PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 47405/07) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by seven Bulgarian nationals, Ms Madlen Magardich Chengelyan, Ms Viktoria Takvor Chengelyan, Mr Eduard Takvor Chengelyan, Mr Manuk Garo Chengelyan, Ms Anaiys Hampartsum Shirin, Mr Ehisapert Ardavast Hintyan and Ms Asthig Hampartsum Bedrosyan (“the applicants”), on 24 September 2007.

2.  Ms Anaiys Hampartsum Shirin passed away on 19 January 2014. Her heirs, Mr Barkev Kamer Shirin, Mr Kamer Barkev Shirin and Ms Araksi Barkev Shirin-Junglas, expressed a wish to continue the application in her stead.

3.  The applicants were represented by Mr M. Ekimdzhiev, Ms K. Boncheva and Ms G. Chernicherska, lawyers practising in Plovdiv. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms A. Panova, of the Ministry of Justice.

4.  The applicants alleged that the domestic courts had failed to respect the res judicata effect of an earlier court judgment in judicial proceedings they had initiated in the context of a dispute regarding restitution of property, and that this had resulted in an unlawful interference with their property rights.

5.  On 16 September 2013 the above complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, were communicated to the Government, and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6.  The applicants were born in 1950, 1979, 1988, 1958, 1947, 1927 and 1932 respectively. They live in Plovdiv, apart from Ms Asthig Hampartsum Bedrosyan, who lives in New York, United States of America. Before her death in 2014, Ms Anaiys Hampartsum Shirin lived in Burgas.

7.  Ancestors of the applicants owned a plot of land measuring 246 square metres in the old part of Plovdiv, which had a two-storey house built on 160 square metres of it. In 1949 the building was declared a cultural monument. In 1966 the property was expropriated and the applicants’ ancestors received compensation. After that, the building was the subject of substantial renovation work, in particular after a fire destroyed part of it in 1978.

A.  Restitution of the property

8.  After the adoption of the Restitution of Property Expropriated under Building Planning Legislation Act (“the Restitution Act”) in 1992 (see paragraph 15 below), some of the applicants and other heirs of the original owners (from whom the remaining applicants succeeded in the course of the domestic proceedings) applied for the revocation of the expropriation. On 28 June 1993 they were informed that their application had been refused by the mayor of Plovdiv municipality, and on 7 July 1993 they applied for judicial review of that refusal. In a judgment of 9 October 1997 the Plovdiv Regional Court upheld the administrative decision.

9.  However, in a final judgment of 2 October 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court reversed. It found that the applicants’ property had been taken under legislation regulating expropriations made with a view to carrying out public works, namely expropriations intended to be followed by the construction of new buildings or infrastructure. The property in issue, however, had been declared a cultural monument, and had been expropriated to be used as such, thus the expropriation had been in breach of the law. The fact that no construction work had ever been envisaged had to be assimilated to a situation where no public works within the meaning of the Restitution Act had ever been commenced. In addition, the renovation work carried out after the expropriation did not represent “public works” either, as it had only aimed to preserve the building. Lastly, it was noted that the property still existed. All of those factors meant that the preconditions for restitution had been fulfilled. On this basis, the Supreme Administrative Court revoked the expropriation, quashing the mayor’s refusal in that regard.

10.  Following the above judgment, in order to make the restitution effective (see paragraph 16 below), on 21 May 1999 the applicants paid back to the municipality the monetary compensation received by their ancestors at the time of the expropriation. The parties disagreed as to whether the applicants had also received compensation in the form of other property at the time of the expropriation, and whether they had to return that as well.

11.  In 2001 the applicants obtained a notarial deed, which named them as the property’s owners.

B.  Rei vindicatio proceedings

12.  Despite the events described above, the applicants could not take possession of the property, because it was being held and used by the Plovdiv municipality, which in 1997 had declared it a public municipal property and had rented a room in the building to an organisation called “13 Centuries Bulgaria” National Endowment Fund (“the Fund”, see paragraphs 19-20 below).

13.  After unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate an agreement, in December 2003 the applicants brought rei vindicatio proceedings against the Plovdiv municipality and the Fund. The action was dismissed by a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 8 June 2007. In the first place, the domestic courts found that they were competent to examine the action. According to the second-instance Plovdiv Regional Court, the judgment of 2 October 1998 was open to indirect judicial review, because it was replacing the mayor’s administrative decision on the applicants’ request for restitution, and did not have a res judicata effect in proceedings specifically concerning the right to property. According to the Supreme Court of Cassation, the defendants to the rei vindicatio action, namely the Plovdiv municipality and the Fund, had not participated in the earlier judicial proceedings and therefore were not bound by the judgment of 2 October 1998.

14.  Next, the domestic courts found that the reparation work carried out on the building which the applicants were claiming had been so substantial (the building’s appearance had been preserved, but the internal construction had been largely modified – the roof, some windows and other elements had also been replaced) that, within the meaning of the Restitution Act, it could not be said that the building still existed. In addition, the property was being used for the purpose for which it had been expropriated, namely as “a cultural monument”, which, in the courts’ view, constituted “public works” within the meaning of the same Act. Accordingly, none of the preconditions for restitution had been satisfied.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A.  The Restitution Act

15.  The Restitution of Property Expropriated under Building Planning Legislation Act (Закон за възстановяване на собствеността върху някои отчуждени имоти по ЗТСУ, ЗПИНМ, ЗБНМ, ЗДИ и ЗС, “the Restitution Act”) was adopted in 1992. In section 1(1) it provided for the revocation of previous expropriations and the restitution of property where certain criteria had been met, in particular where the public works for which the property had been expropriated had not commenced, and where any buildings on the property still existed at the time of the Act’s entry into force.

16.  Restitution could only take effect upon the return of any compensation received at the time of expropriation (sections 5(1) and 6(1) of the Act).

17.  A request for the revocation of an expropriation had to be addressed to the mayor of the relevant municipality, whose refusal (express or tacit) was open to judicial review.

B.  Local SelfGovernment and Local Administration Act

.  Sections 38(1) and 44(1) of the Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act (Закон за местното самоуправление и местната администрация) provide that a mayor is a “body of executive power” of the municipality, who “represents the municipality against individuals and legal entities and before the courts”.

C.  The “13 Centuries Bulgaria” National Endowment Fund

19.  The Fund is an organisation tasked with receiving and managing donations from local and foreign persons made in support of Bulgarian education, science, culture, health and other social activities. It is also financed by the State budget.

20.  Until 2001 its status was regulated by a Council of Ministers decree adopted in 1983, which provided, inter alia, that the Fund was an entity “attached to the Council of Ministers”, that its managing board was to be governed by the Minister of Culture, and that the board’s remaining members were to be appointed by the Prime Minister. In 2001 Parliament adopted the “13 Centuries Bulgaria” National Endowment Fund Act (Закон за Националния дарителски фонд “13 века България”), which provides for a similar scheme: the Fund is governed by a board, which includes the ministers of culture, health, education and labour, and the remaining members are appointed by the Council of Ministers.

D.  Provisions concerning the res judicata effect of final judgments

21.  The relevant provisions have been summarised in the Court’s judgments in the cases of Kehaya and Others v. Bulgaria (nos. 47797/99 and 68698/01, §§ 34-55, 12 January 2006), and Sivova and Koleva (no. 30383/03, §§ 57-60, 15 November 2011).

THE LAW

I.  PRELIMINARY QUESTION

22.  One of the applicants, Ms Anaiys Hampartsum Shirin, passed away on 19 January 2014 while the case was pending before the Court, and her heirs, Mr Barkev Kamer Shirin, Mr Kamer Barkev Shirin and Ms Araksi Barkev Shirin-Junglas, expressed their wish to pursue the application on her behalf (see paragraph 2 above). It has not been disputed that they are entitled to do so, and the Court sees no reason not to accede to their request (see Horváthová v. Slovakia, no. 74456/01, §§ 25-27, 17 May 2005, and Donka Stefanova v. Bulgaria, no. 19256/03, § 11, 1 October 2009).

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

23.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the national courts examining their rei vindicatio action had disregarded the binding force of the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment of 2 October 1998. The applicants relied on the Court’s findings in the case of Kehaya and Others (cited above).

24.  In addition, the applicants complained that section 1(1) of the Restitution Act was unclear as to the exact meaning of the conditions for restitution, allowing for, as in their case, diverging interpretations.

25.  In so far as applicable, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

A.  Arguments of the parties

26.  The Government contested the complaints. They argued that the courts which had dealt with the rei vindicatio proceedings had been competent to examine the applicants’ claims against the Plovdiv municipality, because the municipality “had not participated” in the first set of proceedings concerning the restitution of the plot, “was not bound” by the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment of 2 October 1998, and had no other means of protecting its property rights. The Government also submitted that the mayor of Plovdiv, whose decision the applicants had challenged in the restitution proceedings, “had not been acting for the municipality” in the 1993-98 restitution proceedings. They added that the judgment of 2 October 1998 was replacing the mayor’s administrative decision on the applicants’ request for restitution, and was thus open to indirect judicial review. The Government pointed out that the Fund – named as the second defendant to the applicants’ rei vindicatio claim – was not bound by the judgment of 2 October 1998 either. Lastly, the Government contended that the domestic courts’ conclusions in the rei vindicatio proceedings had been correct and duly based on the evidence in the case.

27.  The applicants disagreed. They argued that the Plovdiv municipality had sought to receive a “second chance” to have the applicants’ entitlement to restitution examined, without relying on any new facts. They contended that the municipality could not be considered to have been a third party to the restitution proceedings and, on the contrary, was bound by the judgment of 2 October 1998; the distinction made by the Government between the mayor and the municipality was, in their view, “artificial”. The applicants also pointed out that in the two sets of proceedings in issue the courts had examined exactly the same matter, and only the manner in which they had interpreted and applied the law had differed.

28.  As to the Fund, the applicants pointed out that it was only renting a room in the disputed building, and had never claimed any property rights. Moreover, it was “an entirely public institution” under State control.

29.  Lastly, the applicants reiterated their argument that the applicable provisions of the Restitution Act had been unclear, thus allowing for conflicting interpretations.

B.  The Court’s assessment

1.  Admissibility

30.  The Court notes that the complaint under Article 6 § 1 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2.  Merits

31.  The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty, encompasses the requirement that, where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999VII; Oferta Plus S.R.L. v. Moldova, no. 14385/04, § 97, 19 December 2006; and Kehaya and Others, cited above, § 61).

.  The Court has already examined a complaint similar to the one at hand in the case of Kehaya and Others (cited above, §§ 59-70), which concerned the application of legislation to agricultural land, and in the case of Decheva and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 43071/06, 26 June 2012, §§ 39-45), which concerned the same legislation considered in the present case. In both those cases, final judgments restoring the applicants’ rights over different properties had been rendered devoid of any legal effect, because in separate proceedings the question of whether the State, respectively the municipality, or the applicants were the owners of the properties had been re-examined and decided differently. In those circumstances, the Court found that the State (the municipality) had been provided with a “second chance” to obtain a re-examination of a dispute already determined by a final judgment in a previous set of proceedings. In both cases the Court went on to find violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, on the grounds that, by depriving final judgments in favour of the applicants of any legal effect, the authorities had acted in breach of the legal certainty principle inherent in that provision.

33.  Similarly, in the present case, even though the judgment of 2 October 1998 allowing the applicants’ restitution claims was not quashed, it was rendered devoid of any legal effect, because in the subsequent rei vindicatio proceedings the national courts found that the restitution had not taken place. The courts examining the rei vindicatio claims gave two reasons for concluding that they had jurisdiction to review the matter and that the judgment of 2 October 1998 had no res judicata effect in the proceedings before them (see paragraph 13 above). Firstly, they pointed out that that judgment was replacing the mayor’s administrative decision on the applicants’ request for restitution, which meant that it was open to indirect judicial review. Secondly, they considered that the defendants to the rei vindicatio action had not participated in the initial judicial proceedings. The Government put forward the same arguments in their submissions to the Court, adding that the mayor “had not been acting” for the municipality in the 1993-98 restitution proceedings (see paragraph 26 above).

34.  It is not the Court’s task here to examine in abstracto the legal theory underlying the Restitution Act and the nature of the proceedings initiated by the applicants in 1993. It must limit its analysis to the question of whether or not the application of the law in these particular circumstances resulted in a violation of the applicants’ right to a fair trial interpreted in light of the principle of legal certainty (see Kehaya and Others, cited above, § 65). It must take into account the fact that the judgment of 2 October 1998 was the result of contentious proceedings before two levels of jurisdiction, including the Supreme Administrative Court. The principle of legal certainty dictates that, where a civil dispute is examined on the merits by competent courts, it should be decided once and for all (ibid., § 68).

35.  There does not appear to be a dispute between the parties that the courts examined the same matter in the two sets of proceedings at issue, namely whether the preconditions for the restitution of the property claimed by the applicants under the 1992 Restitution Act had been satisfied. The salient question is thus whether the same parties were involved in the reexamination. In answering this question, the Court will not consider the Fund’s participation in the second set of proceedings determinative, in view of the fact that it was only renting a room in the disputed building, did not claim any property rights, and that its interest in the proceedings was the defence of its possession of that room (see, a contrario, Tantilovi v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 39351/05, 13 January 2015, where the tenant combatting a rei vindicatio claim had rented the building in question for many years and had made substantial improvements to it). The key question when deciding the present complaint is thus whether the Plovdiv municipality could be considered to have participated in the 1993-98 proceedings and, accordingly, to have been bound by the judgment of 2 October 1998.

36.  In the proceedings initiated in 1993 the applicants sought the judicial review of an order of the mayor of Plovdiv rejecting their restitution claims (see paragraph 8 above); accordingly, the parties to those proceedings were the applicants and the mayor. In the subsequent rei vindicatio proceedings the applicants brought their claims against the Plovdiv municipality (see paragraph 12 above). Even though the mayor of Plovdiv and the Plovdiv municipality may have exercised different functions in respect of municipal property and the question of restitution, this does not alter the fact that they were different emanations of the same local authority (see Decheva and Others, cited above, § 42). In addition, it is significant that, pursuant to the Local SelfGovernment and Local Administration Act, the mayor is a “body of executive power” of the municipality, who “represents the municipality against individuals and legal entities and before the courts” (see paragraph 18 above).

37.  Accordingly, the Court concludes that the national courts reexamined the same matter in the rei vindicatio proceedings, namely whether the preconditions for restitution had been fulfilled, and that the same parties – the applicants and the Plovdiv municipality – were involved in the proceedings. Thus, the courts provided the municipality with a “second chance” to have the matter – which had already been decided upon in earlier contentious proceedings – determined in its favour (see Kehaya and Others, § 69, and Decheva and Others, § 43, both cited above).

38.  The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the principle of legal certainty inherent in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was infringed in this case.

.  In view of the conclusion above, the Court does not consider it necessary to also determine whether the conflicting conclusions of the national courts in the two sets of proceedings being examined were, as argued by the applicants (see paragraphs 24 and 29 above), the result of unclear legislation.

40.  In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1

41.  Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 13 of the Convention, the applicants also complained that they were unfairly deprived of their property.

42.  The Court is of the view that the complaint is most appropriately examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 alone, which reads:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

A.  Arguments of the parties

43.  The Government argued that any interference with the applicants’ property rights had been justified, because the building claimed by them had been declared a cultural monument and registered as public municipal property, together with the plot of land. The Government stated once again that the national courts had correctly concluded that the preconditions for the property’s restitution had not been fulfilled.

44.  The applicants disagreed. They argued that they had been deprived of their possessions in breach of the principle of legal certainty, and thus not “subject to the conditions provided for by law”, as provided by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

B.  The Court’s assessment

45.  The Court observes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above, and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.

46.  The applicants’ property rights over their ancestors’ plot of land and building were restored with the final judgment of 2 October 1998. In order to make the restitution effective, the applicants returned the monetary compensation received at the time of the expropriation to the municipality (see paragraph 10 above). The parties disagreed as to whether the applicants had also received compensation in the form of other property, and whether they had to return that as well (see paragraph 10 above). The Court considers this latter question irrelevant. What matters is that, in the subsequent domestic proceedings, the courts did not rely on any failure on the part of the applicants to return the compensation received. It is also significant that in 2001 the applicants obtained a notarial deed naming them as the property’s owners (see paragraph 11 above). Notwithstanding the fact that they never took possession of the property claimed, the above information is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the applicants had “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

.  The national courts’ judgments in the rei vindicatio proceedings constituted an interference with the applicants’ “possessions”, in that the courts did not recognise them as the owners of the disputed property and dismissed their rei vindicatio claim.

.  The Court finds that it is not necessary to decide whether that interference amounted to a deprivation of property within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It observes that this rule is only concerned with a particular instance of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, and must be construed in the light of the principle enunciated in the first sentence of the first paragraph. The Court will therefore examine the interference in the light of the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Decheva and Others, cited above, § 56).

.  The Court has already found that the authorities in the case acted in breach of the legal certainty principle inherent in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 36-38 above). In Kehaya and Others (§§ 75-76 of the judgment) and Decheva and Others (§ 57), both cited above, where the Court reached a similar conclusion, it concluded that the interference could consequently not be deemed lawful under the Convention, not least because of the fundamental nature of the principle of rule of law in a democratic society, of which the legal certainty principle forms part and which is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention. The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion on the facts of the instant case. Like the two earlier cases, this case is not about the re-opening of civil proceedings within the time-limits and under the conditions regulated by law, but about a failure to recognise the res judicata effect of a final judgment delivered in contentious proceedings.

.  The above is, in principle, sufficient for the Court to conclude that the interference with the applicants’ “possessions” fell foul of the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

.  Nevertheless, the Court also takes note of the facts put forward by the Government to justify that interference, namely that the building claimed by the applicants was a cultural monument and that the whole property was registered as public municipal property (see paragraph 43 above). However, the Government have not shown that there was any statutory obstacle to private individuals owning cultural monuments. Moreover, the building in issue was declared such a monument in 1949 and was privately owned until 1966 (see paragraph 7 above); the fact that it was a monument was known to the Supreme Administrative Court (which delivered the judgment of 2 October 1998), and was not considered an obstacle to restitution. As to the 1997 decision declaring the land and the building public municipal property (see paragraph 12 above), it was issued by the municipality itself, and it has not been shown that it could be validly opposed to the applicants’ claims.

.  It follows from the above that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this case.

IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

53.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Pecuniary damage

54.  The applicants claimed the actual restitution of their property under this head. In case the authorities failed to restore the property to them, they claimed 587,000 euros (EUR) in respect of its value. The applicants presented a valuation report prepared by an expert in March 2014, which indicated this amount as the property’s market value.

55.  The Government contested the claim.

56.  The Court is of the view that the question of the application of Article 41, in so far as it concerns pecuniary damage, is not ready for a decision (Rule 75 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Accordingly, the Court reserves that question and the further procedure, and invites the Government and the applicants, within four months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, to submit their observations on the matter and, in particular, to inform it of any agreement that they may reach.

B.  Non-pecuniary damage

57.  The applicants also claimed EUR 10,000 each in respect of nonpecuniary damage. They argued that they had suffered distress and frustration for many years.

58.  The Government contested this claim. In particular, they urged the Court not to award non-pecuniary damages to Ms Anaiys Hampartsum Shirin, who passed away in 2014 and whose heirs continued the procedure in her stead (see paragraph 2 above), contending that such damages could only be awarded intuitu personae.

59.  As concerns the Government’s objection, the Court observes that it has already awarded non-pecuniary damages to an applicant who passed away during proceedings before it, holding that the award was to be paid to the person’s heirs (see Lukanov v. Bulgaria, 20 March 1997, § 53, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997II, and Baragan v. Romania, no. 33627/96, § 49, 1 October 2002). In the Court’s view, it would be unfair to hold otherwise in the present case.

60.  The Court is of the view that the applicants must have suffered distress and frustration as a result of the violations of their rights. Judging on an equitable basis, it considers it appropriate to award EUR 2,000 to each of them in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The award in respect of Ms Anaiys Hampartsum Shirin is to be paid to her heirs, whose names are indicated in paragraph 2 above.

C.  Costs and expenses

61.  The applicants also claimed 5,168 Bulgarian levs (BGN) in respect of costs and expenses incurred in the domestic rei vindicatio proceedings. In support of this claim, they submitted receipts from their lawyers, dated 2000, 2005 and 2006 respectively, indicating that the applicants had paid them BGN 4,920 in total (the equivalent of EUR 2,510) for legal representation. In addition, the applicants referred to the judgments given by the national courts, whereby they had been ordered to pay the defendants BGN 248 in costs and expenses.

62.  In respect of the proceedings before the Court, the applicants claimed EUR 5,495 for the legal work carried out by their legal representatives. In support of this claim, they submitted a time sheet. They also claimed EUR 58.35 for postage and administrative expenses, of which EUR 27.35 was for postage, substantiated by the relevant invoices. The applicants claimed a further EUR 200 for translation, presenting a contract whereby their representatives had undertaken to pay this amount. The applicants requested that the amounts above, less the BGN 2,000 (EUR 1,020) which they had already paid to their representatives, be transferred directly into their representatives’ bank account.

.  Lastly, the applicants claimed BGN 800 (the equivalent of about EUR 408) which they had paid for the valuation report presented in support of their claim for pecuniary damages (see paragraph 54 above).

64.  The Government argued that it had not been shown that the claims concerning the costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings had been actually incurred. As to the remainder, they argued that the amount claimed for legal representation in the proceedings before the Court was excessive, and that the expenses incurred in obtaining an expert valuation of the disputed property had been unnecessary.

65.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.

66.  In the present case, the Court considers that the expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 61 above) were necessary, as in those proceedings the applicants were trying to prevent the violations of their rights which the Court has found. Accordingly, the Court awards these expenses to the extent that they have been substantiated, namely EUR 2,510, the applicants not having shown that they actually paid the remainder.

67.  As to the costs and expenses claimed in respect of the current proceedings (see paragraph 62 above), firstly, the Court is of the view that the expenses for legal representation were actually and necessarily incurred. However, it considers this part of the claim exaggerated, particularly given the existence of established case-law on the matter, and finds it reasonable to award the applicants EUR 2,500 under this head. Next, the Court awards the amount shown to have been incurred for postage and translation, namely EUR 227.35 in total. The applicants have already paid EUR 1,020 for legal representation. Accordingly, as requested by them, the amounts awarded in this paragraph, less the sum already paid by them, that is EUR 1,707.35, are to be transferred directly into the bank account of their legal representatives.

.  Lastly, the Court considers that the sum paid by the applicants for a valuation report, EUR 408, was also a necessary and reasonable expense. It therefore awards it in full.

D.  Default interest

69.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Declares the application admissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;

4.   Holds that the question of the application of Article 41, in so far as it concerns the claim for pecuniary damages, is not ready for decision;

accordingly,

(a)  reserves the said question;

(b)  invites the Government and the applicants to submit, within four months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, their written observations on the matter and to notify the Court of any agreement that they may reach;

(c)  reserves the further procedure and delegates to the President of the Chamber the power to fix the same if need be;

5.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants (in respect of Ms Anaiys Hampartsum Shirin – to her heirs), within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for non-pecuniary damages and costs and expenses.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 April 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.


PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in applications against Russia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table.

2.  The applications were communicated to the Russian Government (“the Government”).

THE FACTS

3.  The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

4.  The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention. Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention.

THE LAW

I.  JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

5.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

6.  The applicants complained principally of the inadequate conditions of their detention. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

7.  The Court notes that the applicants were kept in detention in poor conditions. The details of the applicants’ detention are indicated in the appended table. The Court refers to the principles established in its caselaw regarding inadequate conditions of detention (see, for instance, Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, §§ 96101, ECHR 2016). It reiterates in particular that a serious lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as a factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the detention conditions described are “degrading” from the point of view of Article 3 and may disclose a violation, both alone or taken together with other shortcomings (see Muršić, cited above, §§ 122 141, and Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 149159, 10 January 2012).

8.  In the leading case of Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, 10 January 2012, the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case. In that case the Court also stressed that in conditions-of-detention cases the respondent Government alone have access to information capable of corroborating or refuting allegations made by applicants. A failure on their part to submit convincing evidence on material conditions of detention may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant’s allegations. The Court further reiterates that certificates issued by the director of the impugned detention facility after the Government have been given notice of the complaint, lacked references to the original prison documentation and were apparently based on personal recollections rather than on any objective data are of little evidentiary value (see, among other authorities, Veliyev v. Russia, no. 24202/05, § 127, 24 June 2010, and Igor Ivanov v. Russia, no. 34000/02, § 34, 7 June 2007). The Court emphasises that, in every case, the Government have to account properly for the failure to submit the original records, in particular those concerning the number of inmates detained together with the applicant, as well as authentic evidence showing both the size of cells where applicant was detained (floor plans) and confirming correlation between the general prison population, the population in the cells where the applicant was detained and the size of those cells (cell records). It further stresses that documents bearing signs of corrections, such as figures in documents being erased or written over, as in case no. 46863/16, or any other alterations to the documents without any explanations as to the their origin, reason and timing, cannot be considered reliable (see Klyukin v. Russia, no. 54996/07, § 59, 17 October 2013, with further references).

9.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of these complaints. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the applicants’ conditions of detention were inadequate.

10.  These complaints are therefore admissible and disclose a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

III.  OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS UNDER WELL-ESTABLISHED CASE-LAW

11.  In applications nos. 32592/16, 33628/17, 43320/17 and 61744/17 the applicants submitted other complaints which also raised issues under the Convention, given the relevant well-established case-law of the Court (see appended table). These complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other ground. Accordingly, they must be declared admissible. Having examined all the material before it, the Court concludes that they also disclose violations of the Convention in the light of its findings in Ananyev and Others, cited above, §§ 100-119, concerning the lack of domestic remedies to complain about poor conditions of detention; Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461/10, 27 November 2012, regarding unreasonably long detention on remand; and Zubkov and Others v. Russia, nos. 29431/05 and 2 others, §§ 146-149, 7 November 2017, dealing with the absence of speedy review of the detention matters.

IV.  REMAINING COMPLAINTS

12.  In application no. 43320/17 the applicant also raised other complaints under various Articles of the Convention.

13.  The Court has examined the application and considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.

14.  It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

V.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

15.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

16.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its caselaw (see, in particular, Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 172, 10 January 2012), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table.

17.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Decides to join the applications;

2.  Declares the complaints concerning the inadequate conditions of detention and the other complaints under well-established case-law of the Court, as set out in the appended table, admissible, and the remainder of the application no. 43320/17 inadmissible;

3.  Holds that these complaints disclose a breach of Article 3 of the Convention concerning the inadequate conditions of detention;

4.  Holds that there has been a violation of the Convention as regards the other complaints raised under well-established case-law of the Court (see appended table);

5.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.

6.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 July 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.


INTRODUCTION

1.  The case concerns allegations that the criminal proceedings against the applicant for a minor offence were unfair, insofar as the court relied on the statement of witnesses whom she had not been able to question.

THE FACTS

2.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Prahova.

3.  The Government were represented by their Agent, most recently Ms O.F. Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

5.  On 13 February 2009 R.M. lodged a criminal complaint with the Prahova police, accusing the applicant of assaulting her on the street. The applicant and R.M. gave statements to the police. The police also heard evidence from three eyewitnesses. On 14 February 2009 witness A declared that he had seen the applicant hit the victim. On 6 March 2009 witnesses B (the applicant’s sister) and C denied that the applicant had hit the victim. The victim also provided the police with a medical certificate stating that she had bruises on her head which did not require medical treatment. It appears that all the statements were taken in the absence of the applicant or a lawyer representing her.

5.  On 13 February 2009 R.M. lodged a criminal complaint with the Prahova police, accusing the applicant of assaulting her on the street. The applicant and R.M. gave statements to the police. The police also heard evidence from three eyewitnesses. On 14 February 2009 witness A declared that he had seen the applicant hit the victim. On 6 March 2009 witnesses B (the applicant’s sister) and C denied that the applicant had hit the victim. The victim also provided the police with a medical certificate stating that she had bruises on her head which did not require medical treatment. It appears that all the statements were taken in the absence of the applicant or a lawyer representing her.

6.  On 28 July 2009 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Ploieşti District Court instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 180 § 1 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”), a provision prohibiting hitting and other acts of violence (see paragraph 11 below).

6.  On 28 July 2009 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Ploieşti District Court instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 180 § 1 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”), a provision prohibiting hitting and other acts of violence (see paragraph 11 below).

7.  By a decision of 15 December 2010 the prosecutor’s office discontinued the proceedings. It considered that the applicant had hit and injured the victim, but that the acts committed by her, fuelled by an ongoing dispute between the parties, were not serious enough to constitute a criminal offence. In accordance with Articles 181, 90 and 91 of the CC and Articles 10 (b1) and 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) (see paragraph 13 below), it imposed an administrative fine of 400 Romanian lei (RON) (approximately 90 euros (EUR) at the time).

8.  On 18 March 2011, following an objection raised by the applicant, the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor’s office upheld the decision.

8.  On 18 March 2011, following an objection raised by the applicant, the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor’s office upheld the decision.

9.  On 8 April 2011 the applicant lodged an objection against the two decisions with the Ploieşti District Court under Article 2781 of the CCP. Her lawyer argued before the court that the evidence in the case file did not support the conclusion that she had committed the acts she had been accused of.

9.  On 8 April 2011 the applicant lodged an objection against the two decisions with the Ploieşti District Court under Article 2781 of the CCP. Her lawyer argued before the court that the evidence in the case file did not support the conclusion that she had committed the acts she had been accused of.

10.  In a final decision of 21 June 2011 (available to the parties on 16 August 2011) the District Court dismissed the objection, finding as follows:

“As can be seen from the evidence in the [case] file, [the applicant] denied being in a dispute with [R.M.] or having injured her.

It is true that during the police investigation both [the applicant] and [the victim] proposed witnesses in order to support their case. However, in addition [to the witness evidence], the victim also provided a medical certificate which, together with the statements made by witness [A] represents genuine evidence proving beyond any doubt that the events occurred exactly as described [by R.M.].

Bearing in mind the minimal violation of [R.M.’s] physical integrity and the particular and personal circumstances in which the events occurred, the court considers that it was correct to discontinue the criminal prosecution and impose an administrative fine. It is obvious that such acts cannot remain unpunished, even when they only cause minimal harm to the social values protected.”

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

11.  The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (“the CC”) in force at the time of the events in the present case were worded as follows:

Article 1 – Aim of the criminal law

“Criminal law protects, against crimes, Romania, the sovereignty, independence, unity and indivisibility of the State, the person, its rights and freedoms, property and the rule of law.”

Article 17 – Essential characteristics of a criminal offence

“A criminal offence is an act which presents a danger to society, is committed with culpable intent (vinovăţie) and is provided for by criminal law.

A criminal offence is the sole basis of criminal liability.”

Article 18 – Social danger of an act

“An act presenting a danger to society for the purposes of criminal law shall be understood to mean any action or inaction which undermines one of the values mentioned in Article 1 and for which the imposition of a sentence is required.”

Article 181 – Acts not having the social danger of a criminal offence

“1.  An act punishable by criminal law shall not constitute a criminal offence if, in view of its minimal interference with one of the values safeguarded by criminal law and the manifestly insignificant nature of its specific content, it does not present the degree of danger to society associated with a criminal offence.

2.  In determining the degree of danger to society, account must be taken of the manner and means by which the act was committed, the aim pursued, the circumstances in which the act was committed, the result which was or could have been produced, and the character and conduct of the perpetrator, if known.

3.  In the event of such an act, the public prosecutor or the court shall impose one of the administrative sanctions provided for in Article 91.”

Article 90 – Conditions for replacement [of criminal liability]

“(1)  The court may replace criminal liability with ... an administrative sanction, if the following conditions are met:

(a)  the sentence prescribed by law for the offence is imprisonment for a maximum of one year or a fine or for the offences provided for in Articles 208, 213, Article 215 § 1, Article 2151 § 1, Article 217 § 1, Article 219 § 1, if the value of the damage does not exceed 10 Romanian lei or for the offence provided for in Article 249, if the value of the damage does not exceed 50 Romanian lei;

(b)  because of its specific content and the circumstances in which it was committed, the act presents a low degree of social danger and did not produce serious consequences;

(c)  the damage caused by the offence has been fully repaired pending the delivery of the decision;

(d)  the perpetrator regrets the act;

(e)  there is sufficient information indicating that the perpetrator can be redeemed without punishment.

(2)  Criminal liability cannot be replaced if the perpetrator has previously been convicted or has twice been subject to administrative sanctions...”

Article 91 – Administrative sanctions

“Where a court orders the replacement of criminal liability, it shall impose one of the following administrative sanctions:

...

(c)  a fine of between 10 and 1,000 lei.”

Title II: Crimes against the person

Chapter 1: Crimes against life, physical integrity and health

Section II: Hitting and damage to physical integrity or health

Article 180 – Hitting or other violence

“(1)  Hitting or any acts of violence causing physical harm shall be punishable by imprisonment of one to three months or by a fine.”

12.  On 1 February 2014 a new Criminal Code (“the NCC”) entered into force in the Respondent State. The provisions which would be applicable to a situation similar to that raised in the present case read as follows:

Article 80 – Conditions for waiving sentencing

“(1)  The court may decide to waive the imposition of a sentence if the following conditions are met:

(a)  the criminal offence committed is of reduced severity, considering the nature and extent of the consequences produced, the means used, the manner and circumstances in which it was committed, the motive and the aim pursued;

(b)  with regard to the offender, their prior conduct, the efforts made by [him or her] to remove or reduce the consequences of the criminal offence, as well as [his or her] possibility of correction, the court considers that the imposition of a sentence would be inappropriate because of the consequences it would have for the offender.

(2)  It is not possible to waive the imposition of a sentence if:

(a)  the offender has previously been convicted, except in the cases stipulated in Article 42 (a) and (b) [deeds which are no longer prohibited by criminal law, and offences which have been amnestied] or where rehabilitation has taken place or the time-limits for rehabilitation have been met;

(b)  the offender has benefitted from a waiver of sentence in the two years preceding the date of commission of the offence for which he [or she] is currently being tried;

(c)  the offender has evaded the criminal investigation or trial, or attempted to prevent the discovery of the truth or the identification and prosecution of the perpetrator or other participants;

(d)  the punishment set by law for the criminal offence committed is imprisonment of more than five years.

(3)  In the event of concurrent offences, a waiver of imposition of a sentence may be ordered if, for each concurrent offence, the conditions set out in paragraphs (1) and (2) above are met.”

(3)  In the event of concurrent offences, a waiver of imposition of a sentence may be ordered if, for each concurrent offence, the conditions set out in paragraphs (1) and (2) above are met.”

13.  The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), as in force at the material time, provided as follows:

Article 10 – Cases when criminal prosecutions are not started or are dropped

“1.  Criminal proceedings cannot be instituted or continued if:

...

(b1)  the act did not present the degree of social danger required to be classified as a criminal offence;”

Article 11 – Termination of criminal investigation, prosecution, acquittal and termination of criminal trial

“Where any of the cases set out in Article 10 is found to exist:

1.  During the criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor, on an application by the prosecuting authority or proprio motu, shall order: ...

(b)  the discontinuation of the proceedings (scoaterea de sub urmărire) in favour of the suspect or accused, in the cases set out in Article 10 (a) to (e).

...”

Article 172 – Rights of the defence

“(1)  During the criminal investigation, the defence counsel of the accused or defendant has the right to participate in any investigative activities and make requests and submit documents. An investigative activity may take place even in counsel’s absence, if there is evidence that counsel was notified of the date and time of the activity. Notification shall be made by telephone, fax, Internet or other such means, and a report shall be concluded in this regard.

...

(3)  If the [defence] counsel is present during an investigative activity, his [or her] presence shall be noted, and the [relevant document] shall also be signed by counsel.

...

(6)  Counsel has the right to complain, in accordance with Article 275, if his [or her] requests are not accepted ...”

Article 275 – Right to lodge a complaint

“Anyone may lodge a complaint in respect of measures and decisions taken during a criminal investigation, if they have harmed his or her legitimate interests ...”

Article 278 – Complaint against the prosecutor’s activities

“Complaints against measures or decisions taken by a prosecutor or implemented at the latter’s request shall be examined by ... the chief prosecutor of the relevant department ....”

Article 2781 – Complaint before the judge against the prosecutor’s decisions or order not to prosecute

“(1)  Following the dismissal by the prosecutor of a complaint lodged under Articles 275 to 278 in respect of a decision to discontinue a criminal investigation ... or a decision not to prosecute (neurmărire penală) ..., the injured party, or any other person whose legitimate interests have been harmed, may complain within twenty days of notification of the decision, to the judge of the court that would normally have jurisdiction to hear the case at first instance.

...

(7)  The judge ruling on the complaint shall verify the prosecutor’s decision or order, on the basis of the material and evidence in the file and any new documents submitted.

(8)  The judge shall take one of the following decisions:

(a)  reject the complaint, by a decision, as out of time, inadmissible or unfounded, and uphold the contested decision or order;

(b)  allow the complaint, by a decision, set aside the prosecutor’s decision or order and refer the case to the prosecutor’s office, in order to start or reopen the criminal investigation, as appropriate. The judge shall give reasons for why he [or she] has referred the case to the prosecutor, and shall indicate the facts and circumstances to be verified and the evidence to be collected;

(c)  allow the complaint, by an interlocutory judgment, set aside the prosecutor’s decision or order and, if the evidence in the case file is sufficient, examine the case as a court of first instance, the provisions concerning the procedure at first instance and appeal proceedings being applicable.

...

(10)  A decision rendered under paragraph 8 shall be final.”

14.  On 1 February 2014 a new Code of Criminal Procedure (“the NCCP”) entered into force in the Respondent State. The procedure provided for in Article 2781 of the CCP was replaced with a new procedure, described in Article 340 of the NCCP, which reads as follows:

Article 340 – Complaint against the decision not to prosecute or not to indict

“(1)  Anyone whose complaint against the decision not to prosecute (clasare), taken in a prosecutor’s order or an indictment, has been rejected in accordance with Article 339 [complaints against prosecutor’s activities or decisions] may complain, within [twenty] days of the date the decision was notified, to the preliminary chamber judge from the court that would, by law, hear the case at first instance.”

15.  In two decisions rendered in 2004 and 2006, the Romanian Constitutional Court ruled that the limitation of the evidence that could be examined in the procedure provided for by Article 2781 of the CCP was justified by the specific nature of that procedure. In particular, the procedure (used by the applicant in the present case) did not concern the merits of the criminal case, and was only meant to verify the lawfulness of decisions taken by the prosecutor. The Constitutional Court considered that, under the procedure, this verification was done by examining the documents in the criminal file which had formed the basis of the prosecutor’s decision.

16.  Enforcement of an administrative fine imposed under Article 181 of the CC was carried out in accordance with the procedure provided for by Government Ordinance No. 2/2001, which at the material time read as follows:

Article 39

“Enforcement of the sanction of a fine shall be done as follows:

(a)  by the authority to which the administrative officer belongs, whenever the appeal against the administrative decision concerning the contravention is not exercised within the time-limits prescribed by law;

(b)  by the court, in any other cases.”

Article 391

“(1)  If the offender has not paid the fine within [thirty] days of the date [the decision imposing] the fine became final, and there is no possibility of enforcement, he [or she] shall notify the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offence was committed, in order to obtain replacement of the fine with the sanction of community service, taking into account, where appropriate, the part of the fine that has been paid.

(2)  If the offender, summoned by the court, has not paid the fine within the time-limit prescribed in paragraph (1), the court shall replace the fine with community service for a maximum duration of [fifty] hours, and for minors over the age of 16, [for a maximum duration of twenty-five] hours.

(3)  A decision imposing community service may be appealed against.

(4)  The civil enforcement service attached to the district court within whose territorial jurisdiction the contravention took place shall be responsible for the execution of such decisions, in collaboration with special departments of the local public authorities.”

(4)  The civil enforcement service attached to the district court within whose territorial jurisdiction the contravention took place shall be responsible for the execution of such decisions, in collaboration with special departments of the local public authorities.”

17.  At the time of the events in the present case, it was not possible for the courts to replace an unpaid administrative fine with days in prison. This option, which had been available in the past, was removed from the law in 2003 (for further details, see Anghel v. Romania, no. 28183/03, §§ 39 and 52, 4 October 2007, and Nicoleta Gheorghe v. Romania, no. 23470/05, §§ 16 and 31, 3 April 2012).

17.  At the time of the events in the present case, it was not possible for the courts to replace an unpaid administrative fine with days in prison. This option, which had been available in the past, was removed from the law in 2003 (for further details, see Anghel v. Romania, no. 28183/03, §§ 39 and 52, 4 October 2007, and Nicoleta Gheorghe v. Romania, no. 23470/05, §§ 16 and 31, 3 April 2012).

18.  At the material time, the Criminal Records Act (Law no. 290/2004) contained the following provisions:

Article 9

“A person’s criminal record shall contain the following information:

(a)  criminal sanctions ... imposed by a final court decision;

(b)  ... administrative fines imposed under the provisions of the Criminal Code, ...”

Article 17

“A criminal record certificate shall contain the criminal sanctions imposed by final court decisions.”

Article 21

“(2)  When a copy of the criminal record is sent to a judicial authority, information about administrative sanctions imposed under the provisions of the Criminal Code shall also be appended.”

Article 27

“(1)  Anyone may obtain their own criminal record certificate.”

THE LAW

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

19.  The applicant complained that the criminal proceedings against her had been unfair, contrary to the requirements of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which read as follows:

“1.  In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...

3.  Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

...

(d)  to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ...”

Admissibility

The Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae

The parties’ submissions

20.  The Government argued that the domestic proceedings giving rise to the final decision of 21 June 2011 had not been criminal proceedings for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. In their view, the complaint was thus incompatible ratione materiae with the requirements of the Convention.

21.  The applicant contested that argument.

The Court’s assessment

22.  The concept of a “criminal charge” in Article 6 § 1 is an autonomous one (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 122, 6 November 2018). The Court’s established case-law sets out three criteria, commonly known as the “Engel criteria”, to be considered in determining whether or not there was a “criminal charge” (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 82, Series A no. 22). The first criterion is the legal classification of the offence under national law, the second is the very nature of the offence, and the third is the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring. The second and third criteria are alternative, and not necessarily cumulative. This, however, does not exclude a cumulative approach where separate analysis of each criterion does not make it possible to reach a clear conclusion as to the existence of a criminal charge (see, among other authorities, Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, §§ 30 31, ECHR 2006 XIV, and Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39665/98 and 40086/98, § 82, ECHR 2003 X). The fact that an offence is not punishable by imprisonment is not by itself decisive for the purposes of the applicability of the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention since, as the Court has stressed on numerous occasions, the relative lack of seriousness of the penalty at stake cannot deprive an offence of its inherently criminal character (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá, cited above, § 122).

23.  The Court will examine whether, in accordance with the aforementioned Engel criteria, the imposition of an administrative fine on the applicant for the offence of which she was accused is covered by the concept of “criminal procedure”.

24.  The Court notes at the outset that the applicant was charged with hitting and other acts of violence, an offence prohibited by Article 180 § 1 of the CC (see paragraphs 6 and 11 below). It is thus undisputed that the offence in question was classified as criminal in domestic law.

25.  However, the Court further notes the application in the present case of Article 181 of the CC, providing that an act falling under criminal law did not constitute a criminal offence if it did not attain the requisite level of seriousness, on account of minimal interference with one of the values safeguarded by criminal law, and its specific content (see paragraph 11 above). In such circumstances, the prosecutor could decide to discontinue the prosecution and, instead of imposing the criminal penalty provided for in the definition of the offence of which the person had been accused, impose another penalty that was likewise provided for in the CC but was designated therein as “administrative” (see Mihalache v. Romania [GC], no. 54012/10, § 58, 8 July 2019).

26.  In the instant case, on 15 December 2010, the prosecutor’s office discontinued the proceedings against the applicant, noting that although her acts fell under criminal law, they did not amount to a criminal offence, and imposed an administrative fine instead (see paragraph 7 above). Be that as it may, the characterisation under domestic law is merely a starting point, and the indications so afforded have only a formal and relative value (see, among many other authorities, Engel and Others, cited above, § 82). The Court will therefore undertake a more detailed analysis of the actual nature of the domestic provision forming the legal basis of the penalty imposed on the applicant and its severity (see, mutatis mutandis, Mihalache, cited above, § 58).

27.  By its very nature, the offence under examination aims at protecting life and physical integrity, values which unquestionably fall within the scope of criminal law (see paragraph 11 above). The provisions of Article 180 of the CC were applicable, in accordance with Articles 1 and 17 of the CC, to anyone who committed, with culpable intent, an act prohibited by criminal law. It is thus important to note that although the acts of which the applicant was accused were not deemed to constitute a criminal offence by the prosecutor (see paragraph 7 above), they nevertheless fell within the scope of a provision of criminal law.

28.  The fact that the criminal acts of which the applicant was accused were regarded as manifestly insignificant on account of their minimal interference with one of the values safeguarded by criminal law and their specific content, does not in itself preclude their classification as “criminal” within the autonomous Convention meaning of the term, as there is nothing in the Convention to suggest that the criminal nature of an offence, within the meaning of the “Engel criteria”, necessarily requires a certain degree of seriousness (see Ezeh and Connors, cited above, § 104, and Mihalache, cited above, § 60).

29.  For these reasons, the Court accepts that the legal provision on the basis of which the prosecutor’s office prosecuted and punished the applicant by means of the prosecutor’s decision of 15 December 2010 (see paragraph 7 above), subsequently upheld by the final court decision of 21 June 2011 (see paragraph 10 above), was criminal in nature.

30.  Lastly, the Court reiterates that the degree of severity of the penalty is determined by reference to the maximum penalty for which the relevant law provides. The actual penalty imposed is relevant to the determination but it cannot diminish the importance of what was initially at stake (see Mihalache, cited above, § 61, with further references).

31.  In the present case, the penalty laid down in law for commission of the offence in question was up to three years’ imprisonment (see paragraph 11 above). In addition, even though the prosecutor’s office did not consider that the acts in question constituted an offence for the purposes of criminal law, it was still required by law to impose a penalty where the legal basis for discontinuing the proceedings was Article 181 of the CC. In the present case, the applicant was fined RON 400 (that is, approximately EUR 90 at the time) for the acts of which she was accused, an amount which is less than half of the maximum allowed by Article 91 of the CC (see paragraph 11 above). Be that as it may, the relative lack of seriousness of the penalty at stake will not deprive the offence of its inherently criminal nature (see paragraph 22 above).

32.  The Court also notes that although the CC designates this penalty as “administrative”, the purpose of the fine was not to repair the damage caused by the applicant, but to punish her and deter her from committing further criminal acts (see Mihalache, cited above, § 62, with further references). The fine imposed on the applicant thus had a punitive and deterrent purpose and was therefore akin to a criminal penalty, despite its domestic classification as an “administrative” fine. The fact that the applicant could not risk prison time even if she failed to pay the penalty (see paragraph 17 above) does not alter this conclusion.

33.  In the same vein, even though criminal record certificates delivered to persons concerned do not contain information on administrative fines, such as the one imposed on the applicant in the present case, this information is nevertheless available to the judicial authorities on the same basis as information concerning any other criminal sanction imposed on that person (see paragraph 18 above).

34.  Having regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes that the nature of the offence for which the applicant was prosecuted and the penalty imposed on her, render the proceedings under examination criminal in nature, for the purpose of Article 6 of the Convention. The criminal limb of Article 6 thus applies to the facts of the present case. Consequently, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection of incompatibility ratione materiae.

Other grounds for inadmissibility

35.  The Court further notes that this complaint is neither manifestly illfounded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

Merits

The parties’ submissions

The applicant

36.  The applicant argued that the District Court had not had full jurisdiction to consider her complaints concerning the finding of guilt and had not afforded her the procedural safeguards of Article 6 of the Convention. She contended that the District Court had only examined the lawfulness of the two decisions and had done no more than uphold the findings concerning her guilt. The prosecutor’s office, however, had failed to ensure the principle of adversarial proceedings, despite the fact that the witnesses had given contradictory statements.

The Government

37.  The Government argued that the applicant had benefitted from all procedural safeguards expected in this type of case. For instance, she had proposed witnesses during the police investigation. However, she had failed to request to be present during the witness interviews. Moreover, she had not repeated her requests for evidence before the District Court.

38.  They also pointed out that the purpose of the proceedings before the court had not been to assess a person’s guilt, but rather to examine the lawfulness of the decisions of the prosecutor’s office, based primarily on the evidence already in the case file.

The Court’s assessment

Preliminary remarks

39.  Having established that the case falls within the scope of the criminal limb of Article 6, the Court must ascertain whether, bearing in mind the particular characteristics of the domestic proceedings at stake, the full guarantees of Article 6 apply to the facts of the present case.

40.  In this connection, it notes that in Blokhin v. Russia ([GC], no. 47152/06, §§ 179-182, 23 March 2016), having found that the proceedings against the applicant for the commission of a delinquent act which, due to the applicant’s age, was not classified as criminal in domestic law, concerned the determination of a criminal charge, the Court examined them in the light of all the safeguards enshrined in Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention (see Blokhin, cited above, §§ 21116).

41.  In the same vein, in Anghel v. Romania (no. 28183/03, §§ 5569, 4 October 2007), the Court applied the full set of safeguards provided by Article 6 of the Convention to domestic proceedings which, although noncriminal under domestic law, were considered by the Court to fall within the scope of the protection guaranteed by the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention.

42.  For these reasons, and bearing in mind that the Convention guarantees rights which are practical and effective (see, among many other authorities, Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37; Alekseyev v. Russia, nos. 4916/07 and 2 others, § 81, 21 October 2010; and Maskhadova and Others v. Russia, no. 18071/05, § 222, 6 June 2013), the Court considers that all the guarantees enshrined in the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention, as interpreted in the relevant case-law (see paragraphs 43-46 below), apply to the facts of the present case.

General principles

General principles

43.  The Court reiterates that the guarantees in paragraph 3 (d) of Article 6 are specific aspects of the right to a fair hearing set forth in paragraph 1 of that Article, which must be taken into account in any assessment of the fairness of proceedings. In addition, the Court’s primary concern under Article 6 § 1 is to evaluate the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings (see Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC], no. 9154/10, §§ 10001, 15 December 2015, and Taxquet v. Belgium [GC], no. 926/05, § 84, 16 November 2010, with further references). In making this assessment, the Court will look at the proceedings as a whole, having regard to the rights of the defence but also to the interests of the public and the victim(s) that crime is properly prosecuted (see Schatschaschwili, cited above, § 101, and Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 175, ECHR 2010) and, where necessary, to the rights of witnesses (see, amongst many authorities, AlKhawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, § 118, ECHR 2011). It is also notable in this context that the admissibility of evidence is a matter for regulation by national law and the national courts and that the Court’s only concern is to examine whether the proceedings have been conducted fairly (see Seton v. the United Kingdom, no. 55287/10, § 57, 31 March 2016, with further references).

43.  The Court reiterates that the guarantees in paragraph 3 (d) of Article 6 are specific aspects of the right to a fair hearing set forth in paragraph 1 of that Article, which must be taken into account in any assessment of the fairness of proceedings. In addition, the Court’s primary concern under Article 6 § 1 is to evaluate the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings (see Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC], no. 9154/10, §§ 10001, 15 December 2015, and Taxquet v. Belgium [GC], no. 926/05, § 84, 16 November 2010, with further references). In making this assessment, the Court will look at the proceedings as a whole, having regard to the rights of the defence but also to the interests of the public and the victim(s) that crime is properly prosecuted (see Schatschaschwili, cited above, § 101, and Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 175, ECHR 2010) and, where necessary, to the rights of witnesses (see, amongst many authorities, AlKhawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, § 118, ECHR 2011). It is also notable in this context that the admissibility of evidence is a matter for regulation by national law and the national courts and that the Court’s only concern is to examine whether the proceedings have been conducted fairly (see Seton v. the United Kingdom, no. 55287/10, § 57, 31 March 2016, with further references).

44.  The Court has formulated the general principles to be applied in cases where a prosecution witness did not attend a trial but statements previously made by him or her were admitted in evidence; those general principles are set out in the cases of Al‑Khawaja and Tahery (cited above, §§ 118-47). A summary of those principles can also be found in Seton (cited above, § 58) and Blokhin (cited above, §§ 200-02). In this respect, having regard to the Court’s case-law, firstly, there must be a good reason for the non-attendance of a witness at the trial and, secondly, when a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence may be restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 (see Blokhin, cited above, § 201, with further references).

44.  The Court has formulated the general principles to be applied in cases where a prosecution witness did not attend a trial but statements previously made by him or her were admitted in evidence; those general principles are set out in the cases of Al‑Khawaja and Tahery (cited above, §§ 118-47). A summary of those principles can also be found in Seton (cited above, § 58) and Blokhin (cited above, §§ 200-02). In this respect, having regard to the Court’s case-law, firstly, there must be a good reason for the non-attendance of a witness at the trial and, secondly, when a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence may be restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 (see Blokhin, cited above, § 201, with further references).

45.  Those principles have been further clarified in Schatschaschwili (cited above, §§ 111-31), in which the Grand Chamber confirmed that the absence of good reason for the non-attendance of a witness could not, of itself, be conclusive of the lack of fairness of a trial, although it remained a very important factor to be weighed in the balance when assessing the overall fairness, and one which might tip the balance in favour of finding a breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d). Furthermore, given that its concern is to ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole were fair, the Court must not only review the existence of sufficient counterbalancing factors in cases where the evidence of the absent witness was the sole or decisive basis for the applicant’s conviction, but also in cases where it finds it unclear whether the evidence in question was sole or decisive but is nevertheless satisfied that it carried significant weight and its admission may have handicapped the defence. The extent of the counterbalancing factors necessary in order for a trial to be considered fair will depend on the weight of the evidence of the absent witness. The more important that evidence, the more weight the counterbalancing factors will have to carry in order for the proceedings as a whole to be considered fair (ibid., § 116, see also Seton, cited above, § 59).

45.  Those principles have been further clarified in Schatschaschwili (cited above, §§ 111-31), in which the Grand Chamber confirmed that the absence of good reason for the non-attendance of a witness could not, of itself, be conclusive of the lack of fairness of a trial, although it remained a very important factor to be weighed in the balance when assessing the overall fairness, and one which might tip the balance in favour of finding a breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d). Furthermore, given that its concern is to ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole were fair, the Court must not only review the existence of sufficient counterbalancing factors in cases where the evidence of the absent witness was the sole or decisive basis for the applicant’s conviction, but also in cases where it finds it unclear whether the evidence in question was sole or decisive but is nevertheless satisfied that it carried significant weight and its admission may have handicapped the defence. The extent of the counterbalancing factors necessary in order for a trial to be considered fair will depend on the weight of the evidence of the absent witness. The more important that evidence, the more weight the counterbalancing factors will have to carry in order for the proceedings as a whole to be considered fair (ibid., § 116, see also Seton, cited above, § 59).

46.  In this context, where a conviction is based solely or decisively on the evidence of absent witnesses, the Court must subject the proceedings to the most searching scrutiny (see Blokhin, cited above, § 202).

46.  In this context, where a conviction is based solely or decisively on the evidence of absent witnesses, the Court must subject the proceedings to the most searching scrutiny (see Blokhin, cited above, § 202).

46.  In this context, where a conviction is based solely or decisively on the evidence of absent witnesses, the Court must subject the proceedings to the most searching scrutiny (see Blokhin, cited above, § 202).

Application of those principles to the facts of the present case

47.  Turning to the facts of the case under examination, the Court notes that the applicant was placed under investigation by the prosecutor’s office (see paragraph 6 above), but that the proceedings were eventually discontinued on the grounds that the acts committed were not serious enough to constitute a criminal offence (see paragraph 7 above). The applicant, who received a fine from the prosecutor’s office, contested the outcome before a criminal court, availing herself of the procedure under Article 2781 of the CCP.

48.  The Court reiterates that under the procedure in question the domestic courts were called upon to examine the lawfulness of the decisions of the prosecutor’s office and had no power to hear witness evidence or directly assess the merits of the case. However, the Court cannot but note that in finding that the events had occurred as described by the victim and that the applicant had committed acts prohibited by criminal law which “[could] not remain unpunished” (see paragraph 10 above), the domestic court did, in fact, make an assessment of the applicant’s guilt. In doing so, it referred to the statement made by a witness, A, who had not appeared before it.

49.  The Court notes that the witness was only heard during the investigation (see paragraph 5 above). In this context, the Court must assess whether there was a good reason for the non-attendance of that witness before the court, such as death or fear, absence on health grounds or the witness’s unreachability (see Schatschaschwili, cited above, § 119, with further references). The Court notes that the applicable law did not allow the courts to hear witness testimony in the procedure under Article 2781 of the CCP, as they were bound to examine the complaint based on the evidence already in the file, the sole exception being the possibility to examine additional documents, if need be (see Article 2781 § 7 of the CCP, cited in paragraph 13 above). This, however, is not a good reason justifying the nonattendance of the relevant witness, for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. It is also relevant to note that there is no indication, nor was it claimed by the Government, that A had not been available or that it would otherwise have been difficult to summon him to appear before the court (see Blokhin, cited above, § 213).

49.  The Court notes that the witness was only heard during the investigation (see paragraph 5 above). In this context, the Court must assess whether there was a good reason for the non-attendance of that witness before the court, such as death or fear, absence on health grounds or the witness’s unreachability (see Schatschaschwili, cited above, § 119, with further references). The Court notes that the applicable law did not allow the courts to hear witness testimony in the procedure under Article 2781 of the CCP, as they were bound to examine the complaint based on the evidence already in the file, the sole exception being the possibility to examine additional documents, if need be (see Article 2781 § 7 of the CCP, cited in paragraph 13 above). This, however, is not a good reason justifying the nonattendance of the relevant witness, for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. It is also relevant to note that there is no indication, nor was it claimed by the Government, that A had not been available or that it would otherwise have been difficult to summon him to appear before the court (see Blokhin, cited above, § 213).

50.  As for the significance of the evidence of the absent witness, the Court notes that the domestic court reached its decision in the case by relying on witness A’s statement, which corroborated the medical evidence. It can be inferred from this that A’s statement was decisive for the court’s conclusion (see, mutatis mutandis, Schatschaschwili, § 141, and Blokhin, § 212, both cited above).

51.  It remains to be determined whether there were sufficient counterbalancing factors to compensate for the handicaps under which the defence laboured as a result of the admission of the decisive evidence of the absent witness (see Schatschaschwili, cited above, § 145). In other words, the Court must ensure that the trial, judged as a whole, was fair, bearing in mind that the lack of a good reason for a prosecution witness’s absence is a very important factor to be weighed in the balance when assessing the overall fairness of a trial which may tip the balance in favour of finding a breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) (see the case-law quoted in paragraph 45 above). One important safeguard would be to have given the applicant or defence counsel an opportunity to question the witnesses during the investigation stage (see Schatschaschwili, cited above, § 131). However, there is no evidence in the file that the defence was informed of the date the witnesses were interviewed, and it appears that the applicant was neither present nor represented during the police questioning (see paragraph 5 above) and the Government did not put forward any justification as to why that was the case. There is nothing in the case file to indicate that he was in any way informed of the date when the witnesses would be interviewed by the investigators or invited to participate.

52.  The Court notes that in her complaint lodged with the domestic court the applicant contested the evidence (see paragraph 9 above). The court nevertheless based its decision on that evidence (see paragraph 10 above). As the domestic court did not have the power to hear witnesses, the Court does not see any reason why she, as suggested by the Government, should have expressly requested that the court hear the witnesses (see paragraph 9 above).

53.  Moreover, on this point, the Court cannot but note that even in the absence of the power to hear witnesses, the court had at its disposal other means to resolve the case which could, at least in theory, have ensured better protection of the rights of the defence. In particular, it notes that under Article 2781 of the CCP the domestic courts had the power to set aside a decision taken by the prosecutor’s office and either refer the case back to the prosecutor’s office or examine it further in proper criminal proceedings, as a first-instance court (see paragraph 13 above). However, in the present case, the domestic court did not avail itself of any of these options, but instead upheld the prosecutor’s decision without hearing evidence, thus frustrating the applicant’s opportunity to cross-examine the witness whose testimony was of decisive importance. In doing so, the court deprived the applicant of the possibility to have her case examined in compliance with the requirements of the Convention.

53.  Moreover, on this point, the Court cannot but note that even in the absence of the power to hear witnesses, the court had at its disposal other means to resolve the case which could, at least in theory, have ensured better protection of the rights of the defence. In particular, it notes that under Article 2781 of the CCP the domestic courts had the power to set aside a decision taken by the prosecutor’s office and either refer the case back to the prosecutor’s office or examine it further in proper criminal proceedings, as a first-instance court (see paragraph 13 above). However, in the present case, the domestic court did not avail itself of any of these options, but instead upheld the prosecutor’s decision without hearing evidence, thus frustrating the applicant’s opportunity to cross-examine the witness whose testimony was of decisive importance. In doing so, the court deprived the applicant of the possibility to have her case examined in compliance with the requirements of the Convention.

54.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention.

OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

55.  Lastly, the applicant complained that she had lacked an effective remedy by which to complain about the decision of 21 June 2011, in violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

56.  However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

57.  Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

58.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

Damage

59.  The applicant claimed 400 Romanian lei (RON) in respect of pecuniary damage, representing the fine imposed on her by the prosecutor’s office. She also sought 1,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage for loss of her image, honour and reputation in the community.

60.  The Government contended that there was no causal link between the complaint brought by the applicant before the Court and the pecuniary damage sought. Furthermore, they pointed out that she could seek the reopening of the proceedings under Article 465 § 1 of the CCP. Lastly, they contended that the finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction for the alleged non-pecuniary damage.

61.  The Court notes that Article 465 § 1 of the CCP allows for the reopening of the domestic proceedings in order to remedy the breaches found by it. Given the nature of the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, the Court considers that in the present case the most appropriate form of redress would be, at the applicant’s request, the reopening of the proceedings complained of in due course.

62.  On the other hand, the Court considers that she must have suffered a certain amount of distress which cannot be compensated solely by the reopening of the proceedings or the finding of a violation. Having regard to the nature of the violation found, and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards her EUR 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

Costs and expenses

63.  The applicant also claimed RON 514 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.

64.  The Government argued that the costs had not been necessarily incurred.

65.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its caselaw, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 100 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

Default interest

66.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

Declares, unanimously, the complaint concerning Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention;

Holds,

by five votes to two, that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

unanimously, that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 100 (one hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

unanimously, that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 February 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Pastor Vilanova and Schukking is annexed to this judgment.

1.  Our dissenting opinion concerns, exclusively, the payment of just satisfaction to the applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention. We have drafted this joint opinion to express our disagreement with the majority position in the Chamber on this point.

2.  We are of the view that the judgment in the present case: (a) does not justify its departure from the Court’s case-law in such matters, and (b) in doing so it overlooks the need for reasoning under Article 45 § 1 of the Convention.

3.  Firstly, it is to be noted that the Court has found on many occasions that it does not follow from its finding of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention that an applicant was wrongly convicted. Indeed, it is impossible to speculate as to what might have occurred had there been no breach of the minimum rights listed in Article 6 § 3. In such circumstances the Court often takes the view that a finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 134, 2006II; Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others, § 315, ECHR 2016; and Beuze v. Belgium [GC], no. 71409/10, § 199, 9 November 2018). It is noteworthy that no less than three Grand Chamber judgments, two of which are recent, have taken such an approach. However, the Chamber now appears to be turning its back on this well-established doctrine.

4.  Secondly, the Court has also taken the view that there is no need to make an award for non-pecuniary damage when the applicant is able to obtain the reopening of the domestic proceedings, after having previously been convicted. In the present case the possibility of a retrial exists under domestic law. In this respect the Court has reiterated many times that when an individual has been convicted following proceedings that have entailed breaches of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, as a rule, a retrial or the reopening of the case, if requested, represents in principle the most appropriate form of redressing that violation (see, among other authorities, Sejdovic v. Italy, cited above, § 126; Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 210 in fine, ECHR 2005IV; Cabral v. the Netherlands, no. 37617/10, §§ 42-43, 28 August 2018; and Chernika v. Ukraine, no. 53791/11, §§ 82-83, 12 March 2020). Once again, this well-established case-law seems to have been ignored.

5.  Lastly, Article 45 § 1 of the Convention requires that reasons must be given for the Court’s judgments and decisions. This provision seems clear and no exception is permitted. As it is not otherwise stipulated, it can be inferred that the obligation to give reasons concerns the entire text of the judgment or decision and not merely certain passages of the judicial ruling. Consequently, even if the majority wished to base their findings on a different strand of case-law, or to depart from the authorities relied upon by the minority, they were under an obligation, we respectfully submit, in terms of the duty of the European adjudicator, to explain the reasons for their position. Such reasoning would have enhanced the principle of legal certainty in the present case.

5.  Lastly, Article 45 § 1 of the Convention requires that reasons must be given for the Court’s judgments and decisions. This provision seems clear and no exception is permitted. As it is not otherwise stipulated, it can be inferred that the obligation to give reasons concerns the entire text of the judgment or decision and not merely certain passages of the judicial ruling. Consequently, even if the majority wished to base their findings on a different strand of case-law, or to depart from the authorities relied upon by the minority, they were under an obligation, we respectfully submit, in terms of the duty of the European adjudicator, to explain the reasons for their position. Such reasoning would have enhanced the principle of legal certainty in the present case.