[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] The warlords dominating the organization. [Laughter] They were independent fiefdoms.

[Assistant] How did that cause problems with what needed to get done?

[User] It was hard to get [any] two fiefs to talk to each other, at least in a meaningful way. It's a natural thing. Each was doing what it thought was right. And from their point of view, it probably was right, but from the standpoint of getting the program done, they had to work as a team. And more than that, we had to have much better communications across the centers and the contractors than we had had up to that point in time. The success or failure of a program like Apollo depends upon all of the people doing the actual work understanding what it is that they are supposed to do and how that contributes to the overall program's success, the overall system.\n\n In particular, in the case of Apollo, it was essential that that communication be on a very rapid level, [and] also on various levels. You couldn't do it just on the design; it had to be on how it was going to operate and how you were going to handle safety, and the safety had to be built in across the board, as well as all of the other disciplines that are required for a successful program.\n\n One of the challenges was to make each of the program offices, both in the centers and at the contractor, realize that all of those disciplines were essential and that they had to be addressed early on, if we were, in fact, going to carry out a successful program.

[Assistant] And you were able to make those changes so that that communication was possible. Some people said that you had a lot of management freedom when you were in your position at NASA. Do you agree with that?

[User] Oh, yes, indeed, much more so than is currently possible anywhere in the government, that [is] in the public sector. The only programs that have that kind of management freedom now—and that's pretty limited—are the black programs.

[Assistant] Why do you think you had the freedom that you had?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] It also turned out, the centers really didn't want them back. [Laughter]

[Assistant] [Laughter] They were trying to pawn them off on you. When you first came to NASA, you asked John [H.] Disher and Del [Adelbert O.] Tischler to conduct an investigation of the Apollo schedule. Do you remember that?

[User] Vividly. That was an off-line kind of thing, and we were trying to figure out how we could get to the Moon in time, and so they went off and looked at what we were doing, and came back saying, "There's no way you're going to be able to do that." … I shared that review with Bob [Robert C.] Seamans [Jr.], and he said that, in effect, "Well, you know, you've got to burn that [report] and start over …, find out how to do it."\n\n Well, I had already decided [how] I was going to do it, but I wanted to be sure I had the support from Bob, who did … was, in fact, a tremendous supporter.

[Assistant] And you made several changes in procedures, some of which we talked about last time, like the all-up testing, but you also instituted a program called the concurrency program, or also called alternate paths. Can you tell us about that?

[User] I hadn't thought of it in that sense. In fact, those two are contradictory.

[Assistant] Explain that to us.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, we carried out, for example, two different development programs for the tanks, relatively small things. There were two kinds of high-pressure tanks that we carried on board, that we carried on in parallel until we got one that was lighter and worked.\n\n We did that wherever we could, we had parallel programs. For example, in the case of the lunar excursion module [LEM or LM], we had two guidance systems on it, one that was a simple one and another one more sophisticated, … either one of them could carry out the landing, but [one] without the bells and whistles that the main line did. But we had a backup there.

[Assistant] Is that kind of program something you think that would be feasible in today's atmosphere and industry?

[User] In industry, probably, but in NASA, probably not.

[Assistant] You're noted as crediting the Apollo Executive Group [AEG] for the success of Apollo. Can you tell us who was in this group and why they were successful?

[User] They were key to the success. So was the Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee [STAC]. [The members of the AEG] were the CEOs or the general managers of the [Apollo and Gemini] contractors, our major contractors. And it is always amazing if you can get the CEO to come and see what the total program is and what his group's problems are, how rapidly those problems get addressed and solved. It is a technique that you can only use when you have a program that's interesting enough so the CEO will come. But if he does, then you've really solved many, many of the problems that plague a lot of programs. The other group, the STAC group, was equally effective, but with our external world.\n\n I highly advise … anyone that's running a large program … to get the [CEO’s of] the contractors who are doing the work involved. And we're doing that here [at Kistler], of course.

[Assistant] Great. Now if it's okay with you, I'd like to talk about Gemini. That's something we didn't touch on in our last interview.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Twelve? I think there were thirteen. Maybe it was twelve. I guess it was twelve. At that point in time we had flown the first three, and so we had nine more to go. I said, "Look. Unless we can get these things flying on one-month centers, we're going to have to terminate the program." And I remember Mr. Mac [James S. McDonnell, Jr., President of McDonnell aircraft Corporation] calling me and saying, "Are you really serious about that?" And I said, "Dead serious. If you can't figure out how to get these things launched on one-month centers, we're going to terminate whenever we get to this point in time."\n\n And lo and behold, they went back and figured out—the Titan group, who were launching these things at Sunnyvale [California], what is Lockheed's group there, and the McDonnell-Douglas troops, John [F.] Yardley, got together and figured out how to get them launched on one. In fact, at one time we launched two of them on one-day centers. So it was amazing what you could do when you set your mind to it and get out of the box of what you're used to doing.

[Assistant] You mentioned that when you were considering the option of canceling Gemini, that there would have been a two-year gap between the missions, the last Gemini and the first Apollo one. What were some of the negative aspects of that to you?

[User] Not the last Gemini; the last Mercury.

[Assistant] Oh, the last Mercury. Okay.

[User] And the first Apollo.

[Assistant] So that was before any Gemini missions had even been flown.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Not the last Gemini; the last Mercury.

[Assistant] Oh, the last Mercury. Okay.

[User] And the first Apollo.

[Assistant] So that was before any Gemini missions had even been flown.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Okay. So what were some of those negative aspects of having it?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And the first Apollo.

[Assistant] So that was before any Gemini missions had even been flown.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Okay. So what were some of those negative aspects of having it?

[User] In order to maintain public interest and support for a program, you have to be doing something that you can report to the public. Progress is important. So without a Gemini Program, about all you'd do is send some pictures of—well, I don't know what we'd send of. Of engine tests out in L.A. [Los Angeles, California], which, after a few of them, you don't have much publicity associated with it.\n\n You also had the whole astronaut crew there, that were interested in doing some flying as well, and they needed to have the practice of working in space before they went off to the Moon. So it was both something that needed to be done in terms of maintaining the skills of the astronaut crew and to make sure the public support continued. As you know, the first Gemini flight we came up with got a ticker-tape parade down New York.

[Assistant] Gemini IV, probably, because you realized the importance at that time.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Okay. So what were some of those negative aspects of having it?

[User] In order to maintain public interest and support for a program, you have to be doing something that you can report to the public. Progress is important. So without a Gemini Program, about all you'd do is send some pictures of—well, I don't know what we'd send of. Of engine tests out in L.A. [Los Angeles, California], which, after a few of them, you don't have much publicity associated with it.\n\n You also had the whole astronaut crew there, that were interested in doing some flying as well, and they needed to have the practice of working in space before they went off to the Moon. So it was both something that needed to be done in terms of maintaining the skills of the astronaut crew and to make sure the public support continued. As you know, the first Gemini flight we came up with got a ticker-tape parade down New York.

[Assistant] Gemini IV, probably, because you realized the importance at that time.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] The first EVAs that were done, even though the Russians did beat us.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] In order to maintain public interest and support for a program, you have to be doing something that you can report to the public. Progress is important. So without a Gemini Program, about all you'd do is send some pictures of—well, I don't know what we'd send of. Of engine tests out in L.A. [Los Angeles, California], which, after a few of them, you don't have much publicity associated with it.\n\n You also had the whole astronaut crew there, that were interested in doing some flying as well, and they needed to have the practice of working in space before they went off to the Moon. So it was both something that needed to be done in terms of maintaining the skills of the astronaut crew and to make sure the public support continued. As you know, the first Gemini flight we came up with got a ticker-tape parade down New York.

[Assistant] Gemini IV, probably, because you realized the importance at that time.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] The first EVAs that were done, even though the Russians did beat us.

[User] Sure. But we also had to be able to do that anyhow.\n\n I don't know, what else would you like to know about Gemini?

[Assistant] The paraglider program.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] The first EVAs that were done, even though the Russians did beat us.

[User] Sure. But we also had to be able to do that anyhow.\n\n I don't know, what else would you like to know about Gemini?

[Assistant] The paraglider program.

[User] Where did you hear about that?

[Assistant] [Laughter] In the Gemini history book.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Sure. But we also had to be able to do that anyhow.\n\n I don't know, what else would you like to know about Gemini?

[Assistant] The paraglider program.

[User] Where did you hear about that?

[Assistant] [Laughter] In the Gemini history book.

[User] [Laughter] I see. Well, there was a desire on the part of some people to build a paraglider to bring the Gemini capsule back to a controlled landing. The problem was that paragliders at that time had a terrible habit of failing, and we didn't think it would make good publicity to have the wings come off the reentry vehicle. [Laughter]\n\n I've always liked the idea of a paraglider. I think it's a great idea, but making one as safe as a parachute is hard. Parachutes aren't all that safe either, because occasionally they don't open. Fortunately [Mueller knocks on wood] we have not had that problem, and they're getting so good now that I don't think that's a likely problem. But with the paragliders at that time, with Gemini, it was a likely problem, and there just wasn't any point in taking that risk.

[Assistant] A lot of time and money was spent on the paraglider program. Did you see any benefits that came out of that research effort?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Where did you hear about that?

[Assistant] [Laughter] In the Gemini history book.

[User] [Laughter] I see. Well, there was a desire on the part of some people to build a paraglider to bring the Gemini capsule back to a controlled landing. The problem was that paragliders at that time had a terrible habit of failing, and we didn't think it would make good publicity to have the wings come off the reentry vehicle. [Laughter]\n\n I've always liked the idea of a paraglider. I think it's a great idea, but making one as safe as a parachute is hard. Parachutes aren't all that safe either, because occasionally they don't open. Fortunately [Mueller knocks on wood] we have not had that problem, and they're getting so good now that I don't think that's a likely problem. But with the paragliders at that time, with Gemini, it was a likely problem, and there just wasn't any point in taking that risk.

[Assistant] A lot of time and money was spent on the paraglider program. Did you see any benefits that came out of that research effort?

[User] Yes. The paragliders are much safer now and people are flying around on them, which wasn't being done at that time. So that's a fallout, if you will, of the Apollo Program. And that work has been continuing now for thirty years, and they're getting so that they're—well, as a matter of fact, they're thinking of using paraglider on the X-38 program, the crew rescue model. So it's not in vain, but it wasn't something that we needed or had to have in Gemini, and there's no point in doing something that it would be nice but not necessary, particularly in a program that is time-critical and as sensitive as the Gemini Program was and as Apollo was.

[Assistant] By that time you'd already decided to land Apollo in the water, so it wasn't going to benefit Apollo, right?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Actually, we tried to build the Apollo capsule so it would land equally safely in water or land if it didn't go the way it was supposed to go, and I don't think that the capsule would have been damaged by a land landing either. The shock level would have been slightly more. Well, it turns out landing on the water at the speeds we do is not much different than landing on land, which we discovered as we were going on and developing the landing system.\n\n We did quite a lot of testing of landing systems in the development of the program, and we were all somewhat surprised at the fact that water landings were not substantially safer than land landings. The principal reason for not landing on land is that coming down on parachutes, you drift, and so you don't know exactly where you're going to land. At that time our ability to control the reentry profile was limited, and so no one wanted to take the chance of landing at White Sands [New Mexico] and ending up in Albuquerque or someplace.

[Assistant] Gemini also helped show that they could have more precise landings.

[User] Yes, it did. In fact, the troops began to bet on how close they could come to the landing spot. The one that got closest used the computer-aided landing. [Laughter] As you should expect.

[Assistant] One of the Gemini missions, one of the first longer ones, was Gemini VII with Borman and Lovell, and in that mission there was some discussion about whether they should wear their suits throughout the mission. Were you involved in those decision-making processes?

[User] Well, I'm sure I was consulted and involved in it, but in that case the final decision was made by Bob Gilruth. Of course, once we got to Apollo, there was room enough to take off suits, and that made all the difference in the world. I never was hung up on having everybody stay in suits. In fact, I kind of encouraged it to get out of them.

[Assistant] It makes long-term space flight more bearable for the astronauts.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, it did. In fact, the troops began to bet on how close they could come to the landing spot. The one that got closest used the computer-aided landing. [Laughter] As you should expect.

[Assistant] One of the Gemini missions, one of the first longer ones, was Gemini VII with Borman and Lovell, and in that mission there was some discussion about whether they should wear their suits throughout the mission. Were you involved in those decision-making processes?

[User] Well, I'm sure I was consulted and involved in it, but in that case the final decision was made by Bob Gilruth. Of course, once we got to Apollo, there was room enough to take off suits, and that made all the difference in the world. I never was hung up on having everybody stay in suits. In fact, I kind of encouraged it to get out of them.

[Assistant] It makes long-term space flight more bearable for the astronauts.

[User] Oh, yes, indeed. [Laughter] It doesn't even have to be very long term.

[Assistant] [Laughter] That's true, too. You've talked about some of the importance of Gemini. Are there any other lessons learned about Gemini that you think were especially important for Apollo?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh, yes, indeed. [Laughter] It doesn't even have to be very long term.

[Assistant] [Laughter] That's true, too. You've talked about some of the importance of Gemini. Are there any other lessons learned about Gemini that you think were especially important for Apollo?

[User] Well, obviously the whole reentry system and the ability to control landing points were important, although I don't think there was ever any doubt about that. Perhaps the most important thing was the demonstration that you could put a program together like that and, in fact, carry it out on a schedule, which was kind of unique at that point in time, as was Apollo.

[Assistant] That's true.

[User] But neither of those would have been possible without the structure of program offices that we set up, in my view.

[Assistant] That's something that's often overlooked. People seem to look at the technical things and not the importance of the management.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, obviously the whole reentry system and the ability to control landing points were important, although I don't think there was ever any doubt about that. Perhaps the most important thing was the demonstration that you could put a program together like that and, in fact, carry it out on a schedule, which was kind of unique at that point in time, as was Apollo.

[Assistant] That's true.

[User] But neither of those would have been possible without the structure of program offices that we set up, in my view.

[Assistant] That's something that's often overlooked. People seem to look at the technical things and not the importance of the management.

[User] Right. And yet that's the key, one of the very real keys, to the successful program. I don't know whether I mentioned it last time, that one thing I learned from that is that if a single center has the entire program under their control, they can, in fact, get the job done if you have sufficient outside pressure to cause it to happen. But if you have multiple centers working, you almost have to have an arbitrator, a person outside of the centers, who is controlling the total program. And a number of illustrations of that [are evident] in the successive programs of NASA.

[Assistant] Speaking of management again, most of the managers with the NASA and most technical industries of that nature are engineers. Are there some difficulties in teaching engineers how to be managers?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] But neither of those would have been possible without the structure of program offices that we set up, in my view.

[Assistant] That's something that's often overlooked. People seem to look at the technical things and not the importance of the management.

[User] Right. And yet that's the key, one of the very real keys, to the successful program. I don't know whether I mentioned it last time, that one thing I learned from that is that if a single center has the entire program under their control, they can, in fact, get the job done if you have sufficient outside pressure to cause it to happen. But if you have multiple centers working, you almost have to have an arbitrator, a person outside of the centers, who is controlling the total program. And a number of illustrations of that [are evident] in the successive programs of NASA.

[Assistant] Speaking of management again, most of the managers with the NASA and most technical industries of that nature are engineers. Are there some difficulties in teaching engineers how to be managers?

[User] Well, not [all] engineers become managers or are good managers. It's just who and what the personality is, I guess. I would never imagine myself as being a manager. In fact, I spent most of my first twenty years of work—well, fifteen, anyhow—avoiding being a manager and trying to do research. So I was dedicated to being a research person. Then I inadvertently got into Ramo-Wooldridge, and began to solve problems there, and it turned out management was one of them. [Laughter] So I got co-opted, if you will.

[Assistant] What were some of the hardest parts of being a manager?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right. And yet that's the key, one of the very real keys, to the successful program. I don't know whether I mentioned it last time, that one thing I learned from that is that if a single center has the entire program under their control, they can, in fact, get the job done if you have sufficient outside pressure to cause it to happen. But if you have multiple centers working, you almost have to have an arbitrator, a person outside of the centers, who is controlling the total program. And a number of illustrations of that [are evident] in the successive programs of NASA.

[Assistant] Speaking of management again, most of the managers with the NASA and most technical industries of that nature are engineers. Are there some difficulties in teaching engineers how to be managers?

[User] Well, not [all] engineers become managers or are good managers. It's just who and what the personality is, I guess. I would never imagine myself as being a manager. In fact, I spent most of my first twenty years of work—well, fifteen, anyhow—avoiding being a manager and trying to do research. So I was dedicated to being a research person. Then I inadvertently got into Ramo-Wooldridge, and began to solve problems there, and it turned out management was one of them. [Laughter] So I got co-opted, if you will.

[Assistant] What were some of the hardest parts of being a manager?

[User] People. Always is. And having a clear enough understanding of what needs to be done and being able to communicate that to people. And I'm not particularly good at that, at least not in the large. But you have to have a vision of what you want to have done and then you have to figure out how to implement that vision and get everybody else involved in implementing it. The first thing you know, everybody's just as gung-ho as you are and they go do it.

[Assistant] One of your visions was a reusable space transportation system.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, not [all] engineers become managers or are good managers. It's just who and what the personality is, I guess. I would never imagine myself as being a manager. In fact, I spent most of my first twenty years of work—well, fifteen, anyhow—avoiding being a manager and trying to do research. So I was dedicated to being a research person. Then I inadvertently got into Ramo-Wooldridge, and began to solve problems there, and it turned out management was one of them. [Laughter] So I got co-opted, if you will.

[Assistant] What were some of the hardest parts of being a manager?

[User] People. Always is. And having a clear enough understanding of what needs to be done and being able to communicate that to people. And I'm not particularly good at that, at least not in the large. But you have to have a vision of what you want to have done and then you have to figure out how to implement that vision and get everybody else involved in implementing it. The first thing you know, everybody's just as gung-ho as you are and they go do it.

[Assistant] One of your visions was a reusable space transportation system.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] Can you tell us how that got started?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] And if we had followed through on the time schedule we set up, by now we would have a colony on the Moon and an outpost on Mars.

[Assistant] Why do you think that NASA wasn't able to carry through with that vision?

[User] Vietnam War and the repercussions of it. Very simply. We spent all of our good will and resources on a war that, well, either shouldn't have been or we should have won. You don't go into war half way, as we're demonstrating in Iraq.

[Assistant] We haven't learned from our mistakes yet.

[User] No. Never do. You always have new people, and they all relearn the mistakes. It's one nice thing about living long enough, you hopefully do not repeat the mistakes you did earlier. [Laughter]

[Assistant] [Laughter] It's true. What do you think has been the impact on NASA of a partially reusable Shuttle as opposed to a fully reusable Shuttle?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Vietnam War and the repercussions of it. Very simply. We spent all of our good will and resources on a war that, well, either shouldn't have been or we should have won. You don't go into war half way, as we're demonstrating in Iraq.

[Assistant] We haven't learned from our mistakes yet.

[User] No. Never do. You always have new people, and they all relearn the mistakes. It's one nice thing about living long enough, you hopefully do not repeat the mistakes you did earlier. [Laughter]

[Assistant] [Laughter] It's true. What do you think has been the impact on NASA of a partially reusable Shuttle as opposed to a fully reusable Shuttle?

[User] Well, it has caused a continuing review of whether we ought to be in space at all, and it is something that has really hobbled the space program over the last two decades, because so much of the funds that could have been used elsewhere are being absorbed in flying the Shuttle.

[Assistant] You mentioned, when we were discussing Gemini, if Gemini hadn't existed, there would have been a two-year gap. There was longer than the two—several years between the ASTP [Apollo-Soyuz Test Project] mission and the first Shuttle flight. What impact do you think that had on NASA?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No. Never do. You always have new people, and they all relearn the mistakes. It's one nice thing about living long enough, you hopefully do not repeat the mistakes you did earlier. [Laughter]

[Assistant] [Laughter] It's true. What do you think has been the impact on NASA of a partially reusable Shuttle as opposed to a fully reusable Shuttle?

[User] Well, it has caused a continuing review of whether we ought to be in space at all, and it is something that has really hobbled the space program over the last two decades, because so much of the funds that could have been used elsewhere are being absorbed in flying the Shuttle.

[Assistant] You mentioned, when we were discussing Gemini, if Gemini hadn't existed, there would have been a two-year gap. There was longer than the two—several years between the ASTP [Apollo-Soyuz Test Project] mission and the first Shuttle flight. What impact do you think that had on NASA?

[User] It sure called into question the whole management and the whole space program itself. There were successive efforts to cancel the program and cancel NASA, for that matter, within the Congress. Fortunately, wiser heads prevailed, or at least politically wiser heads prevailed. But it's been a drag. It is a drag. It uses up funds unnecessarily, and yet the cost of replacing it is now very large indeed.\n\n To me, the amazing thing is, the Shuttle has not been superseded by a follow-on Shuttle long before now, because obviously a design that was built, designed in early 1970, should not be the thing we're flying today, twenty-eight years later. It is one of the characteristics of government that it does not depreciate things, and if you had a depreciation schedule, you would have replaced the Shuttle by now. I think that's important, but something the government seems to be unable to appreciate. They think that an investment is immutable and never wears out.

[Assistant] You've been called the father of the Space Shuttle. How did you get that title?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] It sure called into question the whole management and the whole space program itself. There were successive efforts to cancel the program and cancel NASA, for that matter, within the Congress. Fortunately, wiser heads prevailed, or at least politically wiser heads prevailed. But it's been a drag. It is a drag. It uses up funds unnecessarily, and yet the cost of replacing it is now very large indeed.\n\n To me, the amazing thing is, the Shuttle has not been superseded by a follow-on Shuttle long before now, because obviously a design that was built, designed in early 1970, should not be the thing we're flying today, twenty-eight years later. It is one of the characteristics of government that it does not depreciate things, and if you had a depreciation schedule, you would have replaced the Shuttle by now. I think that's important, but something the government seems to be unable to appreciate. They think that an investment is immutable and never wears out.

[Assistant] You've been called the father of the Space Shuttle. How did you get that title?

[User] By forcing it through. You know, in order for the Space Shuttle to be approved at all, I had to get the Air Force and all of the centers to agree that we would replace the existing arsenal of expendable vehicles with a reusable vehicle, thus saving everybody huge amounts of money. It was that agreement that I managed to get with the Air Force and the DOD [Department of Defense], really, and the NASA centers, as well as our management there, that made it possible to go forward with the Shuttle.

[Assistant] What kind of opposition did you encounter?

[User] Well, everybody wants to do their own thing, and who was going to depend upon NASA to produce this marvelous new machine? But eventually they did, because everybody wanted a low-cost access to space, and no one had a better idea. Still don't.

[Assistant] Do you think, in hindsight, looking at the circumstances that surrounded the Shuttle development, that it would have been possible for NASA to develop a fully reusable Shuttle?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] By forcing it through. You know, in order for the Space Shuttle to be approved at all, I had to get the Air Force and all of the centers to agree that we would replace the existing arsenal of expendable vehicles with a reusable vehicle, thus saving everybody huge amounts of money. It was that agreement that I managed to get with the Air Force and the DOD [Department of Defense], really, and the NASA centers, as well as our management there, that made it possible to go forward with the Shuttle.

[Assistant] What kind of opposition did you encounter?

[User] Well, everybody wants to do their own thing, and who was going to depend upon NASA to produce this marvelous new machine? But eventually they did, because everybody wanted a low-cost access to space, and no one had a better idea. Still don't.

[Assistant] Do you think, in hindsight, looking at the circumstances that surrounded the Shuttle development, that it would have been possible for NASA to develop a fully reusable Shuttle?

[User] If any of our administrators had taken the position that the only way it makes sense to build this vehicle is to make it fully reusable, yes, it's going to cost more to build it in the first place, but it will save you more money in the long run than you can possibly spend on the front end. They said, "Well, we can't do that." "Well, then we can't build it. What would you like us to do then, since you don't like what we're doing?" Now, politically that's not politically correct, but it's the only way you get some of these things done. Either that or else have Russia decide they're going to build one and then you can do it. But even that didn't faze our folks.\n\n Our whole economy is based upon what can you do next month or next year. If it's longer than a year away, it's infinite. That's the whole mind-set of the management of most of the corporations, certainly of the government. Two years is an infinity. One year is barely conceivable.

[Assistant] It makes it difficult for research and development.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, everybody wants to do their own thing, and who was going to depend upon NASA to produce this marvelous new machine? But eventually they did, because everybody wanted a low-cost access to space, and no one had a better idea. Still don't.

[Assistant] Do you think, in hindsight, looking at the circumstances that surrounded the Shuttle development, that it would have been possible for NASA to develop a fully reusable Shuttle?

[User] If any of our administrators had taken the position that the only way it makes sense to build this vehicle is to make it fully reusable, yes, it's going to cost more to build it in the first place, but it will save you more money in the long run than you can possibly spend on the front end. They said, "Well, we can't do that." "Well, then we can't build it. What would you like us to do then, since you don't like what we're doing?" Now, politically that's not politically correct, but it's the only way you get some of these things done. Either that or else have Russia decide they're going to build one and then you can do it. But even that didn't faze our folks.\n\n Our whole economy is based upon what can you do next month or next year. If it's longer than a year away, it's infinite. That's the whole mind-set of the management of most of the corporations, certainly of the government. Two years is an infinity. One year is barely conceivable.

[Assistant] It makes it difficult for research and development.

[User] It does indeed. It's amazing as much gets done as it does. Mostly it's inertia. I mean, doing things in a constructive way.

[Assistant] During your career at NASA, were there any people in particular that had a significant impact on you?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] If any of our administrators had taken the position that the only way it makes sense to build this vehicle is to make it fully reusable, yes, it's going to cost more to build it in the first place, but it will save you more money in the long run than you can possibly spend on the front end. They said, "Well, we can't do that." "Well, then we can't build it. What would you like us to do then, since you don't like what we're doing?" Now, politically that's not politically correct, but it's the only way you get some of these things done. Either that or else have Russia decide they're going to build one and then you can do it. But even that didn't faze our folks.\n\n Our whole economy is based upon what can you do next month or next year. If it's longer than a year away, it's infinite. That's the whole mind-set of the management of most of the corporations, certainly of the government. Two years is an infinity. One year is barely conceivable.

[Assistant] It makes it difficult for research and development.

[User] It does indeed. It's amazing as much gets done as it does. Mostly it's inertia. I mean, doing things in a constructive way.

[Assistant] During your career at NASA, were there any people in particular that had a significant impact on you?

[User] Oh, yes. Lots.

[Assistant] Give us a few examples.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] It does indeed. It's amazing as much gets done as it does. Mostly it's inertia. I mean, doing things in a constructive way.

[Assistant] During your career at NASA, were there any people in particular that had a significant impact on you?

[User] Oh, yes. Lots.

[Assistant] Give us a few examples.

[User] Well, take Jim Webb or take Bob Seamans or take Homer [E.] Newell. There are different kinds of impacts. Or take—a friend of mine [Jim Beggs], the guy that just left NASA at the time of the\n\n Challenger\n\n [STS-51L]. At that time he was head of the Office of Technology. I know him very well. Anyway, he had an impact, because we worked with him in his center in doing things like the gyroscopes that were used on the Skylab, really was the first real application of gyros for attitude stabilization. And then, of course, there was Bob Gilruth and Wernher [von Braun] and Kurt [H. Debus] were tremendous influences, as were George [M.] Low and [Joseph F.] Shea and Eberhard [F. M.] Rees and a whole host of people.\n\n And then, of course, at another level, Chuck [Charles W.] Matthews and, I don't know, you can just name all the key people. They all had a tremendous impact on me and maybe I had some small impact on them.

[Assistant] I'm sure you did. Looking back at your time at NASA, is there anything you would have done differently?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh, yes. Lots.

[Assistant] Give us a few examples.

[User] Well, take Jim Webb or take Bob Seamans or take Homer [E.] Newell. There are different kinds of impacts. Or take—a friend of mine [Jim Beggs], the guy that just left NASA at the time of the\n\n Challenger\n\n [STS-51L]. At that time he was head of the Office of Technology. I know him very well. Anyway, he had an impact, because we worked with him in his center in doing things like the gyroscopes that were used on the Skylab, really was the first real application of gyros for attitude stabilization. And then, of course, there was Bob Gilruth and Wernher [von Braun] and Kurt [H. Debus] were tremendous influences, as were George [M.] Low and [Joseph F.] Shea and Eberhard [F. M.] Rees and a whole host of people.\n\n And then, of course, at another level, Chuck [Charles W.] Matthews and, I don't know, you can just name all the key people. They all had a tremendous impact on me and maybe I had some small impact on them.

[Assistant] I'm sure you did. Looking back at your time at NASA, is there anything you would have done differently?

[User] Well, I wish I had been able to glue that plan down a little more firmly. On the other hand, I don't know that it would have made any difference, because when I left, Tom [Thomas O.] Paine was thoroughly in support of the plan, but then he left. I don't know, if I had stayed on, whether it would have made much difference one way or the other.

[Assistant] What do you feel were your greatest successes?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, I wish I had been able to glue that plan down a little more firmly. On the other hand, I don't know that it would have made any difference, because when I left, Tom [Thomas O.] Paine was thoroughly in support of the plan, but then he left. I don't know, if I had stayed on, whether it would have made much difference one way or the other.

[Assistant] What do you feel were your greatest successes?

[User] Getting to the Moon on time. What else? [Laughter] No, actually, probably even a greater thing was putting in place a follow-on program that would begin to exploit what we'd accomplished in Apollo. The real problem with Apollo was that it was a one-time event, essentially, and it wasn't built to carry on a lunar exploration program, for example. But we did put in place the program that exploited what was left of the Apollo thing, Skylab and those programs, and then laid the groundwork for what were the first two steps in our long-range plan, which we're now implementing. I think we lost a vision, and Dan [Daniel S.] Goldin is beginning to bring the vision back, which is great.

[Assistant] What did you feel was your greatest challenge?

[User] One? [Laughter]

[Assistant] You can give several. [Laughter]


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, you can afford to build one now.

[Assistant] So what did you do between the time you left NASA and when you started—

[User] I went and ran a company, a couple of companies. I went to work for General Dynamics and ran their defense systems, and then I got a job as CEO, Chairman of the System Development Corporation [SDC], a corporation that was originally a not-for-profit, working for the Air Force in developing the software for the Air Force systems, early warning system. Most of the software that SAC [Strategic Air Command] has was built by SDC. And ran it for about twelve years. Then I retired. Well, I sold … the company to Burroughs [phonetic] and stayed there for a year or two, and then retired.\n\n At that time I was President of the International Academy of Astronautics, so I was working on that, and went out and did some investing in various things and actually ended up running a farm, a jojoba [phonetic] farm. That was an experience, clearly one not to be repeated very often in one's life, but, nevertheless, very interesting. Jojoba is a replacement for sperm whale oil. It was the time when the sperm whales were being protected, and it seemed like a good idea to do something that would replace that commodity. Turns out to be harder to domesticate plants than it is animals. [Laughter] And so it took a while to get it to where it was a reasonable thing to do.\n\n Then I got involved with [Kistler] because I always have been interested in reusable launch vehicles ever since I thought about them, and this was a great opportunity to do something constructive and to have some fun. That's why my friends are with me, too.

[Assistant] That's important to have fun.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] Looking back over your career and thinking about when you got into aeronautics and aerospace, would you have ever imagined where it would all lead you?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. As a matter of fact, the [Apollo] one was set up to do that kind of support activity, and essentially what we were able to do was to short-circuit that with the Gemini Program … But originally it was contemplated that the Saturn I would have a number of flights in which all of this work that we did in Gemini would have been carried out. And they could have been, but we probably would not have landed on the Moon in the decade.

[Assistant] Sounds like you made the right choices, then. Also talking about Gemini, you talked about the paraglider program, but one of the other differences in the Gemini Program was the escape system, that Gemini used the ejection seats rather than the launch escape tower. Were you involved with that choice?

[User] I was kind of involved in it, but not in any depth. I was involved in the escape system on Apollo, but I never could persuade them that it didn't make any sense. It's like putting ejection seats in the Space Shuttle. They're useful for about one minute. Not even that long. Thirty seconds of the flight path. So after that, they aren't any good, so you're better off with putting a little more weight in for safety and not having this kind of escape route.\n\n But, unfortunately, all the astronauts are pilots, and so they have the idea that they want … to have an ejection seat or the equivalent thereof. I never was able to persuade them differently. The Shuttle just simply doesn't accommodate ejection seats, although they looked at it very hard. So they didn't put it in there.

[Assistant] That would be hard, when you have a crew on both the upper deck and the lower deck, trying to—

[User] Eject.

[Assistant] Hopefully they have found a good solution. Of course, hopefully they'll never have to test the solutions for escaping on the Shuttle.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I was kind of involved in it, but not in any depth. I was involved in the escape system on Apollo, but I never could persuade them that it didn't make any sense. It's like putting ejection seats in the Space Shuttle. They're useful for about one minute. Not even that long. Thirty seconds of the flight path. So after that, they aren't any good, so you're better off with putting a little more weight in for safety and not having this kind of escape route.\n\n But, unfortunately, all the astronauts are pilots, and so they have the idea that they want … to have an ejection seat or the equivalent thereof. I never was able to persuade them differently. The Shuttle just simply doesn't accommodate ejection seats, although they looked at it very hard. So they didn't put it in there.

[Assistant] That would be hard, when you have a crew on both the upper deck and the lower deck, trying to—

[User] Eject.

[Assistant] Hopefully they have found a good solution. Of course, hopefully they'll never have to test the solutions for escaping on the Shuttle.

[User] Yes. I prefer that alternative. I would not like to try.

[Assistant] I'm going to jump forward a little bit now. You were talking about the plan for following on Apollo with the nodes and the step-by-step system, and eventually getting to Mars. When you were planning this and then when you did see the Shuttle was going to be the first step and it would take a little while before the others could follow on, did you ever realize or even imagine that it would take so long to achieve that plan?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Eject.

[Assistant] Hopefully they have found a good solution. Of course, hopefully they'll never have to test the solutions for escaping on the Shuttle.

[User] Yes. I prefer that alternative. I would not like to try.

[Assistant] I'm going to jump forward a little bit now. You were talking about the plan for following on Apollo with the nodes and the step-by-step system, and eventually getting to Mars. When you were planning this and then when you did see the Shuttle was going to be the first step and it would take a little while before the others could follow on, did you ever realize or even imagine that it would take so long to achieve that plan?

[User] Well, no, I couldn't imagine it then, can't imagine it now, but it's happened, really. But the plan we laid out is a logical plan, and so it's the kind of stuff you're going to have to go through. I think perhaps the greatest worry I would have is that politically we'll decide to do an excursion to Mars instead of an exploration of Mars, because literally what we did with the Moon was to have an excursion to the Moon. That, at the time, is what we should do, but we didn't really follow up with the exploration of the Moon. We're just now beginning to do that.

[Assistant] Beginning with some of the unmanned probes that are going back, like Clementine, and more exploration of it.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. I prefer that alternative. I would not like to try.

[Assistant] I'm going to jump forward a little bit now. You were talking about the plan for following on Apollo with the nodes and the step-by-step system, and eventually getting to Mars. When you were planning this and then when you did see the Shuttle was going to be the first step and it would take a little while before the others could follow on, did you ever realize or even imagine that it would take so long to achieve that plan?

[User] Well, no, I couldn't imagine it then, can't imagine it now, but it's happened, really. But the plan we laid out is a logical plan, and so it's the kind of stuff you're going to have to go through. I think perhaps the greatest worry I would have is that politically we'll decide to do an excursion to Mars instead of an exploration of Mars, because literally what we did with the Moon was to have an excursion to the Moon. That, at the time, is what we should do, but we didn't really follow up with the exploration of the Moon. We're just now beginning to do that.

[Assistant] Beginning with some of the unmanned probes that are going back, like Clementine, and more exploration of it.

[User] Eventually it will be men, and it's just a matter of how soon the politicians decide this is something that's in the nature of fate.

[Assistant] Well, maybe if NASA could ever get that great PR firm, that would help foster the—


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, no, I couldn't imagine it then, can't imagine it now, but it's happened, really. But the plan we laid out is a logical plan, and so it's the kind of stuff you're going to have to go through. I think perhaps the greatest worry I would have is that politically we'll decide to do an excursion to Mars instead of an exploration of Mars, because literally what we did with the Moon was to have an excursion to the Moon. That, at the time, is what we should do, but we didn't really follow up with the exploration of the Moon. We're just now beginning to do that.

[Assistant] Beginning with some of the unmanned probes that are going back, like Clementine, and more exploration of it.

[User] Eventually it will be men, and it's just a matter of how soon the politicians decide this is something that's in the nature of fate.

[Assistant] Well, maybe if NASA could ever get that great PR firm, that would help foster the—

[User] Yes. Yes, it's interesting. We did have resources in Apollo for PR. They were volunteers. But it is very difficult to sell space as anything other than a vision, and we haven't had any PR firms that have vision, that I've seen, because it really has to be faith that there's something there that's worthwhile. I always say, if we had been able to find some diamonds on the Moon, we would have been way ahead of the game. Then we would have had an exploration program.

[Assistant] Oh, definitely. Hopefully, one of these days the spinoffs and the applications will become more recognized.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Eventually it will be men, and it's just a matter of how soon the politicians decide this is something that's in the nature of fate.

[Assistant] Well, maybe if NASA could ever get that great PR firm, that would help foster the—

[User] Yes. Yes, it's interesting. We did have resources in Apollo for PR. They were volunteers. But it is very difficult to sell space as anything other than a vision, and we haven't had any PR firms that have vision, that I've seen, because it really has to be faith that there's something there that's worthwhile. I always say, if we had been able to find some diamonds on the Moon, we would have been way ahead of the game. Then we would have had an exploration program.

[Assistant] Oh, definitely. Hopefully, one of these days the spinoffs and the applications will become more recognized.

[User] Well, everybody seems to think they're magic. [Laughter] Just appear out of nowhere. And that's the problem. It does take a while from the time you have a new technology to where you get it to play. When I left Bell Labs, for example, they had just discovered the transistor, and that was in 1946. It was twenty years later, in the ballistic missile program, that we finally got transistors to the point where they were reliable enough to use. In fact, the Minuteman Program probably did more to advance the integrated circuit work than almost any other thing.

[Assistant] Interesting. I guess you don't think about the stages that something has to go through from the initial conception to common usage, because most people don't hear about it until it is more common.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. Yes, it's interesting. We did have resources in Apollo for PR. They were volunteers. But it is very difficult to sell space as anything other than a vision, and we haven't had any PR firms that have vision, that I've seen, because it really has to be faith that there's something there that's worthwhile. I always say, if we had been able to find some diamonds on the Moon, we would have been way ahead of the game. Then we would have had an exploration program.

[Assistant] Oh, definitely. Hopefully, one of these days the spinoffs and the applications will become more recognized.

[User] Well, everybody seems to think they're magic. [Laughter] Just appear out of nowhere. And that's the problem. It does take a while from the time you have a new technology to where you get it to play. When I left Bell Labs, for example, they had just discovered the transistor, and that was in 1946. It was twenty years later, in the ballistic missile program, that we finally got transistors to the point where they were reliable enough to use. In fact, the Minuteman Program probably did more to advance the integrated circuit work than almost any other thing.

[Assistant] Interesting. I guess you don't think about the stages that something has to go through from the initial conception to common usage, because most people don't hear about it until it is more common.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] I did have one last question. We talked about Kistler and you becoming involved. What was it that actually got you involved?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, everybody seems to think they're magic. [Laughter] Just appear out of nowhere. And that's the problem. It does take a while from the time you have a new technology to where you get it to play. When I left Bell Labs, for example, they had just discovered the transistor, and that was in 1946. It was twenty years later, in the ballistic missile program, that we finally got transistors to the point where they were reliable enough to use. In fact, the Minuteman Program probably did more to advance the integrated circuit work than almost any other thing.

[Assistant] Interesting. I guess you don't think about the stages that something has to go through from the initial conception to common usage, because most people don't hear about it until it is more common.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] I did have one last question. We talked about Kistler and you becoming involved. What was it that actually got you involved?

[User] A guy had promised me we would have enough money to build it. [Laughter] He's my partner, who's now trying to get the money to build it. So far he's only gotten 400 million, and we only need another 400 million, so we're halfway there. But the last half is proving to be a little more difficult than we imagined because of the Asian crisis and Russia going out of business, that kind of thing.

[Assistant] The world economy does seem to be in a little bit of a turmoil.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Right.

[Assistant] I did have one last question. We talked about Kistler and you becoming involved. What was it that actually got you involved?

[User] A guy had promised me we would have enough money to build it. [Laughter] He's my partner, who's now trying to get the money to build it. So far he's only gotten 400 million, and we only need another 400 million, so we're halfway there. But the last half is proving to be a little more difficult than we imagined because of the Asian crisis and Russia going out of business, that kind of thing.

[Assistant] The world economy does seem to be in a little bit of a turmoil.

[User] And, unfortunately, although we may not recognize it here, we're part of that economy, and it hasn't quite caught up with us, but it will.

[Assistant] Yes, it definitely will. That's all I have, other than to say I look forward to seeing Kistler succeed.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I became informed by reading some of the details on the notices. It said research, it said experimental work, aircraft, so I had a clue, and I already had an interest in aviation—I mentioned my uncle [who flew]—and I was in the Army Air Corps, which didn’t make me very well informed, but it did stimulate my interest a little more. [Also, I took flying lessons in college, on the G.I. Bill, long enough to solo.] The main thing that drew me, whether it was aviation or not, was the experimental work. I had asked my physics prof, when I was going to this little parochial school, I said, “I really want to do experimental work. What are my chances of making a living at it?”\n\n And he said, “Well, not very good, because you’d have to get your master’s degree, at least, and preferably your Ph.D. to get experimental work.” Well, I believed him, but it turned out I got experimental work of the very best kind with just a bachelor’s [degree. It was as if I was being led by my hand – essential doors just kept opening before me!]

[Assistant] Were you aware of the work with the X-1 that was being done before you actually came here and then started working on it?

[User] No. I had a beautiful thing just dumped in my lap.

[Assistant] It’s amazing.

[User] Amazing, absolutely. And all through my career it’s actually kind of been that way. I’m one lucky guy. [Actually I should say, “One blessed guy.”]

[Assistant] Since you were in physics, what was your title when you started? Was it research engineer? Did you have an engineering title?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No. I had a beautiful thing just dumped in my lap.

[Assistant] It’s amazing.

[User] Amazing, absolutely. And all through my career it’s actually kind of been that way. I’m one lucky guy. [Actually I should say, “One blessed guy.”]

[Assistant] Since you were in physics, what was your title when you started? Was it research engineer? Did you have an engineering title?

[User] I’m embarrassed to say, because it sounded so—it sounded like something that was made up to be impressive. And it wasn’t just my title, all of the other persons that came in at that time, in response to those application forms, had the same title. You’ll agree it sounded kind of hokey: Aeronautical Research Scientist. We weren’t scientists, but that’s the title, Aeronautical Research Scientist. We snickered when we saw that. We knew we weren’t scientists. However, the nature of the NACA was that you became acquainted with scientists and [on occasion] were mentored by some of them. That was [a wonderful thing].\n\n For example, one of the primary aeronautical geniuses of those decades was Dr. Richard [T.] Whitcomb at Langley Research Center [Hampton, Virginia]. I was privileged to work on all three of his inventions, and I copied, mimicked, I’m not sure what the right term is—I tried to think like [he thought]. I didn’t have the intellectual tools that he had, but I studied how he thought, and it was a great benefit to me.

[Assistant] I was going to ask you about other mentors and people that you worked with that you felt like you learned from.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] [Dr. Whitcomb would have been an example of a scientist that was an “unknowing” mentor. I so very much appreciate the mentoring provided by Hubert Drake (mostly by example), Donald Bellman, Ronald Knapp, Harold Walker, and Scott Crossfield. And there were others whose intellect and work habits influenced me. Back to] Whitcomb, he was unaware that I was observing and trying to understand his way of thinking, but it really stuck. His secret to all three of his inventions was to try to visualize in his mind where an air molecule would want to go as it encountered the [proximity of] certain faces, certain slopes, certain surfaces on an aerodynamic vehicle, [taking account of compressibility effects and shock waves, if present.] I knew that, and so I adopted that way of thinking too, and it just greased the skids, it made things a lot easier.

[Assistant] So it changed your perspective to start thinking more in that way.

[User] Oh yeah, it’s a powerful tool.

[Assistant] You mentioned that when you first started, you started working on the X-1 number 2. What were you doing with that? Was it the L/D [lift to drag ratio] studies?

[User] Yes, with accelerometers and a few other instruments you would be able to resolve the forces acting on the airplane and end up with the lift and the drag and convert it into the various metrics that are of interest for [analyzing and] publishing lift/drag work. That resulted in my first publication.

[Assistant] As far as publishing for NACA, I know they were very well respected, the technical reports and the papers that were published by the NACA.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh yeah, it’s a powerful tool.

[Assistant] You mentioned that when you first started, you started working on the X-1 number 2. What were you doing with that? Was it the L/D [lift to drag ratio] studies?

[User] Yes, with accelerometers and a few other instruments you would be able to resolve the forces acting on the airplane and end up with the lift and the drag and convert it into the various metrics that are of interest for [analyzing and] publishing lift/drag work. That resulted in my first publication.

[Assistant] As far as publishing for NACA, I know they were very well respected, the technical reports and the papers that were published by the NACA.

[User] That’s true.

[Assistant] How were you introduced to that process? Did you work with other people as they were publishing first? Or did they drop you into it and say, “You’re going to do this work and we want you to publish it”?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, with accelerometers and a few other instruments you would be able to resolve the forces acting on the airplane and end up with the lift and the drag and convert it into the various metrics that are of interest for [analyzing and] publishing lift/drag work. That resulted in my first publication.

[Assistant] As far as publishing for NACA, I know they were very well respected, the technical reports and the papers that were published by the NACA.

[User] That’s true.

[Assistant] How were you introduced to that process? Did you work with other people as they were publishing first? Or did they drop you into it and say, “You’re going to do this work and we want you to publish it”?

[User] They did drop it onto me, but what I did, I cheated. I dug up some previously published reports and studied how they presented the data, how they analyzed it, how they explained it, and I copied them. Copied the ideas, you know, I didn’t copy the words. So again, the skids were greased. I’m basically lazy, and I just do it as easily as I can.

[Assistant] Then I imagine you worked with editors and the people actually doing the production of the paper?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] That’s true.

[Assistant] How were you introduced to that process? Did you work with other people as they were publishing first? Or did they drop you into it and say, “You’re going to do this work and we want you to publish it”?

[User] They did drop it onto me, but what I did, I cheated. I dug up some previously published reports and studied how they presented the data, how they analyzed it, how they explained it, and I copied them. Copied the ideas, you know, I didn’t copy the words. So again, the skids were greased. I’m basically lazy, and I just do it as easily as I can.

[Assistant] Then I imagine you worked with editors and the people actually doing the production of the paper?

[User] Yes, and they had excellent editors, just excellent. I admired them even when they changed my words. I came to respect them a great deal, and I also came to enjoy writing myself, and that also greased the skids. [Three excellent editors really cleaned up my proposed writings. They were Helen Foley for the NACA period, and later Lita Holleman, and still later, Yvonne Kellog. There were also other excellent editors that helped me for shorter periods.]

[Assistant] How long did it take you to do that first paper?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, and they had excellent editors, just excellent. I admired them even when they changed my words. I came to respect them a great deal, and I also came to enjoy writing myself, and that also greased the skids. [Three excellent editors really cleaned up my proposed writings. They were Helen Foley for the NACA period, and later Lita Holleman, and still later, Yvonne Kellog. There were also other excellent editors that helped me for shorter periods.]

[Assistant] How long did it take you to do that first paper?

[User] Well, I arrived in the summer of ’51, and the first publication was in 1953. Of course the assembling of the data takes the longest, and then when you get it assembled, then it’s a matter of [analyzing the results and then] fitting into the procedure that they have, and there’s always a backlog of other publications that are ahead of you, and you wait your turn. The ’51 to ’53 thing would not be excessively long at all, it was probably fairly normal.\n\n Another thing that greases the skids is enjoying the writing. If you don’t, then it becomes laborious, and a lot of the guys [did not enjoy the writing duties]. Iowa Wesleyan is a liberal arts school, it’s not an engineering school, and I think coming from a liberal arts school was another thing that helped me. By the way, it was the oldest four-year school west of the Mississippi [River]; it’s been around [since 1842]. It had been in business a fair amount before the Civil War.

[Assistant] I imagine that liberal arts background did help you with writing. You probably did that a lot in school, too.

[User] Yes, and strangely enough, I enjoyed the writing in the school, too. I had no clue that was going to help me [in an engineering job], but it did.

[Assistant] That’s interesting. In doing the technical papers, were there support personnel? I know that computers, of course, helped reduce data and do that sort of thing, but as far as doing the papers, were there graphics people doing the charts?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, and strangely enough, I enjoyed the writing in the school, too. I had no clue that was going to help me [in an engineering job], but it did.

[Assistant] That’s interesting. In doing the technical papers, were there support personnel? I know that computers, of course, helped reduce data and do that sort of thing, but as far as doing the papers, were there graphics people doing the charts?

[User] Yes. Matter of fact—I suspect you’ve heard of Roxanah [B.] Yancey. She was the head computer. She did a lot of the graphics herself. When you see some of the graphics in those early reports, including my first report, she did it. She was quite particular [and improved all of the reports she worked on]. She was a great lady. [Later on under the NASA umbrella, we also had the very best support, very talented and committed workers that employed the latest hi-tech stuff.]

[Assistant] Did you work a lot with the computers and that group of people that did that work?

[User] I made sure [that we] became good friends.

[Assistant] It always helps, doesn’t it?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I made sure [that we] became good friends.

[Assistant] It always helps, doesn’t it?

[User] Greases the skids.

[Assistant] That’s right.

[User] That sounds self-serving, but everybody benefits when you approach it that way.

[Assistant] When you first came, you were on the South Base, on that side, and the working conditions on the South Base were different than it was in 1954, when they built the new facility on the Main Base. Can you just talk a little bit about that South Base and where you were in the setup, where you were located and where you worked, and just a little bit about that area?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, [the earliest work we did on that project was known as Project 1226. However,] there were quite a few things I did before we got the X-15. The very next thing I did was the only work I ever did outside of lift and drag and performance. It was on the [Northrop] X-4 [Bantam], and they asked me to do a stability and control [analysis] on it, which resulted in my second publication. I didn’t know stability and control. Scott Crossfield, whom you’ve heard of, was the pilot. He [said he] was a farm kid, too, by the way. He knew I was going to do some stability and control work, and he knew that I didn’t know anything about the subject.\n\n I want to contradict some myths about Scott Crossfield. He was generally considered to be a little on the dashing, cocky side, and some might even have thought of him as being arrogant. I saw a softer side in him. He mentored me in stability and control, and it worked out well. I’ve always honored him for that. He didn’t have to. He could have said, [based on his position], “The guy you’ve assigned to this doesn’t know the subject. You gotta get somebody else.” He didn’t do that. [Instead he was patient and mentored me effectively enough that I did a credible job. I’m very grateful for his understanding and thoughtfulness.]

[Assistant] During that time, also the Korean War was happening. Did that affect the research that was doing here as far as, did you have security clearances and those kind of things? Were you working on anything that had to have a clearance?

[User] Well, [most of] our publications through that period of time were confidential.

[Assistant] Were they?

[User] Yes, yes. From the X-4, I went on to—does the term Century Series fighters [aircraft] mean anything to you?

[Assistant] I have heard that term before, but go ahead and explain that.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Well, [most of] our publications through that period of time were confidential.

[Assistant] Were they?

[User] Yes, yes. From the X-4, I went on to—does the term Century Series fighters [aircraft] mean anything to you?

[Assistant] I have heard that term before, but go ahead and explain that.

[User] The reason they called them Century Series is that there was a series of fighter pursuit-type aircraft, by now jet-propelled instead of propeller, that were being proposed, and then prototypes built and tested, and then the Air Force or the Navy would, based on results, decide which one to buy. Among them was the 102, [Convair] F-102 [Delta Dagger]. It was a delta-wing airplane. I worked on that between the X-4 and Project 1226, that you referred to. That’s when I was first introduced to Whitcomb, because, you see, the area rule was first applied on a Navy plane, which I did not work on, and also the 102, which I did work on. I think I had about five publications on the 102, I believe, and it was a great privilege to be involved with the area rule, which is, of course, [Whitcomb’s] first major invention that I’m aware of.

[Assistant] And you met him. Did he come out here?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, yes. From the X-4, I went on to—does the term Century Series fighters [aircraft] mean anything to you?

[Assistant] I have heard that term before, but go ahead and explain that.

[User] The reason they called them Century Series is that there was a series of fighter pursuit-type aircraft, by now jet-propelled instead of propeller, that were being proposed, and then prototypes built and tested, and then the Air Force or the Navy would, based on results, decide which one to buy. Among them was the 102, [Convair] F-102 [Delta Dagger]. It was a delta-wing airplane. I worked on that between the X-4 and Project 1226, that you referred to. That’s when I was first introduced to Whitcomb, because, you see, the area rule was first applied on a Navy plane, which I did not work on, and also the 102, which I did work on. I think I had about five publications on the 102, I believe, and it was a great privilege to be involved with the area rule, which is, of course, [Whitcomb’s] first major invention that I’m aware of.

[Assistant] And you met him. Did he come out here?

[User] He’d come out once in a while, yes. A chain-smoking, intense person. Extremely intense. Sometimes there could be all kinds of conversations going around him and he was so intense and concentrated in his thinking that he could filter it all out. Amazing man. [He was the epitome of innovation.]

[Assistant] And it was an interesting time in the country, in trying to get ahead. You mentioned Scott Crossfield, and of course the other pilots. He was helping you with stability and control, but how closely did you normally work with those test pilots?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, our Lifting Body work, I guess, began about 1960, ’61 or ’62. Something like that, I guess. Maybe ’61. Of course [R.] Dale Reed, whom you’re probably well acquainted with, deserves all kinds of credit for getting us into it [that early]. Now, Langley and Ames [Research Center, Moffett Field, California] both proposed [reentry] configurations, and Dale picked up on that right away. You’re already aware, I think, of how he started building a [small scale] model of the Ames model, [i.e., the M2].

[Assistant] That was the plywood one?

[User] [Well, after demonstrating the small model, the plywood M2-F1 was approved.] It was the Ames [shape]. The Langley one was the HL-10, and he did not build that one. There again, that’s the beauty of Paul Bikle’s mindset, in that he supported Dale in that and more or less just went ahead with it whether Headquarters [wanted] it or not, and made it work. And of course the pilots loved that too, it gave them something new that no one had ever flown before. Milt Thompson was quick [to support the Lifting Body and—]what did you call it, the Rogallo wing?

[Assistant] The flying wing? The Paresev?

[User] Yes, [the Paresev] and also the Lifting Body.

[Assistant] Did you work on the Lifting Body project?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] [Well, after demonstrating the small model, the plywood M2-F1 was approved.] It was the Ames [shape]. The Langley one was the HL-10, and he did not build that one. There again, that’s the beauty of Paul Bikle’s mindset, in that he supported Dale in that and more or less just went ahead with it whether Headquarters [wanted] it or not, and made it work. And of course the pilots loved that too, it gave them something new that no one had ever flown before. Milt Thompson was quick [to support the Lifting Body and—]what did you call it, the Rogallo wing?

[Assistant] The flying wing? The Paresev?

[User] Yes, [the Paresev] and also the Lifting Body.

[Assistant] Did you work on the Lifting Body project?

[User] By then I was supervising engineers [in our branch] that did, so I kept abreast of it, yes. [Outside of our branch I mentored Vic [Victor W.] Horton and Dick [Richard E.] Klein on their M2-F1 lift and drag work.]

[Assistant] So you moved on into supervisory positions.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes, [the Paresev] and also the Lifting Body.

[Assistant] Did you work on the Lifting Body project?

[User] By then I was supervising engineers [in our branch] that did, so I kept abreast of it, yes. [Outside of our branch I mentored Vic [Victor W.] Horton and Dick [Richard E.] Klein on their M2-F1 lift and drag work.]

[Assistant] So you moved on into supervisory positions.

[User] Sort of. I always denied that I was a supervisor, and it was frustrating to my supervisors, but I kept close to [the Lifting Body data throughout]. And in later publications that I produced, particularly right before I retired, I used all [the subsonic Lifting Body data]. From all of the Lifting Bodies and the X-15 and the Shuttle, it turns out that they combine into a unified package of [all horizontal landing] entry vehicles, and consequently I was reintroduced to all of the Lifting Body work and interpreted [those results, the X-15 data and the Shuttle data as a unified generic family because they all have large blunt base surfaces].

[Assistant] Was it in the early ’70s, I was reading about your work on the bow waves on trucks and how that came about. Do you want to talk about that for a minute? Because that’s so different, but how that’s related to airplanes and aerodynamics and that sort of thing. If you want to just talk about how that idea came to you and what brought that about.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] By then I was supervising engineers [in our branch] that did, so I kept abreast of it, yes. [Outside of our branch I mentored Vic [Victor W.] Horton and Dick [Richard E.] Klein on their M2-F1 lift and drag work.]

[Assistant] So you moved on into supervisory positions.

[User] Sort of. I always denied that I was a supervisor, and it was frustrating to my supervisors, but I kept close to [the Lifting Body data throughout]. And in later publications that I produced, particularly right before I retired, I used all [the subsonic Lifting Body data]. From all of the Lifting Bodies and the X-15 and the Shuttle, it turns out that they combine into a unified package of [all horizontal landing] entry vehicles, and consequently I was reintroduced to all of the Lifting Body work and interpreted [those results, the X-15 data and the Shuttle data as a unified generic family because they all have large blunt base surfaces].

[Assistant] Was it in the early ’70s, I was reading about your work on the bow waves on trucks and how that came about. Do you want to talk about that for a minute? Because that’s so different, but how that’s related to airplanes and aerodynamics and that sort of thing. If you want to just talk about how that idea came to you and what brought that about.

[User] Sure. Have you been exposed to [Christian] Gelzer’s work?

[Assistant] Yes, the book [Fairing Well: From Shoebox to Bat Truck and Beyond – Aerodynamic Truck Research at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center]. I was looking through that.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. You try to visualize where those molecules are going to go, and it’s such a simple thing [and often quite helpful]. It sometimes prevents you from overlooking something.

[Assistant] And during that time period in the ’70s, too, when you were doing that work, there were other things happening, and there was talk about even closing the Center at some point when the X-15 was over with, and because of the way things were until other work came along. Then the Shuttle changed a lot of the focus, the public perception of what work was being done out here, and being a place for the Approach and Landing Tests [ALT] and then the landings. Do you want to talk about what you were doing during that time? Were you working on or overseeing any engineers working on the Shuttle work, anything with the Shuttle or the ALT landings?

[User] Here again, if you’re doing lift and drag work, you’re sort of on the periphery, in a way, but [eventually] I used the ALT lift and drag data in several publications [that I mentioned earlier, i.e., publications which demonstrated how all blunt-based reentry vehicles (for horizontal landing) belong to a generic family, and how the base flow characteristics obey unifying equations at subsonic speeds. The Shuttle data were a part of this, and it’s interesting that the base flow characteristics of large trucks also belong to this generic family.\n\n So, I believe it is clear that my work did not contribute to the Shuttle; however, I borrowed from the Shuttle by the use of its lift and drag data to formulate the unifying concept, mentioned earlier, which will be useful for reentry designers in the future. I feel fortunate to have tasted that small portion of Shuttle flight results. By the way, have I mentioned that earlier we worked on the XB-70?]

[Assistant] You worked on the B-70?

[User] Yes. And then, much later, the [Grumman] X-29.

[Assistant] Did you work on LLRV [Lunar Landing Research Vehicle?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Here again, if you’re doing lift and drag work, you’re sort of on the periphery, in a way, but [eventually] I used the ALT lift and drag data in several publications [that I mentioned earlier, i.e., publications which demonstrated how all blunt-based reentry vehicles (for horizontal landing) belong to a generic family, and how the base flow characteristics obey unifying equations at subsonic speeds. The Shuttle data were a part of this, and it’s interesting that the base flow characteristics of large trucks also belong to this generic family.\n\n So, I believe it is clear that my work did not contribute to the Shuttle; however, I borrowed from the Shuttle by the use of its lift and drag data to formulate the unifying concept, mentioned earlier, which will be useful for reentry designers in the future. I feel fortunate to have tasted that small portion of Shuttle flight results. By the way, have I mentioned that earlier we worked on the XB-70?]

[Assistant] You worked on the B-70?

[User] Yes. And then, much later, the [Grumman] X-29.

[Assistant] Did you work on LLRV [Lunar Landing Research Vehicle?

[User] No. That was a very innovative thing, too, that came from the minds of Jake and Gene [J.] Matranga and Donald [R.] Bellman. Donald Bellman was my immediate supervisor. Great guy, great guy. He let [his team] do most anything we wanted to [as long as we completed the assigned duties, he encouraged playful/thoughtful innovation!] As long as we didn’t embarrass him, he turned us loose [to explore possibilities].

[Assistant] Did you remember the first ALT landing, after it separated? That first time, were you out there watching that?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes. And then, much later, the [Grumman] X-29.

[Assistant] Did you work on LLRV [Lunar Landing Research Vehicle?

[User] No. That was a very innovative thing, too, that came from the minds of Jake and Gene [J.] Matranga and Donald [R.] Bellman. Donald Bellman was my immediate supervisor. Great guy, great guy. He let [his team] do most anything we wanted to [as long as we completed the assigned duties, he encouraged playful/thoughtful innovation!] As long as we didn’t embarrass him, he turned us loose [to explore possibilities].

[Assistant] Did you remember the first ALT landing, after it separated? That first time, were you out there watching that?

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] With everybody else? All the other thousands of people?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No. That was a very innovative thing, too, that came from the minds of Jake and Gene [J.] Matranga and Donald [R.] Bellman. Donald Bellman was my immediate supervisor. Great guy, great guy. He let [his team] do most anything we wanted to [as long as we completed the assigned duties, he encouraged playful/thoughtful innovation!] As long as we didn’t embarrass him, he turned us loose [to explore possibilities].

[Assistant] Did you remember the first ALT landing, after it separated? That first time, were you out there watching that?

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] With everybody else? All the other thousands of people?

[User] Of course. And by the way, our home in the desert, I told you about the place we bought for $10,000 over the phone, we could see the landings from home. That’s why I rode my bike to work. See, it was so close. It was only 8 ½ miles by road. If you went, as they say, as the crow flies, it was less than half that, maybe 3 miles. So you could see it very well. [So I could view the landings from work and my wife could see it from our front yard.]

[Assistant] That was a treat, every time they landed. And it was an interesting time, because all of a sudden you had so much media attention that you weren’t used to. People at Johnson or at Kennedy [Space Center, Florida] were used to that kind of attention, but you didn’t normally get that out here.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] With everybody else? All the other thousands of people?

[User] Of course. And by the way, our home in the desert, I told you about the place we bought for $10,000 over the phone, we could see the landings from home. That’s why I rode my bike to work. See, it was so close. It was only 8 ½ miles by road. If you went, as they say, as the crow flies, it was less than half that, maybe 3 miles. So you could see it very well. [So I could view the landings from work and my wife could see it from our front yard.]

[Assistant] That was a treat, every time they landed. And it was an interesting time, because all of a sudden you had so much media attention that you weren’t used to. People at Johnson or at Kennedy [Space Center, Florida] were used to that kind of attention, but you didn’t normally get that out here.

[User] Yes, that’s what we were told.

[Assistant] You mentioned the pilots that you were friends with, but during that time, being test pilots, it was pretty dangerous work, and of course there were a lot of accidents and pilots were lost. How did that affect the work that was being done here or the feeling about the work, the danger?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] He was a kick in the pants.

[Assistant] I think it’s interesting that your father insisted that you go to college, even though you’d had this long line of farmers in your heritage. Did you ever ask him why? Or do you know why he was so insistent?

[User] Oh, I knew why. He wanted to be an engineer.

[Assistant] So he wanted you to have that.

[User] He was a smart cookie. When I was a little kid, that would be like five, six years old, something like that, I remember he was working on what today we would call an inline skate. He was trying to invent an inline skate. I recall seeing the drawings of it. His skate—after all, he was just a farmer—but his skate didn’t have a whole row of [many] wheels, it had two wheels, and they were bigger, perhaps two and a half inches in diameter. The drawings, to me, looked quite detailed, but he didn’t know how to [approach the process of applying for a patent, and] didn’t have the money to get an attorney to help him with the patent, so he had to finally drop it. After all, he was busy being a farmer. [Dad’s older brother,] Uncle Elmer, had an invention patented while he was still 18 years old, a Mennonite farm kid. It was an improvement on a grain wagon design. I have a copy of that patent at home.

[Assistant] You had engineering in your blood.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] Oh, I knew why. He wanted to be an engineer.

[Assistant] So he wanted you to have that.

[User] He was a smart cookie. When I was a little kid, that would be like five, six years old, something like that, I remember he was working on what today we would call an inline skate. He was trying to invent an inline skate. I recall seeing the drawings of it. His skate—after all, he was just a farmer—but his skate didn’t have a whole row of [many] wheels, it had two wheels, and they were bigger, perhaps two and a half inches in diameter. The drawings, to me, looked quite detailed, but he didn’t know how to [approach the process of applying for a patent, and] didn’t have the money to get an attorney to help him with the patent, so he had to finally drop it. After all, he was busy being a farmer. [Dad’s older brother,] Uncle Elmer, had an invention patented while he was still 18 years old, a Mennonite farm kid. It was an improvement on a grain wagon design. I have a copy of that patent at home.

[Assistant] You had engineering in your blood.

[User] I don’t know, [perhaps so?] Dad didn’t get to go to engineering school. I think he enrolled and couldn’t even attend, because his dad, my [other] grandfather called Dad home after he had gone to Iowa City, [not long after enrolling at the University, and said,] “Edwin, you got to come home and help me.” So Dad did. That’s back when you did what your dad told you to.

[Assistant] Just like you went to school because he told you to.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] He was a smart cookie. When I was a little kid, that would be like five, six years old, something like that, I remember he was working on what today we would call an inline skate. He was trying to invent an inline skate. I recall seeing the drawings of it. His skate—after all, he was just a farmer—but his skate didn’t have a whole row of [many] wheels, it had two wheels, and they were bigger, perhaps two and a half inches in diameter. The drawings, to me, looked quite detailed, but he didn’t know how to [approach the process of applying for a patent, and] didn’t have the money to get an attorney to help him with the patent, so he had to finally drop it. After all, he was busy being a farmer. [Dad’s older brother,] Uncle Elmer, had an invention patented while he was still 18 years old, a Mennonite farm kid. It was an improvement on a grain wagon design. I have a copy of that patent at home.

[Assistant] You had engineering in your blood.

[User] I don’t know, [perhaps so?] Dad didn’t get to go to engineering school. I think he enrolled and couldn’t even attend, because his dad, my [other] grandfather called Dad home after he had gone to Iowa City, [not long after enrolling at the University, and said,] “Edwin, you got to come home and help me.” So Dad did. That’s back when you did what your dad told you to.

[Assistant] Just like you went to school because he told you to.

[User] Yes.

[Assistant] Well, looking back over your time with the NACA and with NASA, also, is there anything that you’d point out that you’re most proud of, or something that you consider your best achievement?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] [Yes, but] it took much less to get the front end of the trucks nicely rounded. We published our first big truck with the nice rounded front in ’77, and I think Peterbilt and Kenworth and Freightliner and Volvo and International began making nicely rounded front ends about 1981 or ’82, so that was more like four, five years. That was fairly quick, but that was so obvious, and the reason they would’ve done it is because they look for new designs anyway every so often, perhaps every 5 years. [I suspect it was the oil crisis plus common sense that caused the truck builders to make the “front end” change.] These side skirts are add-ons, after manufacture type thing, [and that idea was picked up by smaller manufacturers. For them it would seem like quite a risk to gear up for production. In addition, I suspect these small concerns spent a long time coming up with a design and then testing it.].

[Assistant] Is there anything that we haven’t talked about that you’d like to mention before we go for the day?

[User] I’ve probably talked too much already.

[Assistant] No, it’s all good information.

[User] That’s probably about it, I guess. I’ve had so much fun. You can tell that, can’t you?

[Assistant] Yes, I think we can. We can tell you really enjoyed your career.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I’ve probably talked too much already.

[Assistant] No, it’s all good information.

[User] That’s probably about it, I guess. I’ve had so much fun. You can tell that, can’t you?

[Assistant] Yes, I think we can. We can tell you really enjoyed your career.

[User] I was so blessed for so many years. I wouldn’t change a thing.

[Assistant] Sounds like it was a wonderful career.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] No. No, it was good. The only regrets I have are financial. If I'd made the switch earlier, I would have been smarter financially. But that's the only regret. And now that I'm aware of that, I would say it's a regret, every now and then I do say because the stock market has been so good those past three years, that had you started earlier to be a civilian, you would have been better off financially.\n\n But as far as do I have any regrets? No. I thought it was an experience that I'll always remember. I think the seven people who did that experience know that. I don't think other people realize what they did or that the experience was really different from a Shuttle flight, because I didn't think it was either, remember. But I [now] knew that it was, and they don't. So it's something I wouldn't have known had I not done it.

[Assistant] Each of you had a different mission, but as you mentioned, just seven people have done this. Are there certain characteristics that you feel are necessary to be able to do these missions?

[User] I don't know the answer to that. I honestly don't know the answer to that.

[Assistant] Because everyone of you are so different?

[User] Yes. I don't know the answer to that.

[Assistant] Do you think being a pilot helped you?


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] She got a vacation, and she got to go do a whole lot of things I guess she's been wanting to do.

[Assistant] Did either one of you have a hesitation or a fear about you being on the Mir at that time?

[User] No. No, and if she were here she'd tell you the same thing. She'd tell you the same thing. As far as that goes--I just didn't like--I didn't realize until we had had this separation, oh, three, four weeks into the Mir flight is when I went, "Hmm. Wish I could beam down to the planet for the weekend." [Laughter] And I'd think that every Friday night. "I wish I could beam down to the planet for the weekend."

[Assistant] You've had a life as a military pilot, astronaut, now you're an executive in research with this company [USAA]. Would you classify yourself as a space explorer as well, since you were on the Mir? How do you classify that time in your life?

[User] I don't know. I don't know right now. I don't know. I don't know the answer to your question. I was going to say something else, but it's not related to your question.

[Assistant] Well, you can say that anyway.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I don't know. I don't know right now. I don't know. I don't know the answer to your question. I was going to say something else, but it's not related to your question.

[Assistant] Well, you can say that anyway.

[User] Okay. Well, it's a different thing. It's okay, isn't it?

[Assistant] Sure.

[User] I've realized, and this is something I didn't really know, but a lot of retired astronauts I know know it and they're involved in it, and I guess I'm learning it. I'm very involved in a community project now here in San Antonio. They made me the chairman of a board to bring a Challenger Learning Center to San Antonio. I started that in August. Lean over there and see our plan that we put together, and our fundraising process we're about ready to kick off. So I'm spending a lot of time right now on that particular community effort down here in San Antonio.\n\n I've just started an involvement for the National Research Council. They're doing an independent assessment of the International Space Station. I'm now a member of that committee. So that's kind of interesting. So I still feel like my hand is in the Space Station and in space.\n\n About once a week I have either a luncheon or a dinner or speech somewhere here in San Antonio, or I visit an elementary school and put my flight suit on and talk to those kids. So I feel like I'm still in the space program. So it isn't that I've left it.

[Assistant] It sounds like you're making an investment for that if you're talking to the school children, you want them to understand what you feel about it as well.


[System] Act as an information elicitation agent for oral history.

[User] I've seen dockings of Russian vehicles. I was there when a Soyuz docking occurred. But I've not been there for any of the Shuttle dockings. I was always here in Houston for all those. There's a scattering of flight directors who have been there, certainly. We started off with flight directors. Then we started sending some other people out of Mission Operations Directorate, two of whom later became flight directors after they were chosen to go up to this job. So I guess you could say, retroactively, we sent a flight director. But I've never been one of them. I've always been here.\n\n Phil Engelauf and I, I think, are the only two that have never been to Moscow during a docking. Both of us have always been here for all the docking missions. I think both of us have been to Moscow probably seven, I think I'm up to seven or eight times.\n\n Again, Moscow, itself, has changed so much. I talked about my very first trip there. My last trip there we were wandering the city on Metro pretty much at will.

[Assistant] We noticed your Metro map [displayed on the office wall].

[User] Yes, a map of Metro. We were going to restaurants and bars, generally in two and threes. Generally you don't go out alone. I actually felt safer in Moscow than I would in downtown Houston at night alone, as an example. We know a lot more people there now. There are a lot more Americans, a lot bigger infrastructure, as well. There are a lot more places to eat. The overall economy over there, I think, just from the surface, seems better. Every time I fly into the airport I see more signs in English. I see more things being advertised. I see more stuff in stores. So it's not the same place at all. It's not at all the same as it was when I first there.

[Assistant] In just a short amount of time.

[User] Just a short amount of time, five years or so. The ruble has changed by a factor of twenty or so since I first went there.

[Assistant] How long were you there when you stayed? Did it vary?