PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 19940/05) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Armenian nationals, Mr Grigori Gharibyan, Mrs Gohar Gharibyan and Mrs Anna Gharibyan (“the applicants”), on 1 June 2005.

2.  The applicants were represented by Mr A. Grigoryan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan. The Armenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr G. Kostanyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia at the European Court of Human Rights.

3.  On 28 September 2007 the application was communicated to the Government.

4.  On 15 November 2011 the Court decided to strike part of the application out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention on the basis of the Government’s unilateral declaration and to declare the remainder inadmissible.

5.  On 10 July 2012 the Court decided to restore part of the application to its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 § 2 of the Convention.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6.  The applicants were born in 1946, 1954 and 1985 respectively and live in Yerevan.

7.  The applicants jointly owned a flat which measured 44.1 sq. m. and was situated at 25 Byuzand Street, Yerevan.

8.  On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N, approving the expropriation zones of the real estate situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron District of Yerevan to be taken for State needs for town-planning purposes, having a total area of 345,000 sq. m. Byuzand Street was listed as one of the streets falling within such expropriation zones. A special body, the Yerevan Construction and Investment Project Implementation Agency (hereafter, the Agency) was set up to manage the implementation of the construction projects.

9.  On 7 September 2004 the applicants’ flat was valued upon the request of the Agency by a valuation organisation. The market value of the flat was found to be 16,350 United States dollars (USD).

10.  By a letter of 14 January 2005 the Agency informed the applicants that their flat was subject to expropriation and that it had been valued at USD 16,350 by an independent licensed organisation. An additional sum of USD 12,638.55 was offered to the applicants as a financial incentive if they signed an agreement within five days.

11.  The applicants did not accept the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation offered.

12.  On an unspecified date the Agency lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement on the taking of their flat for State needs and to have them evicted.

13.  On 1 March 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the Agency’s claim, ordering the applicants to sign the agreement for the total amount of USD 16,350.

14.  On 15 March 2005 the applicants lodged an appeal.

15.  On 30 March 2005 the Civil Court of Appeal granted the Agency’s claim upon appeal.

16.  On 13 April 2005 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, in which they argued, inter alia, that the deprivation of their property was not prescribed by law as required by Article 28 of the Constitution.

17.  On 26 May 2005 the Court of Cassation decided to dismiss the applicants’ appeal.

18.  On an unspecified date the awarded sum was paid to the applicants.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

19.  For a summary of the relevant domestic provisions see the judgment in the case of Minasyan and Semerjyan v. Armenia (no. 27651/05, §§ 23-25, 23 June 2009).

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION

20.  The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 of the Convention that the deprivation of their flat had not been prescribed by law. The Court considers that their complaint falls to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”

A.  Admissibility

21.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

22.  The applicants submitted that the deprivation of their possessions had not been carried out under the conditions provided for by law since it had been effected in violation of the guarantees of Article 28 of the Constitution.

23.  The Government admitted that the expropriation of the applicants’ flat had not been carried out under the conditions provided for by law and constituted a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

24.  The Court reiterates that the first and most important requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be lawful: the second sentence of the first paragraph authorises a deprivation of possessions only “subject to the conditions provided for by law” and the second paragraph recognises that States have the right to control the use of property by enforcing “laws”. Moreover, the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 25701/94, § 79, ECHR 2000-XII). The Court further reiterates that the phrase “subject to the conditions provided for by law” requires in the first place the existence of and compliance with adequately accessible and sufficiently precise domestic legal provisions (see Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1986, § 110, Series A no. 102).

25.  The Court notes that it has already examined identical complaints and arguments in a number of cases against Armenia and concluded that the deprivation of property was not carried out in compliance with “conditions provided for by law” (see, for example, Minasyan and Semerjyan, cited above, §§ 69-77; Tunyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 22812/05, §§ 35-39, 9 October 2012; and Danielyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 25825/05, §§ 35-39, 9 October 2012). The Court does not see any reason to depart from that finding in the present case.

26.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

27.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

28.  The applicants claimed that they should be awarded as compensation the market value of the flat which had been promised to them by the Government’s unenforced unilateral declaration. The flat in question measured 115.6 sq. m. and the average market value per square metre amounted to USD 3,000. The applicants further claimed EUR 70,000 for non-pecuniary damage.

29.  The Government objected to the proposed method of calculation of compensation for pecuniary damage and submitted that such compensation should be based on the violation found and not on the offer made by the Government in their unilateral declaration. The Government further submitted that the amount of non-pecuniary damages claimed was excessive.

30.  The Court agrees with the Government that pecuniary damage must be calculated on the basis of the violation found. It notes that it has previously awarded pecuniary damages in an identical situation (see Minasyan and Semerjyan v. Armenia (just satisfaction), no. 27651/05, §§ 17-21, 7 June 2011), which it finds to be fully applicable to the present case. Using the same approach and making an assessment based on all the materials at its disposal, the Court estimates the pecuniary damage suffered at EUR 34,000 and decides to award this amount jointly to the applicants, while dismissing the remainder of their claim. It further decides to award each applicant EUR 6,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B.  Costs and expenses

31.  The applicants did not claim any costs and expenses, legal services having been provided to them on a pro bono basis.

C.  Default interest

32.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Declares the complaint concerning the deprivation of the applicants’ flat admissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;

3.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 November 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.


PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 5738/10) against the Republic of Slovenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovenian national, Mr Milan Šabić (“the applicant”), on 18 December 2009.

2.  The applicant was represented by Odvetniška Družba Matoz O.P. D.O.O., a law firm practising in Koper. The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) were represented their Agents, Mrs T. Mihelič Žitko and Mrs N. Aleš Verdir, State Attorneys.

3.  The applicant alleged, in particular, that the conditions of his detention in Ljubljana prison amounted to a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and that he had no effective remedy in this regard as required by Article 13 of the Convention.

4.  On 27 April 2010 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1) and to give priority to it under Rule 41 of the Rules of the Court.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Novo mesto.

6.  The applicant served his prison sentence in the period between 24 November 2008 and 25 March 2010, in the semi-open and closed sections of Ljubljana prison as well as in the open section Ig, Ljubljana prison (the open section).

7.  From 24 November 2008 to 22 January 2009 and from 15 July 2009 to 10 August 2009 he was held in the closed section. From 24 November 2008 to 22 January 2009 he was held in cell 3 (third floor) measuring 18 square metres (including a separate 1.72 square metre sanitary facility). From 15 July 2009 to 16 July 2009 he was held in cell 6 (third floor) measuring 18 square metres (including a separate 1.72 square metre sanitary facility). From 16 July 2009 to 10 August 2009 he was held in cell 4 (third floor) measuring 18 square metres (including a separate 1.72 square metre sanitary facility).

8.  From 23 January 2009 to 12 July 2009 and from 10 August 2009 to 16 November 2009 he was held in the semi-open section. From 23 January 2009 to 12 July 2009 he was held in cell 138 (third floor) measuring 18.6 square metres (including a separate 1.72 square metre sanitary facility). From 10 August 2009 to 16 November 2009 he was held in cell 145 (third floor) measuring 18.8 square metres (including a separate 1.72 square metre sanitary facility).

9.  All the cells in the closed and semi-open sections contained, apart from the furniture, five sleeping places (two bunk beds and one single bed). According to the applicant, five prisoners were being held in each of the cells during his detention. The Government, however, submitted that the number varied between four and five. Each cell had one 107 x 110 cm double casement window, which the prisoners could freely open or close.

10.  As regards the general characteristics of the cells in the closed and semi-open sections, material conditions inside the cells, sanitary conditions and health care, see the judgment in Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia, nos. ,  and , §§ 21 to 32, 20 October 2011.

11.  As to the out-of-cell time in the closed section, the Court found in the aforementioned judgment that sentenced prisoners in the closed section of the prison were locked up in their cells and were only able to leave them if they applied for certain activities, most of which were to take place in the recreation room. There was, however, only one 50square-metre recreation room per floor, which was to be used by ten inmates at most (see Štrucl and Others, § 86).

12.  As to the out-of-cell time in the semi-open section, the Government submitted that the cell doors in the semi-open section of the prison were unlocked, except from 9.45 p.m. (on Fridays, Saturdays and before holidays from midnight) until 6.00 a.m. (on Saturdays, Sundays and during holidays until 8.30 a.m.). During this time prisoners could move freely in the corridor (35.7 square metres), living quarters of co-prisoners or in the indoor or outdoor exercise areas, in accordance with prison rules. The Government contended that this regime had been in place for several years.

13.  From 12 July 2009 to 15 July 2009 and from 16 November 2009 to 25 March 2010 the applicant was held in the open section in cell 2 measuring 40 square metres, which contained six sleeping places. The Government submitted that four prisoners were held in that cell during the applicant’s detention. On 15 July 2009, he was transferred back to the closed section on the ground of abuse of a more liberal prison regime in the open section.

14.  In the open section cells were open twenty-four hours per day and prisoners could, except when sleeping, move around freely, inside the open section (in a dining room, classroom, recreation room) and in outdoor areas (a park and sports ground). Further, the prisoners were allowed to exercise for four hours per day, they could do shopping in a shop outside the prison, their visits were unsupervised and their correspondence with people from outside the prison and the use of a telephone were not limited and supervised. The open section had a capacity for twenty seven prisoners in five cells. The prisoners shared sanitary facilities with five showers, five washbasins in the lavatory, three toilets on the ground floor and four toilets on the first floor of the section and a laundry room with a washing machine and a drier, which prisoners could freely use. Prisoners in the open section were also entitled to unsupervised visits outside prison for five hours during weekends, unsupervised leave and annual leave if working in Ljubljana prison.

15.  During his imprisonment the applicant had twenty five consultations with a general practitioner and visited a dentist on two occasions. He never requested treatment by a psychiatrist.

16.  As regards the cell temperature, the data provided by the Government showed that the average temperature in the cells in the late afternoon (5- 5.30 p.m.) in the second half of July and August 2009 had been approximately 28oC, exceeding 30oC on seven days.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE AND RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS

17.  For the relevant domestic law and practice as well as relevant international documents see Štrucl and Others, cited above, §§ 33-56.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

18.  The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in Ljubljana prison amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, he complained of severe overcrowding which had led to a lack of personal space, poor sanitary conditions and inadequate ventilation, as well as excessive restriction on out-of-cell time, high temperatures in the cells, inadequate health care and psychiatric support and exposure to violence from other inmates due to insufficient security.

19.  He submitted that the situation amounted to a structural problem, and that this has been acknowledged by the domestic authorities.

20.  The applicant also complained about restrictions on telephone conversations. However, this complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention only.

Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A.  Admissibility

1.  Complaint relating to physical conditions of detention

21.  In Jevšnik v. Slovenia, no. 5747/10, §§ 25 – 26, 9 January 2014 the Court found that the conditions in which the applicant was held in the semiopen section in Ljubljana prison, personal space (about 3.3 or 3.4 square metres) taken together with the time he could spend outside the cell (from Monday to Thursday fifteen hours and forty five minutes per day, on Fridays eighteen hours, on Saturdays fifteen hours and a half and on Sundays thirteen hours and fifteen minutes), could not be considered as to be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, as the restricted space in the sleeping facilities was compensated by the freedom of movement enjoyed by the applicant during the day-time. As regards the temperatures in cells in the summer of 2009, the Court found that although the applicant was imprisoned also in the second half of July and August 2009, his situation during that period could not be considered as being further exacerbated by high temperatures as he was held in the semi-open section and could therefore spent a considerable amount of time outside the cell.

22.  In the present case, the applicant was held in the semi-open section with about 3.37 or 3.4 square metres of personal space and enjoyed the same out-of-cell time as the applicant in the case of Jevšnik v. Slovenia. As the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the semi-open section were the same as those of the applicant in the case of Jevšnik v. Slovenia, this part of the application should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.

23.  The Court reaches the same conclusion regarding the applicant’s detention in the open section, where the applicant had at least 6.7 square metres of personal space (or 10 square metres of personal space if sharing the cell with three other prisoners) and where the cells were open twentyfour hours per day, so that he could, except when sleeping, move around freely, inside the open section and in outdoor areas. The Government argued that the applicant did not seem to be complaining also as regards his detention in the open section. However, the Court finds that the applicant complained about the detention in Ljubljana prison and the open section Ig is a section of Ljubljana prison and in any event the conditions of detention there are not contrary to the Convention standards. Therefore, this part of the application must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.

24.   As the Court rejected the part of the application regarding the applicant’s detention in the semi-open and open sections from 23 January 2009 to 15 July 2009 for being manifestly ill-founded, the part of the application regarding the detention in the closed section from 24 November 2008 to 22 January 2009 should be rejected as not complying with the sixmonth rule within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, as the application was lodged to the Court only on 18 December 2009.

25.  As regards the rest of the application, in the present case as well as in the case of Štrucl and Others and Praznik v. Slovenia, no. 6234/10, 28 June 2012, the Government raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, relying on the same arguments as in the above cases. In Štrucl and Others the Court joined the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies to the merits of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. After finding a violation of the latter provision it rejected the Government’s objection (see Štrucl and Others, §§ 62 and 98-113). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. It further finds that this part of the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It should therefore be declared admissible.

2.  Complaints relating to inadequate health care and psychiatric support and insufficient security measures

26.  The parties in the present case adduced the same arguments as in Štrucl and Others, where the Court found the part of the application concerning inadequate health care, psychiatric support and insufficient security measures manifestly ill-founded (§§ 63-69). The Court decided the same in Praznik. In the absence of any reasons that would lead the Court to reach a different conclusion in the present case, the Court finds these complaints to be manifestly ill-founded and should therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

B.  Merits

27.  The parties relied on the same arguments as in the case of Štrucl and Others (cited above, §§ 70-79).

28.  The Court refers as regards the relevant principles to paragraphs 7276 of its judgment in the case of Mandić and Jović v. Slovenia, nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, 20 October 2011.

29.  The Court notes that the applicant was held in the closed section of Ljubljana prison from 15 July 2009 to 10 August 2009 with four other prisoners and with 3.26 square metres of personal space.

30.  His personal space in the cells was further reduced by the amount of furniture (see Modarca v. Moldova, no. , § 63, 10 May 2007). As regards the Government’s suggestion that not all the beds in the cells were occupied all the time, the Court has already rejected it, finding that no official documents indicating the exact number of prisoners being held in a particular cell had been provided to substantiate it (see Štrucl and Others, cited above, § 81).

31.  It was found in Praznik that the personal space of the applicant, which was for most of the period of his detention in the closed section about 3.3 square metres, and which was slightly larger than the space available to the prisoners in Štrucl and Others, still fell short of the recommendation of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It was further found in Praznik that the applicant’s situation was exacerbated by the very limited time which could be spent outside the cell and by high temperatures in the cell in the summer (see Praznik, cited above, § 20) therefore, it was concluded that the conditions of detention were contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

32.  Likewise, in the present case the applicant was detained in the closed section for twenty-six days with 3.26 square metres of personal space and his situation was further exacerbated by the very limited time which could be spent outside the cell and by high temperatures in the cell in the summer. Having regard to the cumulative effects of these conditions of the applicant’s detention, the Court considers, as in Praznik, that the hardship he endured appears to have exceeded the unavoidable level inherent in detention, and finds that the resulting suffering went beyond the threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention (see, Praznik, cited above, § 21 and mutatis mutandis, Szél v. Hungary, no. 30221/06, § 18, 7 June 2011, and Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, § 75, ECHR 2001III).

33.  The Court therefore finds that the conditions of detention in which the applicant was held in the closed section from 15 July 2009 to 10 August 2009 were contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

34.  The applicant complained that his allegations in respect of Article 3 also gave rise to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In addition, he complained about restrictions on telephone calls. As regards the latter, the applicant submitted that he had often been under pressure from other inmates to terminate his telephone conversations before the allotted time had expired.

35.  Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

36.  As already found in Praznik, the Court notes that in so far as the complaints under Article 8 overlap with those under Article 3 they should be for the same reasons and to the same extent declared admissible. In view of the applicant’s submissions and having regard to the finding relating to Article 3, the Court considers that no separate issue arises under Article 8 in this regard (see Orchowski v. Poland, no. 17885/04, § 198, ECHR 2009... (extracts)). However, as regards the complaints under Article 8 overlapping with those under Article 3, which were in the present case declared inadmissible, the Court considers that the situation in which the applicant was detained has also not given rise to an issue under Article 8 of the Convention. Therefore, this part of the application should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

37.  As regards the applicant’s complaints concerning his contact with persons outside the prison, the Court notes that the parties adduced the same arguments as in the case of Štrucl and Others. In the latter case the Court found that these complaints were unsubstantiated (cited above, §§ 96-97). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. These complaints should therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION

38.  The applicant complained that owing to the systemic nature of the inadequate prison conditions he did not have any effective remedy at his disposal as regards his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence that the remedies which were available in theory could work effectively in practice when it came to prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. He cited Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

A.  Admissibility

39.  In so far as the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention refers to the lack of effective remedies in respect of inadequate physical conditions of detention in the closed section from 15 July 2009 to 10 August 2009, as already found by the Court in Štrucl and Others and Praznik, this aspect of the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

40.  As to the lack of effective remedies in respect of inadequate physical conditions of detention in the semi-open and open sections of Ljubljana prison and in the closed section of Ljubljana prison from 24 November 2008 to 22 January 2009 and in respect of the allegedly inadequate medical and psychological care, inadequate security measures and the restrictions on maintaining contact with people outside the prison, having declared the relevant issues under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention inadmissible, the Court concludes that the applicant has no arguable claim for the purpose of Article 13 of the Convention (see Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no. 32362/02, §§ 745, 20 May 2010). It follows that this aspect of the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention should be rejected as manifestly illfounded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

B.  Merits

41.  The parties’ arguments are identical to those in the case of Štrucl and Others (§§ 101-117) in which the Court found that none of the remedies relied on by the Government could be regarded with a sufficient degree of certainty as constituting an effective remedy for the applicants (ibid., §§ 11833). Since there appear to be no reasons to reach a different conclusion in the present case, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for the applicant’s complaints in respect of the conditions of his detention

IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION

“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.”

43.  The applicant argued that his allegations related to a structural problem of overcrowding in Slovenian prisons. This assertion was disputed by the Government.

44.  The parties’ arguments are identical to those in the case of Štrucl and Others. In the latter case the Court emphasized the need to take steps to reduce the number of prisoners in Ljubljana prison (ibid., §§ 137-141). In view of the fact that the applicant’s complaint of a structural problem applies to the same period of time that was addressed in Štrucl and others (2009), the Court considers that it raises no separate issue which would call for an examination under Article 46 in the present case.

V.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

45.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

46.  The applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of nonpecuniary damage.

47.  The Government contested the claim.

48.  The Court awards the applicant EUR 1,000 in respect of nonpecuniary damage.

B.  Costs and expenses

49.  The applicant also claimed EUR 1,520 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This sum consisted of EUR 1,500 in lawyer’s fees, which he claimed were calculated on the basis of statutory domestic rates and EUR 20 for material expenses.

50.  The Government argued that this claim was excessive. They also argued that the Court should take into account the fact that the applicant’s representative was representing a number of other applicants before the Court and had submitted almost identical pleadings in all these cases.

51.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. With regard to an applicant’s Convention costs, the Court reiterates that it does not consider itself bound by domestic scales and practices, although it may derive some assistance from them (see, among many other authorities, Gaspari v. Slovenia, no. 21055/03, § 83, 21 July 2009, and Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, § 98, ECHR 1999-IV). In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and in particular the fact that the law firm representing the applicant has already been reimbursed in other cases for preparation of submissions almost identical to the present ones (see Mandić and Jović, cited above, §§ 133-35, Štrucl and Others, cited above, §§ 146-48 and Praznik, cited above §§ 38-40), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 500 to cover the costs of the proceedings before the Court.

C.  Default interest

52.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.  Declares the complaint concerning the physical conditions of detention under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention as regards the detention in the closed section from 15 July 2009 to 10 August 2009, as well as the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention relating to the complaint concerning the physical conditions of detention in the closed section from 15 July 2009 to 10 August 2009, admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention as regards the detention in the closed section from 15 July 2009 to 10 August 2009;

3.  Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint concerning the physical conditions of detention in the closed section under Article 8 of the Convention;

4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;

5.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 April 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.