miniconda3/lib/python3.13/site-packages/conda_content_trust/authentication.py

# Copyright (C) 2019 Anaconda, Inc
# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
"""
This module contains functions that verify signatures and thereby authenticate
data.

Function Manifest for this Module
    verify_signature
    verify_gpg_signature
    verify_signable
    verify_root
    verify_delegation
"""
from binascii import unhexlify
from struct import pack

import cryptography.exceptions
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ed25519

from .common import (
    MetadataVerificationError,
    PublicKey,
    SignatureError,
    UnknownRoleError,
    canonserialize,
    checkformat_byteslike,
    checkformat_delegating_metadata,
    checkformat_gpg_signature,
    checkformat_hex_key,
    checkformat_signable,
    is_gpg_signature,
    is_hex_key,
    is_hex_signature,
    is_signable,
    is_signature,
)


# TODO✅: Consider reversing this argument order?  What's more intuitive?
def verify_root(trusted_current_root_metadata, untrusted_new_root_metadata):
    """
    Given currently trusted root metadata, verify that new root metadata is
    trustworthy per the currently trusted root metadata.

    This requires a root chaining process as specified in The Update Framework
    specification.  (Version N must be used in order to verify version N+1.
    Versions cannot be skipped.)

    # TODO✅: Proper docstring.
    """
    # TODO✅💣❌⚠️: Vet against root chaining algorithm we updated in TUF,
    #                and add the attack tests to tests/test_authentication.py.

    # TODO✅: More argument validation
    checkformat_delegating_metadata(trusted_current_root_metadata)
    checkformat_delegating_metadata(untrusted_new_root_metadata)

    if (
        trusted_current_root_metadata["signed"]["type"] != "root"
        or untrusted_new_root_metadata["signed"]["type"] != "root"
    ):
        raise ValueError(
            "Expected two instances of root metadata.  Listed metadata "
            "type in one or both pieces of metadata provided is not "
            '"root".'
        )

    # Extract rules for root from old, trusted version of root.
    root_expectations = trusted_current_root_metadata["signed"]["delegations"]["root"]
    expected_threshold = root_expectations["threshold"]
    authorized_pub_keys = root_expectations["pubkeys"]

    # Also extract new rules for root per new untrusted version of root.
    # NOTE THAT it is important that a new root version be verified BOTH
    # based on the prior, trusted version of root, and also based on ITSELF
    # (the latter in order to reduce the odds of accidentally breaking the root
    # trust chain).
    new_root_expectations = untrusted_new_root_metadata["signed"]["delegations"]["root"]
    new_expected_threshold = new_root_expectations["threshold"]
    new_authorized_pub_keys = new_root_expectations["pubkeys"]

    trusted_root_version = trusted_current_root_metadata["signed"]["version"]
    untrusted_root_version = untrusted_new_root_metadata["signed"]["version"]

    if trusted_root_version + 1 != untrusted_root_version:
        # TODO ✅: Create a suitable error class for this.
        raise MetadataVerificationError(
            "Root chaining failure: we currently trust a version of root "
            "that marks itself as version "
            + str(trusted_root_version)
            + ", and the provided new root metadata to verify marks itself "
            "as version " + str(untrusted_root_version) + "; the new "
            "version must be 1 more than the old version: root updates "
            "MUST be processed one at a time for security reasons: no "
            "root version may be skipped."
        )

    # Verify the new root metadata based on the prior, trusted root version.
    verify_signable(
        untrusted_new_root_metadata, authorized_pub_keys, expected_threshold, gpg=True
    )

    # Make sure that the signatures on the new root metadata would be
    # sufficient to verify it using the new root metadata's own rules as well.
    # Doing this helps avoid breaking the chain of trust.
    verify_signable(
        untrusted_new_root_metadata,
        new_authorized_pub_keys,
        new_expected_threshold,
        gpg=True,
    )


# TODO ✅: Consider verify_untrusted_based_on_trusted(), a function that just
#          takes the two roles and does the digging to fetch authorized keys
#          and threshold for you, along with an argument specifying what role
#          we're trying to verify (redundant, perhaps, but important to make
#          explicit, to avoid bad patterns of trusting attackers in the calling
#          code).
#          The function should:
#             - return if verification succeeds
#             - raise UnknownRoleError if there's no matching delegation
#             - raise a verification failure error if a signature is bad or
#               signatures don't match expectations (threshold, wrong keys,
#               etc.)
#             - of course, raise ValueError if the arguments are invalid
#
# TODO ✅: Autodetect signature type rather than expecting an argument,
#          and allow both OpenPGP-facilitated ed25519 and raw ed25519
#          signatures for any authority metadata (root, key_mgr, etc.)
# TODO ✅: Find way to specifically discourage anti-pattern of calling
#          verify_delegation() directly to verify root metadata (instead of
#          calling verify_root).  We could add a _helper function and have
#          both verify_delegation and verify_root call that, and each check
#          to make sure the metadata type provided is/isn't root as
#          appropriate, but I'd like to avoid adding another level of
#          functions if possible.
# TODO ✅: Remove delegation_name and just take it from
#          untrusted_delegating_metadata['signed']['type'].  Consider utility
#          of keeping argument, though... (allow enforcement, if you have
#          reason to constrain the verifications? unlikely to be a useful arg)
def verify_delegation(
    delegation_name,
    untrusted_delegated_metadata,
    trusted_delegating_metadata,
    gpg=False,
):
    """
    Verify that the given untrusted, delegated-to metadata is trustworthy,
    based on the given trusted metadata's expectations (expected keys and
    threshold).  This function returns if verification succeeds.


    In other words, check trusted_delegating_metadata's delegation
    to delegation_name to find the expected signing keys and threshold for
    delegation_name, and then check untrusted_delegated_metadata to see if it
    is signed by enough of the right keys to be trustworthy.

    For example, using root metadata to verify key_mgr metadata looks like
    this:
        verify_delegation(
                'key_mgr', <full root metadata>, <full key_mgr metadata>)

    Arguments:
        (string) delegation_name is the name of the role delegated.
        (dict)   trusted_delegating_metadata is a signable JSON-serializable
                 object representing the full metadata that delegates to role
                 delegation_name.
        (dict)   untrusted_delegated_metadata is a signable JSON-serializable
                 object
        (bool)   gpg should be true if the signatures to be verified in the
                 delegated metadata are expected to be OpenPGP signatures
                 rather than the usual raw ed25519 signatures.

    Exceptions:
        - raises UnknownRoleError if there's no matching delegation
        - raises SignatureError if a signature is bad or signatures
          don't match expectations (threshold, wrong keys, etc.)
            # TODO: Consider exception handling to raise MetadataVerificationError instead?
        - raises MetadataVerificationError if the metadata type is unexpected
        - raises TypeError or ValueError if the arguments are invalid
    """

    # Argument validation

    if not isinstance(delegation_name, str):
        raise TypeError(
            "delegation_name must be a string, not a " + str(type(delegation_name))
        )

    if gpg not in [True, False]:
        raise TypeError(
            'Argument "gpg" must be a boolean.'
        )  # should probably be ValueError

    checkformat_delegating_metadata(trusted_delegating_metadata)

    # Note that we don't really know the structure of the metadata we're
    # verifying beyond that we expect it to be a signed envelope.
    # We can't assume, for example, that it is itself delegating metadata also,
    # (so no checkformat_delegating_metadata on it): while it could be
    # that we're verifying key_mgr using root, it could also be that we're
    # verifying some package metadata (which is not delegating metadata) using
    # key_mgr.
    # If, however, the untrusted_delegated_metadata *is* delegating metadata,
    # we want to make sure that its type matches what the caller passed in as
    # delegation_name.
    checkformat_signable(untrusted_delegated_metadata)
    try:
        checkformat_delegating_metadata(untrusted_delegated_metadata)
    except:
        # If we can't verify that we're verifying more delegating metadata
        # (e.g. we're using root to verify key_mgr), then we don't need to
        # perform the type check, as it can just be any signed content we're
        # verifying.
        pass
    else:
        # If this is indeed more delegating metadata, make sure the type
        # the caller expects matches what the metadata claims.
        if delegation_name != untrusted_delegated_metadata["signed"]["type"]:
            raise MetadataVerificationError(
                "Instructed to verify provided metadata as if it is of "
                'type "' + delegation_name + '", but it claims to be of '
                'type "' + untrusted_delegated_metadata["signed"]["type"] + '"!'
            )

    # Process the delegation.
    delegations = trusted_delegating_metadata["signed"]["delegations"]

    if delegation_name not in delegations:
        raise UnknownRoleError(
            "Role " + delegation_name + " not found in the given "
            "delegating metadata."
        )

    expected_keys = delegations[delegation_name]["pubkeys"]
    threshold = delegations[delegation_name]["threshold"]

    verify_signable(
        untrusted_delegated_metadata,
        expected_keys,  # drawn from trusted_delegating_metadata
        threshold,  # drawn from trusted_delegating_metadata
        gpg=gpg,
    )  # from argument to this func


# TODO ✅: Consider taking a hex public key instead of a key object, so that:
#            1: the API is simpler (verify_signature is part of the API)
#            2: we can remove PublicKey from the higher-level code, making it
#               simpler.
#            The tradeoff is that we can't later accept key objects that might
#            be used as interfaces to hardware keys, for example.
def verify_signature(signature, public_key, data):
    """
    Raises ❌cryptography.exceptions.InvalidSignature if signature is not a
    correct signature by the given key over the given data.

    Raises ❌TypeError if public_key, signature, or data are not correctly
    formatted.

    Otherwise, returns (nothing), indicating the signature was verified.

    Note that this does not use the generalized signature format (which would
    be compatible with OpenPGP/GPG signatures as well as pyca/cryptography's
    simple ed25519 sigs).

    Args:
        - public_key must be an ed25519.Ed25519PublicKeyObject
        - signature must be a hex string, length 128, representing a 64-byte
          raw ed25519 signature
        - data must be bytes
    """
    if not isinstance(public_key, ed25519.Ed25519PublicKey):
        raise TypeError(
            "verify_signature expects a "
            "cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519ed25519.Ed25519PublicKey"
            'object as the "public_key" argument.  Instead, received '
            + str(type(public_key))
        )

    if not is_hex_signature(signature):
        raise TypeError(
            "verify_signature expects a hex string representing an "
            'ed25519 signature as the "signature" argument. Instead, '
            "received object of type " + str(type(signature))
        )

    if not isinstance(data, bytes):
        raise TypeError(
            'verify_signature expects a bytes object as the "signature" '
            "argument.  Instead, received " + str(type(data))
        )

    public_key.verify(unhexlify(signature), data)

    # If no error is raised, return, indicating success (Explicit for editors)
    return


def verify_signable(signable, authorized_pub_keys, threshold, gpg=False):
    """
    Raises a ❌SignatureError if signable does not include at least threshold
    good signatures from (unique) keys with public keys listed in
    authorized_pub_keys, over the data contained in signable['signed'].

    Raises ❌TypeError if the arguments are invalid.

    Else returns (nothing).

    Args:
        - signable
            common.is_a_signable(signable) must return true.
            wrap_as_signable() produces output of this type.  See those
            functions.

        - authorized_pub_keys
            a list of ed25519 public keys (32 bytes) expressed as 64-character
            hex strings.  This is the form in which they appear in authority
            metadata (root.json, etc.)  Only good signatures from keys listed
            in authorized_pub_keys count against the threshold of signatures
            required to verify the signable.

        - threshold
            the number of good signatures from unique authorized keys required
            in order to verify the signable.

        - gpg (boolean, default False)
            If True, expects OpenPGP ed25519 signatures (see RFC 4880 bis-08)
            instead of raw ed25519 signatures.
            If False, expects raw ed25519 signatures.
    """

    # TODO: ✅ Be sure to check with the analogous code in the tuf reference
    #       implementation in case one of us had some clever gotcha there.
    #       Would be in tuf.sig or securesystemslib.  See
    #       get_signature_status() there, in addition to any prettier
    #       verify_signable code I may have swapped in (dunno if that's in yet).

    # TODO: ✅ Consider allowing this func (or another) to accept public keys
    #       in the form of ed25519.Ed25519PublicKey objects (instead of just
    #       the hex string representation of the public key bytes).  I think
    #       we'll mostly have the hex strings on hand, but....

    # Argument validation
    if not is_signable(signable):
        raise TypeError(
            "verify_signable expects a signable dictionary.  "
            "Given argument failed the test."
        )  # TODO: Tidier / expressive.
    if not (
        isinstance(authorized_pub_keys, list)
        and all([is_hex_key(k) for k in authorized_pub_keys])
    ):
        raise TypeError("authorized_pub_keys must be a list of hex strings ")
    # if not (isinstance(authorized_pub_keys, list) and all(
    #         [isinstance(k, ed25519.Ed25519PublicKey) for k in authorized_pub_keys])):
    #     raise TypeError(
    #             'authorized_pub_keys must be a list of '
    #             'ed25519.Ed25519PublicKeyobjects.')
    if not isinstance(threshold, int) or threshold <= 0:
        raise TypeError("threshold must be a positive integer.")

    # TODO: ✅⚠️ Metadata specification version compatibility check.
    #             Check to see if signable['signed']['metadata_spec_version']
    #             is CLOSE ENOUGH to SECURITY_METADATA_SPEC_VERSION (same
    #             major version?).  If it is not, raise an exception noting
    #             that the version cannot be verified because either it or the
    #             client are out of date.  If versions are close enough,
    #             consider a warning instead.  If the client is at major spec
    #             version x, and the metadata obtained is at major spec version
    #             x + 1, then proceed with a warning that the client must be
    #             updated.  Note that root versions produced must never
    #             increase by more than one major spec version at a time, as a
    #             result.

    # Put the 'signed' portion of the data into the format it should be in
    # before it is signed, so that we can verify the signatures.
    signed_data = canonserialize(signable["signed"])

    # Even though we're not returning this, we produce this dictionary (instead
    # of just counting) to facilitate future checks and logging.
    # TODO: ✅ Keep track of unknown keys and bad signatures for diagnostic and
    #          other logging purposes.
    good_sigs_from_trusted_keys = {}

    for pubkey_hex, signature in signable["signatures"].items():
        # Validate the signature data first (make sure it looks right).
        if not is_hex_key(pubkey_hex):
            # TODO: ✅ Make this a warning instead.
            print(
                'Ignoring signature from "key" with public key value that '
                "does not look like a key value: " + str(pubkey_hex)
            )
            continue

        if gpg and not is_gpg_signature(signature):
            # TODO: ✅ Make this a warning instead.
            print(
                'Ignoring "signature" that does not look like a gpg '
                "signature value: " + str(signature)
            )
            continue

        if pubkey_hex not in authorized_pub_keys:
            # TODO: ✅ Make this an INFO-level log message.
            print(
                'Ignoring signature from a key ("'
                + str(pubkey_hex)
                + '") that is not authorized to sign this metadata.'
            )
            continue

        if not gpg:  # normal ed25519 signatures using pyca/cryptography
            if not is_signature(signature):
                # TODO: ✅ Make this a warning instead.
                print(
                    'Ignoring "signature" that does not look like a hex '
                    "signature value: " + str(signature)
                )
                continue

            public = PublicKey.from_hex(pubkey_hex)

            try:
                verify_signature(signature["signature"], public, signed_data)

            except cryptography.exceptions.InvalidSignature:
                # TODO: ✅ Log at debug or info level.
                continue

            else:
                good_sigs_from_trusted_keys[pubkey_hex] = signature

        else:  # expecting OpenPGP ed25519 signatures (RFC 4880-bis08)
            assert gpg  # code paranoia

            try:
                verify_gpg_signature(signature, pubkey_hex, signed_data)

            except cryptography.exceptions.InvalidSignature:
                # TODO: ✅ Log at debug or info level.
                continue

            else:
                good_sigs_from_trusted_keys[pubkey_hex] = signature

    # TODO: ✅ Logging or more detailed info (which keys).
    if len(good_sigs_from_trusted_keys) < threshold:
        raise SignatureError(
            "Expected good signatures from at least "
            + str(threshold)
            + " unique keys from a set of "
            + str(len(authorized_pub_keys))
            + " keys.  Saw "
            + str(len(signable["signatures"]))
            + " signatures, only "
            + str(len(good_sigs_from_trusted_keys))
            + " of which were good signatures over the given data from the "
            "expected keys."
        )

    # Otherwise, return, indicating success.  (Explicit for code editors)
    return


def verify_gpg_signature(signature, key_value, data):
    """
    Verifies a raw ed25519 signature that happens to have been produced by an
    OpenPGP signing process (RFC4880).

    NOTE that this code DISREGARDS most OpenPGP semantics: is interested solely
    in the verification of a signature over the given data, with the raw
    ed25519 public key given (in the form of a hex string).  This code does not
    care about the GPG public key infrastructure, including key
    self-revocation, expiry, or the relationship of any key with any other key
    through OpenPGP (subkeys, key-to-key signoff, etc.).

    This codebase uses OpenPGP signatures solely as a means of facilitating a
    TUF-style public key infrastructure, where the public key values are
    trusted with specific privileges directly.


    ⚠️💣 ABSOLUTELY DO NOT use this for general purpose verification of GPG
         signatures!!  It is for our root signatures only, where OpenPGP
         signing is just a proxy for a simple ed25519 signature through a
         hardware signing mechanism.


    # TODO: ✅ Proper docstring modeled on verify_signature.
    """

    checkformat_gpg_signature(signature)
    checkformat_hex_key(key_value)
    checkformat_byteslike(data)
    # if not isinstance(data, bytes):   # TODO: ✅ use the byteslike checker in conda_content_trust.common.
    #     raise TypeError()

    public_key = PublicKey.from_hex(key_value)

    # -------
    # This next part takes advantage of code pulled from:
    #       securesystemslib.gpg.eddsa.verify_signature(),
    #       securesystemslib.gpg.eddsa.create_pubkey(),
    #       and securesystemslib.gpg.util.hash_object().
    #
    #  It has been unrolled, had formatting adjustments, variable
    #  renaming, unneeded code removal, etc.
    # -------

    # See RFC4880-bis8 14.8. EdDSA and 5.2.4 "Computing Signatures"
    # digest = securesystemslib.gpg.util.hash_object(
    #     unhexlify(signature["other_headers"]),
    #     hasher(), data)

    # Additional headers in the OpenPGP signature (bleh).
    additional_header_data = unhexlify(signature["other_headers"])

    # As per RFC4880 Section 5.2.4., we need to hash the content,
    # signature headers and add a very opinionated trailing header
    hasher = cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.Hash(
        cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.SHA256(),
        cryptography.hazmat.backends.default_backend(),
    )
    hasher.update(data)
    hasher.update(additional_header_data)
    hasher.update(b"\x04\xff")
    hasher.update(pack(">I", len(additional_header_data)))

    digest = hasher.finalize()

    # # DEBUG 💣💥
    # # DEBUG 💣💥
    # print('Digest as produced by verify_gpg_signature: ' + str(digest))

    # Raises cryptography.exceptions.InvalidSignature if not a valid signature.
    public_key.verify(unhexlify(signature["signature"]), digest)

    # Return if we succeeded.
    return  # explicit for clarity