| { | |
| "original_study": { | |
| "claim": { | |
| "hypothesis": "Among lower-caste households, the association between being a groundwater buyer and farm performance will be more favorable in villages where landownership dominance is held by a lower caste.", | |
| "hypothesis_location": "Section III: Access to Irrigation.", | |
| "statement": "The results indicate that the advantage of living in a low-caste dominated village is concentrated among groundwater buyers: the interaction between low-caste village status and water-buyer status is positive and statistically significant in the crop-income regressions.", | |
| "statement_location": "Table 4 (OLS estimations with water-market interaction terms), “LCV × water buyer”.", | |
| "study_type": "Observational" | |
| }, | |
| "data": { | |
| "source": "UP-Bihar LSMS World Bank survey data, including a household questionnaire and a village questionnaire.", | |
| "wave_or_subset": "Field survey collected in 1997-1998 in rural villages in south and southeastern Uttar Pradesh and north and central Bihar; analysis focuses on Hindu-dominated villages and excludes Muslim-dominated villages and Muslim households.", | |
| "sample_size": "120 villages and 2,250 households in the full sample; the focal regressions use a lower-caste household sample with 1,295 observations.", | |
| "unit_of_analysis": "Household (lower-caste household, BAC/OBC/SC) in a village.", | |
| "access_details": "not stated", | |
| "notes": "Village dominance is defined by which caste group owns the majority of land (upper-caste dominated vs BAC-dominated). Key irrigation measures include private tubewell ownership and groundwater buying. Regression disturbance terms are clustered at the village level in the household-level crop-income models." | |
| }, | |
| "method": { | |
| "description": "The study compares economic outcomes of lower-caste households across villages where landownership is dominated by either an upper caste or a lower backward agricultural caste group, and then tests whether differences in agricultural outcomes are explained by access to irrigation through private groundwater markets by interacting village dominance with household water-market participation.", | |
| "steps": [ | |
| "Draw villages at random from districts in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar and conduct village- and household-level surveys.", | |
| "Classify villages by which caste group owns the majority of land (upper-caste dominated vs BAC-dominated).", | |
| "Restrict the main household analysis to lower-caste households (BAC, OBC, SC) and exclude Muslim-dominated villages and Muslim households.", | |
| "Construct agricultural outcome measures (e.g., crop income per acre) from reported crop sales and landholdings.", | |
| "Measure groundwater market participation using indicators for being a water buyer and tubewell owner.", | |
| "Estimate OLS regressions of crop income per acre on low-caste village status, household controls, and fixed effects, clustering standard errors at the village level.", | |
| "Estimate interaction models where low-caste village status is interacted with water-buyer status to test whether the village-dominance effect operates through groundwater-market access." | |
| ], | |
| "models": "OLS regression models of crop income per acre with interaction terms between village caste dominance and groundwater market participation (water buyer), with clustered standard errors at the village level and included controls/fixed effects as specified in the table.", | |
| "outcome_variable": "Household crop income per acre (crop income per acre of total land).", | |
| "independent_variables": "Low-caste village indicator; water buyer indicator; interaction between low-caste village and water buyer (LCV × water buyer).", | |
| "control_variables": "Literacy indicator and total land; caste controls; state controls; and (depending on specification) district controls and additional sets of controls such as crop, distance, groundwater, and public-goods controls as indicated in the regression table.", | |
| "tools_software": "not stated" | |
| }, | |
| "results": { | |
| "summary": "The interaction analysis shows that the positive association between living in a low-caste dominated village and agricultural performance is concentrated among households that buy groundwater: the interaction between low-caste village status and water-buyer status is positive and statistically significant in the crop-income regression.", | |
| "numerical_results": [ | |
| { | |
| "outcome_name": "Crop income per acre", | |
| "value": "850.9", | |
| "unit": "rupees per acre", | |
| "effect_size": "OLS interaction coefficient (LCV × water buyer)", | |
| "confidence_interval": { | |
| "lower": "not stated", | |
| "upper": "not stated", | |
| "level": "not stated" | |
| }, | |
| "p_value": "< 0.01", | |
| "statistical_significance": 1, | |
| "direction": "positive" | |
| } | |
| ] | |
| }, | |
| "metadata": { | |
| "original_paper_id": "10.1257/app.3.1.239", | |
| "original_paper_title": "Caste as an Impediment to Trade", | |
| "original_paper_code": "not stated", | |
| "original_paper_data": "not stated" | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } |