A sender can intentionally skip a packet number, causing the receiver to treat a packet as "Out-of-order". From NAME comment on


This was just old and needed a little bit of a refresh. Removing the recommendation, which was counter to established views and unnecessary. I will let others determine whether this is editorial/design.
NAME said:
I think that the point of this section is to highlight the possibility that routing based on client-selected values exposes servers to load that is balanced under client - and therefore attacker - control. I don't think that it needs to include such a strong recommendation. If people deploying load balancers are not concerned about this, then that is good. That makes the recommendation less good. As this is very old text, it needs a bit of a cleanup anyway. I'm going to suggest something along the lines of my statement above in a pull request and we can polish the wording there. I don't think that we should remove the Retry SCID language. That remains an option for servers, even if they don't want to exercise the option (whether load balancers look at Retry tokens is very much down to how the various functions are distributed). What could happen is that the Retry SCID is chosen so that the next initial can be routed as though it were chosen by a client, but in such a way as it results in the connection being sent to a lightly-loaded server instance. That is, if the load balancer routes inchoate Initials based on connection ID, knowledge of that routing algorithm is used to direct traffic. That said, I understand that what is more likely here is that Initials with inauthentic Destination Connection ID fields will be routed using other information: round-robin, random, five-tuple, or whatever.
I think you're proposing that the text I quoted be deleted. That is satisfactory, and what I would recommend as well.
Returning to an open state as the chairs directed in their plan.
Closing this now that the IESG have approved the document(s).
To be safe, let's mark this design.


Note that the use of CVO in webrtc is described in URL
NAME feel free to rewrite however and merge. I just wanted to get the xref in.
We mention it in the imageattr section. This is required regardless of whether the receiver supports performing receive-side rotation (e.g., through CVO), as it significantly simplifies the matching logic.
NAME , can you look into this? Not WGLC2 blocking.
will do - I seem to recall it is a 3GPP ref but will try and track down.


As discussed at IETF 110, some MASQUE servers may prefer to avoid sticking out (i.e. they may wish to be indistinguishable from a non-MASQUE-capable HTTP/3 server). The H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter may stick out. Therefore, we should add a note about this to the Security Considerations section. A simple solution could be to encourage widespread HTTP/3 servers to always send this.


It seems section 4.1.3 Server Hello has not been updated to reflect the new version negotiation mechanism. says "servers says "servers MUST [...] negotiate the highest mutually supported version".
Thanks, I caught a few of these on my reread yesterday too, but I probably missed some too, so keep them coming!


From NAME Interesting that this is the first time OHTTP appear in the text, excluding pseudocode and mediatype - please expand (or define somewhere else, for example in terminology).


On line 421: "that this specification is designed to hide". Could edit that as well.
My take is that we don't need to use the same term in every case, but the terms should have the same meaning. conceal and hide are fairly synonymous, but conceal and obfuscate have slightly different meanings.
Does it obfuscate, conceal, or obscure local IP addresses? My vote is for conceal.
Conceal/concealment sgtm.
As noted in , we don't need to use the same term in every case, but the terms should have the same meaning. conceal and hide are fairly synonymous, but conceal and obfuscate have slightly different meanings.


Section 3.3, paragraph 3 is an example of text that should have been removed with SDP munging. Please remove it.
Munging remote SDP is still allowed, but I agree that we don't need to get into the mechanics of how to do it. Agree this para should be removed, and the last para reworked accordingly.


Changes "read-only BIOS" to "ROM" to align with the diagram
I think the text “the read-only BIOS in this example, has to ensure the integrity of the bootloader” is wrong since the example no longer has a “read-only BIOS” component. It should say “ROM” to be consistent. If ROM is determined to be ambiguous as a Root of Trust and we decide to changed it to "RoT" then this sentence would be updated accordingly.
NAME do you want to fix this still?
I'll add it to my list.


Small tweak to text to make clearer that validation RRsets can be in any order.


I'd always heard this as "Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data," so it was -tls that sounded funny. But looking at 5116, it's actually "Associated" data and -tls is correct. Fixing in -transport.
I read this as referring to Authenticated at first.


This starts by moving the good text from to the "Errors" section, where I realized that it duplicated some of that language. It was more complete, so I merged the two. I then added some language about what happens to errors prior to decapsulation. This doesn't define an error signaling format. Though that might be useful, it is also a lot more work and I'm leery of scope creep in this document. My view: if you get an error, you have screwed up somewhere. You probably want to have a human look at what is going on. The privacy consequences of automated responses are difficult to work out properly. Hence this proposed change.
This is an improvement but still insufficient with respect to configuration mismatch signaling.
Let's start with this one and I'll look at addressing the open issue in a follow-up.
Thanks, I think this is clear enough now.