[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] You mean the structure?

[Assistant] Inside, you know, the oﬀices?

[User] We actually had more space when I first got there, and then of course, they had to make accommodations, and then we had the whole renovation. And I think a lot of people were a little upset over that, because there wasnʼt enough staﬀ input. And I canʼt think of many people that like the way itʼs arranged in Suite A [archival staﬀ oﬀice] now, because itʼs just, weʼre on top of each other, one right behind, and phone conversations and all of that gets skewed. Thereʼs no panels. Thereʼs no nothing. And I understand that that was the Google way to do it, but weʼre not Google. [Laughs] So, yeah, I think I even found out that Google is now going away from all that.

[Assistant] Right.

[User] Theyʼre actually going back to cubicles and such, for privacy.

[Assistant] So before, you had more like cubicles with walls?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] We actually had more space when I first got there, and then of course, they had to make accommodations, and then we had the whole renovation. And I think a lot of people were a little upset over that, because there wasnʼt enough staﬀ input. And I canʼt think of many people that like the way itʼs arranged in Suite A [archival staﬀ oﬀice] now, because itʼs just, weʼre on top of each other, one right behind, and phone conversations and all of that gets skewed. Thereʼs no panels. Thereʼs no nothing. And I understand that that was the Google way to do it, but weʼre not Google. [Laughs] So, yeah, I think I even found out that Google is now going away from all that.

[Assistant] Right.

[User] Theyʼre actually going back to cubicles and such, for privacy.

[Assistant] So before, you had more like cubicles with walls?

[User] Yeah, they werenʼt cubicles, but they were, like, really full walls, wooden walls with a top. And they were about, I guess, they came up to just below my neck, so I could always look over and see the next person. But they were a much bigger area. And, yeah.

[Assistant] So what are you going to miss about the job?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Theyʼre actually going back to cubicles and such, for privacy.

[Assistant] So before, you had more like cubicles with walls?

[User] Yeah, they werenʼt cubicles, but they were, like, really full walls, wooden walls with a top. And they were about, I guess, they came up to just below my neck, so I could always look over and see the next person. But they were a much bigger area. And, yeah.

[Assistant] So what are you going to miss about the job?

[User] Iʼm going to miss a lot of not being able to control things [laughs], because I know where thereʼs a lot of errors in DAS, and in describing, and cubic footage, and Iʼll miss not being able to finish those kinds of things, you know, make it right.

[Assistant] Yes, unfinished business.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Iʼm going to miss a lot of not being able to control things [laughs], because I know where thereʼs a lot of errors in DAS, and in describing, and cubic footage, and Iʼll miss not being able to finish those kinds of things, you know, make it right.

[Assistant] Yes, unfinished business.

[User] Unfinished business. And I hope that moving forward, somebody will dig in, and be anal. and just say, “hey, ” you know, do it. You don't get paid extra for doing those things, but itʼs very frustrating to go to my series, and I have .504 cubic feet, DAS says I have .252. And Iʼm like, “Howʼd that happen?” And you start delving in and comparing those discrepancies. Itʼs really diﬀicult, and itʼs also detailed. We had that problem of people putting the same series in the same box, which has really caused a problem. So you have one series, “Subject Files, ” itʼs Box One through Seven. Then you started “Correspondence, ” but you put half of the Correspondence in Box Seven. Youʼre basically counting everything twice, which itʼs not that much cubic feet, but it does add up after a while.

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] Yeah. And I donʼt know really where they are, with how important that is, thatʼs my point. How important is it, is my thing.

[Assistant] I know what you mean, weʼre still not using HMS [Holdings Management System], so thatʼs when you would think it would be important. I donʼt know.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah. And I donʼt know really where they are, with how important that is, thatʼs my point. How important is it, is my thing.

[Assistant] I know what you mean, weʼre still not using HMS [Holdings Management System], so thatʼs when you would think it would be important. I donʼt know.

[User] But if you look at other libraries, theyʼre way behind us, you know, especially the older libraries. And I always wonder, you know, “Well, if theyʼre not enforcing certain things with this library, then why do they enforce it on everybody else?” I mean, to me, the most frustrating thing, working at the library, was the way everything was done diﬀerently at every library. Right?

[Assistant] Right.

[User] And at the regions, you had these forms, when you added cubic feet—I don't know, it was a 14044, or something like that. And you had to put it down precisely, it had to go up to somebody, you had accessioning forms when new material came in, you had a database. And all the regions, as far as I know, pretty much had to do it the same way. And then when I went to the library, I said, “Well, where's your loan database?” or “Where's your this?” And they had nothing. And that part is weird, strange.

[Assistant] Yeah, I mean, for the regions, theyʼre federal forms right? Theyʼre actually, yeah, part of the federal record to have these oﬀicial forms. But they don't have those at the library, or didnʼt. I guess they might have some more now than they did before.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And at the regions, you had these forms, when you added cubic feet—I don't know, it was a 14044, or something like that. And you had to put it down precisely, it had to go up to somebody, you had accessioning forms when new material came in, you had a database. And all the regions, as far as I know, pretty much had to do it the same way. And then when I went to the library, I said, “Well, where's your loan database?” or “Where's your this?” And they had nothing. And that part is weird, strange.

[Assistant] Yeah, I mean, for the regions, theyʼre federal forms right? Theyʼre actually, yeah, part of the federal record to have these oﬀicial forms. But they don't have those at the library, or didnʼt. I guess they might have some more now than they did before.

[User] I think for even loans that we took out to other libraries, I donʼt even think everybody was using the same loan form back then. And I said, “Well, how do you record when nothing comes back, if it's not dated somewhere?” You know, there were just diﬀerent things that were really diﬀerent. Because [in the region] we could get in big trouble, like putting the wrong amount of cubic footage on a form. And maybe thatʼs because we had the agency records. And if the agency wanted something, and you couldnʼt find it, well, then you were in a lot of trouble.

[Assistant] Yeah, yeah.

[User] And so maybe with the library, itʼs all donor deed, at least in our library. And maybe things are more copasetic among the PRA [Presidential Records Act] libraries. I donʼt know, I havenʼt worked there, so Iʼm not sure.

[Assistant] Is there anything else you'd like to talk about, as far as work?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I think for even loans that we took out to other libraries, I donʼt even think everybody was using the same loan form back then. And I said, “Well, how do you record when nothing comes back, if it's not dated somewhere?” You know, there were just diﬀerent things that were really diﬀerent. Because [in the region] we could get in big trouble, like putting the wrong amount of cubic footage on a form. And maybe thatʼs because we had the agency records. And if the agency wanted something, and you couldnʼt find it, well, then you were in a lot of trouble.

[Assistant] Yeah, yeah.

[User] And so maybe with the library, itʼs all donor deed, at least in our library. And maybe things are more copasetic among the PRA [Presidential Records Act] libraries. I donʼt know, I havenʼt worked there, so Iʼm not sure.

[Assistant] Is there anything else you'd like to talk about, as far as work?

[User] No, Iʼm just going to miss a lot of my work. And as I told Brittany, Iʼm not a winter person. So maybe when itʼs raining, and freezing cold, and Iʼm bored, Iʼll come in and do some crap work. And nobody has to train me.

[Assistant] That's true. Youʼre ready to get started.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And so maybe with the library, itʼs all donor deed, at least in our library. And maybe things are more copasetic among the PRA [Presidential Records Act] libraries. I donʼt know, I havenʼt worked there, so Iʼm not sure.

[Assistant] Is there anything else you'd like to talk about, as far as work?

[User] No, Iʼm just going to miss a lot of my work. And as I told Brittany, Iʼm not a winter person. So maybe when itʼs raining, and freezing cold, and Iʼm bored, Iʼll come in and do some crap work. And nobody has to train me.

[Assistant] That's true. Youʼre ready to get started.

[User] [Laughs] Yeah. And then, like I said, the biggest problem with volunteers is having to train them—or interns. And at least if I come in and do something, I donʼt need any of that.

[Assistant] Thatʼs right, thatʼs right.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, Iʼm just going to miss a lot of my work. And as I told Brittany, Iʼm not a winter person. So maybe when itʼs raining, and freezing cold, and Iʼm bored, Iʼll come in and do some crap work. And nobody has to train me.

[Assistant] That's true. Youʼre ready to get started.

[User] [Laughs] Yeah. And then, like I said, the biggest problem with volunteers is having to train them—or interns. And at least if I come in and do something, I donʼt need any of that.

[Assistant] Thatʼs right, thatʼs right.

[User] So Iʼm hoping everything goes well for the library moving forward.

[Assistant] Well, I guess the libraryʼs almost done with a lot of their collections, right? How much still needs to be processed?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] So Iʼm hoping everything goes well for the library moving forward.

[Assistant] Well, I guess the libraryʼs almost done with a lot of their collections, right? How much still needs to be processed?

[User] And thatʼs going to change a lot of what you guys are doing, of course. The most stuﬀ left is that Presidential Personnel Oﬀice [Collection], which is probably pretty boring and a lot of Social Security numbers. And then, if thatʼs done, I mean, youʼre pretty much, I think itʼs only like a thousand cubic feet that are left to be processed.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] So thatʼll change what everybodyʼs focus is, and Iʼm sure it'll be going back to checking mistakes previously and stuﬀ like that.

[Assistant] And maybe doing some rehousing of stuﬀ thatʼs in older boxes.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] So thatʼll change what everybodyʼs focus is, and Iʼm sure it'll be going back to checking mistakes previously and stuﬀ like that.

[Assistant] And maybe doing some rehousing of stuﬀ thatʼs in older boxes.

[User] Yes, thereʼs some problems with that. But again, as when I came from the region to there, that part was the country club. The way the records [in the region] were stored in the most horrific FRC boxes and all over the place. That was nice, to come into that environment where everything was in a little Hollinger box.

[Assistant] Right, right.

[User] So moving forward, I think thatʼs kind of the way itʼs going to go, yeah.

[Assistant] OK, I can shut oﬀ the recording now. Nice talking to you.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Absolutely. The wind tunnel. There were other wind tunnels involved, but I was fortunate enough to be involved with a tunnel that was particularly suited to the speed range for those particular aircraft. Those were exciting times in aeronautics, and I remember in the early fifties when Dick [Richard T.] Whitcomb discovered the famous area rule. I accompanied him to a visit to General Dynamics out in San Diego during the period when the [Convair F-] 102 aircraft was under contract. And, we helped turn that whole operation around; and General Dynamics went on [to redesign], first, for the 102A, to demonstrate, in no uncertain terms, the effectiveness of the area rule. And then they went on to redesign the [F-]106, which was a perfect example of a[n] area rule application for a tail-less airplane.

[Assistant] You must’ve ended up crossing the country out to Edwards frequently then.

[User] Well, I was out at Edwards quite a bit, because I was also the Langley member of the Research Airplane Panel—

[Assistant] My next question would go right there.

[User] —which kind of oversaw the operation of the research activity. At one time, Edwards was called the Langley High-Speed Station. That was a division of Langley. And Hartley [A.] Soulé, who was my boss, as Assistant Director at Langley; also wore a Headquarters hat as the Research Airplane Leader.

[Assistant] So, you got into the rockets right out of jets?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I was out at Edwards quite a bit, because I was also the Langley member of the Research Airplane Panel—

[Assistant] My next question would go right there.

[User] —which kind of oversaw the operation of the research activity. At one time, Edwards was called the Langley High-Speed Station. That was a division of Langley. And Hartley [A.] Soulé, who was my boss, as Assistant Director at Langley; also wore a Headquarters hat as the Research Airplane Leader.

[Assistant] So, you got into the rockets right out of jets?

[User] Rockets—

[Assistant] You were doing them at the same time practically, weren’t you?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —which kind of oversaw the operation of the research activity. At one time, Edwards was called the Langley High-Speed Station. That was a division of Langley. And Hartley [A.] Soulé, who was my boss, as Assistant Director at Langley; also wore a Headquarters hat as the Research Airplane Leader.

[Assistant] So, you got into the rockets right out of jets?

[User] Rockets—

[Assistant] You were doing them at the same time practically, weren’t you?

[User] Well, there was a lot of criticism of NASA in the fifties for not doing more in space, and some of that criticism was unfounded.

[Assistant] You mean NACA or NASA?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Rockets—

[Assistant] You were doing them at the same time practically, weren’t you?

[User] Well, there was a lot of criticism of NASA in the fifties for not doing more in space, and some of that criticism was unfounded.

[Assistant] You mean NACA or NASA?

[User] Huh?

[Assistant] You mean N-A-C-A?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, there was a lot of criticism of NASA in the fifties for not doing more in space, and some of that criticism was unfounded.

[Assistant] You mean NACA or NASA?

[User] Huh?

[Assistant] You mean N-A-C-A?

[User] N-A-C-A, yes.

[Assistant] I’m sorry. Just a correction.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] N-A-C-A was N-A-C-A until ’58.

[Assistant] Right.

[User] But then we had, of course, the Pilotless Aircraft Research Station at Wallops [Island, Virginia], which was very effective in particular before we had a transonic wind tunnel.

[Assistant] Uhm-hm.

[User] The transonic wind tunnel didn’t come into play at all until the middle-fifties really.

[Assistant] So you had the tools coming along that almost—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] But then we had, of course, the Pilotless Aircraft Research Station at Wallops [Island, Virginia], which was very effective in particular before we had a transonic wind tunnel.

[Assistant] Uhm-hm.

[User] The transonic wind tunnel didn’t come into play at all until the middle-fifties really.

[Assistant] So you had the tools coming along that almost—

[User] Had the what?

[Assistant] You had the tools coming along, but almost at pace with just exactly what you needed.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The transonic wind tunnel didn’t come into play at all until the middle-fifties really.

[Assistant] So you had the tools coming along that almost—

[User] Had the what?

[Assistant] You had the tools coming along, but almost at pace with just exactly what you needed.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] So, the X-1 through the X-15: What was your input with those?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] So, the X-1 through the X-15: What was your input with those?

[User] Well, the X-1 was [an] aspect ratio 6 straight [wing] airplane. Now, looking back, it seems bizarre that we should ever have hoped a configuration like that would be a transonic airplane. But it did have a thin wing. We had a 6% wing. 8% was the one that [Charles E.] Yeager flew.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] And then NASA had one with 10%. And then in time there was a low-aspect ratio—aspect ratio 4—X-1E, which I had a hand in having built. And that is the wing that’s on the model outside the—not the model, but the actual aircraft, outside the Headquarters building out at Dryden Station [Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California].

[Assistant] Yes. I’ve seen it many times.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, the X-1 was [an] aspect ratio 6 straight [wing] airplane. Now, looking back, it seems bizarre that we should ever have hoped a configuration like that would be a transonic airplane. But it did have a thin wing. We had a 6% wing. 8% was the one that [Charles E.] Yeager flew.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] And then NASA had one with 10%. And then in time there was a low-aspect ratio—aspect ratio 4—X-1E, which I had a hand in having built. And that is the wing that’s on the model outside the—not the model, but the actual aircraft, outside the Headquarters building out at Dryden Station [Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California].

[Assistant] Yes. I’ve seen it many times.

[User] So, then the D-558, John Stack was active in those days. John didn’t like rocket aircraft. He thought there ought to be a jet aircraft. And so the D-558-I was his brainchild, and that was a straight low-aspect ratio wing, something like the X-1E. But, in the meantime swept wings came along and just made a whole different ballgame out of aircraft design.

[Assistant] And then at the latter end of the Research Plane Program, you got into the lifting body concept. [With] the X-15, the fuselage almost flies itself, doesn’t it?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And then NASA had one with 10%. And then in time there was a low-aspect ratio—aspect ratio 4—X-1E, which I had a hand in having built. And that is the wing that’s on the model outside the—not the model, but the actual aircraft, outside the Headquarters building out at Dryden Station [Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California].

[Assistant] Yes. I’ve seen it many times.

[User] So, then the D-558, John Stack was active in those days. John didn’t like rocket aircraft. He thought there ought to be a jet aircraft. And so the D-558-I was his brainchild, and that was a straight low-aspect ratio wing, something like the X-1E. But, in the meantime swept wings came along and just made a whole different ballgame out of aircraft design.

[Assistant] And then at the latter end of the Research Plane Program, you got into the lifting body concept. [With] the X-15, the fuselage almost flies itself, doesn’t it?

[User] The lifting body came in line with the design of space aircraft.

[Assistant] Okay. All right.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] So, then the D-558, John Stack was active in those days. John didn’t like rocket aircraft. He thought there ought to be a jet aircraft. And so the D-558-I was his brainchild, and that was a straight low-aspect ratio wing, something like the X-1E. But, in the meantime swept wings came along and just made a whole different ballgame out of aircraft design.

[Assistant] And then at the latter end of the Research Plane Program, you got into the lifting body concept. [With] the X-15, the fuselage almost flies itself, doesn’t it?

[User] The lifting body came in line with the design of space aircraft.

[Assistant] Okay. All right.

[User] And, Al [Alfred J.] Eggers at Ames was the first one that come out with the M-1, I think it was. And Langley had…[the] HL-10, or whatever it was called. We used to call them “flying bathtubs” because they had very unusual characteristics; they had what we called a lift/drag ratio of a brick. But, in due time it turned out that you could in fact design a spacecraft with wings that could reenter and could be handled, and that’s the way the shuttle went.

[Assistant] Well, you were in those formative days of Mercury when NACA switched over to NASA. Did you look back to the research program—the Research Plane Program—for material ideas? For instance, you had thrusters on the X-15, etc.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The lifting body came in line with the design of space aircraft.

[Assistant] Okay. All right.

[User] And, Al [Alfred J.] Eggers at Ames was the first one that come out with the M-1, I think it was. And Langley had…[the] HL-10, or whatever it was called. We used to call them “flying bathtubs” because they had very unusual characteristics; they had what we called a lift/drag ratio of a brick. But, in due time it turned out that you could in fact design a spacecraft with wings that could reenter and could be handled, and that’s the way the shuttle went.

[Assistant] Well, you were in those formative days of Mercury when NACA switched over to NASA. Did you look back to the research program—the Research Plane Program—for material ideas? For instance, you had thrusters on the X-15, etc.

[User] Yes, well, we had thrusters on the X-15. Those are helpful. But I think one of the most important contributions of the X-15 was to demonstrate the ability for a pilot from 100,000 ft or more to eyeball a landing. And that was a fundamental reason why, when I was involved with the early days of the—I was the first Acting Director of the Shuttle Program—[I] insisted we could drop jet engines, which were part of our original concept, instead of having the spacecraft come down and [start] jet engines at 40,000 feet and then have to circle around and land. Because of the X-15 experience, we concluded that it was perfectly feasible and far more desirable to land the shuttle in that manner rather than to equip it with air-breathers that you had to take into space.

[Assistant] It did it time and again, the X-15 did.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And, Al [Alfred J.] Eggers at Ames was the first one that come out with the M-1, I think it was. And Langley had…[the] HL-10, or whatever it was called. We used to call them “flying bathtubs” because they had very unusual characteristics; they had what we called a lift/drag ratio of a brick. But, in due time it turned out that you could in fact design a spacecraft with wings that could reenter and could be handled, and that’s the way the shuttle went.

[Assistant] Well, you were in those formative days of Mercury when NACA switched over to NASA. Did you look back to the research program—the Research Plane Program—for material ideas? For instance, you had thrusters on the X-15, etc.

[User] Yes, well, we had thrusters on the X-15. Those are helpful. But I think one of the most important contributions of the X-15 was to demonstrate the ability for a pilot from 100,000 ft or more to eyeball a landing. And that was a fundamental reason why, when I was involved with the early days of the—I was the first Acting Director of the Shuttle Program—[I] insisted we could drop jet engines, which were part of our original concept, instead of having the spacecraft come down and [start] jet engines at 40,000 feet and then have to circle around and land. Because of the X-15 experience, we concluded that it was perfectly feasible and far more desirable to land the shuttle in that manner rather than to equip it with air-breathers that you had to take into space.

[Assistant] It did it time and again, the X-15 did.

[User] The X-15 was very, very helpful in that. And, it also was helpful in training the pilots to operate those jet controls, when they lost aerodynamic control, and to experience the transition back to the regime of flight, when their transonic controls could be operating.

[Assistant] Did you know at that time what was coming? When you were looking at that kind of technique, did you have some inkling of how that might apply to the future?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The X-15 was very, very helpful in that. And, it also was helpful in training the pilots to operate those jet controls, when they lost aerodynamic control, and to experience the transition back to the regime of flight, when their transonic controls could be operating.

[Assistant] Did you know at that time what was coming? When you were looking at that kind of technique, did you have some inkling of how that might apply to the future?

[User] Well, yes. During the Research Airplane Program, there was a period when the slogan was, “Faster and Higher; Faster and Higher.” And, attempts were made to equip the X-15 to fly mach 6, for instance. But it turned out in the course of the fifties, when there was a lot of theoretical work done on lifting bodies and hypersonic jets, you ran into the situation where, when you fly at mach numbers 10, 12, 15, you heat up the machine, so terribly, so that it became a problem of heat protection. Then realization was, “Hey, look if you went a little faster, escape all that, go into orbit and then come on back, and you only have to negotiate the reentry instead of flying through it continuously in the hot environment.”

[Assistant] So I gather from that, then, the first thoughts about going to orbit was a way to escape thermal problems, and it was a way of traveling across distances rather than going into space.

[User] That was certainly part of it. You could go half way around the world and then reenter instead of having to, you know, fly continuously at high mach numbers in the very high heat environment.

[Assistant] Do you get a kick out of the way your ideas keep reemerging now with the . . . we’re talking about supersonic transports that would do much the same thing?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, yes. During the Research Airplane Program, there was a period when the slogan was, “Faster and Higher; Faster and Higher.” And, attempts were made to equip the X-15 to fly mach 6, for instance. But it turned out in the course of the fifties, when there was a lot of theoretical work done on lifting bodies and hypersonic jets, you ran into the situation where, when you fly at mach numbers 10, 12, 15, you heat up the machine, so terribly, so that it became a problem of heat protection. Then realization was, “Hey, look if you went a little faster, escape all that, go into orbit and then come on back, and you only have to negotiate the reentry instead of flying through it continuously in the hot environment.”

[Assistant] So I gather from that, then, the first thoughts about going to orbit was a way to escape thermal problems, and it was a way of traveling across distances rather than going into space.

[User] That was certainly part of it. You could go half way around the world and then reenter instead of having to, you know, fly continuously at high mach numbers in the very high heat environment.

[Assistant] Do you get a kick out of the way your ideas keep reemerging now with the . . . we’re talking about supersonic transports that would do much the same thing?

[User] Well, the supersonic transport is a low mach number; and, ironically, the lift/drag ratio of a mach 3 aircraft can be very high and approach that of a subsonic aircraft. The problem has been the propulsion has been inefficient and it wasn’t worth doing. Now, and I haven’t followed that too closely in recent years, but we know there are military jets [that] can now go supersonic without afterburners. And, improvements in efficiency of the supersonic-type power plants would make possible the mach 2, mach 2½ transport in time.

[Assistant] Yes, I’m thinking particularly of the power plant for the proposed F-22. That’s the engine that can do that.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That was certainly part of it. You could go half way around the world and then reenter instead of having to, you know, fly continuously at high mach numbers in the very high heat environment.

[Assistant] Do you get a kick out of the way your ideas keep reemerging now with the . . . we’re talking about supersonic transports that would do much the same thing?

[User] Well, the supersonic transport is a low mach number; and, ironically, the lift/drag ratio of a mach 3 aircraft can be very high and approach that of a subsonic aircraft. The problem has been the propulsion has been inefficient and it wasn’t worth doing. Now, and I haven’t followed that too closely in recent years, but we know there are military jets [that] can now go supersonic without afterburners. And, improvements in efficiency of the supersonic-type power plants would make possible the mach 2, mach 2½ transport in time.

[Assistant] Yes, I’m thinking particularly of the power plant for the proposed F-22. That’s the engine that can do that.

[User] That would be able to go supersonic without afterburners.

[Assistant] And cruise there.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, the supersonic transport is a low mach number; and, ironically, the lift/drag ratio of a mach 3 aircraft can be very high and approach that of a subsonic aircraft. The problem has been the propulsion has been inefficient and it wasn’t worth doing. Now, and I haven’t followed that too closely in recent years, but we know there are military jets [that] can now go supersonic without afterburners. And, improvements in efficiency of the supersonic-type power plants would make possible the mach 2, mach 2½ transport in time.

[Assistant] Yes, I’m thinking particularly of the power plant for the proposed F-22. That’s the engine that can do that.

[User] That would be able to go supersonic without afterburners.

[Assistant] And cruise there.

[User] And cruise.

[Assistant] What was it like when NACA became NASA? Did people resent the shift? Some felt the Mercury Program might injure their careers, I see. Why did they feel like that?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That would be able to go supersonic without afterburners.

[Assistant] And cruise there.

[User] And cruise.

[Assistant] What was it like when NACA became NASA? Did people resent the shift? Some felt the Mercury Program might injure their careers, I see. Why did they feel like that?

[User] Well, there was quite a bit of feeling of that nature. At Langley, there was a whole group who were still riding the high wave of contributing to the success of military aircraft. Suddenly overnight, this space business comes about. And we had people at Langley who refused to really get into the mode of space. And there was a lot of feeling about that.

[Assistant] Didn’t they take the idea seriously?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And cruise.

[Assistant] What was it like when NACA became NASA? Did people resent the shift? Some felt the Mercury Program might injure their careers, I see. Why did they feel like that?

[User] Well, there was quite a bit of feeling of that nature. At Langley, there was a whole group who were still riding the high wave of contributing to the success of military aircraft. Suddenly overnight, this space business comes about. And we had people at Langley who refused to really get into the mode of space. And there was a lot of feeling about that.

[Assistant] Didn’t they take the idea seriously?

[User] What happened at Langley was when Project Mercury came about in ’59, Bob [Robert R.] Gilruth, who was the Langley Assistant Director, was named the leader of that program; and he asked me to be his Deputy. It was called the Space Task Group. And while we were established at Langley in a certain area, it was assigned to the Space Task Group, but administratively reported to [NASA] Headquarters. So we had that arrangement of a program within a Center that wasn’t responsible to the Center. And that resulted in a conflict of interest at times, because Project Mercury, in ’59 or ’60, was half the NASA budget. And, yet we had a very small group.

[Assistant] Who were they? Who do you remember from the group?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] What happened at Langley was when Project Mercury came about in ’59, Bob [Robert R.] Gilruth, who was the Langley Assistant Director, was named the leader of that program; and he asked me to be his Deputy. It was called the Space Task Group. And while we were established at Langley in a certain area, it was assigned to the Space Task Group, but administratively reported to [NASA] Headquarters. So we had that arrangement of a program within a Center that wasn’t responsible to the Center. And that resulted in a conflict of interest at times, because Project Mercury, in ’59 or ’60, was half the NASA budget. And, yet we had a very small group.

[Assistant] Who were they? Who do you remember from the group?

[User] Well, of course, Gilruth and myself and Max [Maxime A.] Faget, Chuck [Charles W.] Mathews, a group of others and Chris [Christopher C.] Kraft [Jr.], who came out of the Flight Division of Langley. About the same time that this was all happening, as NACA transformed into NASA, there was a policy group at Headquarters deciding that, perhaps, they should transfer all aeronautical flight research out to Dryden High-Speed Flight Station, in those days. Those rumors were not only rumors but initial plans to do that; they never materialized at the time. But the net result of all that was several, I would say, of the key flight people transferred to the Space Task Group. And so we had an influx of experienced flight people—aircraft—and that was very helpful when it came to the shuttle because the fellows at Houston not only had flight experience but, by that time, space experience. And the shuttle was a combination of aircraft and spacecraft; and it was an ideal undertaking for a group such as Johnson [Space Center, Houston, Texas].

[Assistant] So you had a mass that moved to the West Coast, to Dryden, and then you had the Space Task Group taking up the void left by that mass of people?

[User] Well, those people didn’t move.

[Assistant] They didn’t? They stayed right there?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, of course, Gilruth and myself and Max [Maxime A.] Faget, Chuck [Charles W.] Mathews, a group of others and Chris [Christopher C.] Kraft [Jr.], who came out of the Flight Division of Langley. About the same time that this was all happening, as NACA transformed into NASA, there was a policy group at Headquarters deciding that, perhaps, they should transfer all aeronautical flight research out to Dryden High-Speed Flight Station, in those days. Those rumors were not only rumors but initial plans to do that; they never materialized at the time. But the net result of all that was several, I would say, of the key flight people transferred to the Space Task Group. And so we had an influx of experienced flight people—aircraft—and that was very helpful when it came to the shuttle because the fellows at Houston not only had flight experience but, by that time, space experience. And the shuttle was a combination of aircraft and spacecraft; and it was an ideal undertaking for a group such as Johnson [Space Center, Houston, Texas].

[Assistant] So you had a mass that moved to the West Coast, to Dryden, and then you had the Space Task Group taking up the void left by that mass of people?

[User] Well, those people didn’t move.

[Assistant] They didn’t? They stayed right there?

[User] They moved to the Space Task Group.

[Assistant] Only the responsibilities moved to Dryden for aircraft?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, those people didn’t move.

[Assistant] They didn’t? They stayed right there?

[User] They moved to the Space Task Group.

[Assistant] Only the responsibilities moved to Dryden for aircraft?

[User] Responsibilities; some of it. Not all of it. It turned out, in fact, even today, there’s still some political upheavals about moving all of Langley flight research out there to Dryden. So over the years, Langley has continued to do flight research. But all I’m saying is that the result of the moment was, we had a group of hardcore flight research people into the pro-gram, and that was great. In addition to that, the Canadian [AVRO CF-] 102 aircraft was canceled because the Canadians, because of the developments in the intercontinental ballistic missile world, they had concluded that the top defense against that was not another supersonic aircraft. And so they canceled the airplane. And, that was a whole corps of people thrown out of work. And we got a visit from Bob Linlay, I believe, and [James A.] Chamberlin to our Space Task Group saying they had some experienced people up there and perhaps we could find a role for them. So a group of us went up there—Gilruth and myself and Paul [E.] Purser, Chuck Mathews, maybe a couple of others—and, in the course of one weekend up there, we doubled the size of the Space Task Group.

[Assistant] You brought in gold, didn’t you?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Responsibilities; some of it. Not all of it. It turned out, in fact, even today, there’s still some political upheavals about moving all of Langley flight research out there to Dryden. So over the years, Langley has continued to do flight research. But all I’m saying is that the result of the moment was, we had a group of hardcore flight research people into the pro-gram, and that was great. In addition to that, the Canadian [AVRO CF-] 102 aircraft was canceled because the Canadians, because of the developments in the intercontinental ballistic missile world, they had concluded that the top defense against that was not another supersonic aircraft. And so they canceled the airplane. And, that was a whole corps of people thrown out of work. And we got a visit from Bob Linlay, I believe, and [James A.] Chamberlin to our Space Task Group saying they had some experienced people up there and perhaps we could find a role for them. So a group of us went up there—Gilruth and myself and Paul [E.] Purser, Chuck Mathews, maybe a couple of others—and, in the course of one weekend up there, we doubled the size of the Space Task Group.

[Assistant] You brought in gold, didn’t you?

[User] The State Department was working with us; and 2 days later we had some of those people down at Langley.

[Assistant] Excellent.

[User] Because they were able to expedite the transfer.

[Assistant] So, when it comes to, and I’m not talking about inventing Project Mercury as a concept, but I’m thinking from the point of actually building a spacecraft that would fly in space and deciding what was necessary to do that: How large was that group of people that actually came up with what we came to know as Project Mercury?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The State Department was working with us; and 2 days later we had some of those people down at Langley.

[Assistant] Excellent.

[User] Because they were able to expedite the transfer.

[Assistant] So, when it comes to, and I’m not talking about inventing Project Mercury as a concept, but I’m thinking from the point of actually building a spacecraft that would fly in space and deciding what was necessary to do that: How large was that group of people that actually came up with what we came to know as Project Mercury?

[User] In the fundamental spacecraft concept, there [were] probably not more than a half a dozen people involved with that. Max Faget [and] Caldwell [C.] Johnson were probably the two most influential people in that design. And operationally, Mathews and Gilruth had a lot to do with it. The rocket part, of course, was the Atlas; and our contributions to that were really that of project managers, utilizing the lift capabilities of that. We had nothing to do with the propulsion, except for the interface where Mercury had to be set on top of the Atlas.

[Assistant] Did you have anything to do with man-rating the Atlas? I mean, that called into some redundant systems into the system and so forth.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Because they were able to expedite the transfer.

[Assistant] So, when it comes to, and I’m not talking about inventing Project Mercury as a concept, but I’m thinking from the point of actually building a spacecraft that would fly in space and deciding what was necessary to do that: How large was that group of people that actually came up with what we came to know as Project Mercury?

[User] In the fundamental spacecraft concept, there [were] probably not more than a half a dozen people involved with that. Max Faget [and] Caldwell [C.] Johnson were probably the two most influential people in that design. And operationally, Mathews and Gilruth had a lot to do with it. The rocket part, of course, was the Atlas; and our contributions to that were really that of project managers, utilizing the lift capabilities of that. We had nothing to do with the propulsion, except for the interface where Mercury had to be set on top of the Atlas.

[Assistant] Did you have anything to do with man-rating the Atlas? I mean, that called into some redundant systems into the system and so forth.

[User] Well—

[Assistant] You had to set specs for it, didn’t you?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well—

[Assistant] You had to set specs for it, didn’t you?

[User] Yes. Man-rating was involved at that extent, and probably through more intense scrutiny of the production process.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] That’s really what it was.

[Assistant] Well, that must’ve been a hectic time, in coming up with a design. You didn’t have a great deal of time to do that in, did you?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. Man-rating was involved at that extent, and probably through more intense scrutiny of the production process.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] That’s really what it was.

[Assistant] Well, that must’ve been a hectic time, in coming up with a design. You didn’t have a great deal of time to do that in, did you?

[User] There were some problems. Like, I think Dr. [Hugh L.] Dryden wanted a metallic heatshield, for instance; and at that time the ablative material was fairly new, and there wasn’t enough experience with it; and we had built a metallic heatshield—[a] beryllium heatshield—for the Redstone Program. But in due time it turned out that the composite heatshield was the way to go. And that’s the way it went.

[Assistant] And that became very expensive.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s really what it was.

[Assistant] Well, that must’ve been a hectic time, in coming up with a design. You didn’t have a great deal of time to do that in, did you?

[User] There were some problems. Like, I think Dr. [Hugh L.] Dryden wanted a metallic heatshield, for instance; and at that time the ablative material was fairly new, and there wasn’t enough experience with it; and we had built a metallic heatshield—[a] beryllium heatshield—for the Redstone Program. But in due time it turned out that the composite heatshield was the way to go. And that’s the way it went.

[Assistant] And that became very expensive.

[User] Avco was involved with that up in Lowell, Massachusetts.

[Assistant] But the time element. I’m still fascinated by how quickly it was done. How little time did you really have to come up with something that was useful?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] There were some problems. Like, I think Dr. [Hugh L.] Dryden wanted a metallic heatshield, for instance; and at that time the ablative material was fairly new, and there wasn’t enough experience with it; and we had built a metallic heatshield—[a] beryllium heatshield—for the Redstone Program. But in due time it turned out that the composite heatshield was the way to go. And that’s the way it went.

[Assistant] And that became very expensive.

[User] Avco was involved with that up in Lowell, Massachusetts.

[Assistant] But the time element. I’m still fascinated by how quickly it was done. How little time did you really have to come up with something that was useful?

[User] Well, one of the interesting things is that we had the responsibility of decision-making. It didn’t have to pass through a bunch of committees. And, that was very instrumental in being able to decide something and go ahead with it. I ran into that myself during the astronaut selection program. Bob [Gilruth] had given me the responsibility of doing that, and in the course of 2 months, after a bunch of interviews, we had one meeting at Langley when I went through the maybe 25 candidates by that time. And, in the course of 2 hours, [we] came up with about a dozen and called in Gilruth; and we just decided on seven, and then the next half hour I had contacted them by phone. Now you couldn’t possibly do that in these days, you know, without a lot of criticism. Unfortunately, the only criticism we ever really got was, some claimed it was a loaded selection because there was three Air Force, three Navy, and a Marine. And that was purely accidental.

[Assistant] And the Marine became the first one to fly in orbit.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Avco was involved with that up in Lowell, Massachusetts.

[Assistant] But the time element. I’m still fascinated by how quickly it was done. How little time did you really have to come up with something that was useful?

[User] Well, one of the interesting things is that we had the responsibility of decision-making. It didn’t have to pass through a bunch of committees. And, that was very instrumental in being able to decide something and go ahead with it. I ran into that myself during the astronaut selection program. Bob [Gilruth] had given me the responsibility of doing that, and in the course of 2 months, after a bunch of interviews, we had one meeting at Langley when I went through the maybe 25 candidates by that time. And, in the course of 2 hours, [we] came up with about a dozen and called in Gilruth; and we just decided on seven, and then the next half hour I had contacted them by phone. Now you couldn’t possibly do that in these days, you know, without a lot of criticism. Unfortunately, the only criticism we ever really got was, some claimed it was a loaded selection because there was three Air Force, three Navy, and a Marine. And that was purely accidental.

[Assistant] And the Marine became the first one to fly in orbit.

[User] The Marine, yeah. And he was not added because he was a Marine, I’ll tell you.

[Assistant] Let me ask you tangentially, how do you feel about him flying again?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Now those were the original specs. And those were put out before we even had a campaign under way to select the astronauts.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] And some of them, as I interviewed them, had read that information and had already discussed with their spouses whether or not—if they got a call, they might be willing to participate.

[Assistant] That’s wonderful. You’ve been asked the question over and over and over again; it wouldn’t be fair on this tape if we didn’t. No women? What happened?

[User] Well, the basic reason there was no woman is that the President of the United States said, “Select them from the graduates of the Flight Test Centers.” There weren’t any women in there.

[Assistant] So it truly was the President—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, the basic reason there was no woman is that the President of the United States said, “Select them from the graduates of the Flight Test Centers.” There weren’t any women in there.

[Assistant] So it truly was the President—

[User] The number one—

[Assistant] I’m sorry.

[User] —category. Now, it turned out Dr. [W. Randolph] Lovelace [II] thought it’d be a good idea to have a woman. And he didn’t talk to me about it, but he did talk to Gilruth. And Gilruth essentially told him what I told you, that this wasn’t a program to equate the sexes and capabilities. We had a job to do. And, the President streamlined it for us by saying, “Select them from experienced test pilots.”

[Assistant] So, it was a presidential decision that there be no women in the original first—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The number one—

[Assistant] I’m sorry.

[User] —category. Now, it turned out Dr. [W. Randolph] Lovelace [II] thought it’d be a good idea to have a woman. And he didn’t talk to me about it, but he did talk to Gilruth. And Gilruth essentially told him what I told you, that this wasn’t a program to equate the sexes and capabilities. We had a job to do. And, the President streamlined it for us by saying, “Select them from experienced test pilots.”

[Assistant] So, it was a presidential decision that there be no women in the original first—

[User] There wasn’t a decision there wouldn’t be any women. He said, “Select them from the graduates from the Test Pilot Schools.” And there didn’t happen to be any women from the Test Pilot Schools.

[Assistant] You showed them the Mercury capsule.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —category. Now, it turned out Dr. [W. Randolph] Lovelace [II] thought it’d be a good idea to have a woman. And he didn’t talk to me about it, but he did talk to Gilruth. And Gilruth essentially told him what I told you, that this wasn’t a program to equate the sexes and capabilities. We had a job to do. And, the President streamlined it for us by saying, “Select them from experienced test pilots.”

[Assistant] So, it was a presidential decision that there be no women in the original first—

[User] There wasn’t a decision there wouldn’t be any women. He said, “Select them from the graduates from the Test Pilot Schools.” And there didn’t happen to be any women from the Test Pilot Schools.

[Assistant] You showed them the Mercury capsule.

[User] Showed them drawings.

[Assistant] You showed them the drawings of the Mercury capsule. And as you said, John Glenn even asked to see it himself. Go ahead, you were going to say something.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] There wasn’t a decision there wouldn’t be any women. He said, “Select them from the graduates from the Test Pilot Schools.” And there didn’t happen to be any women from the Test Pilot Schools.

[Assistant] You showed them the Mercury capsule.

[User] Showed them drawings.

[Assistant] You showed them the drawings of the Mercury capsule. And as you said, John Glenn even asked to see it himself. Go ahead, you were going to say something.

[User] Well, what one of the—we would spread the drawings out and acquaint them with what at that time was the situation, and ask them if they thought there was any legitimate role for the test pilot experience. A lot depended on how they answered that question. Some would look at it and say, “Uh, I guess not.” Well, others would say, “My God, this is a pioneering venture. Of course.”

[Assistant] And that was the answer you were really wanting for that question.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Showed them drawings.

[Assistant] You showed them the drawings of the Mercury capsule. And as you said, John Glenn even asked to see it himself. Go ahead, you were going to say something.

[User] Well, what one of the—we would spread the drawings out and acquaint them with what at that time was the situation, and ask them if they thought there was any legitimate role for the test pilot experience. A lot depended on how they answered that question. Some would look at it and say, “Uh, I guess not.” Well, others would say, “My God, this is a pioneering venture. Of course.”

[Assistant] And that was the answer you were really wanting for that question.

[User] We just wanted to sense them out. Actually, some of us said, “The only criteria we were using was those commonsense [ones], how you select any pilot for a situation.” Some years later—in fact, about 2 years ago when I was down at Johnson as part of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel activity—I asked to sit down and chat with the current group of guys who initiate and select the astronauts. And we sat down for an interesting couple of hours with George [W. S.] Abbey and his key guys there and discussed it. And it’s surprising how little [has] changed in the criteria and the manner in which they select these people. Except there were far more highly qualified academic candidates now than we had in those days. Those weren’t even a consideration in those days.

[Assistant] You were looking for—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, what one of the—we would spread the drawings out and acquaint them with what at that time was the situation, and ask them if they thought there was any legitimate role for the test pilot experience. A lot depended on how they answered that question. Some would look at it and say, “Uh, I guess not.” Well, others would say, “My God, this is a pioneering venture. Of course.”

[Assistant] And that was the answer you were really wanting for that question.

[User] We just wanted to sense them out. Actually, some of us said, “The only criteria we were using was those commonsense [ones], how you select any pilot for a situation.” Some years later—in fact, about 2 years ago when I was down at Johnson as part of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel activity—I asked to sit down and chat with the current group of guys who initiate and select the astronauts. And we sat down for an interesting couple of hours with George [W. S.] Abbey and his key guys there and discussed it. And it’s surprising how little [has] changed in the criteria and the manner in which they select these people. Except there were far more highly qualified academic candidates now than we had in those days. Those weren’t even a consideration in those days.

[Assistant] You were looking for—

[User] Because we weren’t looking for mission specialists. We were looking for pilots really.

[Assistant] All right; good. When did you know who the first seven would be? And I know this sounds repetitious: But, at what point did you know it? And at what point did you carry that list to Gilruth?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] We just wanted to sense them out. Actually, some of us said, “The only criteria we were using was those commonsense [ones], how you select any pilot for a situation.” Some years later—in fact, about 2 years ago when I was down at Johnson as part of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel activity—I asked to sit down and chat with the current group of guys who initiate and select the astronauts. And we sat down for an interesting couple of hours with George [W. S.] Abbey and his key guys there and discussed it. And it’s surprising how little [has] changed in the criteria and the manner in which they select these people. Except there were far more highly qualified academic candidates now than we had in those days. Those weren’t even a consideration in those days.

[Assistant] You were looking for—

[User] Because we weren’t looking for mission specialists. We were looking for pilots really.

[Assistant] All right; good. When did you know who the first seven would be? And I know this sounds repetitious: But, at what point did you know it? And at what point did you carry that list to Gilruth?

[User] I knew it after the first 2 weeks I interviewed what my key guys were, providing they didn’t come up with any physical or mental [problems], and some did. I won’t say anymore about that. But those tests did reveal some discrepancies like that. Some medical; some mental. But, for the most part, those were made to screen out stuff that you might not recognize until it was too late in the program.

[Assistant] Who was your favorite? Is that an unfair question?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Because we weren’t looking for mission specialists. We were looking for pilots really.

[Assistant] All right; good. When did you know who the first seven would be? And I know this sounds repetitious: But, at what point did you know it? And at what point did you carry that list to Gilruth?

[User] I knew it after the first 2 weeks I interviewed what my key guys were, providing they didn’t come up with any physical or mental [problems], and some did. I won’t say anymore about that. But those tests did reveal some discrepancies like that. Some medical; some mental. But, for the most part, those were made to screen out stuff that you might not recognize until it was too late in the program.

[Assistant] Who was your favorite? Is that an unfair question?

[User] I don’t think that’s a very fair question. In fact, I never listed the order of choices of those fellows. But, at the time, we weren’t sure, and I asked, Gilruth and Dr. Dryden if we could have some backup NASA pilots. That didn’t go over too well with the military people, who thought somehow they would be given an unfair advantage. And, I did interview a couple; but none of the pilots at Edwards were interested at the time anyway.

[Assistant] Yeah, I remember—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I knew it after the first 2 weeks I interviewed what my key guys were, providing they didn’t come up with any physical or mental [problems], and some did. I won’t say anymore about that. But those tests did reveal some discrepancies like that. Some medical; some mental. But, for the most part, those were made to screen out stuff that you might not recognize until it was too late in the program.

[Assistant] Who was your favorite? Is that an unfair question?

[User] I don’t think that’s a very fair question. In fact, I never listed the order of choices of those fellows. But, at the time, we weren’t sure, and I asked, Gilruth and Dr. Dryden if we could have some backup NASA pilots. That didn’t go over too well with the military people, who thought somehow they would be given an unfair advantage. And, I did interview a couple; but none of the pilots at Edwards were interested at the time anyway.

[Assistant] Yeah, I remember—

[User] Because they were part of the experimental test pilot, anti-astronaut syndrome.

[Assistant] That was the Spam in the can and the—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I don’t think that’s a very fair question. In fact, I never listed the order of choices of those fellows. But, at the time, we weren’t sure, and I asked, Gilruth and Dr. Dryden if we could have some backup NASA pilots. That didn’t go over too well with the military people, who thought somehow they would be given an unfair advantage. And, I did interview a couple; but none of the pilots at Edwards were interested at the time anyway.

[Assistant] Yeah, I remember—

[User] Because they were part of the experimental test pilot, anti-astronaut syndrome.

[Assistant] That was the Spam in the can and the—

[User] Yeah, right.

[Assistant] —flying monkeys, and all those—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Because they were part of the experimental test pilot, anti-astronaut syndrome.

[Assistant] That was the Spam in the can and the—

[User] Yeah, right.

[Assistant] —flying monkeys, and all those—

[User] Yeah; yeah.

[Assistant] —disparaging remarks we all heard at the time. Neil [A.] Armstrong was at the Test Pilot School and was flying the X-15 at that time.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah, right.

[Assistant] —flying monkeys, and all those—

[User] Yeah; yeah.

[Assistant] —disparaging remarks we all heard at the time. Neil [A.] Armstrong was at the Test Pilot School and was flying the X-15 at that time.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] Was he even considered in the original group? Or did he come later?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah; yeah.

[Assistant] —disparaging remarks we all heard at the time. Neil [A.] Armstrong was at the Test Pilot School and was flying the X-15 at that time.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] Was he even considered in the original group? Or did he come later?

[User] He wasn’t considered in the original group because he was a NASA pilot— active. And, he did have an opportunity to be interviewed, but he declined it.

[Assistant] He and Joe [H.] Engle were both in that group, as a matter of fact, at Edwards.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Who was the other one?

[Assistant] Joe Engle.

[User] Oh, Joe Engle; yeah.

[Assistant] Yeah; yeah.

[User] No, they were—they came later when they realized that this wasn’t going to be a program that would be put in the closet after its completion, and that was the end of space.

[Assistant] Was that part of it? Was that particular group convinced that it wasn’t going to last? It was just a fad, and it would go away.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No, they were—they came later when they realized that this wasn’t going to be a program that would be put in the closet after its completion, and that was the end of space.

[Assistant] Was that part of it? Was that particular group convinced that it wasn’t going to last? It was just a fad, and it would go away.

[User] Hard to say. Part of it, I think, they began to realize, too, that the Research Airplane Program had come to an end. That the need for another research airplane after the X-15 didn’t exist. So that had a lot to do with their attitude.

[Assistant] My question—

[User] And a lot to do with the attitude of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots.

[Assistant] Michael Collins, Joe Engle, Neil Armstrong, and quite a few of them came out of that program out there.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And a lot to do with the attitude of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots.

[Assistant] Michael Collins, Joe Engle, Neil Armstrong, and quite a few of them came out of that program out there.

[User] I’m not sure all of them harbored the same view that some of the group did, about “Don’t be a Spam in the can.”

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] But, I think they all saw the beginning of the end—you see, the X-15 in the end was advertising for payloads; not as a research vehicle for flight, but as a vehicle for testing payloads in space. So there was a change in the whole concept of flight.

[Assistant] Let’s come back to the management table. What kind of discussions were taking place among all of you at that time? You must’ve had some great doubts, along with the great anticipation you had. What were you talking about behind the scenes?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] But, I think they all saw the beginning of the end—you see, the X-15 in the end was advertising for payloads; not as a research vehicle for flight, but as a vehicle for testing payloads in space. So there was a change in the whole concept of flight.

[Assistant] Let’s come back to the management table. What kind of discussions were taking place among all of you at that time? You must’ve had some great doubts, along with the great anticipation you had. What were you talking about behind the scenes?

[User] You mean in Project Mercury?

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] Well, there was a great concern that if you had a catastrophe. There was a lot of talk about having a risk assessment analysis made. And, we were required to fly an unmanned vehicle and the animal before we had a manned flight. But if you try and assess the relative risk of flying unmanned and flying with a man, just how you put the input of the man in there is a very subjective judgment. And in the end, none of the mathematical attempts to do that were successful, in the sense that, with so many sources of possible error, you might have a .3, a .4 success for an unmanned vehicle. A .3/.4 batting average [in baseball] you’d think was great, but in space it’s terrible. But on the other hand, there are certain things you could do with a man’s presence that might up that to the 8/9 category; 8.9. But, who would believe that kind of a back-of-the-envelope computation? So the best thing you do is scrutinize the engineering and production to the best of your ability and go with it. And that’s what we did.

[Assistant] You bite the bullet and trot on off.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] You mean in Project Mercury?

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] Well, there was a great concern that if you had a catastrophe. There was a lot of talk about having a risk assessment analysis made. And, we were required to fly an unmanned vehicle and the animal before we had a manned flight. But if you try and assess the relative risk of flying unmanned and flying with a man, just how you put the input of the man in there is a very subjective judgment. And in the end, none of the mathematical attempts to do that were successful, in the sense that, with so many sources of possible error, you might have a .3, a .4 success for an unmanned vehicle. A .3/.4 batting average [in baseball] you’d think was great, but in space it’s terrible. But on the other hand, there are certain things you could do with a man’s presence that might up that to the 8/9 category; 8.9. But, who would believe that kind of a back-of-the-envelope computation? So the best thing you do is scrutinize the engineering and production to the best of your ability and go with it. And that’s what we did.

[Assistant] You bite the bullet and trot on off.

[User] That’s pretty much what you still have to do.

[Assistant] Wasn’t the man your weakest link, the least understood element in the equation? The man was the hardest to define, wasn’t he?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, there was a great concern that if you had a catastrophe. There was a lot of talk about having a risk assessment analysis made. And, we were required to fly an unmanned vehicle and the animal before we had a manned flight. But if you try and assess the relative risk of flying unmanned and flying with a man, just how you put the input of the man in there is a very subjective judgment. And in the end, none of the mathematical attempts to do that were successful, in the sense that, with so many sources of possible error, you might have a .3, a .4 success for an unmanned vehicle. A .3/.4 batting average [in baseball] you’d think was great, but in space it’s terrible. But on the other hand, there are certain things you could do with a man’s presence that might up that to the 8/9 category; 8.9. But, who would believe that kind of a back-of-the-envelope computation? So the best thing you do is scrutinize the engineering and production to the best of your ability and go with it. And that’s what we did.

[Assistant] You bite the bullet and trot on off.

[User] That’s pretty much what you still have to do.

[Assistant] Wasn’t the man your weakest link, the least understood element in the equation? The man was the hardest to define, wasn’t he?

[User] Well, hard to define because you never knew what accidental event might take place that might require his judgment. And that did happen on a couple of flights, finally, you know. And, they weren’t planned. Gilruth had a saying. He said, “We try and plan for the unknowns. It’s the unknown unknowns that you have concerns about.” And that’s what you’re talking about, when you’re talking about risk assessment.

[Assistant] Were you, at the same time, working with the physicians who were trying to say, “Here’s what we expect the human body to do under these circumstances.” Was that giving you fits?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s pretty much what you still have to do.

[Assistant] Wasn’t the man your weakest link, the least understood element in the equation? The man was the hardest to define, wasn’t he?

[User] Well, hard to define because you never knew what accidental event might take place that might require his judgment. And that did happen on a couple of flights, finally, you know. And, they weren’t planned. Gilruth had a saying. He said, “We try and plan for the unknowns. It’s the unknown unknowns that you have concerns about.” And that’s what you’re talking about, when you’re talking about risk assessment.

[Assistant] Were you, at the same time, working with the physicians who were trying to say, “Here’s what we expect the human body to do under these circumstances.” Was that giving you fits?

[User] Yes. As a matter of fact, there was a concern that there wasn’t enough work done with animals before we sent a man up. There was a group under Dr. Hartcherig, I believe his name was—a presidential group—[that] came down and went over the whole medical activity with our medical people. They went out to Edwards and looked at the flight records of the physiological inputs for flying, then came back and they made a recommendation that I remember, here at Headquarters one Saturday morning, that the Redstone Program would be all right. That’s a short-duration flight. But before you fly a man in orbit, they proposed having a centrifuge program at Johnsville with some primates that would be tested, what they say, “over the hill.” And that was just a blockbuster. That would have put the program back, I don’t know how long. But fortunately, about a few days later, [Yuri] Gagarin went into space, and that was the end of it. But the lingering doubts are still there, you know. And it turned out Glenn did all right.

[Assistant] His eyeballs didn’t float out of his head. He could swallow; he could breathe; he could function.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, hard to define because you never knew what accidental event might take place that might require his judgment. And that did happen on a couple of flights, finally, you know. And, they weren’t planned. Gilruth had a saying. He said, “We try and plan for the unknowns. It’s the unknown unknowns that you have concerns about.” And that’s what you’re talking about, when you’re talking about risk assessment.

[Assistant] Were you, at the same time, working with the physicians who were trying to say, “Here’s what we expect the human body to do under these circumstances.” Was that giving you fits?

[User] Yes. As a matter of fact, there was a concern that there wasn’t enough work done with animals before we sent a man up. There was a group under Dr. Hartcherig, I believe his name was—a presidential group—[that] came down and went over the whole medical activity with our medical people. They went out to Edwards and looked at the flight records of the physiological inputs for flying, then came back and they made a recommendation that I remember, here at Headquarters one Saturday morning, that the Redstone Program would be all right. That’s a short-duration flight. But before you fly a man in orbit, they proposed having a centrifuge program at Johnsville with some primates that would be tested, what they say, “over the hill.” And that was just a blockbuster. That would have put the program back, I don’t know how long. But fortunately, about a few days later, [Yuri] Gagarin went into space, and that was the end of it. But the lingering doubts are still there, you know. And it turned out Glenn did all right.

[Assistant] His eyeballs didn’t float out of his head. He could swallow; he could breathe; he could function.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] I remember him saying all of those things that they thought might happen to him. But, everything was just great.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. As a matter of fact, there was a concern that there wasn’t enough work done with animals before we sent a man up. There was a group under Dr. Hartcherig, I believe his name was—a presidential group—[that] came down and went over the whole medical activity with our medical people. They went out to Edwards and looked at the flight records of the physiological inputs for flying, then came back and they made a recommendation that I remember, here at Headquarters one Saturday morning, that the Redstone Program would be all right. That’s a short-duration flight. But before you fly a man in orbit, they proposed having a centrifuge program at Johnsville with some primates that would be tested, what they say, “over the hill.” And that was just a blockbuster. That would have put the program back, I don’t know how long. But fortunately, about a few days later, [Yuri] Gagarin went into space, and that was the end of it. But the lingering doubts are still there, you know. And it turned out Glenn did all right.

[Assistant] His eyeballs didn’t float out of his head. He could swallow; he could breathe; he could function.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] I remember him saying all of those things that they thought might happen to him. But, everything was just great.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] Well, after Mercury was under way and before President [John F.] Kennedy set his goal of a landing on the Moon inside the decade, you were involved even in the early discussions of Project Apollo Moon missions.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] I remember him saying all of those things that they thought might happen to him. But, everything was just great.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] Well, after Mercury was under way and before President [John F.] Kennedy set his goal of a landing on the Moon inside the decade, you were involved even in the early discussions of Project Apollo Moon missions.

[User] Yes, we had a number of—

[Assistant] Even at that point.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] Well, after Mercury was under way and before President [John F.] Kennedy set his goal of a landing on the Moon inside the decade, you were involved even in the early discussions of Project Apollo Moon missions.

[User] Yes, we had a number of—

[Assistant] Even at that point.

[User] —studies going on, not only at the Space Task Group but Langley had a group under Clint [Clinton E.] Brown. And Clint Brown’s group was the one that really concentrated on a circumlunar flight with lunar capsules landing from orbit around the Moon.

[Assistant] Right from the beginning.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, we had a number of—

[Assistant] Even at that point.

[User] —studies going on, not only at the Space Task Group but Langley had a group under Clint [Clinton E.] Brown. And Clint Brown’s group was the one that really concentrated on a circumlunar flight with lunar capsules landing from orbit around the Moon.

[Assistant] Right from the beginning.

[User] They were one of the first to do that.

[Assistant] At that point, that was—what?—1961? 1962?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] —studies going on, not only at the Space Task Group but Langley had a group under Clint [Clinton E.] Brown. And Clint Brown’s group was the one that really concentrated on a circumlunar flight with lunar capsules landing from orbit around the Moon.

[Assistant] Right from the beginning.

[User] They were one of the first to do that.

[Assistant] At that point, that was—what?—1961? 1962?

[User] 19—1960, maybe.

[Assistant] 1960. That early on? Did you support that? Or did you think of doing it from a Space Station first? What was your position at that point?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Gemini kind of came into the picture with a realization that we had no rendezvous experience. And, so the Gemini Program really was sandwiched in between Mercury and Apollo; and we learned a lot about the rendezvous activity from Gemini.

[Assistant] And it got its start—Gemini—apparently, the seeds were planted for Gemini, it got started in that briefing on lunar orbit rendezvous, didn’t it?

[User] That could be. I couldn’t swear for certain that that’s how it came about. But there was a feeling that there ought to be something, some more experience beside Mercury into a more useful-type capsule. Gemini was a two-man capsule.

[Assistant] So, what were your original visions of Apollo then? If you were thinking about it that early on, what concept were you thinking of? Before the lunar orbit rendezvous concept?

[User] Probably, a lunar orbit mission as opposed to a space station. For instance, Clint Brown at Langley told me he had come to the conclusion that just a space station after Mercury wouldn’t be considered a really a big enough advancement in activity. And so he started his people working, with Thompson’s approval, on not only a lunar orbit rendezvous but on lunar landing. They had a contract with Chance-Vought [Aircraft Corporation] people at the time; and one of their people down there worked on a similar thing, I think, on the contract to Langley. So the thing kind of kept pushing; but by no means was the decision made at that time, because there was still a lot of interest in the brute force method of getting to the Moon. And, the lunar orbit rendezvous mode really is the one that survived the contests.

[Assistant] And you were trying—you were kicking this around in 1960.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, you know, Gilruth wasn’t present at that meeting that Dryden had with the President and his staff. And, it’s a mystery to me just what convincing argument persuaded the President that that would be an undertaking that was not only worthwhile but had a strong success—a big capability behind it. It’s always puzzled me, because we hadn’t thought about landing so much on the Moon as just studying about it. But here’s now a national commitment to do it. Now without that national commitment, there’s a good possibility we never would have done it, at least in that time frame.

[Assistant] And he made his announcement right after Alan [B.] Shepard [Jr.] made the initial Mercury lift-off.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] That has always seemed like, Boy, that’s a pretty big step from one end to the other so quickly. But your guys had numbers to show him; or at least, they had numbers behind them that convinced them that they could give him a winning argument, didn’t they?

[User] I don’t know who the prime speaker was. Might have been Abe Silverstein, I don’t know. I know Dryden was in there. But the President, you know, he must’ve been offered other options like space station, which as Clint Brown had concluded long before that was not a sufficiently bold step to attract the attention of the world, which was what the President wanted to do to the Russians.

[Assistant] Well, let’s focus on you for a moment. How did you feel that night when you heard him make that speech and out of the blue say, “I believe that within this decade we should land a man on the Moon and return him safely to Earth.”


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] That has always seemed like, Boy, that’s a pretty big step from one end to the other so quickly. But your guys had numbers to show him; or at least, they had numbers behind them that convinced them that they could give him a winning argument, didn’t they?

[User] I don’t know who the prime speaker was. Might have been Abe Silverstein, I don’t know. I know Dryden was in there. But the President, you know, he must’ve been offered other options like space station, which as Clint Brown had concluded long before that was not a sufficiently bold step to attract the attention of the world, which was what the President wanted to do to the Russians.

[Assistant] Well, let’s focus on you for a moment. How did you feel that night when you heard him make that speech and out of the blue say, “I believe that within this decade we should land a man on the Moon and return him safely to Earth.”

[User] I was kind of flabbergasted myself.

[Assistant] Where were you?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I was kind of flabbergasted myself.

[Assistant] Where were you?

[User] I was in— you mean, physically?

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] I was, I guess, over at my office at Langley. But once the announcement was made and the objective clearly stated, that cleared the air and you knew right then how to proceed, with what direction you were going, and put all your energy in that direction. There weren’t a lot of other options. And finally when the decision was made to lunar orbit rendezvous, that cleared the air; that cleared the air.

[Assistant] It pretty well laid out your course for you, didn’t it?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I was in— you mean, physically?

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] I was, I guess, over at my office at Langley. But once the announcement was made and the objective clearly stated, that cleared the air and you knew right then how to proceed, with what direction you were going, and put all your energy in that direction. There weren’t a lot of other options. And finally when the decision was made to lunar orbit rendezvous, that cleared the air; that cleared the air.

[Assistant] It pretty well laid out your course for you, didn’t it?

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] Where was the Saturn V at that stage? Was it still just a gleam in somebody’s eye?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I was, I guess, over at my office at Langley. But once the announcement was made and the objective clearly stated, that cleared the air and you knew right then how to proceed, with what direction you were going, and put all your energy in that direction. There weren’t a lot of other options. And finally when the decision was made to lunar orbit rendezvous, that cleared the air; that cleared the air.

[Assistant] It pretty well laid out your course for you, didn’t it?

[User] Yeah.

[Assistant] Where was the Saturn V at that stage? Was it still just a gleam in somebody’s eye?

[User] Well, the original Saturn 1 was a Redstone research and development program, really, for multi-engine stuff. The Saturn came in when the decision was made to go to lunar orbit rendezvous and you knew what kind of a vehicle was required. It was something to put a 100,000-pound capsule up there in orbit.

[Assistant] Absolutely amazing. Did you feel the technology of the time was up to that?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, the original Saturn 1 was a Redstone research and development program, really, for multi-engine stuff. The Saturn came in when the decision was made to go to lunar orbit rendezvous and you knew what kind of a vehicle was required. It was something to put a 100,000-pound capsule up there in orbit.

[Assistant] Absolutely amazing. Did you feel the technology of the time was up to that?

[User] Well, I think the main concern was really the Saturns. You look back, and that’s a tremendously complex motor and rocket. And with 200,000 chances of something going wrong, with all the interfaces and mechanisms at play there, Marshall [Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama] and the contractors did one hell of a job. And, we had a lot of luck, too.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] You know, it didn’t— wouldn’t have taken much to have something go wrong.

[Assistant] I heard Neil Armstrong one time say that today they’re shocked when the shuttle doesn’t work every time, but they were always surprised when the Saturn V did. It always performed for them, and they were always shocked about that, too. Was it that fragile a system? I mean, it was very complex, and you were pushing the edge of the technology—weren’t you?—with that thing.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think the main concern was really the Saturns. You look back, and that’s a tremendously complex motor and rocket. And with 200,000 chances of something going wrong, with all the interfaces and mechanisms at play there, Marshall [Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama] and the contractors did one hell of a job. And, we had a lot of luck, too.

[Assistant] Yeah.

[User] You know, it didn’t— wouldn’t have taken much to have something go wrong.

[Assistant] I heard Neil Armstrong one time say that today they’re shocked when the shuttle doesn’t work every time, but they were always surprised when the Saturn V did. It always performed for them, and they were always shocked about that, too. Was it that fragile a system? I mean, it was very complex, and you were pushing the edge of the technology—weren’t you?—with that thing.

[User] Well, I think the Marshall people felt that the technology was sufficiently advanced so they could put it all together. And fortunately for the nation, they had that conviction, because they sure did it!

[Assistant] They reached out and pulled things in, that’s for sure. You also worked with the unmanned Moon probes at the same time. That was another part of your—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] You know, it didn’t— wouldn’t have taken much to have something go wrong.

[Assistant] I heard Neil Armstrong one time say that today they’re shocked when the shuttle doesn’t work every time, but they were always surprised when the Saturn V did. It always performed for them, and they were always shocked about that, too. Was it that fragile a system? I mean, it was very complex, and you were pushing the edge of the technology—weren’t you?—with that thing.

[User] Well, I think the Marshall people felt that the technology was sufficiently advanced so they could put it all together. And fortunately for the nation, they had that conviction, because they sure did it!

[Assistant] They reached out and pulled things in, that’s for sure. You also worked with the unmanned Moon probes at the same time. That was another part of your—

[User] Lunar orbiter was at Langley at that time when I was deputy there. And that was at—Langley was the Lead Center on that. And, that was, you know, a precursor to the Apollo Program in the sense that we felt like we needed more photographic information to be able to select the landing. And the lunar orbiter was a very successful program. Primitive technology by today’s standards. I have a hanging on my wall at home of the first picture of the Earth taken from the Moon. And I have to tell you that’s what it is, because you look at it and the kinematics of the situation were pretty poor in those days compared to later Viking and the recent Voyager, you know. A tremendous difference in—

[Assistant] It was kind of a white blur, wasn’t it?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I think the Marshall people felt that the technology was sufficiently advanced so they could put it all together. And fortunately for the nation, they had that conviction, because they sure did it!

[Assistant] They reached out and pulled things in, that’s for sure. You also worked with the unmanned Moon probes at the same time. That was another part of your—

[User] Lunar orbiter was at Langley at that time when I was deputy there. And that was at—Langley was the Lead Center on that. And, that was, you know, a precursor to the Apollo Program in the sense that we felt like we needed more photographic information to be able to select the landing. And the lunar orbiter was a very successful program. Primitive technology by today’s standards. I have a hanging on my wall at home of the first picture of the Earth taken from the Moon. And I have to tell you that’s what it is, because you look at it and the kinematics of the situation were pretty poor in those days compared to later Viking and the recent Voyager, you know. A tremendous difference in—

[Assistant] It was kind of a white blur, wasn’t it?

[User] —technology.

[Assistant] Yeah. What was Moon ball?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Moon—?

[Assistant] Moon ball.

[User] Moon ball?

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] You got me.

[Assistant] Okay. I thought you were a proponent of a system of pounding spacecraft into the surface to test the surface strength.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh, I didn’t recognize it by that name.

[Assistant] Okay.

[User] But, we called them “lunar penetrators.”

[Assistant] All right.

[User] And, there were a couple of projects that Langley proposed on that, just to see if you could find out the depth of the lunar dust. Some like Professor Gold at Cornell, he thought [that if] an astronaut [stepped] on that [it’s] got to be like quicksand and [he’d] sink. So when opinions like that circulate, you think of some way of maybe finding out whether it’s true or not. And the penetrators were part of that system. But I’m not sure they were ever really accomplished.

[Assistant] No, I think they just skipped on past them, and went ahead with the—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] But, we called them “lunar penetrators.”

[Assistant] All right.

[User] And, there were a couple of projects that Langley proposed on that, just to see if you could find out the depth of the lunar dust. Some like Professor Gold at Cornell, he thought [that if] an astronaut [stepped] on that [it’s] got to be like quicksand and [he’d] sink. So when opinions like that circulate, you think of some way of maybe finding out whether it’s true or not. And the penetrators were part of that system. But I’m not sure they were ever really accomplished.

[Assistant] No, I think they just skipped on past them, and went ahead with the—

[User] I think one of the Surveyors went in and—those JPL [Jet Propulsion Laboratory] programs helped to alleviate concerns of that type.

[Assistant] Okay. The Manned Spacecraft Center was designated for Houston in April 1962. This momentum and this path that was laid out for you was beginning to jell very rapidly at that time. And, Axel T. Mattson, Assistant Chief of Full-Scale Research, was sent from Langley by Floyd Thompson to be a liaison. He was to report to you, I believe. Mattson, in an interview, said that he was really a spy for Langley. Is that true? And, why did Langley need a spy in Houston, if so?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No. No. I think after lunar orbiter, I became convinced big programs like that are a drain on a Center. Because you siphon people off, and after the program’s on, it’s hard to get them back into a research mode.

[Assistant] Yeah, yeah. Well, wasn’t it Mattson who introduced John Houbolt in Houston with his lunar orbit concept? Was—didn’t he have something to do with Houbolt coming down there?

[User] Oh, oh, I doubt that, because Houbolt was involved with the Space Task Group when they were still at Langley.

[Assistant] Oh, okay.

[User] This is before they went down there to Houston.

[Assistant] All right. You pulled a coup with Mattson, though, on the water drop test of the Apollo spacecraft, didn’t you? You guys went ahead and did a few tests of your own that really helped out in that respect.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] This is before they went down there to Houston.

[Assistant] All right. You pulled a coup with Mattson, though, on the water drop test of the Apollo spacecraft, didn’t you? You guys went ahead and did a few tests of your own that really helped out in that respect.

[User] Yeah, using the tank.

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] A tank, yeah. Those are the kind of things I mean. We had enough and Johnson would keep getting new people in, too; and sometime they don’t realize how a research center can be helped to utilize—to solve some of the problems. So, it was kind of an education process for me, too, to spread Langley’s capability down there among the people who weren’t so familiar with it.

[Assistant] When you came back to Washington, then, as Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, you made some adjustments in the way the Centers were used, though, didn’t you? For instance, Houston was named Lead Center on various projects. Langley was named Lead on others.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yeah, using the tank.

[Assistant] Yes.

[User] A tank, yeah. Those are the kind of things I mean. We had enough and Johnson would keep getting new people in, too; and sometime they don’t realize how a research center can be helped to utilize—to solve some of the problems. So, it was kind of an education process for me, too, to spread Langley’s capability down there among the people who weren’t so familiar with it.

[Assistant] When you came back to Washington, then, as Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, you made some adjustments in the way the Centers were used, though, didn’t you? For instance, Houston was named Lead Center on various projects. Langley was named Lead on others.

[User] Well, it wasn’t until the Shuttle Program that I got involved again really with that. And I was the first Acting Director of that program. And the whole question of management came up. And, there were various schemes proposed for this thing. But I felt that the important thing to the Shuttle Program was the end product itself, [which] was the shuttle itself, the vehicle going in orbit, and that everything should be aimed in that direction. And unlike the Apollo Program, where we had a Spacecraft Center report to Headquarters, and a Launch Vehicle Center report at Headquarters, and a Rocket Group report to Headquarters—

[Assistant] Watch your microphone.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, it wasn’t until the Shuttle Program that I got involved again really with that. And I was the first Acting Director of that program. And the whole question of management came up. And, there were various schemes proposed for this thing. But I felt that the important thing to the Shuttle Program was the end product itself, [which] was the shuttle itself, the vehicle going in orbit, and that everything should be aimed in that direction. And unlike the Apollo Program, where we had a Spacecraft Center report to Headquarters, and a Launch Vehicle Center report at Headquarters, and a Rocket Group report to Headquarters—

[Assistant] Watch your microphone.

[User] —that became very cumbersome. And, the system of engineering, the large part of Apollo, was done by Bellcomm. By the time the shuttle came around, we now have three Centers: very well experienced, capable of doing systems engineering on their own. And I felt [that] Houston in particular with the corps of flight people—aircraft people—not only from Langley but from industry, from Canada, were ideal people to handle this part of the program. Instead of trying to build up another large group at Headquarters, where it’s difficult to maintain technical competence for long periods, I conceived an idea based on my Langley experience with lunar orbiter of having Johnson as the Lead Center with a Headquarters staff here doing the job of policy-making, and having the launch activity and the booster activity handled by Marshall and Kennedy under this Lead Center concept. And it worked great, for about 8 or 9 years. You get on to a Level I/II, meeting, you couldn’t tell where those people came from unless you knew who they were!

[Assistant] It did work.

[User] And it really fell apart mostly after the first several flights of the Shuttle, when key people left, new people came in at Headquarters, the Centers, and they didn’t adhere to the rigor of the management structure that we had laid out.

[Assistant] Let’s go back. You were Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight at the time of the first lunar landings. Am I correct?