PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 65575/01) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovakian national, Mr Štefan Hornáček (“the applicant”), on 25 January 2001.

2.  The applicant was represented by Mr I. Siakeľ, a lawyer practising in Martin. The Government of the  (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs A. Poláčková.

3.  On 10 November 2004 the Court decided to communicate the application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

4.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Turany.

5.  On 18 November 1997 the Martin District Court issued a payment order under which the applicant was obliged to pay the equivalent of approximately 250 euros to the plaintiff.

6.  On 10 December 1997 the applicant, through his lawyer, filed an objection to the order. The lawyer sent the objection to the District Court by registered mail. He submitted a copy of a postal certificate according to which he had deposited the mail for despatch to the District Court in Martin at the post office on 10 December 1997. The mail had registration number R 690. The certificate, in which the addressee was indicated by the sender, did not mention the contents of the mail.

7.  On 12 December 1997 the Martin District Court dismissed the applicant’s objection to the payment order. The decision stated that the order had been served on 25 November 1997 and that the time-limit for challenging it by means of an objection had expired on 10 December 1997. The court held that the applicant had filed the objection on 11 December 1997 – the date appearing on the stamp of the District Court – which was out of time.

8.  On 29 December 1997 the applicant appealed. With reference to Article 57(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure he argued that by depositing the remedy as registered mail at the post office on 10 December 1997 he had respected the statutory time-limit. He submitted a copy of the postal certificate R 690.

9.  On 26 October 1999 the District Court judge heard the applicant and his lawyer. The lawyer stated that the registered mail R 690 was the only mail which he had deposited in person at the post office in Turany on 10 December 1997.

10.  On 29 October 1999 the judge heard an employee of the District Court in charge of incoming mail. The employee, after having consulted the file, confirmed that the document in question had been stamped and signed by her and that she had received it in person. She further stated that, in accordance with constant practice, the court’s registry would attach the envelope to the letter in case of its delivery by post and that this fact would be mentioned on the document. The employee also pointed out that the applicant’s lawyer used to bring most of his documents to the court in person but admitted that he sometimes also sent submissions by post. In reply to a question by the lawyer the employee stated that it was impossible to determine the contents of the registered mail R 690 addressed to the court and to whom it had been submitted.

11.  On 30 November 1999 the Žilina  upheld the District Court’s decision of 12 December 1997. With reference to the District Court’s stamp of 11 December 1997 on the relevant document and to the above statement of the employee of the District Court, the  established that the remedy had been filed out of time. Since the postal certificate did not indicate the contents of registered mail R 690, the applicant had not reliably shown that he had deposited the relevant document at the post office on 10 December 1997.

12.  On 11 February 2000 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law. He argued that the employee of the District Court could have committed an error when registering the document and that the mail register of the District Court did not indicate the contents of registered mail R 690 and to whom it had been transferred. He argued that it had not been reliably shown that the document had been deposited in person as the lower courts had found.

13.  On 27 September 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal on points of law. The Supreme Court held that the District Court’s stamp on the document challenging the payment order indicated that the document had arrived at the District Court on 11 December 1997. According to a handwritten remark which the employee of the District Court in charge of incoming mail had made on it, the document had been submitted to the court’s registry in person. These facts, taken together with the statement of the employee before the District Court judge, showed that the remedy had been filed belatedly. The applicant had not proved beyond any doubt that the registered mail R 690 deposited at the post on 10 December 1997 had actually contained his objection to the payment order.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

14.  Under Article 57(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a time-limit fixed in the context of judicial proceedings is respected when the action to be taken is effected at a court or where a submission is transmitted, on the day on which the time-limit is to expire, to a body which is under an obligation to deliver it to the addressee.

15.  In accordance with established practice, a timelimit is deemed to be respected where a document is deposited, before the end of the day on which the time-limit expires, at a post office for the purpose of its delivery to the addressee through postal services.

16.  In a judgment given in 1977 the Supreme Court of the  held that the date indicated on the postal certificate issued to the sender of registered mail and not the date on the envelope of such mail was relevant when considering whether an appeal was filed in time. The Supreme Court expressed the view that a court could dismiss an appeal as having been filed belatedly only where it had reliable reasons for such a conclusion. In particular, it had to establish when, where and how an appeal was actually filed (Supreme Court’s Collection, 34/1978, p. 567).

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

17.  The applicant complained that the courts had violated his right of access to a court in that they found that his remedy against the payment order had been filed belatedly. He alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”

18.  The Government contested that argument.

A.  Admissibility

19.  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

20.  The Government contended that the applicant had authorised a lawyer to challenge the payment order on his behalf. The lawyer should have been aware of the applicable procedural requirements. The postal certificate in which the addressee had been indicated by the lawyer did not mention which matter the mail concerned. The lawyer’s allegation that the registered mail deposited on 10 December 1997 contained an objection to the payment order issued against the applicant could not be verified. The respondent State could not be held liable for the lawyer’s failure to file the remedy in issue in a manner permitting it to be verified that the procedural requirements had been respected.

21.  According to the applicant, it has not been the current practice to indicate on postal certificates, a part of which is filled in by senders, the contents of documents sent by registered mail. It was shown that registered mail posted by the lawyer on 10 December 1997 had been delivered to the District Court on 11 December 1997. The fact that the system of registering of incoming mail at the District Court did not permit one to determine the contents of the registered mail should not disadvantage him.

22.  The Court reiterates that the “right to a tribunal”, of which the right of access is one aspect, is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted by implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of an appeal are concerned, since by its very nature it calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard. However, these limitations must not restrict or reduce a person’s access in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Such limitations will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if they do not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (for the recapitulation of the relevant case-law see, for example, Levages Prestations Services v. France, judgment of 23 October 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996V, § 40 and Zedník v. the Czech Republic, no. 74328/01, §§ 27-29, 28 June 2005).

23.  In the present case domestic courts at three levels relied on the statement by the employee of the District Court in Martin that the applicant’s lawyer had submitted the document in issue at the court’s registry in person on 11 December 1999, that is one day after the relevant time-limit had expired. They did not accept the argument of the lawyer that he had sent the objection by registered mail on 10 December 1999 and the postal certificate submitted by him to that effect. In particular, the Supreme Court concluded that the applicant had not shown beyond any doubt that the registered mail contained the objection in question.

24.  It is true that the postal certificate concerning registered mail R 690 in which the sender and the addressee were indicated by the lawyer did not state to which case the mail related. However, it has not been argued before the Court that the relevant law or practice required such an indication.

25.  Thus the applicant showed that he had sent a registered mail to the District Court when the time-limit for filing a remedy against the payment order in issue had not yet expired. In accordance with the Supreme Court’s practice, such a postal certificate has been considered, in principle, to be a reliable indication that a remedy was filed on the day indicated on it.

26.  In the Court’s view, it would have been appropriate in the circumstances of the case for the courts involved to establish when the registered mail R 690 had been delivered to the District Court and in which case file it had been included. There is no indication that such an attempt was made. The courts merely accepted the statement of the employee of the District Court that it was impossible to establish the contents of the registered mail R 690 addressed to the court and to whom it had been submitted.

27.  The Court considers that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the domestic courts failed to ensure a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the legitimate aim of ensuring compliance with the formal requirements for filing the remedy in issue and the applicant’s right of access to a court with a view to having the contested decision reviewed.

There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

28.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

29.  The applicant claimed 2,000 euros (EUR) in respect of nonpecuniary damage.

30.  The Government contested that claim.

31.  The Court accepts that the applicant suffered non-pecuniary damage. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, it awards the applicant the sum claimed, namely EUR 2,000 under this head.

B.  Costs and expenses

32.  The applicant also claimed the equivalent of approximately EUR 360 for the costs and expenses incurred before both the domestic authorities and the Court.

33.  The Government invited the Court to grant compensation for the applicant’s costs and expenses only to the extent that they had been reasonably incurred and with due regard to the value of the subject-matter of the proceedings in issue.

34.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the fact that the applicant was represented by a lawyer both in domestic and Convention proceedings, the Court considers it appropriate to award the sum claimed, namely EUR 360, covering costs under all heads.

C.  Default interest

35.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.  Declares the application admissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 360 (three hundred and sixty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, the above amounts to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 December 2005, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.


PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 5334/11) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four Bulgarian nationals, Ms Donka Ivanova Krasteva (“the first applicant”), Ms Maria Maksimova Piskova (“the second applicant”), Ms Angelina Delova PiskovaIndzhova (“the third applicant”) and Ms Iskra Delcheva Piskova (“the fourth applicant”) (together “the applicants”), on 17 December 2010.

2.  The applicants were represented by Ms M. Hristova and Ms A. Gavrilova-Ancheva, lawyers practising in Sofia. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Dimova, of the Ministry of Justice.

3.  The applicants alleged that they had been unfairly deprived of their title to a plot of land.

4.  On 26 May 2015 the complaint above was communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible, pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicants were born in 1932, 1929, 1965 and 1956 respectively and live in Sofia.

6.  On 15 January 1968 the second applicant, together with the antecedents of the other applicants, bought from the then existing local agricultural co-operative a plot of land situated on the outskirts of Sofia measuring 953 square metres. Until 2002 the applicants or their antecedents enjoyed undisturbed possession of that land.

7.  On 10 May 2002 a group of persons, the heirs of Mr T.S., Mr G.S. and Ms K.S., brought against the applicants a rei vindicatio action, stating that the plot of land was theirs. They stated that the plot, once the property of their antecedents, had been collectivised in the years after 1945, but had been returned to them within the context of the process of the restitution of agricultural land by a decision of the relevant body, the local land commission, dated 27 December 1999. They claimed that under section 10(13) of the Agricultural Land Act (see paragraph 13 below), the fact that the second applicant and the remaining applicants’ antecedents had purchased the land in 1968 could not be held against them.

8.  Initially, the Sofia District Court (its judgement is undated) dismissed the action against the applicants. After an appeal by the heirs of Mr T.S., Mr G.S. and Ms K.S., on 5 November 2009 the Sofia City Court overturned that ruling, allowed the rei vindicatio claim and ordered the applicants to surrender possession of the plot. It found in particular that the land commission’s decision of 27 December 1999 was sufficient to render the claimants the owners of the disputed land. It pointed out that of the two rival claims to the same plot the law – namely section 10(13) of the Agricultural Land Act – gave priority to the one based on restitution, and thus had the effect of rendering devoid of any legal force the contract under which the second applicant and the remaining applicants’ predecessors had bought the plot.

9.  In a final decision of 18 June 2010 the Supreme Court of Cassation declined to entertain a cassation appeal by the applicants.

10.  On an unspecified date soon after that the applicants surrendered possession of the plot.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

11.  The Agricultural Land Act (Закон за собствеността и ползването на земеделските земи) was enacted in 1991. It entitled individuals whose land had been collectivised (or their heirs) to request ‒ in certain circumstances ‒ the restoration of their ownership.

.  At the time of its enactment the Agricultural Land Act did not expressly address situations where restitution was sought in respect of plots which had been acquired by third parties after the collectivisation process. In an interpretative decision of 25 June 1996 (Тълкувателно решение № 2 от 25.VI.1996 г. по гр. д. № 2/96 г., ОСГК) the former Supreme Court found that in situations where post-collectivisation buyers had acted in good faith and their title was not otherwise defective, their rights would prevail over the rights of parties subsequently claiming restitution. It held that:

“[t]he legal effect of valid sale contracts, in accordance with the legislation in force at the time, excludes the right of former owners to obtain restitution of agricultural land ...”

.  The situation changed in 1997, when Parliament added subsection 13 to section 10 to the Agricultural Land Act. The new provision stipulated that former owners’ rights to plots which had not been built on were to be restored even in cases where the land in question had been sold or transferred to third parties. It also provided that those third parties could not rely on acquisitive prescription.

.  In a judgment of 14 November 2000 (Решение № 13 от 14 ноември 2000 г. по к. д. № 11/2000 г.) the Constitutional Court dealt with the compatibility of section 10(13) with the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to property. It found that it was compatible with these provisions, pointing out that the owners of land occupied by agricultural cooperatives “had never lost their property rights” but during a certain period of time “had merely been unable to exercise them”; that is why any contracts transferring their land could not be held against them, regardless of whether or not the third parties acquiring the land had acted in good faith. As to the provision that third parties who had acquired land could not rely on acquisitive prescription, the Constitutional Court held:

“Through that provision, the legislature has given precedence to the rights of owners of agricultural land included in [agricultural co-operatives] who by virtue of that [act of inclusion] were deprived of the possibility of exercising their property rights and preventing the possible acquisition of their land by third parties through adverse possession over [the rights of] those who have acquired it through such adverse possession.

The [Constitutional] Court finds that a fair balance between the conflicting fundamental constitutional rights has thus been achieved.”

.  Even before the judgment mentioned above, in several earlier judgments the Constitutional Court took the view that the collectivisation of agricultural land had not extinguished the owners’ property rights, but had merely created obstacles to their exercise (Решение № 6 от 5 юли 1992 г. по к. д. № 9/92 г.; Решение № 8 от 19 юни 1995 г. по к. д. № 12/95 г.).

.  However, before 1989 it was considered that agricultural cooperatives could validly sell land to private individuals (Тълкувателно решение № 16 от 11.III.1977 г. по гр. д. № 86/76 г., ОСГК). Moreover, the former Supreme Court found during that period that upon collectivisation co-operatives had become the owners of collectivised land and that former owners’ rights had become extinguished (Решение № 314 от 25.II.1966 г. по гр. д. № 2484/66 г., I гр. о.; Решение № 2119 от 31.X.1966 г. по гр. д. № 1502/66 г., I гр. о.).

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1

17.  The applicants complained, relying on Articles 6 § 1 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that they had been unfairly deprived of their property.

.  The Court is of the view that it suffices to examine the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 alone, which reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

A.  Submissions by the parties

19.  The Government did not comment on the admissibility and merits of the application.

20.  Upon the request of the Court, the Government submitted statistical information regarding the number of rei vindicatio claims based on section 10(13) of the Agricultural Land Act that had been examined by the national courts. The data, which did not cover all courts and concerned only the period between 2010 and 2014, showed that between approximately thirty and fifty such cases had been examined by a first-instance court each year. In that regard the Government stated that a “precise analysis at the legislative level” was necessary as regards the possibility of providing for the compensation of persons who had lost their property on the basis of section 10(13).

21.  The applicants reiterated their complaint. They relied on the Court’s judgment in the case of Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria (nos. 43278/98, 45437/99, 48014/99, 48380/99, 51362/99, 53367/99, 60036/00, 73465/01 and 194/02, 15 March 2007), which concerned a similar situation. They argued that their being deprived of their property had not been “lawful”, as required by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, because the addition of section 10(13) to the Agricultural Act in 1997 had been unforeseeable and in breach of the rule of legal certainty and had interfered with fundamental legal principles such as the protection of good-faith buyers and the application of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the applicants pointed out that the taking of their property to satisfy other parties’ restitution claims could not be associated with the social and economic transition of Bulgaria following totalitarian rule and that their title to the disputed land had not been found to be in any way defective. Lastly, the applicants noted that they were not entitled to any compensation for the land taken from them, and that they could not claim back the price paid for it at the time of its purchase, because the seller (the local agricultural co-operative) no longer existed and because in any event the figure paid in 1968 had lost its real value over the years since.

B.  The Court’s assessment

22.  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

23.  On the merits, the Court starts by observing that the present case is similar to Tomov and Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 50506/09, 21 July 2016), which it recently examined, and which also concerned the application of section 10(13) of the Agricultural Land Act.

24.  As in that case, in the case at hand the Court finds that there was State interference with the applicants’ rights which amounted to deprivation of property within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Tomov and Nikolova, cited above, §§ 42-44). In order to comply with the requirements of that provision, any such deprivation must be lawful and in the public interest and must strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interest and the requirement to protect the fundamental rights of the individual in question.

25.  In analysing these issues in Tomov and Nikolova the Court applied the principles developed by it in a series of cases against Bulgaria concerning the effect of restitution on third parties, albeit in respect of the application of different legislation, starting with the leading case of Velikovi and Others (cited above; some of the follow-up cases are cited in §§ 38-39 of the Tomov and Nikolova judgment).

26.  It thus found that the interference with the applicants’ rights could not be seen as an exceptional transitional measure related to the period of social and economic transformation, as it had been based on a legislative provision, namely section 10(13) of the Agricultural Land Act, which had been enacted in 1997 – long after the beginning of the transformation process (see Tomov and Nikolova, cited above, §§ 46-8). In the Velikovi group of cases (see for example the case of Tsonkovi v. Bulgaria, no. 27213/04, §§ 24-27, 2 July 2009) it has already held that challenging property titles, sometimes decades-old, could in principle be seen as justified only when associated with the unique transitional period which started in Bulgaria in 1989. Moreover, under the provisions of the Agricultural Land Act, the possibility for former owners benefitting from positive restitution decisions to challenge the titles of persons who had bought the land after the collectivisation was definitely not subject to a time-limit, and the post-collectivisation owners could not rely on acquisitive prescription (see Tomov and Nikolova, cited above, § 48). Lastly, it was significant that, unlike in the cases of the Velikovi group, in the case at hand it was not necessary for the persons claiming the restitution of the applicants’ land to show that the latter’s title was in any way defective; rather, it had been sufficient for them to rely on section 10(13) of the Agricultural Land Act, which quite simply wiped out the legal force of contracts of sale concluded many years earlier (ibid., § 49). On that basis the Court concluded in Tomov and Nikolova that the taking of the applicants’ property had breached the principle of legal certainty and did not fall within the scope of legitimate aims such as restoring justice and the rule of law, which the restitution provisions of the Agricultural Land Act could have pursued in principle (ibid., § 51).

27.  The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the case at hand, which, as already noted, concerns the application of the same legislation as that relied on in Tomov and Nikolova. Accordingly, it concludes that the taking of the applicants’ property in the case violated the principle of legal certainty and did not fall within the scope of the legitimate aims pursued by the restitution.

28.  As in Tomov and Nikolova (see § 52 of the judgment) and in those cases in the Velikovi group where it reached a similar conclusion (for example, the cases of Todorova and Eneva and Dobrev which were examined in Velikovi and Others – see §§ 236-49 of the judgment), the Court finds that in the circumstances of the instant case nothing short of compensation “reasonably related to the market value” of the property lost could maintain the requisite fair balance under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, the applicable legislation did not provide for compensation for persons in a situation such as that of the applicants. In addition, as pointed out by the applicants (see paragraph 21 above in fine), they could not seek the repayment of the price paid for the land in 1968, because the seller at the time, the agricultural co-operative, apparently no longer existed, and in any event they could have only obtained a token amount, given the domestic courts’ practice of refusing to re-evaluate monetary claims (see, on the latter point, Tomov and Nikolova, cited above, § 24, with further references).

.  Accordingly, as in Tomov and Nikolova (see § 54 of the judgment), the Court concludes that depriving the applicants of their property, in breach of the principle of legal certainty and without any possibility of compensation, was a clearly disproportionate measure.

30.  Consequently, there has been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION

31.  Article 46 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads:

“1.  The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

2.  The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.”

.  Within the context of the execution of judgments in accordance with Article 46 of the Convention, a judgment in which the Court finds a violation of the Convention or its Protocols imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order. Furthermore, in ratifying the Convention (Article 1 in particular) the Contracting States undertook to ensure that their domestic legislation is compatible with it (see Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 47, ECHR 2004I, and Viaşu v. Romania, no. 75951/01, § 80, 9 December 2008).

.  In the case at hand, the Government submitted statistical information which showed that many years after the beginning of the restitution process a significant number of pre-restitution titles to agricultural land continued to be challenged under section 10(13) of the Agricultural Land Act (see paragraph 20 above). Moreover, there is still no limitation in time of the possibility for restitution owners to claim land relying on that provision.

.  In order to assist the respondent Government in the fulfilment of their obligations under Article 46 § 1 of the Convention, the Court expresses the view that the general measures taken in the execution of its judgment in this case should include the introduction into domestic law of a remedy capable of ensuring that persons who have lost their property on the basis of section 10(13) can secure compensation reasonably related to the market value of the respective property; the Government also acknowledged that it could be necessary to take such measures (see paragraph 20 above).

III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

35.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

36.  In respect of pecuniary damage, the applicants claimed, firstly, 121,030 euros (EUR) in respect of the value of the land taken from them. The claim was based on a valuation undertaken in April 2016 by an expert appointed by the applicants. The plot at issue is situated in a residential area at the foot of Vitosha Mountain, on the outskirts of Sofia. The report described it as being eligible for construction despite its being located on a steep slope, and as being close to a bus station and a main road, albeit accessible only via a dirt road. On the basis of information in respect of other similar plots being offered for sale in the area, the expert assessed the “most likely selling price” of the plot at issue at EUR 127 per square metre, or the above-mentioned sum of EUR 121,030 for the whole plot of 953 square metres.

37.  The applicants claimed, in addition, compensation for lost opportunity as they had been unable to use their land after surrendering it to the heirs of Mr T.S., Mr G.S. and Ms K.S. They explained that they had used the land for spending time outdoors, as well as to grow fruit and vegetables. They invited the Court to make an award in equity under this head, noting nevertheless that they considered the amount of EUR 700 per year (EUR 3,850 for five and a half years at the time of the submission of their claims) just.

38.  The applicants requested the Court to make an award to each of them according to their respective shares in the plot of land, namely one-half for the first applicant, one-third for the second applicant and one-twelfth each for the third and fourth applicants.

39.  Lastly, the applicants claimed EUR 3,500 for each of them in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

40.  The Government contested the claims, considering in particular that the market value of the land was much lower than that which was claimed by the applicants. In support of this argument, they submitted three sale offers published on the Internet for plots of land in the neighbourhood. Two of those plots, offered respectively for EUR 68 and EUR 72 per square metre, were eligible for construction. The third plot, offered for EUR 22 per square metre, was forestry land. In addition, the Government contended that the claim related to lost opportunity was not linked to any violation of the Convention that might be found and that the claims concerning nonpecuniary damage were exaggerated.

41.  As regards the applicants’ claim related to the value of the plot which they had lost, the Court has held that illegal or arbitrary dispossessions of property in principle justify restitutio in integrum or the payment of a sum reflecting the current value of the property taken (see, inter alia, Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Article 50), 31 October 1995, §§ 36-39, Series A no. 330B, and Brumărescu v. Romania (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 28342/95, §§ 21-24, ECHR 2001I). This should also be the approach in the present case, in view of the Court’s finding above that the taking of the applicants’ property was in breach of the principle of legal certainty and in view of its approach in earlier similar cases (see Tomov and Nikolova, cited above, § 60, and the just satisfaction judgment in the cases examined in Velikovi and Others, in which the Court found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 – Todorova and Others v. Bulgaria (just satisfaction), nos. 48380/99, 51362/99, 60036/00 and 73465/01, § 11, 24 April 2008). As it is impossible to order the return of the land to the applicants because it has passed to private parties, the Court is to make a monetary award reasonably related to its current market value. The Court notes in this respect the lack of clarity as to the potential use of the property and the rather general character of the information, particularly that provided by the Government, on the basis of which it has to establish its market value. Taking into account the information provided, the Court awards the applicants EUR 80,000 under the present head.

.  The Court finds, in the next place, that it is justified to make an award with regard to the losses suffered by the applicants after they surrendered possession of their plot in 2010 (see paragraph 10 above). In view of the manner in which the applicants claim to have used their plot, namely to spend time outdoors and to grow fruit and vegetables (see paragraph 37 above), the Court considers it justified to award them EUR 2,000 under this head.

.  As requested by the applicants, the amounts awarded in respect of pecuniary damage are to be distributed among them in accordance with their shares in the lost plot (see paragraph 38 above).

.  Lastly, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the Court finds it appropriate to award each of the applicants EUR 1,000.

B.  Costs and expenses

45.  The applicants also claimed EUR 2,034 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts in the proceedings described in paragraphs 7-9 above. They claimed another EUR 945 for the proceedings before the Court, an amount which covered postage as well as the fees charged by their lawyers and the expert who had drawn up the valuation report presented in support of their claim for pecuniary damage (see paragraph 36 above). In order to substantiate these claims, the applicants presented invoices and receipts showing that they had paid the equivalent of those amounts in Bulgarian levs.

46.  The applicants requested that any amount awarded under the head of costs and expenses be distributed among the first three of them in the following manner: one half for the first applicant and one fourth each for the second and third applicants.

47.  The Government contested the claims.

48.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court awards the amounts claimed, totalling EUR 2,979, in full. It notes in particular that the expenses in the domestic proceedings were incurred while the applicants were seeking to prevent the violation of their rights, as found in the case. Lastly, the Court holds that the amount awarded is to be distributed among the first, second and third applicants in the manner indicated by them and as described in paragraph 46 above.

C.  Default interest

49.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Declares the application admissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;

3.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;

4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 1 June 2017, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.


PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 42119/04) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Sergey Gennadyevich Firstov (“the applicant”), on 12 October 2004.

2.  The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyshkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

3.  The applicant alleged, in particular, that the conditions of his detention in police custody had been extremely poor.

4.  On 5 March 2010 the application was communicated to the Government.

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in the town of Tolyatti, Samara Region.

A.  Criminal proceedings against the applicant

6.  On 26 October 2003 police officers from the Inza District Police Department arrested the applicant. He was accused of having broken into a flat and having stolen personal belongings the estimated cost of which was 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (approximately 550 euros (EUR). He was remanded in custody at the Inza Town police station (“the police ward”).

7.  Three days later, a prosecutor authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention and charged him with theft. He was transferred to Inza temporary detention facility IZ-73/3.

8.  On 24 December 2003 a deputy prosecutor of the Inza District served the applicant with a bill of indictment. The applicant was committed to stand trial before the Inza District Court.

9.  On 13 January 2004 the District Court held the first trial hearing, and on 19 January 2004 it found the applicant guilty of aggravated theft and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. On 24 March 2004 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.

B.  Detention in the police ward

10.  In addition to his first period of detention in the police ward following his arrest, the applicant was taken to the ward on twenty-two occasions during the pre-trial investigation and court proceedings.

11.  The applicant provided the following description of the conditions of his detention in the ward. He was usually detained in a cell containing two wooden bunk beds and accommodating up to ten detainees. Inmates had had to take turns to rest owing to the shortage of sleeping places. No bedding was provided. The cell did not have a window in the proper sense of that word – a small window was covered with a metal sheet, blocking access to natural light and air. In the absence of any artificial ventilation in the cell, it was hard to breathe owing to the thick smoke and the humidity. The cell was lit by a small bulb inserted in a recess in the concrete wall above the door. Thick metal bars separated the bulb from the cell. According to the applicant, there was no furniture, wash-bowl or lavatory pan in the cell. Once a day, in the morning, inmates were taken to a public lavatory outside the police station. For the rest of the day, they had to use a bucket as a lavatory pan. They were allowed to clean the bucket once a day, in the morning. The foul smell permeated the cell, as the bucket had no cover. The police station did not have a recreation yard and inmates were therefore confined to their cells day and night. Food was provided once a day. The daily food ration consisted of half a bowl of cabbage soup and a piece of bread. In addition, inmates were given tea, which they drank from containers cut from plastic bottles. Medical assistance was unavailable.

11.  The applicant provided the following description of the conditions of his detention in the ward. He was usually detained in a cell containing two wooden bunk beds and accommodating up to ten detainees. Inmates had had to take turns to rest owing to the shortage of sleeping places. No bedding was provided. The cell did not have a window in the proper sense of that word – a small window was covered with a metal sheet, blocking access to natural light and air. In the absence of any artificial ventilation in the cell, it was hard to breathe owing to the thick smoke and the humidity. The cell was lit by a small bulb inserted in a recess in the concrete wall above the door. Thick metal bars separated the bulb from the cell. According to the applicant, there was no furniture, wash-bowl or lavatory pan in the cell. Once a day, in the morning, inmates were taken to a public lavatory outside the police station. For the rest of the day, they had to use a bucket as a lavatory pan. They were allowed to clean the bucket once a day, in the morning. The foul smell permeated the cell, as the bucket had no cover. The police station did not have a recreation yard and inmates were therefore confined to their cells day and night. Food was provided once a day. The daily food ration consisted of half a bowl of cabbage soup and a piece of bread. In addition, inmates were given tea, which they drank from containers cut from plastic bottles. Medical assistance was unavailable.

12.  The Government submitted that in the period after his arrest and until 4 February 2004, the applicant had been taken back to the police ward twenty-two times. He had usually been taken from the detention facility IZ-73/3 to the ward early in the morning and had been returned to facility IZ-73/3 in the evening, only to be sent back to the police ward in the following morning or several days later. The Government observed that he had spent ten days in the police ward during the pre-trial investigation: five days while attending the court hearings, four days while he was re-acquainting himself with the case-file materials, and an additional three days while he was studying the court records. The Government acknowledged that the material and sanitary conditions in the ward had not “entirely satisfied the established legal requirements”. They stressed that the cells had had no furniture, save for bunk beds, or radios, the lighting had been “insufficient”, the cells had not been equipped with lavatory pans as the police ward was not connected to the water mains or the sewerage system. They further conceded that there had been no artificial ventilation system, the cells had not been disinfected and detainees had not been provided with bedding. Following a number of warnings from the prosecutor, in April 2004 the director of the police station sent a request for additional funding and took the necessary steps to comply with the legal norms governing conditions of detention. The Government provided the Court with a copy of a prosecutor’s order issued on 15 February 2004. Having seen for himself the conditions of detention in the police station and talked to inmates, the prosecutor noted the following problems requiring immediate improvement: occasional overcrowding, failure to provide inmates with bedding, scarce food and lack of sanitary facilities. The Government described the detention authorities’ response to the prosecutor’s orders, and submitted that after the applicant’s detention in the ward the metal shutters had been removed from the cell windows and inmates had been guaranteed an individual sleeping place and personal space of no less than four square metres. Furniture had been installed in the cells and inmates had started receiving food three times a day. The police station administration was now organising daily walks for detainees, had introduced disinfection of the facilities and was providing inmates with the opportunity to take a shower and wash their clothes and bedding.

13.  Nonetheless, the Government disputed the applicant’s allegations concerning the availability of medical assistance and the provision of warm clothes. In particular, they stated that urgent medical assistance had been ensured by emergency doctors, although the applicant had never requested any medical attention. It had also been open to him to ask the administration of the detention facility IZ-73/3 for warm clothes. He had not used that opportunity. The Government insisted that the applicant had had warm clothes when he had been taken to the police station between 13 and 19 January 2004, because his female partner had sent warm clothes to him at the temporary detention facility in December 2003.

C.  Proceedings seeking compensation for damage

14.  On 9 March 2004 the applicant brought an action in tort against the police station administration and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. He claimed that the conditions of his detention in the police ward had been inhuman and had led to a serious deterioration in his health.

14.  On 9 March 2004 the applicant brought an action in tort against the police station administration and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. He claimed that the conditions of his detention in the police ward had been inhuman and had led to a serious deterioration in his health.

15.  On 26 May 2004 the Inza District Court partly allowed the applicant’s action and awarded him RUB 500 (approximately EUR 15) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The District Court held, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“It was established in a court hearing that the facilities provided to detainees in [the Inza police station] were not adequately furnished, in violation of the legal norms; the representatives of [the police station] explained that the underlying cause was a lack of funds.

The materials of the prosecutor’s inquiry confirm that bedding is not provided in the [detention ward]. The cells are not furnished in compliance with the law. There are no lavatory pans, water, tables, radio, etc. The lighting in the cells is insufficient; the cells are in semi-darkness. There are windows in the cells; however, they are covered by metal bars in such a fashion that they block access to natural light. There is no ventilation in the cells. The air is stuffy with a peculiar odour. The police ward is not disinfected ...

... suspects and defendants have the right to one hour’s outdoor recreation per day ...

The director of [the police station] Mr T. explained in a court hearing that he does not draw up a record of detainees’ daily outdoor recreation; whenever possible [detainees] are taken for a walk once a day.

Following a prosecutor’s decision addressed to the director of [the police station] about the elimination of violations of the Detention of Suspects Act, certain measures were taken: persons detained in [the police station] are now taken for outdoor walks in compliance with the above-mentioned law; light bulbs with a higher wattage are now used in the cells, thus producing more light; and an estimate of expenditure has been drawn up in respect of the shortcomings that have to be eliminated in order to comply with [the prosecutor’s] decision. It appears from the reply of the police station director to [the prosecutor’s decision], that once funds have been received, all the necessary measures will be taken to eliminate the shortcomings.

...

[The applicant’s] complaints pertaining to the lack of medical assistance are worth consideration.

In the court hearing the representatives of [the police station] did not dispute the fact that the requirements of the Instruction on the Provision of Medical and Sanitary Assistance to Detainees ... are not complied with in [the police ward].

However, the court does not disregard the fact that ... urgent medical assistance was provided to suspects by emergency medical teams in [the police ward]. That fact is corroborated by the records of medical examinations of detainees. [The applicant] did not request the provision of medical assistance.

...

By virtue of norm no. 3 for daily food rations of persons detained in police detention facilities, detainees ... should have been given the following food ration per twenty-four hours: 550 grams of bread ..., 100 grams of porridge, 20 grams of pasta, 100 grams of meat, 100 grams of fish, 30 grams of margarine, 15 grams of vegetable oil, 30 grams of sugar, 1 gram of tea, 20 grams of salt, 500 grams of potatoes, 250 grams of vegetables, 0.1 gram of bay leaf and 3 grams of tomato sauce.

In the court hearing [the applicant] explained that [on the days when he was transferred between the police station and detention facility IZ-73/3] he received food in [that facility] in the morning and evening, [and that he was] not given food in [the police station]. [During longer stays] he received food once a day [in the ward]. The food ration included a plate of soup, half a loaf of bread and a glass of tea. The representatives of the [police station] did not dispute that fact.

...

It was established in a court hearing that when [the applicant] was transferred [to the ward] in winter, he did not have winter clothes. He was not provided with winter clothes in detention facility IZ-73/3... [The ward] also did not provide [the applicant] with warm clothes as it did not have them.

The above-mentioned facts confirm that [the applicant’s] right to conditions of detention in compliance with domestic requirements was violated in [the police ward], which caused [him] psychological distress.

...

Having regard to the requirements of reasonableness and justice, the nature of the psychological distress caused to [the applicant], the temporary character of [the applicant’s] detention in [the police ward]: the limited period of less than twenty-four hours; the fact that [he] was transferred to [the police station] to take part in investigative measures and court hearings, and the number of days during which [he] was detained in [the ward], the court finds that [the applicant’s] claims should be awarded but in a reduced amount.”

16.  The applicant attended the hearings before the District Court.

17.  On 10 August 2004 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 26 May 2004, endorsing the reasons given by the District Court.

D.  Proceedings in respect of compensation for health damage

18.  In November 2004 the applicant lodged an action against the head of the medical unit of the temporary detention facility IZ-73/3 in Inza, the police station administration and an investigator from the Inza Town Police Department, seeking compensation for damage to his health and loss of earnings. In particular, he argued that he had had no chronic illnesses prior to his detention and that he had fallen ill during his pre-trial detention because of the appalling conditions of his detention in the Inza police ward. He also alleged that the serious deterioration in his health had become apparent in July and August 2004, after his first tort action against the police ward had already been examined by the Inza District Court.

19.  On 24 May 2005 the Inza District Court dismissed the applicant’s action, finding it to be manifestly ill-founded. The District Court concluded that there was no evidence supporting the applicant’s allegations that he had sustained damage to his health as a result of his detention. The applicant was represented by a lawyer during the hearings. On 30 August 2005 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

A.  Conditions of detention

20.  Section 22 of the Detention of Suspects Act (Federal Law no. 103-FZ of 15 July 1995) provides that detainees should be given sufficient food to maintain them in good health, in accordance with standards established by the Government of the Russian Federation. Section 23 provides that detainees should be kept in conditions which satisfy the prescribed sanitary and hygiene requirements. They should be provided with an individual sleeping place and given bedding, tableware and toiletries. Each inmate should have no less than four square metres of personal space in his or her cell.

B.  Civil-law remedies against illegal acts by public officials

21.  Article 1064 § 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation provides that damage caused to the person or property of a citizen will be compensated in full by the tortfeasor. Pursuant to Article 1069, State agencies and State officials are liable for damage caused to an individual by their unlawful actions or failure to act. Such damage is to be compensated at the expense of the federal or regional treasury. Articles 151 and 1099 to 1101 of the Civil Code provide for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Article 1099 states, in particular, that non-pecuniary damage will be compensated irrespective of any award for pecuniary damage.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

22.  The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in the ward of the Inza Town police station had breached Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A.  Submissions by the parties

A.  Submissions by the parties

23.  The Government commented on the conditions of the applicant’s detention. In particular, they submitted that, in violation of the domestic requirements, the applicant had usually been detained in poorly lit cells with no ventilation, lavatory pan or furniture, apart from bunk beds. The cells had not been disinfected. Detainees had received small quantities of food once a day and had not been provided with bedding. Nonetheless, the Government argued that those conditions of detention did not amount to inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In their subsequent submissions to the Court, having commented on the applicant’s claims for just satisfaction, they again asserted that the applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the Convention had not been violated. They noted that the applicant had used domestic remedies: he had applied to the Russian courts and had received RUB 500 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Lastly, the Government stressed that the applicant could therefore no longer claim to be a victim of the violation of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention.

24.  The applicant insisted that the conditions of his detention had been inhuman and degrading. He further argued that, despite the fact that the domestic courts had acknowledged that the conditions of his detention in the ward had not met the requirements of Russian law, he had not lost his “victim” status, as his detention for an aggregate period of a month in appalling conditions could hardly be considered to have been adequately compensated with RUB 500. He also pointed out that the Government had not acknowledged that his rights had been violated under Article 3 of the Convention.

B.  The Court’s assessment

1.  Admissibility

25.  The applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in the police ward on twenty-three occasions between 26 October 2003 and 4 February 2004. The Government submitted that the applicant had rarely stayed in the ward overnight, having been taken there in the morning and sent back to the detention facility in the evening. He had, however, returned to the cell either in the morning of the following day or several days later. Given the nature and frequency of the applicant’s stays in the police ward, the Court finds that the entire period of the applicant’s detention should be regarded as a “continuing situation”. Short periods of absence during which the applicant was taken back to facility IZ-73/3 had no incidence on the continuous nature of the detention (see, among others, Shilbergs v. Russia, no. 20075/03, § 19 and §§ 81-84, 17 December 2009; Fetisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 43710/07, 6023/08, 11248/08, 27668/08, 31242/08 and 52133/08, §§ 72-78, 17 January 2012; and Samartsev v. Russia, no. 44283/06, § 38 and §§ 106-14, 2 May 2013).

26.  The Court notes the Government’s argument that in the light of the domestic courts’ ruling awarding the applicant compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused as a result of his detention in the Inza police ward, he could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court reiterates that Article 34, in its relevant part, provides:

“The Court may receive applications from any person ... claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. ”

27.  The Court summarised the principles governing the assessment of an applicant’s victim status in paragraphs 178-92 of its judgment in the case of Scordino v. Italy ((no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, ECHR 2006-V). In so far as relevant to the case under consideration, they are as follows:

(a)  in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, it falls first to the national authorities to redress any alleged violation of the Convention. In this regard, the question whether an applicant can claim to be a victim of the violation alleged is relevant at all stages of the proceedings under the Convention;

(b)  a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a “victim”, unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention;

(c)  the issue whether the applicant may still claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention depends on the redress which the domestic remedy has given him or her;

(d)  the principle of subsidiarity does not mean renouncing all supervision of the result obtained from using domestic remedies, otherwise the rights guaranteed by the Convention would be devoid of any substance. In that connection, it should be reiterated that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory rights, but rights that are practical and effective.

28.  It follows from the foregoing principles that the Court must verify whether the authorities acknowledged, at least in substance, that there had been a violation of a right protected by the Convention, and whether the redress can be considered appropriate and sufficient (see Scordino (no. 1), cited above, § 193).

29.  The Court is mindful of the fact that the domestic courts did not expressly acknowledge that the treatment to which the applicant had been subjected as a result of his detention in the police ward had breached Article 3 of the Convention. They found that various aspects of the applicant’s detention, having been in breach of the domestic legal requirements, had caused the applicant psychological distress (see paragraph 15 above). Moreover, the Court cannot overlook the Government’s refusal to acknowledge that the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention were not respected in the applicant’s case. In these circumstances, the Court is prepared to conclude that, in the absence of direct acknowledgment by the Russian authorities that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment contrary to the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention, he has not lost his “victim status”. Although that finding is sufficient for the Court to dismiss the Government’s related objection, it would nevertheless like to determine whether the compensation awarded to the applicant could have been considered sufficient redress.

30.  The Court notes that the applicant’s claims against the police ward administration and the Ministry of Finance were allowed in part. The domestic courts awarded him RUB 500. In assessing the amount of compensation to award, they took into account various aspects, including the requirements of reasonableness and justice, the nature of the applicant’s suffering, the length and temporary character of his detention in the ward, the responsibility of the police station administration for the suffering caused to the applicant, given that he had stayed in the ward on the initiative of the investigating and judicial authorities when they had needed his presence, and the insufficiency of funds which had prevented the administration from providing the applicant with appropriate conditions of detention. It may thus be concluded that the applicant received at least partial compensation for the treatment he had suffered.

30.  The Court notes that the applicant’s claims against the police ward administration and the Ministry of Finance were allowed in part. The domestic courts awarded him RUB 500. In assessing the amount of compensation to award, they took into account various aspects, including the requirements of reasonableness and justice, the nature of the applicant’s suffering, the length and temporary character of his detention in the ward, the responsibility of the police station administration for the suffering caused to the applicant, given that he had stayed in the ward on the initiative of the investigating and judicial authorities when they had needed his presence, and the insufficiency of funds which had prevented the administration from providing the applicant with appropriate conditions of detention. It may thus be concluded that the applicant received at least partial compensation for the treatment he had suffered.

31.  In this connection, the Court reiterates that the question whether the applicant received reparation for the damage caused – comparable to just satisfaction as provided for under Article 41 of the Convention – is important. The Court has already had occasion to indicate that an applicant’s victim status may depend on the level of compensation awarded at domestic level on the basis of the facts about which he or she has complained before the Court (see Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, § 93, ECHR 2006V, with further references). Whether the amount awarded may be regarded as reasonable, however, falls to be assessed in the light of all the circumstances of the case. These include also the value of the award judged in the light of the standard of living and the general level of incomes in the State concerned, and the fact that a remedy in the national system is closer and more accessible than an application to the Court (see Scordino, cited above, §§ 206 and 268, and Dubjaková v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 67299/01, 19 October 2004, with further references).

32.  Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court is unable to conclude whether the amount of compensation awarded to the applicant could have been considered sufficient in domestic terms, as the parties did not produce any relevant information in this regard. However, the Court’s task in the present case is not to review the general practice of the domestic courts in awarding compensation for inhuman conditions of detention or to set a level of compensation which would satisfy the requirements of “adequate and sufficient redress”, but rather to determine, in the circumstances of the case, whether the amount of compensation awarded to the applicant constituted sufficient redress in view of his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention pertaining to his detention in the police ward.

33.  In this connection, the Court considers that the duration of the applicant’s detention in police custody and the reasons given by the domestic courts in making an award in respect of that detention are among the factors to be taken into account in assessing whether the domestic award could be considered as adequate and sufficient redress (see, mutatis mutandis, Staykov v. Bulgaria, no. 49438/99, §§ 91-93, 12 October 2006).

33.  In this connection, the Court considers that the duration of the applicant’s detention in police custody and the reasons given by the domestic courts in making an award in respect of that detention are among the factors to be taken into account in assessing whether the domestic award could be considered as adequate and sufficient redress (see, mutatis mutandis, Staykov v. Bulgaria, no. 49438/99, §§ 91-93, 12 October 2006).

34.  The aggregate length of the applicant’s detention in the Inza police ward amounted to approximately one month between 26 October 2003 and 4 February 2004. On 26 May 2004 the Inza District Court awarded the applicant RUB 500 in pecuniary damages in response to his tort action related to his detention in the police ward.

35.  The Court is mindful that the task of estimating the amount of damages to be awarded is a difficult one, especially in a case where personal suffering, whether physical or psychological, is the subject of the claim. There is no standard by which pain and suffering, physical discomfort and psychological distress and anguish can be measured in terms of money. The Court has no doubt that the domestic courts in the present case, with every desire to be just and eminently reasonable, attempted to assess the cumulative effect which the conditions of detention had had on the applicant’s well-being (see, mutatis mutandis, Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-II) and to determine the level of physical suffering, emotional distress, anxiety or other harmful effects sustained by the applicant by reason of his detention in those conditions (see Nardone v. Italy (dec.), no. 34368/02, 25 November 2004). However, the Court cannot overlook the fact that the amount of RUB 500 awarded for an aggregate period of a month on twenty-three occasions of detention, that is, a rate of approximately RUB 16 per day, was disproportionately lower than the damages that it generally awards in comparable Russian cases (see, for example, Labzov v. Russia, no. 62208/00, 16 June 2005, and Kantyrev v. Russia, no. 37213/02, 21 June 2007).

36.  While emphasising the importance of a reasonable amount of just satisfaction being offered by the domestic system for the remedy in question to be considered effective under the Convention, the Court has held on a number of occasions that a wider margin of appreciation should be left to the domestic courts in assessing the amount of compensation to be paid. Such an assessment should be carried out in a manner consistent with its own legal system and traditions and take into account the standard of living in the country concerned, even if that results in awards of amounts that are lower than those fixed by the Court in similar cases (see Cocchiarella, cited above, § 80, and the finding in paragraph 31 above). However, the Court has also stressed that when awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage, the domestic courts have to justify their decision by giving sufficient reasons (see Scordino (no. 1), cited above, § 204).

37.  In this regard, the district and regional courts merely cited the duration and temporary character of the applicant’s detention in the police cell as a reason for the “reduced amount” of compensation. While the Court agrees that the length of time the applicant spent in the cell is an acutely relevant factor for the determination of the appropriate amount of compensation, it is not convinced that that factor alone should have been adopted by the Russian courts as the underlying reason for such a disproportionately small award. It appears that the degree of responsibility of the police station administration and their lack of financial resources were taken into account by the Russian courts as additional reasons justifying the amount of compensation. In this respect, the Court reiterates its findings in the case of Shilbergs v. Russia (cited above), in which it was confronted with an identical issue of assessing the national court’s reasoning for awarding compensation in a case of poor conditions of detention. In that case, the Court held as follows:

“The Court accepts that, applying the compensatory principle, national courts might make an award taking into account the motives and conduct of the defendant and making due allowance for the circumstances in which the wrong was committed. However, it reiterates its finding made in a number of cases that financial or logistical difficulties, as well as the lack of a positive intention to humiliate or debase the applicant, may not be cited by the domestic authorities as circumstances relieving them of their obligation to organise the State’s penitentiary system in such a way as to ensure respect for the dignity of detainees (see, among other authorities, Mamedova v. Russia, no. 7064/05, § 63, 1 June 2006). The same logic applies to domestic courts’ reasoning in awarding damages when entertaining actions against a State in respect of its tortious conduct. The Court finds it anomalous for the domestic courts to decrease the amount of compensation to be paid to the applicant for a wrong committed by the State by referring to the latter’s lack of funds. It considers that in circumstances such as those under consideration the means available to the State should not be accepted as mitigating its conduct, and are thus irrelevant in assessing damages under the compensatory criterion. Furthermore, the Court is of the opinion that the domestic courts, as the custodians of individual rights and freedoms, should have felt it their duty to mark their disapproval of the State’s wrongful conduct to the extent of awarding an adequate and sufficient quantum of damages to the applicant, taking into account the fundamental importance of the right of which they had found a breach in the present case, even if they considered that breach to have been an inadvertent rather than an intended consequence of the State’s conduct. As a corollary this would have conveyed the message that the State may not set individual rights and freedoms at nought or circumvent them with impunity.” (ibid, § 78).

38.  The Court believes that its findings in the Shilbergs case are fully applicable to the circumstances of the present case. In view of the absence of a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the amount of compensation awarded to the applicant, the circumstances of the case and the domestic courts’ reasoning in making the award, the Court concludes that, having regard to its case-law (see paragraph 34 above), the redress was insufficient and manifestly unreasonable.

39.  Given that both the first condition, acknowledgement of a violation, and the second condition, appropriate and sufficient redress, have not been fulfilled, the Court is entirely convinced that the applicant in the instant case may still claim to be a “victim” of a breach of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention on account of his detention in the Inza police ward. Accordingly, this objection by the Government must be dismissed.

40.  The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2.  Merits

41.  The applicant was detained at the Inza police station twenty-three times over a period of slightly over three months between 26 October 2003 and 4 February 2004; the aggregate period of his detention amounted to a month.

42.  In the proceedings in which the applicant sought compensation for damage, the domestic courts found that his right to conditions of detention in compliance with domestic requirements had been violated and that he had sustained psychological distress as result of his detention in the Inza police ward. In particular, they found that he had been held in poor sanitary conditions in insufficiently lit, inadequately furnished and stuffy cells, that he had been given a small quantity of food only once or twice a day, and that when he was transferred to the ward in the winter he had not been given warm clothes (see paragraph 15 above). The Court notes the observations of a prosecutor who saw for himself the conditions in which the applicant had been held. In particular, the prosecutor noted occasional overcrowding, the authorities’ failure to provide inmates with bedding, the lack of recreational walks, the limited access to a toilet and no access to any facilities in order to maintain even basic hygiene, given that the police ward was not connected to the main sewerage or water-supply systems. The lack of sanitary facilities meant that inmates had to relieve themselves in a bucket installed in a corner of the cell (see paragraph 12 above). The Government did not dispute the prosecutor’s findings.

43.  In these circumstances, the Court considers that the distress and hardship endured by the applicant exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and went beyond the threshold of severity under Article 3 (see, for similar reasoning, Kantyrev, cited above, §§ 52-53, Guliyev v. Russia, no. 24650/02, § 43, 19 June 2008; Shilbergs, cited above, §§ 81-84; Andreyevskiy v. Russia, no. 1750/03, §§ 73-78, 29 January 2009; and Samartsev, cited above, § 112-14).

44.  Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention in the ward of the Inza Town police station, which the Court considers to be inhuman and degrading within the meaning of this provision.

II.  OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

45.  The Court has examined the other complaints submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as those complaints fall within the its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

46.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

47.  The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

48.  The Government, reiterating their assertion that the applicant’s Convention right had not been violated, stressed that the amount of compensation requested was excessive and unreasonable.

49.  The Court reiterates, firstly, that the applicant cannot be required to furnish any proof of the non-pecuniary damage he has sustained (see Gridin v. Russia, no. 4171/04, § 20, 1 June 2006). It considers that the applicant’s suffering and frustration caused by his detention in conditions that did not meet the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention cannot be compensated for by a mere finding of a violation. However, the actual amount claimed does appear excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

B.  Costs and expenses

50.  The applicant also claimed RUB 296 (approximately EUR 7) for postal expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court. He submitted a receipt for that amount.

51.  The Government reiterated that the applicant should have confirmed that expenses were necessary and were in fact incurred.

52.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum claimed in full, together with any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

C.  Default interest

53.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1.  Declares the complaint concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the ward of the Inza Town police station admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;

3.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 February 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.