[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I was not.

[Assistant] Okay. The mission when you flew, on Gemini VII, in a 14-day mission, do you remember what your thoughts were when they first said to you, “14 days”?

[User] Well, Gemini VII was looked upon among the astronaut group as, you know, not much of a pilot’s mission. Just sort of a medical experiment mission, which it was. And we got the mission as you know, I think one of the great people in NASA was Deke [Donald K.] Slayton. He was—he had the integrity that was required; and I never talked to him once about crew assignments. I’ve heard that other people would try to lobby him for it, but I didn’t. And I figured when they gave me Gemini VII, we’d do the best we could with it.\n\n And fortunately I didn’t have a choice in [Pilot James A.] Lovell [Jr.] either, but it turns out that was wonderful. Jim Lovell was a wonderful guy to spend 14 days with in a very small place. But the—we had a lot of interesting things. You know, some of the doctors said, “Oh well, in order to do that you’re going to have to simulate it on Earth and see if you can stay in one g for 14 days.” And I, you know, “They’re out of their mind. Fourteen days sitting in a straight-up ejection seat on Earth? You’re crazy!”\n\n And so I was able—NASA at that time listened to the crewmembers when—in areas. We were able to get that nonsense kicked out in a hurry. And then we just went about our business, doing the best we could.

[Assistant] So they wanted you all to (what?) simulate—

[User] Yeah! Two weeks in one g! Come on, give me a break! That didn’t last long.

[Assistant] —with no bathroom breaks or anything?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, Gemini VII was looked upon among the astronaut group as, you know, not much of a pilot’s mission. Just sort of a medical experiment mission, which it was. And we got the mission as you know, I think one of the great people in NASA was Deke [Donald K.] Slayton. He was—he had the integrity that was required; and I never talked to him once about crew assignments. I’ve heard that other people would try to lobby him for it, but I didn’t. And I figured when they gave me Gemini VII, we’d do the best we could with it.\n\n And fortunately I didn’t have a choice in [Pilot James A.] Lovell [Jr.] either, but it turns out that was wonderful. Jim Lovell was a wonderful guy to spend 14 days with in a very small place. But the—we had a lot of interesting things. You know, some of the doctors said, “Oh well, in order to do that you’re going to have to simulate it on Earth and see if you can stay in one g for 14 days.” And I, you know, “They’re out of their mind. Fourteen days sitting in a straight-up ejection seat on Earth? You’re crazy!”\n\n And so I was able—NASA at that time listened to the crewmembers when—in areas. We were able to get that nonsense kicked out in a hurry. And then we just went about our business, doing the best we could.

[Assistant] So they wanted you all to (what?) simulate—

[User] Yeah! Two weeks in one g! Come on, give me a break! That didn’t last long.

[Assistant] —with no bathroom breaks or anything?

[User] —no. Just in one g.

[Assistant] Just you and—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah! Two weeks in one g! Come on, give me a break! That didn’t last long.

[Assistant] —with no bathroom breaks or anything?

[User] —no. Just in one g.

[Assistant] Just you and—

[User] Well, I don’t think you could do that.

[Assistant] —just you and Jim Lovell?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —no. Just in one g.

[Assistant] Just you and—

[User] Well, I don’t think you could do that.

[Assistant] —just you and Jim Lovell?

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] When things went wrong with hooking up with, you know, Wally [Walter M.] Schirra’s [Jr.] part of that part of your mission, in hooking up with VI-A; and, you know,—and that mission was juggled around and changes were suggested; and you played a role in deciding what was finally going to happen. Walk us through that.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I don’t think you could do that.

[Assistant] —just you and Jim Lovell?

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] When things went wrong with hooking up with, you know, Wally [Walter M.] Schirra’s [Jr.] part of that part of your mission, in hooking up with VI-A; and, you know,—and that mission was juggled around and changes were suggested; and you played a role in deciding what was finally going to happen. Walk us through that.

[User] Well, we were down at the Cape for the launch of Gemini VI, and the Agena went off and everybody thought they had a good target vehicle. It turns out it blew up after it was out of sight. But in any event, before we walked out of that blockhouse, John [F.] Yardley and Chris [Christopher C.] Kraft and some others were already starting, “How can we use Gemini VII as a target vehicle?” And it—that was NASA at that time. There was a tremendous imperative to do—to reach the Moon before the Russians.

[Assistant] Were you—what was your initial reaction? I guess it was George [M.] Low and John Yardley were really driving that thing of, “Let’s let you hook up with—”


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] When things went wrong with hooking up with, you know, Wally [Walter M.] Schirra’s [Jr.] part of that part of your mission, in hooking up with VI-A; and, you know,—and that mission was juggled around and changes were suggested; and you played a role in deciding what was finally going to happen. Walk us through that.

[User] Well, we were down at the Cape for the launch of Gemini VI, and the Agena went off and everybody thought they had a good target vehicle. It turns out it blew up after it was out of sight. But in any event, before we walked out of that blockhouse, John [F.] Yardley and Chris [Christopher C.] Kraft and some others were already starting, “How can we use Gemini VII as a target vehicle?” And it—that was NASA at that time. There was a tremendous imperative to do—to reach the Moon before the Russians.

[Assistant] Were you—what was your initial reaction? I guess it was George [M.] Low and John Yardley were really driving that thing of, “Let’s let you hook up with—”

[User] I don’t think it was George Low as much as it was John Yardley and then Chuck [Charles W.] Mathews, who was running the Gemini Program. Low may’ve had a hand in it. I don’t know. But in any event, I was all for it. I thought it was great. And this is another example of the flexibility in management that made NASA so successful.

[Assistant] When—there’s a story about when you were—when Wally Schirra had hung up this sign in the window: “Beat Army.”


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, we were down at the Cape for the launch of Gemini VI, and the Agena went off and everybody thought they had a good target vehicle. It turns out it blew up after it was out of sight. But in any event, before we walked out of that blockhouse, John [F.] Yardley and Chris [Christopher C.] Kraft and some others were already starting, “How can we use Gemini VII as a target vehicle?” And it—that was NASA at that time. There was a tremendous imperative to do—to reach the Moon before the Russians.

[Assistant] Were you—what was your initial reaction? I guess it was George [M.] Low and John Yardley were really driving that thing of, “Let’s let you hook up with—”

[User] I don’t think it was George Low as much as it was John Yardley and then Chuck [Charles W.] Mathews, who was running the Gemini Program. Low may’ve had a hand in it. I don’t know. But in any event, I was all for it. I thought it was great. And this is another example of the flexibility in management that made NASA so successful.

[Assistant] When—there’s a story about when you were—when Wally Schirra had hung up this sign in the window: “Beat Army.”

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] And that you purposely misread it?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] And that you purposely misread it?

[User] That’s right. [laughs]

[Assistant] “Beat Navy.”

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] What are your memories of that moment? Take us through this.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s right. [laughs]

[Assistant] “Beat Navy.”

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] What are your memories of that moment? Take us through this.

[User] Well, that’s true. We were—we’d—Lovell and I had been up there for 11 or 12 days (I don’t remember how long). And we were tired, and the systems on the spacecraft were failing. We were running out of fuel, and it was a real high point to see this bright light (it looked like a star) came up, and then eventually we could see it was a Gemini vehicle. And we found that we could—we had very limited fuel. But we found that the autopilot for the controls were perfect. You could fly formation with no problem. And then Wally slapped up the thing: “Beat Army.”\n\n Wally was always one to inject some levity into the program. And, God bless him, he really did a good job in everything he did. He just has a different—he has that little quirk of being able to include some fun with things. I never had that. I didn’t think much about the “Beat Army” sign, although it was fun at the time.

[Assistant] Why do you think you didn’t like to take part in all the practical jokes?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, that’s true. We were—we’d—Lovell and I had been up there for 11 or 12 days (I don’t remember how long). And we were tired, and the systems on the spacecraft were failing. We were running out of fuel, and it was a real high point to see this bright light (it looked like a star) came up, and then eventually we could see it was a Gemini vehicle. And we found that we could—we had very limited fuel. But we found that the autopilot for the controls were perfect. You could fly formation with no problem. And then Wally slapped up the thing: “Beat Army.”\n\n Wally was always one to inject some levity into the program. And, God bless him, he really did a good job in everything he did. He just has a different—he has that little quirk of being able to include some fun with things. I never had that. I didn’t think much about the “Beat Army” sign, although it was fun at the time.

[Assistant] Why do you think you didn’t like to take part in all the practical jokes?

[User] Me?

[Assistant] Uhm-hmm.

[User] I guess it’s just the way I’m built. I don’t have any other reason. You know, I would have—well, when—on Apollo (we’re skipping ahead, but)—when on Apollo, when we opened up the dinner for Christmas and I found somebody had included brandy in there, you know, I didn’t think that was funny at all. Because you and I both know, if we’d have drunk one drop of that damn brandy and the thing would have blown up on the way home, they’d have blamed the brandy on it. You know, I wanted to do the mission and I didn’t care about the other crap. I didn’t care about the food or anything else. I just wanted to get it done.

[Assistant] Were there any other things from your Gemini mission that—and they specifically want you to tell, maybe things that weren’t in your book Countdown? Any stories that you’ve—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Me?

[Assistant] Uhm-hmm.

[User] I guess it’s just the way I’m built. I don’t have any other reason. You know, I would have—well, when—on Apollo (we’re skipping ahead, but)—when on Apollo, when we opened up the dinner for Christmas and I found somebody had included brandy in there, you know, I didn’t think that was funny at all. Because you and I both know, if we’d have drunk one drop of that damn brandy and the thing would have blown up on the way home, they’d have blamed the brandy on it. You know, I wanted to do the mission and I didn’t care about the other crap. I didn’t care about the food or anything else. I just wanted to get it done.

[Assistant] Were there any other things from your Gemini mission that—and they specifically want you to tell, maybe things that weren’t in your book Countdown? Any stories that you’ve—?

[User] No. I—the interesting thing—one of the interesting things was flying formation with the second stage that put us into orbit and using an infrared sensor to track that. We referred to it as a “bogey” all the time, which was natural, normal parlance for it. And when we got back, True magazine wrote a big story about how we’d been tracking a UFO and all that nonsense. So I’ve been plagued with that ever since. People say, “Well,”—if you run into UFO circles today, they’ll still tell you, well, we saw a UFO. Which is just foolish.

[Assistant] And look where you moved.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I guess it’s just the way I’m built. I don’t have any other reason. You know, I would have—well, when—on Apollo (we’re skipping ahead, but)—when on Apollo, when we opened up the dinner for Christmas and I found somebody had included brandy in there, you know, I didn’t think that was funny at all. Because you and I both know, if we’d have drunk one drop of that damn brandy and the thing would have blown up on the way home, they’d have blamed the brandy on it. You know, I wanted to do the mission and I didn’t care about the other crap. I didn’t care about the food or anything else. I just wanted to get it done.

[Assistant] Were there any other things from your Gemini mission that—and they specifically want you to tell, maybe things that weren’t in your book Countdown? Any stories that you’ve—?

[User] No. I—the interesting thing—one of the interesting things was flying formation with the second stage that put us into orbit and using an infrared sensor to track that. We referred to it as a “bogey” all the time, which was natural, normal parlance for it. And when we got back, True magazine wrote a big story about how we’d been tracking a UFO and all that nonsense. So I’ve been plagued with that ever since. People say, “Well,”—if you run into UFO circles today, they’ll still tell you, well, we saw a UFO. Which is just foolish.

[Assistant] And look where you moved.

[User] I’m sorry?

[Assistant] Look where you moved. UFO country. Las Cruces.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I’m sorry?

[Assistant] Look where you moved. UFO country. Las Cruces.

[User] That’s right! [laughs] Over here in—

[Assistant] I know.

[User] —over here in Roswell [New Mexico]. That’s right. But the last few days were really trying. And, you know, the—I was very concerned about the fuel cells. And again, this was another example, I—of the concern that I had being really put to rest by Chris Kraft. He came on and told me, “Yeah, we have enough fuel in the fuel cells. It’s going to be all right to go the whole 14 days.” And so I had so much confidence in him, I quit worrying about it.

[Assistant] It was a tough flight. Talk about readjusting, when you got down. I mean, were you surprised at—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s right! [laughs] Over here in—

[Assistant] I know.

[User] —over here in Roswell [New Mexico]. That’s right. But the last few days were really trying. And, you know, the—I was very concerned about the fuel cells. And again, this was another example, I—of the concern that I had being really put to rest by Chris Kraft. He came on and told me, “Yeah, we have enough fuel in the fuel cells. It’s going to be all right to go the whole 14 days.” And so I had so much confidence in him, I quit worrying about it.

[Assistant] It was a tough flight. Talk about readjusting, when you got down. I mean, were you surprised at—?

[User] Well, we had a—you know, the doctors had made (as they did all the time in that era)—made more out of it than it really was. So they had Lovell with garters on that pneumatically contracted and then let out to try to impede the blood flowing back to the heart and to make the—trick the body and to think it was in one g. I was a control mechanism. I didn’t have any. And the thought—some people even said that when we—when the Gemini snapped upright as we were on the parachute, that we would pass out or perhaps even die. And of course, we didn’t. And it—about the only thing that I really felt after 2 weeks like that were the—our leg muscles were shot. And it took about 3 or 4 days; and I guess you could feel it for a week or so afterwards. But it wasn’t any big deal.

[Assistant] Can you imagine what it would be like to stay up on [Russian space station] Mir for, you know, 6 months or—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —over here in Roswell [New Mexico]. That’s right. But the last few days were really trying. And, you know, the—I was very concerned about the fuel cells. And again, this was another example, I—of the concern that I had being really put to rest by Chris Kraft. He came on and told me, “Yeah, we have enough fuel in the fuel cells. It’s going to be all right to go the whole 14 days.” And so I had so much confidence in him, I quit worrying about it.

[Assistant] It was a tough flight. Talk about readjusting, when you got down. I mean, were you surprised at—?

[User] Well, we had a—you know, the doctors had made (as they did all the time in that era)—made more out of it than it really was. So they had Lovell with garters on that pneumatically contracted and then let out to try to impede the blood flowing back to the heart and to make the—trick the body and to think it was in one g. I was a control mechanism. I didn’t have any. And the thought—some people even said that when we—when the Gemini snapped upright as we were on the parachute, that we would pass out or perhaps even die. And of course, we didn’t. And it—about the only thing that I really felt after 2 weeks like that were the—our leg muscles were shot. And it took about 3 or 4 days; and I guess you could feel it for a week or so afterwards. But it wasn’t any big deal.

[Assistant] Can you imagine what it would be like to stay up on [Russian space station] Mir for, you know, 6 months or—?

[User] I admire those people. It would take an awful lot of mental toughness, self-discipline, and it would take a (I hope they have) means to (I’m sure they do)—they have means to exercise some while they’re up there. But I have great admiration for those people.

[Assistant] What did you miss the most when you were up there? What comforts of Earth?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, we had a—you know, the doctors had made (as they did all the time in that era)—made more out of it than it really was. So they had Lovell with garters on that pneumatically contracted and then let out to try to impede the blood flowing back to the heart and to make the—trick the body and to think it was in one g. I was a control mechanism. I didn’t have any. And the thought—some people even said that when we—when the Gemini snapped upright as we were on the parachute, that we would pass out or perhaps even die. And of course, we didn’t. And it—about the only thing that I really felt after 2 weeks like that were the—our leg muscles were shot. And it took about 3 or 4 days; and I guess you could feel it for a week or so afterwards. But it wasn’t any big deal.

[Assistant] Can you imagine what it would be like to stay up on [Russian space station] Mir for, you know, 6 months or—?

[User] I admire those people. It would take an awful lot of mental toughness, self-discipline, and it would take a (I hope they have) means to (I’m sure they do)—they have means to exercise some while they’re up there. But I have great admiration for those people.

[Assistant] What did you miss the most when you were up there? What comforts of Earth?

[User] It wasn’t much—so much miss so much, it was just putting up with what we had to put up with. The food didn’t bother me or anything else. It was boring. You know, when you’re out of attitude control fuel and you’re just drifting, tumbling through space, time goes slow.

[Assistant] Yet some of the descriptions of what you all had to put up with: the bathroom facilities are—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I admire those people. It would take an awful lot of mental toughness, self-discipline, and it would take a (I hope they have) means to (I’m sure they do)—they have means to exercise some while they’re up there. But I have great admiration for those people.

[Assistant] What did you miss the most when you were up there? What comforts of Earth?

[User] It wasn’t much—so much miss so much, it was just putting up with what we had to put up with. The food didn’t bother me or anything else. It was boring. You know, when you’re out of attitude control fuel and you’re just drifting, tumbling through space, time goes slow.

[Assistant] Yet some of the descriptions of what you all had to put up with: the bathroom facilities are—

[User] Oh the bathroom facilities were primitive. But it’s—

[Assistant] Yeah. That’s being kind.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh the bathroom facilities were primitive. But it’s—

[Assistant] Yeah. That’s being kind.

[User] Well, that’s right; I was being kind. But, again, we were very fortunate. Well, I was very fortunate because Lovell was a great partner. We even ended up—I don’t know how in the world we could, but in that small area, somehow, that small volume, we lost a toothbrush. We ended up sharing a toothbrush! [laughs]

[Assistant] Oh really?

[User] Yeah. Unbelievable.

[Assistant] It’s like being on a Boy Scout camping trip.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, that’s right; I was being kind. But, again, we were very fortunate. Well, I was very fortunate because Lovell was a great partner. We even ended up—I don’t know how in the world we could, but in that small area, somehow, that small volume, we lost a toothbrush. We ended up sharing a toothbrush! [laughs]

[Assistant] Oh really?

[User] Yeah. Unbelievable.

[Assistant] It’s like being on a Boy Scout camping trip.

[User] Exactly.

[Assistant] You know, you’d been on Gemini and then you were there when the Apollo spacecraft was being developed. And it was two different companies: you had McDonnell [Aircraft Corporation]for one, and then you had North American [Aviation, Inc.] for Apollo. So it’s kind of like that first taste of switching contractors. What do you remember from that process? Any differences in the—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah. Unbelievable.

[Assistant] It’s like being on a Boy Scout camping trip.

[User] Exactly.

[Assistant] You know, you’d been on Gemini and then you were there when the Apollo spacecraft was being developed. And it was two different companies: you had McDonnell [Aircraft Corporation]for one, and then you had North American [Aviation, Inc.] for Apollo. So it’s kind of like that first taste of switching contractors. What do you remember from that process? Any differences in the—?

[User] It was like going from night to day. McDonnell was much more informal and, you know, I think everybody really had a great deal of respect for Mr. [James S.] McDonnell [Jr.], for John Yardley, and for Walter [F.] Burke. And it was a sort of a countrified company. I don’t know: You just had the feeling of people that did their work and weren’t very fancy about it. You went to North American, and they had layers and layers of briefers and this and that and the other things, and customer service or customer reps. I don’t know. It was also a feeling what—that I had the feeling, “Well, we built the X-15. We did this. We did that. We know more than everything about it.” You know, so—

[Assistant] What? That they felt that knew more?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Exactly.

[Assistant] You know, you’d been on Gemini and then you were there when the Apollo spacecraft was being developed. And it was two different companies: you had McDonnell [Aircraft Corporation]for one, and then you had North American [Aviation, Inc.] for Apollo. So it’s kind of like that first taste of switching contractors. What do you remember from that process? Any differences in the—?

[User] It was like going from night to day. McDonnell was much more informal and, you know, I think everybody really had a great deal of respect for Mr. [James S.] McDonnell [Jr.], for John Yardley, and for Walter [F.] Burke. And it was a sort of a countrified company. I don’t know: You just had the feeling of people that did their work and weren’t very fancy about it. You went to North American, and they had layers and layers of briefers and this and that and the other things, and customer service or customer reps. I don’t know. It was also a feeling what—that I had the feeling, “Well, we built the X-15. We did this. We did that. We know more than everything about it.” You know, so—

[Assistant] What? That they felt that knew more?

[User] That’s right.

[Assistant] Knew more than you? Do you think that played a role, that feeling, in then what would later happen with Apollo 1?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] All the years of training! Everybody was there was a pilot, you know. Well, “We’ve got a better way of doing it. We’re North American. We’re engineer—we’re human factor engineers. We understand this.”

[Assistant] Funny.

[User] We got it fixed.

[Assistant] Well, let’s talk about North American a little bit and the Apollo 1 fire. I’m—you know, you’ve said that you’re a straight-shooter. So, you know, it comes out later that there was criticism before the fire, that there was [Thomas R.] Baron’s report in ’66 and then [Gen.] Sam [Samuel C.] Phillips had written (I guess) his unpublished report criticizing North American. Were you aware of any of that, though, at the time?

[User] I was aware of the fact—as a matter of fact, we were assigned to the crew early on with one of the Block 1 spacecraft. But Gus [Grissom] and Ed [White] and Roger [B. Chaffee] were leaders in that, and I was aware they were having a lot of trouble with the spacecraft. But you know, when we were assigned our individual missions, we sort of focused on that; and the feedback would come through Deke or through meetings we’d have. But nobody felt it as intensely as the people that were involved in it. But I did know they were having a lot of trouble with the spacecraft.

[Assistant] Did you know things had been written? Like, that somebody had actually put down on paper?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] We got it fixed.

[Assistant] Well, let’s talk about North American a little bit and the Apollo 1 fire. I’m—you know, you’ve said that you’re a straight-shooter. So, you know, it comes out later that there was criticism before the fire, that there was [Thomas R.] Baron’s report in ’66 and then [Gen.] Sam [Samuel C.] Phillips had written (I guess) his unpublished report criticizing North American. Were you aware of any of that, though, at the time?

[User] I was aware of the fact—as a matter of fact, we were assigned to the crew early on with one of the Block 1 spacecraft. But Gus [Grissom] and Ed [White] and Roger [B. Chaffee] were leaders in that, and I was aware they were having a lot of trouble with the spacecraft. But you know, when we were assigned our individual missions, we sort of focused on that; and the feedback would come through Deke or through meetings we’d have. But nobody felt it as intensely as the people that were involved in it. But I did know they were having a lot of trouble with the spacecraft.

[Assistant] Did you know things had been written? Like, that somebody had actually put down on paper?

[User] About the Phillips report? No, I didn’t know that.

[Assistant] Okay. The other astronauts’ complaints. Like, as you said, what credence did you give them? You knew about them, but did you—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I was aware of the fact—as a matter of fact, we were assigned to the crew early on with one of the Block 1 spacecraft. But Gus [Grissom] and Ed [White] and Roger [B. Chaffee] were leaders in that, and I was aware they were having a lot of trouble with the spacecraft. But you know, when we were assigned our individual missions, we sort of focused on that; and the feedback would come through Deke or through meetings we’d have. But nobody felt it as intensely as the people that were involved in it. But I did know they were having a lot of trouble with the spacecraft.

[Assistant] Did you know things had been written? Like, that somebody had actually put down on paper?

[User] About the Phillips report? No, I didn’t know that.

[Assistant] Okay. The other astronauts’ complaints. Like, as you said, what credence did you give them? You knew about them, but did you—?

[User] I think everybody thought, “Well, it’s a first time. It’s a very complicated vehicle. These are things that will work out.” I’m sure that’s the way the crew felt, you know; that they were disgusted, they were trying to make it happen. But I’m sure they felt it would get fixed.

[Assistant] Did you have your own individual concerns at that point?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I think everybody thought, “Well, it’s a first time. It’s a very complicated vehicle. These are things that will work out.” I’m sure that’s the way the crew felt, you know; that they were disgusted, they were trying to make it happen. But I’m sure they felt it would get fixed.

[Assistant] Did you have your own individual concerns at that point?

[User] I did not.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] No.

[Assistant] I guess when the fire happened, I read that you were actually in a cabin somewhere in Texas.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I did not.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] No.

[Assistant] I guess when the fire happened, I read that you were actually in a cabin somewhere in Texas.

[User] That’s right.

[Assistant] Where were you at? In Texas?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No.

[Assistant] I guess when the fire happened, I read that you were actually in a cabin somewhere in Texas.

[User] That’s right.

[Assistant] Where were you at? In Texas?

[User] We were having dinner with some friends on a lake in Huntsville, Texas; and a highway patrolman knocked on the door. And how in the world anybody ever found that, I’ll never know, because I didn’t tell a soul. It was my family and I were up there.

[Assistant] They said it was a Texas Ranger, I guess. Is that their—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] We were having dinner with some friends on a lake in Huntsville, Texas; and a highway patrolman knocked on the door. And how in the world anybody ever found that, I’ll never know, because I didn’t tell a soul. It was my family and I were up there.

[Assistant] They said it was a Texas Ranger, I guess. Is that their—?

[User] Well, I think it was a highway patrolman—

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] —or whatever.

[Assistant] Knocked on the door?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think it was a highway patrolman—

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] —or whatever.

[Assistant] Knocked on the door?

[User] Knocked on the door and said that I was supposed to call Houston right away. And so I did, and that’s how I found out about it.

[Assistant] Did you immediately fly to the Cape?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —or whatever.

[Assistant] Knocked on the door?

[User] Knocked on the door and said that I was supposed to call Houston right away. And so I did, and that’s how I found out about it.

[Assistant] Did you immediately fly to the Cape?

[User] Went back. Susan [Borman] and I left and drove back to Houston and went to—went over to Ed White’s house, because Susan was close to Pat White, and stayed there for—I left the next morning.

[Assistant] Did—what was your initial reaction? I mean, your—the human reaction.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Knocked on the door and said that I was supposed to call Houston right away. And so I did, and that’s how I found out about it.

[Assistant] Did you immediately fly to the Cape?

[User] Went back. Susan [Borman] and I left and drove back to Houston and went to—went over to Ed White’s house, because Susan was close to Pat White, and stayed there for—I left the next morning.

[Assistant] Did—what was your initial reaction? I mean, your—the human reaction.

[User] Well, Ed White was a close friend of mine and we—our families were close. And of course, your reaction is one of grief to begin with. I mean, that’s normal. And then when you see, you know, the devastation that creates in a family, you it’s difficult.

[Assistant] Did you—I know you said you went the next day, but from—again from what I’ve read that—I don’t want to say you were the first person in the spacecraft but—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Went back. Susan [Borman] and I left and drove back to Houston and went to—went over to Ed White’s house, because Susan was close to Pat White, and stayed there for—I left the next morning.

[Assistant] Did—what was your initial reaction? I mean, your—the human reaction.

[User] Well, Ed White was a close friend of mine and we—our families were close. And of course, your reaction is one of grief to begin with. I mean, that’s normal. And then when you see, you know, the devastation that creates in a family, you it’s difficult.

[Assistant] Did you—I know you said you went the next day, but from—again from what I’ve read that—I don’t want to say you were the first person in the spacecraft but—

[User] I was not.

[Assistant] Would you—some people write it that way, that you were the first person. Maybe what they mean is, were you the first other astronaut to go in or the first person from the investigating team?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, Ed White was a close friend of mine and we—our families were close. And of course, your reaction is one of grief to begin with. I mean, that’s normal. And then when you see, you know, the devastation that creates in a family, you it’s difficult.

[Assistant] Did you—I know you said you went the next day, but from—again from what I’ve read that—I don’t want to say you were the first person in the spacecraft but—

[User] I was not.

[Assistant] Would you—some people write it that way, that you were the first person. Maybe what they mean is, were you the first other astronaut to go in or the first person from the investigating team?

[User] Well, I think what happened was: After they got the bodies out and everything and we organized the committee down there, I was assigned to the group that was to dismantle the spacecraft. So under that portfolio, I was the first one in as we started to monitor—not monitor, but to document where—what the switch positions were. I’d go in and say, “You know, the ECS [environmental control system] is in this position,” and the people would record it. So I was really the first—I think I was probably the first one on the investigating committee that went in. But there had been other people in there.

[Assistant] Okay. And the bodies weren’t in there?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I was not.

[Assistant] Would you—some people write it that way, that you were the first person. Maybe what they mean is, were you the first other astronaut to go in or the first person from the investigating team?

[User] Well, I think what happened was: After they got the bodies out and everything and we organized the committee down there, I was assigned to the group that was to dismantle the spacecraft. So under that portfolio, I was the first one in as we started to monitor—not monitor, but to document where—what the switch positions were. I’d go in and say, “You know, the ECS [environmental control system] is in this position,” and the people would record it. So I was really the first—I think I was probably the first one on the investigating committee that went in. But there had been other people in there.

[Assistant] Okay. And the bodies weren’t in there?

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Or the—but when you—do you remember what it was like when you first went in there? I mean, you were somebody who would be riding in—could have easily been riding in there? I mean, that could’ve been your assignment. What were your thoughts when you first went in there and saw it?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think what happened was: After they got the bodies out and everything and we organized the committee down there, I was assigned to the group that was to dismantle the spacecraft. So under that portfolio, I was the first one in as we started to monitor—not monitor, but to document where—what the switch positions were. I’d go in and say, “You know, the ECS [environmental control system] is in this position,” and the people would record it. So I was really the first—I think I was probably the first one on the investigating committee that went in. But there had been other people in there.

[Assistant] Okay. And the bodies weren’t in there?

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Or the—but when you—do you remember what it was like when you first went in there? I mean, you were somebody who would be riding in—could have easily been riding in there? I mean, that could’ve been your assignment. What were your thoughts when you first went in there and saw it?

[User] Well, it was devastation and it was, you know—it was—your thoughts were, “I—I can’t believe it could happen.” I never—if you’re asking, “Did I reflect some personal?” No, I didn’t do that. Again, I had a job to do and my job one was recording the switches. Then the next thing was, we went through and tried to understand where there might be bad insulation on it. So it was a long, drawn-out process.

[Assistant] Did you ever have a thought like, “Can—we can’t recover from this as an Agency?”


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Or the—but when you—do you remember what it was like when you first went in there? I mean, you were somebody who would be riding in—could have easily been riding in there? I mean, that could’ve been your assignment. What were your thoughts when you first went in there and saw it?

[User] Well, it was devastation and it was, you know—it was—your thoughts were, “I—I can’t believe it could happen.” I never—if you’re asking, “Did I reflect some personal?” No, I didn’t do that. Again, I had a job to do and my job one was recording the switches. Then the next thing was, we went through and tried to understand where there might be bad insulation on it. So it was a long, drawn-out process.

[Assistant] Did you ever have a thought like, “Can—we can’t recover from this as an Agency?”

[User] Never—in one instant.

[Assistant] And why not?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, it was devastation and it was, you know—it was—your thoughts were, “I—I can’t believe it could happen.” I never—if you’re asking, “Did I reflect some personal?” No, I didn’t do that. Again, I had a job to do and my job one was recording the switches. Then the next thing was, we went through and tried to understand where there might be bad insulation on it. So it was a long, drawn-out process.

[Assistant] Did you ever have a thought like, “Can—we can’t recover from this as an Agency?”

[User] Never—in one instant.

[Assistant] And why not?

[User] I guess it’s just the inherent optimism that people have that, you know, we stubbed our toes. And you’ve got to remember: Look, I’ve been around quite a few people that made holes in the ground. And that’s it. You press on.

[Assistant] How—there was a lot of criticism of NASA and North American during the investigation. A lot. I mean, how much do you think was justified?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Never—in one instant.

[Assistant] And why not?

[User] I guess it’s just the inherent optimism that people have that, you know, we stubbed our toes. And you’ve got to remember: Look, I’ve been around quite a few people that made holes in the ground. And that’s it. You press on.

[Assistant] How—there was a lot of criticism of NASA and North American during the investigation. A lot. I mean, how much do you think was justified?

[User] Very little of it. It was a media frenzy with people who wanted to get their names in the paper. It—you know, we were—if today you gave NASA the mission of going back to the Moon, I bet you they couldn’t do it as fast as they did it back then. This was uncharted territory, and a very complicated machine, with a very difficult mission. And to expect that you weren’t going to have problems was unrealistic.\n\n It’s like the nitwit that was Secretary of Transportation (I forgot what his name was) but—we will not—you know, “Our goal: we’ll never have another accident.” You know, well he should say, “We’ll do everything to make certain that we do our best not to have another accident, but you know damn well there’s going to be another accident.” Well, NASA had one. And I got really kind of sick of the second-guessers.

[Assistant] How long do you think NASA kept in mind the lessons that they had learned from Apollo 1?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Very little of it. It was a media frenzy with people who wanted to get their names in the paper. It—you know, we were—if today you gave NASA the mission of going back to the Moon, I bet you they couldn’t do it as fast as they did it back then. This was uncharted territory, and a very complicated machine, with a very difficult mission. And to expect that you weren’t going to have problems was unrealistic.\n\n It’s like the nitwit that was Secretary of Transportation (I forgot what his name was) but—we will not—you know, “Our goal: we’ll never have another accident.” You know, well he should say, “We’ll do everything to make certain that we do our best not to have another accident, but you know damn well there’s going to be another accident.” Well, NASA had one. And I got really kind of sick of the second-guessers.

[Assistant] How long do you think NASA kept in mind the lessons that they had learned from Apollo 1?

[User] I have no way of knowing because—I know they kept it in mind very well while George Low and the people that were there were there. I have no way of knowing whether that stayed with them or not.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] I really can’t comment on NASA management because I left in ’70 and I never looked back.

[Assistant] You know, you’re on the review board and you’re sent out to Downey to kind of lead that spacecraft redefinition team. And you’re also trying to train for your Apollo 8 mission. How did you juggle all that?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, no, I didn’t—I wasn’t training for the Apollo 8 mission—

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] —then.

[Assistant] You weren’t.

[User] My sole job then was: remember, I met Dr. [Robert R.] Gilruth in the hall somewhere and he said, “Look, we’re going to put George Low in charge of the Apollo spacecraft or Project Office, and we’d like you to go out to North American and implement or help to oversee the implementation of the changes that the Program Office in Houston were mandating for the spacecraft.” And so I just said, “Yes, sir,” and went—and then I went.

[Assistant] What was that like to be out there? I mean, you described your initial perception of the company; and now you’re sent out there to kind of be—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —then.

[Assistant] You weren’t.

[User] My sole job then was: remember, I met Dr. [Robert R.] Gilruth in the hall somewhere and he said, “Look, we’re going to put George Low in charge of the Apollo spacecraft or Project Office, and we’d like you to go out to North American and implement or help to oversee the implementation of the changes that the Program Office in Houston were mandating for the spacecraft.” And so I just said, “Yes, sir,” and went—and then I went.

[Assistant] What was that like to be out there? I mean, you described your initial perception of the company; and now you’re sent out there to kind of be—

[User] Well, I had a good team: Aaron Cohen, Doug [Douglas R.] Broome, and we had—and Scotty [Scott H. Simpkinson]. We had about four or five people that knew their job, knew their business, and we just worked our fannies off.

[Assistant] Any stories that stand out from that experience of changes you think you were able to make and—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I had a good team: Aaron Cohen, Doug [Douglas R.] Broome, and we had—and Scotty [Scott H. Simpkinson]. We had about four or five people that knew their job, knew their business, and we just worked our fannies off.

[Assistant] Any stories that stand out from that experience of changes you think you were able to make and—?

[User] Well, a lot of the changes that they were proposing weren’t changes at all that wouldn’t have maybe really been effective. Like the change in the oxygen system. But we were able to make an input there. But, you know, George Low was one of the giants of the program, and he ran that Change Board so that things didn’t get by him that were too frivolous or that were—and then I was faced with the problem: Guys would fly out and try to put their own changes in. So we controlled it all pretty well.\n\n We had an argument with George [E.] Mueller once about the—we added a lot of weight to the spacecraft. And as a result of that, they were going to have to change the way the parachute de-reefed. And he didn’t want to test the new parachute. But I won that battle, too. See, NASA was really—NASA at that time would listen to people that were on the spot and that were not—that were—that they had confidence in. I was very fortunate to be a part of that team.

[Assistant] Do you know why, or have you ever found out why, looking back, that you were selected to be on the Apollo 1 Review Board?

[User] I don’t know.

[Assistant] Any speculation on your part about why? I mean, there was a lot of astronauts—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, a lot of the changes that they were proposing weren’t changes at all that wouldn’t have maybe really been effective. Like the change in the oxygen system. But we were able to make an input there. But, you know, George Low was one of the giants of the program, and he ran that Change Board so that things didn’t get by him that were too frivolous or that were—and then I was faced with the problem: Guys would fly out and try to put their own changes in. So we controlled it all pretty well.\n\n We had an argument with George [E.] Mueller once about the—we added a lot of weight to the spacecraft. And as a result of that, they were going to have to change the way the parachute de-reefed. And he didn’t want to test the new parachute. But I won that battle, too. See, NASA was really—NASA at that time would listen to people that were on the spot and that were not—that were—that they had confidence in. I was very fortunate to be a part of that team.

[Assistant] Do you know why, or have you ever found out why, looking back, that you were selected to be on the Apollo 1 Review Board?

[User] I don’t know.

[Assistant] Any speculation on your part about why? I mean, there was a lot of astronauts—

[User] Oh, I’d been working on the spacecraft. Maybe they felt I had some familiarity with the [spacecraft]. I have no idea. Like I said, if Slayton said, “do it” I went and did it.

[Assistant] Maybe it’s because you were the only one who didn’t play those gotcha games. Who knows?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh, I’d been working on the spacecraft. Maybe they felt I had some familiarity with the [spacecraft]. I have no idea. Like I said, if Slayton said, “do it” I went and did it.

[Assistant] Maybe it’s because you were the only one who didn’t play those gotcha games. Who knows?

[User] I don’t know. [laughs]

[Assistant] Who knows?

[User] I don’t know.

[Assistant] How did you view your management style? I mean, in a way that was—in some ways kind of your first taste of managing. You had sub-panels to management. How did—how would you describe your management style?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I don’t know. [laughs]

[Assistant] Who knows?

[User] I don’t know.

[Assistant] How did you view your management style? I mean, in a way that was—in some ways kind of your first taste of managing. You had sub-panels to management. How did—how would you describe your management style?

[User] Well, I think that the management that NASA had there (which I think is the appropriate one), you gave people responsibility for doing it, you checked on them, but you did not try to micromanage it. And you were—you know, NASA at that time demanded the best; and if you didn’t cut it, you were gone. And we had the best. At North American, NASA flexed its muscles and the whole hierarchy was gone. Bill [William B.] Bergen came in and Buzz [Bastian] Hello. So North American really became almost a sub [contractor] to NASA after the fire.

[Assistant] Do you think that played a role in being able to so quickly recover?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I don’t know.

[Assistant] How did you view your management style? I mean, in a way that was—in some ways kind of your first taste of managing. You had sub-panels to management. How did—how would you describe your management style?

[User] Well, I think that the management that NASA had there (which I think is the appropriate one), you gave people responsibility for doing it, you checked on them, but you did not try to micromanage it. And you were—you know, NASA at that time demanded the best; and if you didn’t cut it, you were gone. And we had the best. At North American, NASA flexed its muscles and the whole hierarchy was gone. Bill [William B.] Bergen came in and Buzz [Bastian] Hello. So North American really became almost a sub [contractor] to NASA after the fire.

[Assistant] Do you think that played a role in being able to so quickly recover?

[User] Absolutely. Just take a look at the difference in recovery time between the Apollo and the Shuttle.

[Assistant] Yeah. It’s remarkable.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think that the management that NASA had there (which I think is the appropriate one), you gave people responsibility for doing it, you checked on them, but you did not try to micromanage it. And you were—you know, NASA at that time demanded the best; and if you didn’t cut it, you were gone. And we had the best. At North American, NASA flexed its muscles and the whole hierarchy was gone. Bill [William B.] Bergen came in and Buzz [Bastian] Hello. So North American really became almost a sub [contractor] to NASA after the fire.

[Assistant] Do you think that played a role in being able to so quickly recover?

[User] Absolutely. Just take a look at the difference in recovery time between the Apollo and the Shuttle.

[Assistant] Yeah. It’s remarkable.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] In fact, did you have a moment where you’d think, “We’re not going to fulfill [President John F.] Kennedy’s goal of doing it before the end of the decade” after the fire?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Absolutely. Just take a look at the difference in recovery time between the Apollo and the Shuttle.

[Assistant] Yeah. It’s remarkable.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] In fact, did you have a moment where you’d think, “We’re not going to fulfill [President John F.] Kennedy’s goal of doing it before the end of the decade” after the fire?

[User] I guess I’m an optimist. I never doubted that we’d do it. I never doubted we’d do it. And in that, you know, I wanted to beat Kennedy’s goal—I wanted to meet Kennedy’s goal. But the more important thing to me was beating the Russians. There—this—I took very seriously this Cold War and the idea that we were somehow second-rate to a Communist country.

[Assistant] Did—in terms of your Apollo 8 training and I guess the backup mission, you know, in case they decided you weren’t going to go orbit the Moon was (I guess) to spend 10 days in orbit.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] In fact, did you have a moment where you’d think, “We’re not going to fulfill [President John F.] Kennedy’s goal of doing it before the end of the decade” after the fire?

[User] I guess I’m an optimist. I never doubted that we’d do it. I never doubted we’d do it. And in that, you know, I wanted to beat Kennedy’s goal—I wanted to meet Kennedy’s goal. But the more important thing to me was beating the Russians. There—this—I took very seriously this Cold War and the idea that we were somehow second-rate to a Communist country.

[Assistant] Did—in terms of your Apollo 8 training and I guess the backup mission, you know, in case they decided you weren’t going to go orbit the Moon was (I guess) to spend 10 days in orbit.

[User] No.

[Assistant] Did you train for that contingency?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I guess I’m an optimist. I never doubted that we’d do it. I never doubted we’d do it. And in that, you know, I wanted to beat Kennedy’s goal—I wanted to meet Kennedy’s goal. But the more important thing to me was beating the Russians. There—this—I took very seriously this Cold War and the idea that we were somehow second-rate to a Communist country.

[Assistant] Did—in terms of your Apollo 8 training and I guess the backup mission, you know, in case they decided you weren’t going to go orbit the Moon was (I guess) to spend 10 days in orbit.

[User] No.

[Assistant] Did you train for that contingency?

[User] No.

[Assistant] You just refused to acknowledge it existed?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No.

[Assistant] Did you train for that contingency?

[User] No.

[Assistant] You just refused to acknowledge it existed?

[User] [laughs] We figured we’d figure out what to do if it came about!

[Assistant] Did they make you train? Or did you just—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] [laughs] We figured we’d figure out what to do if it came about!

[Assistant] Did they make you train? Or did you just—

[User] No!

[Assistant] No.

[User] They didn’t—they—I—look we—I really think that that would’ve been wired or called up to us telling us what to do. We didn’t train for it.

[Assistant] What were your thoughts about being the first flight on a Saturn V?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No!

[Assistant] No.

[User] They didn’t—they—I—look we—I really think that that would’ve been wired or called up to us telling us what to do. We didn’t train for it.

[Assistant] What were your thoughts about being the first flight on a Saturn V?

[User] Well, I had worked with the Huntsville people a lot. And I was confident that when [Wernher] von Braun told me he’d fix the Saturn V I, you know—I sure figured he’d fix the Saturn V. They—they had some pogo problems before. But I was involved with a guy that worked at Huntsville by the name of Jack Keutner in the crew safety committee there, where we put in the crew safety automatic ejection or automatic abort system. So I knew it pretty well. And I thought it was a reasonable design.\n\n We started off with—there were certain parts of the launch where if you had a failure, crew reaction time wasn’t enough to abort. So we said, “Okay, we’ll put in a gyroscope,” for instance if you get a—“Well, then you get a gyroscope failure,” then you’re gone with—“Well, we’ll put in two gyroscopes.” Okay, you put in two gyroscopes; “Which one are you going to believe?” So we ended up with three. And we voted it: “If two out of three said go, you went.” And that was a development of many—over many weeks of the people at Huntsville. And it was, you know—I was confident in the Saturn V.\n\n You know, I sound like a, you know, “People, if you believe me, I’ll sell you the Brooklyn Bridge.” But I understood. I had been with these people. And I had confidence that they would do their job.

[Assistant] The—you know, you’re going to go do something that’s, you know, nobody’s ridden on a Saturn V before. How do you prepare your family for that?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I didn’t do a good job of it, but part of the reason that I didn’t do a good job is that: my wife is a wonderful, wonderful person who was a complete support system. When we got married in the ’50s, it was like a team. She had her job and I had my job. And one of her jobs was to (I guess she had assumed it)—was to not in any way show any kind of fear or any kind of trepidation over what I was doing.\n\n And so I never had the—I never really understood her concern. Particularly after the fire, because she and Pat White were close and she saw how Pat White was devastated. And, look, it’s as I said: it wasn’t as if she hadn’t consoled widows before, because she had. And not a lot—not too long before we come to NASA. But in any event, I misread that; and so I just assumed that she was as strong—stronger than she really was.

[Assistant] How did you manage to pick—to be lucky enough (speaking of your wife) to pick July 20th, Moon landing day, as not only your wedding anniversary but the birth of one of your children?

[User] I know. I don’t understand that. I—and as a matter of fact, you’re the first person that’s ever pointed that out to me. [laughs]

[Assistant] You had to have thought about it, when we landed on the Moon on July 20th, that—the coincidence—

[User] I didn’t even—I had forgotten it was July 20th.

[Assistant] You had a premonition. So it’s the day before your launch on Apollo 8. And I had read that Charles Lindbergh actually came to visit you all in the crew quarters. What did you all—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I know. I don’t understand that. I—and as a matter of fact, you’re the first person that’s ever pointed that out to me. [laughs]

[Assistant] You had to have thought about it, when we landed on the Moon on July 20th, that—the coincidence—

[User] I didn’t even—I had forgotten it was July 20th.

[Assistant] You had a premonition. So it’s the day before your launch on Apollo 8. And I had read that Charles Lindbergh actually came to visit you all in the crew quarters. What did you all—?

[User] Charles Lindbergh and Anne Lindbergh came and had lunch with us and—the day before the launch; and we talked and talked and talked, and they stayed and stayed and stayed. And we eventually got the conversation around to his flight. It was a delightful afternoon. It really was.

[Assistant] Was he a hero of yours?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Charles Lindbergh and Anne Lindbergh came and had lunch with us and—the day before the launch; and we talked and talked and talked, and they stayed and stayed and stayed. And we eventually got the conversation around to his flight. It was a delightful afternoon. It really was.

[Assistant] Was he a hero of yours?

[User] Not really. No.

[Assistant] No.

[User] I—my family was very, very pro-British and very, very pro-let’s go help the British. And of course, Lindbergh was an America First’er. And so Lindbergh was not a popular name in our house when I was a child. On the other hand, I admired his (as I grew into the Air Force) what he had done, and I liked him a lot. He was a—he was intellectually very, very curious and very, very intent—even when he was asking about the Apollo 8 flight.

[Assistant] So it’s—now it’s launch day, and they actually count down, and they don’t delay. You’re really—I mean, when did you have this sense, sitting up there, that this is really going to happen and you’re really going to go?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Not really. No.

[Assistant] No.

[User] I—my family was very, very pro-British and very, very pro-let’s go help the British. And of course, Lindbergh was an America First’er. And so Lindbergh was not a popular name in our house when I was a child. On the other hand, I admired his (as I grew into the Air Force) what he had done, and I liked him a lot. He was a—he was intellectually very, very curious and very, very intent—even when he was asking about the Apollo 8 flight.

[Assistant] So it’s—now it’s launch day, and they actually count down, and they don’t delay. You’re really—I mean, when did you have this sense, sitting up there, that this is really going to happen and you’re really going to go?

[User] Well, I think the big—greatest concern was that it wouldn’t happen. I had two great concerns: I think the worst fear that I had was that somehow the crew would foul up, and that was the one thing that I did not want to happen. I want—you know, I had a great team in Bill [William A.] Anders and Lovell, and I wanted to make certain that we did and we could handle whatever was handed our way. The second thing was, I didn’t want—really want the mission to get fouled up because we really weren’t certain that the Russians weren’t breathing down our backs. So I wanted to go on time.

[Assistant] What was it like to lift off on that? I mean, there’s never been another rocket like the Saturn V.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think the big—greatest concern was that it wouldn’t happen. I had two great concerns: I think the worst fear that I had was that somehow the crew would foul up, and that was the one thing that I did not want to happen. I want—you know, I had a great team in Bill [William A.] Anders and Lovell, and I wanted to make certain that we did and we could handle whatever was handed our way. The second thing was, I didn’t want—really want the mission to get fouled up because we really weren’t certain that the Russians weren’t breathing down our backs. So I wanted to go on time.

[Assistant] What was it like to lift off on that? I mean, there’s never been another rocket like the Saturn V.

[User] No, the Saturn V was a unique vehicle. And of course, it was powerful and noisy and vibrated, and the stagings were really kind of violent. But when you got on the third stage, the S-IVB, it was smooth and quiet and was just like the upper stage of the Gemini. Actually, it was less demanding than Gemini from a g standpoint, because it didn’t reach the high-g’s. It burned, I think, 11 minutes or something like that. It didn’t get to the high-g’s.

[Assistant] No fear at liftoff?

[User] I on’t think there was any fear. The main fear, as I said, was that somehow we’d screw up. I remember I had my hand on the abort handle; and all I’d [have] had to do was like that and it—we’d have been gone on. And so I was worried that the vibration might—and yet I didn’t want to take my hand off there, so that kind of concern was [it].

[Assistant] So the human element of things—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, the Saturn V was a unique vehicle. And of course, it was powerful and noisy and vibrated, and the stagings were really kind of violent. But when you got on the third stage, the S-IVB, it was smooth and quiet and was just like the upper stage of the Gemini. Actually, it was less demanding than Gemini from a g standpoint, because it didn’t reach the high-g’s. It burned, I think, 11 minutes or something like that. It didn’t get to the high-g’s.

[Assistant] No fear at liftoff?

[User] I on’t think there was any fear. The main fear, as I said, was that somehow we’d screw up. I remember I had my hand on the abort handle; and all I’d [have] had to do was like that and it—we’d have been gone on. And so I was worried that the vibration might—and yet I didn’t want to take my hand off there, so that kind of concern was [it].

[Assistant] So the human element of things—

[User] No, I’m not saying that, you know, it wasn’t exciting and that there wasn’t a lot of anticipation of what was going on. But Lovell and I had been there before. It wasn’t that bad.

[Assistant] The—you know, you—there’s the little things, like, the closeout crew does before launch. And one of the little stories (I know this was in the book A Man On the Moon) was that they gave you a tiny stocking hanging from a paper Christmas tree. Do you know why that was the gift they gave you?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I on’t think there was any fear. The main fear, as I said, was that somehow we’d screw up. I remember I had my hand on the abort handle; and all I’d [have] had to do was like that and it—we’d have been gone on. And so I was worried that the vibration might—and yet I didn’t want to take my hand off there, so that kind of concern was [it].

[Assistant] So the human element of things—

[User] No, I’m not saying that, you know, it wasn’t exciting and that there wasn’t a lot of anticipation of what was going on. But Lovell and I had been there before. It wasn’t that bad.

[Assistant] The—you know, you—there’s the little things, like, the closeout crew does before launch. And one of the little stories (I know this was in the book A Man On the Moon) was that they gave you a tiny stocking hanging from a paper Christmas tree. Do you know why that was the gift they gave you?

[User] I don’t even remember that. [laughs]

[Assistant] They had given Jim Lovell a clean, white handkerchief.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, I’m not saying that, you know, it wasn’t exciting and that there wasn’t a lot of anticipation of what was going on. But Lovell and I had been there before. It wasn’t that bad.

[Assistant] The—you know, you—there’s the little things, like, the closeout crew does before launch. And one of the little stories (I know this was in the book A Man On the Moon) was that they gave you a tiny stocking hanging from a paper Christmas tree. Do you know why that was the gift they gave you?

[User] I don’t even remember that. [laughs]

[Assistant] They had given Jim Lovell a clean, white handkerchief.

[User] Where was that? Where did they do this?

[Assistant] It—on launch morning, as they’re suiting you up.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I don’t even remember that. [laughs]

[Assistant] They had given Jim Lovell a clean, white handkerchief.

[User] Where was that? Where did they do this?

[Assistant] It—on launch morning, as they’re suiting you up.

[User] Oh, okay.

[Assistant] And you have—Guenter [Wendt] would always—.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Where was that? Where did they do this?

[Assistant] It—on launch morning, as they’re suiting you up.

[User] Oh, okay.

[Assistant] And you have—Guenter [Wendt] would always—.

[User] I thought you meant at the pad.

[Assistant] No. You know how Guenter at the pad would give you little gifts.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh, okay.

[Assistant] And you have—Guenter [Wendt] would always—.

[User] I thought you meant at the pad.

[Assistant] No. You know how Guenter at the pad would give you little gifts.

[User] Yeah. To be honest with you—

[Assistant] You don’t remember.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I thought you meant at the pad.

[Assistant] No. You know how Guenter at the pad would give you little gifts.

[User] Yeah. To be honest with you—

[Assistant] You don’t remember.

[User] —I didn’t focus on that in that light.

[Assistant] I mean, obviously it was right before Christmas—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —I didn’t focus on that in that light.

[Assistant] I mean, obviously it was right before Christmas—

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] —but—

[User] It was, yeah.

[Assistant] — I don’t know. What were your feelings when you knew that you were going to have to go around to the dark side of the Moon? It’s hard for us to fathom now that that was even, like, such a big deal, that you don’t know. You know, can you come back around? And, but—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] —but—

[User] It was, yeah.

[Assistant] — I don’t know. What were your feelings when you knew that you were going to have to go around to the dark side of the Moon? It’s hard for us to fathom now that that was even, like, such a big deal, that you don’t know. You know, can you come back around? And, but—

[User] It’s hard for us to fathom now. But the thing that’s interesting about that mission was that, I don’t know, maybe half a dozen of us sat in Chris Kraft’s office one afternoon and we went over the flight plan, to try to understand what would we do on the—on—when we got to the—or on the whole flight. And I’ve always thought, again, it was an example of NASA’s leadership with Kraft and their management style that we were able to hammer out, in one afternoon, the basic tenets of the mission.\n\n You know, the Tracking people wanted us to stay up there a month. I didn’t want to stay more than one—it was a give-and-take, and Kraft called the shots. So we ended up going around 10 times, and I never really thought about, you know, going around behind—you’d lose radio contact; but that’s about all.\n\n It was—actually, the far side was lit, because the Sun was over there. And it was a—I remember that, in order to go 10 revolutions around the Moon, we had to launch at a certain time; but the recovery would then be before sunrise. And the Recovery people were concerned about that. But all this was thoroughly discussed, and then Kraft made the decision. It wasn’t a committee; it wasn’t a—you know, it was one man who had the knowledge to fly like that.

[Assistant] Well, you know, you’ve kind of been portrayed in some of the things I’ve read as “Let’s do the mission and not one thing more.”


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s right.

[Assistant] And—why?

[User] Well, because—well, I—some idiot had the idea that on the way to the Moon we’d do an EVA. Naw. You know, I guess I shouldn’t call him “an idiot.” He was just stupid to—you know, to put a—what do you want to do? What’s the main objective? The main objective was to go to the Moon, do enough orbits so that they could do the tracking, be the pathfinders for Apollo 11, and get your ass home. Why complicate it with a bunch of other stuff?\n\n You had to decide: What is the primary objective? And then forget it! I was—I couldn’t believe it when people proposed that we open that damn hatch so you risk (or not risk) but you subject the main mission to the possibility of failure with some of these trivial things on the side. And I just wouldn’t buy that.\n\n Now maybe it’s the—maybe it’s the thing—maybe it’s the military background, you know. Because you always say, “Okay, what’s the main objective? Let’s make sure the main objective gets done, and put all your resources into your main push. And don’t forget about the rest.”

[Assistant] Do you know what your feelings were when you all first dropped out of that radio contact? And did you have any sense of the tension on the ground as they’re waiting to pick you back up?

[User] Not at that point. I think our—the time of greatest tension in the spacecraft was when we fired the rocket to slow us up, and when we fired the rockets to get us out of there. That was the time of—

[Assistant] To slow up, to go into Moon orbit.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, because—well, I—some idiot had the idea that on the way to the Moon we’d do an EVA. Naw. You know, I guess I shouldn’t call him “an idiot.” He was just stupid to—you know, to put a—what do you want to do? What’s the main objective? The main objective was to go to the Moon, do enough orbits so that they could do the tracking, be the pathfinders for Apollo 11, and get your ass home. Why complicate it with a bunch of other stuff?\n\n You had to decide: What is the primary objective? And then forget it! I was—I couldn’t believe it when people proposed that we open that damn hatch so you risk (or not risk) but you subject the main mission to the possibility of failure with some of these trivial things on the side. And I just wouldn’t buy that.\n\n Now maybe it’s the—maybe it’s the thing—maybe it’s the military background, you know. Because you always say, “Okay, what’s the main objective? Let’s make sure the main objective gets done, and put all your resources into your main push. And don’t forget about the rest.”

[Assistant] Do you know what your feelings were when you all first dropped out of that radio contact? And did you have any sense of the tension on the ground as they’re waiting to pick you back up?

[User] Not at that point. I think our—the time of greatest tension in the spacecraft was when we fired the rocket to slow us up, and when we fired the rockets to get us out of there. That was the time of—

[Assistant] To slow up, to go into Moon orbit.

[User] Into lunar orbit, right.

[Assistant] And how did you know that—didn’t you actually, like, turn it off, even though the computer would have shut it off? You shut it off yourself to be safe?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Not at that point. I think our—the time of greatest tension in the spacecraft was when we fired the rocket to slow us up, and when we fired the rockets to get us out of there. That was the time of—

[Assistant] To slow up, to go into Moon orbit.

[User] Into lunar orbit, right.

[Assistant] And how did you know that—didn’t you actually, like, turn it off, even though the computer would have shut it off? You shut it off yourself to be safe?

[User] Lovell, I think we—he had a—we back up the computer—we backed up the computer on that. And also on starting we did, too. But, the—we really didn’t know where we were from the standpoint of, we knew where—from the standpoint of how high we were in the lunar orbit. Except we had a—one of the timeline things in the flight plan that would give you a pretty good idea that you were on course is when you lost radio communication. And we lost it right at the time we were supposed to.

[Assistant] When you got home and somebody sent you a telegram and—do you—that said, you know, “Thank you for saving 1968,” did you—was it a telegram sent to you that said that? What were—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Into lunar orbit, right.

[Assistant] And how did you know that—didn’t you actually, like, turn it off, even though the computer would have shut it off? You shut it off yourself to be safe?

[User] Lovell, I think we—he had a—we back up the computer—we backed up the computer on that. And also on starting we did, too. But, the—we really didn’t know where we were from the standpoint of, we knew where—from the standpoint of how high we were in the lunar orbit. Except we had a—one of the timeline things in the flight plan that would give you a pretty good idea that you were on course is when you lost radio communication. And we lost it right at the time we were supposed to.

[Assistant] When you got home and somebody sent you a telegram and—do you—that said, you know, “Thank you for saving 1968,” did you—was it a telegram sent to you that said that? What were—

[User] To the crew of Apollo 8.

[Assistant] To the crew. I mean, did you know what they meant right away? And what were—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Lovell, I think we—he had a—we back up the computer—we backed up the computer on that. And also on starting we did, too. But, the—we really didn’t know where we were from the standpoint of, we knew where—from the standpoint of how high we were in the lunar orbit. Except we had a—one of the timeline things in the flight plan that would give you a pretty good idea that you were on course is when you lost radio communication. And we lost it right at the time we were supposed to.

[Assistant] When you got home and somebody sent you a telegram and—do you—that said, you know, “Thank you for saving 1968,” did you—was it a telegram sent to you that said that? What were—

[User] To the crew of Apollo 8.

[Assistant] To the crew. I mean, did you know what they meant right away? And what were—?

[User] Well, ’68 was a rotten year. [laughs] So you’re darn right I knew what they meant! Yeah.

[Assistant] And did you—did it make you proud? How did that make you feel to get that telegram?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] To the crew of Apollo 8.

[Assistant] To the crew. I mean, did you know what they meant right away? And what were—?

[User] Well, ’68 was a rotten year. [laughs] So you’re darn right I knew what they meant! Yeah.

[Assistant] And did you—did it make you proud? How did that make you feel to get that telegram?

[User] Well, I was glad because, in a way it sort of endorsed what we had done. You know, there were still naysayers about spending the money on the Moon and all that whole lunar project, you know.

[Assistant] The—you didn’t want to bring the television camera along.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, ’68 was a rotten year. [laughs] So you’re darn right I knew what they meant! Yeah.

[Assistant] And did you—did it make you proud? How did that make you feel to get that telegram?

[User] Well, I was glad because, in a way it sort of endorsed what we had done. You know, there were still naysayers about spending the money on the Moon and all that whole lunar project, you know.

[Assistant] The—you didn’t want to bring the television camera along.

[User] I didn’t want to bring a television camera.

[Assistant] So that’s true.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I was glad because, in a way it sort of endorsed what we had done. You know, there were still naysayers about spending the money on the Moon and all that whole lunar project, you know.

[Assistant] The—you didn’t want to bring the television camera along.

[User] I didn’t want to bring a television camera.

[Assistant] So that’s true.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] You didn’t want to bring it on?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I didn’t want to bring a television camera.

[Assistant] So that’s true.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] You didn’t want to bring it on?

[User] I did not.

[Assistant] You wound up bringing it on.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] You didn’t want to bring it on?

[User] I did not.

[Assistant] You wound up bringing it on.

[User] I was dumb in that.

[Assistant] But you wound up bringing it along and you do the broadcast that, to this day, I still remember watching—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I did not.

[Assistant] You wound up bringing it on.

[User] I was dumb in that.

[Assistant] But you wound up bringing it along and you do the broadcast that, to this day, I still remember watching—

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] —as a child. And it gives me chills right now thinking about it. How did you come up with reading from Genesis and—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I was dumb in that.

[Assistant] But you wound up bringing it along and you do the broadcast that, to this day, I still remember watching—

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] —as a child. And it gives me chills right now thinking about it. How did you come up with reading from Genesis and—?

[User] Well, it’s another example of the wonderful country we live in. Because Julian Sheer, who was the head of public information for NASA in Washington, called me one day. He said, “You’re going to have the largest audience that’s ever listened to or seen a television picture of a human on Christmas Eve; and you’ve got” (I don’t know) “5 or 6 minutes.” And I said, “Well, that’s great, Julian. What are we doing?” He said, “Do whatever’s appropriate.” That’s the only instructions. But—and that’s the exact word, “Do whatever’s appropriate.” Whatever you feel is appropriate.\n\n And to be honest with you, we were so involved in the mission (and this was a peripheral one), so I just kind of farmed that out to a friend of mine, Si [Simon] Bourgin, and (from Washington)—and he came back—well, I guess he consulted with some of his friends and came back with the idea of reading from Genesis. And I discussed it with Bill and Jim, and we had it typed on the flight plan; and that’s—I didn’t give it anymore thought than that.

[Assistant] And then the line at the end, you know, “on the good Earth.”


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] —as a child. And it gives me chills right now thinking about it. How did you come up with reading from Genesis and—?

[User] Well, it’s another example of the wonderful country we live in. Because Julian Sheer, who was the head of public information for NASA in Washington, called me one day. He said, “You’re going to have the largest audience that’s ever listened to or seen a television picture of a human on Christmas Eve; and you’ve got” (I don’t know) “5 or 6 minutes.” And I said, “Well, that’s great, Julian. What are we doing?” He said, “Do whatever’s appropriate.” That’s the only instructions. But—and that’s the exact word, “Do whatever’s appropriate.” Whatever you feel is appropriate.\n\n And to be honest with you, we were so involved in the mission (and this was a peripheral one), so I just kind of farmed that out to a friend of mine, Si [Simon] Bourgin, and (from Washington)—and he came back—well, I guess he consulted with some of his friends and came back with the idea of reading from Genesis. And I discussed it with Bill and Jim, and we had it typed on the flight plan; and that’s—I didn’t give it anymore thought than that.

[Assistant] And then the line at the end, you know, “on the good Earth.”

[User] I think—On the good Earth. I think that Sy—I think that Sy had printed that, too. Had sent it back.

[Assistant] Did you know when you were reading it, the effect—I mean, did it have that effect on you all up there?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I think—On the good Earth. I think that Sy—I think that Sy had printed that, too. Had sent it back.

[Assistant] Did you know when you were reading it, the effect—I mean, did it have that effect on you all up there?

[User] Looking back at the Earth on Christmas Eve had a great effect, I think, on all three of us. I can only speak for myself. But it had for me. Because of the wonderment of it and the fact that the Earth looked so lonely in the universe. It’s the only thing with color. All of our emotions were focused back there with our families as well. So that was the most emotional part of the flight for me.

[Assistant] Speaking of that a little bit, I get the sense from—(again from reading some of the recollections, especially Bill Anders’ recollections), you know. He would’ve liked to look out the window a lot more; and you were like his taskmaster in a way.

[User] Well, he had a job to do. And again it gets back to, “Let’s do the mission.” And you know, we weren’t there simply as observers. We had a lot of job—Bill had a lot of jobs, and he did them very well. And, you know, I think he felt, “Well, you know, I don’t want to go to sleep here. We’re—” But by the same token, I wanted everybody alert so that we ended up getting home and that nobody fouled up their part of the procedures to get us home.

[Assistant] So you literally made him take a nap at one point, right?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Looking back at the Earth on Christmas Eve had a great effect, I think, on all three of us. I can only speak for myself. But it had for me. Because of the wonderment of it and the fact that the Earth looked so lonely in the universe. It’s the only thing with color. All of our emotions were focused back there with our families as well. So that was the most emotional part of the flight for me.

[Assistant] Speaking of that a little bit, I get the sense from—(again from reading some of the recollections, especially Bill Anders’ recollections), you know. He would’ve liked to look out the window a lot more; and you were like his taskmaster in a way.

[User] Well, he had a job to do. And again it gets back to, “Let’s do the mission.” And you know, we weren’t there simply as observers. We had a lot of job—Bill had a lot of jobs, and he did them very well. And, you know, I think he felt, “Well, you know, I don’t want to go to sleep here. We’re—” But by the same token, I wanted everybody alert so that we ended up getting home and that nobody fouled up their part of the procedures to get us home.

[Assistant] So you literally made him take a nap at one point, right?

[User] I sent him—yeah. We—I sent he and Jim underneath to get—they were making mistakes. They were getting tired.

[Assistant] Any other recollections from Apollo 8 that you didn’t necessarily include in your book? Stories you might’ve left out that [pauses].


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, he had a job to do. And again it gets back to, “Let’s do the mission.” And you know, we weren’t there simply as observers. We had a lot of job—Bill had a lot of jobs, and he did them very well. And, you know, I think he felt, “Well, you know, I don’t want to go to sleep here. We’re—” But by the same token, I wanted everybody alert so that we ended up getting home and that nobody fouled up their part of the procedures to get us home.

[Assistant] So you literally made him take a nap at one point, right?

[User] I sent him—yeah. We—I sent he and Jim underneath to get—they were making mistakes. They were getting tired.

[Assistant] Any other recollections from Apollo 8 that you didn’t necessarily include in your book? Stories you might’ve left out that [pauses].

[User] No. I think I may have put in the book, but one of the other things that always struck me was: when we were going over to—when I was going over to testify before Congress on the results of the investigation, I rode over with Mr. [James E.] Webb (Jim Webb), who was the Administrator of NASA. And I never will forget, he said, “Look, I don’t want you to do anything to try to protect me or to try to protect NASA. The American people have a right to know exactly the unvarnished truth, and you tell them.” That impressed me. I was going to do it anyway but here was the man—you know, I just don’t think that happens today. I can’t imagine the President today telling me to say the unvarnished truth to anything, when he’s such a liar himself!

[Assistant] Probably so. When your friend Jim Lovell went on to command Apollo 13 and all the problems happened, did you reflect back on your mission at all? Or—you said you left and never looked back. But he was a friend of yours obviously—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I sent him—yeah. We—I sent he and Jim underneath to get—they were making mistakes. They were getting tired.

[Assistant] Any other recollections from Apollo 8 that you didn’t necessarily include in your book? Stories you might’ve left out that [pauses].

[User] No. I think I may have put in the book, but one of the other things that always struck me was: when we were going over to—when I was going over to testify before Congress on the results of the investigation, I rode over with Mr. [James E.] Webb (Jim Webb), who was the Administrator of NASA. And I never will forget, he said, “Look, I don’t want you to do anything to try to protect me or to try to protect NASA. The American people have a right to know exactly the unvarnished truth, and you tell them.” That impressed me. I was going to do it anyway but here was the man—you know, I just don’t think that happens today. I can’t imagine the President today telling me to say the unvarnished truth to anything, when he’s such a liar himself!

[Assistant] Probably so. When your friend Jim Lovell went on to command Apollo 13 and all the problems happened, did you reflect back on your mission at all? Or—you said you left and never looked back. But he was a friend of yours obviously—

[User] A good friend. Still is.

[Assistant] —still is. Did it make you reflect on your mission and what if that had happened to—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] You know, I had a job then because the—no, that was Apollo 11. No, I—on Apollo 13, I was just a bystander. No, I did have a job in Apollo 13. Excuse me. I had—after Apollo 8, I had been assigned to the White House as liaison to prepare for Apollo 11. And so I got to know Mr. [President Richard M.] Nixon pretty well and the people up there.\n\n And on Apollo 13, Bob Gilruth called me and he said, “Look, we just got the word that the Vice President, [Spiro T.] Agnew, is coming down here.” He said, “That’s the last thing we need. We’ve got a problem. We don’t want all the press. We don’t want—” You know, Agnew was head of the [Space Task Group]. He said, “You’ve been up in the White House. Can’t you do anything? Please see if you can put him to put that off.” So I called Bob (oh, I’ve forgotten his name)—Bob—(What was Nixon’s right-hand man? the hatchet man?)

[Assistant] Halderman?

[User] Halderman.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] I called Bob Halderman. Thank you. And I explained the situation to him, and they stopped Agnew from taking off and sent him somewhere else. So I performed on Apollo 13. [laughs]

[Assistant] You were still with the Agency?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Halderman.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] I called Bob Halderman. Thank you. And I explained the situation to him, and they stopped Agnew from taking off and sent him somewhere else. So I performed on Apollo 13. [laughs]

[Assistant] You were still with the Agency?

[User] I was. Yeah.

[Assistant] Yeah, you were still with the Agency. Did it—did you reflect on what it would be like to be the astronaut in that experience?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I called Bob Halderman. Thank you. And I explained the situation to him, and they stopped Agnew from taking off and sent him somewhere else. So I performed on Apollo 13. [laughs]

[Assistant] You were still with the Agency?

[User] I was. Yeah.

[Assistant] Yeah, you were still with the Agency. Did it—did you reflect on what it would be like to be the astronaut in that experience?

[User] No. Oh I figured that, again, Lovell knew that thing. I had confidence in him, confidence in the people in the ground. If they could get them back, they’d get back. If they couldn’t, they’d be dead. It was as simple as that.

[Assistant] You know, Apollo 8 in many ways was a real gamble and it really took a lot of guts on the part of the team who said, “We’re going to go do this. And we’re going to try to get it done.” And many people feel that we really wouldn’t have made it to the Moon without doing that, that in some ways it was, like, the defining mission that made Apollo 11 possible. Did you have that sense at the time?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I—it wasn’t that I didn’t want to. But when you look at, again, who’s going to do the mission, the—I had never even been in the lunar simulator. I had—when all this was going on, I had been on that committee and then I’d been out at North American. I knew the—I think I knew the Apollo spacecraft as well as any other astronaut. I didn’t know a damn thing about the LM. And I’m not—I don’t recall Slayton ever discussing it with me. But I would’ve been flattered if he had. But I would’ve thought that there [would’ve] been better people, better prepared to do that—to do that.

[Assistant] Well, how did, then—you say you didn’t have a direct discussion about putting you in that role. But was it just the crew rotation that would have naturally put you in that role?

[User] The crew—No. The crew rotation, which was he had established and which he followed, put the backup crew in that role. [Neil A.] Armstrong was on that flight. And nobody knew for certain Apollo 11 was going to be the lunar lander. What if 9 would’ve fouled up? Or what if 10 would’ve fouled up?\n\n Deke established a rotation system. I was the backup on IV in Gemini, and I flew on VII. And Neil was the backup on 8 and he flew on 11.

[Assistant] You know, there’s always speculation about how did Neil Armstrong get picked to be—and you could say it was a quirk of fate, you know. And then some people say, “Well, he happened to be the only civilian astronaut at the time—”

[User] I think that’s nonsense. I think that Slayton looked at us all. I don’t think he knew whether we were military or civilians. I think Neil was picked because he was a competent guy, and he had a good team.

[Assistant] He’s a quiet astronaut.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I think that’s nonsense. I think that Slayton looked at us all. I don’t think he knew whether we were military or civilians. I think Neil was picked because he was a competent guy, and he had a good team.

[Assistant] He’s a quiet astronaut.

[User] He’s an introvert.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] An introvert. He’s much more intellectually curious than I am.

[Assistant] Were you surprised at terms of—you know, when we landed on the Moon. Where were you when we landed on the Moon?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] He’s an introvert.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] An introvert. He’s much more intellectually curious than I am.

[Assistant] Were you surprised at terms of—you know, when we landed on the Moon. Where were you when we landed on the Moon?

[User] I was with Mr. Nixon in the White House.

[Assistant] You were? And do you remember what your recollections were? And what the President thought?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] An introvert. He’s much more intellectually curious than I am.

[Assistant] Were you surprised at terms of—you know, when we landed on the Moon. Where were you when we landed on the Moon?

[User] I was with Mr. Nixon in the White House.

[Assistant] You were? And do you remember what your recollections were? And what the President thought?

[User] Well, it was a great euphoria. You know, he didn’t have else much—he was still getting battered over Vietnam and everything else was—this was before Watergate. But nevertheless, this was a very bright and shining plus for the American people. It was a happy time.

[Assistant] Were you surprised at—I mean, the reaction when they came home? I mean, it was—you know, they were heroes. And for many people, though, that’s probably the last astronauts they could name. You know, that after that—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I was with Mr. Nixon in the White House.

[Assistant] You were? And do you remember what your recollections were? And what the President thought?

[User] Well, it was a great euphoria. You know, he didn’t have else much—he was still getting battered over Vietnam and everything else was—this was before Watergate. But nevertheless, this was a very bright and shining plus for the American people. It was a happy time.

[Assistant] Were you surprised at—I mean, the reaction when they came home? I mean, it was—you know, they were heroes. And for many people, though, that’s probably the last astronauts they could name. You know, that after that—

[User] Well, [John H.] Glenn [Jr.]. I think they all could name Glenn.

[Assistant] Yeah, everybody can.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, it was a great euphoria. You know, he didn’t have else much—he was still getting battered over Vietnam and everything else was—this was before Watergate. But nevertheless, this was a very bright and shining plus for the American people. It was a happy time.

[Assistant] Were you surprised at—I mean, the reaction when they came home? I mean, it was—you know, they were heroes. And for many people, though, that’s probably the last astronauts they could name. You know, that after that—

[User] Well, [John H.] Glenn [Jr.]. I think they all could name Glenn.

[Assistant] Yeah, everybody can.

[User] And [Alan B.] Shepard [Jr.] I guess, maybe.

[Assistant] But—because he hit a golf ball on the Moon? Do you think maybe that’s why—?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, [John H.] Glenn [Jr.]. I think they all could name Glenn.

[Assistant] Yeah, everybody can.

[User] And [Alan B.] Shepard [Jr.] I guess, maybe.

[Assistant] But—because he hit a golf ball on the Moon? Do you think maybe that’s why—?

[User] Because—I hope it was because he was the first man in space—American in space.

[Assistant] Yeah, I would hope so, too.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Because—I hope it was because he was the first man in space—American in space.

[Assistant] Yeah, I would hope so, too.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] But—

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] —the point is, that you had brought up earlier, about how after we went to the Moon it was all over for you.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] But—

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] —the point is, that you had brought up earlier, about how after we went to the Moon it was all over for you.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] And in many ways, it was for the American public. I remember Chris Kraft telling me once that he knew it was all over when he looked at his little monitor in Mission Control and we were driving on the Moon for the first time. And he looked over at the networks, and they were all still showing soap operas.