c789d95f53e1ef13794e923d7469cd6d579d9a\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/pkexec\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"polkit-127-2.fc44.2.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"package\": \"polkit-127-2.fc44.2.x86_64\", \"polkit_local_listable\": false, \"sudoers_readable\": false}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator runs `sudo -l -U martin`, reads /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/* and /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/*, and removes any entry granting this identity a root command", "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/pkexec", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "arbitrary command execution as uid 0, gated on an authentication factor", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the gate is the authorisation policy, which is unreadable by the agent (/etc/sudoers is 0440 root, /etc/polkit-1/rules.d is 0700 root)", "evidence_bytes": 541, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"410973435216008c113693ee29743a4d7c3d232cfbc1013227fc8d0be666f209\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"410973435216008c113693ee29743a4d7c3d232cfbc1013227fc8d0be666f209\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/su\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"util-linux-2.41.5-1.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"package\": \"util-linux-2.41.5-1.fc44.x86_64\", \"polkit_local_listable\": false, \"sudoers_readable\": false}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator runs `sudo -l -U martin`, reads /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/* and /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/*, and removes any entry granting this identity a root command", "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/su", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "arbitrary command execution as uid 0, gated on an authentication factor", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the gate is the authorisation policy, which is unreadable by the agent (/etc/sudoers is 0440 root, /etc/polkit-1/rules.d is 0700 root)", "evidence_bytes": 494, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": null, \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"52d280f4d4411a54afcad91468f765790056c8b388e1074f2324dad3e31846de\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4111\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/sudo\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"package_owner\": \"sudo-1.9.17-8.p2.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"package\": \"sudo-1.9.17-8.p2.fc44.x86_64\", \"polkit_local_listable\": false, \"sudoers_readable\": false}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator runs `sudo -l -U martin`, reads /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/* and /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/*, and removes any entry granting this identity a root command", "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/sudo", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "arbitrary command execution as uid 0, gated on an authentication factor", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 164, "evidence_json": "{\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/umount\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["exists", "mode", "owner_gid", "owner_uid", "path", "readable_by_agent", "setuid", "writable_by_agent"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/umount", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "bounded by fstab 'user' entries", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 801, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"0cb285f3c1819e3ca92545b448fed4d0b6a41ce81899ad11d9512d80b18b7e79\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"0cb285f3c1819e3ca92545b448fed4d0b6a41ce81899ad11d9512d80b18b7e79\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/unix_chkpwd\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"pam-1.7.2-2.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded to the caller's own row in /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow or the PAM timestamp; it cannot grant a group or a uid the caller lacks\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"pam-1.7.2-2.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/unix_chkpwd", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "edits the invoking user's own account record after PAM authentication; it takes no caller-chosen command and writes no caller-chosen path", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the gate is the authorisation policy, which is unreadable by the agent (/etc/sudoers is 0440 root, /etc/polkit-1/rules.d is 0700 root)", "evidence_bytes": 502, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": null, \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"fbb10ea3f210c48e5a9cc623f43d40b1b603beb1ef00a339c2a23e3f7585f6be\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4711\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/userhelper\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"package_owner\": \"usermode-1.114-16.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"package\": \"usermode-1.114-16.fc44.x86_64\", \"polkit_local_listable\": false, \"sudoers_readable\": false}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator runs `sudo -l -U martin`, reads /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/* and /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/*, and removes any entry granting this identity a root command", "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/userhelper", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "arbitrary command execution as uid 0, gated on an authentication factor", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "no discriminator is defined for this binary, and an unclassified setuid-root binary is treated as unresolved, never as safe", "evidence_bytes": 509, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"89905a0051eaaec3f7d62034e6c07fea9d3930645056bfb1c2b9b8489d38454e\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"89905a0051eaaec3f7d62034e6c07fea9d3930645056bfb1c2b9b8489d38454e\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/bin/vmware-user-suid-wrapper\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"open-vm-tools-desktop-13.1.0-2.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"basename\": \"vmware-user-suid-wrapper\"}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator determines whether caller-controlled input can reach a privileged effect (arbitrary exec, arbitrary write, namespace or device manipulation, credential change); if not needed, remove the setuid bit", "path_id": "setuid:/usr/bin/vmware-user-suid-wrapper", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "setuid-root binary with no measured bound", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 881, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"2015304df43beff0b74409cdc4d858107efcde650d9bc8afb1288041d62cec4b\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"2015304df43beff0b74409cdc4d858107efcde650d9bc8afb1288041d62cec4b\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/lib/claude-desktop-unofficial/chrome-sandbox\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"claude-desktop-unofficial-1.24012.9-3.2.1.fc42.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded by the SUID sandbox protocol: the helper refuses to run unless invoked as the sandbox host of its own process tree\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"claude-desktop-unofficial-1.24012.9-3.2.1.fc42.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/lib/claude-desktop-unofficial/chrome-sandbox", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "creates a user/PID namespace for a browser renderer and execs only the target passed by its own zygote; it does not take a caller-chosen command", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 878, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"026972c2853aa610480cdf5957dacdf28d7b07059977282cfee0a5d8deb0605a\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"026972c2853aa610480cdf5957dacdf28d7b07059977282cfee0a5d8deb0605a\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/lib/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"polkit-127-2.fc44.2.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded: it is the credential-checking half of the polkit conversation. It cannot grant an action -- polkitd does that, and polkitd's decision is the separately-classified pkexec path\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"polkit-127-2.fc44.2.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/lib/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "authenticates the caller to polkitd over a private channel; it execs nothing and writes no caller-chosen path", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 853, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"3cb77cf3a2fd251c4c43c7d164b20472f6818a25ffcf88f0330f0b3df8f62ba3\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"3cb77cf3a2fd251c4c43c7d164b20472f6818a25ffcf88f0330f0b3df8f62ba3\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/lib64/cef/chrome-sandbox\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"cef-146.0.11^chromium146.0.7680.177-2.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded by the SUID sandbox protocol: the helper refuses to run unless invoked as the sandbox host of its own process tree\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"cef-146.0.11^chromium146.0.7680.177-2.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/lib64/cef/chrome-sandbox", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "creates a user/PID namespace for a browser renderer and execs only the target passed by its own zygote; it does not take a caller-chosen command", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "no verified provenance for these bytes (integrity=FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT), so the design bound cannot be attributed to the binary actually on disk; and neither D-Bus system-service directory is agent-writable", "evidence_bytes": 1106, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": null, \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"3276f1f7ce40adbbd7cfa2bc00d62cb53ec1348da4719d9a5d34aa31c7421aef\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4750\", \"owner_gid\": 81, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/libexec/dbus-1/dbus-daemon-launch-helper\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"package_owner\": \"dbus-daemon-1.16.2-1.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": {\"bound_if_provenance_held\": \"bounded: the service files it may launch live in root-owned directories the agent cannot write, so it takes no caller-chosen binary\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"FILE_UNREADABLE_BY_AGENT\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"dbus-daemon-1.16.2-1.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}, \"conf\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/etc/dbus-1/system.d\", \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"services\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/share/dbus-1/system-services\", \"writable_by_agent\": false}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator establishes provenance for this binary (vendor manifest, checksum, or a package whose digest the agent can read) or removes the setuid bit", "path_id": "setuid:/usr/libexec/dbus-1/dbus-daemon-launch-helper", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "launches a system service as the user named in its .service file", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 860, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"74c298a23c56b07d977355d3d143cc1c98c35e4d658eae8de49a36853a379dd3\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"74c298a23c56b07d977355d3d143cc1c98c35e4d658eae8de49a36853a379dd3\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/libexec/libgtop_server2\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"libgtop2-2.41.3-5.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded: it discloses information and performs no write, no exec and no credential change. Information disclosure is not uid-0 authority under the classification criteria\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"libgtop2-2.41.3-5.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/libexec/libgtop_server2", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "reports system and process statistics to a desktop client", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares; and the readable allow list names specific bridges", "evidence_bytes": 813, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"42788deb78c835fbd8279f97af9586179b16f0fdbd8b3d88afcdbede90db0b72\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"42788deb78c835fbd8279f97af9586179b16f0fdbd8b3d88afcdbede90db0b72\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/libexec/qemu-bridge-helper\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"qemu-common-10.2.2-1.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"allow_entries\": [\"allow virbr0\"], \"bound\": {\"bound\": \"bounded by the allow list in /etc/qemu/bridge.conf: ['allow virbr0']\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"qemu-common-10.2.2-1.fc44.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/libexec/qemu-bridge-helper", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "attaches a tap device to a bridge as root", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "no discriminator is defined for this binary, and an unclassified setuid-root binary is treated as unresolved, never as safe", "evidence_bytes": 533, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"df25e68200204f4dc88b01697b68bccaa52c386314ad51ae9cd274da9a32fec8\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"df25e68200204f4dc88b01697b68bccaa52c386314ad51ae9cd274da9a32fec8\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/libexec/spice-gtk-x86_64/spice-client-glib-usb-acl-helper\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"spice-glib-0.42-8.fc44.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"basename\": \"spice-client-glib-usb-acl-helper\"}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": "operator determines whether caller-controlled input can reach a privileged effect (arbitrary exec, arbitrary write, namespace or device manipulation, credential change); if not needed, remove the setuid bit", "path_id": "setuid:/usr/libexec/spice-gtk-x86_64/spice-client-glib-usb-acl-helper", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "setuid-root binary with no measured bound", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 843, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"b80ae15c6479c7feaba09d0be5baa7dc5e9f6c4a8318ad810ab2403bd19c1556\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"b80ae15c6479c7feaba09d0be5baa7dc5e9f6c4a8318ad810ab2403bd19c1556\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/share/antigravity/chrome-sandbox\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"antigravity-1.23.2-1776330658.el8.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded by the SUID sandbox protocol: the helper refuses to run unless invoked as the sandbox host of its own process tree\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"antigravity-1.23.2-1776330658.el8.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/share/antigravity/chrome-sandbox", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "creates a user/PID namespace for a browser renderer and execs only the target passed by its own zygote; it does not take a caller-chosen command", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 824, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"2015304df43beff0b74409cdc4d858107efcde650d9bc8afb1288041d62cec4b\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"2015304df43beff0b74409cdc4d858107efcde650d9bc8afb1288041d62cec4b\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/share/code/chrome-sandbox\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"code-1.129.0-1784075033.el8.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded by the SUID sandbox protocol: the helper refuses to run unless invoked as the sandbox host of its own process tree\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"code-1.129.0-1784075033.el8.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/share/code/chrome-sandbox", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "creates a user/PID namespace for a browser renderer and execs only the target passed by its own zygote; it does not take a caller-chosen command", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "owning package identified, the on-disk digest equals the digest rpm recorded for this file at build time, and the setuid bit is the one the package declares", "evidence_bytes": 830, "evidence_json": "{\"binary_hash\": \"566d3ebc00aeacc9072e7c9345845f598d5ebf9c78d9bba0918034030866e069\", \"capabilities\": \"none\", \"expected_hash\": \"566d3ebc00aeacc9072e7c9345845f598d5ebf9c78d9bba0918034030866e069\", \"file\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o4755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/share/cursor/chrome-sandbox\", \"setgid\": false, \"setuid\": true, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"package_owner\": \"cursor-3.12.10-1784174250.el8.x86_64\", \"rule\": {\"bound\": \"bounded by the SUID sandbox protocol: the helper refuses to run unless invoked as the sandbox host of its own process tree\", \"provenance\": {\"digest_algorithm\": \"sha256\", \"integrity\": \"MATCH\", \"mode_matches_package\": true, \"package_owner\": \"cursor-3.12.10-1784174250.el8.x86_64\", \"packaged\": true, \"setuid_declared_by_package\": true, \"setuid_on_disk\": true}}}", "evidence_keys": ["binary_hash", "capabilities", "expected_hash", "file", "integrity", "package_owner", "rule"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "setuid:/usr/share/cursor/chrome-sandbox", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "creates a user/PID namespace for a browser renderer and execs only the target passed by its own zygote; it does not take a caller-chosen command", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "setuid"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "`sudo -n -l` distinguishes *no entry* ('not allowed to run sudo') from *an entry behind a password* ('a password is required'). It cannot reveal which commands the entry grants, and /etc/sudoers is 0440 root", "evidence_bytes": 317, "evidence_json": "{\"interpretation\": \"an entry exists; its command set is unmeasured. `ALL=(ALL) ALL` would be root-equivalent\", \"probe\": {\"argv\": [\"sudo\", \"-n\", \"-l\"], \"rc\": 1, \"stderr\": \"sudo: a password is required\", \"stdout\": \"\"}, \"sudoers_entry_exists_for_agent\": true, \"sudoers_mode\": \"0o440\", \"sudoers_readable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["interpretation", "probe", "sudoers_entry_exists_for_agent", "sudoers_mode", "sudoers_readable_by_agent"], "operator_action": "operator runs `sudo -l -U martin` and reads /etc/sudoers plus /etc/sudoers.d/*; any root-capable entry for this identity must be removed", "path_id": "sudo:sudo", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "arbitrary command execution as uid 0 if the policy grants it", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "sudo"}
{"blocking": true, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "REQUIRES_OPERATOR_EVIDENCE", "discriminator": "the readable half of the policy is measured below; the deciding half, /etc/polkit-1/rules.d, is 0700 root and can return polkit.Result.YES (no password) for this action", "evidence_bytes": 354, "evidence_json": "{\"action_id\": \"org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units\", \"admin_identities_from_50_default\": [], \"agent_groups\": [\"wheel\", \"docker\", \"martin\"], \"agent_is_admin_identity\": false, \"implicit\": {\"implicit active\": \"auth_admin_keep\", \"implicit any\": \"auth_admin\", \"implicit inactive\": \"auth_admin\"}, \"overlap\": [], \"polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent\": false}", "evidence_keys": ["action_id", "admin_identities_from_50_default", "agent_groups", "agent_is_admin_identity", "implicit", "overlap", "polkit_local_rules_listable_by_agent"], "operator_action": "operator confirms no polkit rule grants this identity org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units without authentication", "path_id": "systemd:systemd_run", "prior_classification": "UNKNOWN", "privilege_effect": "starts a transient unit under the system manager, which runs as root by default", "provenance": "measured_here", "reclassified": true, "surface": "systemd"}
{"blocking": false, "carrier_analysis_json": null, "classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "discriminator": "carried forward from the source inventory, which measured it in a host-representative context", "evidence_bytes": 648, "evidence_json": "{\"root_services_with_agent_writable_exec\": [], \"unit_dirs\": {\"/etc/systemd/system\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/etc/systemd/system\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"/run/systemd/system\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/run/systemd/system\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}, \"/usr/lib/systemd/system\": {\"exists\": true, \"mode\": \"0o755\", \"owner_gid\": 0, \"owner_uid\": 0, \"path\": \"/usr/lib/systemd/system\", \"readable_by_agent\": true, \"setuid\": false, \"writable_by_agent\": false}}}", "evidence_keys": ["root_services_with_agent_writable_exec", "unit_dirs"], "operator_action": null, "path_id": "systemd:systemd_unit_control", "prior_classification": "NON_ROOT_EQUIVALENT", "privilege_effect": "no system unit directory is agent-writable and no root service has an agent-writable executable", "provenance": "carried_forward", "reclassified": false, "surface": "systemd"}