{"attack_id": "D_subuid", "changed_canonical": false, "parent_id": null, "raw_json": "{\"attack\": \"D_delegated_subuid_remap\", \"changed_canonical\": false, \"stderr\": \"/bin/sh: line 1: /tmp/cspa3-e59509353b61/canon/files/README.md: Permission denied\", \"verdict\": \"DENIED_BY_DAC\", \"why\": \"the delegated range tops out at 589823; uid 940 is not in it, so remapping lands on a principal with no authority over the store\"}", "verdict": "DENIED_BY_DAC", "why": "the delegated range tops out at 589823; uid 940 is not in it, so remapping lands on a principal with no authority over the store"}
{"attack_id": "E_setns:docker_route", "changed_canonical": true, "parent_id": "E_setns", "raw_json": "{\"changed_canonical\": true, \"route\": \"docker exec, i.e. the root-equivalent socket\", \"stderr\": \"\", \"verdict\": \"EXPECTED_SUCCESS\", \"why\": \"this is not a namespace weakness. It is the Docker socket, and its remediation is removing that socket, not changing namespaces.\"}", "verdict": "EXPECTED_SUCCESS", "why": "this is not a namespace weakness. It is the Docker socket, and its remediation is removing that socket, not changing namespaces."}
{"attack_id": "E_setns:procfs_route", "changed_canonical": null, "parent_id": "E_setns", "raw_json": "{\"error\": \"Permission denied\", \"openable\": false, \"route\": \"/proc/<pid>/ns via the namespace boundary\", \"verdict\": \"DENIED_BY_DAC\"}", "verdict": "DENIED_BY_DAC", "why": null}
{"attack_id": "F_ptrace", "changed_canonical": null, "parent_id": null, "raw_json": "{\"attached_authority\": false, \"attack\": \"F_nondescendant_ptrace\", \"broker_pid_found\": 1763211, \"container_pid\": \"1763169\", \"control_attached_agent_owned_process\": true, \"maps_readable\": false, \"mem_readable\": false, \"stdout\": \"DENIED Operation not permitted\", \"verdict\": \"DENIED_BY_DAC\", \"why\": \"ptrace_may_access requires matching uid or CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the target's user namespace. The authority is uid 940, which the agent cannot become -- so ptrace_scope=0 no longer helps it. This is the direct reversal of V2's result.\"}", "verdict": "DENIED_BY_DAC", "why": "ptrace_may_access requires matching uid or CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the target's user namespace. The authority is uid 940, which the agent cannot become -- so ptrace_scope=0 no longer helps it. This is the direct reversal of V2's result."}
{"attack_id": "J_broker_replacement:J1_host_write_to_code", "changed_canonical": null, "parent_id": "J_broker_replacement", "raw_json": "{\"detail\": \"Permission denied\", \"verdict\": \"DENIED_BY_DAC\"}", "verdict": "DENIED_BY_DAC", "why": null}
{"attack_id": "J_broker_replacement:J2_docker_cp_into_container", "changed_canonical": null, "parent_id": "J_broker_replacement", "raw_json": "{\"returncode\": 0, \"stderr\": \"\", \"verdict\": \"EXPECTED_SUCCESS\", \"why\": \"the Docker socket writes into the authority's filesystem regardless of who owns it\"}", "verdict": "EXPECTED_SUCCESS", "why": "the Docker socket writes into the authority's filesystem regardless of who owns it"}
{"attack_id": "J_broker_replacement:J3_replace_whole_authority", "changed_canonical": null, "parent_id": "J_broker_replacement", "raw_json": "{\"container_running\": \"true\", \"detail\": \"the agent can 'docker rm -f' this container and start its own with substituted code; the container is running under the agent's own Docker authority\", \"not_executed\": \"the destructive form is not run because it would end the measurement; J2 already demonstrates write access to the authority's code, which is the same capability\", \"verdict\": \"EXPECTED_SUCCESS\"}", "verdict": "EXPECTED_SUCCESS", "why": null}
{"attack_id": "K_socket_impersonation", "changed_canonical": null, "parent_id": null, "raw_json": "{\"attack\": \"K_socket_impersonation\", \"detail\": \"Permission denied\", \"rename\": \"denied (Permission denied)\", \"runtime_dir_mode\": \"0o771\", \"runtime_dir_owner\": 940, \"verdict\": \"DENIED_BY_DAC\"}", "verdict": "DENIED_BY_DAC", "why": null}
{"attack_id": "Q_key_material", "changed_canonical": null, "parent_id": null, "raw_json": "{\"attack\": \"Q_authority_key_material\", \"detail\": \"Permission denied\", \"key_file\": \"/tmp/cspa3-e59509353b61/run/authority.key\", \"mode\": \"0o640\", \"owner_gid\": 940, \"owner_uid\": 941, \"verdict\": \"DENIED_BY_DAC\"}", "verdict": "DENIED_BY_DAC", "why": null}
{"attack_id": "container_roots:H_rootful_container_root", "changed_canonical": true, "parent_id": "container_roots", "raw_json": "{\"changed_canonical\": true, \"stdout\": \"ok\", \"verdict\": \"EXPECTED_SUCCESS\", \"why\": \"real host root; DAC does not apply to it and is not claimed to\"}", "verdict": "EXPECTED_SUCCESS", "why": "real host root; DAC does not apply to it and is not claimed to"}
{"attack_id": "container_roots:I_rootless_container_root", "changed_canonical": false, "parent_id": "container_roots", "raw_json": "{\"changed_canonical\": false, \"output\": \"Error: short-name resolution enforced but cannot prompt without a TTY\", \"verdict\": \"DENIED_BY_DAC\", \"why\": \"rootless container root maps to the agent uid or its delegated subuid range, neither of which owns the store\"}", "verdict": "DENIED_BY_DAC", "why": "rootless container root maps to the agent uid or its delegated subuid range, neither of which owns the store"}