PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 46349/09) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Andrey Vladimirovich Smolentsev (“the applicant”), on 8 August 2009.

2.  The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.

3.  The applicant alleged, in particular, that he had suffered illtreatment at the hands of the police and that the domestic authorities had failed to conduct a prompt and effective investigation into his complaints.

4.  On 22 May 2012 the above complaint was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Barnaul. He has been disabled since childhood and has lacked legal capacity since 1999. The application was brought on his behalf by his mother.

A.  Applicant’s arrest, alleged ill-treatment and criminal proceedings against him

6.  At about 5 p.m. on 28 August 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery and taken to Industrialniy district police station, Barnaul (Индустриальный РОВД г. Барнаула, “the Industrialniy ROVD”) by Officers K., S. and Ch., who allegedly beat him when they arrived at the police station.

7.  A report on the applicant’s arrest was drawn up at 9 p.m., following which the applicant’s mother was informed about his arrest. She arrived at the police station shortly afterwards. The applicant complained, in the presence of his mother and a lawyer, that he felt unwell and that he had been beaten by the police officers who had arrested him.

7.  A report on the applicant’s arrest was drawn up at 9 p.m., following which the applicant’s mother was informed about his arrest. She arrived at the police station shortly afterwards. The applicant complained, in the presence of his mother and a lawyer, that he felt unwell and that he had been beaten by the police officers who had arrested him.

8.  An ambulance was called to the police station at 10.29 p.m. on 28 August. The applicant was diagnosed as having facial and chest contusions. He told the ambulance medics that he had been physically assaulted by the police.

8.  An ambulance was called to the police station at 10.29 p.m. on 28 August. The applicant was diagnosed as having facial and chest contusions. He told the ambulance medics that he had been physically assaulted by the police.

9.  Another ambulance was called for the applicant at 12.24 a.m. on 29 August 2007, to the temporary detention facility. He was diagnosed as having a contusion on the soft tissues of the face and an X-ray examination was recommended. The applicant told the medics that he had injured himself while drunk two days previously after falling down and hitting his head on the ground.

9.  Another ambulance was called for the applicant at 12.24 a.m. on 29 August 2007, to the temporary detention facility. He was diagnosed as having a contusion on the soft tissues of the face and an X-ray examination was recommended. The applicant told the medics that he had injured himself while drunk two days previously after falling down and hitting his head on the ground.

10.  The applicant was taken to hospital the same day for the X-ray examination and was diagnosed as having a closed fracture of his nose bones with displacement of bone fragments and a chest contusion. He gave the same explanation for the injuries as he had given previously that day to the ambulance medics at the temporary detention facility.

11.  Upon admission to the temporary detention facility, staff seized, among other items, a pledge ticket for a silver chain and cross which were in pawn until 5 September 2007 (worth 4,840 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 990 respectively).

12.  On 30 August 2007 the Industrialniy District Court of Barnaul (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant to be kept under arrest for an additional forty-eight hours, until 2.30 p.m. on 1 September 2007.

13.  On 1 September 2007 the applicant was released.

14.  On the same day the District Court granted an application from the investigator to place the applicant in a psychiatric hospital for a psychiatric forensic examination.

15.  On 4 September 2007 the applicant was admitted to a psychiatric hospital, where he stayed until 4 October 2007.

16.  On 4 October 2007 the report on the forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant was concluded. It established that at the time of the events in question the applicant could understand and take responsibility for his actions.

17.  On 11 October 2007 the pawn shop ticket was returned to the applicant.

17.  On 11 October 2007 the pawn shop ticket was returned to the applicant.

18.  On 9 November 2007 the applicant underwent planned surgery for a fracture of the nose (rhinoplasty).

19.  On 17 March 2008 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued owing to a lack of evidence of his involvement in the crime in question.

B.  Investigation of the alleged ill-treatment

20.  On 29 August 2007 the applicant’s mother complained to the prosecutor’s office that the applicant had been beaten by the police.

20.  On 29 August 2007 the applicant’s mother complained to the prosecutor’s office that the applicant had been beaten by the police.

20.  On 29 August 2007 the applicant’s mother complained to the prosecutor’s office that the applicant had been beaten by the police.

21.  On 19 September 2007 a forensic medical expert held that the closed fracture of the applicant’s nose had been caused by a blow from a hard, blunt object with a limited area of impact and that it had resulted in moderately severe health damage. The report went on to say that the injury had occurred shortly before the applicant had sought medical assistance and that it could have been caused on 28 August 2007. The possibility of the injury being caused by a fall or that the applicant had inflicted it on himself was excluded. The diagnosis of a chest contusion was found to be unsubstantiated by the information in the medical documents.

1.  Refusals to open criminal proceedings against the police officers

1.  Refusals to open criminal proceedings against the police officers

22.  On 4 October, 25 November and 24 December 2007, and 1 February and 15 March 2008 the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in their actions. The applicant’s statements were found to be contradictory and not consistent with the injuries sustained. The applicant’s mother had not witnessed the alleged beatings and, because the applicant was mentally disabled and had been inebriated when arrested, his statements were assessed in critical fashion. There was also evidence that the applicant had possibly had injuries prior to his arrest. The initial refusal to institute criminal proceedings referred to the following evidence:

-  the statements of the applicant’s mother, who submitted that the applicant had had no injuries when he had left home on 28 August 2007 and that she had found him at the police station later that day with a swollen face, bruises on his back and with his clothes covered in blood;

-  a statement by the applicant’s mother that on 26 August 2007 she had witnessed a quarrel between her son and a certain Kar., that she had called the police and that the police had helped her take the applicant home;

-  statements by a witness, B., who had seen the applicant on 28 August 2007, shortly before his arrest, drunk, but without any visible injuries; B. later saw police officers escorting the applicant to a police car, with the applicant showing no resistance. B. did not see the police officers using physical force against the applicant;

-  the applicant’s statements on the circumstances of his arrest. He submitted, in particular, that the beatings had taken place at the back entrance to the police station and in an out-of-the-way office inside the police station; the police officers had hit him with truncheons on his back, bottom and legs (at least four to five blows), and had then punched him on the head and nose (no less than seven to ten blows). The applicant had started bleeding and the officers had threatened him, warning him not to tell anyone about the beatings;

-  information on the applicant’s health and his disability, as well as his previous criminal and administrative offence records;

-  documents on the applicant’s arrest;

-  documents on the ambulance doctors’ examination of the applicant on 28 August 2007 in connection with complaints of a bleeding nose and chest pain;

-  the forensic medical report of 19 September 2007 (see paragraph 21 above);

-  statements by Officers S. and K. on the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest. In particular, they submitted that when the applicant had seen them he had started to run in the opposite direction. He had stumbled and fallen forward onto the pavement. When they had lifted him up they had noticed that he had old abrasions on the left side of his face and a bleeding nose, probably from falling on the pavement. His breath had also smelt of alcohol. The applicant had then been escorted to the police car and taken to the police station. He had not resisted arrest and no physical force had been applied to him;

-  statements by Officer Ch., who had been waiting for S. and K. in the police car. He submitted that he had seen S. and K. escorting the applicant to the car and that the applicant had been visibly drunk. He had had abrasions and dried blood on his face and his clothes had been dirty. No physical force had been used against him;

-  statements by police officers on duty at the police station on 28 August 2007 about the absence of any conflict situations there on that day or any complaints of ill-treatment from the applicant;

-   statements by Ts., A., D., detained at the police station at the same time as the applicant. They submitted that they had not witnessed any clashes between the applicant and the police and had not seen the police use physical force against him;

-  statements by the investigator, N., who had questioned the applicant on 28 August 2007 and to whom he had explained that his injuries (a scratch on the face and a swollen nose) had been sustained while he was drunk, either by falling down or in some other way, the applicant had not remembered exactly. The investigator had later called the applicant’s mother. After she had arrived, the applicant had started complaining that he felt unwell and that he had been beaten by the police, after which an ambulance had been called for him;

-  statements by the investigator D., who said that she had questioned the applicant on 31 August 2007 at the temporary detention facility. He had stated that he had been drinking in the courtyard of his house on 26 August 2007 and had picked a fight with a certain Kar., with whom he had drunk before;

-  information from the temporary detention facility on the applicant’s injuries at the time of his admission (a closed fracture of the nasal bones and an abrasion on the left cheek) and a handwritten note from the applicant to the effect that he had received the injuries after falling down while in an inebriated state and that he had no complaints about the law-enforcement bodies;

-  statements by a certain R., who submitted that on 26 August 2007 the applicant and her husband Kar. had been drinking together and had had a quarrel.

The subsequent decisions also took into account the following evidence:

-  statements by Kar., who submitted that he had been drinking alcohol with the applicant on 25 August 2007, that they had been so drunk they could not walk in a straight line and had had to hold to one another, and that on their way home they had fallen down several times. On 26 August 2007 Kar. and the applicant had again spent all day drinking together, but had had no arguments. He could not remember whether the applicant had had any injuries on 25 and 26 August 2007;

-  an additional forensic medical report of 18 December 2007 which showed that the injury could have been caused on 26 August 2007 but that it could not have been caused by the applicant’s falling down;

-  statements by the doctors who examined the applicant on 28 and 29 August 2007 and performed the X-ray examination and by the expert who conducted the initial forensic medical examination.

23.  The supervising authority set aside all those decisions, except for the most recent one, as unfounded and ordered additional pre-investigation inquiries.

2.  Institution of criminal proceedings against unidentified persons

24.  In the meantime, on 13 December 2007 the chief of inquiries at the investigations department of the Industrialniy ROVD instituted criminal proceedings against unidentified persons under Article 112 § 1 of the Criminal Code for the intentional infliction of moderately severe damage to the applicant’s health at an unidentified place and time, but no later than midnight of 19 September 2007.

25.  On 14 February 2008, 11 March 2009, 20 October 2010 and 5 May 2012 forensic medical examinations of the applicant’s medical file were conducted. The conclusions of the examinations showed that the closed fracture of the nose and swelling of the soft tissues in the nasal area could have been caused between 26 August and 28 August 2007. It was not possible to completely exclude the possibility that the above injury had originated as the result of the impact of a slightly protruding object. The injured area was also accessible to the applicant himself. The report of 20 October 2010 excluded the possibility that the applicant had been injured by falling on the pavement while running away from Officers S. and K. given the absence of other injuries on prominent parts of his face (nose, cheekbones or forehead) or on other parts of his body (the stomach or his extremities).

26.  On 12 January 2008 the chief of inquiries at the investigations department of the Industrialniy ROVD decided to suspend the investigation.

27.  However, on 29 January 2008 the acting prosecutor of the Industrialniy District of Barnaul set that decision aside. He noted that the case file contained information that police officers at the Industrialniy ROVD had allegedly inflicted the applicant’s injuries and transferred the criminal case from the investigations department of the Industrialniy ROVD to the Barnaul investigations department of the investigation committee of the Altay Regional Prosecutor’s Office.

28.  On 11 February 2008 the chief of inquiries at the investigations department of the investigation committee of the Altay Regional Prosecutor’s Office resumed the case.

29.  On 13 February 2008 a witness, I., (the victim in the proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of robbery) submitted that when the alleged robbery had taken place, at about 3 p.m. on 28 August 2007, she had noticed that the applicant had an old abrasion on his face. She did not exclude the possibility that she could have scratched the applicant in the course of the struggle, but she had not hit him and had not seen any injuries on his face later that day when she had seen him at the police station.

29.  On 13 February 2008 a witness, I., (the victim in the proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of robbery) submitted that when the alleged robbery had taken place, at about 3 p.m. on 28 August 2007, she had noticed that the applicant had an old abrasion on his face. She did not exclude the possibility that she could have scratched the applicant in the course of the struggle, but she had not hit him and had not seen any injuries on his face later that day when she had seen him at the police station.

30.  On 16 February 2008 Officer Ch. was questioned as a witness.

30.  On 16 February 2008 Officer Ch. was questioned as a witness.

31.  On 11 April 2008 the proceedings were suspended for the second time. The decision mentioned that the operational-search activities conducted to identify the perpetrator of the assault had not led to any positive results. It provided no further details on the exact measures taken by the investigator.

32.  On 16 April 2008 the deputy head of the investigations department set that decision aside and held that it was necessary to give the applicant victim status in the proceedings and question him. He also wanted to give the applicant’s mother the status of the applicant’s legal representative and question her, to carry out a comprehensive psychological and psychiatric examination of the applicant, to question a number of witnesses on the circumstances of the alleged ill-treatment (among them Officer S.), and to join references from work on Officers K., S. and Ch. to the case file.

32.  On 16 April 2008 the deputy head of the investigations department set that decision aside and held that it was necessary to give the applicant victim status in the proceedings and question him. He also wanted to give the applicant’s mother the status of the applicant’s legal representative and question her, to carry out a comprehensive psychological and psychiatric examination of the applicant, to question a number of witnesses on the circumstances of the alleged ill-treatment (among them Officer S.), and to join references from work on Officers K., S. and Ch. to the case file.

33.  On 17 April 2008 the applicant was given the status of a victim in the proceedings and was questioned as such. The applicant’s mother joined the proceedings as his legal representative and was questioned.

33.  On 17 April 2008 the applicant was given the status of a victim in the proceedings and was questioned as such. The applicant’s mother joined the proceedings as his legal representative and was questioned.

34.  On 19 May 2008 the proceedings were suspended for the third time, with reference to the fact that the operational-search activities to identify the perpetrator had not led to any positive result. However, on 21 May 2008 the deputy head of the investigations department set that decision aside and held that it was necessary to question the witnesses to establish all the relevant circumstances of the alleged ill-treatment.

34.  On 19 May 2008 the proceedings were suspended for the third time, with reference to the fact that the operational-search activities to identify the perpetrator had not led to any positive result. However, on 21 May 2008 the deputy head of the investigations department set that decision aside and held that it was necessary to question the witnesses to establish all the relevant circumstances of the alleged ill-treatment.

35.  Between May and August 2008 the head of the Industrialniy ROVD and the officers present there at the time of the applicant’s arrest were questioned as witnesses.

35.  Between May and August 2008 the head of the Industrialniy ROVD and the officers present there at the time of the applicant’s arrest were questioned as witnesses.

36.  Meanwhile, on 26 June 2008 a fourth decision on suspending the proceedings was taken. However, on 2 July 2008 the deputy head of the investigations department set the decision aside and listed in detail the investigative measures that were needed. They included questioning the police officers S., K. and Ch. about the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest, a forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant and, depending on the results of that examination, deciding on the possibility of carrying out identification parades involving the applicant and S., K. and Ch.

36.  Meanwhile, on 26 June 2008 a fourth decision on suspending the proceedings was taken. However, on 2 July 2008 the deputy head of the investigations department set the decision aside and listed in detail the investigative measures that were needed. They included questioning the police officers S., K. and Ch. about the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest, a forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant and, depending on the results of that examination, deciding on the possibility of carrying out identification parades involving the applicant and S., K. and Ch.

37.  On 7 August 2008 Officer K. was questioned as a witness.

37.  On 7 August 2008 Officer K. was questioned as a witness.

38.  The proceedings were suspended for the fifth time on 14 September 2008, but were again resumed on 29 September 2008. The acting head of the investigations department considered it necessary, inter alia, to put further questions to certain witnesses. He also wanted to carry out a comprehensive psychological and psychiatric forensic examination of the applicant and, depending on the results of that examination, to decide on the possibility of carrying out identification parades involving the applicant and S., K. and Ch. In addition, he wanted to request documents on the applicant’s hospital treatment after 4 September 2007 and join them to the case file and to carry out an additional forensic medical examination.

38.  The proceedings were suspended for the fifth time on 14 September 2008, but were again resumed on 29 September 2008. The acting head of the investigations department considered it necessary, inter alia, to put further questions to certain witnesses. He also wanted to carry out a comprehensive psychological and psychiatric forensic examination of the applicant and, depending on the results of that examination, to decide on the possibility of carrying out identification parades involving the applicant and S., K. and Ch. In addition, he wanted to request documents on the applicant’s hospital treatment after 4 September 2007 and join them to the case file and to carry out an additional forensic medical examination.

39.  On 23 October 2008 another witness, D., (an acquaintance of the applicant’s mother) stated that he had seen the applicant’s arrest on 28 August 2007. The applicant had been escorted by two people – one wearing a police uniform and the other in plain clothes. The applicant had not shown any resistance, had had no visible injuries and had not been subjected to physical force.

40.  On 28 October 2008 the applicant had an additional forensic psychiatric examination, which established that at the time of the alleged beatings he could not correctly perceive the factual aspect of events or understand the meaning and nature of actions taken in his respect.

40.  On 28 October 2008 the applicant had an additional forensic psychiatric examination, which established that at the time of the alleged beatings he could not correctly perceive the factual aspect of events or understand the meaning and nature of actions taken in his respect.

41.  On 30 October and 8 November 2008 two witnesses, Z. and M., stated respectively that they had seen the applicant on 28 August 2007, shortly before his arrest, that he had been dressed tidily and had had no injuries on his body or blood stains on his clothes. They had later seen him being escorted by two police officers to a police car, the applicant had acted calmly, his clothes had been tidy and no physical force had been applied to him. A similar statement was made by the witness B.

42.  On 14 November 2008 the investigator decided to suspend the proceedings for the sixth time. He relied on the results of the applicant’s forensic psychiatric examination of 28 October 2008 and therefore the impossibility for the investigation to rely on his statements, as well as the absence of eyewitnesses of the circumstances in which the applicant had received his injuries. However, on 30 December 2008 the District Court found that decision unlawful and unsubstantiated.

43.  On 12 February 2009 the proceedings were resumed, only to be suspended for the seventh time on 12 March 2009 for the same reasons as given in the decision of 14 November 2008. However, on 7 April 2009 the District Court found the decision of 12 March 2009 unlawful and unsubstantiated, and on 14 May 2009 the proceedings were again resumed.

44.  On 15 June 2009 the proceedings were yet again suspended. The decision said that the applicant’s statement about his alleged ill-treatment by the police officers S., K. and Ch. could not be admitted as evidence in view of the results of the forensic psychiatric examination of 28 October 2008. The applicant’s mother’s statements had derived from those of the applicant himself. There was no direct evidence proving that the applicant had sustained his injuries at the hands of S., K. and Ch. The fact that those officers had arrested the applicant and taken him to the Industrialniy ROVD had not proved that they had been involved in the alleged ill-treatment. Exhaustive measures had been taken to establish the time the applicant had sustained his injuries. The witnesses B., D. and Z., who had seen the applicant’s arrest, had stated that they had not seen the police officers use any physical force against him.

45.  On 12 January 2010 the proceedings were resumed and subsequently suspended for the ninth time on 15 February 2010. The investigation established that on 28 August 2007 the applicant had been taken to the Industrialniy ROVD by Officers S., K. and Ch. The applicant had complained that those officers had beaten him after his arrest. According to the forensic medical examination of 14 February 2008, the applicant had had a closed fracture of bones in the nose and swelling of the soft tissues in the nasal area, which had been caused by the impact of a hard, blunt object and could have occurred between 26 August and 28 August 2007. The investigation had not confirmed any fact of ill-treatment of the applicant by S., K. and Ch. That was in accordance with the statements by the police officers, who had denied inflicting any injuries on the applicant, the witnesses who had seen the applicant’s arrest, the records of identification parades and other evidence. There had been no other evidence attesting directly to the fact that a crime had been committed by the police officers. In addition, the decision reiterated that the applicant’s statements could not be relied on in view of the results of the forensic psychiatric examination of 28 October 2008 and could not be a basis for bringing charges against the police officers. The mother’s statements had derived from those of the applicant and therefore could not be relied on either.

46.  On 27 April 2010 the District Court found the decision of 15 February 2010 unlawful and unsubstantiated and on 1 June 2010 the proceedings were again resumed.

46.  On 27 April 2010 the District Court found the decision of 15 February 2010 unlawful and unsubstantiated and on 1 June 2010 the proceedings were again resumed.

47.  On 8 June 2010 P., an expert in psychiatry – a doctor of medical sciences and a professor – was questioned as a witness. He submitted that the conclusions of the psychiatric expert examination of 28 October 2008 on the applicant’s mental state at the time of the events in question were more consistent and reliable than those of the applicant’s previous psychiatric expert examination on 4 October 2007.

48.  On 11 June 2010 the proceedings were suspended for the tenth time. The decision referred to the applicant’s arrest on 28 August 2007, his statement as to the alleged ill-treatment by the police officers S., K. and Ch., the results of the forensic medical examination of 14 February 2008 with a description of his injuries and the time they were inflicted, and the police officers’ denial of the alleged ill-treatment.

49.  Proceedings were resumed on 12 July 2010. Formal confrontations were carried out between the witnesses B. and Z., Officer K. and Z., Officer Ch. and Z., the applicant and the investigator N., the applicant’s mother and N., the applicant and the police officer who had taken him from the Industrialniy ROVD to the temporary detention facility and had allegedly threatened him on their way there by warning him not to tell anyone about the beatings, and the applicant and Officer K.

50.  On 19 July 2010 the proceedings were suspended for the eleventh time. The decision noted that it had been impossible to reconcile the statements of the police officers and the witnesses as to whether the applicant had had any injuries on his face at the time of his arrest. However, on 31 August 2010 the District Court found that decision unlawful and unjustified and the proceedings resumed again on 19 October 2010.

50.  On 19 July 2010 the proceedings were suspended for the eleventh time. The decision noted that it had been impossible to reconcile the statements of the police officers and the witnesses as to whether the applicant had had any injuries on his face at the time of his arrest. However, on 31 August 2010 the District Court found that decision unlawful and unjustified and the proceedings resumed again on 19 October 2010.

51.  On 21 August 2010 another police officer, S., was questioned as a witness (the case file contains no earlier record, if any, of the questioning of S. as a witness).

52.  The proceedings were again suspended on 26 October 2010, 14 January, 10 February and 17 February 2011, and resumed respectively on 12 January, 8 February, 15 February and 7 April 2012. In addition to the previously collected evidence, the decisions on suspension relied on:

-  statements by the investigator N.;

-  statements by Ts., D. and Yer., detained at the police station at the same time as the applicant;

-  a radiology laboratory assistant K. and the radiologist R.;

-  an expert, Kl., on the nature of the applicant’s injuries;

-  statements by Kar.;

-  a statement by the witness, S., who submitted that she had seen a fight between the applicant and the witness I., but that she had not seen any injuries on the applicant’s body at that time;

-  Kr., who submitted that she had seen no injuries on the applicant on 26 August 2007 and that when she had seen him on 1 September 2007 he had had a swollen nose. He had had no other visible injuries;

-  a statement by the officer on duty at the temporary detention facility, P., who called an ambulance for the applicant on 29 August 2007;

-  the ambulance medics who examined the applicant on 28 August and 29 August 2007, but who could not remember any circumstances of value to the investigation given the length of time since the events in question;

-  the neurosurgeon R., who examined the applicant on 29 August 2007 at the hospital and submitted that he could have received his injuries several days prior to the examination;

-  the lawyer M., present at the applicant’s questioning at the police station on 28 August 2007. Owing to the passage of time, he could not remember whether the applicant had any visible injuries or if he had told him anything about the circumstances of the alleged beatings.

-  the lawyer M., present at the applicant’s questioning at the police station on 28 August 2007. Owing to the passage of time, he could not remember whether the applicant had any visible injuries or if he had told him anything about the circumstances of the alleged beatings.

53.  On 10 May 2012 the proceedings were suspended for the sixteenth and last time. Taking into account the evidence that had been collected, the investigating authority came to the conclusion that the applicant had received his injuries no later than 10.37 p.m. on 28 August 2007 (the time of his examination by ambulance medics at the Industrialniy ROVD). However, it was impossible to make an objective and reliable conclusion as to the exact time and circumstances of the injuries. The results of the applicant’s psychiatric expert examination precluded the investigating authority from relying on the applicant’s submissions as evidence and there was no other evidence proving beyond doubt that his injuries had been inflicted in the circumstances he had described. In addition, the experts had arrived at the conclusion that the injury could have been caused anytime between 26 August and 28 August 2007.

C.  Applicant’s attempts to have criminal proceedings instituted against a trainee police officer, I., and police officers A. and B.

54.  According to the applicant, while the investigator was questioning him as a suspect on 28 August 2007, a trainee police officer, I., had taken the keys to his flat and had gone there and searched his room. A gold bracelet had allegedly gone missing after the search.

55.  According to the applicant, Officers A. and B. had allegedly threatened him on the same day, warning him not to reveal that he had been beaten at the police station and to say instead that he had injured himself several days before in a fight.

56.  From 2008 the applicant’s mother sought to have criminal proceedings instituted against I. and Officers A. and B. for abuse of position.

57.  The investigator refused several times to institute criminal proceedings.

58.  The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings against I. is dated 15 October 2009. On 10 December 2009 the Altay Regional Court found at final instance that the aforementioned decision was lawful and justified. It had been established that the applicant’s mother had let I. into the flat, answered his questions, and had then let him into the applicant’s room and helped him search it. It had also been established that the disappearance of a gold bracelet had been alleged long after the events complained of. For those reasons, there could not reasonably have been an expectation that the incident would be investigated.

59.  The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings against A. and B. is dated 31 May 2010. The inquiry found no evidence to support the applicant’s allegations. There is no information in the case file as to whether the applicant challenged the lawfulness of that decision in court.

D.  Civil proceedings for damages

60.  The applicant’s mother brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Finance on behalf of herself and the applicant, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the unlawful prosecution of the applicant and the resulting medical treatment. She also sought compensation for pecuniary damage, representing the cost of the silver chain and cross which could not be recovered from the pawnshop and other costs and expenses.

61.  On 10 March 2010 the District Court granted the claim in part and ordered the Ministry of Finance to pay the applicant RUB 15,000 for the non-pecuniary damage caused by his unlawful prosecution. It refused the claim for recovery of the cost of the silver chain and cross, holding that the mother, as the applicant’s legal representative, could have recovered them from the pawnshop herself.

62.  On 21 April 2010 the Altay Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal, increasing the amount awarded in respect of nonpecuniary damage to RUB 40,000. The court further held that the applicant’s mother had failed to submit any evidence that she had asked the investigator to return the pawnshop pledge ticket and that such a request had been refused.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

63.  For a summary of the relevant domestic law on the prohibition of torture and other types of ill-treatment and the procedure for examining a criminal complaint see Manzhos v. Russia (no. 64752/09, §§ 21-27, 24 May 2016).

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

64.  The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police and that no effective investigation had been carried out into his complaint. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

65.  The Government supported the conclusions of the domestic investigating authority and submitted that there had been no violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 3.

A.  Admissibility

66.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

1.  The State’s obligation to conduct an effective investigation

67.  The Court reiterates that where an individual makes a credible assertion that he or she has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. That investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and – if appropriate – punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice, and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 131, ECHR 2000IV, and Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 5878/08, § 233, 30 March 2016).

68.  The investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. The authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened, and should not rely on hasty or illfounded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09, 45886/07 and 32431/08, § 322, ECHR 2014 (extracts), and Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933/04, § 133, 29 July 2010). Furthermore, the investigation must be independent, impartial and subject to public scrutiny (see Mesut Deniz v. Turkey, no. 36716/07, § 52, 5 November 2013). It should result in a reasoned decision to reassure a concerned public that the rule of law has been respected (see, mutatis mutandis, Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, § 118, 4 May 2001).

69.  The Court observes that on 29 August 2007 the applicant’s mother, acting as the applicant’s legal representative, complained to the prosecutor’s office that on 28 August 2007 her son had been subjected to illtreatment at the Industrialniy ROVD. The matter was, hence, duly brought before the competent authorities at a time when they could reasonably have been expected to investigate the circumstances in question.

70.  The complaint was substantiated by reference to reports on the applicant’s examination by ambulance paramedics on 28 August and 29 August 2007 and an examination at the hospital on 29 August 2007, attesting to a closed fracture of the nose bones with displacement of fragments and a chest contusion (see paragraphs 8-10 above). The claim was therefore shown to be “arguable” and the domestic authorities were placed under an obligation to conduct an effective investigation satisfying the above-mentioned requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.

71.  The Court notes that in the period between 4 October 2007 and 15 March 2008 the domestic authorities carried out five rounds of “preinvestigation inquiries” into the applicant’s complaint under Article 144 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (проверка по заявлению о преступлении). During that period, the domestic authorities took five decisions to refuse the institution of criminal proceedings against police officers for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in their actions. In the meantime, however, on 13 December 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted against unidentified persons for the intentional infliction of moderately severe damage to the applicant’s health.

72.  The Court found in Lyapin v. Russia (no. 46956/09, 24 July 2014) that in cases of credible allegations of treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention, it was incumbent on the authorities to open a criminal case and conduct an investigation, a “pre-investigation inquiry” alone not being capable of meeting the requirements of an effective investigation under Article 3 (ibid., §§ 128-40). It further found in Razzakov v. Russia (no. 57519/09, 5 February 2015) that a delay in commencing a criminal investigation into credible assertions by the applicant (in that case amounting to five months) had had an unavoidable and significant adverse impact on the investigation, considerably undermining the investigating authority’s ability to secure evidence of the alleged illtreatment (ibid., § 61).

73.  The Court observes that in the present case the delay in opening a criminal case related to the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment amounted to over three months. The proceedings were subsequently suspended on sixteen occasions in the period between 12 January 2008 and 10 May 2012 on the grounds of it being impossible to identify those responsible for the applicant’s injuries, and they appear to be ongoing to the present day (see paragraphs 26-53 above). Several initial decisions suspending the proceedings were taken without basic investigative measures to establish the circumstances of the alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 26, 31, 34, 36 and 38 above). In particular, the applicant was not given victim status and questioned as a victim until four months after the institution of criminal proceedings (see paragraph 33 above). The police officers whom the applicant indicated as the alleged perpetrators were questioned quite late in the proceedings: Officer Ch. was questioned two months after the institution of criminal proceedings, Officer K. almost eight months after and Officer S. two years and eight months after the institution of criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 30, 37 and 51 above). The questioning of other witnesses who had seen the applicant during his arrest and of those who had seen him at the police station thereafter was not carried out with due swiftness either (see paragraphs 35, 39 and 41 above). It took the domestic authorities over a year and seven months to address the contradictory results of the applicant’s psychiatric expert examinations of 4 October 2007 and 28 October 2008 (see paragraph 47 above).

74.  Regard being had to the foregoing, the Court finds that the threemonth delay in opening a criminal case in connection with the applicant’s allegations of being beaten by the police officers at Industrialniy ROVD and the subsequent handling of the criminal proceedings, which are still going on ten years after the events complained of, show that the authorities failed in their obligation to conduct an effective investigation of the applicant’s allegations of police assault.

75.  Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its procedural aspect.

2.  The applicant’s alleged ill-treatment

76.  The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. , § 90, ECHR 2000XI; see also Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, § 81, ECHR 2015).

77.  In order for ill-treatment to fall within the scope of Article 3 it must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 162, Series A no. 25).

78.  Where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny. Where domestic proceedings have taken place, however, it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them. Although the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic courts, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 93, ECHR 2010).

79.  In assessing the evidence on which to base a decision as to whether there has been a violation of Article 3, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. , § 67, ECHR 2006IX).

80.  Where an individual is taken into police custody in good health and is found to be injured on release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, § 34, Series A no. 336, and Selmouni v. France [GC], no. , § 87, ECHR 1999V).

81.  The Court observes that on 28 August 2007 the applicant was arrested and taken to the Industrialniy ROVD, where he was allegedly illtreated by police officers. On the same day an ambulance was called to the police station for the applicant and, several hours later on the following day, one was called to the temporary detention facility and the applicant was found to have face and chest contusions. On 29 August 2007 the applicant was taken to hospital for an X-ray, which showed that he had a closed fracture of the nose bones with displacement of fragments (see paragraphs 8-10 above).

82.  The Court also observes that after six forensic medical examinations experts concluded that the closed fracture of the applicant’s nose and the swelling of the soft tissue in the nasal area could have been caused between 26 August and 28 August 2007; that it could not be completely excluded that the above injury had originated as the result of the impact of a limited protruding object; and that the injured area had also been accessible to the applicant himself. The experts excluded the possibility that the applicant had injured himself by falling on the pavement while running away from Officers S. and K. (as alleged by them) given the absence of any other injuries on prominent parts of his face (nose, cheekbones, forehead) or any other parts of his body (see paragraphs 21, 22 and 25 above).

83.  The Court considers that the medical evidence, along with the allegation that the ill-treatment took place while the applicant was in police custody, created a presumption of fact that the applicant was subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of State agents. That required the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation as to how the applicant’s injuries could have been caused.

84.  On the basis of all the material placed before it, the Court finds that neither the authorities at the domestic level nor the Government in the proceedings before the Court have advanced any explanation as to the origin of the applicant’s injuries. The Court concludes therefore that the Government have not satisfactorily established that the applicant’s injuries were caused in any other way than by the alleged treatment he suffered at the hands of the police officers on the premises of the Industrialniy ROVD.

85.  Accordingly, having regard to the nature of the applicant’s injuries, the Court concludes that the State is responsible under the substantive aspect of Article 3 on account of the inhuman and degrading treatment to which the applicant was subjected while in the Industrialniy ROVD.

II.  OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

86.  The Court has examined the rest of the complaints submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly illfounded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

87.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damages

A.  Damages

88.  The applicant claimed 60,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage (including medical expenses, photocopying, postal and translation expenses, lawyer’s fees, and telephone and travel expenses) and EUR 130,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

89.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s claim in respect of pecuniary damage was unsubstantiated and that his claim for non-pecuniary damage was excessive. They argued that any finding of a violation by the Court would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction.

90.  The Court reiterates that there must be a clear causal connection between the pecuniary damage claimed by an applicant and the violation of the Convention found (see, among other authorities, Çakıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, § 127, ECHR 1999IV). In that connection, the Court first of all notes its finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the police’s ill-treatment of the applicant. Furthermore, it has regard to the medical documents submitted by the applicant, confirming that he had surgery for his injury (see paragraph 18 above) and incurred related medical expenses. The Court finds that there is a clear causal connection between the treatment for the injury sustained by the applicant and the violation of Article 3 of the Convention found above. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court awards the applicant EUR 500 in that regard.

91.  The Court considers it appropriate to deal with the photocopying, postal and translation expenses, lawyer’s fees, and the telephone and travel expenses claimed by the applicant under the head of costs and expenses.

92.  In so far as non-pecuniary damage is concerned, the Court notes that it has found a violation of the applicant’s right under Article 3 of the Convention not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. In those circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant’s suffering and frustration cannot be compensated for by a mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B.  Costs and expenses

93.  As mentioned above (see paragraph 88 above), the applicant claimed costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and in the proceedings before the Court.

94.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,000, covering costs under all heads.

C.  Default interest

95.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Declares the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs;

3.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 July 2017, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.


PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in two applications (nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Russian nationals, Mr Aleksandr Sergeyevich Svinarenko and Mr Valentin Alekseyevich Slyadnev (“the applicants”), on 5 May 2008 and 2 July 2008 respectively.

2.  The applicants were represented by Mr V.G. Palchinskiy and Mr Ye.F. Plotnikov respectively, lawyers practising in Magadan. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the  at the European Court of Human Rights.

3.  The applicants alleged, in particular, that their placement in a metal cage in the courtroom had been contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and that the length of the criminal proceedings against them had been excessive.

4.  On 23 October 2008 the applications were communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the applications at the same time (Article 29 § 1).

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicants were born in 1968 and 1970 respectively and live in the settlement of Sinegorye in the Yagodninskiy District of the Magadan Region.

A.  Preliminary investigation

6.  In 2002 the Far Eastern Federal Circuit Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee at the Ministry of the Interior brought a number of sets of criminal proceedings against a Mr Grishin.

7.  On 24 September 2002 the first applicant was questioned as one of the suspects in those proceedings. On 9 October 2002 he was arrested. In a decision of 12 November 2002 ordering his detention on remand, the Magadan Town Court noted that the crimes he was charged with had been committed during a three-year probation period under a judgment of the Magadan Region Yagodninskiy District Court of 13 April 2001 convicting him of theft and imposing on him a conditional sentence of five years’ imprisonment. It also noted that he had negative references from his place of residence and that he had breached his undertaking to appear before the investigating authority. According to the final charges against the first applicant, he was accused of robbery with violence against Mr A.S. and Mrs T.S. in September 2002 as a member of a gang led by Mr Grishin, and of the illegal acquisition, storage, transportation and carrying of ammunition.

8.  On 20 January 2003 the second applicant, who was serving a sentence of imprisonment after his conviction by the Magadan Region Yagodninskiy District Court on 26 July 2002 for negligent infliction of death under Article 109 § 1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (“the CC”), was questioned as one of the suspects in the proceedings brought against Mr Grishin. On 22 January 2003 he was charged with the following crimes:

(i)  establishing an armed gang under Mr Grishin’s leadership and participating in the gang’s attacks on citizens from October 2001 to September 2002 – under Article 209 § 1 of the CC;

(ii)  the robbery in October 2001 of Mr V.B., the director of a private goldrefining company, with the use of weapons and violence endangering life and health and a threat to use such violence, by an organised group, with the aim of misappropriating another’s property of substantial value – under Article 162 § 3 of the CC;

(iii)  illegal storage and transportation of precious metals (industrial gold stolen from Mr V.B.) of substantial value by an organised group in October 2001 – under Article 191 § 2 of the CC;

(iv)  extortion (from Mr V.B.) in October 2001 with the aim of obtaining a right to property under the threat of the use of violence, repeatedly, by an organised group – under Article 163 § 3 of the CC;

(v)  the robbery of Mr Ya.B. in October 2001 with the use of weapons and violence endangering life and health and the threat to use such violence, by a group of persons according to a premeditated plan, repeatedly, by means of illegal entry into a dwelling with the aim of misappropriating another’s property of substantial value – under Article 162 § 3 of the CC; and

(vi)  illegal acquisition, storage, transfer, transportation and carrying of firearms, repeatedly, by an organised group in October 2001 – under Article 222 § 3 of the CC.

9.  On 11 April 2003 the Magadan Region Khasynskiy District Court found the second applicant to be eligible, in view of his orderly behaviour and positive references, for early conditional release one year and three months ahead of the term of two years and three months to which he had been sentenced under the Yagodninskiy District Court’s judgment of 26 July 2002.

10.  On 24 April 2003 the  ordered the second applicant’s remand in custody pending the current criminal proceedings against him. It noted, inter alia, that he was accused of grave crimes which had been committed during a three-year probation period under the Yagodninskiy District Court’s judgment of 15 June 2001 convicting him of hooliganism and infliction of bodily harm and sentencing him conditionally to four years’ imprisonment.

11.  On 20 May 2003 the investigation was completed and the defence received access to the case file.

12.  On 13 August 2003 the  found that the second applicant had been deliberately delaying the examination of the case file and set a time-limit for the examination at 5 September 2003.

B.  Jury trial

1.  First set of proceedings

13.  On 19 September 2003 the case was sent for trial to the Magadan Regional Court, which scheduled for 2 October 2003 and held from 16 October to 26 December 2003 a preliminary hearing to decide on numerous requests by the applicants and their two co-defendants concerning the admissibility of the evidence and other procedural issues, as well as to prepare the jury trial requested by the defendants. During this period the hearing was postponed for about four weeks at the co-defendants’ request.

14.  As a result of the preliminary hearing, on 26 December 2003 the  ordered that the case be examined at an open hearing by a jury on 23 January 2004. On that day fewer than twenty candidate jurors appeared before the court instead of the fifty invited and the court, therefore, ordered that another 100 candidate jurors be summoned.

15.  On 13 February 2004 a jury was formed and the jurors were sworn in.

16.  The  held about thirty court sessions, during which it decided various procedural issues, such as the replacement of some jurors, the exclusion or examination of certain evidence and the ordering of expert opinions. It examined the evidence, including the testimony of the victims, witnesses and experts, and heard the defendants. The hearing was adjourned for two weeks as one of the defence lawyers could not attend.

17.  On 15 June 2004 the prosecution amended one of the robbery charges against the second applicant (concerning Mr Ya.B.) to the milder charge of “arbitrary unlawful acts with the use of violence”, under Article 330 § 2 of the CC.

18.  On 22 June 2004 the jury found the applicants not guilty. They were released in the courtroom. On 29 June 2004 the  delivered a judgment in which they were acquitted and their right to rehabilitation was acknowledged.

19.  The co-defendants and the prosecution appealed against the trial court’s judgment. On 7 December 2004 the Supreme Court examined the case on appeal and quashed the judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that some of the jurors had concealed information about their family members’ criminal records although they had been obliged to disclose such information to the parties and the court at the time of their selection, and that the presiding judge had failed to sum up all the evidence in his directions to the jury, in particular the victims’ and witnesses’ statements. It remitted the case to the  for fresh examination.

2.  Second set of proceedings

20.  On 21 December 2004 the  received the case file. It adjourned its hearing twice, on 31 January and 7 February 2005, as the second applicant’s lawyer had failed to appear.

21.  In a decision of 8 February 2005 the  imposed on the defendants an undertaking not to leave their place of residence without its authorisation, to appear before it when summoned, and not to obstruct the proceedings.

22.  The Regional Court’s decision of the same date to remit the case to the Magadan Regional Prosecutor for the rectification of errors in the indictment was appealed against by the defence and quashed as erroneous by the Supreme Court on 26 April 2005.

23.  The hearing before the  was adjourned on 17 June 2005 as a result of the first applicant’s and a co-defendant’s failure to appear, for unknown reasons. It was adjourned again on 21 June 2005 owing to a co-defendant’s hospitalisation and the impossibility of examining the case in respect of the others in separate proceedings.

24.  The hearing resumed on 22 November 2005. On that day, however, fewer than twenty candidate jurors appeared before the court instead of the thirty invited and the court, therefore, ordered that another 100 candidate jurors be summoned.

24.  The hearing resumed on 22 November 2005. On that day, however, fewer than twenty candidate jurors appeared before the court instead of the thirty invited and the court, therefore, ordered that another 100 candidate jurors be summoned.

24.  The hearing resumed on 22 November 2005. On that day, however, fewer than twenty candidate jurors appeared before the court instead of the thirty invited and the court, therefore, ordered that another 100 candidate jurors be summoned.

25.  On 6 December 2005 the  ordered that the applicants and the other two defendants be detained on remand. It noted the applicants’ previous convictions, the serious charges against them, and the fact that during the preliminary investigation and the current trial some of the witnesses had expressed fears of unlawful behaviour by the defendants. In its decision it did not give any details concerning the fears referred to, or the names of the defendants concerned. The first applicant’s appeal against the detention order, in which he argued, inter alia, that the witnesses’ fears did not relate to him, was dismissed. The applicants’ detention was subsequently extended for similar reasons.

25.  On 6 December 2005 the  ordered that the applicants and the other two defendants be detained on remand. It noted the applicants’ previous convictions, the serious charges against them, and the fact that during the preliminary investigation and the current trial some of the witnesses had expressed fears of unlawful behaviour by the defendants. In its decision it did not give any details concerning the fears referred to, or the names of the defendants concerned. The first applicant’s appeal against the detention order, in which he argued, inter alia, that the witnesses’ fears did not relate to him, was dismissed. The applicants’ detention was subsequently extended for similar reasons.

25.  On 6 December 2005 the  ordered that the applicants and the other two defendants be detained on remand. It noted the applicants’ previous convictions, the serious charges against them, and the fact that during the preliminary investigation and the current trial some of the witnesses had expressed fears of unlawful behaviour by the defendants. In its decision it did not give any details concerning the fears referred to, or the names of the defendants concerned. The first applicant’s appeal against the detention order, in which he argued, inter alia, that the witnesses’ fears did not relate to him, was dismissed. The applicants’ detention was subsequently extended for similar reasons.

26.  On 9 December 2005 the jury was formed and the court held hearings on 12, 20 and 23 December 2005. On the last-mentioned date one of the co-defendants was granted leave to retain a new lawyer. On 27 December his new lawyer failed to appear and the hearing was adjourned until 10 January 2006, 1-9 January being non-working days. The  continued the examination of the case in January. It ruled on numerous procedural requests by the defence, in particular, challenges to the presiding judge and the prosecutor.

27.  As the witnesses and victims who lived in Sinegorye had failed to appear at the hearings several times, on 17 January the court ordered them to be brought before it by force. The hearing was adjourned on 20 January until 27 January and on 26 February until 10 March 2006 pending the execution of that order.

28.  The examination of the case continued in February, March, April and May 2006. During this time the hearing was adjourned on a number of occasions for about four weeks in total at the request of jurors who could not participate, and for about a week at the request of one of the defence lawyers, who was ill. On 2 June 2006 the presiding judge declared the examination of the evidence closed. In five sessions in June 2006 the  heard the parties’ pleadings. It announced a break from 14 July until 3 October 2006 in view of the fact that several jurors were leaving for summer holidays in central .

29.  The hearing resumed on 3 October 2006. Having consulted the parties, the court decided that they would repeat their pleadings. They did so on 6, 12 and 19 October and 2 November 2006. The preparation of questions to be put to the jury followed. The jury delivered its verdict on 17 November 2006. The first applicant was found not guilty and was released in the courtroom.

30.  On 5 December 2006, after an examination of the legal issues during the sessions held in November and December, the  delivered its judgment. The first applicant was acquitted and his right to rehabilitation was acknowledged. The second applicant was convicted of extortion (from Mr V.B.), and arbitrary unlawful acts with the use of violence (in respect of Mr Ya.B.), and was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, which took into account his 2001 conviction, in respect of which the conditional sentence was revoked, and acquitted on the remaining charges. His detention on remand was to continue until the judgment took effect.

31.  On 6 June 2007 the Supreme Court examined the appeals against the judgment lodged by Mr Grishin, one of the victims and the prosecution. It found a violation of the rules pertaining to a criminal trial by the defendants and their lawyers, who had abused their rights and, despite the presiding judge’s warnings, discussed, in the jurors’ presence, issues which fell outside the scope of their competence, such as the alleged falsification of evidence, alleged violations of the law when obtaining evidence, for example, by the torturing one of the defendants, and the allegation that a certain victim had given statements on the investigators’ instructions. They had made remarks which did not concern the issues to be decided by the jury and which had been aimed at discrediting the evidence against them, thus creating a negative impression of the victims and the presiding judge, and a positive one of themselves. This was held to have unlawfully influenced the jury’s verdict. It was also noted that the jury’s verdict had not been entirely clear as some of the answers had been contradictory. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the  for fresh examination. It also ordered that the second applicant should remain in custody.

32.  In August 2007 the first applicant was detained on remand in connection with another set of criminal proceedings brought against him on suspicion of extortion allegedly committed in 2002.

3.  Third set of proceedings

33.  On 4 September 2007 the  received the case file and opened the proceedings. On 5 October 2007 fewer than twenty candidate jurors appeared before the  instead of the 100 invited and the court, therefore, ordered that another 150 candidate jurors be summoned.

34.  On 2 November 2007 the selection of the jurors began. However, after a number of candidate jurors refused sit in the case, their number was still insufficient and the court ordered that another 150 candidate jurors be summoned. The same situation occurred on 22 November 2007.

35.  The number of candidate jurors who appeared before the Regional Court was again insufficient on 11 December 2007 and 17 January 2008, which necessitated the summoning of an additional 200 and 250 persons respectively.

36.  The jury was formed on 5 February 2008 and the trial commenced. The court held five or six sessions monthly from February to June 2008, two sessions in July, four in August (after a break for jurors’ holidays from 1 July to 18 August), eleven in September, six in October, ten in November and four in December 2008. Some of the sessions were held without the jury as they concerned various procedural issues, including the admissibility of evidence and requests for the examination of the evidence before the jury. The court examined the vast body of evidence, including the testimony of more than seventy victims and witnesses, and numerous expert reports.

37.  For about a month the trial was delayed because Mr Grishin was ill. Some delay was due to difficulties in ensuring the appearance of a number of the victims and witnesses, who resided in remote settlements in Burkhala and Sinegorye or had moved to the central and other parts of the country.

38.  On 13 February 2009 the  started hearing the parties’ pleadings.

39.  On 7 March 2009 the jury returned a not guilty verdict in respect of the first applicant. It found the second applicant guilty of arbitrary unlawful acts and not guilty of the remaining charges.

40.  On 12 March 2009 the  ordered the second applicant’s release on an undertaking not to leave his place of residence and that he would behave in a law-abiding manner.

41.  On 19 March 2009 it delivered its judgment, acquitting the first applicant and finding as follows in respect of the second applicant:

On 11 October 2001 Grishin, Slyadnev and N.G., against whom the criminal proceedings were terminated owing to his death, had requested Ya.B. to repay a debt in the amount of 100,000 Russian roubles (RUB). Following his refusal, Grishin and N.G. had beaten him up. Slyadnev had beaten up S.K., who had witnessed Ya.B.’s beating. They had then taken Ya.B. to his home and Grishin had taken money from him in the amount of RUB 247,000.

42.  The Regional Court considered that, given the gravity of the acts committed by Mr Grishin and the second applicant, as well as the specific circumstances, which characterised the crimes committed by them as brazen attacks on citizens using violence, threats and weapons, the deprivation of their liberty was the only proper punishment for each of them. The Regional Court convicted the second applicant under Article 330 § 2 of the CC for arbitrary unlawful acts with the use of violence, sentenced him to two years and ten months’ imprisonment, revoked the conditional sentence under his 2001 conviction as the new crime had been committed during the probation period, and, after adding the revoked conditional sentence, sentenced him to a total of four years and five months’ imprisonment, discharged him from serving the sentence in the part relating to the conviction under Article 330 § 2 as criminal liability had become time-barred, and found that he had served his sentence in the remaining part in view of his detention on remand from 24 April 2003 to 22 June 2004 and from 6 December 2005 to 12 March 2009, which amounted to four years, five months and six days in total. It acquitted him of the remaining charges.

43.  On 23 July 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by Mr Grishin and the prosecution and upheld the judgment.

C.  Conditions in the courtroom

44.  During the applicants’ detention on remand they were taken to the  from their detention facility by police guards. During the hearings they sat on a bench enclosed on four sides by a metal railing. The enclosure was 255 centimetres long, 150 centimetres wide and 225 centimetres high, with a doorway. The distance between the railing rods, which were 10 millimetres in diameter, was 19 centimetres.

45.  According to the first applicant’s additional information, armed policemen were on guard near the caged dock. There were always two policemen per each detainee  eight policemen in total during the first two sets of proceedings and six policemen during the third set of trial proceedings.

D.  Compensation proceedings

46.  On 25 August 2009 the first applicant, who had been acquitted of all charges, brought proceedings for compensation in respect of pecuniary and nonpecuniary damage incurred as a result of the criminal proceedings against him, in particular, his detention on remand. On 23 October 2009 the  awarded him RUB 18,569 by way of damages. On 1 March 2010 the  awarded him RUB 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid by the Ministry of Finance.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

A.  Code of Criminal Proceedings

47.  Article 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the  prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment of a defendant or other participants in criminal proceedings.

B.  Construction rules

48.  Under the Rules on the Design and Construction of Courthouses, in force since 1 August 2000, courtrooms for the hearing of criminal cases must have a subzone for defendants and guards, which must be enclosed on four sides with a railing made of metal rods 14 millimetres in diameter, 220 centimetres high or extending up to the ceiling, with a doorway and a steelwire ceiling (paragraphs 5.4, 5.9 and 8.3 of the Rules СП 311042000, as approved by the Courts Administration Office at the Russian Federation Supreme Court on 2 December 1999). Access from the defendants’ cells in the courthouse to the courtroom must be through separate corridors and stairs and a separate entry to the courtroom. There must be metal detectors at the public entrance to the courthouse and metal bars on the windows in the courtroom (paragraphs 5.11, 8.1, 8.2 and 5.35 of the Rules).

C.  The Ministry of the Interior internal regulations and their review by the Supreme Court

49.  Under the Directions on the Functioning of Temporary Detention Centres and Police Guard and Convoy units, approved by Order no. 140 of Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation on 7 March 2006 (“Order no. 140”), suspects and accused are taken from their detention facility to the courthouse by police guards and are placed in the courtroom in a dock behind a barrier (“metal railing”). It is prohibited to take them to a courtroom which is not equipped with a barrier (“metal railing”). The same rules were contained in directions approved by Order no. 41 of the Ministry of the Interior of the  on 26 January 1996, which was in force before Order no. 140.

50.  Both Orders were issued for internal use only. Applications challenging their legality on the basis of lack of official publication were dismissed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which found that they contained confidential information and had been registered with the Ministry of Justice of Russia (decision of 2 December 2002, as upheld by the appeal section of the Supreme Court on 24 April 2003 in respect of Order no. 41, and decision of 7 December 2011 in respect of Order no. 140).

51.  Order no. 41 was also challenged before the Supreme Court by a Mr Sh. on the ground that its provision on keeping defendants behind a “metal railing” during their trials violated domestic law and the Convention in so far as they prohibited degrading treatment and guaranteed the right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court dismissed that appeal in a decision of 19 October 2004. It noted that the impugned provision concerned persons detained on remand by a court decision in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The police were responsible for guarding and taking them to a courthouse from their detention facilities (Article 10 § 16 of the Law on Militia). The Rules on the Design and Construction of Courthouses provided for the installation of “metal railings” for defendants as one of the security requirements. Detention on remand was to be carried out in accordance with the principles of legality, fairness, the presumption of innocence, equality before the law, humanism, and respect for human dignity, and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles and norms of international law, and the international agreements of the Russian Federation, and must not be accompanied by torture or other acts aimed at the infliction of physical or moral suffering (the Federal Law on the Detention of Suspects and Defendants charged with Criminal Offences).

52.  On 23 December 2004 the decision was upheld on appeal by the appeal section of the Supreme Court, which noted that, in so far as Mr Sh. had argued that he had actually been held in a “metal cage”, the disputed Order had not set out the technical characteristics of the “barrier (metal railing)”.

THE LAW

I.  JOINDER OF APPLICATIONS

53.  Given that the applications at hand concern similar facts and complaints and raise identical issues under the Convention, the Court decides to join them pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

54.  The applicants complained that during their detention on remand they had appeared before the jury court in a metal cage, like “monkeys in a zoo”, and had thereby been subjected to humiliating treatment injuring their honour and dignity. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

55.  The Government submitted that keeping defendants in a metal cage in the courtroom was an ordinary security measure. Cages were permanently installed in courtrooms for hearing criminal cases in accordance with the detailed design contained in the Rules for the Construction and Design of Courthouses, approved by the Supreme Court of the  in 1999 (see paragraph 48 above). By Order no. 140, issued in 2006, the Ministry of Interior prohibited its convoy guards from taking suspects and accused to courtrooms which were not equipped with the cages (see paragraph 49 above).

56.  The Government argued that it had not been the intention of the authorities to inflict any harm, subject the applicants to torture, humiliate them, make them endure physical or moral suffering, or cause them to feel like “monkeys in a zoo”. The applicants had failed to submit any information as to the physical or mental effect their placement in the “metal cage” had had on them, if there had been any such effect at all.

57.  The first applicant submitted that his exposure to the public – the inhabitants of Sinegorye, where he lived, and Magadan, as well as the jury – in a metal cage, like a dangerous “animal” requiring high security measures, had humiliated him and caused him suffering. The second applicant added that it had prejudiced the jury against him.

1.  Admissibility

58.  The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes, therefore, that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2.  Merits

59.  The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v.  [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000IV).

60.  Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 91, ECHR 2000XI).

61.  Where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and fall within the prohibition of Article 3 (see Pretty v. the , no. 2346/02, § 52, ECHR 2002III). The suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see Kudła, cited above, § 92).

62.  The question whether the purpose of the treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, but the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see V. v. the  [GC], no. 24888/94, § 71, ECHR 1999IX). The public nature of the treatment may be a relevant factor, although it may be sufficient that the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes (see Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, § 32, Series A no. 26).

63.  A measure of restraint does not normally give rise to an issue under Article 3 where the measure has been imposed in connection with a lawful detention and does not entail a use of force, or public exposure, exceeding what is reasonably considered necessary. In this regard, it is important to consider, for instance, whether there is a danger that the person concerned might abscond or cause injury or damage (see Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, § 56, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997VIII). In respect of a person deprived of his liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see Labita, cited above, § 120).

64.  In applying the above principles to the case of Sarban v. Moldova, the Court found that keeping the applicant, who was ill, wore a surgical collar, was handcuffed and under guard, in a cage during hearings which were given much publicity, so that a doctor had to measure his blood pressure through the bars of the cage in front of the public, was a factor contributing to its finding that the applicant had been subjected to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 (see Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456/05, §§ 8890, 4 October 2005). In the case of Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia, in which the applicants, who were public figures, were held in a cage and guarded by heavily armed men wearing black hood-like masks during the judicial review of their detention while the hearing was broadcast live throughout the country, the Court also found such treatment to have been degrading (see Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia, no. 1704/06, § 101, 27 January 2009). It found likewise in two other cases in which applicants were kept in a cage during appeal proceedings (see Ashot Harutyunyan v. , no. 34334/04, §§ 126-129, 15 June 2010), or the entire trial (see Khodorkovskiy v. , no. 5829/04, §§ 125-126, 31 May 2011). The fact that the applicants were accused of non-violent crimes and had no previous convictions, together with their orderly behaviour and the absence of any evidence giving serious grounds for fears that they would resort to violence, abscond, or that their own safety would be at risk, were factors taken into account by the Court.

65.  In the above cases it was not the placement in a cage as such but its unjustified or disproportionate use in the individual circumstances that led the Court to conclude that it was degrading. Similar considerations applied to the finding of a violation of Article 3 in the case of Gorodnitchev, where the applicant appeared at public hearings in handcuffs (see Gorodnitchev v. Russia, no. 52058/99, §§ 103-109, 24 May 2007) and, most recently, in the case of Piruzyan (see Piruzyan v. , no. 33376/07, §§ 6974, ECHR 2012 (extracts).

66.  The Court notes that Armenia and , for example, have removed the cages from their courtrooms as a result of reforms (see Ashot Harutyunyan, cited above, § 118, and the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers’ Resolution CM/ResDH(2011)105). In  the cages are still used in many regions and, as the Government explained, this is a usual security measure applicable to any accused detained on remand. It can be seen from the Government’s submissions that the legal basis for such common practice is to be found in the construction rules for courthouses, and the Ministry of the Interior’s unpublished internal regulations (see paragraphs 4953 and 55 above). In their submissions to the Court the Government did not mention any alternative practices for the arrangement of courtrooms.

67.  The applicants complained about their placement in a metal cage in the courtroom during the third round of their jury trial, when the first applicant was detained on remand in connection with another set of criminal proceedings brought against him and the second applicant was detained on remand pending the trial in question. No reasons were given by the trial court for subjecting them to such treatment.

68.  The Court notes that the applicants were accused of violent crimes such as robbery (both applicants) and banditry (second applicant). They had previous convictions for theft (first applicant) and hooliganism, infliction of bodily harm and negligent infliction of death (second applicant). Furthermore, the witnesses’ fear of the defendants’ unlawful behaviour was cited among the grounds for their detention on remand.

69.  At the same time, the Court notes that although the vague reference to witnesses’ fears appears in some of the detention orders, it is unclear, in the absence of any details or the names of the defendants concerned, given that there were four defendants on trial, whether those fears related to the applicants and whether they were justified (see paragraph 25 above). It further notes that shortly before the second applicant’s detention on remand the court had granted him early release from serving his sentence after his previous conviction in view of his orderly behaviour and positive references (see paragraph 9 above). There is nothing in the materials before the Court which would point to the applicants’ improper or violent behaviour during their trial. No arguments to the contrary have been advanced by the Government.

70.  Noting that the applicants were constantly guarded by armed police officers, and that other security measures had also to be taken in the courtroom (see paragraphs 45 and 48 above), and having regard to the absence of any evidence capable of giving serious grounds for the fear that the applicants posed a danger to order and security in the courtroom, or would resort to violence or abscond, or that there was a risk to their own safety, the Court finds that their placement in the cage, where they were exposed to the public in the courtroom, was not justified. The Court considers that the impugned treatment humiliated the applicants in their own eyes and in those of the public and aroused in them feelings of anguish and inferiority amounting to degrading treatment.

71.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

72.  The applicants complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”

73.  The Government contested the applicants’ argument.

74.  The period to be taken into consideration began on 24 September 2002 in respect of the first applicant and on 20 January 2003 in respect of the second applicant. On those dates they were questioned as suspects in the case. It ended on 23 July 2009, when the trial court’s judgment was upheld on appeal. It thus lasted six years and ten months for the first applicant and six and a half years for the second applicant, with two levels of jurisdiction involved.

A.  Admissibility

75.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly illfounded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

76.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999II).

77.  The Court observes that the case was very complex. It comprised more than ten counts of serious crimes and four accused. It involved more than seventy victims and witnesses, many of whom resided in remote settlements situated more than 500 kilometres away from Magadan where the trial was held. Numerous expert reports were ordered and examined in the course of the trial.

78.  The preliminary investigation in the case lasted less than a year. During that time the second applicant deliberately delayed the examination of the case file between 20 May and 13 August 2003 (see paragraphs 1112 above).

79.  The applicants and their co-defendants, who were all represented by lawyers, chose a jury trial. The case was considered by a jury court three times, as the Magadan Regional Court’s judgment was twice set aside on appeal by the Supreme Court of the .

80.  On the first occasion it took the Regional Court nine months to hold the jury trial and deliver its judgment in June 2004, when the applicants, who had been detained on remand, were acquitted and released. During that time the hearing was adjourned for about four weeks at the request of the codefendants, and for two weeks when one of the defence lawyers could not attend. It then took the Supreme Court six months to examine the case on appeal.

81.  The Court considers that up to that point there had been no delays attributable to the authorities.

86.  The appeal against the Regional Court’s second judgment was examined in six months, and on 6 June 2007 the judgment was quashed, this time on the ground, in particular, that the defendants and their lawyers had abused their rights and violated the jury trial procedure in an attempt to influence the jurors’ verdict. They thereby contributed to the resultant delay in the proceedings.

87.  For a year and nine months, until the third judgment was delivered, and while the second applicant continued to be held on remand, the case lay dormant for three months before the  opened the proceedings in September 2007. Another five months passed before the jury was formed and the trial could begin, which then lasted for more than a year. The hearing was adjourned for about a month owing to a co-defendant’s illness. The appeal against the third judgment was examined in four months; on 23 July 2009 the appeal was rejected and the judgment was upheld.

88.  Even though there were some delays for which the applicants or their co-defendants were responsible, and which do not engage the State’s responsibility, there were significant delays attributable to the State during the period when the case was pending before the trial court for the second and the third time which amounted to at least a year, and during that time the applicants were detained on remand, so that particular diligence was required on the part of the domestic courts to administer justice expeditiously (see Kalashnikov, cited above, § 132). While taking into account the complexity of the case and the difficulties which the Magadan Regional Court faced, the Court reiterates that the State remains responsible for the efficiency of its system, and the manner in which it provides for mechanisms to comply with the “reasonable time” requirement – whether by automatic time-limits and directions or some other method – is for it to decide. If a State allows proceedings to continue beyond the “reasonable time” prescribed by Article 6 of the Convention without doing anything to advance them, it will be responsible for the resultant delay (see Blake v. the United Kingdom, no. 68890/01, § 45, 26 September 2006).

89.  Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

90.  There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.

IV.  OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

91.  As regards the applicants’ remaining complaints concerning, in particular, the appeal court’s quashing of their acquittal, the first applicant’s detention on remand, and the second applicant’s conviction and his claim that he was discriminated against compared to one of his co-defendants who remained at liberty while he was detained on remand, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

92.  It follows that these parts of the applications are manifestly illfounded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

V.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

93.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

94.  Mr Svinarenko claimed 78,000 euros (EUR) in respect of nonpecuniary damage and EUR 2,000, representing the alleged loss of an unemployment allowance during the criminal proceedings against him, in respect of pecuniary damage. Mr Slyadnev claimed EUR 15,000 in respect of nonpecuniary damage and 2,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB), representing the alleged loss of income during his detention on remand, in respect of pecuniary damage.

95.  The Government contested the claims.

96.  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects these claims. On the other hand, it awards EUR 7,500 to each applicant in respect of nonpecuniary damage.

B.  Costs and expenses

97.  Mr Slyadnev also claimed RUB 317,476 which he had allegedly been ordered to pay by a domestic court for his legal representation in the domestic criminal proceedings against him.

98.  The Government stated that the applicant had been ordered to pay RUB 175,000 to the federal budget in partial compensation for the legal costs borne by the State.

99.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the violations of the Convention found, the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings.

C.  Default interest

100.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

2.  Declares the complaints concerning the applicants’ placement in a “metal cage” and the length of the criminal proceedings against them admissible and the remainder of the applications inadmissible;

3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicants’ placement in a metal cage in the courtroom;

4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicants;

5.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay each applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 7,500 (seven thousand five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 December 2012, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.