Add files using upload-large-folder tool

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.3.7.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.3.7 release notes
+==========================
+
+*February 20, 2013*
+
+Django 1.3.7 corrects a packaging problem with yesterday's :doc:`1.3.6 release
+</releases/1.3.6>`.
+
+The release contained stray ``.pyc`` files that caused "bad magic number"
+errors when running with some versions of Python. This releases corrects this,
+and also fixes a bad documentation link in the project template ``settings.py``
+file generated by ``manage.py startproject``.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.4.11.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.4.11 release notes
+===========================
+
+*April 21, 2014*
+
+Django 1.4.11 fixes three security issues in 1.4.10. Additionally,
+Django's vendored version of six, ``django.utils.six``, has been
+upgraded to the latest release (1.6.1).
+
+Unexpected code execution using ``reverse()``
+=============================================
+
+Django's URL handling is based on a mapping of regex patterns
+(representing the URLs) to callable views, and Django's own processing
+consists of matching a requested URL against those patterns to
+determine the appropriate view to invoke.
+
+Django also provides a convenience function -- ``reverse()`` -- which performs
+this process in the opposite direction. The ``reverse()`` function takes
+information about a view and returns a URL which would invoke that view. Use
+of ``reverse()`` is encouraged for application developers, as the output of
+``reverse()`` is always based on the current URL patterns, meaning developers
+do not need to change other code when making changes to URLs.
+
+One argument signature for ``reverse()`` is to pass a dotted Python
+path to the desired view. In this situation, Django will import the
+module indicated by that dotted path as part of generating the
+resulting URL. If such a module has import-time side effects, those
+side effects will occur.
+
+Thus it is possible for an attacker to cause unexpected code
+execution, given the following conditions:
+
+1. One or more views are present which construct a URL based on user
+   input (commonly, a "next" parameter in a querystring indicating
+   where to redirect upon successful completion of an action).
+
+2. One or more modules are known to an attacker to exist on the
+   server's Python import path, which perform code execution with side
+   effects on importing.
+
+To remedy this, ``reverse()`` will now only accept and import dotted
+paths based on the view-containing modules listed in the project's :doc:`URL
+pattern configuration </topics/http/urls>`, so as to ensure that only modules
+the developer intended to be imported in this fashion can or will be imported.
+
+Caching of anonymous pages could reveal CSRF token
+==================================================
+
+Django includes both a :doc:`caching framework </topics/cache>` and a system
+for :doc:`preventing cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks
+</ref/csrf/>`. The CSRF-protection system is based on a random nonce
+sent to the client in a cookie which must be sent by the client on future
+requests and, in forms, a hidden value which must be submitted back with the
+form.
+
+The caching framework includes an option to cache responses to
+anonymous (i.e., unauthenticated) clients.
+
+When the first anonymous request to a given page is by a client which
+did not have a CSRF cookie, the cache framework will also cache the
+CSRF cookie and serve the same nonce to other anonymous clients who
+do not have a CSRF cookie. This can allow an attacker to obtain a
+valid CSRF cookie value and perform attacks which bypass the check for
+the cookie.
+
+To remedy this, the caching framework will no longer cache such
+responses. The heuristic for this will be:
+
+1. If the incoming request did not submit any cookies, and
+
+2. If the response did send one or more cookies, and
+
+3. If the ``Vary: Cookie`` header is set on the response, then the
+   response will not be cached.
+
+MySQL typecasting
+=================
+
+The MySQL database is known to "typecast" on certain queries; for
+example, when querying a table which contains string values, but using
+a query which filters based on an integer value, MySQL will first
+silently coerce the strings to integers and return a result based on that.
+
+If a query is performed without first converting values to the
+appropriate type, this can produce unexpected results, similar to what
+would occur if the query itself had been manipulated.
+
+Django's model field classes are aware of their own types and most
+such classes perform explicit conversion of query arguments to the
+correct database-level type before querying. However, three model
+field classes did not correctly convert their arguments:
+
+* :class:`~django.db.models.FilePathField`
+* :class:`~django.db.models.GenericIPAddressField`
+* ``IPAddressField``
+
+These three fields have been updated to convert their arguments to the
+correct types before querying.
+
+Additionally, developers of custom model fields are now warned via
+documentation to ensure their custom field classes will perform
+appropriate type conversions, and users of the :meth:`raw()
+<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.raw>` and :meth:`extra()
+<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.extra>` query methods -- which allow the
+developer to supply raw SQL or SQL fragments -- will be advised to ensure they
+perform appropriate manual type conversions prior to executing queries.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.4.17.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.4.17 release notes
+===========================
+
+*January 2, 2015*
+
+Django 1.4.17 fixes a regression in the 1.4.14 security release.
+
+Additionally, Django's vendored version of six, ``django.utils.six``, has
+been upgraded to the latest release (1.9.0).
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a regression with dynamically generated inlines and allowed field
+  references in the admin (:ticket:`23754`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.4.18.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.4.18 release notes
+===========================
+
+*January 13, 2015*
+
+Django 1.4.18 fixes several security issues in 1.4.17 as well as a regression
+on Python 2.5 in the 1.4.17 release.
+
+WSGI header spoofing via underscore/dash conflation
+===================================================
+
+When HTTP headers are placed into the WSGI environ, they are normalized by
+converting to uppercase, converting all dashes to underscores, and prepending
+``HTTP_``. For instance, a header ``X-Auth-User`` would become
+``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`` in the WSGI environ (and thus also in Django's
+``request.META`` dictionary).
+
+Unfortunately, this means that the WSGI environ cannot distinguish between
+headers containing dashes and headers containing underscores: ``X-Auth-User``
+and ``X-Auth_User`` both become ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER``. This means that if a
+header is used in a security-sensitive way (for instance, passing
+authentication information along from a front-end proxy), even if the proxy
+carefully strips any incoming value for ``X-Auth-User``, an attacker may be
+able to provide an ``X-Auth_User`` header (with underscore) and bypass this
+protection.
+
+In order to prevent such attacks, both Nginx and Apache 2.4+ strip all headers
+containing underscores from incoming requests by default. Django's built-in
+development server now does the same. Django's development server is not
+recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production
+servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment.
+
+Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs
+=============================================================
+
+Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g.
+``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`)
+to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these
+redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) didn't strip leading
+whitespace on the tested URL and as such considered URLs like
+``\njavascript:...`` safe. If a developer relied on ``is_safe_url()`` to
+provide safe redirect targets and put such a URL into a link, they could suffer
+from a XSS attack. This bug doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put
+this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore
+JavaScript there.
+
+Denial-of-service attack against ``django.views.static.serve``
+==============================================================
+
+In older versions of Django, the :func:`django.views.static.serve` view read
+the files it served one line at a time. Therefore, a big file with no newlines
+would result in memory usage equal to the size of that file. An attacker could
+exploit this and launch a denial-of-service attack by simultaneously requesting
+many large files. This view now reads the file in chunks to prevent large
+memory usage.
+
+Note, however, that this view has always carried a warning that it is not
+hardened for production use and should be used only as a development aid. Now
+may be a good time to audit your project and serve your files in production
+using a real front-end web server if you are not doing so.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* To maintain compatibility with Python 2.5, Django's vendored version of six,
+  ``django.utils.six``, has been downgraded to 1.8.0 which is the last
+  version to support Python 2.5.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.4.19.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.4.19 release notes
+===========================
+
+*January 27, 2015*
+
+Django 1.4.19 fixes a regression in the 1.4.18 security release.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* ``GZipMiddleware`` now supports streaming responses. As part of the 1.4.18
+  security release, the ``django.views.static.serve()`` function was altered
+  to stream the files it serves. Unfortunately, the ``GZipMiddleware`` consumed
+  the stream prematurely and prevented files from being served properly
+  (:ticket:`24158`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.4.5.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.4.5 release notes
+==========================
+
+*February 20, 2013*
+
+Django 1.4.5 corrects a packaging problem with yesterday's :doc:`1.4.4 release
+</releases/1.4.4>`.
+
+The release contained stray ``.pyc`` files that caused "bad magic number"
+errors when running with some versions of Python. This releases corrects this,
+and also fixes a bad documentation link in the project template ``settings.py``
+file generated by ``manage.py startproject``.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.4.8.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.4.8 release notes
+==========================
+
+*September 14, 2013*
+
+Django 1.4.8 fixes two security issues present in previous Django releases in
+the 1.4 series.
+
+Denial-of-service via password hashers
+======================================
+
+In previous versions of Django, no limit was imposed on the plaintext
+length of a password. This allowed a denial-of-service attack through
+submission of bogus but extremely large passwords, tying up server
+resources performing the (expensive, and increasingly expensive with
+the length of the password) calculation of the corresponding hash.
+
+As of 1.4.8, Django's authentication framework imposes a 4096-byte
+limit on passwords and will fail authentication with any submitted
+password of greater length.
+
+Corrected usage of :func:`~django.views.decorators.debug.sensitive_post_parameters` in :mod:`django.contrib.auth`’s admin
+=========================================================================================================================
+
+The decoration of the ``add_view`` and ``user_change_password`` user admin
+views with :func:`~django.views.decorators.debug.sensitive_post_parameters`
+did not include :func:`~django.utils.decorators.method_decorator` (required
+since the views are methods) resulting in the decorator not being properly
+applied. This usage has been fixed and
+:func:`~django.views.decorators.debug.sensitive_post_parameters` will now
+throw an exception if it's improperly used.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.4.9.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.4.9 release notes
+==========================
+
+*October 23, 2013*
+
+Django 1.4.9 fixes a security-related bug in the 1.4 series and one other
+data corruption bug.
+
+Readdressed denial-of-service via password hashers
+==================================================
+
+Django 1.4.8 imposes a 4096-byte limit on passwords in order to mitigate a
+denial-of-service attack through submission of bogus but extremely large
+passwords. In Django 1.4.9, we've reverted this change and instead improved
+the speed of our PBKDF2 algorithm by not rehashing the key on every iteration.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a data corruption bug with ``datetime_safe.datetime.combine`` (#21256).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.5.10.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.5.10 release notes
+===========================
+
+*September 2, 2014*
+
+Django 1.5.10 fixes a regression in the 1.5.9 security release.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Allowed inherited and m2m fields to be referenced in the admin
+  (:ticket:`22486`)

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.5.11.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.5.11 release notes
+===========================
+
+*October 22, 2014*
+
+Django 1.5.11 fixes a couple regressions in the 1.5.9 security release.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Allowed related many-to-many fields to be referenced in the admin
+  (:ticket:`23604`).
+
+* Allowed inline and hidden references to admin fields
+  (:ticket:`23431`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.5.12.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.5.12 release notes
+===========================
+
+*January 2, 2015*
+
+Django 1.5.12 fixes a regression in the 1.5.9 security release.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a regression with dynamically generated inlines and allowed field
+  references in the admin
+  (:ticket:`23754`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.5.3.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.5.3 release notes
+==========================
+
+*September 10, 2013*
+
+This is Django 1.5.3, the third release in the Django 1.5 series. It addresses
+one security issue and also contains an opt-in feature to enhance the security
+of :mod:`django.contrib.sessions`.
+
+Directory traversal vulnerability in ``ssi`` template tag
+=========================================================
+
+In previous versions of Django it was possible to bypass the
+``ALLOWED_INCLUDE_ROOTS`` setting used for security with the ``ssi``
+template tag by specifying a relative path that starts with one of the allowed
+roots. For example, if ``ALLOWED_INCLUDE_ROOTS = ("/var/www",)`` the following
+would be possible:
+
+.. code-block:: html+django
+
+    {% ssi "/var/www/../../etc/passwd" %}
+
+In practice this is not a very common problem, as it would require the template
+author to put the ``ssi`` file in a user-controlled variable, but it's possible
+in principle.
+
+Mitigating a remote-code execution vulnerability in :mod:`django.contrib.sessions`
+==================================================================================
+
+:mod:`django.contrib.sessions` currently uses :mod:`pickle` to serialize
+session data before storing it in the backend. If you're using the :ref:`signed
+cookie session backend<cookie-session-backend>` and :setting:`SECRET_KEY` is
+known by an attacker (there isn't an inherent vulnerability in Django that
+would cause it to leak), the attacker could insert a string into their session
+which, when unpickled, executes arbitrary code on the server. The technique for
+doing so is simple and easily available on the internet. Although the cookie
+session storage signs the cookie-stored data to prevent tampering, a
+:setting:`SECRET_KEY` leak immediately escalates to a remote code execution
+vulnerability.
+
+This attack can be mitigated by serializing session data using JSON rather
+than :mod:`pickle`. To facilitate this, Django 1.5.3 introduces a new setting,
+:setting:`SESSION_SERIALIZER`, to customize the session serialization format.
+For backwards compatibility, this setting defaults to using :mod:`pickle`.
+While JSON serialization does not support all Python objects like :mod:`pickle`
+does, we highly recommend switching to JSON-serialized values. Also,
+as JSON requires string keys, you will likely run into problems if you are
+using non-string keys in ``request.session``. See the
+:ref:`session_serialization` documentation for more details.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.5.4.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.5.4 release notes
+==========================
+
+*September 14, 2013*
+
+This is Django 1.5.4, the fourth release in the Django 1.5 series. It addresses
+two security issues and one bug.
+
+Denial-of-service via password hashers
+======================================
+
+In previous versions of Django, no limit was imposed on the plaintext
+length of a password. This allowed a denial-of-service attack through
+submission of bogus but extremely large passwords, tying up server
+resources performing the (expensive, and increasingly expensive with
+the length of the password) calculation of the corresponding hash.
+
+As of 1.5.4, Django's authentication framework imposes a 4096-byte
+limit on passwords, and will fail authentication with any submitted
+password of greater length.
+
+Corrected usage of :func:`~django.views.decorators.debug.sensitive_post_parameters` in :mod:`django.contrib.auth`’s admin
+=========================================================================================================================
+
+The decoration of the ``add_view`` and ``user_change_password`` user admin
+views with :func:`~django.views.decorators.debug.sensitive_post_parameters`
+did not include :func:`~django.utils.decorators.method_decorator` (required
+since the views are methods) resulting in the decorator not being properly
+applied. This usage has been fixed and
+:func:`~django.views.decorators.debug.sensitive_post_parameters` will now
+throw an exception if it's improperly used.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a bug that prevented a ``QuerySet`` that uses
+  :meth:`~django.db.models.query.QuerySet.prefetch_related` from being pickled
+  and unpickled more than once (the second pickling attempt raised an
+  exception) (#21102).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.5.5.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.5.5 release notes
+==========================
+
+*October 23, 2013*
+
+Django 1.5.5 fixes a couple security-related bugs and several other bugs in the
+1.5 series.
+
+Readdressed denial-of-service via password hashers
+==================================================
+
+Django 1.5.4 imposes a 4096-byte limit on passwords in order to mitigate a
+denial-of-service attack through submission of bogus but extremely large
+passwords. In Django 1.5.5, we've reverted this change and instead improved
+the speed of our PBKDF2 algorithm by not rehashing the key on every iteration.
+
+Properly rotate CSRF token on login
+===================================
+
+This behavior introduced as a security hardening measure in Django 1.5.2 did
+not work properly and is now fixed.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a data corruption bug with ``datetime_safe.datetime.combine`` (#21256).
+* Fixed a Python 3 incompatibility in ``django.utils.text.unescape_entities()``
+  (#21185).
+* Fixed a couple data corruption issues with ``QuerySet`` edge cases under
+  Oracle and MySQL (#21203, #21126).
+* Fixed crashes when using combinations of ``annotate()``,
+  ``select_related()``, and ``only()`` (#16436).
+
+Backwards incompatible changes
+==============================
+
+* The undocumented ``django.core.servers.basehttp.WSGIServerException`` has
+  been removed. Use ``socket.error`` provided by the standard library instead.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.5.6.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.5.6 release notes
+==========================
+
+*April 21, 2014*
+
+Django 1.5.6 fixes several bugs in 1.5.5, including three security
+issues.
+
+Unexpected code execution using ``reverse()``
+=============================================
+
+Django's URL handling is based on a mapping of regex patterns
+(representing the URLs) to callable views, and Django's own processing
+consists of matching a requested URL against those patterns to
+determine the appropriate view to invoke.
+
+Django also provides a convenience function -- ``reverse()`` -- which performs
+this process in the opposite direction. The ``reverse()`` function takes
+information about a view and returns a URL which would invoke that view. Use
+of ``reverse()`` is encouraged for application developers, as the output of
+``reverse()`` is always based on the current URL patterns, meaning developers
+do not need to change other code when making changes to URLs.
+
+One argument signature for ``reverse()`` is to pass a dotted Python
+path to the desired view. In this situation, Django will import the
+module indicated by that dotted path as part of generating the
+resulting URL. If such a module has import-time side effects, those
+side effects will occur.
+
+Thus it is possible for an attacker to cause unexpected code
+execution, given the following conditions:
+
+1. One or more views are present which construct a URL based on user
+   input (commonly, a "next" parameter in a querystring indicating
+   where to redirect upon successful completion of an action).
+
+2. One or more modules are known to an attacker to exist on the
+   server's Python import path, which perform code execution with side
+   effects on importing.
+
+To remedy this, ``reverse()`` will now only accept and import dotted
+paths based on the view-containing modules listed in the project's :doc:`URL
+pattern configuration </topics/http/urls>`, so as to ensure that only modules
+the developer intended to be imported in this fashion can or will be imported.
+
+Caching of anonymous pages could reveal CSRF token
+==================================================
+
+Django includes both a :doc:`caching framework </topics/cache>` and a system
+for :doc:`preventing cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks
+</ref/csrf/>`. The CSRF-protection system is based on a random nonce
+sent to the client in a cookie which must be sent by the client on future
+requests and, in forms, a hidden value which must be submitted back with the
+form.
+
+The caching framework includes an option to cache responses to
+anonymous (i.e., unauthenticated) clients.
+
+When the first anonymous request to a given page is by a client which
+did not have a CSRF cookie, the cache framework will also cache the
+CSRF cookie and serve the same nonce to other anonymous clients who
+do not have a CSRF cookie. This can allow an attacker to obtain a
+valid CSRF cookie value and perform attacks which bypass the check for
+the cookie.
+
+To remedy this, the caching framework will no longer cache such
+responses. The heuristic for this will be:
+
+1. If the incoming request did not submit any cookies, and
+
+2. If the response did send one or more cookies, and
+
+3. If the ``Vary: Cookie`` header is set on the response, then the
+   response will not be cached.
+
+MySQL typecasting
+=================
+
+The MySQL database is known to "typecast" on certain queries; for
+example, when querying a table which contains string values, but using
+a query which filters based on an integer value, MySQL will first
+silently coerce the strings to integers and return a result based on that.
+
+If a query is performed without first converting values to the
+appropriate type, this can produce unexpected results, similar to what
+would occur if the query itself had been manipulated.
+
+Django's model field classes are aware of their own types and most
+such classes perform explicit conversion of query arguments to the
+correct database-level type before querying. However, three model
+field classes did not correctly convert their arguments:
+
+* :class:`~django.db.models.FilePathField`
+* :class:`~django.db.models.GenericIPAddressField`
+* ``IPAddressField``
+
+These three fields have been updated to convert their arguments to the
+correct types before querying.
+
+Additionally, developers of custom model fields are now warned via
+documentation to ensure their custom field classes will perform
+appropriate type conversions, and users of the :meth:`raw()
+<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.raw>` and :meth:`extra()
+<django.db.models.query.QuerySet.extra>` query methods -- which allow the
+developer to supply raw SQL or SQL fragments -- will be advised to ensure they
+perform appropriate manual type conversions prior to executing queries.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed :class:`~django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend` raising
+  ``UnboundLocalError`` if :func:`~django.contrib.auth.get_user_model`
+  raised an error (#21439).
+
+Additionally, Django's vendored version of six, ``django.utils.six``,
+has been upgraded to the latest release (1.6.1).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.6.10.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.6.10 release notes
+===========================
+
+*January 13, 2015*
+
+Django 1.6.10 fixes several security issues in 1.6.9.
+
+WSGI header spoofing via underscore/dash conflation
+===================================================
+
+When HTTP headers are placed into the WSGI environ, they are normalized by
+converting to uppercase, converting all dashes to underscores, and prepending
+``HTTP_``. For instance, a header ``X-Auth-User`` would become
+``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`` in the WSGI environ (and thus also in Django's
+``request.META`` dictionary).
+
+Unfortunately, this means that the WSGI environ cannot distinguish between
+headers containing dashes and headers containing underscores: ``X-Auth-User``
+and ``X-Auth_User`` both become ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER``. This means that if a
+header is used in a security-sensitive way (for instance, passing
+authentication information along from a front-end proxy), even if the proxy
+carefully strips any incoming value for ``X-Auth-User``, an attacker may be
+able to provide an ``X-Auth_User`` header (with underscore) and bypass this
+protection.
+
+In order to prevent such attacks, both Nginx and Apache 2.4+ strip all headers
+containing underscores from incoming requests by default. Django's built-in
+development server now does the same. Django's development server is not
+recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production
+servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment.
+
+Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs
+=============================================================
+
+Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g.
+``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`)
+to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these
+redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) didn't strip leading
+whitespace on the tested URL and as such considered URLs like
+``\njavascript:...`` safe. If a developer relied on ``is_safe_url()`` to
+provide safe redirect targets and put such a URL into a link, they could suffer
+from a XSS attack. This bug doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put
+this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore
+JavaScript there.
+
+Denial-of-service attack against ``django.views.static.serve``
+==============================================================
+
+In older versions of Django, the :func:`django.views.static.serve` view read
+the files it served one line at a time. Therefore, a big file with no newlines
+would result in memory usage equal to the size of that file. An attacker could
+exploit this and launch a denial-of-service attack by simultaneously requesting
+many large files. This view now reads the file in chunks to prevent large
+memory usage.
+
+Note, however, that this view has always carried a warning that it is not
+hardened for production use and should be used only as a development aid. Now
+may be a good time to audit your project and serve your files in production
+using a real front-end web server if you are not doing so.
+
+Database denial-of-service with ``ModelMultipleChoiceField``
+============================================================
+
+Given a form that uses ``ModelMultipleChoiceField`` and
+``show_hidden_initial=True`` (not a documented API), it was possible for a user
+to cause an unreasonable number of SQL queries by submitting duplicate values
+for the field's data. The validation logic in ``ModelMultipleChoiceField`` now
+deduplicates submitted values to address this issue.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.6.11.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.6.11 release notes
+===========================
+
+*March 18, 2015*
+
+Django 1.6.11 fixes two security issues in 1.6.10.
+
+Denial-of-service possibility with ``strip_tags()``
+===================================================
+
+Last year :func:`~django.utils.html.strip_tags`  was changed to work
+iteratively. The problem is that the size of the input it's processing can
+increase on each iteration which results in an infinite loop in
+``strip_tags()``. This issue only affects versions of Python that haven't
+received :bpo:`a bugfix in HTMLParser <20288>`; namely Python < 2.7.7 and
+3.3.5. Some operating system vendors have also backported the fix for the
+Python bug into their packages of earlier versions.
+
+To remedy this issue, ``strip_tags()`` will now return the original input if
+it detects the length of the string it's processing increases. Remember that
+absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of ``strip_tags()`` being
+HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a ``strip_tags()`` call without
+escaping it first, for example with :func:`~django.utils.html.escape`.
+
+Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs
+=============================================================
+
+Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g.
+``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`)
+to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these
+redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) accepted URLs with
+leading control characters and so considered URLs like ``\x08javascript:...``
+safe. This issue doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put this URL
+into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore JavaScript
+there. Browsers we tested also treat URLs prefixed with control characters such
+as ``%08//example.com`` as relative paths so redirection to an unsafe target
+isn't a problem either.
+
+However, if a developer relies on ``is_safe_url()`` to
+provide safe redirect targets and puts such a URL into a link, they could
+suffer from an XSS attack as some browsers such as Google Chrome ignore control
+characters at the start of a URL in an anchor ``href``.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.6.2.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.6.2 release notes
+==========================
+
+*February 6, 2014*
+
+This is Django 1.6.2, a bugfix release for Django 1.6. Django 1.6.2 fixes
+several bugs in 1.6.1:
+
+* Prevented the base geometry object of a prepared geometry to be garbage
+  collected, which could lead to crash Django
+  (:ticket:`21662`).
+
+* Fixed a crash when executing the :djadmin:`changepassword` command when the
+  user object representation contained non-ASCII characters
+  (:ticket:`21627`).
+
+* The :djadmin:`collectstatic` command will raise an error rather than
+  default to using the current working directory if :setting:`STATIC_ROOT` is
+  not set. Combined with the ``--clear`` option, the previous behavior could
+  wipe anything below the current working directory
+  (:ticket:`21581`).
+
+* Fixed mail encoding on Python 3.3.3+
+  (:ticket:`21093`).
+
+* Fixed an issue where when
+  ``settings.DATABASES['default']['AUTOCOMMIT'] = False``, the connection
+  wasn't in autocommit mode but Django pretended it was.
+
+* Fixed a regression in multiple-table inheritance ``exclude()`` queries
+  (:ticket:`21787`).
+
+* Added missing items to ``django.utils.timezone.__all__``
+  (:ticket:`21880`).
+
+* Fixed a field misalignment issue with ``select_related()`` and model
+  inheritance
+  (:ticket:`21413`).
+
+* Fixed join promotion for negated ``AND`` conditions
+  (:ticket:`21748`).
+
+* Oracle database introspection now works with boolean and float fields
+  (:ticket:`19884`).
+
+* Fixed an issue where lazy objects weren't actually marked as safe when passed
+  through :func:`~django.utils.safestring.mark_safe` and could end up being
+  double-escaped (:ticket:`21882`).
+
+Additionally, Django's vendored version of six, ``django.utils.six`` has been
+upgraded to the latest release (1.5.2).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.6.7.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.6.7 release notes
+==========================
+
+*September 2, 2014*
+
+Django 1.6.7 fixes several bugs in 1.6.6, including a regression related to
+a security fix in that release.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Allowed inherited and m2m fields to be referenced in the admin
+  (:ticket:`23329`).
+* Fixed a crash when using ``QuerySet.defer()`` with ``select_related()``
+  (:ticket:`23370`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.6.8.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.6.8 release notes
+==========================
+
+*October 22, 2014*
+
+Django 1.6.8 fixes a couple regressions in the 1.6.6 security release.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Allowed related many-to-many fields to be referenced in the admin
+  (:ticket:`23604`).
+
+* Allowed inline and hidden references to admin fields (:ticket:`23431`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.6.9.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.6.9 release notes
+==========================
+
+*January 2, 2015*
+
+Django 1.6.9 fixes a regression in the 1.6.6 security release.
+
+Additionally, Django's vendored version of six, ``django.utils.six``, has
+been upgraded to the latest release (1.9.0).
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a regression with dynamically generated inlines and allowed field
+  references in the admin (:ticket:`23754`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.7.10.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.7.10 release notes
+===========================
+
+*August 18, 2015*
+
+Django 1.7.10 fixes a security issue in 1.7.9.
+
+Denial-of-service possibility in ``logout()`` view by filling session store
+===========================================================================
+
+Previously, a session could be created when anonymously accessing the
+``django.contrib.auth.views.logout()`` view (provided it wasn't decorated
+with :func:`~django.contrib.auth.decorators.login_required` as done in the
+admin). This could allow an attacker to easily create many new session records
+by sending repeated requests, potentially filling up the session store or
+causing other users' session records to be evicted.
+
+The :class:`~django.contrib.sessions.middleware.SessionMiddleware` has been
+modified to no longer create empty session records, including when
+:setting:`SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST` is active.
+
+Additionally, the ``contrib.sessions.backends.base.SessionBase.flush()`` and
+``cache_db.SessionStore.flush()`` methods have been modified to avoid creating
+a new empty session. Maintainers of third-party session backends should check
+if the same vulnerability is present in their backend and correct it if so.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.7.11.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.7.11 release notes
+===========================
+
+*November 24, 2015*
+
+Django 1.7.11 fixes a security issue and a data loss bug in 1.7.10.
+
+Fixed settings leak possibility in ``date`` template filter
+===========================================================
+
+If an application allows users to specify an unvalidated format for dates and
+passes this format to the :tfilter:`date` filter, e.g.
+``{{ last_updated|date:user_date_format }}``, then a malicious user could
+obtain any secret in the application's settings by specifying a settings key
+instead of a date format. e.g. ``"SECRET_KEY"`` instead of ``"j/m/Y"``.
+
+To remedy this, the underlying function used by the ``date`` template filter,
+``django.utils.formats.get_format()``, now only allows accessing the date/time
+formatting settings.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a data loss possibility with :class:`~django.db.models.Prefetch` if
+  ``to_attr`` is set to a ``ManyToManyField`` (:ticket:`25693`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.7.3.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.7.3 release notes
+==========================
+
+*January 13, 2015*
+
+Django 1.7.3 fixes several security issues and bugs in 1.7.2.
+
+WSGI header spoofing via underscore/dash conflation
+===================================================
+
+When HTTP headers are placed into the WSGI environ, they are normalized by
+converting to uppercase, converting all dashes to underscores, and prepending
+``HTTP_``. For instance, a header ``X-Auth-User`` would become
+``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`` in the WSGI environ (and thus also in Django's
+``request.META`` dictionary).
+
+Unfortunately, this means that the WSGI environ cannot distinguish between
+headers containing dashes and headers containing underscores: ``X-Auth-User``
+and ``X-Auth_User`` both become ``HTTP_X_AUTH_USER``. This means that if a
+header is used in a security-sensitive way (for instance, passing
+authentication information along from a front-end proxy), even if the proxy
+carefully strips any incoming value for ``X-Auth-User``, an attacker may be
+able to provide an ``X-Auth_User`` header (with underscore) and bypass this
+protection.
+
+In order to prevent such attacks, both Nginx and Apache 2.4+ strip all headers
+containing underscores from incoming requests by default. Django's built-in
+development server now does the same. Django's development server is not
+recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production
+servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment.
+
+Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs
+=============================================================
+
+Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g.
+``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`)
+to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these
+redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) didn't strip leading
+whitespace on the tested URL and as such considered URLs like
+``\njavascript:...`` safe. If a developer relied on ``is_safe_url()`` to
+provide safe redirect targets and put such a URL into a link, they could suffer
+from a XSS attack. This bug doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put
+this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore
+JavaScript there.
+
+Denial-of-service attack against ``django.views.static.serve``
+==============================================================
+
+In older versions of Django, the :func:`django.views.static.serve` view read
+the files it served one line at a time. Therefore, a big file with no newlines
+would result in memory usage equal to the size of that file. An attacker could
+exploit this and launch a denial-of-service attack by simultaneously requesting
+many large files. This view now reads the file in chunks to prevent large
+memory usage.
+
+Note, however, that this view has always carried a warning that it is not
+hardened for production use and should be used only as a development aid. Now
+may be a good time to audit your project and serve your files in production
+using a real front-end web server if you are not doing so.
+
+Database denial-of-service with ``ModelMultipleChoiceField``
+============================================================
+
+Given a form that uses ``ModelMultipleChoiceField`` and
+``show_hidden_initial=True`` (not a documented API), it was possible for a user
+to cause an unreasonable number of SQL queries by submitting duplicate values
+for the field's data. The validation logic in ``ModelMultipleChoiceField`` now
+deduplicates submitted values to address this issue.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* The default iteration count for the PBKDF2 password hasher has been
+  increased by 25%. This part of the normal major release process was
+  inadvertently omitted in 1.7. This backwards compatible change will not
+  affect users who have subclassed
+  ``django.contrib.auth.hashers.PBKDF2PasswordHasher`` to change the
+  default value.
+
+* Fixed a crash in the CSRF middleware when handling non-ASCII referer header
+  (:ticket:`23815`).
+
+* Fixed a crash in the ``django.contrib.auth.redirect_to_login`` view when
+  passing a ``reverse_lazy()`` result on Python 3 (:ticket:`24097`).
+
+* Added correct formats for Greek (``el``) (:ticket:`23967`).
+
+* Fixed a migration crash when unapplying a migration where multiple operations
+  interact with the same model (:ticket:`24110`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.7.4.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.7.4 release notes
+==========================
+
+*January 27, 2015*
+
+Django 1.7.4 fixes several bugs in 1.7.3.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a migration crash when unapplying ``contrib.contenttypes``’s or
+  ``contrib.auth``’s first migration (:ticket:`24075`).
+
+* Made the migration's ``RenameModel`` operation rename ``ManyToManyField``
+  tables (:ticket:`24135`).
+
+* Fixed a migration crash on MySQL when migrating from a ``OneToOneField`` to a
+  ``ForeignKey`` (:ticket:`24163`).
+
+* Prevented the ``static.serve`` view from producing ``ResourceWarning``\s in
+  certain circumstances (security fix regression, :ticket:`24193`).
+
+* Fixed schema check for ManyToManyField to look for internal type instead
+  of checking class instance, so you can write custom m2m-like fields with the
+  same behavior. (:ticket:`24104`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.7.5.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.7.5 release notes
+==========================
+
+*February 25, 2015*
+
+Django 1.7.5 fixes several bugs in 1.7.4.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Reverted a fix that prevented a migration crash when unapplying
+  ``contrib.contenttypes``’s or ``contrib.auth``’s first migration
+  (:ticket:`24075`) due to severe impact on the test performance
+  (:ticket:`24251`) and problems in multi-database setups (:ticket:`24298`).
+
+* Fixed a regression that prevented custom fields inheriting from
+  ``ManyToManyField`` from being recognized in migrations (:ticket:`24236`).
+
+* Fixed crash in ``contrib.sites`` migrations when a default database isn't
+  used (:ticket:`24332`).
+
+* Added the ability to set the isolation level on PostgreSQL with psycopg2 ≥
+  2.4.2 (:ticket:`24318`). It was advertised as a new feature in Django 1.6
+  but it didn't work in practice.
+
+* Formats for the Azerbaijani locale (``az``) have been added.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.7.6.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.7.6 release notes
+==========================
+
+*March 9, 2015*
+
+Django 1.7.6 fixes a security issue and several bugs in 1.7.5.
+
+Mitigated an XSS attack via properties in ``ModelAdmin.readonly_fields``
+========================================================================
+
+The :attr:`ModelAdmin.readonly_fields
+<django.contrib.admin.ModelAdmin.readonly_fields>` attribute in the Django
+admin allows displaying model fields and model attributes. While the former
+were correctly escaped, the latter were not. Thus untrusted content could be
+injected into the admin, presenting an exploitation vector for XSS attacks.
+
+In this vulnerability, every model attribute used in ``readonly_fields`` that
+is not an actual model field (e.g. a :class:`property`) will **fail to be
+escaped** even if that attribute is not marked as safe. In this release,
+autoescaping is now correctly applied.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed crash when coercing ``ManyRelatedManager`` to a string
+  (:ticket:`24352`).
+
+* Fixed a bug that prevented migrations from adding a foreign key constraint
+  when converting an existing field to a foreign key (:ticket:`24447`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.7.7.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.7.7 release notes
+==========================
+
+*March 18, 2015*
+
+Django 1.7.7 fixes several bugs and security issues in 1.7.6.
+
+Denial-of-service possibility with ``strip_tags()``
+===================================================
+
+Last year :func:`~django.utils.html.strip_tags`  was changed to work
+iteratively. The problem is that the size of the input it's processing can
+increase on each iteration which results in an infinite loop in
+``strip_tags()``. This issue only affects versions of Python that haven't
+received :bpo:`a bugfix in HTMLParser <20288>`; namely Python < 2.7.7 and
+3.3.5. Some operating system vendors have also backported the fix for the
+Python bug into their packages of earlier versions.
+
+To remedy this issue, ``strip_tags()`` will now return the original input if
+it detects the length of the string it's processing increases. Remember that
+absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of ``strip_tags()`` being
+HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a ``strip_tags()`` call without
+escaping it first, for example with :func:`~django.utils.html.escape`.
+
+Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs
+=============================================================
+
+Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g.
+``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`)
+to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these
+redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) accepted URLs with
+leading control characters and so considered URLs like ``\x08javascript:...``
+safe. This issue doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put this URL
+into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore JavaScript
+there. Browsers we tested also treat URLs prefixed with control characters such
+as ``%08//example.com`` as relative paths so redirection to an unsafe target
+isn't a problem either.
+
+However, if a developer relies on ``is_safe_url()`` to
+provide safe redirect targets and puts such a URL into a link, they could
+suffer from an XSS attack as some browsers such as Google Chrome ignore control
+characters at the start of a URL in an anchor ``href``.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed renaming of classes in migrations where renaming a subclass would
+  cause incorrect state to be recorded for objects that referenced the
+  superclass (:ticket:`24354`).
+
+* Stopped writing migration files in dry run mode when merging migration
+  conflicts. When ``makemigrations --merge`` is called with ``verbosity=3`` the
+  migration file is written to ``stdout`` (:ticket:`24427`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.7.8.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.7.8 release notes
+==========================
+
+*May 1, 2015*
+
+Django 1.7.8 fixes:
+
+* Database introspection with SQLite 3.8.9 (released April 8, 2015)
+  (:ticket:`24637`).
+
+* A database table name quoting regression in 1.7.2 (:ticket:`24605`).
+
+* The loss of ``null``/``not null`` column properties during field alteration
+  of MySQL databases (:ticket:`24595`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.10.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.8.10 release notes
+===========================
+
+*March 1, 2016*
+
+Django 1.8.10 fixes two security issues and several bugs in 1.8.9.
+
+CVE-2016-2512: Malicious redirect and possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs containing basic auth
+===============================================================================================================
+
+Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g.
+``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`)
+to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security check for these
+redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) considered some URLs
+with basic authentication credentials "safe" when they shouldn't be.
+
+For example, a URL like ``http://mysite.example.com\@attacker.com`` would be
+considered safe if the request's host is ``http://mysite.example.com``, but
+redirecting to this URL sends the user to ``attacker.com``.
+
+Also, if a developer relies on ``is_safe_url()`` to provide safe redirect
+targets and puts such a URL into a link, they could suffer from an XSS attack.
+
+CVE-2016-2513: User enumeration through timing difference on password hasher work factor upgrade
+================================================================================================
+
+In each major version of Django since 1.6, the default number of iterations for
+the ``PBKDF2PasswordHasher`` and its subclasses has increased. This improves
+the security of the password as the speed of hardware increases, however, it
+also creates a timing difference between a login request for a user with a
+password encoded in an older number of iterations and login request for a
+nonexistent user (which runs the default hasher's default number of iterations
+since Django 1.6).
+
+This only affects users who haven't logged in since the iterations were
+increased. The first time a user logs in after an iterations increase, their
+password is updated with the new iterations and there is no longer a timing
+difference.
+
+The new ``BasePasswordHasher.harden_runtime()`` method allows hashers to bridge
+the runtime gap between the work factor (e.g. iterations) supplied in existing
+encoded passwords and the default work factor of the hasher. This method
+is implemented for ``PBKDF2PasswordHasher``  and ``BCryptPasswordHasher``.
+The number of rounds for the latter hasher hasn't changed since Django 1.4, but
+some projects may subclass it and increase the work factor as needed.
+
+A warning will be emitted for any :ref:`third-party password hashers that don't
+implement <write-your-own-password-hasher>` a ``harden_runtime()`` method.
+
+If you have different password hashes in your database (such as SHA1 hashes
+from users who haven't logged in since the default hasher switched to PBKDF2
+in Django 1.4), the timing difference on a login request for these users may be
+even greater and this fix doesn't remedy that difference (or any difference
+when changing hashers). You may be able to :ref:`upgrade those hashes
+<wrapping-password-hashers>` to prevent a timing attack for that case.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a crash on PostgreSQL that prevented using ``TIME_ZONE=None`` and
+  ``USE_TZ=False`` (:ticket:`26177`).
+
+* Added system checks for query name clashes of hidden relationships
+  (:ticket:`26162`).
+
+* Made ``forms.FileField`` and ``utils.translation.lazy_number()`` picklable
+  (:ticket:`26212`).
+
+* Fixed :class:`~django.contrib.postgres.fields.RangeField` and
+  :class:`~django.contrib.postgres.fields.ArrayField` serialization with
+  ``None`` values (:ticket:`26215`).
+
+* Reallowed dashes in top-level domain names of URLs checked by
+  ``URLValidator`` to fix a regression in Django 1.8 (:ticket:`26204`).
+
+* Fixed ``BoundField`` to reallow slices of subwidgets (:ticket:`26267`).
+
+* Prevented ``ContentTypeManager`` instances from sharing their cache
+  (:ticket:`26286`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.12.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.8.12 release notes
+===========================
+
+*April 1, 2016*
+
+Django 1.8.12 fixes several bugs in 1.8.11.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Made ``MultiPartParser`` ignore filenames that normalize to an empty string
+  to fix crash in ``MemoryFileUploadHandler`` on specially crafted user input
+  (:ticket:`26325`).
+
+* Fixed data loss on SQLite where ``DurationField`` values with fractional
+  seconds could be saved as ``None`` (:ticket:`26324`).
+
+* Restored the functionality of the admin's ``raw_id_fields`` in
+  ``list_editable`` (:ticket:`26387`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.13.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.8.13 release notes
+===========================
+
+*May 2, 2016*
+
+Django 1.8.13 fixes several bugs in 1.8.12.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed ``TimeField`` microseconds round-tripping on MySQL and SQLite
+  (:ticket:`26498`).
+
+* Restored conversion of an empty string to null when saving values of
+  ``GenericIPAddressField`` on SQLite and MySQL (:ticket:`26557`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.14.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.8.14 release notes
+===========================
+
+*July 18, 2016*
+
+Django 1.8.14 fixes a security issue and a bug in 1.8.13.
+
+XSS in admin's add/change related popup
+=======================================
+
+Unsafe usage of JavaScript's ``Element.innerHTML`` could result in XSS in the
+admin's add/change related popup. ``Element.textContent`` is now used to
+prevent execution of the data.
+
+The debug view also used ``innerHTML``. Although a security issue wasn't
+identified there, out of an abundance of caution it's also updated to use
+``textContent``.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed missing ``varchar/text_pattern_ops`` index on ``CharField`` and
+  ``TextField`` respectively when using ``AddField`` on PostgreSQL
+  (:ticket:`26889`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.15.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.8.15 release notes
+===========================
+
+*September 26, 2016*
+
+Django 1.8.15 fixes a security issue in 1.8.14.
+
+CSRF protection bypass on a site with Google Analytics
+======================================================
+
+An interaction between Google Analytics and Django's cookie parsing could allow
+an attacker to set arbitrary cookies leading to a bypass of CSRF protection.
+
+The parser for ``request.COOKIES`` is simplified to better match the behavior
+of browsers and to mitigate this attack. ``request.COOKIES`` may now contain
+cookies that are invalid according to :rfc:`6265` but are possible to set via
+``document.cookie``.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.16.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.8.16 release notes
+===========================
+
+*November 1, 2016*
+
+Django 1.8.16 fixes two security issues in 1.8.15.
+
+User with hardcoded password created when running tests on Oracle
+=================================================================
+
+When running tests with an Oracle database, Django creates a temporary database
+user. In older versions, if a password isn't manually specified in the database
+settings ``TEST`` dictionary, a hardcoded password is used. This could allow
+an attacker with network access to the database server to connect.
+
+This user is usually dropped after the test suite completes, but not when using
+the ``manage.py test --keepdb`` option or if the user has an active session
+(such as an attacker's connection).
+
+A randomly generated password is now used for each test run.
+
+DNS rebinding vulnerability when ``DEBUG=True``
+===============================================
+
+Older versions of Django don't validate the ``Host`` header against
+``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` when ``settings.DEBUG=True``. This makes them
+vulnerable to a `DNS rebinding attack
+<https://benmmurphy.github.io/blog/2016/07/11/rails-webconsole-dns-rebinding/>`_.
+
+While Django doesn't ship a module that allows remote code execution, this is
+at least a cross-site scripting vector, which could be quite serious if
+developers load a copy of the production database in development or connect to
+some production services for which there's no development instance, for
+example. If a project uses a package like the ``django-debug-toolbar``, then
+the attacker could execute arbitrary SQL, which could be especially bad if the
+developers connect to the database with a superuser account.
+
+``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is now validated regardless of ``DEBUG``. For
+convenience, if ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is empty and ``DEBUG=True``, the following
+variations of localhost are allowed ``['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']``. If
+your local settings file has your production ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` value, you must
+now omit it to get those fallback values.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.18.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.8.18 release notes
+===========================
+
+*April 4, 2017*
+
+Django 1.8.18 fixes two security issues in 1.8.17.
+
+CVE-2017-7233: Open redirect and possible XSS attack via user-supplied numeric redirect URLs
+============================================================================================
+
+Django relies on user input in some cases  (e.g.
+``django.contrib.auth.views.login()`` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`)
+to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security check for these
+redirects (namely ``django.utils.http.is_safe_url()``) considered some numeric
+URLs (e.g. ``http:999999999``) "safe" when they shouldn't be.
+
+Also, if a developer relies on ``is_safe_url()`` to provide safe redirect
+targets and puts such a URL into a link, they could suffer from an XSS attack.
+
+CVE-2017-7234: Open redirect vulnerability in ``django.views.static.serve()``
+=============================================================================
+
+A maliciously crafted URL to a Django site using the
+:func:`~django.views.static.serve` view could redirect to any other domain. The
+view no longer does any redirects as they don't provide any known, useful
+functionality.
+
+Note, however, that this view has always carried a warning that it is not
+hardened for production use and should be used only as a development aid.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.19.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.8.19 release notes
+===========================
+
+*March 6, 2018*
+
+Django 1.8.19 fixes two security issues in 1.18.18.
+
+CVE-2018-7536: Denial-of-service possibility in ``urlize`` and ``urlizetrunc`` template filters
+===============================================================================================
+
+The ``django.utils.html.urlize()`` function was extremely slow to evaluate
+certain inputs due to a catastrophic backtracking vulnerability in a regular
+expression. The ``urlize()`` function is used to implement the ``urlize`` and
+``urlizetrunc`` template filters, which were thus vulnerable.
+
+The problematic regular expression is replaced with parsing logic that behaves
+similarly.
+
+CVE-2018-7537: Denial-of-service possibility in ``truncatechars_html`` and ``truncatewords_html`` template filters
+==================================================================================================================
+
+If ``django.utils.text.Truncator``'s ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods were
+passed the ``html=True`` argument, they were extremely slow to evaluate certain
+inputs due to a catastrophic backtracking vulnerability in a regular
+expression. The ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods are used to implement the
+``truncatechars_html`` and ``truncatewords_html`` template filters, which were
+thus vulnerable.
+
+The backtracking problem in the regular expression is fixed.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.4.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.8.4 release notes
+==========================
+
+*August 18, 2015*
+
+Django 1.8.4 fixes a security issue and several bugs in 1.8.3.
+
+Denial-of-service possibility in ``logout()`` view by filling session store
+===========================================================================
+
+Previously, a session could be created when anonymously accessing the
+``django.contrib.auth.views.logout()`` view (provided it wasn't decorated
+with :func:`~django.contrib.auth.decorators.login_required` as done in the
+admin). This could allow an attacker to easily create many new session records
+by sending repeated requests, potentially filling up the session store or
+causing other users' session records to be evicted.
+
+The :class:`~django.contrib.sessions.middleware.SessionMiddleware` has been
+modified to no longer create empty session records, including when
+:setting:`SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST` is active.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Added the ability to serialize values from the newly added
+  :class:`~django.db.models.UUIDField` (:ticket:`25019`).
+
+* Added a system check warning if the old ``TEMPLATE_*`` settings are defined
+  in addition to the new ``TEMPLATES`` setting.
+
+* Fixed ``QuerySet.raw()`` so ``InvalidQuery`` is not raised when using the
+  ``db_column`` name of a ``ForeignKey`` field with ``primary_key=True``
+  (:ticket:`12768`).
+
+* Prevented an exception in ``TestCase.setUpTestData()`` from leaking the
+  transaction (:ticket:`25176`).
+
+* Fixed ``has_changed()`` method in ``contrib.postgres.forms.HStoreField``
+  (:ticket:`25215`, :ticket:`25233`).
+
+* Fixed the recording of squashed migrations when running the ``migrate``
+  command (:ticket:`25231`).
+
+* Moved the :ref:`unsaved model instance assignment data loss check
+  <unsaved-model-instance-check-18>` to ``Model.save()`` to allow easier usage
+  of in-memory models (:ticket:`25160`).
+
+* Prevented ``varchar_patterns_ops`` and ``text_patterns_ops`` indexes for
+  ``ArrayField`` (:ticket:`25180`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.5.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.8.5 release notes
+==========================
+
+*October 3, 2015*
+
+Django 1.8.5 fixes several bugs in 1.8.4.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Made the development server's autoreload more robust (:ticket:`24704`).
+
+* Fixed ``AssertionError`` in some delete queries with a model containing a
+  field that is both a foreign and primary key (:ticket:`24951`).
+
+* Fixed ``AssertionError`` in some complex queries (:ticket:`24525`).
+
+* Fixed a migrations crash with ``GenericForeignKey`` (:ticket:`25040`).
+
+* Made ``translation.override()`` clear the overridden language when a
+  translation isn't initially active (:ticket:`25295`).
+
+* Fixed crash when using a value in ``ModelAdmin.list_display`` that clashed
+  with a reverse field on the model (:ticket:`25299`).
+
+* Fixed autocompletion for options of non-``argparse`` management commands
+  (:ticket:`25372`).
+
+* Alphabetized ordering of imports in ``from django.db import migrations,
+  models`` statement in newly created migrations (:ticket:`25384`).
+
+* Fixed migrations crash on MySQL when adding a text or a blob field with an
+  unhashable default (:ticket:`25393`).
+
+* Changed ``Count`` queries to execute ``COUNT(*)`` instead of ``COUNT('*')``
+  as versions of Django before 1.8 did (:ticket:`25377`). This may fix a
+  performance regression on some databases.
+
+* Fixed custom queryset chaining with ``values()`` and ``values_list()``
+  (:ticket:`20625`).
+
+* Moved the :ref:`unsaved model instance assignment data loss check
+  <unsaved-model-instance-check-18>` on reverse relations to ``Model.save()``
+  (:ticket:`25160`).
+
+* Readded inline foreign keys to form instances when validating model formsets
+  (:ticket:`25431`).
+
+* Allowed using ORM write methods after disabling autocommit with
+  :func:`set_autocommit(False) <django.db.transaction.set_autocommit>`
+  (:ticket:`24921`).
+
+* Fixed the ``manage.py test --keepdb`` option on Oracle (:ticket:`25421`).
+
+* Fixed incorrect queries with multiple many-to-many fields on a model with the
+  same 'to' model and with ``related_name`` set to '+' (:ticket:`24505`,
+  :ticket:`25486`).
+
+* Fixed pickling a ``SimpleLazyObject`` wrapping a model (:ticket:`25389`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.6.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.8.6 release notes
+==========================
+
+*November 4, 2015*
+
+Django 1.8.6 adds official support for Python 3.5 and fixes several bugs in
+1.8.5.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a regression causing ``ModelChoiceField`` to ignore
+  ``prefetch_related()`` on its queryset (:ticket:`25496`).
+
+* Allowed "mode=memory" in SQLite test database name if supported
+  (:ticket:`12118`).
+
+* Fixed system check crash on ``ForeignKey`` to abstract model
+  (:ticket:`25503`).
+
+* Fixed incorrect queries when you have multiple ``ManyToManyField``\s on
+  different models that have the same field name, point to the same model, and
+  have their reverse relations disabled (:ticket:`25545`).
+
+* Allowed filtering over a ``RawSQL`` annotation (:ticket:`25506`).
+
+* Made the ``Concat`` database function idempotent on SQLite (:ticket:`25517`).
+
+* Avoided a confusing stack trace when starting :djadmin:`runserver` with an
+  invalid :setting:`INSTALLED_APPS` setting (:ticket:`25510`). This regression
+  appeared in 1.8.5 as a side effect of fixing :ticket:`24704`.
+
+* Made deferred models use their proxied model's ``_meta.apps`` for caching
+  and retrieval (:ticket:`25563`). This prevents any models generated in data
+  migrations using ``QuerySet.defer()`` from leaking to test and application
+  code.
+
+* Fixed a typo in the name of the ``strictly_above`` PostGIS lookup
+  (:ticket:`25592`).
+
+* Fixed crash with ``contrib.postgres.forms.SplitArrayField`` and
+  ``IntegerField`` on invalid value (:ticket:`25597`).
+
+* Added a helpful error message when Django and South migrations exist in the
+  same directory (:ticket:`25618`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in ``URLValidator`` that allowed URLs with consecutive
+  dots in the domain section (like ``http://example..com/``) to pass
+  (:ticket:`25620`).
+
+* Fixed a crash with ``GenericRelation`` and
+  ``BaseModelAdmin.to_field_allowed`` (:ticket:`25622`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.7.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.8.7 release notes
+==========================
+
+*November 24, 2015*
+
+Django 1.8.7 fixes a security issue and several bugs in 1.8.6.
+
+Additionally, Django's vendored version of six, ``django.utils.six``, has
+been upgraded to the latest release (1.10.0).
+
+Fixed settings leak possibility in ``date`` template filter
+===========================================================
+
+If an application allows users to specify an unvalidated format for dates and
+passes this format to the :tfilter:`date` filter, e.g.
+``{{ last_updated|date:user_date_format }}``, then a malicious user could
+obtain any secret in the application's settings by specifying a settings key
+instead of a date format. e.g. ``"SECRET_KEY"`` instead of ``"j/m/Y"``.
+
+To remedy this, the underlying function used by the ``date`` template filter,
+``django.utils.formats.get_format()``, now only allows accessing the date/time
+formatting settings.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a crash of the debug view during the autumn DST change when
+  :setting:`USE_TZ` is ``False`` and ``pytz`` is installed.
+
+* Fixed a regression in 1.8.6 that caused database routers without an
+  ``allow_migrate()`` method to crash (:ticket:`25686`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in 1.8.6 by restoring the ability to use ``Manager``
+  objects for the ``queryset`` argument of ``ModelChoiceField``
+  (:ticket:`25683`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in 1.8.6 that caused an application with South migrations
+  in the ``migrations`` directory to fail (:ticket:`25618`).
+
+* Fixed a data loss possibility with :class:`~django.db.models.Prefetch` if
+  ``to_attr`` is set to a ``ManyToManyField`` (:ticket:`25693`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in 1.8 by making ``gettext()`` once again return UTF-8
+  bytestrings on Python 2 if the input is a bytestring (:ticket:`25720`).
+
+* Fixed serialization of
+  :class:`~django.contrib.postgres.fields.DateRangeField` and
+  :class:`~django.contrib.postgres.fields.DateTimeRangeField` (:ticket:`24937`).
+
+* Fixed the exact lookup of ``ArrayField`` (:ticket:`25666`).
+
+* Fixed ``Model.refresh_from_db()`` updating of ``ForeignKey`` fields with
+  ``on_delete=models.SET_NULL`` (:ticket:`25715`).
+
+* Fixed a duplicate query regression in 1.8 on proxied model deletion
+  (:ticket:`25685`).
+
+* Fixed ``set_FOO_order()`` crash when the ``ForeignKey`` of a model with
+  ``order_with_respect_to`` references a model with a ``OneToOneField``
+  primary key (:ticket:`25786`).
+
+* Fixed incorrect validation for ``PositiveIntegerField`` and
+  ``PositiveSmallIntegerField`` on MySQL resulting in values greater than
+  4294967295 or 65535, respectively, passing validation and being silently
+  truncated by the database (:ticket:`25767`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.8.8.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.8.8 release notes
+==========================
+
+*January 2, 2016*
+
+Django 1.8.8 fixes several bugs in 1.8.7.
+
+Python 3.2 users, please be advised that we've decided to drop support for
+Python 3.2 in Django 1.8.x at the end of 2016. We won't break things
+intentionally after that, but we won't test subsequent releases against Python
+3.2 either. Upstream support for Python 3.2 ends February 2016 so we don't find
+much value in providing security updates for a version of Python that could be
+insecure. To read more about the decision and to let us know if this will be
+problematic for you, please read the `django-developers thread
+<https://groups.google.com/g/django-developers/c/eMu5UQpUdWs/discussion>`_.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed incorrect ``unique_together`` field name generation by ``inspectdb``
+  (:ticket:`25274`).
+
+* Corrected ``__len`` query lookup on ``ArrayField`` for empty arrays
+  (:ticket:`25772`).
+
+* Restored the ability to use custom formats from ``formats.py`` with
+  ``django.utils.formats.get_format()`` and the ``date`` template filter
+  (:ticket:`25812`).
+
+* Fixed a state bug when migrating a ``SeparateDatabaseAndState`` operation
+  backwards (:ticket:`25896`).
+
+* Fixed missing ``varchar/text_pattern_ops`` index on ``CharField`` and
+  ``TextField`` respectively when using ``AlterField`` on PostgreSQL
+  (:ticket:`25412`).
+
+* Fixed a state bug when using an ``AlterModelManagers`` operation
+  (:ticket:`25852`).
+
+* Fixed a regression which prevented using a language not in Django's default
+  language list (:setting:`LANGUAGES`) (:ticket:`25915`).
+
+* ``django.views.decorators.cache.never_cache()`` now sends more persuasive
+  headers (added ``no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate`` to ``Cache-Control``)
+  to better prevent caching (:ticket:`13008`). This fixes a problem where a
+  page refresh in Firefox cleared the selected entries in the admin's
+  ``filter_horizontal`` and ``filter_vertical`` widgets, which could result
+  in inadvertent data loss if a user didn't notice that and then submitted the
+  form (:ticket:`22955`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in the admin which ignored line breaks in read-only fields
+  instead of converting them to ``<br>`` (:ticket:`25465`).
+
+* Made ``loaddata`` skip disabling and enabling database constraints when it
+  doesn't load any fixtures (:ticket:`23372`).
+
+* Fixed a crash in ``QuerySet.values()/values_list()`` after an ``annotate()``
+  and ``order_by()`` when ``values()/values_list()`` includes a field not in
+  the ``order_by()`` (:ticket:`25316`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.9.1.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.9.1 release notes
+==========================
+
+*January 2, 2016*
+
+Django 1.9.1 fixes several bugs in 1.9.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed ``BaseCache.get_or_set()`` with the ``DummyCache`` backend
+  (:ticket:`25840`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in ``FormMixin`` causing forms to be validated twice
+  (:ticket:`25548`, :ticket:`26018`).
+
+* Fixed a system check crash with nested ``ArrayField``\s (:ticket:`25867`).
+
+* Fixed a state bug when migrating a ``SeparateDatabaseAndState`` operation
+  backwards (:ticket:`25896`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in ``CommonMiddleware`` causing ``If-None-Match`` checks
+  to always return HTTP 200 (:ticket:`25900`).
+
+* Fixed missing ``varchar/text_pattern_ops`` index on ``CharField`` and
+  ``TextField`` respectively when using ``AlterField`` on PostgreSQL
+  (:ticket:`25412`).
+
+* Fixed admin's delete confirmation page's summary counts of related objects
+  (:ticket:`25883`).
+
+* Added ``from __future__ import unicode_literals`` to the default ``apps.py``
+  created by ``startapp`` on Python 2 (:ticket:`25909`). Add this line to your
+  own ``apps.py`` files created using Django 1.9 if you want your migrations
+  to work on both Python 2 and Python 3.
+
+* Prevented ``QuerySet.delete()`` from crashing on MySQL when querying across
+  relations (:ticket:`25882`).
+
+* Fixed evaluation of zero-length slices of ``QuerySet.values()``
+  (:ticket:`25894`).
+
+* Fixed a state bug when using an ``AlterModelManagers`` operation
+  (:ticket:`25852`).
+
+* Fixed ``TypedChoiceField`` change detection with nullable fields
+  (:ticket:`25942`).
+
+* Fixed incorrect timezone warnings in custom admin templates that don't have
+  a ``data-admin-utc-offset`` attribute in the ``body`` tag.
+  (:ticket:`25845`).
+
+* Fixed a regression which prevented using a language not in Django's default
+  language list (:setting:`LANGUAGES`) (:ticket:`25915`).
+
+* Avoided hiding some exceptions, like an invalid ``INSTALLED_APPS`` setting,
+  behind ``AppRegistryNotReady`` when starting ``runserver`` (:ticket:`25510`).
+  This regression appeared in 1.8.5 as a side effect of fixing :ticket:`24704`
+  and by mistake the fix wasn't applied to the ``stable/1.9.x`` branch.
+
+* Fixed ``migrate --fake-initial`` detection of many-to-many tables
+  (:ticket:`25922`).
+
+* Restored the functionality of the admin's ``list_editable`` add and change
+  buttons (:ticket:`25903`).
+
+* Fixed ``isnull`` query lookup for ``ForeignObject``
+  (:ticket:`25972`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in the admin which ignored line breaks in read-only fields
+  instead of converting them to ``<br>`` (:ticket:`25465`).
+
+* Fixed incorrect object reference in
+  ``SingleObjectMixin.get_context_object_name()`` (:ticket:`26006`).
+
+* Made ``loaddata`` skip disabling and enabling database constraints when it
+  doesn't load any fixtures (:ticket:`23372`).
+
+* Restored ``contrib.auth`` hashers compatibility with ``py-bcrypt``
+  (:ticket:`26016`).
+
+* Fixed a crash in ``QuerySet.values()/values_list()`` after an ``annotate()``
+  and ``order_by()`` when ``values()/values_list()`` includes a field not in
+  the ``order_by()`` (:ticket:`25316`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.9.10.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.9.10 release notes
+===========================
+
+*September 26, 2016*
+
+Django 1.9.10 fixes a security issue in 1.9.9.
+
+CSRF protection bypass on a site with Google Analytics
+======================================================
+
+An interaction between Google Analytics and Django's cookie parsing could allow
+an attacker to set arbitrary cookies leading to a bypass of CSRF protection.
+
+The parser for ``request.COOKIES`` is simplified to better match the behavior
+of browsers and to mitigate this attack. ``request.COOKIES`` may now contain
+cookies that are invalid according to :rfc:`6265` but are possible to set via
+``document.cookie``.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.9.11.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.9.11 release notes
+===========================
+
+*November 1, 2016*
+
+Django 1.9.11 fixes two security issues in 1.9.10.
+
+User with hardcoded password created when running tests on Oracle
+=================================================================
+
+When running tests with an Oracle database, Django creates a temporary database
+user. In older versions, if a password isn't manually specified in the database
+settings ``TEST`` dictionary, a hardcoded password is used. This could allow
+an attacker with network access to the database server to connect.
+
+This user is usually dropped after the test suite completes, but not when using
+the ``manage.py test --keepdb`` option or if the user has an active session
+(such as an attacker's connection).
+
+A randomly generated password is now used for each test run.
+
+DNS rebinding vulnerability when ``DEBUG=True``
+===============================================
+
+Older versions of Django don't validate the ``Host`` header against
+``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` when ``settings.DEBUG=True``. This makes them
+vulnerable to a `DNS rebinding attack
+<https://benmmurphy.github.io/blog/2016/07/11/rails-webconsole-dns-rebinding/>`_.
+
+While Django doesn't ship a module that allows remote code execution, this is
+at least a cross-site scripting vector, which could be quite serious if
+developers load a copy of the production database in development or connect to
+some production services for which there's no development instance, for
+example. If a project uses a package like the ``django-debug-toolbar``, then
+the attacker could execute arbitrary SQL, which could be especially bad if the
+developers connect to the database with a superuser account.
+
+``settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is now validated regardless of ``DEBUG``. For
+convenience, if ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` is empty and ``DEBUG=True``, the following
+variations of localhost are allowed ``['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']``. If
+your local settings file has your production ``ALLOWED_HOSTS`` value, you must
+now omit it to get those fallback values.

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.9.12.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+===========================
+Django 1.9.12 release notes
+===========================
+
+*December 1, 2016*
+
+Django 1.9.12 fixes a regression in 1.9.11.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Quoted the Oracle test user's password in queries to fix the "ORA-00922:
+  missing or invalid option" error when the password starts with a number or
+  special character (:ticket:`27420`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.9.7.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.9.7 release notes
+==========================
+
+*June 4, 2016*
+
+Django 1.9.7 fixes several bugs in 1.9.6.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Removed the need for the ``request`` context processor on the admin login
+  page to fix a regression in 1.9 (:ticket:`26558`).
+
+* Fixed translation of password validators' ``help_text`` in forms
+  (:ticket:`26544`).
+
+* Fixed a regression causing the cached template loader to crash when using
+  lazy template names (:ticket:`26603`).
+
+* Fixed ``on_commit`` callbacks execution order when callbacks make
+  transactions (:ticket:`26627`).
+
+* Fixed ``HStoreField`` to raise a ``ValidationError`` instead of crashing on
+  non-dictionary JSON input (:ticket:`26672`).
+
+* Fixed ``dbshell`` crash on PostgreSQL with an empty database name
+  (:ticket:`26698`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in queries on a ``OneToOneField`` that has ``to_field``
+  and ``primary_key=True`` (:ticket:`26667`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/1.9.8.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.9.8 release notes
+==========================
+
+*July 18, 2016*
+
+Django 1.9.8 fixes a security issue and several bugs in 1.9.7.
+
+XSS in admin's add/change related popup
+=======================================
+
+Unsafe usage of JavaScript's ``Element.innerHTML`` could result in XSS in the
+admin's add/change related popup. ``Element.textContent`` is now used to
+prevent execution of the data.
+
+The debug view also used ``innerHTML``. Although a security issue wasn't
+identified there, out of an abundance of caution it's also updated to use
+``textContent``.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed missing ``varchar/text_pattern_ops`` index on ``CharField`` and
+  ``TextField`` respectively when using ``AddField`` on PostgreSQL
+  (:ticket:`26889`).
+
+* Fixed ``makemessages`` crash on Python 2 with non-ASCII file names
+  (:ticket:`26897`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/2.1.3.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+==========================
+Django 2.1.3 release notes
+==========================
+
+*November 1, 2018*
+
+Django 2.1.3 fixes several bugs in 2.1.2.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed a regression in Django 2.0 where combining ``Q`` objects with ``__in``
+  lookups and lists crashed (:ticket:`29838`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in Django 1.11 where ``django-admin shell`` may hang
+  on startup (:ticket:`29774`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in Django 2.0 where test databases aren't reused with
+  ``manage.py test --keepdb`` on MySQL (:ticket:`29827`).
+
+* Fixed a regression where cached foreign keys that use ``to_field`` were
+  incorrectly cleared in ``Model.save()`` (:ticket:`29896`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in Django 2.0 where ``FileSystemStorage`` crashes with
+  ``FileExistsError`` if concurrent saves try to create the same directory
+  (:ticket:`29890`).

testbed/django__django/docs/releases/2.1.5.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+==========================
+Django 2.1.5 release notes
+==========================
+
+*January 4, 2019*
+
+Django 2.1.5 fixes a security issue and several bugs in 2.1.4.
+
+CVE-2019-3498: Content spoofing possibility in the default 404 page
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+An attacker could craft a malicious URL that could make spoofed content appear
+on the default page generated by the ``django.views.defaults.page_not_found()``
+view.
+
+The URL path is no longer displayed in the default 404 template and the
+``request_path`` context variable is now quoted to fix the issue for custom
+templates that use the path.
+
+Bugfixes
+========
+
+* Fixed compatibility with mysqlclient 1.3.14 (:ticket:`30013`).
+
+* Fixed a schema corruption issue on SQLite 3.26+. You might have to drop and
+  rebuild your SQLite database if you applied a migration while using an older
+  version of Django with SQLite 3.26 or later (:ticket:`29182`).
+
+* Prevented SQLite schema alterations while foreign key checks are enabled to
+  avoid the possibility of schema corruption (:ticket:`30023`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in Django 2.1.4 (which enabled keep-alive connections)
+  where request body data isn't properly consumed for such connections
+  (:ticket:`30015`).
+
+* Fixed a regression in Django 2.1.4 where
+  ``InlineModelAdmin.has_change_permission()`` is incorrectly called with a
+  non-``None`` ``obj`` argument during an object add (:ticket:`30050`).