[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] [19]’59.

[Assistant] In 195—

[User] In ’58. That was when I came with the Alpha Draco in ’58.

[Assistant] And you were with McDonnell?

[User] Yes. I stayed with McDonnell—

[Assistant] It wasn’t even McDonnell Douglas at the time.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] In ’58. That was when I came with the Alpha Draco in ’58.

[Assistant] And you were with McDonnell?

[User] Yes. I stayed with McDonnell—

[Assistant] It wasn’t even McDonnell Douglas at the time.

[User] No, no.

[Assistant] It was McDonnell Aircraft Corporation.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. I stayed with McDonnell—

[Assistant] It wasn’t even McDonnell Douglas at the time.

[User] No, no.

[Assistant] It was McDonnell Aircraft Corporation.

[User] Right, and—

[Assistant] What was your first job with—for them here?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, no.

[Assistant] It was McDonnell Aircraft Corporation.

[User] Right, and—

[Assistant] What was your first job with—for them here?

[User] Now that was again, I was the—Okay, we had an interesting thing. I was supposed to be responsible for the pad operations for the spacecraft. Now you’re going to realize all through my active career I had very little to do with the boosters or the rockets itself. In other words, I knew the basic fundamentals of it but I had no input as to what they did, how they did, or when they did. So essentially I was responsible for the spacecraft preparations for launch. In other words, once a spacecraft hit the Cape, then we had to coordinate who wants to do what or who must do what from the time it got here until we launched it. That was my job—

[Assistant] And this was Mercury.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, he said that, “This is a chance that you take, but you try to avoid taking it.” In other words, I mean—you try to get away all the things that could leave you in that predicament. And by the way, the boy, when he found out John was one of the seven, he said, “Oh, oh, where’s a hole I can climb into?”\n\n But this is again, you know, John was very, very much people oriented. I mean, he was great as a matter of fact. He had a patience that I wouldn’t have had. We were having dinner, his family and [M.] Scott Carpenter and so on, at the Holiday Inn at that time, and a fellow came up to him and shot the—during the dinner shot a picture and said, “Hey, sign this” you know. And I was going to tell the fellow what he could do with the picture. But John says , “Okay,” and he signed it. I said, “John, I think I could have told him what he can do with the picture.” He says, “Guenter,” he says, “that goes with the job.” So he was always that way that oriented. And it was interesting to work with him. He went sometimes farther than the other astronauts who thought that time was precious and you have to use every minute of it for whatever comes along. But not John.

[Assistant] Well, as pad—as pad leader—

[User] Okay, we had—

[Assistant] —in charge of pad operations, I’m curious, because this is a job that no one had done before.

[User] No.

[Assistant] It didn’t exist before, to be responsible for launching humans into space. So how did you kind of create your own job description?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. So see, these are the things that you learn and you find out and you try to, see, make provisions for that.

[Assistant] But did your family know how dangerous it was?

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] Or did you—? They did.

[User] There was no question about it. The same way I always made it a habit of, for each crew that flew in Apollo, I had their families come up and look at the spacecraft before they went. I showed them what it looks like, what it is, so that they had a good idea as to what it is their husbands get into. Now you have to be realistic about it. I mean, this is the thing you volunteer for it, and that goes with it.

[Assistant] Well let me throw in a question here, just because of something you just said. Their husbands climbing in. In the beginning, it was all men. You had daughters. I mean, how did you think about when the idea of women coming into it and doing that what all the men did in the beginning?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No. No they left them.

[Assistant] You’d just present it and then you take it down.

[User] The suit techs would take it back and it would then go to Houston [Texas] for them when they came back, you know. No, you couldn’t put anything in the spacecraft because we controlled very tightly what was going in the spacecraft. With the exception of the PPKs, which is the personal preference kit, you know little bags on the side of where the astronaut could elect things that they wanted to take, like medallions or—

[Assistant] What have you heard, or what do you know first-hand is one of the strangest things that ever flew along that somebody wouldn’t think would’ve been on a spacecraft?

[User] Oh in—I don’t know how many went along, but in Gemini, we had a bunch of ants in the spacecraft, which we had a heck of a time trying to get them out. We don’t even know how they got in there. But can you imagine ants? And anyhow, but that was probably one of the strangest—I’m not sure what other strange things went along.

[Assistant] That the astronauts might’ve taken?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The suit techs would take it back and it would then go to Houston [Texas] for them when they came back, you know. No, you couldn’t put anything in the spacecraft because we controlled very tightly what was going in the spacecraft. With the exception of the PPKs, which is the personal preference kit, you know little bags on the side of where the astronaut could elect things that they wanted to take, like medallions or—

[Assistant] What have you heard, or what do you know first-hand is one of the strangest things that ever flew along that somebody wouldn’t think would’ve been on a spacecraft?

[User] Oh in—I don’t know how many went along, but in Gemini, we had a bunch of ants in the spacecraft, which we had a heck of a time trying to get them out. We don’t even know how they got in there. But can you imagine ants? And anyhow, but that was probably one of the strangest—I’m not sure what other strange things went along.

[Assistant] That the astronauts might’ve taken?

[User] Now, see that was—normally we kept that pretty quiet. As a matter of fact, on 11 I had a little opal I wanted to send along for my wife. I asked Neil if he would take it. But in order to do that, I had to put the opal in plastic. I had to run it through a vacuum chamber to evacuate it. I had to expose it for 24 hours, 100% oxygen atmosphere. Make sure we run it through a spectrometer that it didn’t outgas anything. Because you had to be very, very careful what you took along because, yeah, it was touchy. You didn’t want to have anything detrimental to the health of the crew. So, it was very, very thought of as to what they would take along. Normally what they would take in the PPK was cleared and manifested with the Chief of the Astronaut Office.

[Assistant] Now, you brought up Apollo 11. What was that like, to close out, and you think, “They’re going to the Moon. I mean, they’re going to the Moon!”


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s the way it goes, you see. I mean, these were the 120 seconds I told you. If nothing went wrong, we had a 120 seconds to exchange little gifts.

[Assistant] So that you would—sometimes you would carry out a gotcha during that time.

[User] Yes. You see, that’s the same thing with that fish that came up on Apollo 11. The most important flight. We had [Neil A.] Armstrong, he gave me a coupon for a ride between any two planets, anytime I want to, you know? So, and [Edwin E. "Buzz"] Aldrin [Jr.] he had gotten me a copy of (it’s right in that cabinet there)—of Good News for Modern Man: A Condensed Version of the Bible. And I told him, I said, as a—his dad had donated it to a Presbyterian church in Houston. I said, “You were too cheap to buy one. You had to get one from those things back.” Anyhow, so it’s autographed there. And then when [Michael] Collins’ turn came to get in, he had a brown paper bag, illegal as you know what, in the white room. And out of it comes that fish you see up on the wall there. And he said—See, I used to go and take the astronauts fishing when they were in quarantine, and we would go water skiing and things like that. And he says, “Hey, at your house I’ve never seen a big trophy trout or trophy fish on your wall. You need one.” So now we have a trophy trout. Now there’s three things wrong: Illegal size. Not cleaned. And not preserved.

[Assistant] It was a live fish?

[User] It was—

[Assistant] It was a dead fish.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. You see, that’s the same thing with that fish that came up on Apollo 11. The most important flight. We had [Neil A.] Armstrong, he gave me a coupon for a ride between any two planets, anytime I want to, you know? So, and [Edwin E. "Buzz"] Aldrin [Jr.] he had gotten me a copy of (it’s right in that cabinet there)—of Good News for Modern Man: A Condensed Version of the Bible. And I told him, I said, as a—his dad had donated it to a Presbyterian church in Houston. I said, “You were too cheap to buy one. You had to get one from those things back.” Anyhow, so it’s autographed there. And then when [Michael] Collins’ turn came to get in, he had a brown paper bag, illegal as you know what, in the white room. And out of it comes that fish you see up on the wall there. And he said—See, I used to go and take the astronauts fishing when they were in quarantine, and we would go water skiing and things like that. And he says, “Hey, at your house I’ve never seen a big trophy trout or trophy fish on your wall. You need one.” So now we have a trophy trout. Now there’s three things wrong: Illegal size. Not cleaned. And not preserved.

[Assistant] It was a live fish?

[User] It was—

[Assistant] It was a dead fish.

[User] No, it was frozen, ja.

[Assistant] A frozen fish.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, it was frozen, ja.

[Assistant] A frozen fish.

[User] As a matter of fact of all the things in my life people had gotten those things for them the night before launch, out of the Banana River. And then the food techs had collaborated to go ahead, freeze it, and just stick it on the board. So for 22 years it stuck in my freezer, until I found somebody to freeze-dry it; and now I can hang it up on the wall.

[Assistant] That’s amazing.

[User] So these were little things—if we had the time, then we could do that. To break the tension.

[Assistant] Now the answer to this might be one of the stories you’ve already told me. But, what was your favorite gotcha that somebody did to you and that you did to an astronaut?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] As a matter of fact of all the things in my life people had gotten those things for them the night before launch, out of the Banana River. And then the food techs had collaborated to go ahead, freeze it, and just stick it on the board. So for 22 years it stuck in my freezer, until I found somebody to freeze-dry it; and now I can hang it up on the wall.

[Assistant] That’s amazing.

[User] So these were little things—if we had the time, then we could do that. To break the tension.

[Assistant] Now the answer to this might be one of the stories you’ve already told me. But, what was your favorite gotcha that somebody did to you and that you did to an astronaut?

[User] I don’t know. It was lots of going back and forth. You always had that back and forth. I don’t think there was any favorite one. I think the one that got me the most was that live snake, because that was really something.

[Assistant] It scared you.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] So these were little things—if we had the time, then we could do that. To break the tension.

[Assistant] Now the answer to this might be one of the stories you’ve already told me. But, what was your favorite gotcha that somebody did to you and that you did to an astronaut?

[User] I don’t know. It was lots of going back and forth. You always had that back and forth. I don’t think there was any favorite one. I think the one that got me the most was that live snake, because that was really something.

[Assistant] It scared you.

[User] Because in here, in Florida, a snake is something you always worry about.

[Assistant] Well, I’m going to ask you about, actually, you know, earlier you were talking about the checkout at the pad and that preflight checklist. And you kind of went through a few of the procedures. I’m curious: Do you still remember the preflight checklist? I mean, can you, like, go through it in your mind? And do you find yourself—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I don’t know. It was lots of going back and forth. You always had that back and forth. I don’t think there was any favorite one. I think the one that got me the most was that live snake, because that was really something.

[Assistant] It scared you.

[User] Because in here, in Florida, a snake is something you always worry about.

[Assistant] Well, I’m going to ask you about, actually, you know, earlier you were talking about the checkout at the pad and that preflight checklist. And you kind of went through a few of the procedures. I’m curious: Do you still remember the preflight checklist? I mean, can you, like, go through it in your mind? And do you find yourself—

[User] I have one right here. I mean—

[Assistant] But do you play it over and over in your mind? And—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Because in here, in Florida, a snake is something you always worry about.

[Assistant] Well, I’m going to ask you about, actually, you know, earlier you were talking about the checkout at the pad and that preflight checklist. And you kind of went through a few of the procedures. I’m curious: Do you still remember the preflight checklist? I mean, can you, like, go through it in your mind? And do you find yourself—

[User] I have one right here. I mean—

[Assistant] But do you play it over and over in your mind? And—

[User] Not anymore. Because we knew the major things we had to do—But the individual steps, which step number it was, and which valve it is—As a matter of fact—I had a hard time because, again, when we did that scene at the white room, Tom [Hanks] says, “Hey, I want to have the correct pressure reading on the cabin pressure gauge.” I didn’t know what it was. So I had to get back to find my ECS [Environmental Control Systems] engineer. I says , “What was the actual reading we had?” Well then we had to set that gauge right. And that’s how accurate he wanted to have that stuff done.

[Assistant] So you used your preflight checklist when you were a consultant on From Earth to the Moon?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I have one right here. I mean—

[Assistant] But do you play it over and over in your mind? And—

[User] Not anymore. Because we knew the major things we had to do—But the individual steps, which step number it was, and which valve it is—As a matter of fact—I had a hard time because, again, when we did that scene at the white room, Tom [Hanks] says, “Hey, I want to have the correct pressure reading on the cabin pressure gauge.” I didn’t know what it was. So I had to get back to find my ECS [Environmental Control Systems] engineer. I says , “What was the actual reading we had?” Well then we had to set that gauge right. And that’s how accurate he wanted to have that stuff done.

[Assistant] So you used your preflight checklist when you were a consultant on From Earth to the Moon?

[User] Oh yeah. And not just that. I mean, I had about 8 or 10 books over there. It’s not just a preflight checklist. I mean, we did certain things. —Like for instance, how did we position the M-113s on the pad? You know. And how did we do this? And in the cabinet there behind me, see, I have about 1000 pictures yet and so on that you had to go back and—. Let me show you something there. Hand me that light book there for a second.\n\n Okay. See, here is the real script. By the way, every time you see a revision, see, the color changes for a revision. And then in reviewing the stuff—. Okay. See, then they use certain aspects of it. Like for instance, we were talking about when—after we did that, he said. Wally Schirra talks to me, and he says, “Hey, the elevator is malfunctioning.” I said, “That isn’t what he said. He said, ‘The elevator crapped out,’ —” See that’s the way—

[Assistant] Did they write in your change to “crapped out?”


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s now during the later—that was before I retired.

[Assistant] Did you—do you think that that’s some of the climate that led to\n\n Challenger\n\n ?

[User] No. The\n\n Challenger\n\n , I mean, in my book is—The biggest mistake made was when a bureaucrat overrules the chief engineer. The chief engineer of Thiokol had recommended not to fly and he wouldn’t sign the paper for readiness for flight. But then the vice president decided that he would sign the paper, “Ready for flight.” Now as a technical person, if you overrule your chief engineer, you’d better think twice and find out why he doesn’t want to have that paper signed. Well, there’s one of the biggest things.

[Assistant] I guess I meant the climate within NASA, though, that led to the fact that there was this underlying problem in the first place and that feeling of not—

[User] Now, there again you’re getting into an area where individual centers have their individual kingdom. And anytime you run into a bureaucracy, you have situations which you don’t really care for. But—

[Assistant] You mean Marshall?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No. The\n\n Challenger\n\n , I mean, in my book is—The biggest mistake made was when a bureaucrat overrules the chief engineer. The chief engineer of Thiokol had recommended not to fly and he wouldn’t sign the paper for readiness for flight. But then the vice president decided that he would sign the paper, “Ready for flight.” Now as a technical person, if you overrule your chief engineer, you’d better think twice and find out why he doesn’t want to have that paper signed. Well, there’s one of the biggest things.

[Assistant] I guess I meant the climate within NASA, though, that led to the fact that there was this underlying problem in the first place and that feeling of not—

[User] Now, there again you’re getting into an area where individual centers have their individual kingdom. And anytime you run into a bureaucracy, you have situations which you don’t really care for. But—

[Assistant] You mean Marshall?

[User] Marshall, right. And you have it again. I mean, sometimes with Houston, with Kennedy, with Marshall. Each one has their budget. Each one has their pet project. Each one’s the ones that do that. And there is a competition which may not necessarily be the best for the program. So you have to worry about that. But, luckily I didn’t have to play that game, even though I was accused that I completely disregarded who I was working for. But that didn’t mean anything.

[Assistant] Well, let’s talk about who you were working for. Because you know many people would look at your career and just assume you’re NASA. And you never worked for NASA.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Now, there again you’re getting into an area where individual centers have their individual kingdom. And anytime you run into a bureaucracy, you have situations which you don’t really care for. But—

[Assistant] You mean Marshall?

[User] Marshall, right. And you have it again. I mean, sometimes with Houston, with Kennedy, with Marshall. Each one has their budget. Each one has their pet project. Each one’s the ones that do that. And there is a competition which may not necessarily be the best for the program. So you have to worry about that. But, luckily I didn’t have to play that game, even though I was accused that I completely disregarded who I was working for. But that didn’t mean anything.

[Assistant] Well, let’s talk about who you were working for. Because you know many people would look at your career and just assume you’re NASA. And you never worked for NASA.

[User] I never worked for NASA.

[Assistant] You always worked for contractors.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Marshall, right. And you have it again. I mean, sometimes with Houston, with Kennedy, with Marshall. Each one has their budget. Each one has their pet project. Each one’s the ones that do that. And there is a competition which may not necessarily be the best for the program. So you have to worry about that. But, luckily I didn’t have to play that game, even though I was accused that I completely disregarded who I was working for. But that didn’t mean anything.

[Assistant] Well, let’s talk about who you were working for. Because you know many people would look at your career and just assume you’re NASA. And you never worked for NASA.

[User] I never worked for NASA.

[Assistant] You always worked for contractors.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] Did—how—what was that relationship like? I mean, and describe it to me in terms of what it was back then versus the contractor/NASA relationship today. And how you interacted with your NASA counterparts.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I said, “You didn’t have a piece of paper to even attach that plastic.” And he looked at me—

[Assistant] What kind of spacecraft was it?

[User] An Apollo spacecraft.

[Assistant] Apollo.

[User] And see, he knew that’s the way it is. But if I had gone strictly by the rules, I couldn’t put that plastic on the spacecraft without a piece of paper. I had no signatures. I had no authorization. I had nothing. But I had a leak in the roof. You see, this is when you have to go ahead and make exceptions.

[Assistant] And what did he say to you?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] An Apollo spacecraft.

[Assistant] Apollo.

[User] And see, he knew that’s the way it is. But if I had gone strictly by the rules, I couldn’t put that plastic on the spacecraft without a piece of paper. I had no signatures. I had no authorization. I had nothing. But I had a leak in the roof. You see, this is when you have to go ahead and make exceptions.

[Assistant] And what did he say to you?

[User] He said, “I won’t bug you again.”

[Assistant] What was the last flight that you served in your capacity as pad leader? I mean, what—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] He said, “I won’t bug you again.”

[Assistant] What was the last flight that you served in your capacity as pad leader? I mean, what—

[User] The ASTP—the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] Okay. And then I did the same functions when we did the approach and landing test at Edwards.

[Assistant] Okay. But when you did the Apollo-Soyuz, did you know that going in that that was going to be your last time as pad leader?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The ASTP—the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] Okay. And then I did the same functions when we did the approach and landing test at Edwards.

[Assistant] Okay. But when you did the Apollo-Soyuz, did you know that going in that that was going to be your last time as pad leader?

[User] Oh yeah, I would assume that because, see, then we didn’t have anything left to go on.

[Assistant] Right. I mean, what were your feelings then, thinking, “Wow, this could be the last time,” and—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I wouldn’t tell you the name. I know who it was. You’ll probably know it, too. [Richard] Gephardt.

[Assistant] So after, you know, Apollo—

[User] Okay. So then I went to Edwards for what was supposed to be 1 year, and then 2 years, and I was responsible for the Orbiter preparations for the test and for bringing it back… In other words, I had a—

[Assistant] For Shuttle.

[User] Yeah, the Shuttle. Ja. The Orbiter.

[Assistant] Right. I know.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah, the Shuttle. Ja. The Orbiter.

[Assistant] Right. I know.

[User] Right. Shuttle is the whole thing.

[Assistant] Right.

[User] So okay, and—because the Air Force was very touchy about, you know, that we had ammonia on board and so on. We had to taxi by the thing plus the fact I had to go out and I had to—they had to do the flight control system—the ailerons and the rudder. But they couldn’t see it. So when they were on the runway, just before takeoff, you know, we would give them a go ahead. We had to power up the APUs [Auxiliary Power Units]— which run on hydrazine. They’re on—Ja, on hydrazine. And then we would do the 20 degree, 30 degree, you know, right rudder, left rudder, left rudder, and so on. And I would tell him that everything is okay. Then I would wait on the runway when they came back and see if we had any leaks and so on and clear them to go past the Air Force hangars to go back to our hangar. That was during the Shuttle Program.

[Assistant] And those were, like, approach and landing tests?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right. Shuttle is the whole thing.

[Assistant] Right.

[User] So okay, and—because the Air Force was very touchy about, you know, that we had ammonia on board and so on. We had to taxi by the thing plus the fact I had to go out and I had to—they had to do the flight control system—the ailerons and the rudder. But they couldn’t see it. So when they were on the runway, just before takeoff, you know, we would give them a go ahead. We had to power up the APUs [Auxiliary Power Units]— which run on hydrazine. They’re on—Ja, on hydrazine. And then we would do the 20 degree, 30 degree, you know, right rudder, left rudder, left rudder, and so on. And I would tell him that everything is okay. Then I would wait on the runway when they came back and see if we had any leaks and so on and clear them to go past the Air Force hangars to go back to our hangar. That was during the Shuttle Program.

[Assistant] And those were, like, approach and landing tests?

[User] That was the so-called approach and landing test, ja. You remember where we took the Shuttle and we dropped it off the 747.

[Assistant] What did you think, I mean? When you see, you know, such a different vehicle than what you were used to? I mean, what did you just think? That your career had spanned such technological development.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] So okay, and—because the Air Force was very touchy about, you know, that we had ammonia on board and so on. We had to taxi by the thing plus the fact I had to go out and I had to—they had to do the flight control system—the ailerons and the rudder. But they couldn’t see it. So when they were on the runway, just before takeoff, you know, we would give them a go ahead. We had to power up the APUs [Auxiliary Power Units]— which run on hydrazine. They’re on—Ja, on hydrazine. And then we would do the 20 degree, 30 degree, you know, right rudder, left rudder, left rudder, and so on. And I would tell him that everything is okay. Then I would wait on the runway when they came back and see if we had any leaks and so on and clear them to go past the Air Force hangars to go back to our hangar. That was during the Shuttle Program.

[Assistant] And those were, like, approach and landing tests?

[User] That was the so-called approach and landing test, ja. You remember where we took the Shuttle and we dropped it off the 747.

[Assistant] What did you think, I mean? When you see, you know, such a different vehicle than what you were used to? I mean, what did you just think? That your career had spanned such technological development.

[User] I don’t know. I never like to stand still. As a matter of fact, to be real honest, I was tired of doing back to the Moon. It was just more of the same. You want to do something else. You want to go farther— You want to do—You know, if you just do the same thing, I wasn’t too great for that, to doing the same thing.

[Assistant] Did you want to—I mean, you still worked for Rockwell when the first Shuttle launched. Did you—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That was the so-called approach and landing test, ja. You remember where we took the Shuttle and we dropped it off the 747.

[Assistant] What did you think, I mean? When you see, you know, such a different vehicle than what you were used to? I mean, what did you just think? That your career had spanned such technological development.

[User] I don’t know. I never like to stand still. As a matter of fact, to be real honest, I was tired of doing back to the Moon. It was just more of the same. You want to do something else. You want to go farther— You want to do—You know, if you just do the same thing, I wasn’t too great for that, to doing the same thing.

[Assistant] Did you want to—I mean, you still worked for Rockwell when the first Shuttle launched. Did you—

[User] Oh yeah, I worked for them until [19]’89.

[Assistant] I mean, what did you think when the first Shuttle launched in the early ’80s? Did you want to—Did you say, Oh I want to get back in there? I noticed there was a picture that said Bob [Robert L.] Crippen said he looked forward to when you could strap him into the Space Shuttle.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh yeah, I worked for them until [19]’89.

[Assistant] I mean, what did you think when the first Shuttle launched in the early ’80s? Did you want to—Did you say, Oh I want to get back in there? I noticed there was a picture that said Bob [Robert L.] Crippen said he looked forward to when you could strap him into the Space Shuttle.

[User] Yeah I know. Bob also flew in the approach and landing test.

[Assistant] Right.

[User] But, no. By that time, there was some or other strong controversy between the top management and myself about—and—as a matter of fact, the local head of Rockwell said I would never make it back to the Cape. But then some way it got interfered with, and I was back at the Cape. So that was a little sideline. But I then wound up in the safety program, as I was looking at flight crew safety and developing procedures—for flight crew.

[Assistant] But do you think that times had changed? I mean, I—you’ve talked about how you ran a pad operation.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah I know. Bob also flew in the approach and landing test.

[Assistant] Right.

[User] But, no. By that time, there was some or other strong controversy between the top management and myself about—and—as a matter of fact, the local head of Rockwell said I would never make it back to the Cape. But then some way it got interfered with, and I was back at the Cape. So that was a little sideline. But I then wound up in the safety program, as I was looking at flight crew safety and developing procedures—for flight crew.

[Assistant] But do you think that times had changed? I mean, I—you’ve talked about how you ran a pad operation.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Do you think the times changed and kind of—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] But, no. By that time, there was some or other strong controversy between the top management and myself about—and—as a matter of fact, the local head of Rockwell said I would never make it back to the Cape. But then some way it got interfered with, and I was back at the Cape. So that was a little sideline. But I then wound up in the safety program, as I was looking at flight crew safety and developing procedures—for flight crew.

[Assistant] But do you think that times had changed? I mean, I—you’ve talked about how you ran a pad operation.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Do you think the times changed and kind of—

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] You wouldn’t have fit in with the Shuttle being out there saying, “I’m running this at the pad.”


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Now, to begin with you need to understand: Even the first Shuttle flight, we had a heck of a time getting it off. I mean, we had so many problems with the Shuttle—and so on that we really had to work hard. And so on. And I was pretty much in the part of solving problems. And I got again criticized for talking directly to NASA and solving the problems—And they said, “Hey, you talk to NASA?” I said, “Yeah, we had a problem. I talked to the guy here. We agreed we could do it that way, so we did.” “Oh, you shouldn’t talk to him. I mean, if O’Malley hears about it, he’s going to fly off the roof, you know.” And see, I couldn’t stomach that quite a bit.\n\n There are people too much concerned with what the image is or what this is or what that is. It is not a coherent operation like we used to do it. In other words, right now if there is a problem we’d rather form a committee to solve the problem. I’d like to go back to the thing: You and I sign the paper, and it’s our tail end if this goes up. Okay? Then you know you are responsible for it. I know I am responsible for it.

[Assistant] What did you think when you watched\n\n Challenger\n\n ? I mean, did you know right away?

[User] Yes, I knew when I saw it. I knew what—

[Assistant] What did—

[User] I didn’t know why it happened—when I saw it go bad.

[Assistant] What did you think?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, I knew when I saw it. I knew what—

[Assistant] What did—

[User] I didn’t know why it happened—when I saw it go bad.

[Assistant] What did you think?

[User] And I immediately think about the people, and then you have some other thoughts because, see, I knew what can transpire in the crew compartment, okay? And what—later on I was on the investigation with it—And primarily crew activities and crew things. So I knew what actually happened.\n\n And here again, I mean, there were about seven people of us who knew quite a bit. And we agreed we wouldn’t talk, except to the families if they asked us. But then some joker eventually got a piece of paper and publicized it in the—on the press or so, which is ridiculous because there was—there were many unwritten laws. Because there were certain things you did not talk about. And now it is more or less: it’s a job. You know, it’s no longer the dedication. I mean the guy looked at it and [said], “Hey, man, it’s a quarter to 4. Forget it,” he says, “I’m going off at 4 o’clock.” He doesn’t give a damn what happens after 4 o’clock. There are not—I mean, there are some good people there.\n\n I mean, don’t get me wrong. But with all the layoffs, everybody worries about, “Oh man, if I say there is something wrong, hey, I’m going to get fired. Or if I do something wrong, I’m going to get fired.” And you can’t operate that way.

[Assistant] Did—what do you think the impact\n\n Challenger\n\n had on just the morale of people that you worked with and—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And you need at least 2 minutes for seven people.

[Assistant] Tell me the story about the test with that pole, that you were in Houston and you—

[User] Well, that was just another one of those things—where I got involved in it because of the past experience. I don’t want to dwell on it very much. That people says that I had done most of the—even during the Shuttle, the pad operations, the emergency egress test, I had written a lot of them and I had a conducted a lot of them— And we always would play different games. In other words, come up with a different scenario to make sure the crew had to respond to it correctly. That was one of the biggest things I did in the Shuttle Program, to worry about the egress test that we had. But that was only during pad operations. See? There is no—much you can do after your liftoff.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] And most people don’t realize that either.

[Assistant] The—did you leave Rockwell? I mean, in—did you retire after the return to flight?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And most people don’t realize that either.

[Assistant] The—did you leave Rockwell? I mean, in—did you retire after the return to flight?

[User] Oh I retired in [19]’89.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] Ja, ja. No, we had quite a few flights after that.

[Assistant] Right. What would—what did you think, I mean—I assume you watched the return to flight right here from Florida. And what did you think then? That—you know, you’d gone through the Apollo 1 fire, not working for the company involved but you’d seen that and you’d seen the recovery from that. Did you think it would take 2 years to recover from\n\n Challenger\n\n before they’d fly again?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh I retired in [19]’89.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] Ja, ja. No, we had quite a few flights after that.

[Assistant] Right. What would—what did you think, I mean—I assume you watched the return to flight right here from Florida. And what did you think then? That—you know, you’d gone through the Apollo 1 fire, not working for the company involved but you’d seen that and you’d seen the recovery from that. Did you think it would take 2 years to recover from\n\n Challenger\n\n before they’d fly again?

[User] Oh I would think yes. But the main things which bothered me was, all the help you got from politicians and non-technical people. In other words, there were so many restrictions, so many conditions put on which are unnecessary—that actually had became more of a hindering block than a contributing factor. So, even today it is—a lot of decisions are made more at the political level than at the technical level.

[Assistant] When did you receive your Silver Snoopy Award? I see it hanging up there.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Ja, ja. No, we had quite a few flights after that.

[Assistant] Right. What would—what did you think, I mean—I assume you watched the return to flight right here from Florida. And what did you think then? That—you know, you’d gone through the Apollo 1 fire, not working for the company involved but you’d seen that and you’d seen the recovery from that. Did you think it would take 2 years to recover from\n\n Challenger\n\n before they’d fly again?

[User] Oh I would think yes. But the main things which bothered me was, all the help you got from politicians and non-technical people. In other words, there were so many restrictions, so many conditions put on which are unnecessary—that actually had became more of a hindering block than a contributing factor. So, even today it is—a lot of decisions are made more at the political level than at the technical level.

[Assistant] When did you receive your Silver Snoopy Award? I see it hanging up there.

[User] Oh, John Young gave that to me. It was ’87 or somewhere—’86 or ’87, I’m not sure. I’ll have to look at the date.

[Assistant] And, you know, that award always means a lot because it’s presented by the astronauts for kind of exceptional service. What did you receive it for?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh I would think yes. But the main things which bothered me was, all the help you got from politicians and non-technical people. In other words, there were so many restrictions, so many conditions put on which are unnecessary—that actually had became more of a hindering block than a contributing factor. So, even today it is—a lot of decisions are made more at the political level than at the technical level.

[Assistant] When did you receive your Silver Snoopy Award? I see it hanging up there.

[User] Oh, John Young gave that to me. It was ’87 or somewhere—’86 or ’87, I’m not sure. I’ll have to look at the date.

[Assistant] And, you know, that award always means a lot because it’s presented by the astronauts for kind of exceptional service. What did you receive it for?

[User] Yes. Well, it says right there.

[Assistant] My eyes aren’t that good.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh, John Young gave that to me. It was ’87 or somewhere—’86 or ’87, I’m not sure. I’ll have to look at the date.

[Assistant] And, you know, that award always means a lot because it’s presented by the astronauts for kind of exceptional service. What did you receive it for?

[User] Yes. Well, it says right there.

[Assistant] My eyes aren’t that good.

[User] Okay. They realized that I contributed over many, many years to the safety of the flight crews and to the success of their operations. In other words, I did not have a scrub that was blamed on us. I did not have a failure that was blamed on the pad operations and so on. So that was pretty much appreciated. And that was the reason that I was able to disregard a lot of rules and regulations, because I had a tremendous support from the flight crews. In other words, if I couldn’t get through to some people I would just go to the flight crews. I says , “Hey, there is something you—there is a question you may want to ask at the flight readiness review and see what kind of an answer you get.”

[Assistant] What do you think is different about that relationship now between the folks who serve in your role now with the astronauts at the pad?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] They don’t have the close contact anymore. I mean, they—right now you see the flight crews for egress test, for a CDDT [Countdown Demonstration Test], and for launch. See, all major test in Mercury and Apollo and Gemini were where the flight crew participated. See, you had a flight crew and you had a backup crew. You either saw one or the other. But it was a daily basis. They were here every day. Every time you ran a test, they were there.\n\n In Mercury and even in Gemini, they went to the home plant and they watched the spacecraft being built. Once you were assigned to it—it became your spacecraft. And the same way, I mean, the technicians were very, very much attached to a spacecraft. See like for example, in Apollo we had one in the hangar and one on the pad. Now there was a lot of competition. I mean, these people, they said, “Don’t you touch my spacecraft!” It was their spacecraft. See, and it was their crew. So it made quite a difference. Right now, once they fly, you don’t see them anywhere. I mean, it’s—maybe you see them on TV. There is—the interaction is not there anymore.

[Assistant] I take it you don’t think that’s necessarily a good thing.

[User] No. I would have liked them—maybe there’s a necessity with all the things that go on— The payload specialist. What I would have liked pretty much, the—at least the commander and the pilot and maybe the mission specialist, the three key people, that they would spend more time in the trenches. What I call “in the trenches.”

[Assistant] At the Cape.

[User] At the Cape, right. That’s when—I mean, that’s my own personal opinion.

[Assistant] Do any stories about particular astronauts that kind of stick in your mind that you think, “Oh if future generations are looking at this tape, many years from now,” you think, “boy they really need to know this story.”


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] So—

[Assistant] Need a glass of water?

[User] Oh probably.

[Assistant] That would probably help. Why don’t we let him get it?\n\n All right, the first one. When you look back over your career, what do you think? I mean, we were just talking about the what did the American public get out of the sacrifices that you made? You talked—you worked 7 weeks in a row once without a day off.

[User] I know, but—

[Assistant] Your family sacrificed. What did we all get out of that? When—in your own words, what do you think it all meant? For our society, to have gone and done this.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh, I think I probably got my reward when I retired. They just about—all the people that worked for me told me I was not the most lovable character, but they always would like to work for me because I was fair and I was easy to work with in that regard. So, and for myself I said, I always set out to find a job I liked to do and then do it. It isn’t work. It is really something you like to do.\n\n When I used to go recruiting in colleges, I always told the graduates, I says , “Don’t take a job because it pays well. Take a job you like because if you like what you’re doing, you’re going to be great at it.” That’s the way I like to look at it. I don’t look at myself as being anything extraordinary. I was very, very fortunate enough, having survived World War II, having coming over here, having found a job I like to do and got paid for it. So, I mean, what more can you ask? So I’m very happy.\n\n As a matter of fact, a little side stories: Wernher von Braun became a good friend of mine. At one time early in the program I asked him, I said, “Wernher, I don’t like rumors. And I have a rumor, and I’d like you to say Yes or No.” He said, “What’s the rumor?” I said, “Rumor has it that General Motors offered you $500,000 to come to work for them and you turned them down. True or false?” [phone rings] He said—

[Assistant] Oops.

[User] Oh excuse me.

[Assistant] The last story. I just want—And actually I’ll have you start. Tell me about the Guenter—I mean, tell me the story with Wernher von Braun.

[User] Oh.

[Assistant] And that’s the one.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh excuse me.

[Assistant] The last story. I just want—And actually I’ll have you start. Tell me about the Guenter—I mean, tell me the story with Wernher von Braun.

[User] Oh.

[Assistant] And that’s the one.

[User] Okay. So I asked him, I said, “True or false?” He says, “True.” He says, “They offered me $500,000 to come to work for them.” And I said, “Now, wait a minute.” I said, “You’re making $36,000 a year.” That was the highest pay for NASA at that time. “Why do you turn a $500,000 job down?” And he says, “Guenter, what I dream to build no private company can afford. And I’d rather build my dream.” So he turned them down.\n\n Now, jumping a number of years. Before he passed away, we were again together on an award a contract show, and by that time I know he didn’t have long to go. And he knew it. So I asked him. I said, “Wernher, are you sorry for something you wanted to do you didn’t get done?” And he says, “Guenter,” he says, “when I pass on, I’m the most contented person that ever will pass away because my dream became a reality. I go in peace.” So that was a—I mean, he was a great guy. A photographic mind. I mean, I enjoyed working with him.\n\n In a way he was a little bit also like somebody I know. We went to a meeting, a 3-day meeting, one time and there were 72 people in the conference room with nameplates nicely calligraphed. And we started the meeting. At lunchtime he says, “Gentlemen,” (there were no ladies there at the time) “we’ll break for lunch. Let it be known that anybody who was has not spoken to or addressed by the agenda, do not return for the rest of the meeting.” Twenty-four people showed up after lunch.

[Assistant] That was just his way.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Crew Systems was responsible for the life support system, for the EVA [Extravehicular Activity] system. I'm trying to think of the other things. A lot of other things. A lot of other things.

[Assistant] What were some things that you learned from the Mercury Program that you were able to—

[User] Pass on?

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] Oh, gosh, that's kind of hard to say. We were responsible in the Mercury Program for the life support system. We had an animal program, medical instrumentation. A lot of stuff. And I think really we kind of took that stuff and kind of let it roll into the Gemini Program.

[Assistant] Were there any things that you learned in the Mercury Program or learned that were not necessarily good things to do that you did carry over into the Gemini Program?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Pass on?

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] Oh, gosh, that's kind of hard to say. We were responsible in the Mercury Program for the life support system. We had an animal program, medical instrumentation. A lot of stuff. And I think really we kind of took that stuff and kind of let it roll into the Gemini Program.

[Assistant] Were there any things that you learned in the Mercury Program or learned that were not necessarily good things to do that you did carry over into the Gemini Program?

[User] I can't think of anything.

[Assistant] Why don't we, as we go through the Gemini Program, just take mission by mission and look at some of the advancements that were made in each mission. We can start with Gemini III, with [Virgil I. “Gus”] Grissom and [John W.] Young. What did you take from any of the unmanned missions in Gemini and apply to Mercury?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh, gosh, that's kind of hard to say. We were responsible in the Mercury Program for the life support system. We had an animal program, medical instrumentation. A lot of stuff. And I think really we kind of took that stuff and kind of let it roll into the Gemini Program.

[Assistant] Were there any things that you learned in the Mercury Program or learned that were not necessarily good things to do that you did carry over into the Gemini Program?

[User] I can't think of anything.

[Assistant] Why don't we, as we go through the Gemini Program, just take mission by mission and look at some of the advancements that were made in each mission. We can start with Gemini III, with [Virgil I. “Gus”] Grissom and [John W.] Young. What did you take from any of the unmanned missions in Gemini and apply to Mercury?

[User] We really didn't take much from the unmanned part of the thing. I think really the unmanned part was more a demonstration they could put the thing up and bring it back. So I think in Gemini III we were mainly evaluating the life support system, their space suits, their medical instrumentation, and food system. There was a lot of things like that. It was a very successful mission. One of the things that got the crew in trouble, they smuggled a sandwich on board.

[Assistant] And that didn't make Crew Systems very happy?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I can't think of anything.

[Assistant] Why don't we, as we go through the Gemini Program, just take mission by mission and look at some of the advancements that were made in each mission. We can start with Gemini III, with [Virgil I. “Gus”] Grissom and [John W.] Young. What did you take from any of the unmanned missions in Gemini and apply to Mercury?

[User] We really didn't take much from the unmanned part of the thing. I think really the unmanned part was more a demonstration they could put the thing up and bring it back. So I think in Gemini III we were mainly evaluating the life support system, their space suits, their medical instrumentation, and food system. There was a lot of things like that. It was a very successful mission. One of the things that got the crew in trouble, they smuggled a sandwich on board.

[Assistant] And that didn't make Crew Systems very happy?

[User] It didn't bother me. [Laughter] No, it didn't bother me. It bothered some people at the [Johnson Space] Center, but it didn't bother me.

[Assistant] They also had a mishap that resulted in a broken faceplate, for Grissom, and a scratched one for John Young. What kind of changes did you make in the space suits to prevent something like that from happening again?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] We really didn't take much from the unmanned part of the thing. I think really the unmanned part was more a demonstration they could put the thing up and bring it back. So I think in Gemini III we were mainly evaluating the life support system, their space suits, their medical instrumentation, and food system. There was a lot of things like that. It was a very successful mission. One of the things that got the crew in trouble, they smuggled a sandwich on board.

[Assistant] And that didn't make Crew Systems very happy?

[User] It didn't bother me. [Laughter] No, it didn't bother me. It bothered some people at the [Johnson Space] Center, but it didn't bother me.

[Assistant] They also had a mishap that resulted in a broken faceplate, for Grissom, and a scratched one for John Young. What kind of changes did you make in the space suits to prevent something like that from happening again?

[User] I think we went to Lexan visors, as I recall. I don't know exactly why Gus broke his visor. That spacecraft came down, and then when it hit the water, it flopped over. I think that's when he broke it. So I really can't tell you any more than that.

[Assistant] How were the space suits for Gemini different from the ones used in Mercury?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No. I'll tell you what we did. We took things that we could get from the Mercury ECS [Environmental Control System] and the Gemini ECS and we designed the thing around those components. The thing worked great. It really did. I guess of all the things I ever did while I worked in Crew Systems, that was one of the best, because we did it in house and we didn't tell anybody we were doing it. I kept a list of everybody that knew about it. We finished it up.

[Assistant] Did the zip gun work as you anticipated?

[User] Yes. In fact, I went over to Paris [France] after that mission, to give a paper at the IF, and I was getting ready to go, and somebody said there was a guy named Don Flickenger [phonetic], a general in the Air Force, and he had picked a copy of the film up, and it really irritated me, so I called him in Paris. I said, "Don, I understand you've got a copy of the Gemini IV EVA."\n\n He said, "Yes. Why?"\n\n I said, "I'm giving a paper and I'm going to use that film, and I'd like you to put that back in your suitcase and leave it there." He didn't know what to say. So anyhow, that's what happened.

[Assistant] Then the next mission was Gemini V, which was an eight-day mission, which at that time was the longest mission that we'd performed. What type of changes did Crew Systems have to implement to accommodate an eight-day mission?

[User] For one thing, we made different suits for them. Was Gemini V the fourteen-day mission?

[Assistant] I believe it was an eight-day mission.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. In fact, I went over to Paris [France] after that mission, to give a paper at the IF, and I was getting ready to go, and somebody said there was a guy named Don Flickenger [phonetic], a general in the Air Force, and he had picked a copy of the film up, and it really irritated me, so I called him in Paris. I said, "Don, I understand you've got a copy of the Gemini IV EVA."\n\n He said, "Yes. Why?"\n\n I said, "I'm giving a paper and I'm going to use that film, and I'd like you to put that back in your suitcase and leave it there." He didn't know what to say. So anyhow, that's what happened.

[Assistant] Then the next mission was Gemini V, which was an eight-day mission, which at that time was the longest mission that we'd performed. What type of changes did Crew Systems have to implement to accommodate an eight-day mission?

[User] For one thing, we made different suits for them. Was Gemini V the fourteen-day mission?

[Assistant] I believe it was an eight-day mission.

[User] We made a soft suit that the guys could take off, they could doff. As I recall, it was Jim McDivitt and Frank Borman flew that mission. Who do you have down there?

[Assistant] Gemini V, [L. Gordon] Cooper [Jr.] and [Charles C. “Pete”] Conrad.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] For one thing, we made different suits for them. Was Gemini V the fourteen-day mission?

[Assistant] I believe it was an eight-day mission.

[User] We made a soft suit that the guys could take off, they could doff. As I recall, it was Jim McDivitt and Frank Borman flew that mission. Who do you have down there?

[Assistant] Gemini V, [L. Gordon] Cooper [Jr.] and [Charles C. “Pete”] Conrad.

[User] No, I don't remember them going eight days. Maybe they did.

[Assistant] Borman and [James A.] Lovell [Jr.] went fourteen.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] We made a soft suit that the guys could take off, they could doff. As I recall, it was Jim McDivitt and Frank Borman flew that mission. Who do you have down there?

[Assistant] Gemini V, [L. Gordon] Cooper [Jr.] and [Charles C. “Pete”] Conrad.

[User] No, I don't remember them going eight days. Maybe they did.

[Assistant] Borman and [James A.] Lovell [Jr.] went fourteen.

[User] That's where we made the soft suit. I don't know what I can tell you about the Gemini V. We had suits that David Clark had built, and that's pretty much what they flew. And the food system and everything else was like we had done in Gemini IV. It was kind of an uneventful mission.

[Assistant] In [Gemini VII], there was some disagreement about whether the astronauts should keep their suits on the whole time or could take them off. Were you involved at all in that discussion?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, I don't remember them going eight days. Maybe they did.

[Assistant] Borman and [James A.] Lovell [Jr.] went fourteen.

[User] That's where we made the soft suit. I don't know what I can tell you about the Gemini V. We had suits that David Clark had built, and that's pretty much what they flew. And the food system and everything else was like we had done in Gemini IV. It was kind of an uneventful mission.

[Assistant] In [Gemini VII], there was some disagreement about whether the astronauts should keep their suits on the whole time or could take them off. Were you involved at all in that discussion?

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] What did you think?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That's where we made the soft suit. I don't know what I can tell you about the Gemini V. We had suits that David Clark had built, and that's pretty much what they flew. And the food system and everything else was like we had done in Gemini IV. It was kind of an uneventful mission.

[Assistant] In [Gemini VII], there was some disagreement about whether the astronauts should keep their suits on the whole time or could take them off. Were you involved at all in that discussion?

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] What did you think?

[User] I thought they should take the suits off. I mean, if you're going to be up there for fourteen days, you sure as hell don't want to sit around in a suit that's—you can't sweat, you can't do anything. So that's the reason we built some soft suits that they could doff and put on when they needed to, and that's what we flew. We developed those in, gosh, I don't know, five or six months. I had a real group of people working for me in Crew Systems. We could do anything.

[Assistant] If we move to Gemini VIII, that was the one with [Neil A.] Armstrong and [David R.] Scott, where they had the thruster malfunction and the spacecraft was rolling. Did Crew Systems learn anything about the way men handle emergencies in space from this incident?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] What did you think?

[User] I thought they should take the suits off. I mean, if you're going to be up there for fourteen days, you sure as hell don't want to sit around in a suit that's—you can't sweat, you can't do anything. So that's the reason we built some soft suits that they could doff and put on when they needed to, and that's what we flew. We developed those in, gosh, I don't know, five or six months. I had a real group of people working for me in Crew Systems. We could do anything.

[Assistant] If we move to Gemini VIII, that was the one with [Neil A.] Armstrong and [David R.] Scott, where they had the thruster malfunction and the spacecraft was rolling. Did Crew Systems learn anything about the way men handle emergencies in space from this incident?

[User] Not really. We didn't really. I think really the problem with that mission was more with the system that controlled the attitude of the spacecraft. I think they did a good job of straightening it out and bringing it in and landing it without any trouble. But, no, I didn't learn anything from it.

[Assistant] Gemini IX with [Thomas P.] Stafford and [Eugene A.] Cernan had problems on the EVA. Can you tell us about that incident?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I'll tell you what. We had built a maneuvering unit which we had located in the back of the spacecraft, and what Cernan had to do was to go out and go around to the back of the spacecraft and pick this thing up. For some reason, he ran into some troubles and he couldn't get back in and pick it up, so he never did use the maneuvering unit. He just couldn't get back there.\n\n I think we learned a couple of things from that. Number one, we didn't have enough handholds and restraint systems and so on for him to go back there and pick the thing up. And that was not Crew Systems' fault, that was the fault of the people building the spacecraft. So I always felt bad about that, but I didn't feel responsible for it in any way. I had nothing to do with how the back of that spacecraft was built.

[Assistant] Cernan also had problems because he was working so hard that his suit and the visor fogged up. What kind of changes did you make in future EVA suits so that that sort of thing didn't happen?

[User] I don't think we really did anything for the Gemini suits. Unfortunately, when he exerted all this energy, he started sweating and the sweat condensed on the visor and it went on from there. The suit caught a lot of static about it, but it really wasn't the suit; it was the way the handholds and things built back in that part of the spacecraft so that you could go back and retrieve that maneuvering unit. So I never felt responsible for anything like that. None of the people working for me did either.

[Assistant] Did you participate in any way in training for EVAs?

[User] People working for me did, sure.

[Assistant] Because by Gemini XII, Aldrin had incorporated underwater training.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I don't think we really did anything for the Gemini suits. Unfortunately, when he exerted all this energy, he started sweating and the sweat condensed on the visor and it went on from there. The suit caught a lot of static about it, but it really wasn't the suit; it was the way the handholds and things built back in that part of the spacecraft so that you could go back and retrieve that maneuvering unit. So I never felt responsible for anything like that. None of the people working for me did either.

[Assistant] Did you participate in any way in training for EVAs?

[User] People working for me did, sure.

[Assistant] Because by Gemini XII, Aldrin had incorporated underwater training.

[User] That's right. In fact, I think really as a result of Cernan's problem, we started training the astronauts in a water tank, doing tasks like they would do when they were in flight. It ended up being a worthwhile way to train people to do EVA. You've got to understand that when we first did EVAs, it was something totally new, and the people doing training didn't really have the proper things to train people to do the EVAs. Those people worked for a guy named Warren [J.] North. But I think that the experiences we had in Gemini taught us a lot about how to do EVAs, so it all worked out before it was over with.

[Assistant] What were some things that you learned in Gemini that you were able to apply in Apollo?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] People working for me did, sure.

[Assistant] Because by Gemini XII, Aldrin had incorporated underwater training.

[User] That's right. In fact, I think really as a result of Cernan's problem, we started training the astronauts in a water tank, doing tasks like they would do when they were in flight. It ended up being a worthwhile way to train people to do EVA. You've got to understand that when we first did EVAs, it was something totally new, and the people doing training didn't really have the proper things to train people to do the EVAs. Those people worked for a guy named Warren [J.] North. But I think that the experiences we had in Gemini taught us a lot about how to do EVAs, so it all worked out before it was over with.

[Assistant] What were some things that you learned in Gemini that you were able to apply in Apollo?

[User] For one thing, we learned that if you're going to send somebody outside the spacecraft, you've got to have restraint systems and things that they can get a hold of to go move about the spacecraft, which we did in Apollo. I guess really that's the biggest thing we learned. Cernan probably did as much as anybody to get us started in the right way.

[Assistant] Did you have people working on Apollo at the same time as working on Gemini?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That's right. In fact, I think really as a result of Cernan's problem, we started training the astronauts in a water tank, doing tasks like they would do when they were in flight. It ended up being a worthwhile way to train people to do EVA. You've got to understand that when we first did EVAs, it was something totally new, and the people doing training didn't really have the proper things to train people to do the EVAs. Those people worked for a guy named Warren [J.] North. But I think that the experiences we had in Gemini taught us a lot about how to do EVAs, so it all worked out before it was over with.

[Assistant] What were some things that you learned in Gemini that you were able to apply in Apollo?

[User] For one thing, we learned that if you're going to send somebody outside the spacecraft, you've got to have restraint systems and things that they can get a hold of to go move about the spacecraft, which we did in Apollo. I guess really that's the biggest thing we learned. Cernan probably did as much as anybody to get us started in the right way.

[Assistant] Did you have people working on Apollo at the same time as working on Gemini?

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] Did you do anything to promote communications between them?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] For one thing, we learned that if you're going to send somebody outside the spacecraft, you've got to have restraint systems and things that they can get a hold of to go move about the spacecraft, which we did in Apollo. I guess really that's the biggest thing we learned. Cernan probably did as much as anybody to get us started in the right way.

[Assistant] Did you have people working on Apollo at the same time as working on Gemini?

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] Did you do anything to promote communications between them?

[User] Oh, yes. I had regular staff meetings, and they compared notes on what they were doing for the Gemini suit and the Apollo suit and so on.\n\n What made it difficult then, we were supporting two programs. An awful lot of our energy went into the Gemini Program because it was happening. I remember one day I went out to [North American] Rockwell, and I was flying back with Joe [Joseph F.] Shea. He was sitting next to me. He started on me, and I took it for as long as I could, and I finally said, "Joe, will you just shut up. We're doing everything we can for you and your program, but get off my back." He never, ever bothered me after that. I liked Joe Shea. He was okay, but he was very arrogant. I shouldn't say that, I guess, but I did.

[Assistant] After Gemini, then you went into Apollo. You talked extensively about Apollo 1 before, so maybe we can start with Apollo 7. How did you feel about the quality of the Block II command and service module (CSM) before Apollo 7 went up?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] Did you do anything to promote communications between them?

[User] Oh, yes. I had regular staff meetings, and they compared notes on what they were doing for the Gemini suit and the Apollo suit and so on.\n\n What made it difficult then, we were supporting two programs. An awful lot of our energy went into the Gemini Program because it was happening. I remember one day I went out to [North American] Rockwell, and I was flying back with Joe [Joseph F.] Shea. He was sitting next to me. He started on me, and I took it for as long as I could, and I finally said, "Joe, will you just shut up. We're doing everything we can for you and your program, but get off my back." He never, ever bothered me after that. I liked Joe Shea. He was okay, but he was very arrogant. I shouldn't say that, I guess, but I did.

[Assistant] After Gemini, then you went into Apollo. You talked extensively about Apollo 1 before, so maybe we can start with Apollo 7. How did you feel about the quality of the Block II command and service module (CSM) before Apollo 7 went up?

[User] Are we going to talk about Apollo now?

[Assistant] Yes, if that's okay.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Mike Collins. Mike was one of the best guys I've ever known. And they did it. We all did it.

[Assistant] Absolutely. It took everybody to make it happen.

[User] Yes, yes. You know, we brought them back and put them into quarantine for, I guess, twenty-one days. I've forgot. But they all said—in fact, most of the crews who landed on the Moon and had to go into quarantine for three weeks really thought that was the best thing that ever happened to them, because it gave them a chance to unwind and to sit down and chronicle their thoughts and write their memoirs and do whatever they wanted to do without a lot of press people and whatever bothering them. Now, they were happy as hell to get out of there, but I think that they were a good crew. As I say, Aldrin was probably the only flake in the group, and he still is.

[Assistant] You've talked about the Apollo fire, which was a great tragedy, and then Apollo 11, which was such a triumph to come back and make it all happen. Then you mentioned that you worked on the Review Board for Apollo 13 when their accident occurred, is that correct?

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] We didn't talk much about that. Can you tell us a little bit about what you—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Fred Haise. But, you know, we brought them back and they were fine. But it was touch and go for a lot of things.

[Assistant] Luckily you were able to help get them back successfully, and it all worked out and the Apollo Program went on.

[User] Yeah, yeah. I think, as a result of that fire, though, they went back and redid those tanks, because we didn't fly Apollo 14 for probably six months after that.

[Assistant] I have one last question that's a little bit off our topics for today, but in the light of what's going on up in space right now, John [H.] Glenn [Jr.] is flying aboard the Space Shuttle. You worked with him during the Mercury Program.

[User] Yes, and I worked with him before he was an astronaut.

[Assistant] Do you have any thoughts on his space flight right now?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, of course, when I was a child, it was long ago enough that there wasn’t a space program.\n\n I had thought about going to West Point, and there was a lieutenant colonel that lived in our neighborhood and told me about the new Air Force Academy that was being developed. And so I applied and was accepted to the first class, and many of my instructors there were starting to talk about the new space program.\n\n We had program managers who did things in the new missiles that were coming into the air force, and talked about how it wouldn’t be terribly long before we started a space program, and so that was kind of my introduction to space. And, of course, being at the Air Force Academy made me desire to become a pilot as well.

[Assistant] That was a unique privilege to be in the first class of the Air Force Academy then.

[User] Oh yes, it really was. We had a lot of instructors who were going to be later taking over departments, and they were usually very well qualified. My physics instructor was the range safety officer at Eniwetok [Atoll] atomic tests. My astrodynamics instructor was a deputy at the test pilot school. You know, it was on like that, so it was really quite a privilege to be there then.

[Assistant] And you graduated in 1959. So that was just when things were starting in the space program.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] So after you graduated from the academy, where did you go into next?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh yes, it really was. We had a lot of instructors who were going to be later taking over departments, and they were usually very well qualified. My physics instructor was the range safety officer at Eniwetok [Atoll] atomic tests. My astrodynamics instructor was a deputy at the test pilot school. You know, it was on like that, so it was really quite a privilege to be there then.

[Assistant] And you graduated in 1959. So that was just when things were starting in the space program.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] So after you graduated from the academy, where did you go into next?

[User] I went to pilot training. I became a fighter pilot. I served two tours as a fighter pilot and then went to the test pilot school. The test pilot school at that time had basically an aircraft test, and then they started talk about space activities. I applied to the Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory [MOL] and was accepted, and that was my first tour as an astronaut, was in an air force program.

[Assistant] I know some of that’s probably still classified, but can you still tell us something about your activities in the MOL Program?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] So after you graduated from the academy, where did you go into next?

[User] I went to pilot training. I became a fighter pilot. I served two tours as a fighter pilot and then went to the test pilot school. The test pilot school at that time had basically an aircraft test, and then they started talk about space activities. I applied to the Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory [MOL] and was accepted, and that was my first tour as an astronaut, was in an air force program.

[Assistant] I know some of that’s probably still classified, but can you still tell us something about your activities in the MOL Program?

[User] The astronauts’ activities there were patterned rather similarly to the astronauts’ activities here at NASA. Of course, NASA had already been in operation.\n\n I was stationed in Los Angeles [California] at, at that time, called Space and Missile Systems Organization and spent a couple of years there in the MOL Program, participating in the development of that activity.

[Assistant] Did you have any interaction with NASA at that time? I know they were planning on using an adapted Gemini capsule for that program. So did you interact in any way with NASA?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I went to pilot training. I became a fighter pilot. I served two tours as a fighter pilot and then went to the test pilot school. The test pilot school at that time had basically an aircraft test, and then they started talk about space activities. I applied to the Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory [MOL] and was accepted, and that was my first tour as an astronaut, was in an air force program.

[Assistant] I know some of that’s probably still classified, but can you still tell us something about your activities in the MOL Program?

[User] The astronauts’ activities there were patterned rather similarly to the astronauts’ activities here at NASA. Of course, NASA had already been in operation.\n\n I was stationed in Los Angeles [California] at, at that time, called Space and Missile Systems Organization and spent a couple of years there in the MOL Program, participating in the development of that activity.

[Assistant] Did you have any interaction with NASA at that time? I know they were planning on using an adapted Gemini capsule for that program. So did you interact in any way with NASA?

[User] Yes, I came down here a couple of times and before that, even, when I was at the test pilot school, I had come down to NASA. I had done a little research on—the people were starting to think of the question of, “Okay, what do you do with a person who is not necessarily a pilot but whose skills are going to be necessary on a space vehicle?” And I can remember coming down here and talking to Al [Alan B.] Shepard [Jr.] about that.

[Assistant] The MOL Program kind of had a few setbacks and budget problems and things. Did the people you worked with in that program realize that it was potentially going to come to an end, or while you were there, did you really think it was going to come to fruition?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The astronauts’ activities there were patterned rather similarly to the astronauts’ activities here at NASA. Of course, NASA had already been in operation.\n\n I was stationed in Los Angeles [California] at, at that time, called Space and Missile Systems Organization and spent a couple of years there in the MOL Program, participating in the development of that activity.

[Assistant] Did you have any interaction with NASA at that time? I know they were planning on using an adapted Gemini capsule for that program. So did you interact in any way with NASA?

[User] Yes, I came down here a couple of times and before that, even, when I was at the test pilot school, I had come down to NASA. I had done a little research on—the people were starting to think of the question of, “Okay, what do you do with a person who is not necessarily a pilot but whose skills are going to be necessary on a space vehicle?” And I can remember coming down here and talking to Al [Alan B.] Shepard [Jr.] about that.

[Assistant] The MOL Program kind of had a few setbacks and budget problems and things. Did the people you worked with in that program realize that it was potentially going to come to an end, or while you were there, did you really think it was going to come to fruition?

[User] I think we all thought that it was going to come to fruition. It was a surprise that it was just cancelled one day. I can remember I had a classmate from the Air Academy that had come to the MOL Program and it was his first day, and they called everybody down to the auditorium, and they said, “Guess what, folks? The program’s been canceled.” [Laughs]

[Assistant] Oh, my goodness.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, I came down here a couple of times and before that, even, when I was at the test pilot school, I had come down to NASA. I had done a little research on—the people were starting to think of the question of, “Okay, what do you do with a person who is not necessarily a pilot but whose skills are going to be necessary on a space vehicle?” And I can remember coming down here and talking to Al [Alan B.] Shepard [Jr.] about that.

[Assistant] The MOL Program kind of had a few setbacks and budget problems and things. Did the people you worked with in that program realize that it was potentially going to come to an end, or while you were there, did you really think it was going to come to fruition?

[User] I think we all thought that it was going to come to fruition. It was a surprise that it was just cancelled one day. I can remember I had a classmate from the Air Academy that had come to the MOL Program and it was his first day, and they called everybody down to the auditorium, and they said, “Guess what, folks? The program’s been canceled.” [Laughs]

[Assistant] Oh, my goodness.

[User] So he was kind of surprised, as we were all were.

[Assistant] And that was in 1969.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I think we all thought that it was going to come to fruition. It was a surprise that it was just cancelled one day. I can remember I had a classmate from the Air Academy that had come to the MOL Program and it was his first day, and they called everybody down to the auditorium, and they said, “Guess what, folks? The program’s been canceled.” [Laughs]

[Assistant] Oh, my goodness.

[User] So he was kind of surprised, as we were all were.

[Assistant] And that was in 1969.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] That was a pivotal year that your program got canceled. About a month later, a man landed on the Moon. Vietnam was going on. After they came and told you that this program was canceled, what did you see as your options, and how did you make your decision what direction you wanted to go?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] So he was kind of surprised, as we were all were.

[Assistant] And that was in 1969.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] That was a pivotal year that your program got canceled. About a month later, a man landed on the Moon. Vietnam was going on. After they came and told you that this program was canceled, what did you see as your options, and how did you make your decision what direction you wanted to go?

[User] I decided that it was time in my career that if there was going to be a change, that I should go to school. And so I applied and was allowed to go to school and went to USC [University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California], which is right there in California, and, of course, also had applied for NASA here and was accepted into the astronaut corps here.

[Assistant] And you just continued your schooling until that was done, and then you—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] That was a pivotal year that your program got canceled. About a month later, a man landed on the Moon. Vietnam was going on. After they came and told you that this program was canceled, what did you see as your options, and how did you make your decision what direction you wanted to go?

[User] I decided that it was time in my career that if there was going to be a change, that I should go to school. And so I applied and was allowed to go to school and went to USC [University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California], which is right there in California, and, of course, also had applied for NASA here and was accepted into the astronaut corps here.

[Assistant] And you just continued your schooling until that was done, and then you—

[User] Then came here. Yes, there were three of us who had gone to school for a year out of the seven who came here to become astronauts, and we just continued for a year. NASA said, “Yeah, we like you, but, we can wait an extra six months or so until you finish with your school.”

[Assistant] Tell us about your first impressions when you came down here to be an astronaut, move to Houston, and getting indoctrinated into the NASA way of doing things, which was probably a little different than what you’d been used to.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Then came here. Yes, there were three of us who had gone to school for a year out of the seven who came here to become astronauts, and we just continued for a year. NASA said, “Yeah, we like you, but, we can wait an extra six months or so until you finish with your school.”

[Assistant] Tell us about your first impressions when you came down here to be an astronaut, move to Houston, and getting indoctrinated into the NASA way of doing things, which was probably a little different than what you’d been used to.

[User] Yes, of course, it was different. We came down here and purchased a house and got moved in. Perhaps the first year or so was rather, at times, rather frustrating down here. During the first year, we were told twice that we were fired.

[Assistant] Really?

[User] Yes. [Bergen laughs] And then that was rescinded. They said, “The program is not going anyplace. We don’t need you folks, and, so you’re going to be let go and go back to the air force.” But that was rescinded, and we stayed and got involved in the programs that were going on here.

[Assistant] So what was your initial training that you had when you came here? Were you trained in anything in particular?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, of course, it was different. We came down here and purchased a house and got moved in. Perhaps the first year or so was rather, at times, rather frustrating down here. During the first year, we were told twice that we were fired.

[Assistant] Really?

[User] Yes. [Bergen laughs] And then that was rescinded. They said, “The program is not going anyplace. We don’t need you folks, and, so you’re going to be let go and go back to the air force.” But that was rescinded, and we stayed and got involved in the programs that were going on here.

[Assistant] So what was your initial training that you had when you came here? Were you trained in anything in particular?

[User] First thing I started to work on was Space Station, believe it or not. [Bergen laughs] Not Skylab, but Space Station. And after the Apollo Program, there was a group that got together, a high-level group, and decided that the United States should have two things: one was the Space Station, and, two, was a way to easily get in and out of space, and that was the Space Shuttle.\n\n And so it became evident rather quickly that they didn’t have money to do both of those, and so they focused on the Space Shuttle, because you couldn’t do a station without a shuttle.\n\n So they did turn the Station around a little. They had talked about launching a station on top of a Saturn [rocket], and when they decided that the Shuttle was going to be the transportation system of the future, they redesigned the Station during that initial study and made it into a modular space station, which is the predecessor of what we have today.

[Assistant] So what was your role in participating in Space Station? Were you there to give the astronauts’ perspective?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] First thing I started to work on was Space Station, believe it or not. [Bergen laughs] Not Skylab, but Space Station. And after the Apollo Program, there was a group that got together, a high-level group, and decided that the United States should have two things: one was the Space Station, and, two, was a way to easily get in and out of space, and that was the Space Shuttle.\n\n And so it became evident rather quickly that they didn’t have money to do both of those, and so they focused on the Space Shuttle, because you couldn’t do a station without a shuttle.\n\n So they did turn the Station around a little. They had talked about launching a station on top of a Saturn [rocket], and when they decided that the Shuttle was going to be the transportation system of the future, they redesigned the Station during that initial study and made it into a modular space station, which is the predecessor of what we have today.

[Assistant] So what was your role in participating in Space Station? Were you there to give the astronauts’ perspective?

[User] Yes, yes. And that didn’t last for too long. The next thing was I was involved in a program called SMEAT, the Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test. I can remember I was out in California and was called, and they said, “We drew straws, and you won and you’re gonna go to SMEAT.”\n\n I didn’t even know what SMEAT was. [Bergen laughs] And so that took about a year of time, all the preparations for that and then the execution of that and then the follow-up.

[Assistant] It seemed like it was almost on par with doing a mission, because it was—

[User] Well, except we were—

[Assistant] We’re on the ground.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, yes. And that didn’t last for too long. The next thing was I was involved in a program called SMEAT, the Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test. I can remember I was out in California and was called, and they said, “We drew straws, and you won and you’re gonna go to SMEAT.”\n\n I didn’t even know what SMEAT was. [Bergen laughs] And so that took about a year of time, all the preparations for that and then the execution of that and then the follow-up.

[Assistant] It seemed like it was almost on par with doing a mission, because it was—

[User] Well, except we were—

[Assistant] We’re on the ground.

[User] Right. [Bergen laughs] We tried to do as much as we could to make it be like a real mission. There were some things, obviously, we couldn’t do.

[Assistant] What kind of training did you have to do to prepare for this?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Have a tooth pulled, yes. Now I’m not sure, since we were on the ground, they’d make us pull each other’s teeth, but certainly if you were in orbit, that was a consideration. If you said, “This tooth hurts,” and somebody looked at it, and they knew that that one had problems in the past, you may consider that.

[Assistant] During that course of fifty-six days that you were in that enclosed environment, what were some of the things that you did while you were in there that really stand out in your memory from that time period?

[User] You know, we’d perform the medical experiments on the same schedule as they worked for Skylab. We worked together as a team and with the ground, found little things that were wrong with the Skylab either equipment or processes or procedures that we critiqued and they straightened out later for Skylab.\n\n It was a long time, but it was easy, and it seemed to pass rather quickly. I’m not sure if at the end of fifty-seven days if somebody had said, “Would you like to go for another fifty-seven?” that I would have volunteered, but, you know, generally, I think that the feeling that I had through most of it was that you’re working, you’ve got a job to do, and there was even times you worried if we’d get it all done in the time that we had available.

[Assistant] I know you wrote a detailed report about all the specific experiments you did and the problems that you had. Did you have a chance, either formally or informally, to talk to the Skylab astronauts to share your experiences with them?

[User] Sure. Sure. And there were a couple of those that were kind of a liaison with us, so they took the lessons that we had and took them into Skylab.

[Assistant] Were there any things in particular that you shared with them that you thought was really important for them to keep in mind on this long mission?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] But they took us around over there. We saw a lot. We tried to take them around over here and show them a lot. Neither of us had had the opportunity to see those sorts of things before. Like I said, I’m sure we were the first Americans down at Kazakhstan down at the launch site and probably lots of other places as well.

[Assistant] And the irony of the fact that you were a fighter pilot, you know, who trained most of your career to view them as the enemy, and here you were working together.

[User] Oh yes. Yes. But that was the start.

[Assistant] So what benefit do you think that the Apollo-Soyuz Program had for NASA and for our country?

[User] Well, I think it started cooperative space ventures between the countries, and perhaps helped them to learn to get along a little better together, which is still evolving now with the Space Station. You know, it’s a tough thing to take two very, very capable and arrogant organizations and try to make it together.

[Assistant] Especially when you have such different cultural and language obstacles to compound the situation even more. So it was a pretty amazing feat, especially at the time. That’s why it must have been very exciting to be part of that.\n\n When you finished with your participation in the Apollo-Soyuz Program, what did you do next?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh yes. Yes. But that was the start.

[Assistant] So what benefit do you think that the Apollo-Soyuz Program had for NASA and for our country?

[User] Well, I think it started cooperative space ventures between the countries, and perhaps helped them to learn to get along a little better together, which is still evolving now with the Space Station. You know, it’s a tough thing to take two very, very capable and arrogant organizations and try to make it together.

[Assistant] Especially when you have such different cultural and language obstacles to compound the situation even more. So it was a pretty amazing feat, especially at the time. That’s why it must have been very exciting to be part of that.\n\n When you finished with your participation in the Apollo-Soyuz Program, what did you do next?

[User] Well, one of the other things that I was involved in was the tests [Approach and Landing Tests, ALT] out at Edwards [Air Force Base, California] of the Shuttle and of the Enterprise, and so we worked for some time trying to get that all together. You said CapCom a couple of times. I had been CapCom on the Apollo-Soyuz. And then I was CapCom every other mission for the drop tests of the Shuttle off of the 747.\n\n And then on the other side of that, I was flying the chase airplane alongside the 747 and the Shuttle. So that took quite some time. I don’t remember exactly how long we worked on that, but I’ll guess it was probably close to a year or two, you know, by the time we set it up and did all the training out there at Edwards.

[Assistant] So did you actually participate in some of the training or what other activities? You said you were CapCom and you flew the chase plane. Were there other activities you actually participated in, in those tests?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think it started cooperative space ventures between the countries, and perhaps helped them to learn to get along a little better together, which is still evolving now with the Space Station. You know, it’s a tough thing to take two very, very capable and arrogant organizations and try to make it together.

[Assistant] Especially when you have such different cultural and language obstacles to compound the situation even more. So it was a pretty amazing feat, especially at the time. That’s why it must have been very exciting to be part of that.\n\n When you finished with your participation in the Apollo-Soyuz Program, what did you do next?

[User] Well, one of the other things that I was involved in was the tests [Approach and Landing Tests, ALT] out at Edwards [Air Force Base, California] of the Shuttle and of the Enterprise, and so we worked for some time trying to get that all together. You said CapCom a couple of times. I had been CapCom on the Apollo-Soyuz. And then I was CapCom every other mission for the drop tests of the Shuttle off of the 747.\n\n And then on the other side of that, I was flying the chase airplane alongside the 747 and the Shuttle. So that took quite some time. I don’t remember exactly how long we worked on that, but I’ll guess it was probably close to a year or two, you know, by the time we set it up and did all the training out there at Edwards.

[Assistant] So did you actually participate in some of the training or what other activities? You said you were CapCom and you flew the chase plane. Were there other activities you actually participated in, in those tests?

[User] The whole team worked to get the tests ready to go, figure out exactly what was going to happen, do all the things that were necessary, precede the tests.

[Assistant] Were there anything in those tests that really surprised people?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The whole team worked to get the tests ready to go, figure out exactly what was going to happen, do all the things that were necessary, precede the tests.

[Assistant] Were there anything in those tests that really surprised people?

[User] I don’t think so. You know, the tests pointed out the viability of the Shuttle as a landing aircraft. We designed some of the things such as how the approach would actually be made in the Shuttle even before that started on that, and worked on items such as if we landed on a lakebed runway, was that adequate for a shuttle to land on?\n\n You know, I can remember going through quite an exercise there. Using radar to look underneath the lakebed surface to see if there were any voids the Shuttle might fall through, because there are holes that appear out in the Edwards lakebed, and that’s water that runs down and causes the holes to appear. And so we were looking at what the geology was underneath.\n\n That was all just part of getting those tests together. The tests were challenging. I mean, the Shuttle and flying with a T-38 alongside the Shuttle was interesting, the two rather different airplanes. [Bergen laughs]\n\n And the slow-speed Shuttle tests, you’d have the gear down, and you’d be even shaking the stick to try to get a little bit more drag into the T-38 to have it not overrun the Shuttle.

[Assistant] New and different challenges every time.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] After the Shuttle had been tested and it was finally ready to do the first launch, STS-1, you were in charge of the equipment checkout and testing. Is that correct?