[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Never looked back. I felt it was—that was what it was designed to do, and there was no reason to feel that the design wouldn’t work on all the systems we had, including the guidance and navigation system. I remember the one issue Frank had. You know, we changed—one of the big changes after the fire, which we didn’t talk about, was the fact from an inward opening hatch to an outward opening hatch. Because Apollo had—on the fire had an inward opening hatch—

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] —primarily because of Gus Grissom’s flight [Mercury-Redstone 4, Liberty Bell 7], which caused the outward opening hatch to cause the failure. So, we went back to an outward opening hatch. It turns out, on the pad, you’re safer with an outward opening hatch for escape; but in space, you’re safer with an inward opening hatch because the pressure tends—the pressure inside is higher than outside and it tends to seal. And an outward opening hatch, it tends to want to blow it open. And that was Frank—one of Frank Borman’s biggest issues. He wanted us to be sure that thing wouldn’t open on him. And it was designed like a vault anyway, so it wasn’t going to open. But that was his biggest issue, I think.

[Assistant] Around you other people at NASA, as I recall, seemed to be terribly surprised that things were moving at this kind of Mach speed, that you were going to do—that 8 was going to do what they thought 9 or 10 was going to do.

[User] Right, right.

[Assistant] Did you have a lot of explaining to do to them, or—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah, it was scary. Yeah, there was—

[Assistant] Did the astronauts realize this was happening to them, too?

[User] I think they did. I think they knew that. And I think that’s of course where our good operations people came in. Because I think our operations capability with people like Glynn Lunney and Gene Kranz and Chris (at that time) were able to help resolve those operational issues even though the system—you know, I was more into the design part of it. They were more in the operations part of it, and I think—

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] —that’s where it all came together really.

[Assistant] Do you remember that Christmastime when 8 went around the Moon—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I think they did. I think they knew that. And I think that’s of course where our good operations people came in. Because I think our operations capability with people like Glynn Lunney and Gene Kranz and Chris (at that time) were able to help resolve those operational issues even though the system—you know, I was more into the design part of it. They were more in the operations part of it, and I think—

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] —that’s where it all came together really.

[Assistant] Do you remember that Christmastime when 8 went around the Moon—

[User] Yes, I do.

[Assistant] —and we lost them for a while?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —that’s where it all came together really.

[Assistant] Do you remember that Christmastime when 8 went around the Moon—

[User] Yes, I do.

[Assistant] —and we lost them for a while?

[User] Right, right.

[Assistant] And we didn’t know—I mean, I guess you knew they were going to come back the other side. But sheer mortals didn’t know it was going to come back.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right, right.

[Assistant] And we didn’t know—I mean, I guess you knew they were going to come back the other side. But sheer mortals didn’t know it was going to come back.

[User] Well, I knew they were. But it’s just—it’s no matter if you knew or not knew, you knew physically they could. But of course, whether the communication was going to come through was another question.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] Of course, that was always a very tenuous time, when you’re behind the Moon. You can’t do much about it until you come to the other side, and you hope you’re going to re-contact with them. But, yes, it was very—I won’t say it was scary. But it was very tense.

[Assistant] When Apollo came home, did you feel like you had had done it all? I mean, that you’d done everything that they brought you to Houston to do?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I knew they were. But it’s just—it’s no matter if you knew or not knew, you knew physically they could. But of course, whether the communication was going to come through was another question.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] Of course, that was always a very tenuous time, when you’re behind the Moon. You can’t do much about it until you come to the other side, and you hope you’re going to re-contact with them. But, yes, it was very—I won’t say it was scary. But it was very tense.

[Assistant] When Apollo came home, did you feel like you had had done it all? I mean, that you’d done everything that they brought you to Houston to do?

[User] Well, you mean Apollo 11 or Apollo 8?

[Assistant] No, when 8 came home.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Of course, that was always a very tenuous time, when you’re behind the Moon. You can’t do much about it until you come to the other side, and you hope you’re going to re-contact with them. But, yes, it was very—I won’t say it was scary. But it was very tense.

[Assistant] When Apollo came home, did you feel like you had had done it all? I mean, that you’d done everything that they brought you to Houston to do?

[User] Well, you mean Apollo 11 or Apollo 8?

[Assistant] No, when 8 came home.

[User] Well, I—no. I still felt we had to do Apollo 11, and that’s really what we—

[Assistant] But from a guidance standpoint—.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I—no. I still felt we had to do Apollo 11, and that’s really what we—

[Assistant] But from a guidance standpoint—.

[User] From a guidance standpoint, we really did what we had to do. And from the heatshield—

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] —from the two things that I was really, you might say—from a subsystem point of view, interestingly we did, but you also have to recognize that then I became, as you pointed out, in my career—I became more involved with all of the systems. And so, I really—until the parachutes came out and the bags came out, and we got the crew out of the vehicle, it was not over.

[Assistant] In 1968, you became the Chief of Command and Service Modules Project, Engineering Division.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] From a guidance standpoint, we really did what we had to do. And from the heatshield—

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] —from the two things that I was really, you might say—from a subsystem point of view, interestingly we did, but you also have to recognize that then I became, as you pointed out, in my career—I became more involved with all of the systems. And so, I really—until the parachutes came out and the bags came out, and we got the crew out of the vehicle, it was not over.

[Assistant] In 1968, you became the Chief of Command and Service Modules Project, Engineering Division.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] What does that mean?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —from the two things that I was really, you might say—from a subsystem point of view, interestingly we did, but you also have to recognize that then I became, as you pointed out, in my career—I became more involved with all of the systems. And so, I really—until the parachutes came out and the bags came out, and we got the crew out of the vehicle, it was not over.

[Assistant] In 1968, you became the Chief of Command and Service Modules Project, Engineering Division.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] What does that mean?

[User] Well, that meant that I really was doing the—almost the same thing, but just had the title, really is what that meant. I was really doing the same thing as I did in the Project Engineering Division.

[Assistant] Then in [19]’70, you were the Manager, Command and Service Module.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] What does that mean?

[User] Well, that meant that I really was doing the—almost the same thing, but just had the title, really is what that meant. I was really doing the same thing as I did in the Project Engineering Division.

[Assistant] Then in [19]’70, you were the Manager, Command and Service Module.

[User] Service module, right. Then I took over the total job and that’s when I became manager of the total project, including the resources, the schedule, the resources, and the vehicle. Right.

[Assistant] You are the manager of the command and service—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, that meant that I really was doing the—almost the same thing, but just had the title, really is what that meant. I was really doing the same thing as I did in the Project Engineering Division.

[Assistant] Then in [19]’70, you were the Manager, Command and Service Module.

[User] Service module, right. Then I took over the total job and that’s when I became manager of the total project, including the resources, the schedule, the resources, and the vehicle. Right.

[Assistant] You are the manager of the command and service—

[User] Service modules.

[Assistant] —modules for a program that is winding down.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Service module, right. Then I took over the total job and that’s when I became manager of the total project, including the resources, the schedule, the resources, and the vehicle. Right.

[Assistant] You are the manager of the command and service—

[User] Service modules.

[Assistant] —modules for a program that is winding down.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Was it difficult to keep the enthusiasm up after 11?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Service modules.

[Assistant] —modules for a program that is winding down.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Was it difficult to keep the enthusiasm up after 11?

[User] Not really, no; it really wasn’t. I didn’t have that problem. I mean, I think the enthusiasm for Apollo was there. And I think people did recognize the significance of it. And I do think people knew that each step along the way was important. And I think George Low left us with a legacy of understanding the detail, working on the details, and paying attention to details. So, he taught us that. And with that type of a legacy, you pay attention to details. So, yes, I think it wasn’t hard to keep the people’s—at least I don’t think it was hard to keep people’s interest up.

[Assistant] The day Gene [Eugene A.] Cernan took that last step on the Moon and started coming home, did you go home that night and say, “Well, you know, this—” I mean, did you feel the historic significance of this? Or did you think there would be lots of other people going back to the Moon?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Was it difficult to keep the enthusiasm up after 11?

[User] Not really, no; it really wasn’t. I didn’t have that problem. I mean, I think the enthusiasm for Apollo was there. And I think people did recognize the significance of it. And I do think people knew that each step along the way was important. And I think George Low left us with a legacy of understanding the detail, working on the details, and paying attention to details. So, he taught us that. And with that type of a legacy, you pay attention to details. So, yes, I think it wasn’t hard to keep the people’s—at least I don’t think it was hard to keep people’s interest up.

[Assistant] The day Gene [Eugene A.] Cernan took that last step on the Moon and started coming home, did you go home that night and say, “Well, you know, this—” I mean, did you feel the historic significance of this? Or did you think there would be lots of other people going back to the Moon?

[User] Well, I thought that—I thought we would have a continuation—not necessarily to the Moon, but some continuation. Although the Shuttle was in the horizon, and that’s where I was headed towards. Of course, we did have one—we did have this interruption of Apollo 13 in the middle of all that. And of course, that was an interesting story in my perspective of what happened on Apollo 13.

[Assistant] Was—this is a stupid question. It was a surprise, obviously. But were you surprised that what happened to 13 could happen to 13?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, it was. Of course now I’m responsible for the design, development, and operation of the—

[Assistant] You’re going to start and build the whole thing?

[User] Right. We’re starting with a viewgraph. And we’re starting with all over building a Space Shuttle. And the Space Shuttle Orbiter was—is basically three systems. It’s basically a launch vehicle; it’s a spacecraft, because it stays; and it’s an airplane. So, you’re designing three systems in one. And in the system complexity, the Orbiter is so much more complex than the Apollo vehicle. I mean, it’s just—the mission is not as complex but the systems are so—I mean, it’s just a so much more complex. And at that time I also had the responsibility of the integration of the system. When we first started out, Bob [Robert F.] Thompson gave me the job of the Orbiter plus the integration, so I did have also the integration of the system engineering integration.

[Assistant] What is the lead Center management structure?

[User] Well, the lead Center management structure is a way of managing the vehicle. And—when you have a very complicated system like the Shuttle and you have various centers operating it, you want to have some Center in charge, or you could have one—some Center in charge. The Johnson Space Center was given the lead Center, and systems engineering and integration was given to the Johnson Space Center; and that was under Bob Thompson. And then the Orbiter was responsible to Johnson Space Center. And the main engine and solid rocket boosters and tank was the responsibility of the Marshall Spaceflight Center. And then the launch was the responsibility of the Kennedy Space Center. And the lead Center was at the Johnson Space Center under Bob Thompson, which integrated that total activity.

[Assistant] When they gave you this job, did they tell you they wanted a reusable Space Shuttle, as it were?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right. We’re starting with a viewgraph. And we’re starting with all over building a Space Shuttle. And the Space Shuttle Orbiter was—is basically three systems. It’s basically a launch vehicle; it’s a spacecraft, because it stays; and it’s an airplane. So, you’re designing three systems in one. And in the system complexity, the Orbiter is so much more complex than the Apollo vehicle. I mean, it’s just—the mission is not as complex but the systems are so—I mean, it’s just a so much more complex. And at that time I also had the responsibility of the integration of the system. When we first started out, Bob [Robert F.] Thompson gave me the job of the Orbiter plus the integration, so I did have also the integration of the system engineering integration.

[Assistant] What is the lead Center management structure?

[User] Well, the lead Center management structure is a way of managing the vehicle. And—when you have a very complicated system like the Shuttle and you have various centers operating it, you want to have some Center in charge, or you could have one—some Center in charge. The Johnson Space Center was given the lead Center, and systems engineering and integration was given to the Johnson Space Center; and that was under Bob Thompson. And then the Orbiter was responsible to Johnson Space Center. And the main engine and solid rocket boosters and tank was the responsibility of the Marshall Spaceflight Center. And then the launch was the responsibility of the Kennedy Space Center. And the lead Center was at the Johnson Space Center under Bob Thompson, which integrated that total activity.

[Assistant] When they gave you this job, did they tell you they wanted a reusable Space Shuttle, as it were?

[User] Yes, they did. They said they wanted a reusable Space Shuttle.

[Assistant] Why that instead of like what the Russians were doing?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, they did. They said they wanted a reusable Space Shuttle.

[Assistant] Why that instead of like what the Russians were doing?

[User] Well, because the whole idea—the whole thought process that, in order to make spaceflight more economical—

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] —and more readily usable for commercial activities, you wanted something that could be reused time and time again and not throw away the expensive guidance and navigation system, environmental control system, for the basic structure. So, that’s why they wanted a reusable system. And I think in that context, the Shuttle has proved out to be very, very successful.

[Assistant] Are you one of those kind of people who sits around and doodles on a piece of yellow foolscap? Did you draw some designs of that just in your mind?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, because the whole idea—the whole thought process that, in order to make spaceflight more economical—

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] —and more readily usable for commercial activities, you wanted something that could be reused time and time again and not throw away the expensive guidance and navigation system, environmental control system, for the basic structure. So, that’s why they wanted a reusable system. And I think in that context, the Shuttle has proved out to be very, very successful.

[Assistant] Are you one of those kind of people who sits around and doodles on a piece of yellow foolscap? Did you draw some designs of that just in your mind?

[User] No, I really didn’t. I—in all fairness, there were several configurations that came out of it that had been done previously, and we—I came in when—the point when we had proposals from the North American, Grumman, and Lockheed [Aircraft Corporation], and Martin [Marietta Aerospace] (at the time). And basically, all had had a very similar configuration.

[Assistant] Didn’t they have big wings at one time?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, I really didn’t. I—in all fairness, there were several configurations that came out of it that had been done previously, and we—I came in when—the point when we had proposals from the North American, Grumman, and Lockheed [Aircraft Corporation], and Martin [Marietta Aerospace] (at the time). And basically, all had had a very similar configuration.

[Assistant] Didn’t they have big wings at one time?

[User] That—well, they had fly-back boosters, if that’s—they had fly-back boosters.

[Assistant] Okay. Yeah.

[User] But the point there was that the fly-back booster—see, you had several problems with the Shuttle. Now you become very much—you have a cost constraint to get to the point that you—

[Assistant] No blank check this time.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That—well, they had fly-back boosters, if that’s—they had fly-back boosters.

[Assistant] Okay. Yeah.

[User] But the point there was that the fly-back booster—see, you had several problems with the Shuttle. Now you become very much—you have a cost constraint to get to the point that you—

[Assistant] No blank check this time.

[User] —no blank—it said, “You’re going to build a reusable system.” The need statement or the top requirement, “You’re going to build a reusable system,” and didn’t give us a time constraint on it, but that had to stay within a cost constraint of so many dollars in a given year. I think it was [19]’72 dollars. And—’72 year dollars, because we accounted for inflation. And so, you were fixed now. When we went to a fly-back booster, it—you went out of the development box. It became too expensive. So, that’s why we had to go without the big wings on the booster. And so, that’s why we gave up the total—the fly-back booster and stayed with the system you see today.

[Assistant] Can you talk about how much the Department of Defense [DoD] entered into this whole thing?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] But the point there was that the fly-back booster—see, you had several problems with the Shuttle. Now you become very much—you have a cost constraint to get to the point that you—

[Assistant] No blank check this time.

[User] —no blank—it said, “You’re going to build a reusable system.” The need statement or the top requirement, “You’re going to build a reusable system,” and didn’t give us a time constraint on it, but that had to stay within a cost constraint of so many dollars in a given year. I think it was [19]’72 dollars. And—’72 year dollars, because we accounted for inflation. And so, you were fixed now. When we went to a fly-back booster, it—you went out of the development box. It became too expensive. So, that’s why we had to go without the big wings on the booster. And so, that’s why we gave up the total—the fly-back booster and stayed with the system you see today.

[Assistant] Can you talk about how much the Department of Defense [DoD] entered into this whole thing?

[User] Well, the Department of Defense entered into several factors. They drove basically the size of the bay of the Shuttle, because they had some payloads they wanted to fly. So, they drove that. They made a very—and they also drove the amount of (I’ll use the term) cross-range. How much out-of-plane maneuvering the vehicle could take for purposes. And that drove the wings, the type of wings we had. So, when you look at what the Air Force really did, their requirements for—to satisfy the requirements drove those two things. And the Air Force was very, very important in helping get the Shuttle really sold to the government.

[Assistant] You built it to stay up for a month, I guess?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, the Department of Defense entered into several factors. They drove basically the size of the bay of the Shuttle, because they had some payloads they wanted to fly. So, they drove that. They made a very—and they also drove the amount of (I’ll use the term) cross-range. How much out-of-plane maneuvering the vehicle could take for purposes. And that drove the wings, the type of wings we had. So, when you look at what the Air Force really did, their requirements for—to satisfy the requirements drove those two things. And the Air Force was very, very important in helping get the Shuttle really sold to the government.

[Assistant] You built it to stay up for a month, I guess?

[User] Well, the original requirement—the original requirement was for—let’s see. It was really a—what we called a 28-day mission—

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] —it was 4 people for 7 days. That’s a 28-day mission. And then later, it was stated that we wanted to be able to stay up for 30 days with the number of people. So, we really had a design that could do that, but we never really—and that sort of drove the problem. But, yes, that’s what we had, is the—

[Assistant] So, that one that’s flying right now is basically that same kind of design?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, the original requirement—the original requirement was for—let’s see. It was really a—what we called a 28-day mission—

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] —it was 4 people for 7 days. That’s a 28-day mission. And then later, it was stated that we wanted to be able to stay up for 30 days with the number of people. So, we really had a design that could do that, but we never really—and that sort of drove the problem. But, yes, that’s what we had, is the—

[Assistant] So, that one that’s flying right now is basically that same kind of design?

[User] Right. It’s basically the same.

[Assistant] But they don’t stay up that long.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —it was 4 people for 7 days. That’s a 28-day mission. And then later, it was stated that we wanted to be able to stay up for 30 days with the number of people. So, we really had a design that could do that, but we never really—and that sort of drove the problem. But, yes, that’s what we had, is the—

[Assistant] So, that one that’s flying right now is basically that same kind of design?

[User] Right. It’s basically the same.

[Assistant] But they don’t stay up that long.

[User] No, they don’t stay—well, we really never did design—we never really did stay up 30 days. We never did really stay. The—they—it was—

[Assistant] But did you have to compromise the design because of that?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right. It’s basically the same.

[Assistant] But they don’t stay up that long.

[User] No, they don’t stay—well, we really never did design—we never really did stay up 30 days. We never did really stay. The—they—it was—

[Assistant] But did you have to compromise the design because of that?

[User] Yeah, you had to compromise the design; but we—it was really, in all honesty,—it was more of a soft requirement. That was a soft requirement than a hard requirement. To see what you could get with a goal of 30 days. It was really never a hard requirement to make a 30-day mission. But actually, it’s done—it’s—we’ve had 7 people up for—we’ve sent 7 people up for 14 days, so that’s—let’s see, that’s 98 day—that’s a hundred—that’s a 100 man-day mission, you might say.

[Assistant] You said when it was designed, it was designed to be—or when it—when they started talking about it, it was going to be a reusable thing that would really make space travel efficient and inexpensive. And they were talking about sending up two or three of these things a month. Is that ever going to happen?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think—

[Assistant] —warp movement within the next 25 or 50 years?

[User] —well, I think so. If you look at 1903, the Wright brothers flew—

[Assistant] Oh yeah.

[User] —their plane, and it was the length of the external tank. So, you know—so, and now we can fly—we can keep a vehicle in orbit for, as you point out, 30 days. And Space Station and actually send probes, unmanned probes, to Mars and Venus. And eventually, I think we will send human probe—or human vehicles to Mars—in, that’s what my students are working on—but we’ll send them back to the Moon and on to Mars. I’m convinced of it.

[Assistant] Are the guidance problems solved? I mean, that part of the—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —well, I think so. If you look at 1903, the Wright brothers flew—

[Assistant] Oh yeah.

[User] —their plane, and it was the length of the external tank. So, you know—so, and now we can fly—we can keep a vehicle in orbit for, as you point out, 30 days. And Space Station and actually send probes, unmanned probes, to Mars and Venus. And eventually, I think we will send human probe—or human vehicles to Mars—in, that’s what my students are working on—but we’ll send them back to the Moon and on to Mars. I’m convinced of it.

[Assistant] Are the guidance problems solved? I mean, that part of the—

[User] I think the guidance problems are solved. I don’t think that’s an issue. I think now the issues are more: can we make the propulsion systems more efficient? Can we make the structure more efficient? Those are the type of things. Can we get more efficient—really for interplanetary travel, can we have a closed-loop environmental control system so you can actually recycle all your waste products and that type of thing? So, you’re now looking for things like that. And can you take advantage of resources on other planets? Can you get propellant? Can you get oxygen out of the lunar soil or the Martian soil? These are the type of technologies that you’re looking for today.

[Assistant] The Space Shuttle design was an exercise in compromise, it has been said. In a perfect world, what would it have looked like?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —their plane, and it was the length of the external tank. So, you know—so, and now we can fly—we can keep a vehicle in orbit for, as you point out, 30 days. And Space Station and actually send probes, unmanned probes, to Mars and Venus. And eventually, I think we will send human probe—or human vehicles to Mars—in, that’s what my students are working on—but we’ll send them back to the Moon and on to Mars. I’m convinced of it.

[Assistant] Are the guidance problems solved? I mean, that part of the—

[User] I think the guidance problems are solved. I don’t think that’s an issue. I think now the issues are more: can we make the propulsion systems more efficient? Can we make the structure more efficient? Those are the type of things. Can we get more efficient—really for interplanetary travel, can we have a closed-loop environmental control system so you can actually recycle all your waste products and that type of thing? So, you’re now looking for things like that. And can you take advantage of resources on other planets? Can you get propellant? Can you get oxygen out of the lunar soil or the Martian soil? These are the type of technologies that you’re looking for today.

[Assistant] The Space Shuttle design was an exercise in compromise, it has been said. In a perfect world, what would it have looked like?

[User] Well, I think—

[Assistant] If you hadn’t had to make all those compromises?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I think the guidance problems are solved. I don’t think that’s an issue. I think now the issues are more: can we make the propulsion systems more efficient? Can we make the structure more efficient? Those are the type of things. Can we get more efficient—really for interplanetary travel, can we have a closed-loop environmental control system so you can actually recycle all your waste products and that type of thing? So, you’re now looking for things like that. And can you take advantage of resources on other planets? Can you get propellant? Can you get oxygen out of the lunar soil or the Martian soil? These are the type of technologies that you’re looking for today.

[Assistant] The Space Shuttle design was an exercise in compromise, it has been said. In a perfect world, what would it have looked like?

[User] Well, I think—

[Assistant] If you hadn’t had to make all those compromises?

[User] —well, I think in the perfect world, in my mind, of course, I’m a—I sort of feel like the father of the Space Shuttle Orbiter, so I’m not going to be too critical of what my offspring—

[Assistant] You shouldn’t be.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think—

[Assistant] If you hadn’t had to make all those compromises?

[User] —well, I think in the perfect world, in my mind, of course, I’m a—I sort of feel like the father of the Space Shuttle Orbiter, so I’m not going to be too critical of what my offspring—

[Assistant] You shouldn’t be.

[User] —looks like. But I do think if you—in a perfect world, you probably would have a fully reusable Shuttle. By that I mean, you wouldn’t have to throw away the external tanks or let the solid rocket boosters go, even though we recover them. You would have a fully reusable system. As you pointed out, you’d have more of a fly-back booster. That would be the perfect world. Of course, is the development cost—and that’s where they talk about the compromise. Is the development cost warranted in that in making up for what the operations—reduction in operations cost? So, how do you balance development cost to operations cost? And that’s what—that’s would be when they talk about compromises, that’s where the compromise is.\n\n Do I think that’s a major compromise? Probably no. I do think there are things we could’ve done better had we had some of the tools that our young engineers have today, such as computer-aided design systems, CADS systems, systems that are more automated in design processes rather than drawing on a drafting board and a T-square, as we did in the olden days. But that’s to me where you can make your benefit of it. And I think eventually it’ll come along.

[Assistant] Has your baby been everything you thought it was going to be?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] Did that—were you aware of that?

[User] Yes, I was. And, of course, that’s where we really coined that phrase “A ship in the harbor is safe, but that’s not what ships are built for.” My deputy—I became Center director about that point.

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] And my deputy was a great guy named Paul [J.] Weitz. He was an astronaut. And Paul and I had the job of trying to figure out how we were going to get the astronauts and how we were going to get the [Johnson Space] Center going again. And I think when you really got down and started talking to people, they really wanted to fly again. The people at the Johnson Space Center really wanted to fly again. And that’s what the business we were in. And we felt we did have a mission to do. We did have satellites to put up. We did have research to do in orbit. We did have things that we felt were good for humankind that we could do in orbit that we couldn’t do on the ground, and that the Shuttle was the place to do it until we had a space station, until we could get a space station going. So, I think in that context, we were able to convince ourselves and we were able to convince the people at the Johnson Space Center. As a result, I think we were able to convince Congress and the public that was what we wanted to do.

[Assistant] But that must’ve been an extremely trying time because—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, I was. And, of course, that’s where we really coined that phrase “A ship in the harbor is safe, but that’s not what ships are built for.” My deputy—I became Center director about that point.

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] And my deputy was a great guy named Paul [J.] Weitz. He was an astronaut. And Paul and I had the job of trying to figure out how we were going to get the astronauts and how we were going to get the [Johnson Space] Center going again. And I think when you really got down and started talking to people, they really wanted to fly again. The people at the Johnson Space Center really wanted to fly again. And that’s what the business we were in. And we felt we did have a mission to do. We did have satellites to put up. We did have research to do in orbit. We did have things that we felt were good for humankind that we could do in orbit that we couldn’t do on the ground, and that the Shuttle was the place to do it until we had a space station, until we could get a space station going. So, I think in that context, we were able to convince ourselves and we were able to convince the people at the Johnson Space Center. As a result, I think we were able to convince Congress and the public that was what we wanted to do.

[Assistant] But that must’ve been an extremely trying time because—

[User] It was a very hard time. Yes, it was.

[Assistant] —you had essentially two jobs. You had—you were in charge of rebuilding that Shuttle—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And my deputy was a great guy named Paul [J.] Weitz. He was an astronaut. And Paul and I had the job of trying to figure out how we were going to get the astronauts and how we were going to get the [Johnson Space] Center going again. And I think when you really got down and started talking to people, they really wanted to fly again. The people at the Johnson Space Center really wanted to fly again. And that’s what the business we were in. And we felt we did have a mission to do. We did have satellites to put up. We did have research to do in orbit. We did have things that we felt were good for humankind that we could do in orbit that we couldn’t do on the ground, and that the Shuttle was the place to do it until we had a space station, until we could get a space station going. So, I think in that context, we were able to convince ourselves and we were able to convince the people at the Johnson Space Center. As a result, I think we were able to convince Congress and the public that was what we wanted to do.

[Assistant] But that must’ve been an extremely trying time because—

[User] It was a very hard time. Yes, it was.

[Assistant] —you had essentially two jobs. You had—you were in charge of rebuilding that Shuttle—

[User] Right.

[Assistant] —and at the same time, you got a—you’ve got all these people whose heads are hanging low—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] It was a very hard time. Yes, it was.

[Assistant] —you had essentially two jobs. You had—you were in charge of rebuilding that Shuttle—

[User] Right.

[Assistant] —and at the same time, you got a—you’ve got all these people whose heads are hanging low—

[User] That’s right.

[Assistant] —and you’re trying to build them up.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] —and at the same time, you got a—you’ve got all these people whose heads are hanging low—

[User] That’s right.

[Assistant] —and you’re trying to build them up.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] How’d you do that?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s right.

[Assistant] —and you’re trying to build them up.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] How’d you do that?

[User] Well, I really went back—what I did is I—again, I took the lessons from people I learned from, like George Mueller, George Low, Chris Kraft. And I took things—and Frank Borman—things that I learned from them, and I went back—I used the analogy very much to when a football team or a baseball team is having problems. You go back to your fundamentals. You go back to paying attention to details. What is your goals? What are you trying to do? How do you fix it? And we just went back paying attention to our details. Trying to see how we fix the things that were wrong and with a motive of how we got things going again. And as a result, everybody jumped in and we had teamwork again.

[Assistant] And how did you feel when the Shuttle flew again?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] How’d you do that?

[User] Well, I really went back—what I did is I—again, I took the lessons from people I learned from, like George Mueller, George Low, Chris Kraft. And I took things—and Frank Borman—things that I learned from them, and I went back—I used the analogy very much to when a football team or a baseball team is having problems. You go back to your fundamentals. You go back to paying attention to details. What is your goals? What are you trying to do? How do you fix it? And we just went back paying attention to our details. Trying to see how we fix the things that were wrong and with a motive of how we got things going again. And as a result, everybody jumped in and we had teamwork again.

[Assistant] And how did you feel when the Shuttle flew again?

[User] Well, I was quite elated. I’ve got to be honest with you, that was very—that was probably the most nervous I’ve been in a long time. But we had a great crew and a great operations team. And I think—and a great contractor team that helped us get the vehicle ready to go again.

[Assistant] One of the things you did to stabilize the Center was have each directorate report directly to the head as opposed—tell me about that. Tell me about that organizational method you used.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I think the standings are good. I think that the biggest problem NASA has is being able to explain what they’re doing to the lay person. In fact, a little history on that. And I got burned by that a little bit. The Greater Houston Partnership said, “Aaron, tell us why the—” And some very important people were there. “Tell us why the space program is important?” So, we put some documentaries together. And when you look at the documentaries, they look like a Ph.D. thesis. And so, I took that—I didn’t recognize that myself. And I took that to the Greater Houston Partnership, and they said, “This won’t help.”

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] They said, “You’re talking to—you—you’ve got a Ph.D. thesis put together. You didn’t put together what the public needs to know.” And I think that’s probably one of the hardest thing for a technical organization such as NASA to do. They know so much technically and they’re concerned about how they—they’re concerned they don’t want to give you too much of a soft—of a hard sell, but as a result they tend to do it more technically and don’t—and do not communicate accurately with the lay person. I think that’s the hardest problem for us to do. The information we do have, the research we do, the knowledge we do is—the knowledge we have obtained for people is fantastic. And if we could only explain it to them a little better. It’s easier said than done. I mean, NASA tries to do it, but it’s easier said than done.

[Assistant] Well, that’s why they need to teach speech across the street over there as well as engineering.

[User] Well, that’s right.

[Assistant] To understand—so you can understand those things.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] They said, “You’re talking to—you—you’ve got a Ph.D. thesis put together. You didn’t put together what the public needs to know.” And I think that’s probably one of the hardest thing for a technical organization such as NASA to do. They know so much technically and they’re concerned about how they—they’re concerned they don’t want to give you too much of a soft—of a hard sell, but as a result they tend to do it more technically and don’t—and do not communicate accurately with the lay person. I think that’s the hardest problem for us to do. The information we do have, the research we do, the knowledge we do is—the knowledge we have obtained for people is fantastic. And if we could only explain it to them a little better. It’s easier said than done. I mean, NASA tries to do it, but it’s easier said than done.

[Assistant] Well, that’s why they need to teach speech across the street over there as well as engineering.

[User] Well, that’s right.

[Assistant] To understand—so you can understand those things.

[User] Yeah. But it’s—you know, it’s just very hard to do. It’s not easy to do.

[Assistant] In 8—in 1989, you wrote the Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration to the Moon and Mars.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, that’s right.

[Assistant] To understand—so you can understand those things.

[User] Yeah. But it’s—you know, it’s just very hard to do. It’s not easy to do.

[Assistant] In 8—in 1989, you wrote the Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration to the Moon and Mars.

[User] Yeah, right.

[Assistant] 10 years ago. What’s happening?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah, right.

[Assistant] 10 years ago. What’s happening?

[User] Well, I think a lot’s happening. I’ve got to be honest with you: that was another great point in my career, to do that study. It turns out it was probably a little bit more expensive than people wanted it to be, so it didn’t go over too well. But in all fairness, I think it was better than people accepted. Because our—the way we costed it was really a long-range program that was going to do—it was where we were going to go back to the Moon, this time to stay, and on to Mars. That’s what President [George H. W.] Bush stated that we wanted to do. And when we priced that out, it became very expensive; but if you really looked at the missions, they weren’t that out of the ordinary when you compare it to the Apollo cost. I think the framework was good. I think there have been studies since then. I think the time probably was not right for it. I think there were other circumstances within the country, such as the problem with the monetary system in the Savings & Loan. So, I think things really weren’t right—

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] —for us to spend that money. But what’s happening is—I’ll tell you what’s happening under Dan [Daniel S.] Goldin, which is very positive. We are sending robotic probes to Mars, to other planets. There are studies to see how you would send humans to other planets, essentially Mars. And I’m convinced that that report is a forerunner; and I’m convinced that all this will come to pass. I’m convinced that students of mine will—if they desire to become astronauts, will be able to walk on Mars. So, I’m convinced that is going to happen.

[Assistant] Mr. Cohen, we probably would not have gone to the Moon when we did had there not been a Cold War going on that required—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think a lot’s happening. I’ve got to be honest with you: that was another great point in my career, to do that study. It turns out it was probably a little bit more expensive than people wanted it to be, so it didn’t go over too well. But in all fairness, I think it was better than people accepted. Because our—the way we costed it was really a long-range program that was going to do—it was where we were going to go back to the Moon, this time to stay, and on to Mars. That’s what President [George H. W.] Bush stated that we wanted to do. And when we priced that out, it became very expensive; but if you really looked at the missions, they weren’t that out of the ordinary when you compare it to the Apollo cost. I think the framework was good. I think there have been studies since then. I think the time probably was not right for it. I think there were other circumstances within the country, such as the problem with the monetary system in the Savings & Loan. So, I think things really weren’t right—

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] —for us to spend that money. But what’s happening is—I’ll tell you what’s happening under Dan [Daniel S.] Goldin, which is very positive. We are sending robotic probes to Mars, to other planets. There are studies to see how you would send humans to other planets, essentially Mars. And I’m convinced that that report is a forerunner; and I’m convinced that all this will come to pass. I’m convinced that students of mine will—if they desire to become astronauts, will be able to walk on Mars. So, I’m convinced that is going to happen.

[Assistant] Mr. Cohen, we probably would not have gone to the Moon when we did had there not been a Cold War going on that required—

[User] That’s true.

[Assistant] —the missile gap to—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —for us to spend that money. But what’s happening is—I’ll tell you what’s happening under Dan [Daniel S.] Goldin, which is very positive. We are sending robotic probes to Mars, to other planets. There are studies to see how you would send humans to other planets, essentially Mars. And I’m convinced that that report is a forerunner; and I’m convinced that all this will come to pass. I’m convinced that students of mine will—if they desire to become astronauts, will be able to walk on Mars. So, I’m convinced that is going to happen.

[Assistant] Mr. Cohen, we probably would not have gone to the Moon when we did had there not been a Cold War going on that required—

[User] That’s true.

[Assistant] —the missile gap to—

[User] Right.

[Assistant] —catch up. So, is it going to take something like that now to propel us on?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s true.

[Assistant] —the missile gap to—

[User] Right.

[Assistant] —catch up. So, is it going to take something like that now to propel us on?

[User] Well, I’m not sure it’s going to take that. I do think, though, your point’s well taken. The—you know, you go back and why was the space program started? It was not started for science or technology or economics. It was started because of the Cold War. And so, you’re absolutely right. But I do think that there does have to be a need, a need that causes the public to see the importance of it. Now what’s that need going to be? I don’t know.

[Assistant] That’s my question.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] —catch up. So, is it going to take something like that now to propel us on?

[User] Well, I’m not sure it’s going to take that. I do think, though, your point’s well taken. The—you know, you go back and why was the space program started? It was not started for science or technology or economics. It was started because of the Cold War. And so, you’re absolutely right. But I do think that there does have to be a need, a need that causes the public to see the importance of it. Now what’s that need going to be? I don’t know.

[Assistant] That’s my question.

[User] I don’t—.

[Assistant] What is the need for you to go to Mars?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh, I—no, I think you still—I think there’s a place for both. I think you do need a robotic missions. In fact, I’ve been on the Mars Architecture Study at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory [Pasadena, California] where we’ve looked at the robotic missions. But even the people that are very interested in the robotic mission are very firm that you do need men and women in space. There is no question in their mind, the robotic missions are the precursors. But eventually to do the job, you do need men and women. And I think you get very much in support from both the people doing the robotic missions that humans are going to be a very intimate part of the exploration program.

[Assistant] Why’d you leave NASA?

[User] Well, I left NASA because I felt it was time for me to do something else. I always had the desire that I wanted to teach. I’ve had that desire—I never taught before. I always had the desire; I wanted to teach; and an opportunity was coming to me at the—at several places. One at MIT and one at Texas A&M. And, of course, I’m a graduate of Texas A&M and I felt that it was a good time for me to go. I didn’t want—I—but leaving NASA was very hard. I mean, it was very hard; and it was—they treated me very well. I enjoyed it. I had a wonderful career. I couldn’t think of anything I’d want to do more than I did. But I did want to teach. And I had an opportunity to come here and teach senior mechanical engineering design, which is something that I can use my talents on. A lot—many of the things we talked about today are examples how I get my students and teach my students. In fact, we design projects very much like what we’re talking about. The futuristic projects, these students do that. So, I had the opportunity to come teach; and that’s why I left. And I—

[Assistant] Your students still want to go to the Moon or go to Mars?

[User] Yes, they do.

[Assistant] Is this still a—is this still something that engineering students are interested in?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I left NASA because I felt it was time for me to do something else. I always had the desire that I wanted to teach. I’ve had that desire—I never taught before. I always had the desire; I wanted to teach; and an opportunity was coming to me at the—at several places. One at MIT and one at Texas A&M. And, of course, I’m a graduate of Texas A&M and I felt that it was a good time for me to go. I didn’t want—I—but leaving NASA was very hard. I mean, it was very hard; and it was—they treated me very well. I enjoyed it. I had a wonderful career. I couldn’t think of anything I’d want to do more than I did. But I did want to teach. And I had an opportunity to come here and teach senior mechanical engineering design, which is something that I can use my talents on. A lot—many of the things we talked about today are examples how I get my students and teach my students. In fact, we design projects very much like what we’re talking about. The futuristic projects, these students do that. So, I had the opportunity to come teach; and that’s why I left. And I—

[Assistant] Your students still want to go to the Moon or go to Mars?

[User] Yes, they do.

[Assistant] Is this still a—is this still something that engineering students are interested in?

[User] Yes, they are. And it—well, of course, it does challenge the engineering in terms of structures, materials, guidance systems, propulsion systems, environmental control systems. So, it really taxes them on their technology and their advancement of the state of the art. So, they’re very interested in it. And I’m very fortunate to teach here at Texas A&M because I do get a lot of rejuvenation myself, you might say, in working with the students.

[Assistant] You could’ve stayed making microwaves. Are you glad you came to NASA?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, they do.

[Assistant] Is this still a—is this still something that engineering students are interested in?

[User] Yes, they are. And it—well, of course, it does challenge the engineering in terms of structures, materials, guidance systems, propulsion systems, environmental control systems. So, it really taxes them on their technology and their advancement of the state of the art. So, they’re very interested in it. And I’m very fortunate to teach here at Texas A&M because I do get a lot of rejuvenation myself, you might say, in working with the students.

[Assistant] You could’ve stayed making microwaves. Are you glad you came to NASA?

[User] Oh I can’t—I mean, yes, I’m very happy. I’m very happy I came to NASA. Yes, I am.

[Assistant] At the time you did, it must’ve been terribly exciting.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, they are. And it—well, of course, it does challenge the engineering in terms of structures, materials, guidance systems, propulsion systems, environmental control systems. So, it really taxes them on their technology and their advancement of the state of the art. So, they’re very interested in it. And I’m very fortunate to teach here at Texas A&M because I do get a lot of rejuvenation myself, you might say, in working with the students.

[Assistant] You could’ve stayed making microwaves. Are you glad you came to NASA?

[User] Oh I can’t—I mean, yes, I’m very happy. I’m very happy I came to NASA. Yes, I am.

[Assistant] At the time you did, it must’ve been terribly exciting.

[User] It was extremely exciting, and I’m—I feel very, very fortunate to have worked with the people I had the opportunity to work with and the things I had to work on. It was just a wonderful, wonderful career for me.

[Assistant] 8 or Moon landing or the first time the Shuttle flew? The biggest moments of your life?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] It was extremely exciting, and I’m—I feel very, very fortunate to have worked with the people I had the opportunity to work with and the things I had to work on. It was just a wonderful, wonderful career for me.

[Assistant] 8 or Moon landing or the first time the Shuttle flew? The biggest moments of your life?

[User] Well, let me give it to you in sequence.

[Assistant] All right.

[User] First of all, I have to say the most significant event in my career was Apollo 8, as we talked about. I think that because humans left the influence of the Earth for the first time. And that had to be a very, very significant event. The second most important thing in my career was the first flight of the Shuttle. Because that to me was the most complicated vehicle we ever flew. And the second most—the third one was actually the second flight of the Shuttle, because that showed we had a reusable vehicle. And the fourth one, which although was very, very important, was the Apollo lunar landing—was the fourth one in my estimation. So, that’s how I rate my goals and my—

[Assistant] It’s interesting that everybody’s making lists—\n\n If you look at all those lists that people are making now at the—as we come to the end of the 20th century about great events of the 20th century, Apollo 11 is way up there.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, let me give it to you in sequence.

[Assistant] All right.

[User] First of all, I have to say the most significant event in my career was Apollo 8, as we talked about. I think that because humans left the influence of the Earth for the first time. And that had to be a very, very significant event. The second most important thing in my career was the first flight of the Shuttle. Because that to me was the most complicated vehicle we ever flew. And the second most—the third one was actually the second flight of the Shuttle, because that showed we had a reusable vehicle. And the fourth one, which although was very, very important, was the Apollo lunar landing—was the fourth one in my estimation. So, that’s how I rate my goals and my—

[Assistant] It’s interesting that everybody’s making lists—\n\n If you look at all those lists that people are making now at the—as we come to the end of the 20th century about great events of the 20th century, Apollo 11 is way up there.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] 8’s not even there.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think that’s right. And I think when you—like the National Academy of Engineering is—which is the most prestigious engineering organization in the country came up with their list and they actually have Apollo 11 as one. They don’t mention Apollo 8.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] You’re absolutely right.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] And I think that’s probably right from a perspective of the country and of the world. But if you really look at the engineering and what you—as you pointed out, what you were really trying to accomplish, Apollo 8 has to stand out. And I’ve got to tell you: I don’t think today that you could make a decision on—to do Apollo 8 like we did. I mean, this was something George Low thought was important; for whatever reason, he thought it was important. He was able to put it together. He was able to sell it. And we were able to do it. Could you do something like that today? I’m not sure you could. I mean, I’m not sure that you could because there are a lot of risks. I mean, talk about risks! There were—you said, you asked me and I passed it off, like, “Yeah, it was easy.” But there were a lot of risks in doing Apollo 8. And—that’s something that not too many—

[Assistant] There are debates going on to this very day as to whether you all really were ready to do what you did with Apollo 8. Obviously it worked! But the question is: were you really ready?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] You’re absolutely right.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] And I think that’s probably right from a perspective of the country and of the world. But if you really look at the engineering and what you—as you pointed out, what you were really trying to accomplish, Apollo 8 has to stand out. And I’ve got to tell you: I don’t think today that you could make a decision on—to do Apollo 8 like we did. I mean, this was something George Low thought was important; for whatever reason, he thought it was important. He was able to put it together. He was able to sell it. And we were able to do it. Could you do something like that today? I’m not sure you could. I mean, I’m not sure that you could because there are a lot of risks. I mean, talk about risks! There were—you said, you asked me and I passed it off, like, “Yeah, it was easy.” But there were a lot of risks in doing Apollo 8. And—that’s something that not too many—

[Assistant] There are debates going on to this very day as to whether you all really were ready to do what you did with Apollo 8. Obviously it worked! But the question is: were you really ready?

[User] Well, you know, I really think so. I mean, I really think we were. You know, at some point in time you’ve got to do what you set out to do. And we set out to leave the Earth and not stay around in low Earth orbit anymore. We said we were going to go someplace.

[Assistant] Did that mean you’d learned so much on those previous flights that it was just—you just didn’t need to do the same thing over again, or what?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, you know, I really think so. I mean, I really think we were. You know, at some point in time you’ve got to do what you set out to do. And we set out to leave the Earth and not stay around in low Earth orbit anymore. We said we were going to go someplace.

[Assistant] Did that mean you’d learned so much on those previous flights that it was just—you just didn’t need to do the same thing over again, or what?

[User] Well—yeah, I think that’s right. Well, I—whether you learn, I think you accomplish what you set out—

[Assistant] You—yeah.

[User] —to do. And I don’t think you were really going to learn much more—I mean, you know, you couldn’t study—you can’t study forever. And—

[Assistant] So, somebody was too conservative in 1968 or ’69 when they started building up all of this stuff?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah, that’s right.

[Assistant] —we—the Russians made us feel like everybody had overstayed their time there and men were—men and women were doing more than they really should do and could do. And that got to be a situation where I think the American public began to ask a lot of questions about whether this was wise or not.

[User] Wise, and should we participate? Should we send astronauts back to the Mir? Well, I think that’s right. I think anytime—you know, it’s easy anytime you have a potential failure or a failure that becomes life-threatening, you question it. So, in this question, I think we gained an awful lot from going to the Mir and working with the Russians. I think today, if you look at the Space Station (and I’ve got to be honest with you, I’m not that much—I’m—I’ve been away from it a while, so I’m not really an expert) —

[Assistant] I understand.

[User] —but if you look at what—where the Space Station stands, I feel firmly that if the Russians don’t participate with us, there’s ways we can get around it. On the other hand, I think if they can participate, we probably would do it faster, maybe, with a little less money. But I do think we can handle it without the Russians.

[Assistant] Which brings up the whole point of international cooperation that’s going on now. Is there really that much or—or not?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Wise, and should we participate? Should we send astronauts back to the Mir? Well, I think that’s right. I think anytime—you know, it’s easy anytime you have a potential failure or a failure that becomes life-threatening, you question it. So, in this question, I think we gained an awful lot from going to the Mir and working with the Russians. I think today, if you look at the Space Station (and I’ve got to be honest with you, I’m not that much—I’m—I’ve been away from it a while, so I’m not really an expert) —

[Assistant] I understand.

[User] —but if you look at what—where the Space Station stands, I feel firmly that if the Russians don’t participate with us, there’s ways we can get around it. On the other hand, I think if they can participate, we probably would do it faster, maybe, with a little less money. But I do think we can handle it without the Russians.

[Assistant] Which brings up the whole point of international cooperation that’s going on now. Is there really that much or—or not?

[User] Well, I think there is. I think, you know, there’s Russians and—we’re talking about Space Station in particular. There are the Russians. And of course the—you’ve got to recognize, there are the Japanese, there’s the European Space Agency. So, I think the international cooperation’s very large. There’s also a lot of international cooperation in the robotic missions, the missions the Italians are playing a big part in, in sending robot—the unmanned missions to Mars. So, are the French; the CNS. And I think—I really think that space, since I really feel space is an international enterprise, I do think international cooperation is extremely important. And I don’t think it’s really going to be a success unless you have true international cooperation.

[Assistant] We are—we’re in the middle of 1999, as this is being recorded. Are you surprised that there has not been more of a commercialization of space? That—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Certainly. When I was called to consult down at Oklahoma City on Rocketplane, I think the organization that was being proposed did not show enough space experience. I knew that NASA would not be familiar with some of the characters that were being called out, and their backgrounds, so we made some adjustments there. They were also going to have their program office located in Oklahoma City. I thought it would be much smarter to either locate it in Houston or locate it somewhere near the Cape [Canaveral, Florida]. We made some adjustments there.\n\n As far as the technical end of it, the four or five fellows that worked on it did an excellent job. Then the schedule was adjusted to fit more to the NASA needs than it was laid out by the initial proposal that they submitted. We made changes to the schedule as well. Those are the ones I recall. There were other minor ones, but nothing great.

[Assistant] Were you involved in any of the negotiations or due diligence visits when NASA representatives came to visit the company?

[User] The answer is yes.

[Assistant] Can you talk about your role in that capacity, please?

[User] Sure. I was asked to come down for the due diligence review NASA attended. I sat in the audience and was asked questions that the four or five could not answer. I don’t remember those questions, but it was in support of Rocketplane and I think it was called by George French. Again, to have more people who were familiar with the NASA folks, to be there for the review.\n\n The review was mostly handled by Randy Brinkley, the due diligence. And Will [Wilbur C.] Trafton was also there, who also was with NASA. Brinkley and Trafton were both NASA Headquarters [Washington, DC], as well as Houston folks that NASA were familiar with. It was more bringing people together that knew each other, and therefore had the same ideas and same goals, and communicated extremely well with each other. The Rocketplane people had never worked for NASA before.

[Assistant] You were sort of a liaison?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The answer is yes.

[Assistant] Can you talk about your role in that capacity, please?

[User] Sure. I was asked to come down for the due diligence review NASA attended. I sat in the audience and was asked questions that the four or five could not answer. I don’t remember those questions, but it was in support of Rocketplane and I think it was called by George French. Again, to have more people who were familiar with the NASA folks, to be there for the review.\n\n The review was mostly handled by Randy Brinkley, the due diligence. And Will [Wilbur C.] Trafton was also there, who also was with NASA. Brinkley and Trafton were both NASA Headquarters [Washington, DC], as well as Houston folks that NASA were familiar with. It was more bringing people together that knew each other, and therefore had the same ideas and same goals, and communicated extremely well with each other. The Rocketplane people had never worked for NASA before.

[Assistant] You were sort of a liaison?

[User] Yes, I think so.

[Assistant] When you were helping answer questions, were those primarily technical, or more financial, business-side questions?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Sure. I was asked to come down for the due diligence review NASA attended. I sat in the audience and was asked questions that the four or five could not answer. I don’t remember those questions, but it was in support of Rocketplane and I think it was called by George French. Again, to have more people who were familiar with the NASA folks, to be there for the review.\n\n The review was mostly handled by Randy Brinkley, the due diligence. And Will [Wilbur C.] Trafton was also there, who also was with NASA. Brinkley and Trafton were both NASA Headquarters [Washington, DC], as well as Houston folks that NASA were familiar with. It was more bringing people together that knew each other, and therefore had the same ideas and same goals, and communicated extremely well with each other. The Rocketplane people had never worked for NASA before.

[Assistant] You were sort of a liaison?

[User] Yes, I think so.

[Assistant] When you were helping answer questions, were those primarily technical, or more financial, business-side questions?

[User] There were both. I really think the NASA folks out of Houston were very familiar with the technical end of it. A lot of questions were financial. “When are you going to get the money? How are you going to get the money? How much do you need?” All of those arrangements.\n\n The Space Act Agreement that was agreed to had some technical milestones in it, but also had some finance milestones. I think NASA came in with the idea, “Hey, these guys can go off and build this vehicle and make it work.” There was no doubt that we had a heck of a team at Kistler that were very, very talented and knew their systems in and out. It was more a question about, “Who’s going to get the money? Where is it going to come from? How much are you going to get?” Those were questions dealt by the finance people that were there.

[Assistant] Throughout the length of Rocketplane Kistler’s Space Act Agreement with NASA, did you also have any involvement in trying to help them raise the necessary financing?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, I think so.

[Assistant] When you were helping answer questions, were those primarily technical, or more financial, business-side questions?

[User] There were both. I really think the NASA folks out of Houston were very familiar with the technical end of it. A lot of questions were financial. “When are you going to get the money? How are you going to get the money? How much do you need?” All of those arrangements.\n\n The Space Act Agreement that was agreed to had some technical milestones in it, but also had some finance milestones. I think NASA came in with the idea, “Hey, these guys can go off and build this vehicle and make it work.” There was no doubt that we had a heck of a team at Kistler that were very, very talented and knew their systems in and out. It was more a question about, “Who’s going to get the money? Where is it going to come from? How much are you going to get?” Those were questions dealt by the finance people that were there.

[Assistant] Throughout the length of Rocketplane Kistler’s Space Act Agreement with NASA, did you also have any involvement in trying to help them raise the necessary financing?

[User] The answer is yes. I attended some of the meetings that they would have. They called it a “road show,” where they went around and spoke to a bunch of investors, hedge fund people. I attended those sessions. I gave them top-level briefings about what this vehicle looked like, what the technical capability was, what the schedule would be, what customers are talking to us about. I gave them an overview. Then any level of detail was given by the engineers. The finance stuff was briefed primarily by Randy Brinkley and George French. I also want to add that NASA also cooperated and attended some of those meetings, to show their seriousness about this program. Of course it still didn’t make it.

[Assistant] From your perspective, why do you think that in the end, they weren’t able to secure the financing? We understand that they had a very solid technical plan, but investors still weren’t attracted to that as a business opportunity.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Indoctrination, no. We worked directly with the people. Well, for example, may I show you the example? I brought some special things. I thought I had this stuff organized a little better, Becky.

[Assistant] That’s all right.

[User] I’m just going to show you some—yes, here we go. [Biggs shows example.] Say, for example, I’d sit down with the Gemini crew and talk about, okay, how’s this astronaut [maneuvering] unit going to look, and how far out will you be, and when we land on the Moon, what sort of craters. We’d just sit and talk to them, and they would share their thoughts with me and tell what they thought it would look like. Then I would do the illustrations, go back to them, let them look at it. They’d say, “No, the color’s wrong. Originally the command module was black,” things like that.\n\n So, no special training per se, but it was what we called in the air force OJT, on-the-job training, just work with them, and you just did it over until you got it right.

[Assistant] What type of tools were you using at the time?

[User] Guache was the favorite medium then which is watercolor in a tube, and a lot of pencil drawings, a lot of illustrations. Like I say, not only full-color illustrations for publications, but illustrations for reports. After a mission, we’d do the mission report, and typically I’d do the cover of the mission report. So it might be in a pencil medium or charcoal or something like that.\n\n So, really, basically the same thing that some commercial artists would be using in a studio. You use the same tools.

[Assistant] And how many of you were there? How many were in your crew?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I’m just going to show you some—yes, here we go. [Biggs shows example.] Say, for example, I’d sit down with the Gemini crew and talk about, okay, how’s this astronaut [maneuvering] unit going to look, and how far out will you be, and when we land on the Moon, what sort of craters. We’d just sit and talk to them, and they would share their thoughts with me and tell what they thought it would look like. Then I would do the illustrations, go back to them, let them look at it. They’d say, “No, the color’s wrong. Originally the command module was black,” things like that.\n\n So, no special training per se, but it was what we called in the air force OJT, on-the-job training, just work with them, and you just did it over until you got it right.

[Assistant] What type of tools were you using at the time?

[User] Guache was the favorite medium then which is watercolor in a tube, and a lot of pencil drawings, a lot of illustrations. Like I say, not only full-color illustrations for publications, but illustrations for reports. After a mission, we’d do the mission report, and typically I’d do the cover of the mission report. So it might be in a pencil medium or charcoal or something like that.\n\n So, really, basically the same thing that some commercial artists would be using in a studio. You use the same tools.

[Assistant] And how many of you were there? How many were in your crew?

[User] Really three of us, Gerry [Gerald J.] Lyons, Grant Lathey [phonetic], and myself, we were the three conceptual illustrators. Then we had another group of people in that same organization. Most of them did flip charts and reports and stuff like that, but we were the three conceptual people, did conceptual work.

[Assistant] How did your duties evolve in this area?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Guache was the favorite medium then which is watercolor in a tube, and a lot of pencil drawings, a lot of illustrations. Like I say, not only full-color illustrations for publications, but illustrations for reports. After a mission, we’d do the mission report, and typically I’d do the cover of the mission report. So it might be in a pencil medium or charcoal or something like that.\n\n So, really, basically the same thing that some commercial artists would be using in a studio. You use the same tools.

[Assistant] And how many of you were there? How many were in your crew?

[User] Really three of us, Gerry [Gerald J.] Lyons, Grant Lathey [phonetic], and myself, we were the three conceptual illustrators. Then we had another group of people in that same organization. Most of them did flip charts and reports and stuff like that, but we were the three conceptual people, did conceptual work.

[Assistant] How did your duties evolve in this area?

[User] Well, it’s sort of what you volunteered to do, and then if you proved you had the skills, then they’d continue to let you do it. Of course, that has its down sides, because if you keep volunteering, they would keep piling it on, and that’s basically what happened. But I really liked that.\n\n When my boss, Roy [L.] Magin, found out that “He can do illustrations. Then we’ll let him do illustrations,” I started getting more of those. And that’s just the way it went, working with a repetograph [phonetic]. Whatever skill that you had, they’d take advantage of it. That’s a pretty small group, and we didn’t have a contract support at that time. Later we got some contract support. It was all done in-house by NASA employees.

[Assistant] At the time that you were doing this specific task, Gemini was under way, but at some point Apollo started to come onboard. Did you have the task of working on both projects or both programs at the same time?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, I’ve always found that worked quite well. I can’t address anything after 1992, but up until 1992, I thought the Headquarters-Center function worked real well. Headquarters would fund for something if it were a World’s Fair or a Paris Air Show. Then they would look to the Center who could provide that support that was necessary, whether it was video support or designing and building a Paris Air Show.\n\n Really, we at JSC took advantage of that, too, because we had some good skills, and since it was funded by NASA Headquarters, it allowed us to maintain a contract staff that we might not be able to maintain otherwise. So I never really had a problem with it. You might get a different story from someone down the hall, but we worked quite well with our media counterparts.

[Assistant] I think that’s all I have.

[User] That’s all the questions you have?

[Assistant]
Sandra?

I just had one. You mentioned that they projected the amount of people that would be going through Space Center Houston as being higher than the amount that actually did.

[User] Yes, they did.

[Assistant] We’ve talked to a couple of other people, like Bill Kelly, and they mentioned that. Do you have any idea why you think the public didn’t respond the same way that projections were?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s all the questions you have?

[Assistant]
Sandra?

I just had one. You mentioned that they projected the amount of people that would be going through Space Center Houston as being higher than the amount that actually did.

[User] Yes, they did.

[Assistant] We’ve talked to a couple of other people, like Bill Kelly, and they mentioned that. Do you have any idea why you think the public didn’t respond the same way that projections were?

[User] No. I think they just over-anticipated the demand. We’re not in downtown Houston. We’re off the beaten track. I mean, you’ve got to come out here to come out to see us, you know, and I think the one point—they said it would go to 1.7 [million visitors a year or] something like that, and then it would taper off, and then it would gradually start to increase. But they thought that the first year that it opened would have 1.7. Well, we had about 800,000 people.\n\n The first year’s financial numbers, we were about $6 million in debt. Maybe that was two years. We had to dip into a contingency fund. So our current director of Space Center Houston, Richard Allen, should get most of that thanks, too, because he made a lot of management changes, personnel changes, operational changes that got them in the black. They’re in the black, doing well, but they’re still hovering under a million people. But that’s not [anything to] be ashamed of. Marshall Space Flight Center, 400,000 [to] 500,000, you know, that’s pretty good numbers out where we are.

[Assistant] Before you leave today, we want you to share some other items that you brought with us, and we can do it however you would like.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, it was in different pieces. The command and service module was at Rockwell. The first stage was at Mississippi Test, and the second stage was at Michoud, and they were in big bags of dry nitrogen. That way they were keeping it in pristine condition so that if we ever needed to fly it again, we could.\n\n There’s our Apollo-Soyuz in position, or this is our Apollo docking module in position, waiting for the Soyuz to come in. [Biggs shows a photograph.] Then they brought in the Soyuz. Then once everything is in position, then a big giant crane—

[Assistant] Amazing.

[User] And to work out the mechanics and the details of doing this, it was really exciting for me. I think back on it, and I never really had a fear that things would go wrong, and now I think back on that, and it really scares me. [Laughter] I’d just always assumed, you know, with good people you’re going to work your problems out, and there’re not problems at all.\n\n Here’s our friend Bob McCall. You might find this interesting. Here’s Bob McCall up on his scaffolding, working on his mural. Like I say, he was up there for several months. He added the woman, Sally [K.] Ride, and added some of the women in the control center and then added a couple of our black astronauts.\n\n But a great career here, and I enjoyed it, and I’d like to do it again. But only one time around.

[Assistant] It sounds like your new adventure may give you some great memories as well.

[User] Yes, it’s fine, and it’s doing many of the same things, many of the same kind of projects.

[Assistant] Before we close today, is there anything else that you want to add, or anything else that you can think of?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And to work out the mechanics and the details of doing this, it was really exciting for me. I think back on it, and I never really had a fear that things would go wrong, and now I think back on that, and it really scares me. [Laughter] I’d just always assumed, you know, with good people you’re going to work your problems out, and there’re not problems at all.\n\n Here’s our friend Bob McCall. You might find this interesting. Here’s Bob McCall up on his scaffolding, working on his mural. Like I say, he was up there for several months. He added the woman, Sally [K.] Ride, and added some of the women in the control center and then added a couple of our black astronauts.\n\n But a great career here, and I enjoyed it, and I’d like to do it again. But only one time around.

[Assistant] It sounds like your new adventure may give you some great memories as well.

[User] Yes, it’s fine, and it’s doing many of the same things, many of the same kind of projects.

[Assistant] Before we close today, is there anything else that you want to add, or anything else that you can think of?

[User] No, not really. As I mentioned before, this is an exercise, whether it’s formal like this or not, I think this is an exercise that everyone ought to do, just to kind of reflect back on their lives, especially people that are my age. I turned sixty-five in March, and sometimes I think we might be pleasantly surprised at how much fun we’ve really had. You know, we dwell on the bad things in life, illnesses and death in the family and that sort of thing. We kind of shove aside and forget the things that have really been great about our lives.

[Assistant] We certainly are glad you came in today, because we have learned a lot about areas that we had not heard before, and certainly are glad that you spent the time with us. So I thank you again.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, I’ve got students all over the country. This is a direct fallout of all my work with LSAPT and the Meteorite Working Group, because I know these people, and if I’ve got a good student, I can call them and they’ll say, yes, they’ll take a hard look at him.

[Assistant] That’s great.

[User] It’s an old-boy, old-girls’ network right down the line.

[Assistant] It’s worked out really well for you. You’ve certainly had a fascinating career.

[User] Oh, I’ve enjoyed it thoroughly.

[Assistant]
I’d like to give Kevin a chance now to ask you a couple of questions.

I have one specific question and a couple of general questions. Earlier on in the interview you mentioned testing some protective clothing and such for NASA down at Antarctica. I was wondering if you could elaborate on that.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I don’t think that I really saw it coming, because I was at a level where we were just so busy and had so many things going on, although I could see it somewhat among the press. This was somewhat dismaying to me on a personal basis, because I was thinking the press was in many ways defining public opinion. That’s not good. And we see this today. All you have to do is to follow the stock market today, and you can see that the press is defining that, but the average person is not necessarily that associated with it.\n\n Yes, this was a bit difficult, and, as I said a little earlier, it was a real problem. We would sit and ask and almost, why? Why is it that one day we’re kind of the darlings of the system and the next day you’re the dregs? You just don’t quite understand it. I know that many people were fighting to keep things going, and they did a wonderful job, but we went through some very difficult years. I hate to see it, but part of it comes from the fact that NASA has to go in for its budget every year. This is a rather stupid kind of a situation when NASA thinks in decades and not in years. So that’s part of the problem.

[Assistant] Those were all the questions I had. Thank you.

[User] Good.

[Assistant] I want to thank you for spending some time with us this afternoon and sharing so many of your interesting experiences with us and so much of the history of the program.

[User] Well, thank you. It’s been fun.

[Assistant] It certainly has been for us as well.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, let's get started.

[Assistant] All right. In April of this year, you assumed this role of Associate Deputy Administrator, placing you responsible for a number of things here at the agency. We'd like for you to begin today by telling us what those duties are and how you moved into this position.

[User] I wish I could tell you specifically what they are. They pretty much change every day. But generally speaking, I serve as the deputy to the Deputy Administrator [Shana L. Dale]. Until you've actually worked here, you really don't have an appreciation for what the Deputy Administrator and Administrator do on a daily basis. So my job is to help fill in the blanks. I cover some of those things that she just can't get to because of such demands on her schedule. That can range from filling in for her at a speaking engagement at a field center or conducting budget reviews. Making sure the Operations Management Council (OMC) is scheduled and the agenda is appropriate for what she's trying to get done. But if I could sum it up, I help execute her vision and strategy for the things she wants to get done during her tenure here at the agency.

[Assistant] Is there one thing in particular that seems to be more memorable in your short term in this job that stood out that you were able to step in and do?

[User] Well, generally speaking, what really is amazing is the pace which things occur here in the A Suite [Administrator’s Suite]. It is most relentless. It's constant and it's full. But actually helping work the corporate G&A budget process has been I believe a tremendous help to Shana. Working with the various mission support offices here in the building and helping balance the budget needs across each of those mission directorates. Also being an interface for her into the HSPD-12 [Homeland Security Presidential Directive] project that's going on now throughout all of government and helping to keep that in focus and in line, and working with the different offices that's charged with implementing HSPD-12.

[Assistant] You've been with NASA for more than 30 years and began your career as a cooperative education student.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] To NASA the agency?

[Assistant] Yes, the agency.

[User] Well, where else can you work where there is a mission like the one we have? Again, I may feel that way because it's the only place I've ever worked. But I don't think that's it. Challenging and exploring the unknown and trying to figure out if we can we live in other places other than Earth, and how we get there, the research we do, having a permanent presence in space on the Space Station, to me that should be encouragement enough. But the benefits that goes back into society, I would argue that we play a greater or as great a role as any other agency in all of government. It's simply an exciting place to work. Again I go back to the people that work in this agency. Extremely bright and always willing to help, and take on any challenge.

[Assistant] Well, I pretty much have concluded my thoughts to share. Is there anything else that you would like to add?

[User] First of all, I really appreciate what you're doing here. I'm glad someone actually thought about doing this. Because NASA is a baby compared to a lot of agencies. But what a tremendous achievement for 50 years. I think that should be recorded somewhere for future generations so that they may get interested in trying to figure out how we accomplished so much and who were some of the people that worked there. So I thank you for what you are doing.

[Assistant] You'll get to be more involved, and they all do something different, and JPL [Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California] going off to Mars, and of course [NASA] Kennedy [Space Center, Florida] where you'll have more and more chance to go down and see the launch of the new vehicles.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, thanks for letting me doing this.

[Assistant] This is a wonderful, a wonderful project and a wonderful opportunity for you to share some of your thoughts and experiences as a Peace Corps volunteer. So let's begin this conversation by your telling me, why did you join the Peace Corps?

[User] Yeah, that's a, that's a good question. To be honest, I hadn't really given it a whole lot of thought ahead of time. You know, I'd known about the Peace Corps. I'd heard of the Peace Corps, but never really considered that this was something that I would do, but it was kind of a spur of the moment thing. I had a friend who had been down to the Peace Corps office and was really interested in joining the Peace Corps.

[Assistant] Was that the office in Washington, D.C., or someplace else?

[User] No, it was a recruiting office in San Diego, which I grew up in East County, San Diego. So she had gone down and picked up all the materials. And I happened to be over at her house that evening. And she was really disappointed because they had moved from Canada and never became U.S. citizens. So she was ineligible. And I was sitting there looking at all this material that she had brought home. And I thought, well, this looks like, this looks like pretty interesting. You know, this looks like it could be fun. So I filled out the application and sent it in. And that's about as much planning as went into my applying for the Peace Corps. It was more or less a whim.

[Assistant] Where were you in your life at that point? What were you doing? What was that time frame in your own life?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah, I didn't have a plan to follow, so that kind of freed me up to take off to Fiji on a whim.

[Assistant] Right. Well, so what did your family say when you told them you wanted to do Peace Corps? What did they say?

[User] Well, it was, I don't know. It was kind of mixed. You know, my parents had broken up long before that. So my dad, you know. He was fine. Actually, my dad grew up during the Depression, and he ran away from home when he was a young kid, about 12 or 13. And he had rode freight trains across the country. In fact, you know, when we were like, my brother and I were like ten or 12 years old, he used to tell us we ought to run away. So.

[Assistant] And have the adventures that he had?

[User] Yeah. So he thought this was a good idea also, you know, if you could travel on Uncle Sam's dime, you know, that was great. So he was all for it. My mother, you know, on the other hand, you know, mothers don't want to see their kids, you know, travel halfway around the world and be out of contact with them. So, you know, she didn't think it was a great idea. But no, you know, nobody really protested loudly or try to talk me out of it. She might have not, she might have thought it was kind of a dumb idea, but she didn't try to talk me out of it, that's for sure.

[Assistant] And the siblings, your older sibling, did they have any memorable response?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah. So he thought this was a good idea also, you know, if you could travel on Uncle Sam's dime, you know, that was great. So he was all for it. My mother, you know, on the other hand, you know, mothers don't want to see their kids, you know, travel halfway around the world and be out of contact with them. So, you know, she didn't think it was a great idea. But no, you know, nobody really protested loudly or try to talk me out of it. She might have not, she might have thought it was kind of a dumb idea, but she didn't try to talk me out of it, that's for sure.

[Assistant] And the siblings, your older sibling, did they have any memorable response?

[User] No, not really.

[Assistant] Right. Yeah.

[User] I'd say so.

[Assistant] Right. So OK.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, not really.

[Assistant] Right. Yeah.

[User] I'd say so.

[Assistant] Right. So OK.

[User] It was something that, you know, nobody would have ever thought about in our family to do something like that.

[Assistant] So what about your Canadian friend who wasn't able to? Did she ever get a citizenship so she could join Peace Corps?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I'd say so.

[Assistant] Right. So OK.

[User] It was something that, you know, nobody would have ever thought about in our family to do something like that.

[Assistant] So what about your Canadian friend who wasn't able to? Did she ever get a citizenship so she could join Peace Corps?

[User] I don't know. You know, I haven't seen her in, I haven't seen her in a long time, but I don't think she ever did.

[Assistant] Right. That could have been an impetus. So let's think about then you've closed your business, you've gotten apart or gotten a temporary job in order to get yourself, keep food on the table, shall we say.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] It was something that, you know, nobody would have ever thought about in our family to do something like that.

[Assistant] So what about your Canadian friend who wasn't able to? Did she ever get a citizenship so she could join Peace Corps?

[User] I don't know. You know, I haven't seen her in, I haven't seen her in a long time, but I don't think she ever did.

[Assistant] Right. That could have been an impetus. So let's think about then you've closed your business, you've gotten apart or gotten a temporary job in order to get yourself, keep food on the table, shall we say.

[User] Right. Right.

[Assistant] And go into Peace Corps. So what, you know, tell us about arriving at training. Where did you train and what was that like?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I don't know. You know, I haven't seen her in, I haven't seen her in a long time, but I don't think she ever did.

[Assistant] Right. That could have been an impetus. So let's think about then you've closed your business, you've gotten apart or gotten a temporary job in order to get yourself, keep food on the table, shall we say.

[User] Right. Right.

[Assistant] And go into Peace Corps. So what, you know, tell us about arriving at training. Where did you train and what was that like?

[User] OK, so we trained in country. We had, we actually had an orientation in Chicago several weeks before we took off. So I think it was a bit of a screening process. They flew everybody to Chicago. The country director was there on and one of the local Peace Corps office staff members, one of the Fijian guys, and they were there to tell us a little bit about what serving in Fiji would be like. And then also they had the country director sat down with everybody individually and had a little one on one interview. And they were actually a couple of people that got screened out at that time.

[Assistant] Mm hmm. Interesting. How many were you?